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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium  
Renaat Van Elslande, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
and Development Cooperation

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Leonard Firestone, US Ambassador to Belgium

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 28, 1975  
9:15 p.m.

PLACE: Le Petit Salon Blanc  
The Royal Palace  
Brussels

[There was five minutes small talk standing, before the group sat down.]

Kissinger: Like most of our Ambassadors, Firestone is already sitting on the Belgian side.

Tindemans: One of your former Ambassadors lives here -- MacArthur. Who was your predecessor?

Firestone: Strausz-Hupe.

President: I am looking forward to the next two days of meetings. I want to tell you I reaffirm the US commitment to NATO. There have been questions about our commitment and there have been developments which led many to do that. But I am certain of the credibility of our commitments.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12068, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/14/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state rev. as 3/9/04  
BY llh, NARA, DATE 5/17/04

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I gave Congress the drill in a speech last night. Last week there was a House Amendment to withdraw 70,500 troops -- it was defeated 290-91. Tip O'Neill has favored cuts for years but he said this was not the time. There is a changing mood. Mansfield for years has pushed withdrawals from NATO, Korea and Vietnam -- he said he wouldn't do it now. It is this message I want to get out.

Tindemans: That is good news because my Foreign Minister was asking if there was a new foreign policy.

I don't know if there is a specific topic you wanted to discuss, but there is the question of the F-104 replacement. It is difficult for us. You know we divided North-South and there were some split ones. There were three planes certified by NATO. Yours, the Mirage, and the Swedish. If I had taken a vote, the government would have fallen. I went to Paris and met with my friend Chirac. There was much lobbying on both sides. There was a price deadline but the French kept making new proposals. The four countries recognized the General Dynamics plane was the best and cheapest. But the French made new proposals, adding economic compensation. We have a small industry in the area, located in the South. Also an electronics industry located in the North. This complicated things. Chirac made political proposals. He said, "Let's do it together, for a European aircraft industry." The MRCA is German, a consortium plane. The French proposed a European aircraft industry. It was an attractive idea. At the last moment the French proposed a European Council for Security Affairs to study arms and the implementation of production of arms. Second, Chirac said he accepted going back to the Eurogroup of NATO -- this a Gaullist leader! -- but Giscard doesn't say this. It's paradoxical. So there appeared this possibility. So we consulted. I spoke with Thorn, the Dutch Government and asked the Dutch their reaction. I also talked to Schmidt, who has never answered. We figured if the French made such a proposal they had talked to the Germans.

Kissinger: The French told me they wouldn't proceed with European defense projects.

Tindemans: He told me "Security affairs" of the Nine; he didn't want to use the word "defense."

Denmark answered no, Iceland no, Great Britain said, "Don't talk of it before the referendum." So the Germans and the Dutch didn't answer, Denmark and Iceland said no, so we tried. If it is a European solution, we must have another solution. So my Minister will talk to you about some of the details.



President: I am glad to hear it is coming to a head. I followed it without being personally involved. I was with the Defense Procurement Committee in the House, so I know all the planes. It is our plan to have 250 of them in NATO. We had a tough competition and decided the F-16 was the best. I am encouraged about what I heard from the Danes, the Norwegians and the Dutch.

Tindemans: We didn't like the way they did it. They took a decision without consulting us, that if the four agreed, they wanted the F-16. They have a problem, the Socialist party -- his own party -- voted against such a plane. Den Uyl said that not the country, but now the Socialist leaders are giving him problems. So he has problems. And we have a problem, so I think we can make a choice without the government falling.

President: So the French were actually helpful.

Kissinger: Not by design.

Tindemans: My Minister of Defense pressed for the Mirage so he will have some questions.

President: I would be interested in your views on Portugal. I am worried about it.

Tindemans: You can say it is a danger for NATO -- for security. But the other view is that if we take such an attitude now, the forces who would make a coup would have it because they are already ostracized. Conversely . . . .

President: The military said they wouldn't pay attention to the vote. Somehow we have to support the 87 percent -- but how do we do it without supporting the few?

Kissinger: There is another problem. There are left-wing parties in Europe with communist allies. If Portugal goes like Algeria and Yugoslavia and yet stays in NATO, it will set a pattern. The anomaly of having them there attending the meetings, reading the documents. Like tomorrow. We might as well have the Russian Ambassador in.

President: We don't have the answer. We didn't like the previous government. But we are very disturbed by the way it is going.



Kissinger: The former government was on no threat -- no one would imitate it. But this is a new phenomenon. A neutralist, Communist-dominated government in NATO.

