

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8  
CIA-~~EX~~ 5112108; OSD-~~EX~~ 3115105  
MROB-90 #1; State ~~Unrev~~ 3/9/04

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY dal NARA DATE 9/24/08

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: September 13, 1974

PLACE: The Oval Office

[The decision was made to let NATO announce Haig.]

President: Wayne Hays said it is not good to send AI to NATO. I said I made a commitment and would stick to it.

Kissinger: Goodpaster hasn't helped or been generous. Wayne Hays will be okay.

President: How about meeting with that group?

Kissinger: We are going the CRA route.

President: We still can offer credits.

Kissinger: It depends on whether to take on the Turkish aid cutoff. We brief on the Greek-Turkey situation and say why are you giving a generous interpretation to hold aid over the Turks. It would be the forthright thing to do.

President: I think we are sort of committed to the leadership. It would keep the good atmosphere of yesterday. Let's try to set it up.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp To Det.

You also are meeting with the Scott group?

Kissinger: Tuesday.

Dinitz is the only one who really understands the process. I told Dinitz that Rabin should be trying to establish rapport with you, not just ask for handouts.

I have decided: They don't want to move; if there is a war, they think it would be better if it were now. And they want enough arms to get flexibility. I told them we agreed in principle on lasers, besides the list.

I told them we need a rough outline of what we are aiming for. If I don't have something for the Arabs by the time I go to the Middle East, we are in trouble. I need a concrete proposal on Egypt and Jordan before I go there. We shouldn't engage in shuttle diplomacy -- it stakes too much on the personal.

I planned to go the 8th-14th, and maybe to Greece and Turkey also. Then to the Soviet Union, and India, the last week in October or first week in November. Then on to Iran, and to Rome for the food conference. Then to Japan and Peking.

Nothing Rabin says has meaning until it goes through the Cabinet. We can't keep stalling. If it hadn't been for the change of Administration, we would be in trouble now.

President: So you need a concrete plan on timing, substance and negotiation method in October. If he gives this commitment....

Kissinger: You could then say we, in this atmosphere, would look over the rest of the list in December.

President: I would say we would have real trouble going beyond this.

Kissinger: Giscard wants to meet in December.

President: I would like to be free after about the 18th-19th.

Kissinger: It would probably be about the 15th or 16th.



President: Fine, I could go until the 20th if necessary. Is Schmidt off?

Kissinger: He has his own scandal. Brandt's plus an advisor buying votes for the Soviet treaty ratification. Much like your problem. Now Brandt has decided to publish his memoirs. The whole affair is much like Watergate. Like the Chile affair.

President: That is not going anywhere, I don't think.

Kissinger: They are hunting in foreign policy. It is now my operation, not CIA.

President: I probably should have a good question and answer session on the Chile operation.

Kissinger: Separate the two issues. Describe why covert operations are sometimes necessary. Refuse to talk about the specifics of this. This operation followed the procedures that were regularly used.

President: On the Israelis, which is the chicken and which is the egg?

Kissinger: We have to give them this list. Don't put it on a blunt quid pro quo basis. That could leak to the Jewish community.

The Jackson letter. It is in bad faith. The Soviet Union won't buy it. I don't even know if these could stick.

President: In the House, one Congress is not bound by the previous Congress.

Kissinger: This procedure means that every year we would go through this. Javits thinks it should be a regular veto by one House.

President: He told me that. I wouldn't buy that until we have fought for the other.

Kissinger: We could get up a breakfast or just say it is unacceptable and see.

President: I would want to know that Ribicoff and Javits are okay.

Kissinger: Why don't I call him and meet again before you meet with them.



President: We've got to make sure about Javits and Ribicoff.

Kissinger: They are afraid to stand up to him. The Jewish community looks okay.

President: Can I get the precise language I want before the meeting.

Kissinger: On the UN speech -- this is pretty good. I may not speak because most of it is here. Shall I give it to Bob Hartmann?

