

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
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State let 9/19/08
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BY dal NARA DATE 2/17/09

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 19, 1974
8:00 a.m. [Breakfast]

PLACE: The White House

Kissinger: This European thing will work out okay. They are pissing in their pants.

Schlesinger: I want to travel along the Central Front.

Kissinger: Don't go until after the middle of April. We don't want things to move too fast. We need to stay tough.

Schlesinger: I want to put pressure on the Europeans to make changes on the Central Front.

Why move Strausz-Hupe?

Kissinger: Politics.

The Germans have promised to have consultation with us before they take decisions. The British have gone even further.

Schlesinger: We should write down the list of NATO military needs and make the Europeans shape up. Jones says the British are really obstructionists in NATO -- subtly. We need new command arrangements.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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Kissinger: I agree. We have troops there to either give us a more flexible response or to prevent European neutralism. If we can't get it, we should organize our defense rationally for us.

I wouldn't reassure the Europeans about keeping our troops in Europe.

Schlesinger: I am not. I have told them that we must have a military reason to keep our troops there.

Diego Garcia.

Kissinger: I defended you to Stennis. I only didn't know why it had to be by supplemental.

Schlesinger: I need to tell Congress that the British don't have a veto on its use.

Kissinger: You can't tell them there is a codicil.

Schlesinger: Can I tell Hebert we have high confidence?

Kissinger: Yes.

Schlesinger: For Suez, we need a Presidential letter.

Kissinger: Okay.

Schlesinger: I don't know if we can pay for it.

Kissinger: If possible, I think the Navy should pay for it. We need to be forthcoming to the Egyptians.

Schlesinger: How about Zumwalt for SACEUR?

Kissinger: Not bad, except he is Navy. Haig would be a good SACEUR.

Schlesinger: I gather the Soviets are not pushing on SALT.

Kissinger: It is hard to say. Gromyko told me only Brezhnev could make a decision on it.

Schlesinger: Why should they push?



Kissinger: What have the Soviets gotten from detente. The psychic satisfaction of reducing the chance of war and gaining equality with the U.S.

Nothing else. We have defused the peace movement here. The Middle East must be painful to the Soviets.

Schlesinger: Part was their fault.

Kissinger: No nation admits that. And we stalled, obfuscated, etc. on the Middle East last year and they had nothing to give to the Arabs. So they passed arms because they couldn't give the Arabs anything else. Everyone miscalculated. The Soviets probably think I screwed them at the end of October by not proceeding jointly. They have been humiliated.

So I think they will make an effort on SALT.

Schlesinger: I think we could be more forthcoming on MBFR than on SALT.

Kissinger: JCS are starting to go the same way in MBFR as in SALT -- toward cynicism.

Schlesinger: The JCS have revised their SALT position. I don't agree completely, but it is thoughtful.

Kissinger [reads JCS paper]: Not bad. It may even be possible. What does Zumwalt want?

Schlesinger: To be tougher.

Kissinger: How?

Schlesinger: We have all Trident and they are restricted to G and H.

Kissinger: The problem is if the Soviets want to break out MIRV from a permanent agreement.

Schlesinger: Zumwalt is on thin ice on air defense. If the Soviets applied it to ASW, we are in trouble.

We got to deal with the FBS.

Kissinger: Maybe we can deal with it in MBFR.



But even if we did it in SALT, we don't have to disband the forces, just pull them out of range.

The only thing I can tell the Soviets is we can put it into MBFR and look at it benevolently.

One way of restricting MIRV is by missile fields.

Schlesinger: It is interesting.

We need \$50 million more on Canadian needs and PD on it. It is being held up in State.

Kissinger: By whom?

Schlesinger: The security assistance people. You have to start testimony -- early April.

Kissinger: I won't be here much in April. Let's work it out.

Schlesinger: Israeli aid. There are two decisions -- the breakout of the \$1.5 billion and PD to go above \$1.5.

Kissinger: Let's give everything the Arabs don't like in connection with the Syrian disengagement. (Gun-ships -- probably don't give them Cobras, or anybody in the Middle East.)

Schlesinger: Thailand. It is important that we announce 10,000 now -- it doesn't matter over what period. We must negotiate with the Thai military a permanent presence.

Kissinger: On SALT. FBS, we can try to put it into MBFR. If they want to break out a MIRV deal, I will bring it back.

For your thinking, the President might want a MIRV deal and we must not make it look like a sell-out. Even a slowdown in MIRV deployment is in our interest. I will go no further than to elicit Soviet proposals.

Arms for Egypt. They are making a massive move toward us. They have given us a big shopping list. There are two ways we can provide it. I don't want to give them high-visibility items. One way is third countries.



Schlesinger: There is no problem in doing this, only that it may have to become public.

Kissinger: We must be cold-blooded about it. We maybe can give high-visibility items to the Saudis and let them keep them there for a while.

NSSM 177. We must get going.

Schlesinger: Let's not do it in the DPRC. Let's do it in our SRG.

Kissinger: Okay. Set up a meeting to discuss the issue.

Schlesinger: Hewlett-Packard. You are in favor.