President: I felt compelled to speak frankly. I spoke to some European journalists on TV and I expressed these views. Most Americans feel this way.

Tindemans: When Giscard came in, he invited us all to the Elysee. I discovered that some of the new leaders weren't acquainted with the Treaty of Rome. Some of the leaders proposed things that were contrary to it. There is no longer the generation of pioneers for the Treaty of Rome. There are now economic difficulties, and that always puts pressure on governments. There is no movement now towards integration. That is not the mood of the moment. So it was a surprise when Giscard proposed direct election of the European Parliament and abandonment of unanimity at the Council of Ministers. DeGaulle would have died. The other governments said that at this difficult movement their populations wouldn't understand why we weren't talking the problems of reality, like energy. At the Foreign Ministers' level there was suspicion about the Paris meeting. But we had to do something so we decided a study should be made of the future of Europe.

We shouldn't speak of new institutions -- what we need is new policies. There are no longer any strong decisions. Don't look for harmony among all, because even the United States doesn't have that kind of harmony. That was what came from the Dublin meeting [of the Nine].

We are not realizing our monetary union, but we are drifting away from each other. I gave a press conference and said that the political leaders in 1972 were too ambitious to propose monetary union by 1980. The difference in regions are still too great. I said sometime, maybe in ten, 20, 30 years. But I was attacked by the British for advocating monetary union. But in Luxembourg, where they were for it, they said they could tell me how to do it soon. So we have problems.

So now can we now speak of monetary union, common energy policy, different institutions, and the question of: do we need new institutions? What is the role of the Committee and the Commission? What is the role of the Council of Ministers? The Summit meetings are now called the European Council -- it meets five times a year. What is relation of that to the Commission? No one knows. These are the problems, the solutions for which I must caution upon in my paper by December.



President: I would say you have a monumental task preparing such a report. Your problems remind me of Clarence Streit, who was always for Atlantic Union. His resolution has passed the House a couple of times. But I think it is healthy to have this kind of discussion. It's better than wanting to destroy what you have -- at least you are looking for ways to progress.

Tindemans: For us, Europe is not against the Atlantic Alliance. We need an Atlantic World -- it is life for us. But if we can have a Europe, we want it, because otherwise borders are closed and the small countries are hurt. But there is an anti-Europe mood in Europe now. Even in the socialist parties.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TINDEMANS OF BELGIUM

Wednesday, May 28, 1975

9:15 p.m. (30 minutes)

Le Petit Salon Blanc, The Royal Palace  
Brussels, Belgium

From: Henry A. Kissinger *B*

I. PURPOSE

This meeting, on the eve of the NATO summit, will permit you and the Belgian Prime Minister to review trans-Atlantic and East-West issues as well as current international developments of mutual interest. Your purpose will be:

-- to state the United States' total commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to seek Belgian support for the strengthening of the Alliance.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: This will be your first meeting with Prime Minister Tindemans (TIN-dah-mons), one of the postwar generation of moderate Flemish political figures who have risen to prominence in Belgian national politics in recent years. Tindemans will welcome this meeting to review the current state of Atlantic relations and the prospects for further steps in East-West relations, particularly in the CSCE and MBFR talks. He may also seek your views on developments relating to Cyprus.

Tindemans' center-right government took office in April 1974. It is a coalition of Social Christians, Liberals, and a small linguistic party. At present, his most pressing concern is the depressed state of the Belgian economy: inflation is running at 15 per cent and unemployment at 6 per cent. There are no significant bilateral problems between the US and Belgium, although the Tindemans government is currently facing a difficult issue in its choice of a replacement for its F-104 combat aircraft.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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GDS

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *State Review 3/9/04*  
BY *11* . NARA, DATE *5/17/04*

The Belgians must weigh the technical and cost advantages of the US built F-16 against French political pressure to choose the Mirage F-1.

Belgium is one of the most consistent and resolute supporters of NATO. Domestic political considerations, however, deeply influence the Belgian government's attitudes toward possible Spanish membership in NATO and the effect of recent events in Portugal on its role in NATO. The Belgians strongly oppose any steps to improve Spain's relationship with NATO while Franco is in power, fearing that such steps would lead to the collapse of the Belgian Government and undermine support in Belgium for continued participation in the Alliance. At the same time, the Belgians prefer an optimistic interpretation of the April 25 elections in Portugal and would probably favor accommodation with the Portuguese on NATO security issues.

