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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10-180-#23

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

date rev. 7/24/01; RAC 9/9/04; CIA-22 6/24/00

By dal NARA, Date 5/18/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 5, 1975
9:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: Did you see the Draper article in Commentary about the
October 1973 war?

Kissinger: He was a TASS correspondent in the 30's. He is violently
pro-Israeli. His type is against the step-by-step because they think
it would make progress and they are for a comprehensive approach
because they think it would lead to a stalemate. They will attack you
if you come out for a comprehensive agreement.



I would hold to your CBS line in your press conference. Fisher is
pressuring us for a favorable settlement. I would say we are committed
to the survival of Israel, not its "security." If you're asked about the
'67 frontiers, I would say we still are studying our position.

We have a problem with the Church Committee. They want to interview
anyone in State they want, without a State Department officer present.
I think there should be a White House order confirming that these inter-
views should be limited to Presidential appointees and on specific
subjects. This goes to Executive Privilege. Every middle-level official
will keep a file on all the decisions he disagrees with.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B 3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det

President: Our problem is they have already done it with the CIA.

Kissinger: If we establish a precedent that Congressional committees can run loose in agencies -- that is worse than what McCarthy did.

President: Give me a memo on it.

Kissinger: I think the Executive Branch is in serious trouble. I think we should put together some of these things like FOI, CIA investigation, etc.

President: Did you read the Levi speech? It was very good. Marsh said Sparkman has asked again for the letters. He is against and says we should be tougher.

Scowcroft: That is not unanimous. Counsel is weakening it.

President: I want to be tough. That is the right side. Now that Vietnam is over, the public interest is not there -- I think we should be firm.

Kissinger: Are you bothered on meeting Sadat in Salzburg?

President: Hell no.

Kissinger: We could move it to Vietnam.

President: It makes no difference. They are just nit-picking. About the Glomar, too. Like does Hughes or the US own it? Who cares?

Kissinger: I wonder if we should have leadership meetings and discuss Turkey and Portugal.

President: The leadership meetings worry me because Burton is there. He wants to get on the Puerto Rico commission. That is an unusual request and I am concerned about his interest. It is a volatile situation and he could stir it up. If we have one, we should structure it so he is not there or.....

Kissinger: On the other hand, if he isn't, you can't get anything done.

President: Let's have one.



Kissinger: On Portugal, point out we should do something and can't do it with 50 people knowing.

President: he commented to me about your letter on refugees. He said the "intent" was bad. I hit him hard on making a tawdry issue of it. He protests he wants cooperation.

President: He tells the Vice President that, and the Vice President believes him. Could we have a joint meeting on Turkey and aid and a smaller one without Burton on Portugal?

Kissinger: I am worried about what the Church Committee will get from roaming through CIA--about giving Church everything that was given to the Rockefeller Commission.

When you meet on Cyprus, don't promise too much on negotiations. We have lost our leverage with the Turks. I don't know what they will give.

The Shah is showing great reservations about us, our role in the Middle East, our military supply to them. Your meeting with him is very important. He has got to know we will be with him in a pinch, because he is very capable but very ruthless. You must be very frank with him -- about a Qaddafi takeover in Saudi Arabia, for example. No one knows that Nixon promised him support for an Iranian operation against a new regime.

President: Are we moving along on our joint programs?

Kissinger: We are up from 15 to about 24 billion now. We have to figure out how to buy the oil. The best way we have figured is to give non-interest-bearing notes to be paid in three years--that saves us the interest. The other is an oil-for-arms swap, but our government is not structured well that way.

President: That sounds simpler. We are in the throes of putting together an RFC which could be a device we would use.

Kissinger: That is another way. I think you should clinch a deal. If we could get 500,000 barrels a day over what we have, that would be the first cracking of the cartel. If we could get it for \$7-8 a barrel.



President: That would be a boost to the economy.

Kissinger: We may have to promise a fixed price for several years. Then the people will complain the price may drop. I don't think that will happen, when the recession ends.

We have a Jordanian Air Defense problem. We should tell Israel and the Congress soon. You will be criticized that you are holding up Israel but not Jordan. The answer is that Jordan is not as intimately involved and we haven't stopped on Israeli shipments-- only in particular areas. We sent them 200 tanks during April.

President: Go ahead. I would like to see that summary of what we gave Israel.

Kissinger: I will bring it in tomorrow.

President: I ad-libbed some words about commitments last Saturday.

