

MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY del NARA DATE 11/6/08

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, November 10, 1974

PLACE: Camp David

SUBJECT: Vladivostok Summit with Brezhnev

[Secretary Kissinger read the Ash memo on food aid.]

Kissinger: I agree with it. But we will not get the credit for it. One of the real problems is the State of this country in the world. A President and Vice President hounded out, what we have been doing to ourselves.

Asad asked me: Why did we cut off aid to Turkey? He couldn't understand it.

President: The American people are wallowing.

Kissinger: I believe the country is moving to the right while the Congress is moving to the left.

President: I had lunch with Tom Braden, Charles Bartlett, Scotty Reston and one other. Did you see the Reston column today? I feel we must make strong decisions, whether they're supported by Congress or not.

Kissinger: The country needs you to assert national leadership. You won't get anywhere being a nice guy.

If you defend the national interest, with the Democrats fragmented, you can hold it together and win in '76.



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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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The Vladivostok meeting is very important. You can't be too nice to him -- be tough and confident.

The liberals will scream foul when you attack; but when you don't, you won't get any kudos.

President: I think we must bite the bullet and let the chips fall where they may. If we are right, we will win some and lose some.

If the Congress doesn't keep up with us.... They have to be a partner now, and if they don't measure up....

Kissinger: We have to have a team, not a bunch of prima donnas.

President: I agree. Where do we start?

Kissinger: Let me start with mood. Brezhnev is very upset by some of the things which have happened. He thinks we are trying to make them look weak. I think we must show the three Senators the Gromyko letter [warning of a repudiation of MFN]. We had this for a year -- except for Brezhnev's personal assurance to you. This looks like a humiliation to them. And for what? They get \$300 million in credits in 2 years, when Schmidt gave them \$360 million at one crack. And even if they do it, they get MFN for only 18 months. They think we let them down on the corn deal because Butz led them on.

On the other hand, they are eager to have a good relationship with you. But they can't figure us out -- Rockefeller, my position, etc. They must ask themselves how many chips they can put in their pot.

In '72, I could kick them around because we were strong -- I could give or withhold a billion in credits and clobber North Vietnam. Now what can we do?

I asked to see Brezhnev alone Friday, and I said to him this will be the third meeting in Moscow this year. If it is a failure, Ford is not tied to detente -- I am. I can go home and say I tried and failed and my course doesn't work. He called a Politburo meeting the next day.

But we know it's a bluff.



While we have detente, the Democrats can't get together between the Jacksons and the Kennedys. If we fail, we will be back like '69 where the Democrats will push for unilateral concessions and they will follow. [He described the Soviet SALT proposal].

President: What about throw weight?

Kissinger: There are no limits on throw weight. But that is a fraud because we can build a bigger missile legally, under the agreement, and put them in the same silos.

Brezhnev asked for 180 SS-18's to be MIRVed.

I think we could manage the proposal by getting a disparity in our favor in MIRV'd missiles while they have a disparity in their favor in over-all numbers, but by the date of 1 January 1984.

We would give them 180 SS-18's MIRVed and they won't count our missiles or bombers.

[He argued the futility of the B-1]

I think you can't let the Defense Budget be prepared on the basis of interservice bargaining.

To go the Schlesinger route on SALT is I think impossible. You would have to put SALT on ice for two or three years and go on a building program. I think if you are tough at Vladivostok and we give them my counterproposal, I think we can get a deal. It won't be a glorious deal. The danger is we won't be able to get from 2200 to 2400. But we would have that problem anyway.

The Soviets are already committed to their program. We aren't.

President: Can I see the counterproposal?

Kissinger: By Tuesday.

President: This would be for signing in June 1975?

Kissinger: Yes. You will get flak from the right and the left. The right will say they can build up their MIRVs; the left will say that it is no arms control agreement at all because it requires us to keep building. But you can say that they can otherwise MIRV everything, and this will put a cap on it.



President: I want to be fully briefed and up to speed on everything.

Kissinger: Yes. I need to tell you about Brezhnev also. At Vladivostok we could announce that we have agreed to reach an agreement by June based on equal aggregates and equal MIRVs. The JCS may just want equal aggregates, but then they could MIRV everything.

As a practical matter, the Soviet Union couldn't MIRV more than about 8-900 on ICBM.

It will be a bitch of a negotiation, because he hasn't focused on the fact that if any missile is tested as MIRV'd, all of them must be counted as MIRVed.

My impression is they want the SS-18 against China. I think we should ask for 12 Tridents so as to keep the production lines open.

For us to get to 2400 and keep within 1300 on MIRV's is tough, because all our systems are MIRV'd. But you can make an announcement. I would leave the heavies out of it for now.

