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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of  
the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo  
of the Central Committee of the CPSU,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to  
the United States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Gerald R. Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S.  
Ambassador to the USSR

DATE & TIME:

Sunday - November 24, 1974  
1:40 - 2:05 p.m.

PLACE:

Okeanskaya Sanatorium  
Near Vladivostok

SUBJECT:

Nuclear War

President: Shortly after I became President, Dr. Kissinger briefed me  
some on what you and President Nixon discussed. I would like to know  
more about what you told President Nixon, and then I would like to ask  
some questions. There are some things I have to get straight in my  
mind. Then we could go to negotiations, or whatever. But first I need  
to know more about what you discussed.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 11/24/74, State Dept. Guidelines  
By KAH, NSA, Date 7/25/01

[Copied from original in Kissinger Reports on  
Soviet Union, China, and Middle East - Box 1 -  
"USSR - Nov. 23-24, 1974 - Vladivostok Summit (2)"]  
Additional State Department memcons appear in that folder]

Brezhnev: This was in the Crimea. As I am at all times, I was guided by the basic principle that there would be no nuclear war between us or nuclear war in the world in general. I told President Nixon that there are some countries which had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not observe it. Therefore a situation could arise where you or we could be threatened with a nuclear attack. I thought it might be good for us to conclude a treaty dealing only with a nuclear attack on one of our countries. In the event of a nuclear attack on one, the other would come to its aid with all the resources at its disposal.

President Nixon, I recall, said that this was interesting and that he would look further into it. I had some further talks with Dr. Kissinger on this [in Moscow on October 26], but for various reasons nothing came of it. That is where we stand.

In the preamble we could say something like: we are aware of what a nuclear war would mean in such circumstances and, desirous to avoid such an event, the two sides, etcetera. We could do it so as to avoid giving offense to allies -- and in fact it would give a reassurance of protection to our allies.

President: As I told you, I was briefed on this in general terms. I want to ask a couple of questions, and then Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko can discuss it further.


I agree with President Nixon; it is an interesting idea. One question is, does it mean strategic nuclear attack, tactical nuclear attack, or any nuclear attack?

Brezhnev: Under the treaty we would each agree not to use nuclear weapons against anyone.

President: They would be defensive only?

Brezhnev: Yes.

I agree to Dr. Kissinger continuing with subsequent discussions. My concept is related to any use of nuclear weapons. What is the difference whether they are tactical or strategic? Because in either case there would be a nuclear war, and we want to prevent that.



President: I asked because I wanted to know if it were a tactical nuclear attack whether it would be an "all-force reaction," and I wondered whether the response to different kinds of attack should be different. That is of some importance.

Brezhnev: The important thing is not to have a nuclear attack on us or our allies. If we entered this kind of an arrangement, nuclear war would be impossible for decades to come. The basic thing is to talk the general concept. We can then work on the details and go into it deeper.

President: Let me ask: what about an attack by a nuclear power on a third party that is not an ally? What would be the situation?

Brezhnev: It is hard to give a precise answer. Perhaps we could agree to enter consultations as the best course. A lot would depend on who attacked whom. This proposal hasn't been elaborated in detail. But since the United States and the Soviet Union are the most important powers, an agreement like this between us would eliminate nuclear war for many years to come.

President: We do want to prevent nuclear war, and your country and mine have a great responsibility. We should talk further. Meanwhile, I think we should make a major effort to get the laggards to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are some laggards.

Brezhnev: I fully agree.

President: Let's have it between Dr. Kissinger and your Ambassador to work on that.

Brezhnev: We are putting the Non-Proliferation Treaty into the communique.

Let's think about it little by little. It should be discussed energetically.

[The private conversation ended and the principals rejoined the larger meeting.]

Return to  
Scowcroft files

(Vladivostok Summit  
Notes)

Transcribed + held in  
sensitive files



Recall points from Soviet w/K. We want to have friendly relations w/US. All Soviets feel this way. I think most Amos. want good business relations w/US.

- (2) We will do all we can to help a US Pres who wants to continue a line of last 2 yrs.
- (3) We will do everything possible to prevent a war bet. us.
- (4) SALT agreement remains valid
- (5) ~~Trust~~ <sup>Trust</sup> treaty should ~~be~~ <sup>lead to</sup> a government signal to Soviet 1985 to show a world we are serious about SALT.

We didn't discuss doves. felt in USA or SU. On SALT - we believe best idea would bet. protocol, present agreement, then on this we did a year w/K, such as ICBMs. We put in writing a government on principles we needed.

P2 encouraged by progress you have described. ∴ I have held up decisions on my budget pushing ~~through~~ <sup>through</sup> ~~con.~~ <sup>con.</sup> of this treaty. If it goes well, I can hold back; if not, I will have no choice but to go forward. We appear to have a possibility for agreement.

B There is a loss, but last proposals stiffer than terms we had in Moscow.

P It is true last 200 missiles does make it a stronger position, but in order to make it politically acceptable & in order to satisfy our experts, we must have a 200 missiles. We must have equality for an agreement to be acceptable to Am. people.

