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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel  
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, July 3, 1973

PLACE: The Western White House  
San Clemente, California

SUBJECT: Report on Brezhnev Visit

Kissinger: The Middle East was a problem of the greatest difficulty at the summit. The Soviets raised it every day, but we avoided it until Wednesday. I had a meeting with Gromyko Wednesday to just discuss principles. I said what we wanted was something that each side could interpret differently -- but it was a way to get negotiations started. Gromyko said he thought we weren't serious, that they had decisions to make on deliveries, etc.

We had two problems: what would be in the communique, and that what would appear would be as a result of the summit, not at the summit. I think you are not too dissatisfied.

Dinitz: Only with one phase.

Kissinger: That was inserted as a result of Rogers discussion with Gromyko. I didn't feel I could overrule Rogers. [This is only for the Prime Minister.] I threatened to Gromyko not to have a communique.

Dinitz: Aside from this point, it was better than 1972. It left all options open; it didn't foreclose anything.

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Kissinger: The reason we managed to avoid specifics in the communique was by agreeing to substantive discussions on the Middle East, which took place on Saturday. My strategy on the communique was to get everything in reach . . . .

[Read different formulations.]

On Saturday morning they resumed on the formulation I read. They wanted a reference to the UN, and we just sat tight. On Saturday morning, we left the communique in abeyance and went to the principles. Gromyko rejected the principles of 72, modified as you insisted. Brezhnev requested a meeting with the President alone, to avoid this. I agreed to modify the principles for discussion.

Dinitz: It was a question of the free choice of the refugees still remaining.

Kissinger: No, all your points were taken account of. [He read the refugee point.] Through maneuvers I won't describe. They wanted a return to 1967, guarantees, international waterways, security zones. Gromyko and Dobrynin were present. We rejected it. Brezhnev said this agreement would never leave the room. We said making an agreement that no one knew about was hard to understand.

Dinitz: If we are expected to be asked to return to the 1967 borders, we have to be asked.

Kissinger: I wouldn't agree the first time.

Dinitz: Or the second.

Kissinger: The discussion got very nasty. Then Brezhnev said he would withdraw all of the points but the 1967 borders. The President asked what he disagreed with. Brezhnev said we had withdrawn from the 1972 proposals. We agreed to redo it and send it to him at Camp David.

Before you explode, let me describe the tactical situation. We wanted to avoid having something we would be trapped into agreeing to, and we sent this to them after they had left -- at Camp David. They have never even acknowledged it. [He hands Dinitz a copy of Tab A.]

Let me point out the differences. Paragraph one mentions a final peace and appropriate negotiations.

Paragraph two says, "in accordance with appropriate UN resolutions."

Paragraph four -- we have eliminated reference to Sharm el Sheikh and the word "temporary."

Paragraph five -- "Should lead to an end to a state of belligerency" rather than "end the state of belligerency."

The refugee clause is stated in the language of the communique.

I think there is no chance of an agreement.

Dinitz: I must read it through more carefully, but certain things come to mind.

Incorporation of the UN resolutions in paragraph 2. Resolution 242 is interpreted differently by the different parties. There are September 1971 and 1972 General Assembly resolutions that can be read as calling for a total withdrawal, and that is how they will be read, and in conjunction with withdrawal. If this is how it will be read.

Kissinger: They know we mean 242.

Dinitz: It depends on how it is read.

Demilitarized zones. "By agreement of the parties" should be included.

Kissinger: The whole thing must be negotiated. That's in paragraph one.

Dinitz: Paragraph five -- end to the state of belligerency without the state of peace. You can have the end of belligerency without having a state of peace. A state of peace in the mind of the Soviet Union is less than peace.

Paragraph seven -- International waterways. We don't want freedom of navigation at Sharm el Sheikh assured to us; we want to assure it ourselves.

Kissinger: They will never agree.

Dinitz: Paragraph eight is spoiled by the "legitimate interests of the Palestine people."

If this seems to kill the 1972 principles, it is preferable. If it is an agreed paper at the highest level, it has bad features.

