

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

BY del NARA, DATE 11/5/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense  
William Colby, Director Central Intelligence  
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint  
Chiefs of Staff  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 2, 1973  
1:15 - 2:55 p.m. [Luncheon]

PLACE: The Secretary's Office  
Department of State



Kissinger: The purpose of this meeting is to talk candidly. I will tell you what I plan -- I hope you will do likewise. We will use the machinery, but it is useful to exchange views. Anyone here has the option of saying something here only and it won't go to the State Department. Otherwise, I may tell Rush and you can tell Clements.

Schlesinger: We can't have people telling Congress how we are handling it.

Kissinger: Maybe you should begin.

Schlesinger: We can move 20-50 thousand tons from Laos. We have MASF there. We are moving forces out and we will discuss ammunition in excess of Laos needs.

There is money in the Air Force to fund F-5As which was cut from the budget. Stennis will get that restored in conference -- that is free money.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
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The Thais want OV-10s. The Thais have ammunition. We can swap, but we need a swap arrangement.

Kissinger: I would like to interrupt for a minute. Give Brent a list of any complaints you have about the State Department. One of the utilities of my dual position is to bring this whole thing together. I basically am on your side.

Schlesinger: So we can keep the ammunition flowing a long time but we need facade.

The reason I don't tell Tarr is that there are things in the law, but if we talk about it, they will be eliminated.

Kissinger: But they have to have money to shoot people up.

Schlesinger: If I can just get through the conference on F-5A, that will help. It should happen in a few days.

Kissinger: This has been a big item though. If we suddenly go quiet, someone will get to the Congress. Give me a cover story and write me a memo I can show.

Keep discipline in your shop, Tom. How about equipment?

Schlesinger: If we get this Air Force money back, we can handle this.

Moorer: We have a million or so of spares in addition to ammunition.

Kissinger: On the diplomatic side -- for you alone -- in June I had the Chinese lined up for a 60-day Cambodian ceasefire and settlement. We had a ceasefire in place and a Laos-type government. The Chinese said they would recommend it to Sihanouk when he returned. That is when we passed the bomb halt, and then the Chinese said the situation had changed.

Moorer: The reason the Communists tried to take Phnom Penh before August 15 was they were afraid it would be solved before August 15 and they would be left out. Of course they were dumb in the way they went at it.



Kissinger: Now I will send a message to Le Duc Tho that we are prepared to discuss Cambodia along the lines we discussed in June. I will tell the Chinese that if Sihanouk has anything to say -- we won't use Mansfield -- we will listen to what he has to say. We shouldn't go to the Embassy in Phnom Penh and upset the Cambodians but sit tight. I don't plan any contact with Sihanouk.

Moorer: I would be wary of dealing with Sihanouk. I am not sure he can deliver.

Kissinger: There is a 90 percent chance I won't see him.

Colby: Sihanouk can't deal with the Lon Nol group.

Kissinger: I don't see a negotiation coming.

Colby: We don't need it if we can stall along.

The critical factor is the Phnom Penh leadership.

Kissinger: We have no compulsion to get into this negotiation.

Let's have our next meeting Wednesday. Brent will be the focal point for items to discuss.

Schlesinger: On Cambodian ammunition, there will be no paperwork. It will just be done.

Kissinger: But give me something I can tell Tarr. It is important we get weapons in. Can I count on that being done?

Schlesinger: Yes.

Kissinger: I am going to London the 14-16 of October. I will see Scheel, Moro, and Home. On the 22nd I will go to China. I will spend two days in Japan for the Chiefs of Mission Conference. I am debating about spending a day in Korea. It depends on whether we cut Korean MAP. Should I stop there?

Moorer: I think it would be useful. It would make a big impact.



Colby: We have to handle the Kim problem.

Moorer: That will be over.

Kissinger: Then I leave on the evening of the 21st.

Schlesinger: I go to Europe on the 6-7 of November. I go to Germany first, then Amsterdam for the NPG. By the time the DPC comes, I am thinking of going to Paris, because France doesn't belong to the DPC.

Kissinger: I notice the French made an offer over FRELOC.

Schlesinger: They agreed on a joint group to study how much FRELOC is worth. \$50 million is the down payment. If we get \$100 million, it is a good deal.

Kissinger: I had a good talk with Jobert. We have to keep our military and diplomatic talks in Tandem. They promised cooperation on a NATO declaration. I think they want to be cooperative.

The decision for us is whether to push the declaration through this year or next. Our problem was cooperation last summer.

Colby: Are the British coming around?

Kissinger: They really are. They make noises in European forums, but they never say it was a terrible mistake. Don't let them up for air too fast, but relax a little.

On the PRC, we have a concern about a Soviet attack.

Colby: I have a study on this. I would say it's a one in ten chance.