Schlesinger will complain, but you can say that his way would take a heavy program for two to three years and we can't get the money for it. Schlesinger asked today for my support to keep a \$95 billion budget for '76.

We must project an image of brutal toughness. Your misfortune is that you are paying the price for Watergate.

President: We have to plan what is the vehicle to get the Turkish aid thing repealed. Better do this next week.

Kissinger: Brezhnev has made us a proposal of, in effect, an alliance. If either one of us were attacked by nuclear weapons, or one of our allies, the other would come to our aid. It is really directed against China.

President: What if Israel launched a nuclear attack on Syria?

Kissinger: Technically, neither are allies of ours. But it would drive all of them to become allies to get the protection. It is rather clever. Obviously it is unacceptable, but you may not want to kill it at Vladivostok.

I think we may have to break the French.



President: How?

Kissinger: We could have a frosty meeting with Giscard. Our most consistent opponents are the Europeans. Only the Germans are reasonably solid.

Last summer Giscard told us to work in energy in a small group. We did it, and they turned on us without warning.

If the French prevail on the consumer-producer deal, Europe will be dependent on Riyadh like they were dependent on us in the Marshall Plan.

* * *

Kissinger: On visiting India, which they want you to do, we can wait. Basically we straightened out our relations. You should probably go out there next year at this time.

The problem is weapons for Pakistan. I laid some groundwork on my trip. It is not right that India has total domination of the subcontinent. But we can talk South Asia later.

You should meet the Shah. He is one of the world leaders, He wants the C-5. He is willing to get the production lines open.

President: Shouldn't we get that decision so we can get it in the '76 budget? I think this is important. It won't mean much to us in '76 -- \$100 million or so, because he would be opening the line.

Kissinger: Also in our joint commissions, he is willing to send people here to spend \$10 billion -- for nuclear reactors, agricultural machinery, fertilizer, etc. He wants Iran to have the standard of living of Europe by 1983.

President: Why shouldn't we meet in January or February?

Kissinger: Let me say about our energy strategy: You are being told we have to break the Shah to get oil prices down. Simon will recommend that you cut the Shah off unless he cuts OPEC prices by 50%. It won't work, and it's based on a misconception. The Saudis tell everyone that they would reduce prices if Iran would -- because they know Iran won't. Without Iran, the Saudis wouldn't do it because of the radicals. For us to break Iran is insane. He is politically one of our best allies. If Turkey goes radical, we will need him.



He agreed to a cut of 20-25%, with an index for inflation.

You should write him confirming this. We must hold our consumption down, get our own production up, get consumer and financial solidarity with Europe and then we can work on the prices.

My prediction is that within two or three years we will have an oil glut.

President: With him we would get a 15% cut and \$10 billion in capital investment. Let's meet with him.

Kissinger: With luck we can announce the \$10 billion by April. We do not have the horsepower to take on the producers until we get the consumers financially consolidated in an energy program.

If we confront the Shah now, the Europeans will pick up the pieces. And we need him if there is a Middle East war.

In the Middle East, the Israelis are the villains. If Sadat and Hussein had had something to carry into the Rabat summit, it wouldn't have come out that way. We could have calmed Asad if we could have given him assurance of a kilometer or two. The key is whether we can get a separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiation going. The only alternative would be a negotiation on the Golan, or with the PLO, and that would require real blood.

If we block the PLO for a year, the Arabs may turn back to Hussein.

But to move with Sadat, we need to try to give him a firmer commitment. You may have to bite the bullet and give him some arms. I wouldn't do it through Saudi Arabia because we would have another Watergate. There could be cash sales, with an understanding that he wouldn't buy Soviet arms.

I told Rabin I would not agree to any economic aid for them [Israel] unless they would move with Egypt.

Sadat agreed to have a separate negotiation in secret. Israel will send Allon here. Rabin is willing to go back only 28 kilometers in the center because of an electronic installation they have there which covers all Egyptian airfields. But it would be 50 kilometers on each side of this and 100 in the south to give them the oil fields.



President: How soon would they be willing to start a negotiation?

Kissinger: Allon would come here early in December with a proposal, which we would then convey to Sadat. We wouldn't conclude it before the Brezhnev visit but we'd have it wrapped up by 15 February. So we should have Allon here December 2 or 3.

If we can get a movement in the Sinai, we will have six to nine months. By then we will see whether the PLO will moderate or whether we can turn it back to Hussein.

The question is whether a nation of three million Jews can hold the security of the U.S. and the world in their hands.

President: That's right.

Kissinger: I may have to go out to the Middle East because the Israelis are such bastards. There's no other way to get it done.

President: Isn't it that the Israelis think they can control the U.S. through their lobbies?

Kissinger: The Arabs are irresponsible too. They lie, they cheat -- they are romantic children.

