

THE WHITE HOUSE

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AUTHORITY MR appeal NLF 04-06, #3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY dal NARA, DATE 12/3/09

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary
of Defense
Carl Duckett, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Roberge, JCS briefer
Mr. Welch, JCS briefer

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, August 9, 1973
8:00 a.m. - Breakfast meeting

PLACE: The Pentagon

Kissinger: Can't Stennis get control when he gets back?

Moorer: I think that is part of the game. Symington is not going to give up power easily.

Schlesinger: Symington's comments about CIA were an attack on Stennis.

We will go after Hughes. Ask if he wants more men killed, etc.

[Some talk about the progress of the Defense Appropriations.]

Moorer: We should not modify it in a way that we degrade the present SIOP.

Kissinger: Isn't that Catch 22?

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
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Moorer: No, we can do it, it depends on how long we take. It depends on how quick we can get a decision and how quickly we can retarget.

There is a clear distinction between operations on a third country and those on the USSR itself. The latter certainly risks a general war. The problem is not military -- it's political and policy. It would be helpful if we could get the President involved in exercises, etc.

Kissinger: The President has to know in a crisis what options are available. Then we can get him involved in exercises.

Moorer: There's a difference between tactical and strategic weapons.

Kissinger: The President will not authorize their use in the blind, without knowing just what will happen.

Moorer: A quick decision is what I was referring to.

Kissinger: The President must know at least the categories of targets -- airfields, etc.

Clements: The NSDM is deceptive. We don't have the capability to do what the NSDM asked for. The forces aren't that flexible.

The President shouldn't think he will have these options if he approves them.


Schlesinger: It's a matter of time. We can't put the mechanical flexibility into the forces until we know what is wanted.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union is building forces for something. I want to avoid the military telling the President they can do anything he orders.

Moorer: We can do better in preemption than in retaliation.

Schlesinger: I am not sure a strike (very limited) on the Soviet Union is more hazardous than taking out all the airfields in Poland.

Roberge [begins briefing:] We are looking at the different options which would cover the whole range of possibilities. In outline, there are:



- Regional options -- theater options.
- Limited options.
- Selected options.
- Major options.

The prime change in target base was in army units and political and economic targets.

We identified five Soviet attack options.

- (1) The Soviet nuclear threat to U.S. -- 7,000
- (2) The Soviet nuclear threat to Europe -- 886
- (3) The Soviet nuclear threat to forces in Asia
- (4) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S.
- (5) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S. forces in Asia

Kissinger: But the key is what it is we are trying to accomplish.

Schlesinger: For example, what are the political and military options?

Roberge: Those were our criteria for developing these options.

Kissinger: We would like to know what those are.

Schlesinger: We need to show the ultimate objective -- not that it is "the destruction of 11th Rocket Army."

Welch: We would like to have you look at the case studies and tell us if these are the kinds of things we need.

Kissinger: What is the next step?

Schlesinger: We are trying to convey a message to stop. "We are showing your vulnerability and demonstrating the hazards of further escalation."

Otherwise you would have to look over the whole 4,000 target list individually.

For example, we destroy the targets on the Chinese border, leaving the USSR open to Chinese attack; that could convey a signal of a US-PRC alliance, which may or may not exist.



You tell us what message you want to convey.

Kissinger: It's the chicken and the egg. We had done good contingency planning in Jordan and it went well in '70. We wouldn't have an idea what to do in case of an attack on Iran or Europe.

If the Soviets could make us back down anywhere in the world, the result would be disastrous.

Moorer: You are right about the chicken and the egg. That is why we need a dialogue.

Duckett: Should we include options where disengagement is easy? Air or sea attack?

Kissinger: There are several categories. A European incident; a Soviet move against third countries; a third country conflict which may involve the United States.

Take Jordan -- I think we scared the Soviets by pouring forces in at a reckless rate.

I think a serious crisis is almost inevitable with the world the way it is.

Schlesinger: Take Tito's death.

Kissinger: Yes. I've had a NSSM on this kicking around for a year.

Conceptually there are two theories: escalate slowly, or take a big jump at once.

Schlesinger: Computationally I lean to the second. Nuclear, I lean toward the first.