Kissinger: If the document is subject to different interpretations, we could accept it with an understanding on our interpretation. On the UN resolutions, we would make clear that we mean 242. On the others, you could interpret it as the negotiations go on.

Dinitz: If they use this as a starting point for further moves, then this as a bad starting point would lead to bad future modifications.

Kissinger: You think this is a bad paper. The Arabs would not agree. Egypt wants an agreement that we understand that border changes apply only to Jordan and that with Israel it applies to total Israeli withdrawal.

Dinitz: The Soviet Union has hinted in many ways that they don't exclude changes, but on the Eastern front. They are playing politics. With Egypt they will interpret a withdrawal as total and the changes as on the Jordanian front.

We have a good chance in the negotiations, but not on the basis of a document which has had features. On the basis of 242, all options are open, and preferable to this which has some confining features. It is worse than 242 on security guarantees, secure boundaries, and international waterways.

Our reading was that the Summit produced positive results, because the Soviet Union now has to explain it to Egypt, there are troubles in Iraq, and differences between Egypt and Libya.

Kissinger: The tactical situation was -- take it or leave it. If all our people had been present, it would have agreed to go back to the 1967 borders. You must compare it with this, not with your maximum position. You got out of the summit with a minimum of damage.

Dinitz: This paper would be great if it removed the 1972 paper without substituting another.

Kissinger: But this is better.

Dinitz: But as a talking basis, not an agreed paper.

Kissinger: They won't accept it, so there is no agreed paper. If they propose changes, so will we. They either got from the Arabs an agreement that it should be vague -- like the Vietnam negotiations, where I produced a new paper each week. This is no basis for joint action until

there is agreement on a basis so vague that it can be interpreted differently by both sides and negotiations can go on. It must be so vague that it is not totally unacceptable to both. We can't move until Egypt agrees to principles that are so vague that they can be interpreted differently by both sides. Until that basic decision is made, we must give the illusion of movement and avoid a showdown with us, Egypt, the Soviet Union -- anything which keeps the process going.

Dinitz: That works in our favor. As long as it doesn't undermine our position.

Kissinger: An unsigned document of general principles can't be used to undermine your position. The points that give you trouble we can interpret our way. I am not asking you to accept this. We are informing you. We don't need a formal government position unless they come back to us; we won't press them for an answer. If they do, we will see if we need a formal answer from you.

Dinitz: Okay.

Kissinger: Let me discuss the proposed State Department initiative. The basic idea is to invite you and Egypt to begin private negotiations in Washington under U.S. auspices. [Read conditions.] Note that 242 neither explicitly accepts or rejects the 4 June boundary as final.

Dinitz: By private, you mean secret?

Kissinger: Yes, but with Egypt and the State Department, it can't be secret.

Dinitz: Have you discussed it yet with Egypt?

Kissinger: They say no, but don't bet on it.

Dinitz: Anything else?

Kissinger: Proximity probably -- in the same hotel on different floors, or in different hotels.

Dinitz: Sisco talked twice that he is preparing something for me, he talked generally on the Summit.

Kissinger: What was said was: They wanted total withdrawal; 242; the Jarring paper and the Secretary and Sisco. They didn't succeed in mentioning 242 and Jarring.

There are no agreements other than the communique. You shouldn't interpret it that the U.S. has withdrawn its interest in 242, and Jarring, etc., but since the Soviet Union wanted to make 242 more explicit, Rogers got it dropped. At the last minute, the Secretary called Sisco in to rescue the communique.

Dinitz: On the UN Secretary General's visit, here is our answer, in conjunction with State. [He read and handed over the note at Tab B.]

I will pass this to the Prime Minister on a close hold basis. Such a formula will never be agreeable. I can't accept a document which says a return to 1967 is not excluded. The new borders must be the result of negotiations. This would be a new change in policy which I don't think we will make. It is different when the U.S. says that than when we say it.

Kissinger: I don't think either side can accept this. Egypt will object that 242 can allow modification.

Dinitz: So why produce an initiative at all? It could be a move backward.