President: Give it to me. On the guest list from here, I noticed some Counsellors. I don't want a field list. You and Henry, but rotate the others.

Kissinger: On attendance at SALT, I recommend the same group plus Alex Johnson.

President: Yes. I like the meetings small.

Kissinger: On the SALT meeting -- the Delegation is going to start talks on the 18th. We need general guidance. But someone may spring a full proposal. I would just say we will study it. You will also hear buzz words. We don't want to freeze the delegation approach, because the Soviet Union will take that as a hardened position -- but we can float reduction and slow deployment as principles to discuss. We need to look hard at the trends in the arms race. The throwweight problem is of our making and can be corrected by a bigger Minuteman. To ask them to come down to us is to ask them to redesign their force.

We eventually will give you the equal aggregate options, differentials, and throwweight options. We will need a Verification Panel and NSC meeting before I leave so I can take concepts to the Soviet Union. If you want equal aggregates, the Soviet Union ought to know; ditto with differential and reductions. If we get somewhere we could have announcement at Vladivostok and then -- after a helluva negotiation -- sign an agreement here in June.

With Brown you have a great and cooperative man.

President: On the Army Chief, I want three nominees rather than just one.

I think time is of the essence.



Kissinger: Yes, you need a strong leader.

President: When I get the names I will talk to you.

Kissinger: North Korea has made many feelers to us. I would use them to get good behavior in the UN but not so as to shake up South Korea.

On the UN, you can go straight in or go to the US mission. It would please Scali, but I think your first visit should be to the UN. Then if you want to go to the mission you can do it afterwards.

President: That sounds much better. Let's do it that way. Speaking of Rogers and Cuba, where are we?

Kissinger: I planned to talk to you soon.

There are two aspects: bilateral and in the OAS. State is preparing a paper with these guidelines: We are being moved into relations with Cuba, but it should not appear to the American people as if it is being forced on us. So I would hold tough in the OAS, using the Brazilians. But we should start with low level talks with the Cubans to see what we can get for it. If we don't we may be driven by majority votes from one position to another.

President: Let me look at the paper. What price would we want?

Kissinger: Some promise against subversion. Some principle on expropriation of assets; some foreign policy moves.

President: What would be the Soviet attitude?

Kissinger: It is costing them a lot. We have little to gain from Cuba. There is nothing Castro can do for us. A little embarrassment in Third World meetings. We should move slowly.



\* What would equal missile to do for this - total

✓ P/K 13 Sept 74

(Decision was to let NATO announce this)

P Wayne Hop said not good to send A-1 to NATO. I said I made a contract & would stick to it.

K Goodpastor hasn't had too helpful been generous. Wayne Hop will back.

P How about entry w/ chat group?

K We going the chat entry.

P Still can offer concessions.

K Depends on whether to take on a Turk and cutoff. We bring on G-T set & say why you giving generous interpretation to hold and over Turkey. It would be forthright thing to do

P I think we are sort of committed to leadership. It would keep a good stream of yesterday. Lets try to set it up.

\* You also entry w/ 7 other groups

K Tuesday.

Dimitry is only one who really understands a process.

I told Dimitry Robin should be trying to set up just w/ you, not just asking for handouts -

I have decided = They don't want to move  
of a war, better now

Want enough arms to get flexibility

I told them we agreed in principle to on buses, tanks & chat.

I told them are real rough outline of what we aiming for. If I don't have something for Arabs by a time I go to ME, even in tank. I need a concrete proposal on E & F when I go there. We shouldn't lay eye on shuttle diplomacy stakes too much on personal. (last week Oct - 1st ask you 2 yrs)

I planned to go 8-14 (maybe G-T also). Then S U, India,

Iran, fossil conf. Then Japan & Peking  
Nothing Robin says has meaning until it goes thru cabinet.

We can't keep slacking - if hadn't been for change of Admin, we would be in trouble now.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY per ml 08-90 #1

BY Ma NARA, DATE 8/17/09



\* \* Get P re Wilson letter to P.