Kissinger: Diego Garcia will almost certainly be voted down. Richardson and others urge that we have arms control talks on the Indian Ocean. They would be a fraud. We may have to agree we will do it.



Q's + A's

✓ P/K 5 May 75

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) 88088
MR # 10-130: #27
dated 7/24/01: RAC 9/19/04: CIA-EO
By dal NARA, Date 8/18/10 6/24/10

P (Discussing ^{Dreyer} ~~Hertzberg~~ Commentary article)

K He was Tass corresp. in 30's. He is involuntarily pro-I.
His type is against also because they think it
~~was~~ would make prog. + for emp. approach because they
think it would lead to statements. They will attack
you if you come out for energy agreement.
I would hold to ~~the~~ ^{your} CBS line in your P.C.
Fisher pressing ~~us~~ us for a favorable settlement.
I would say "survival" not "security". If asked about
67 frontiers, I would say we still study in our
position.

Church wants press - they want to interview anyone
in State they want, w/o State officer present. I think
there should be WH order copying interviews to Pres
appointees. This goes to ^{or on specific subjects} the privilege - every middle
official will have a file on decisions he disagrees w/.

P Our job is they have already done it w/ C.A.
K If we establish precedent that Cong. Comtee can reimburse
in agencies - that is worse than Mc Carthy did.

** P Give me a memo on it.

K I think the Exec Branch is in serious trouble - I think we
should put together some of these things like FOI,
CIA investigation, etc.

P Did you read her speech. Her very good. March
said Sporkman has asked again for a letter. He
is against + says we should be tougher.

S That not unreasonable. Counsel is weaker it

P I want to be tough. That is the right side. Even
VN is over, a public interest is not there - I think

out for P.

Salyburger article Sunday Paper Saturday in NYT

we should be fine.

K And you looked at meeting in Salzburg.

P Hall no.

E we could move to Vienna

P makes no dif. They are just nit-picking. About Albania, too. Like does Hungary or US own it. Who comes?

* E Get me 2 articles (above)

R I wonder if we should have leadership mtg & discuss T & Portugal

P Leadership mtg everyone because Burston is there. He wants to get on Portugal mission. That is an unusual request & I am concerned about his intent. It is volatile sit & he could stir it up. If we have one, we should structure it so he can't cause or...

K On other hand, if he isn't, you can't get anything done.

P Let's have one.

R On Portugal, point out we should do something and don't w/ 50 people knowing

P But he will get Portugal trip into wrong hands.

R He wanted to me about your letter on refugees. Said "intent" bad. I bit him hard as making a tendency issue fit. He protests ^{he wants} cooperation

P He tells VP that, + VP believes him.

Could we have joint mtg on T + aid + a matter one w/ Burston on Portugal.

K I worried about what Church letter will get from someone there CIA. (Giving Church everything given to Rockefeller)



When you meet on Cyprus, don't promise too much on export. We have lost our leverage w/c Turks I don't know what they will give. The State is showing great reservations about us, our role in ME, our oil supply & there. Your entry w/ him is very important. I got to know we will be w/ him in a pinch, because he is very capable but very ruthless. You must be very frank w/ him - about a Qaddafi takeover in Saudi, for example. No one knows Nixon provided his support for our decision on against a war against you.

P Are we moving ahead on our joint prop.

R We are up from 15 to about 24 bil now.

We have to figure out how to buy oil. Best way we have figured is to give non-interest bearing notes paid in 3 yrs - that saves us interest. The other is an oil - arms swap, but our govt is not structured well that way.

P That sounds simpler. We in there of putting together an RFC which could be a device we could use.

R That another way. I think you should check a deal. If we could get 500,000 bbl/day over what we have. That would be a checking of a cartel. If we could get it for 7-8 \$.

P That would be a best to economy.

R We may have to promise fixed price for several years. Then people will complain a price may drop. I don't think that will happen, when recession ends.



We have a Jordanian Air Sy pact. We should tell I & Cong too. You will be criticized that you holding up I but not J. Answer is Jordan not so intimately involved & we haven't stopped on I requirements - only particulars we

**

P On ahead. I would like to see that summary for what we found F.

**

K I will bring it in tomorrow

P I add ad-libbed some words about contacts last Saturday. (Discussion of Caracas)

K Diego Garcia will almost certainly be watered down. Richardson + others urge arms control talks on Indian Ocean. They would be a fraud. We may have to



MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 0139, #14, de la, recd 7/30/01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

By dal NARA, Date 9/25/01

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 5, 1975
 2:21 - 10:30 a.m.