Kissinger: I can't promise. But if we can get an answer on this, I can discuss it with the President.

Don't show your foreign office.

Dinitz: Shalev has the Prime Minister's full backing.

I have a few more points:

The Prime Minister, subsequent to the Brandt visit said he sent a letter to Nixon and Brezhnev talking of his impression of Israel's desire for peace. She wanted the President to know this in light of the Heath letter. When these people come to Israel they talk differently. She expressed the hope the President would not take the Heath letter seriously. Talking to the British Deputy Foreign Minister, he said to someone that Israel was responsible for the Six-Day War.

Kissinger: I don't remember the contents, but Brandt is not noted for his precision of thought. He said he favored a Middle East settlement.

Dinitz: We have been active in Washington to get Jordanian MAP restored. We will try to influence the German Government, if you don't object.

Kissinger: No, we will too.

On Ethiopia, the instructions were to be forthcoming, except where Congressional restrictions prevent it.

Dinitz: Anything new on the Saudi F-4? Will it go ahead?

Kissinger: I think so.

Dinitz: Is there anything we can do? Gave Rush a note.

Kissinger: Let me think about it. We haven't answered the last Egyptian note, but probably will. The more forums we keep open the better.

Dinitz: Yes, that is why we go along with the Secretary General.



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Sent to Brezhnev at  
Camp David  
June 24, 1973

### General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be comprehensive, embracing all parties concerned and all issues. This means the elaboration and implementation of a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve appropriate forms of negotiation between the parties acceptable to all parties concerned. In the process of working out agreement on the whole complex of questions relating to the settlement, the possibility is not precluded of this agreement being implemented by stages or that some questions may be resolved on a priority basis.
2. The settlement should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 in accordance with appropriate UN resolutions.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could include demilitarized zones; establishment of an international force; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees which could include the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The settlement should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
7. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
8. There must be a settlement of the refugee problem on a just basis through agreed procedures and taking into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

## EXPLANATORY POINTS

Paragraph 1: This paragraph accepts the first paragraph from Foreign Minister Gromyko's paper presented at Zavidovo with the addition of the formulation on negotiation discussed June 23 in San Clemente.

Paragraph 2: The word "agreements" is changed to "settlement" in this and subsequent paragraphs in accordance with the discussion June 23 despite the fact that it was taken from Foreign Minister Gromyko's paper at Zavidovo. It then refers simply to "appropriate UN resolutions."

Paragraph 3: This remains unchanged from the draft of May, 1972.

Paragraph 4: This has been simplified in the light of the Gromyko-Kissinger conversation of June 23.

Paragraph 5: Again, the word "agreement" is replaced with "settlement." Otherwise this is unchanged from the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 6: This is the same as the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 7: This remains as accepted in discussions June 23.

Paragraph 8: The language of the communique is introduced.

The overall objective is to produce a set of working principles that would be sufficient to get talks started between Israel and its neighbors but not so specific as to produce a deadlock before they start. The question, as the President said, is whether we are to cooperate in launching talks in some form or to create issues between us now.

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The Government of Israel's attitude towards the visit proposed by you is positive and agreeable in principle.

2003/11

The Government of Israel prefers to await the end of the debate at the Security Council before giving a definite answer in light of the situation at that time and including the result of the Security Council debate, since this could have beneficial or inhibiting effect on the Secretary General's efforts.

It is assumed that you will be visiting the capitals in your capacity as Secretary General of the United Nations. You will be welcomed and received with all the honors and hospitality reserved for the Secretary General of the U.N. coming to meet with Heads of Government.

We propose that an announcement be made by you early in July to the effect that the parties have agreed in principle to a visit by the Secretary General and that its exact date and details would be agreed on later.

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R- ME was prob of guarantee dig at summit - SC would  
very day, but we arrived it til Wed. When they  
found ~~the summit~~ that mtg w/ G was for Wed  
on principle. Said what we wanted was something  
each could interpret differently - a way to  
get negotiations started.