Right now the Chinese have a tremendous threat potential.

Kissinger: That is different from your assessment, Tom.

Moorer: By 1976 they will have moved.

Colby: They may already have lost their chance.



Schlesinger: If the Soviets move, we have to offset the psychological impression of the Soviet moves. Perhaps we move into Austria.

Kissinger: They would fight. They are neutral -- they have nothing to gain. Eight years ago they were trying to figure out how to defend against attack from the East.

Schlesinger: They aren't bad. But under circumstances of Soviet nuclear attack on the PRC, they might think differently.

Kissinger: Under those circumstances, the impact on Japan would be tremendous. On Europe also. Therefore we must do something. This stuff about we can't stay apart from China is crap. I am just trying to get us into a position where we can do something but I don't know what to do.

Colby: There is a fine line between helping China and the Soviets knowing we do that and scaring them into an attack.

Kissinger: Right, but suppose they attack anyway?

Colby: You could draw a line across China -- this far and no further.

[A discussion takes place about an attack on China.]

We have to make them important.

An attack could mobilize the kooks in this country.

Schlesinger: What can we do in Europe? Tell them we will not attack if they evacuate East Germany.

Kissinger: What if they say no?

Colby: Keep the fight in China.

Kissinger: What if they just take out the nuclear facilities?

Colby: They can fire their few remaining missiles one at a time.

Schlesinger and Kissinger: That is not likely.



Schlesinger: Why can't we divide China?

Kissinger: Is there anything we can do militarily?

Colby: We could move into the Middle East to protect the oil.

Kissinger: If we divide China we lost Europe -- because it looks like a condominium. It looks like if things get tough, we grab what we can.

Moorer: The degree of success of a Soviet attack would depend on the action Europe took.

Colby: I agree. We must show strength somewhere other than China.

Kissinger: What about Japan? Would they follow?

Colby: They would follow Europe.

Moorer: They would rearm.

Kissinger: If the Soviets do this, we have to go to brutal big power diplomacy -- no more nonaligned.

Schlesinger: Yes. It would show them that nothing but power which counts.

Colby: Tell them to get out of the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: There is some merit to this. Kick them out of the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Schlesinger: If we move into Austria, tell them we want Bohemia and East Germany while they dispose of the PRC.

Kissinger: If we do that, we are haggling. I think we have to keep a moral position. The Europeans are soft -- the Japanese are basically tough.

Schlesinger: The French are tough.

Kissinger: Yes.



Colby: The Germans are basically tough, but they have to change their form of government.

This assessment is military. I will have a political one following along.

Schlesinger: What is your perception on deployment of forces in the Far East?

Kissinger: If not for the need for a presence, I would withdraw slowly from Korea -- cut them in half.

Schlesinger: Five thousand a year?

Kissinger: Yes.

Schlesinger: Leave the Marines in Okinawa?

Kissinger: Yes. A visible presence is good.

Schlesinger: In Thailand are we going down to 32,000?

Kissinger: I guess, but where is the pressure coming from.

Schlesinger and Moorer: All from Unger.

Kissinger: I couldn't tell from Chatchai, because Unger was sitting there. My instinct would be to go to 32,000.

Schlesinger: How about the B-52s in Guam? If we don't, Congress will say we don't need them for SIOP.

Kissinger: Why not give us a plan for withdrawal of the excess B-52s?

The last time I saw Mao he said he hoped we would keep our forces in Asia.

Schlesinger: We need to trickle the B-52s back through refit to put new wings back on.

Kissinger: I would like to keep 42 in Thailand [out of 50]. Will the Thais let us keep them there?

Moorer: I think so. Utapao was built for them.

I think we should take a few from each base and keep the bases open. We can get the B-52s back.

Kissinger: You now have 175 out there. You want to pull 75 back over a period of time. Don't start too actively before I get back from China.

Moorer: On carriers. We have three carriers. One is anchored to the Tonkin Gulf. I would like more flexibility for this one.

Kissinger: Tho complained about carriersto close to the coast. Brent, tell Tom [Moorer] what the change is.

Moorer: I would like to give the carrier 48 hours leeway.

Kissinger: Okay.

Schlesinger: A squadron of the A-7 is being rotated. If we are going to withdraw them, why rotate them?

On the MBFR we have to squash the Germans' wish for indigenous force cuts. The German level of effort now is not that impressive. There is a great difference between stationed and indigenous forces. Then it's the Germans against Czechoslovakia and our forces disappear.

On offset, the Treasury is being obstinate. The Germans will give burden sharing.

Kissinger: Shultz says all you want is loans.

Schlesinger: The Germans are prepared to give hard offset. For tele-phones, etc. It isn't in the United States budget so Shultz says it's no good.

Kissinger: How do we move? Let's get a NSSM.