In Iran, for example, if we were to fly in some F-111s, we convey a message. Then maybe privately refer to Caspian oil fields.

Kissinger: We need to move this discussion from the theoretical to actual packages for actual areas. The most likely areas are not too legion. Let's meet after Labor Day.



HAK - Sch... Antares

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8:00 AM BRK & MIL
Thurs. 9 Aug 73

K. Can't Stromis get control when he gets back?

M - I think that is part of a game. Sgm. is not going to give up power easily.

S - Sgm wants to about CIA were an attack on Stromis. We will go after things. Ask if he wanted more men back, etc.

Some talk about progress of Def. of prop.

M - We should not modify in a way that we degrade present S/O P

K - But that catch 22?

M - No, we can do it, it depends on how long it takes we take. Depends on how quickly we can get decision + how quickly we can retarget.

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There is clear distinction between
operations on 3rd Country & those on USSR
itself. The latter certainly involves war.
Problem is not military - it is political & policy.
Helpful if we could get Pres involved in
exercises, etc.

K - Pres has to know in a crisis what
options are available. There we can get
him involved in exercises

M - Diff bet tac & strat wps

K - Pres will not authorize use in the
blind, w/o knowing first what will
happen.

M - A mite decision is what I was referring to.

K - Pres must know at least categories
of targets - airfields, etc.

Cl - The NSOM is disruptive. We don't
have capability to do what the NSOM
asked for. The press want that flexibility



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- Cl - The Pres should not think he will have these options if he approves them.
- S - It is a matter of time. We can't put the mechanical flexibility into a paper until we know what is wanted.
- K - SO is looking for something. I want to avoid a military thing. Pres they can do anything he wishes.
- M - We can do better in preemption than in ~~other~~ retaliation.
- S - I don't see a strike (very limited) on SO is more hazardous than taking out all apts in Poland.
- Bishop (Rohrer) - We are looking at dif options which would cover a whole ^{range of possibilities.}
- frontiers { Regional Options - theater options
 { Limited Options -



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Selected Options
Major Options

Prime change in target base was
in Army units & political & econ targets.
We submitted 5 sub alternatives

- (1) Saw - more threat to US 7000
- (2) " " " Europe 886
- (3) " " " Free in Asia
- (4) PRC " " US
- (5) PRC " " " Free in Asia

Reg Options

K - But a key is what it is we are trying
to accomplish.

S - E, E. what are pol & mil options

Rebase - Those were our criteria for
developing these options.

K - We would like to know what those are.



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S - We need to show ultimate objectives -
not that it is "a destruction of
the Rocket Army."

Wick - We would like to have you
look at a case studies & tell us
if there are a kinds of things we
need.

K - What is next step.

S - We trying to convey a message
to stop - we are showing your
vulnerability & demonstrating hazards
of further escalation.

① The next you would have to
look over whole 4000 target list
in detail.

For example, we destroy a target
on Chinese border, having USSR



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open to Chinese attack - Could convey
a signal of US-PRC alliance, which
may or may not exist,
You tell us what message you want
to convey.

K - It is chicken & egg. We had done
good contingency planning in ^{Japan} ~~the Philippines~~,
& it went well in 70. We ~~couldn't~~
wouldn't have an idea what to do
in case of attack on ~~Japan~~ or E. or
if Laos could make us back down
anywhere in world, & result would
be disastrous.

M - You're right about chicken & egg. That
is why we need strategy.

Reichert - Should we include options where
disengagement is easy? (Air or sea
attacks)



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K- Several citizens. A European
incident, a Sov market
3rd countries, 3rd country
conflict which may involve US.
Take position - I think we should
SO by joining forces in at
a reckless rate.

I think serious crisis is almost
inevitable w/c could come any way it is.

S - Take Titus death. ~~to~~

K - Yes. I've had a NSSM on this
pending around for a year.

K - Conceptually there are 2 theories:
localize slowly, or take a big
jump at once.

S - Conceptually 2 beams lead to
2nd. nuclear, I lean toward 1st.



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- S- In Iowa, for example, if orders
to fly in some F-111's, we receive
a message. Then many from the
report to keep in air fields.
- K- We need A more this discussion
from theoretical to actual packages
for actual areas. Most likely areas
are not too large.
- Let's meet after Labor Day

