

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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 DATE WITHDRAWN 05/28/2004
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Sanitized 11/28/00
 3/28/08
 4/18/12

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
EO. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 10-115-416

state ltr 7/14/10; CIA ltr 4/18/12

By dal NARA, Date 7/24/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Wednesday - March 5, 1975
9:17 - 10:02 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: The Iranian deal played well.

Kissinger: It was so screwed up -- but it did appear well.

[redacted] State thinks it is a mistake, on the
ground that the risk is out of proportion to gain. I don't see a hell of a
lot to gain [redacted] We could wind up with the worst possible
situation. Colby indicated he wouldn't spend it. What do you think,
Brent?

Scowcroft: The advantage is the press is Communist-controlled and the
press of the moderate party is asking for the money.

President: How can any one object to helping a democratic press?

Kissinger: That is what we did in Chile.

President: If it is defensible, why shouldn't we?

Kissinger: It will leak and hurt the parties.

President: That is a different case.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
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Kissinger: I would tell Colby to do what he can in the package without spending the money.

President: Should I talk to Church?

Kissinger: I would tell him the dangers are that our intelligence will be paralyzed; we have to protect sensitive data. Colby is now blackmailing me on the assassination stories. Nixon and I asked Helms to look into possibilities of a coup in Chile in 1970. Helms said it wouldn't work. Then later the people who it was discussed with tried to kidnap Schneider and killed him.

The OPEC summit came out interestingly. He said OPEC had to behave responsibly and Algeria would agree to a price cut if its development budget was protected. Our policy is working. They are no longer jumping at the consumer-producer conference.

President: What is happening in IEA?

Kissinger: We are telling the British and Dutch we won't accept an invitation to a preparatory conference until we get alternative sources nailed down. I think the OPEC evolution is very encouraging.

President: Some of the smart people in Europe must see we are making the producers need income.

Kissinger: That is right. One way would be raise the price. But to do that, they would have to cut production. They can't agree on how to allocate the cuts. If we were free with the Saudis, we could get at least a deal not to cut production. That is why this discrimination campaign of the Jews is outrageous.

Ethiopia: My recommendation is to send them \$7 million and encourage negotiations. Kenya has asked for military assistance.

President: What do they want? What kind of attitude do they have to us?

Kissinger: I favor it. They are friendly and they have some neighbors who are disturbing.

I am uneasy about the Israelis. They haven't asked for compensation for the oil fields, but there has not been even a study group.



If necessary, I would like a letter from you saying you can't accept a stalemate, and if we go to Geneva you will put forward a modification of the Rogers Plan -- which means the 1967 borders. I think we just can't go to Geneva as the lawyer for Israel.

President: The toughest position needed to get them to act is what I favor.

Kissinger: Asad has even indicated he would take a limited agreement and would sign a peace treaty; he was willing to dump the PLO. Now he is enlisting the PLO to stymie things. We can't bring Asad in -- even though if I tried, he would be so obnoxious that it would go slower than Egypt -- and then we could move it to Geneva after Egypt settled. But that is too tricky. I would rather tell him the truth privately -- that we would make an effort as soon as an Egypt-Israel deal is finished.

President: That is my preference.

Kissinger: The big issue is will you take on Israel for another Syrian move.

President: If we are honest with him and go through Geneva -- which will fail -- then Asad would come to us.

Kissinger: I think Asad will want something before Geneva. The other would be ideal.

President: Can't you tell him we will try to get something before Geneva?

Kissinger: Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody with the Israelis. If we could get five or ten kilometers on the Golan, we would be in good shape. Israel will claim it destroys their defensive capability.

It is important whether I can tell Asad we will make a major effort. We will have to move into open opposition to the Israelis.

President: If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

Kissinger: We will be driven to a Syrian move, either before or after.

President: Suppose the Israelis say let's go to Geneva, the Soviet Union does...



Kissinger: We can go to Geneva. What happens will depend on Syria. Sadat won't want Geneva. He will want to rest, and come here for a big triumph. Israel will want to avoid a Syrian negotiation so Syria won't want to. So only Israel and the Soviet Union will want to go to Geneva.