Schlesinger: Loans are only after we have all the offset we can get. I was thinking of 50-year bonds, with interest on 18 months.

The idea that if it's not in the U.S. budget, it doesn't count is fallacious.





Kissinger: On MBFR, your idea of the Soviet position is right. Five percent stationed, five percent indigenous. We can't buy so little.

Moorer: It can't be verified.

Schlesinger: Shultz says the Bundesbank can't buy long-term loans. That is their problem which they can work out.

Kissinger: On the Yugoslav trip: If it is worked out, I would refuse to see the Foreign Minister. If not, I wouldn't go.

Schlesinger: It's not set, so I won't go.



AAK/Schlesinger/Cobby/Morales  
2 Oct 73

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- K - Purpose to talk candidly. I tell what I plan - hope you likewise. We will use machinery, but want to change views.
- S - Anybody here has option of paying treasury & it won't go to state. O. Thomas I don't tell Rusk & you tell Clements.
- S - ~~If you~~ Can't have people talking Congress how we are handling it.
- K - Maybe you should have
- S - would 20-50 thousand tons from Laos (have VMAF there). We manage <sup>this</sup> & we will discuss status in press & for book. Money in AF & fund FSA's which was cut from budget. Status get behind in experience - that fell away. This went on - 10's. This done means we can swap, but would swap anyway.
- K - For contingency. Gene Beent a bit of complaints about state. One of activities from board position is to bring this whole thing together. I basically on your side.
- S - So we can help more planning every time but we will finish. Reason about all Tare is that there are things in - low, but if we talk

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BY dee NARA, DATE 1/5/11



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- cannot it, they will be eliminated.
- K - But have to know way to shut people up.
- S - If I can just get them copy on F-5A, that will help. Should help you in a few days.
- N - ~~But~~ This has been a big ~~at~~ item this. If we suddenly get paid, someone will get a - copy.  
Give me a cover story & write me a memo. I can show.  
Key change in your story. Tom  
How about equip?
- S - If we get this AT money back, we can handle this
- M - We have millions of dollars in addition to arms.
- X - Don't dip into - for you alone -  
the fund I had PRC lined up - (Estimate preparation). Clearer in place to be a top govt. PRC said they would be moved to Saigon & other places. That is a total and partial board halt & PRC said that. Changed



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- M - Russia must try to take PP before any-  
thing afraid it would be signed before  
any is & they be left out. Cause they  
will check in the way they want it.
- K - how I send to Tho we prepared to discuss  
but also along lines discussed in June  
IWD PC that if Schmidt has anything  
to say - we won't see Mansfield - will  
well listen to what he has to say.  
we should not go to Embassy PP  
except Commission but sit tight.  
I don't plan plan any contract w/ Schmidt
- M - I see way of dealing w/ Schmidt. I don't  
know before decision.
- K - 70% chance I want to see him
- C - Schmidt can't deal w/ our  
group.
- K - I don't see a negotiable coming
- C - we don't want it if we can still  
always  
critical factor is PP & Schmidt
- K - how we negotiate to get into  
this negotiation



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- K - Lets have next entry Wed.  
Point in final point for letters  
to chairs
- S - On combination around there will be  
two papers. It will just be done.
- K - But give me something I can tell  
myself we get copies in. Can I  
count on that being done?
- S - Yes
- K - I going to London 14-16 Oct. I will  
see Shel, Wood, Howe.  
On 22 I will go to China, 2 days  
in Japan for Chief of Mission Conf.  
Debaty about a day in Korea.  
Depends on whether out Korea MAP.  
Should I stay there?
- M - I think would be useful. Make  
big report
- C - How to handle Kim problem
- M - That be over.
- K - Then I should see evening of 21st
- S - I go Europe 6-7 Nov. Germany first.

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then Ambassador for NPG. By this  
DPC comes, I think of going to <sup>Paris</sup> ~~London~~,  
Carson France doesn't belong to DPC

K - I notice Fr. made offer de France  
S - I think they agreed on joint going  
to study how much France wants

50 mil is down payment. If we get  
100 mil, we have general deal

K - I had general talk w/ Jotant, we have  
to keep mil + dip talks in tandem  
They promised cooperation on NATO  
declaration. I think they want to  
be cooperative.

Decision for us is whether to push  
declaration this year or next.

One problem was cooperation last  
summer

C - Are Brits coming around.