The Israelis assess that you aren't strong enough. They think they can put through the \$4 billion and you won't dare veto it. If Sadat says he can't accept the Israeli proposals, we will have brutal decisions to make.

We ought to get Fahmi in for at least 15 minutes next week.

We had bad luck in Turkey. Ecevit has lost his coalition. He can't form a minority government because he would get the credit for making a deal. The only loss of prestige for him has been the Congressional vote. That has set things back two months. The biggest problem we have in the world is questioning whether we can deliver.

You must say you will be a candidate in '76, even if you won't.

President: I will be.



Kissinger: The Turkish thing we can pick up whenever they get a government. With luck we will get the Egyptian thing; the SALT prospect is fair; with the PRC we have a normalization problem; with oil and the Shah, we will have a price collapse in two years.

President: How is the OAS veto coming? We will even catch some hell here for abstaining.

Kissinger: OAS/South Africa.

President: [Discussed the election.]

Kissinger: You should do what Truman did after '46.

President: I agree.

Kissinger: Your meeting with Brezhnev is important. You must be tough and decisive.

President: I would like a summary of where we stand on the main issues.



P/R Camp David
10 Nov 1974 ✓

Real oak leaves on Ford's car.

R I agree w/it. But we will not get credit for it
One of the real problems is a state of US in a world.
A Pesa + V1 handed out, etc.
Oval asked why a Tank and cutoff

P The other people are walking.

R I believe a country is moving right while Cong is
moving left.

P I had lunch w/ Bush, Ballath, Reston & one other.
Reston came today. I felt we must make strong
decisions, whether supported by Cong or not.

R The country needs you to assist with
leadership. You won't get anywhere being
a nice guy.

If you speak with interest, w/ a clear
purpose, you can hold it together & win
in '76.

Vladimir is very important. You can't be
too nice - Tough & confident.

The liberal will scream foul when you attack,
when you don't, you won't get any benefits.


P I think we must hit a bullet & let a chip fall
where they are. If we are right, we will win
loud & lose some.

R If the Cong doesn't buy up w/ us, they have to
be a partner now & if they don't measure up....

K We had to have a team, w/ a bunch of
senior clerks.

P I agree. Where start?

R Let me start w/ word. Biz is very upset
by some of things which have happened.



He thinks we are trying to make them look weak.
I think we must show = 3 leaders = G. letter.
We had this for a year - kept for ^{person} Bay, assured
to go. This looks like a ~~summit~~ ^{summit} to them &
for what - 300 mil credit in 2 yrs, when Schmidt
gave 360 mil of one crack. And they get N.V. /
only 18 now.

They think we let them down on a case deal because
Bartz let them on.

On other hand, they say for good relationship
w/ you. But they can't pressure us out - Rockefeller,
my partner, etc. They must ask themselves
how many chips they can put in the pot.

In 72, I could back them around cause we
were strong - I could give Phil credits, &
closer N.V. Now what can we do?

I asked to see Bay, about Friday & said this will be 3rd
entry in Moscow - this year if it a failure, Ford is
not tied to detente - damn. I can go home & say
I tried & failed & my cause doesn't work. He
called Phillips entry next day.


But we know it a bluff.

As both sides have detente, & Dems can't get together
not a Jacksons or a Kennedy's. If we fail,
we will be back like 69 where a Dems will
push for unilateral concessions & they will
follow.

(Describe Soviet SALT proposal)

P Thrown away?

R No limits. But that a fraud because we can
give broader bigger missile



X Call Saw Out K Christy - Greenby -

Buz asked for 180 SS/5 Mio.

I think we could manage a proposal by getting a Mio disparity while they have a disparity, but by dating 1 Jan 84.

CSB would give them 180 15's Mio and they won't want drinks on beaches.

(Argued feasibility of B-1)

I think you can't let a Def Budget be prepared on basis of discontinuous bargaining.

To you Schlos wants on STAT so I think impossible.

You would have to put Easton Sec for 2-3

Yrs + go on building prog. I think if you are tough at Vlad. & we give them this - my counter-proposal, I think we can get a deal. It won't be a glorious deal.

The danger is we won't be able to get for 2200 to 2400. But we would have that anyway.

The Secs are already created to their prog. We aren't

P Can I see a concrete proposal.

K By Tues.

P That would be for signing in June 75.

K Yes. You will get flack from right & left.

Right will say they can build up Mio, & left that it no improvement because required buildup. But you can say they can extend Mio everything & it will put a cap on it.

P I want to be fully briefed & up to speed on everything.

K Yes. I will tell you about Buz abt.

at Vlad we could arrange agreed program



How long I start calculations

10
39
48
48

by June would be = aggregates = Mises.
The JCS may just want = aggregates, but
then they could Mises everything.
Also practical matter, SU could be Mises
more than about 8-10 on ICBM.