Kissinger: Yes. I want to know before it happens so I can get some political mileage.

Schlesinger: The sub SIOP briefing -- the briefing leaves out the political deficits.



HAK - Schlesinger
19 Mar. 74


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- K - This Euro thing will work out ok. They are pressing in their ~~parts~~ ^{parts}.
- S - I want to travel along a central front.
- K - Don't go until after the middle of April. We don't want things to come too fast. We need to stay tough.
- S - I want to put pressure on Euro to make changes on Central Front. Why more strong - 4 wks.
- K - Politics
The Germans have promised consultation before decisions. Butts have gone even further.
- S - We should work down a list of NATO military needs + make a Euro shape up. Jones says a Butts are really obstructive in NATO - assembly. We will have command arrangements.
- K - I agree. We have ^{been} two years there to give us a more flexible response or to prevent Euro controversy. If we can't get it, we should organize our response internally for us.
I wouldn't blame Euro about keeping our troops in Euro.
- S - I am not. I have told them that

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AUTHORITY FOUO 08-03, #21

BY WJ NARA, DATE 8/14/09



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we must have a military reason
to keep our troops there.

S - Diego Casero.

K - I defended you to Stimson. I only didn't
know why it had to be by seizure.

S - I used to tell them Clegg that Brits
don't have a right on us.

K - You can't ~~talk~~ tell them there is a
evidence.

J - Can I tell H what ~~it~~ our home high
confidential.

K - YES

S - Suez. We need a Press letter.

K - OK

S - Don't know if we can pay for it

K - If possible I think a Navy should pay for it
We need to be forthcoming as to Egypt

S - How about 2 million for Suez?

K - Not bad, except he is Navy.

Haig would be a good Suez.

S - I'll let Suez ~~with~~ pushing on SALT


K - Hard to say. George told me only
Berg could make a decision on it.



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- ~~S~~ S - Why should they push?
- R - What have I said gotten from disturb
Psychic satisfaction of reducing
to chance of war + gaining permanently ^{all}
Nothing else.
We have closed a peace environment.
ME must be painful to Iovs.
- S - Part was their fault.
- K - No nation admits that. And we
stalled, oppressed, etc since ME last
year + they had nothing to give
to Arabs. So they passed arms
because they couldn't give Arabs
anything else.
Everything was calculated.
Iovs probably think I screwed them at end
of Oct, by not proceeding further. They
have been humiliated.
So I think they will make an effort
on SALT
- S - I think we could be more forthcoming
on MBFR than on SALT
- K - ICS are starting to go some way in MBFR
as in SALT - toward agreement



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- S- JCS have revised their SPT
portion. I don't agree completely, but
it is thoughtful.
- K- (Lends JCS paper). Don't talk, may even
be possible. What does Eisenhower want?
- S- Total toughness
- K- How?
- S- We have all Tulgent & they restricted
to G & H.
- K- Problem is if Saps want to trade out
MIRV from Polonium agreement
- S- I comment on their idea on our
defense. If Saps agreed it to ASU,
we are trouble.
We get to deal w/ FRS
- K- Maybe we can deal w/ it in
MIFAR.
But even if we did it in SPT,
we don't have to distribute papers, just
pull them out of range.
Only thing I can tell Saps is we
can put it into MIFAR & look at
it honestly.



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One way of defining restricting
MIRV is by missile fields.

S- It is interesting.

S- We need 50 mil more on Cooperation
Need a PD on it.
It may hold up in State

→ K- By whom

S- Security assis. You have to
start testing - Early April.

→ K- Want to see begin in April
to work it out

S- Small and. There are 2 discussions -
breakout of 1.5 bill + PD to get above
\$1.5.

K- Lets give every thing the Arabs
don't like in connection of w/c
Egyptian disengagement.

(Guerrillas - probably don't give
them Libya - dry body in ME)

S- Chair - important that we announce
12,000 now - doesn't matter



→ Answer from K... (to [unclear]) w/ [unclear]
Road of w/ channel, + when + [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]

Research
w/ [unclear]

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... what period. We must
negotiate w/ c. t. in military
a permanent presence.

K- On SALT, F.B.S., and can try
to put it into NIFR. If they
want to break out a NIFR deal, I
will bring it back.

For your thinking, I might want
a NIFR deal & we must not
make it look like a sell out.

Even a slow down in NIFR
deployment is in our interest.

I will go no further than to
sketch some proposals.

Power for E. They are making
a massive ~~move~~ move toward
us.

They ~~will~~ have given us a
big shopping list. Two ways
will be provided. I don't want to
give them high visibility items.



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- S- There is no problem in doing this, only that it may have to become public (3rd country transfer)
- K- We must be cold blooded about it. We might can give high visibility items to Saudis & let them keep them there for a while.
- K- NSSM-177. We must get going.
- S- Let's not do it in DPR U.S. but do it in an SRG.
- K- OK. ~~to~~ Set up a meeting to discuss issues.
- S- Harbath - Parkard. You are in favor.
- K- Yes. I want to know before it happens so I can get some political mileage.
- S- Sub-Scop briefing. The briefing deals out political aspects.