East-West Issues: Belgium is amenable to a CSCE summit in Helsinki this summer but wants further Soviet concessions on notification of major military maneuvers and on Basket III issues (human contacts). Belgium continues to be among the strongest defenders of the Alliance position in MBFR and is concerned over growing pressures in some Alliance countries for early cuts in MBFR. The Belgians believe that following CSCE the Soviets will make a major push in MBFR and that unless the Europeans are prepared, public pressure for a conclusion reflecting Eastern goals will be difficult to resist. They believe NATO should concentrate on developing common positions on the nuclear option and the common ceiling.

- B. Participants: Prime Minister Tindemans, Foreign Minister Van Elslande, Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.
- C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will be announced as part of your schedule in Brussels, and there will be a press photo session at the beginning of your conversations with the Prime Minister.



III. TALKING POINTS

Atlantic Alliance/NATO Summit

1. In the year since the signing of the Atlantic Declaration, consultations and cooperation among the nations of the Alliance have improved significantly. We greatly appreciate the important contributions which Belgium has made to this encouraging development.
2. It is my firm belief that no cause is of greater importance for our peoples -- and to the prospects for peace and stability throughout the world -- than that of maintaining and demonstrating the strength and solidarity of the West.
3. These are times of immense challenge for our countries. The very fact that the issues before us are of such gravity and complexity makes this NATO summit especially important as an opportunity to reaffirm our determination to resolve problems and to find solutions in the common interest.
4. I will state clearly tomorrow that the United States remains true to our North Atlantic Treaty commitments.
5. I look forward during the next two days to consulting with the other leaders of the Alliance on the need to maintain a strong and credible defense, to improve the process of consultation, and to proceed together with the agenda for detente.
6. Unless each of us keeps our defense forces strong and unless we continue modernization, the Alliance will be extremely hard pressed to meet the challenges we face.

Portugal and NATO

1. The April 25 election results, while encouraging for the Socialists and other moderates, will have only slight effect upon the policies and leadership of the AFM. Continuing unrest and turmoil in Portugal, such as have taken place recently are a source of continuing concern.





2. We remain deeply concerned about the radical and neutralist policies of the AFM, its repression of Socialist party organs, the presence of Communist ministers in the Cabinet, and the future role of Portugal in the Alliance.

Spain and NATO

1. It is important to look to the future, and to the importance that the stable, purposeful framework of the North Atlantic Alliance can provide to Spain over the coming years. Our defense facilities in Spain make a substantial contribution to the Alliance.
2. Spain would be aided in following a stable, moderate course if it is brought into the NATO framework as early as circumstances permit.
3. We recognize that a number of Allies, including Belgium, cannot consider Spanish membership in NATO while Franco is in office. However, we should be prepared for the transition. We think it important to begin to indicate to the Spanish, as well as to our publics, that a future possibility for a Spanish role in the Alliance exists.

CSCE

1. The Allies have done a good job in developing realistic goals at The CSCE. We hope that Belgium will continue to join in holding firm on Western positions, and I know the importance your government attaches to the freedom of contact and humanitarian issues in Basket III.
2. At the same time, we believe the Allies should be realistic in demands for Soviet concessions on Confidence Building Measures.
3. We still assume that results of the Geneva talks will be significant enough to justify a stage III summit this year, but we will continue to withhold a final commitment to a summit until results are in hand.

MBFR

1. We have just completed a thorough review of MBFR in which we examined what should be done in the near future to help achieve our MBFR objectives.



2. Our review of course included the question of introducing nuclear weapons into MBFR.
3. We have concluded that the addition of nuclear elements to the US first-phase reductions offers the best promise for reducing the existing asymmetry in armor and manpower in Central Europe and gaining Eastern Acceptance of manpower parity in that area.
4. A prime objective in our examination of this possible change in the Alliance position has been to maintain the greatest possible flexibility for improving NATO forces and military effectiveness.
5. We will be presenting to NATO a comprehensive paper on our views, explaining our proposal in detail.

Energy/Raw Materials

1. I regret lack of agreement at the producer-consumer preparatory conference, but believe it better not to move forward with a conference which would clearly not be productive. The primary focus of US international energy initiatives will remain the IEA.
2. The Prepcon's failure underscored several points: we cannot resolve the energy problem simply by talking to the producers; we must take the necessary steps to achieve the conservation and development of domestic energy sources which will reduce our dependence on imports, and create the objective conditions for lower oil prices. My recently announced energy measures are designed to achieve these ends.
3. The politicization of raw materials issues stalemated the energy Prepcon. It is now in the interest of the industrialized countries to coordinate with one another to ensure a common approach to the developing countries and demands for abandonment of the present international economic system.
4. I want to emphasize our very real interest in cooperation with both consumers and producers. In this spirit, we are willing to participate in another preparatory conference. We remain convinced however that energy resources and other raw materials must receive separate treatment if progress is to be made in either area.