B Throughout all discussions, topic of our heavy missile keeps coming up. Both of us are permitted to improve our missiles w/ in present sites & are banned from new sites. You are converting your missiles into heavy ones w/ in front of - <sup>China</sup> ~~US~~, & in some cases w/ or c need for site changes. For us, we are



- not only not increasing site size, but are making them narrower, so we certainly not exceeding agreement.
- H But deeper. We haven't accused you of violation.
- B. But we know you are converting your medium missiles to heavy missiles. That you are entitled to do.
- P We are living w/in a agreement.
- B I don't have to give you any assurances. As ev, you know what we doing.
- H But we have no missile which can be called heavy - very hard to if building continue, but not war.
- B But you know we agreed we would not build any more heavy heavy missiles. This whole story coming because in Mins, a US has pulled somewhat ahead. You must admit that a basic issue that US prog would end in 77 + 50 prog would you.
- H Any prog has a practical consequence of giving a US 5-6 years to build Mins. But there is no other which say US must stop its Min prog in 1977.
- B We can do something to.
- H Of course. The basic purpose we made was 50 equality in Mins. It puts a delay on every prog in which we are being - fed. So even if we are ahead in 1 thing a another CSU has a chance to catch up.
- B Under a US proposal, a US would be entitled to build new sites, even tho you could put heavier missiles into present sites + you could also build 150 heavy missiles.
- H That was not our intention in phrasing it the way we did. We agree we would have to put any new missiles into cold holes, so in fact we couldn't have a heavy missile.  
W/in a dimensions permitted for site modification

we may put a bigger missile in.

B. In Moscow I felt we were ~~not~~ coming close to reality but now I see US position is getting tougher.

K. I think we are close to Moscow. My instruction was to bring missile Miss. Then in private only you gave me some #'s. This figure is close to those #'s!

B. You did not mention a geographic factor FBS, as you mentioned once a missile field w/ 3 warheads it would count as such. You said we have 5, yet 5 would not count.

K. Once it is moved we don't ~~know~~ <sup>know</sup> how many warheads - for a single ~~warhead~~ warhead missile we don't know size. We not counting warhead - just moved missiles.

B. The basic rule is a side dimension must stay same. We haven't changed them one centimeter

K. But deeper

B. No.

P. You have said you not rotating + we have. (we both right)

B. You acted w/ greater foresight - MN missile is much larger than the missile. If it your MN 3 is 120 tons whereas your earlier one is 35 tons. So it is a new missile.

For missiles can't hit US but can USSR. Also you haven't accounted for FBS. Why 1983 - why not 1985?

K. We giving so largest possible differential capability w/ US almost. sit. The extra 125 exers are of low flexibility anyway.

P. Cond in exchange and make minor adjustment.



Transcribed  
by PWR

Prs HHC BS  
Stressed  
Brechin, Dobryn, Aletis, Nikita  
2 nd Day (Special Op)

Sunday  
morning

A. Shortly after I became P. K. briefed me sound on what you & N discussed. I would like to know what you told N & character positions. There are some things I have to get straight in my mind. From ~~the~~ we could go to negotiations or whatever but need to know what ~~you~~ you discussed.

B. This was in Crimea. A still time I pointed by basic principle that as we can't work we were in world in gen. I told N <sup>there are</sup> some countries which had not joined NATO & don't observe it, ∴ a sit could arise where you & us could be threatened w/ our attack. I don't think it might be good to conclude a treaty dealing only w/ our attack on one of our enemies. In event of our attack on one, another would come to aid w/ our enemies at disposal.

N said interesting & would look further into it. I had seen further talks w/ K but for obvious reasons nothing came of it. That is what we stand.

So a possible way could say something like some way we would ensure in such circumstances to avoid such an event, 2 sides - etc. We could do it as to avoid offense to allies & it would give assurance



B. Hard to give precise ans. Perhaps we could agree to enter consultations as best we can. A lot would depend on who attached who - This proposal hasn't been elaborated in detail. But since our most important agreement would eliminate our own obligations to us.

P. We do want to present our case to your eyes - time has passed very. ~~We~~ We should talk further. Memo with me. should make more effort to get beyond to sign NPT. There are some beyond.

B. I fully agree

P. Let's have it met K & Amb to work as that.

B. We're putting NPT into committee.

Let's think about it little by little. Should be discussed every

- B. After our return, can we arrange exchange of air instructions on these
- H. How can we work from tomorrow ~~for the exchange~~ <sup>for the exchange</sup>.
- B. What shall we discuss now
- H. Can we complete arrangements so there is time to ~~set it~~ <sup>set it</sup> typed?

agreed. { A joint statement <sup>in the presence of a limitation</sup> relating to the ~~subject~~ <sup>subject</sup> of strategic arms will be is being put separately.  
Types "and will make every effort in that direction."

- H. I ~~leave~~ <sup>leave</sup> brief ~~at 3:30~~ <sup>at 3:30</sup> w/ exchange to 2:00. I ~~leave~~ <sup>leave</sup> brief when you eat lunch.
- B. Sign a communique right after lunch
- P. Then go to Vlad + then lunch.
- B. Yes, after Vlad we will go directly to train.