PLACE: The White House
 The Oval Office

Kissinger: I contacted the Nobel Committee about my prize. They said the award was still justified and they wouldn't take it back.

President: The Paris Agreement was a good agreement if it had been kept. Everyone bought the agreement at the time because they were so eager to get out of the war.

Kissinger: Don seems to think we subjected you to unnecessary humiliation.

President: I strongly disagree with Don.

Kissinger: We would have had to disavow Morgan and Zablocki.

President: And Sparkman. I think the House behaved shamefully.

Kissinger: Bruce Morton described the do-nothing Congress. I would strongly support your giving an energy speech. If we have a Middle East crisis, we are in terrible shape. Sidey says all you need for a big boost in popularity is some kind of success.

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President: I plan to give an energy speech.

Kissinger: I met with a group of academicians yesterday on the Middle East. They unanimously supported an overall settlement with the '67 borders and only modest variations. Only Rita Hauser said we couldn't do it if Israel disagreed. If Israel wouldn't agree, she would cut aid.

The Israeli strategy is to get us to call off our reassessment, and re-affirm our commitments -- then they will hit us for aid.

You shouldn't tell Sadat what you will do, but get from him what he will do if you propose it.

Rabin has accepted for 11-13 June. This may be your most difficult meeting as President. They will try to envelope you with friendship. I think you must be tough. They can't proselytize the public, you will not tolerate a stalemate, and we will severely react to a preemptive attack.

There is a US-Israeli Joint Commission. I think Simon should be correct, but no big warm social events.

President: Should I tell him?

Kissinger: Let me tell him first.

Maybe around June 24 you might give a speech. That's the only way we will have a platform on which to stand. I prefer saying we support their survival, not their security, because they would interpret security as the present boundaries.

We should get a lot of international support. The only ones who would oppose us would be those who think we hadn't gone far enough. We could use George Ball, Cy Vance, etc to work on the Congress. The Jews will scream but I think we will have a lot of support.

Israel may come up with a plan of its own.

President: We would have to pick the right forum.



Scowcroft: We need an aid figure for the breakfast

President/Kissinger: Leave the figure blank for Israel.

Kissinger: We have another problem with the Soviets. I was going to meet with Gromyko. I was planning to announce the CSCE summit date at the end of the meeting. That is crazy. My advisers generally think I should go ahead since I had cancelled a meeting in March.

President: I think you could go ahead.

Kissinger: If we meet, they will press me for agreement to a CSCE summit.

President: I want to be very well prepared for my Sadat meeting.

Kissinger: Kreisky wants to give a lunch on Sunday. Maybe a dinner with the families with Sadat at night and a reciprocal lunch the next day.

Jackson and the others will start to hit you about the CSCE summit as a fraud that isn't worthy of a summit. They will mobilize the Baltics and the East European emigrants. It doesn't change the situation of the Baltic States.

President: We must do what we can to explain to them. Can we baby them along? If I or you could talk to them and undercut Scoop.

Kissinger: It is a cause celebre if you meet with them, or even if I do. Let me see what we can do. We could delay the summit, but I doubt we could cancel it.

President: I think if we didn't participate, it would appear we were sulking and going back to Cold War. I don't think the American people would understand.

Kissinger: The public and the Congress want to be tranquilized about the results of Vietnam. But if you don't point out the consequences, in a year we will have real problems. As the speeches come up, we should see if we can get statements in about future challenges-- not the dissensions in the past.



President: I notice the Brits complaining about my statement that they were going down the drain economically.

Kissinger: There is no political power without economic power. Britain is on the level of Italy, except for discipline of the civil service.

We have a massive problem with the Indochina refugees. There are about 120,000 now.

The problem is we are without parole authority. INS doesn't want to let them land on Guam.

President: We can't do that. What do we do?

Kissinger: We will draft a letter to Levi for you.

President: What else?

Kissinger: We need an extension of parole authority. If you made a strong statement of the U.S. obligation to help....

Scowcroft: Should you call the leaders in to consult?

President: I don't want to.

Kissinger: I agree. That makes it look like parliamentary government.

We need an NSC on Panama. Maybe after the OAS meeting.

President: I am getting more and more reaction from the Congressmen who are concerned about it.

Kissinger: They are wrong.

President: But the sentiment is there.

Kissinger: We can go ahead, stop, or agree to a treaty and sit on it. If we dig in, we will have massive riots, Latin America will unite behind them, and we will be dragged into international forum after forum.



President: That's what I tell them. But they are focussed on why should we give up the Canal.