5. We are prepared to consider realistic proposals for change in specific areas where change is of substantive benefit and mutually agreeable. Increases in developing country income should be achieved primarily through increased production and trade; it is particularly unrealistic to think that large scale transfers can take place in a stagnating world economy or on the basis of unrealistic demands for "reparations."
6. We must convince developing countries of our genuine interest in finding solutions to commodity problems and of the necessity to tailor solutions to the individual commodities. We must also convince them that they must move from their radical demands to more realistic bargaining.

#### Middle East

1. I am looking forward to my talks with Sadat.
2. The Middle East situation is, of course, dangerous for all of us since without some significant diplomatic movement there will almost certainly be an eventual resumption of hostilities and another oil embargo.
3. Our reassessment has been prolonged because its outcome naturally depends in good part on the attitude of the parties and we are hoping for some change. As yet we have made no decisions on a diplomatic option. The choices are to resume the suspended negotiations over the Sinai passes and oil fields, try for a broader interim agreement, or go squarely for a comprehensive settlement, with the possibility of it resulting in a series of interim agreements. Nor have we made any firm decisions on Geneva, although this seems more and more likely as time goes by with no signs of movement.
4. We are under heavy pressure from Israel and its supporters in the U.S., on the one hand, and Sadat and the other Arabs, on the other, to take a public stand in their favor.
5. We have been firm in not entering into any new military or economic commitments with Israel while the reassessment continues, and we have had no new diplomatic proposals from them. Sadat is becoming more anxious because political and economic pressures



on him are increasing, partly generated by the USSR. Critical dates for the Arabs will be the Arab Summit on June 28 and the renewal of UNEF on July 25, so something must begin to move this month.

6. I hope my meetings in Salzburg with Sadat and later with Rabin will provide a clearer idea of what is feasible.

#### Cyprus

1. The continuing lack of a negotiated settlement on Cyprus is damaging to the Alliance and has weakened its strategic southern flank. It is therefore important to the Alliance -- as well as to the parties -- that a solution be found. The United States will continue to offer its good offices in assisting the parties to find such an acceptable solution.
2. It is in this spirit that I will meet with the Greek and Turkish prime ministers tomorrow. I am hopeful that these meetings, together with recent direct Greek-Turkish and Cypriot intercommunal contacts, will create momentum for progress toward a settlement acceptable to all parties -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

#### F-104 Replacement

1. Our commitment to a strong alliance requires that we give continuing attention to provision of the most modern, technologically advanced weapons systems for our defense forces -- the replacement of the F-104 is, therefore, a significant and very positive step.
2. I am pleased that the four consortium countries, including Belgium, acknowledge the technical superiority of the F-16. We certainly are not opposed to a European defense industry, but if it is done as a means of competing with the U.S. on the basis of French industry, U.S. support for NATO will wane.
3. Together with our own planned deployment of 250 F-16's to Europe in the 1980's, a decision for the F-16 would enlarge the area of standardization among NATO air forces and would increase by a significant margin the efficiency of the air war capability of the Alliance.

\* \* \* \*

The Department of State's memorandum on this meeting, biographic sketches and additional background materials are in your bilateral briefing book at the Tab marked Belgium.

Kara/Daniel ...

\* (Foresaw... in meeting) / Tinderman

P/Tinderman 28 May 26.

(5 minutes - would take standing)


K ... on Belgian side

T ... what was your job?

F. Strong - Huger.

P ... I went to tell you I reappear the US contract to NATO. There have been questions about our contract, but there have been reports which had my ... I gave ... a speech to last night. Last week there was a ... 20,000 - it departed 298.97. O'hell ... forwards for years but said this not time. There is a changing mood. ... years has ... will said he would not let it now. It is this now I want to get out

T ... if there was a new ... I know if a specific you wanted to ... but there is a question of ... of ... & some ... certified by NATO - ... If I had ... a ... would have ... I went to Paris & met w/ my friend



China, There was much lobbying on both sides. There was a price - deadline but E's kept making new proposals. The 4 countries used G-D plans as best & cheapest, but E's made new proposals, adding new organizations. We had a small industry in - area, located in south. Also electronics, located in north. This complicated things. China made pol. proposals. Said lets do it together - E's aircraft industry.