P So you will concrete plan on timing, substance & report method in Oct. If he gives this content. . . .

K You could then say we, in this atmosphere we would look over the rest of the list in Dec.

P I would say we would have real trouble going beyond this.

K Consider months to meet in Dec.

P I would like to be free <sup>of the</sup> about 18-19

K It would prob. be about 15 or 16.

P Fine, I could go until 20<sup>th</sup> if necessary. Schmidt off?

K He has his own scandal - Bennett's plus advice buying votes for SC treaty ratif. Much like your part. Now Bennett has decided to put his memoirs.

The whole affair is much like Watergate. . . like a Chile affair.

P That's not going anywhere, I don't think.

K Hunting in F.P. It is now my operation, not CIA.

P I probably should have a good Q & A on the Chile open.

K Separate 2 issues - describe why court open sometimes necessary. Refuse to talk about specifics of this. This open followed a procedure regularly used.

P On Israelis, which is chicken & egg.

K We have to give them this list. Don't put further than it on a blunt period per year basis. That would leak to Jewish community.

Jackson letter. Bad faith. We won't buy it. I don't even know if that could stick.

P In House, one thing is not bound by previous Cong.

K This procedure means that every year we would go through this. Janitzo thinks regular visits by House.

P He told me that. I wouldn't buy that unless we have fought for a while.

K We could set up breakfast or just say unacceptable & see



\* P I would want to know that Rivoff & Javits are OK  
K Why don't I call him & meet again before you  
P Got to make some about J & R.  
K They appear to stand up w/ to him - Jewish community looks OK.

\* P Can I get precise language I want before a meeting  
K On U14 speech - this pretty good. I may not speak cause most of it here. Shall I give it to Hartman?

\* P Give it to me. On guest list from here, I invited  
Some councilors. I would not want a fixed list. You  
& Henry, but rotate others

K On attendance at S&T, I recommend some plus  
Ally Johnson.

P Yes. I like a mtg small.

K On S&T mtg - Delegation is going to start talks  
on c/18th - an excellent guidance. But someone  
may bring a full proposal. I would first  
try to work study. You will also hear bugz words.  
We don't want to freeze a delegation approach, cause  
SU will take that as hard hat position - but we can  
first education & show deployment as principle to discuss.  
We need to look hard at trends in arms race. The  
TW problem is you are making & can be carried by  
larger M16. To ask them to come down to us is  
to ask them to redesign their plane.

We eventually will give you - aggregate options, differentiated,  
TW options. We will need VP & HSC before we  
so I can take concepts to SU. If you want - aggregate  
a SU want to know; draft w/ differentiated & education.  
If we get somewhere we could have announcement at  
Ohal & then - after billow negotiations - sign an  
agreement here in June.

W/ Brown you have a guest & my man.

\* P On any chief, I want 3 words rather than just  
one.





Pres conf. notes

I think time is of essence.

K Yes, you need a strong leader.

P When I get a number I will talk to you

K N. Korea has made many failures to us. I would use them to get good behavior in UN but not so to shake up S Korea

On UN, you can go straight in or go to the US mission. It would phase South, but I think your 1st visit should be to UN. Then if you want to go to mission you can do it afterwards.

P That sounds ~~to~~ much better. Let's do it that way.

Speaking of Rogers & Cuba, where are we?

K I planned to talk to you soon.

There are 2 aspects - bilateral & OAS. State preparing a paper w/ these guidelines: we being <sup>pushed</sup> ~~forced~~ into relations w/ Cuba, but it should not appear to our people as if it being forced on us. So I would hold tough in OAS, using Organization. But we should start low level talks w/ Cubans to see what we can get for it. If we don't, we may be driven by majority votes from one position to another.

P Let me look at a paper. What price could we want?

K Some provision against submission. Some principle of x prop assets; some F.P. issues

P What would our attitude be.

K Nothing from a lot. We have little to gain from Cuba. There is nothing Castro can do for us - a little embarrassment in 3rd world votes. We should move slowly