K - They really are. They make noise  
in European forums, but they never  
say a word outside. Don't let them



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- up for air too fast, but what a little
- H. On PRC, we have concern about  
Sov attack.
- C. I have a study on this. Say I'm 10  
chance.
- ~~R~~ Report now PRC has tremendous  
threat
- R- That different from your assessment  
Tom
- MA- By '76 they have become
- C- They may already have lost their  
chance.
- S- If Sovs come, we have to offset pay  
impulsion of Sov moves.  
Perhaps we move into Armenia
- R- They would fight. They wouldn't -  
have nothing to gain  
S says they were trying to prevent  
them to expand against attacks from East
- S- They aren't bad, but under circumstances  
of Sov move attack on PRC they might  
think differently.
- R- Under those circumstances, forget on Japan



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transmission - Europe also. I. we must  
do something. This stuff about we  
can't stay apart from China is crap. I just  
trying to get us into a position where we  
could do something but I don't know what  
to do

C - Find line between buying China  
and keeping us do that + scoring them  
with attack.  
~~we could~~

K - Right, but suppose they attack Hong Kong

C - You could draw a line across China -  
thus force us further.

Discussion about an attack on China  
- make them irrevocable.

~~an~~ an attack could mobilize - breaks  
in this country

S - What can we do in Europe. Tell  
them we not attack if they don't with  
E Germany

K - What if they do say no?





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- C - They're fighting in China.
- K - What if they just take out some facilities
- C - They can fire their few remaining missiles one at a time.
- S + K - not likely.
- S - Why can't we divide China?
- K - Anything we can do militarily?
- C - we could move into ME to protect oil.
- K - If divide China we lose East & because looks like Communism - things get tough, we don't get what we can.
- M - Degree of success of Sino-Atlantic would depend on a strong East link.
- C - Japan, we must show strength somewhere other than China.
- K - Japan?
- C - They would follow Europe
- M - They would lead

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- K - If ~~we~~ do this, we have to go  
\* limited big power diplomacy - we  
must understand.
- S - Yes, could show some ~~big~~ ~~power~~ ~~diplomacy~~  
which counts
- C - Tell them to get out of Ind
- K - Some must do this, keep them out  
of ME + Ind.
- S - If we ~~take~~ move into Austria,  
tell them we want Bohemia, E Germany  
while they dispose of PR
- K - If we do that, we haggle. I think  
we have to keep a broad position.  
Europeans are soft - Japs are basically  
tough.
- S - French are tough
- K - Yes
- C - Common basically tough, but have  
to change form of asset.
- C - This assessment is military. I will  
have a political one following along



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S - What is your perception on development  
of press in Far East

K - If not for pressure, I would w/char  
shrinky from Korea - not there in

S - <sup>body.</sup> <sup>clear</sup> - K - yes  
S - learn Marquis in Okinawa?

K - Yes. visit to pressure panel.

S - That - Are we going down to  
32,000?

K - I guess, but where pressure coming  
from

S - all from Unger

K - I couldn't tell from Chatchai, came  
Unger sitting there.

My instinct would be to go to  
32,000

S - How about B-52 in Vietnam. If  
we don't, Congress will say don't send  
for 500

K - why not give us a plan for  
w/ removal of excess B-52's.

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- K - last time I saw Mac to send  
he told me keep feet in sand
- S - we need a truck B-52 Ds back  
then split a part now wings broke  
on.
- L - like to buy 42 in Thai (cost of 50)  
will Thai let us buy them then?
- M - I think so. Utayad was built for  
them.  
I think we should take a few  
from each base & keep a base open.  
We can get C-52 as base
- K - You know how 175 cost them. You  
want to pull 75 back over time. Don't  
start to actually buy & get back  
from China.
- M - Carriers - ~~One~~ is Home 3 carriers  
One anchored to Tonkin gulf. I  
would like more flexibility for  
this one
- K - The complaint about carrier too



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close to coast. Bennett call M about  
change is.

M - I would like to give a corner of the  
library

K - 21

S - Schedule of A-7 being retained by  
w/chem team, why  
not?

S - On NBER we have to support German  
wish for indigenous price cuts.  
German level of effort is now is  
not that impressive.

There is great difference between standard  
& indigenous prices. The German  
vs Czech, + own prices also appear.

On effort, Germany being obstructive  
Germans will give low brushing

K - Schultz says all you want is loans

S - Germans are prepared to give hard effort  
Telegrams etc. Don't see US budget  
to Schultz. say no don't

K - How do we know? he to get a NSSM.



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S - Loans are only after we have all the  
effect we can get. I thinking of 50 yo  
bond, not an 8 month.

21

K - Bunt - Got N.S. sat today.

S - Shultz has people in Texas who  
haven't had so much fun in  
years.

I like that if not in all budget it  
doesn't count is is is

N - On N.B.F.R. you think is is is  
is right 5% is is is, 5% is is is  
we can't buy so little

M - Can't be is is is.

S - Shultz say is is is can't buy  
any more is is is. That is the  
problem which they can work out.

K - on Yugo trip - if worked out I  
would refuse to see F.M.; if not, I  
wouldn't go

S - not set, so won't go.