Kissinger: We could have a meeting the week after next.

The final issue is on commodities. We can't maintain the position that the market should regulate commodities. All the European industrial countries are reviewing their position.



✓ P/R 5 May 75

K Noel Coats said the award was still justified & they wouldn't take it back.

P It was a good agreement if it had been kept. Everyone bought a agreement at a time because they were so eager to get out of a war.

K Don seems to think we subjected you to unnecessary humiliation.

P I strongly disagree w/ Don.

K We would have had to discuss Morgan/ Zolbaki

P and speaker. I think it was behind shamefully.

K Bruce Watson described a dea - nothing long. I would strongly suggest a you giving an energy speech. If you have a NE issue, an intricate shape. Sidney says all you need for a big boat in popularity is some kind of success.

P I plan to give an energy speech.

K I met w/ a group of academicians yesterday. ~~It was~~ ^{They} unanimously supported an overall settlement w/ 67 leaders & only modest variations. Only Hansen said we couldn't do it if I disagreed. If I wouldn't agree, she would cut aid.

I strategy is to get us to call off our reassessment, ^{repeal} ~~cancel~~ our contracts - then they will cut us for aid.

You shouldn't tell Sal what you will do, but get from him what he will do if you propose it. Rabin has accepted for 11-15 yrs. This may be your best ship out as P. They will try to swallow you w/ friendships. I think you must be tough.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY for ml 01-3944; 5/14/01

BY JA NLF, DATE 5/14/04

They can't prosecute a public, you will not
threat a statement, & we will surely react to a
presumptive attack.

There is a US-I joint mission. I think Simon
should be excused, but not by some special event.

P Should I tell him.

K Let me first.

Maybe around June 24 you might give a speech.

Only way we will have platform on which to stand.

I prefer saying we support several, not security,
because they would interpret security as present
boundaries.

We should get a lot of initial support. The only one who
would oppose us would be those who think we hadn't
gone far enough. We could use George Ball, G.
Chance, etc to work on a Camp. You will scream
but I think we will have lot of support.

I may come up as a flavor of its own.

P We would have pick a right name.

* S Need figure brochure.

P/R How a figure blank for I

K also have another prob w/c Suro. I was going to meet w/
Carragher. I was planning to announce summit date
at end of mtg. That is wrong. My advisors generally
think I should go ahead since ~~we~~ had camp
a party in March.

P I think you could go ahead.

K If we meet, they will press me for agreement to
ESSE summit.

P I want to be very well prepared for my Satat party.

K Keesby wants to give a lunch on Sunday. Maybe a dinner w/ families w/ Sadat at night & reception lunch next day.

Jackson & others will start to tell you about CEE summit as a good not worthy of a summit. They will criticize C Baltics & E Euro issues. It doesn't change a bit of C Baltics states.

P We must do what we can to explain to them. Can we baby them along - If I or you could talk to them & understand Scary.

* K It a course either if you meet w/ them or even if I do. Let me see what we can do. We could delay a summit, but I doubt we could cancel it.

P I think if we didn't participate, it would appear we were ~~settling~~ settling & going back to Cold War. I don't think Am people would understand.

K The public & Congress want to be tranquilized about results of UN. But if don't point out consequences, in a year we will have real probs. As speeches come up, we should see if we can get statements in about future challenges - not discuss past.

P I notice C Brits complaining about my statements they were going down & down economically.

K There is no pol power w/o econ power. But is on a level of study, except for discipline of a civil service.

We have a massive prob w/ refugees. We get there are about 120,000 now.

- Secretaries are my you

Part is we are w/o formal authority. IHS doesn't want to let them land on ground.

P We can't do that. What do we do?

K We will draft a letter to Levi for you.

P What else?

K We need extension of formal authority. If you make a strong statement about ~~extension~~ of US obligation to help.

S (ask Leveson in to consult?)

P I don't want to.

K I agree. That makes it look like parliamentary govt.

We need an NSC on Panama. Maybe after OAS mtg.

P I am getting more & more reaction from Congress on concern about it.

K They are wrong.

P But the sentiment is there.

K We can go ahead, stop, or agree to a treaty & sit on it. If we dig in, we will have massive riots, LA will unite behind them, we will be dragged into ^{with} ~~from~~ after form.

P That's what I tell them. But they are focused on why we should give up a Canal.

X K We could have a mtg week after next. Final issue is on condition. We can't enter position & market should regulate markets. All Euro industrial countries are removing their partners.