Champs said the thoughts are what seems  
That they had decisions to make on decisions, its  
even like had 2 problems: what would be  
in Communiqué, & that <sup>what</sup> it would happen  
would be as result of summit, not at a  
summit.

I think you are not to be disappointed

D - Only one phrase

R That was inserted as result of Rogers decision  
w/ G. I didn't feel I could overrule Rogers  
(This only for PM) I threatened to G not to have  
a communiqué

D Aside from this point, it was better than  
'72. Left all options open, didn't force  
anything. →

R Reason we encouraged to avoid specifics  
in Communiqué was to agree to substantive  
discussions on all, which took place on Sat.  
My strategy on Communiqué was to get  
something in reach.

R On Sat morning they resumed on a parallel  
I said. They wanted ref to UK and we  
just for Sat night. On Sat morning  
we left Communiqué in abeyance & went  
to principle. I champs updated principles  
of 72 modified as you wished.



B requested mtg w/ Pres about to cancel  
this, depend on meeting & principles for  
discussion

D - Was position of free choice of <sup>refugees</sup> people  
still remaining

K - No, all your points were taken account of (Read  
& print)

Three maximums I want describe

Return to 67, Guarantees with continuing  
a month gone, G & D were present. We  
rejected it. B said this had would mean  
less a room. We said deal was an  
issue that was hard to understand

D - If we had <sup>agreed</sup> to return to 67, how to  
be worked

K - I wouldn't agree, at times

D - or sound

K - Discussion got very nasty. Frank B  
said he would w/ draw all but 67  
leaves. Pres asked what he objected w/c  
B said we had w/ draw from 2 proposals  
we agreed to send & send to C.D.

Before you suggest, let me describe -  
~~completely~~ tactical sit, we expected to  
avoid having something <sup>we would be triggered with</sup> eyed to & sent  
this to them after they had left - at C.D.  
They have never seen a plan it.  
(Hands to Dinity)

R. D. Ginn - Para 1, <sup>written</sup> final peace & offering  
negotiations

Para 2 - In accord w/ oppo UK resolutions

Para 4 - Eliminate Sharm el Sheikh &  
word "territory"

Para 5 - "Should end state of belligerency"  
rather than "part to end"

Refugee is stated in lang of  
evacuation

D I think no chance of agreement  
must read carefully but certain things  
are to mind.

Interpretation of UK resolutions in para.  
2 & 2 is integral documents, Sept 21  
& 22 are <sup>as far as any resolutions</sup> very different & can be  
used as total w/ charmed, & that is  
how they will be read, & in conjunction  
w/ another one. If this is how it  
will be read

R They know me well on 2 & 2  
D - depends on how read

Demilitarized zone. By agreement of parties  
should be included

R Whole thing must be negotiated. Para 1

D Para 5 - State of belligerency, State of peace.  
You can have end of belligerency w/o having  
a state of peace. State of peace in  
mind of UNSC is less than para  
Para 7 - Joint workshopping. We don't want  
further of negotiations at Sharm

assumed to be, an attempt to avoid it  
anymore

X  
more open

D Per of no guidelines by "legit interests  
of absolute people."

✓ D If this seems to kill 72 principles, it is  
preferable. If an agreed paper at  
highest level, it has bad features

R. If we subject to diff interpretations,  
we could accept w/ ambiguity on  
an interpreter, ~~etc.~~ and K resolution,  
w/ will make clear that we mean 2/2,  
on other you could interpret as negotiable  
game.

✓ D If they use this as starting point for  
further moves than this as bad starting  
point would lead to bad future negotiations

R Think this is bad paper. Arabs ~~could~~ cannot  
agree. ~~E~~ E wants agreement that we under-  
stand that changes apply only to Jordan & that  
w/ channel applies to total stability w/ channel

D SU has hinted in many ways that they  
don't exclude changes, but on Eastern front.  
They are playing public. W/Egypt they  
will interpret w/ channel as total + changes  
as on Jordan front.)