<sup>start</sup> MRCA is common, Common plane, E's proposed a E's aircraft industry. It was attractive when at that moment E's proposed E's Council for security affairs to study arms & implementation of production arms. 2nd, E's said to accept going into Emergency of NATO - This for Gorbachev made - but Council doesn't. (General period). So there appeared this possibility. So we consulted & spoke w/ T. Man, Dutch Govt & asked Dutch military. I also talked to Schmidt who has been announced. We imagined if E's made such a proposal they had talked to us.

R E's told me they wouldn't proceed w/ E's def. projects.

T He told me "Security papers" for 9, don't use word "defence".

Denmark answered no, Ireland no, GB said don't talk for help referendum. So FR & Dutch didn't answer, Denmark, Ireland no, so we tried if we E's solution, we would have another



solution. So my mind of what talk & you  
about some of the details.

P Clark has been it coming to trial. I followed it  
w/o being personally involved. I was as/leg  
presented with in House, so I know all  
the plans. It is a plan & time 250 of the  
in Natl. We had a tough negotiation &  
drafted F-16 was best. I encouraged what  
what I heard from Oscar Neuwagen & Dutch  
just being there on you

T We didn't like every thing they did it. They take  
a decision w/o consulting ~~us~~ that if it  
agreed, they would F-16. They have put a  
Socialist party - his - voted against such a plane  
The Sen. Chyl said that with country, but some Socialist  
leaders are giving him jobs, as he has jobs.  
And we have a job, so I think we can make  
a thing w/o just falling

P So a F-16 was actually helped


K Not by choice

T My kindly proposal for savings as he will have  
some problems

P I would be interested in your views on Post.  
I am worried.

?? ~~F-16~~ Savings ~~estimated~~

T There is a comment... you can say it is  
a danger for Natl - for security. But if we take  
such an attitude now, a force who would make  
a copy would have to expire be reval the thing which



ostensibly, Giscard.

P The media said they would pay attention to the vote. Some donors we have to suggest a 2% - but have to do it w/o suggesting a firm.

R There another prob. There are left wing parties in France w/ right allies. If Port goes into Algeria & Yugoslavia stays in Nato, it will set a pattern. The anomaly of having them there attending votes, making documents, like tomorrow w/ Yugoslavia would have a Roman Club in

P We shall have a message. We didn't like a previous report, but we were very abstracted & say it is going.

K The former got more threat - we are weak countries. But this a new phenomenon, a nationalist, most dominant part in Nato

P I felt compelled to speak frankly. I spoke to Euron TV & expressed these views. Most are full throats.

R

T When Giscard came in, he invited us all to Elysee. I discovered some of the new leaders commit a great deal of Treaty of Rome. Some of the leaders proposed things contrary to it. ~~There~~ no longer generation of parties for Treaty of Rome. There are now even dog & that always put pressure on you. There is no movement now toward integration & that and a mood of moment. So it was a surprise when Giscard proposed direct election for Euron parties, & abandonment of unanimity at Council of Ministers - De Gaulle would have





child. Other guests said at this time moment their  
populations wouldn't understand why we weren't taking  
a part of unity - like energy. At the level there  
was scepticism about Paris entry. But we had to  
do something so we had to decide a study should  
be made of future of E.M.U. ~~Don't~~ ~~it~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~  
(I left)

Don't speak of new institutions - what we need is new  
policies. There are no longer any strong decisions.  
Don't look for harmony among all, because we  
don't have that kind of harmony. That was  
what came from Dublin entry.

We are not resolving monetary union, but  
drifting away from each other. I gave  
press conf. & said we had to lead in 22  
years to conclusion to proper <sup>monetary</sup> ~~monetary~~ union by  
1980. The day, in my opinion we still too great.  
I said sometimes, maybe 10, 20, or yes. But I  
was attacked by the press for advocating monetary union.  
But in London, when they said, they said  
they could tell me how to do it some of us  
have jobs.

So now can we have aspects of monetary  
union, common energy policy, day institutions,  
do we need new institutions, what is role of  
Committee & Council. About role of Council of Ministers.  
The summit entry was now called E.M.U.  
Committee - meets 5 times/yr. What is relation  
of that to Council. As we know. Please me



C jobs, & activities for which I must exercise myself  
in my paper by December

P I would say you have a monumental task  
preparing such a report. Your job reminds me  
of Clarence Street - that was Atlantic Union,  
but has passed & passed a couple of times. I  
don't think it healthy to have this kind of  
discussion. Better than writing & doing what  
you know - at least you are looking for  
ways to progress

T For us Eur is not against Atlanticism.  
We need an Atlantic world - it is life  
force. But if we can have a Eur, we  
want it, because otherwise there are  
places & small countries are hurt. But  
there is one North Eur trend in Europe  
and, even in a transitional period.

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