President: Can't we commit ourselves to a good faith effort?

Kissinger: A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off the ground. Israel won't look at it.

President: A good faith effort to me is one where we put the screws on.

Kissinger: Okay. If I see an opening to get us to Geneva -- maybe the Soviet Union will carry the can to get everyone to Geneva -- that would be fine.

I have given you the Schmidt letter.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
 TYPE OF MATERIAL Note
 DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for
 memcon
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P/K
5 Mar 75

Wednesday
9:17 10:03 AM

P The Iranian deal played well.
K It was so screwed up - but it did appear well

[REDACTED]

We could come up w/c worst possible set. Colby indicated he wouldn't spend it. What do you think, Brent?
S ~~The~~ advantage is the press is most controllable and a moderate party press is doing for money

P How can anyone object to helping discuss press?
K That is what we did in Chile.

P If it is defensible, why shouldn't we?
K It will leak & hurt a party.

P That is a different case.
K I would tell Colby to do what he can in a ~~paper~~ ^{public} w/o spending a penny.

P Should I talk to Chuck?
K I would tell him - computers are that critical will

be paralyzed; how to protect sensitive data. Colby was blackmailing me on a assassination story. He asked Helms to look into possibilities for a conf in Chile in 1973. Helms said it wouldn't work

[REDACTED]

The OPEC summit was most interesting. He said OPEC had to behave resp. & Algeria would agree to ^{provide} export if its budget ~~budget~~ was protected. OPEC policy is working. They are no longer pinning at a c-p conf.

P What happening in FEA.
K We talking to, Dutch - we want to accept incentives

PHOTO COPY FROM GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY



* Pres (shorts) of departing - Car at
SW drive (largest to go
in car)

I think - Open evolution is very encouraging

P Some of smart people in Eus must see we
are making a producer need income

K That's right. One way would be to raise price. But to do
that they would have to cut prod. They can't agree
on how to allocate funds. If we were free w/c Saudis,
we could get it but a deal not to cut prod. That is
why this discriminative comparison of a few is outrageous
E Chicopee. My recon. is to send them 7 mil.
+ encourage export. If you have asked for
mail assist. *

P What do they want. What kind of attitude is it

K I fear it. They finally and have some neighbors
who are disturbing.

I'm uneasy about it. They have it asked for equipment
for a oil fields - not even a study pump.

If necessary, I would like a letter from you saying
you can't accept a statement + if we got answer
you will put forward a modif. of the Rogers plan (a?
books)

I think we just can't go to Geneva as a longer part

P The toughest position to get them to act is what
I favor.

K [REDACTED]

We can't bring Assad in - even tho if I tried, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] it would be slower than E and then
we could move it to Geneva after E settled - but
that's too tricky. I would rather tell him a truth
privately - that we would make an effort as soon
as E-I finish.




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1974

P That is my preference

K The big issue is will you take on I for another Syrian move.

P If we honest up him and say that Geneva - which will fail, then Assad would come to us.

K I think Assad will want something before Geneva - the other would be ideal.

P Can't you talk to him and we will try to get something before Geneva

K Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody w/c I. If we could get 5-10 km on Golan we would be in good shape. It will claim it during their defensive cap.

It is important whether I can tell Assad we will make a major effort. We will have to move into pre-negotiation FCI.

P If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

K We will be driven to a Syrian move, either before or after

P Suppose c I say lets go to Geneva, c S U does...

K We can go to Geneva, what happens with Assad on Syria. Sabot won't want Geneva - he will want to rest, come back for big things. I will want to to avoid Syrian negot, so Syria won't want A. So only t + S U will want to go to Geneva

P Can't we commit to good faith effort?

K A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off ground - I can't look at it.

P A good faith effort to me is one where one party knows on

K OK. If I see opening to get us to Geneva - maybe



SC will carry a case to get everyone to Cuba - that
could be fine.

K I have given you a Schmitt letter.