D We have good chance in negotiations, but  
not on basis of document which we had  
~~the~~ features. On basis of 2/2 all options  
are open, & preferable to this which has



~~There~~ some briefing material  
Worse than <sup>China 242</sup> security guarantees  
draw boundaries  
into waterways

One thing was that Summit produced  
positive results, even SC now has to  
speak to Egypt, troubles in Iraq, etc but  
E & Libya.

K Tact situation was - take it or leave it, if  
all our people had been present, would have  
argued to go back to 62 borders - but  
concern w/ this, not your more particular  
Youngstown of limits w/ minimum damage.

D This paper would be great if it showed  
72 pages w/ a subsidiary another.

R But this is better.

D But as a talking paper, not an agreed  
paper.

K They won't accept, so no agreed paper. If  
they propose changes, we will not.  
They will get from Arab agreement it should  
be agreed (similar to UK - yes, I produced your  
paper last week). In basis for joint action until  
agreement that basis so vague can be  
interpreted differently by both & we must  
do so that not totally unacceptable to both.

Can't move until E agrees to principles so vague  
can be interpreted differently by both  
until that basic decision made, we must  
give illusion of movement & avoid  
shutdown - w/ ~~us~~ us, E, SC, anything

which keeps forever going

D- That works in our favor. As long as  
don't see how long position

K- An unexpired lot of good principles could  
be raised. US can interpret your  
treaty points any way.

but asking you to accept this. Are you  
you. Don't need a formal govt position  
unless they come back to us, and want  
them for answers. If they do, we will  
say we had formal answer from you

D- ok

K- Let me discuss proposed State initiative.

Basic idea is if to invite you & E to begin formal  
negotiation Wash under US auspices.

(Special conditions), note that 242 neither <sup>explicitly</sup> accepts  
nor rejects of your boundary as final.

D- By private you mean secrets.

K- Yes, but w/ E & State can't be secret

D- Decided yet w/ E?

K- They say no, but don't talk about

D- Anything else

K- ~~any~~ Perkin's probably - some hotel dig floor,  
dig hotel.

D - Since talked twice that he is preparing something for me, talked justly on summit

K - What said

Total of demand, 242, ~~forming~~ <sup>part</sup> ~~of~~ Secy & Smea report that it didn't succeed in meeting 242 & forming.

No agreements other than ~~arrangement~~ ~~was~~ made. Should but understand that US has w/ demand interest in 242, forming, etc, but since SC movement to make 242 more explicit, Rogers got it dropped last month, Secy called Smea in to research ~~arrangement~~

D - On UN Secy and here is our answer, in cooperation w/ State.

Govt of Israel agrees to visit and of SC debate since could benefit or implicate visit. Visiting as Secy goal, arm (have no eye)

D - I guess to PM (Chai Wald) State

Such further needs agreeable.

Commit accept due says return to 61 not excluded, but has the result of negotiations. This would be new


Change in policy which don't think we could make. Different when US says that than when we say it.

K - Don't think either side can accept

Even if it that 242 can all our motivation

D - So why produce an initiative at all? Could be a move to know

K - Commit promise. But if can get answers on this I can discuss w/ Pres.



- K- Don't show foreign press
- D- Shalom has PM field to bring.
- D- Few more points:

PM subsequent to Bennett visit and sent letter to N & B asking of impression of I desire for peace. Wanted P to know in light of health letter. When these people came to I they talk differently. She expressed hope P would take health letter seriously. Talking to Dr. Day for Min he said to some that I may go 6 day ~~can~~.   
 think he said would a ME settlement.

- K- Don't remember contents, but Bennett not noted for <sup>preparation of thought</sup>
- D- <sup>we want</sup> Active in work to get Jordan to get ~~to get~~   
 ANAP restored

We will try to influence American govt, if you don't object.

- K- NO, we will try
- K- On Ethiopia, restriction must be further, to get where long restriction present
- D- Anything new on Saudi F-4. Will it get out
- K- I think so
- P- anything we can do. Good Ruzha note
- K- Let me think about it.

Have not considered ~~the~~ last E note, but probably will. More forms are prepared & better.

- D- Yes, that why are you going w/ Secy Ambr