It will be a bit of negotiation, because he
hasn't focused on fact on Mises missile,
and must count as Mises.

My impression is they would be against China.
I think we should look for 12 Trident so as to
keep production lines open.

For us to get to zero ~~starting~~ w/ in 200 Mises
is tough, because all our systems are MICK.

But you can make an agreement, I would
leave the missiles out of it for now.

Schles will complain, but you can say his army
would take a heavy pay for 2-3 years & we can't get
a heavy price. Schles asked to be very support to
keep a \$95 bil budget for 74.

We must project our image of mental toughness. Your
negotiation is you are paying for W. at the site.

* * We have to plan what is a vehicle to get a T-100
and thing expected. Better do this next week.

K Big alliance proposal. Further attacked by
some on its allies, coalition would end. Really directed
against PRC.

P What if I launched an attack on Syria

K Technically, neither are allies. But would drive all
to be allies to get a protection.

It rather clear. Obviously unacceptable but you
may not want to kill it at Mad.



Our energy strategy - you are being told we have
to break a shock & get oil price down. Senior
will recommend you cut shock off unless he cuts
prices 50%. It won't work & is based on misdirection.
Saudis told everyone they would reduce price if Iran
would - cause they know Iran won't. W/o Iran,
Saudis would not because of cash. For us to
break Iran is insane. He is probably one of
our best allies. If Tuesday you succeed, we will
walk him.

He agreed to a cut of 20-25%, w/o explanation.
You should credit him for this.

We must hold ^{crisis} ~~production~~ ^{production}, get production
up, get economies ^{solidarity} & then we can
work on prices.

By production is w/in 2-3 yrs we will have our
oil glut.

P Within we would get 15% cut & 10 bil in capital.
Let's meet w/ him.

R W/ bank we can announce a 10 bil by April.
We do not have a HP to take on a producer until
we get a consensus financially established in a
meeting prog.

If we support a shock, ^{but} a Euro will lose price w/ a
crisis & we need him w/ a ME w/ us.

For ME, a I am a supporter. If Sadat & Hussein
had something to say w/ a summit, it would not
have come out that way. We could have Cabaret
Said if we could have given him a loan a 2.
The key is whether we can get a separate E-I
negotiation going.



The only alternative would be to negotiate on Colm
or W/PHO & that would require real blood.

For each PHO per year, they may turn back to
Hassim.

But to move w/ Sadat, we would try to give him
a private contract. You may have to hit a bullet
& give him some arms. I don't think it's there
S.P. because we would have another Watergate.
Cash sales, w/ substantiating it wouldn't be secret
arms.

I told Rahim I would not agree to any deal and unless
they would success w/ E.

Sadat agreed to a separate negotiation in secret.

I will send Allan here. Rahim is working to get back
only 25 km in width in case of electronic
installation which covers all E airfields. But 50 km
on each side & 100 in South to give them a outfields -

P How soon would they talk?

K Allan would come early in Dec w/ proposal which
we would get to Sadat. We wouldn't conclude before
Aug visit but have it wrapped up by 15 Feb.

K We will have Allan here Dec 2 or 3.

If we can get a Sinai move we will handle 9
mos. By then we will see whether PHO will moderate
or turn it back to Hassim.

(Discussion of 3 million Jews holding a security of
US & would see into their hands)

Why shells are needed in ME because of tank search
bustards.

P Don't it that I think they can control US than
their lobbies?



* Friend ex: if Johnson / Kissinger / Japeto are
here for a meeting this week.

(Don't we have to get authorization for cash sales to E?)

The Arabs are irresponsible. They lie, they cheat - they
are romantic children.

The Israelis that you ~~are~~ are strong enough -
they can put three 4 bit eyes want those nuts it.

If Sadat says he can't accept I proposals, we will have
essential discussions to make.

* We ought to get Fakhri in, at least for 15 minutes
next week.

As had had lunch in Thursday Ezerit has
has lost his condition. He came from a minority
part because he would get a credit for working
a deal. The loss only loss of prestige for him has
been a Croy note. That has set things back 2 mo.

The biggest problem we have in a world is getting
whether we can deliver.

You must say you will be in candidate in '76
even if you want

P I will be.

K The Truck thing we can pick up whenever they get
a just. w/ back we will get a E thing; The
Salt is of property price; RRC we have normalization
put; w/oil + Shah, we will have a price collapse
in 2 years.

P How is oil sale coming. We will even catch some
bill here for abstaining.

K OAS / South Africa

~~K~~

P Decision to election

K You should do what Truman did in '46

P I agree.



Tell Schick & ask you about
budget division paper book.

Your meeting w/ Berg is important. You must
be tough & decisive.

P I would like summary of case

