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Scrivener Oil Co., 91-EPP-6 (ALJ Aug. 12, 1996)


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
800 K STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001

DATE: August 12, 1996
CASE NO. 91-EPP-6

In the Matter of:

SCRIVENER OIL COMPANY,
and
RICHARD SCRIVENER,
    Respondents
.

BEFORE: John M. Vittone
    Chief Administrative Law Judge

DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND

    On April 13, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued a Decision and Order in this matter finding that Respondents had violated the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(4). The Secretary remanded the matter to the Administrative Law Judge for a determination on an appropriate remedy pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 801.42(b) and 801.67(b), and the Secretary's decision in State Employees Credit Union, 93-EPP-9 (Sec'y Mar. 31, 1995). The Administrative Law Judge who originally presided over this matter retired prior to the rendering of a decision on remand. Consequently, this matter has been reassigned to the undersigned. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.30.1

   Respondents' violated the EPPA because the employee was suspended before she had received a written copy of the test examiner's opinion and the questions used during the test. State Employees Credit Union, 93-EPP-9, slip op. at 5, citing 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(4). The Secretary held that, although Respondents were entitled to administer a polygraph examination pursuant to the ongoing investigation exemption, their failure to follow the post-testing requirements of the Act and regulations nullified entitlement to that exemption.


[Page 2]

Id. The Secretary also held that the temporal proximity between the employee's suspension and Respondents' learning of the test result justified an inference that the test result was the likely reason for the suspension. Id. at 6.

DISCUSSION

    The Administrator bears the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the penalty assessed. Rapid Robert's, Inc., 91-EPP-4 (June 18, 1992), aff'd, (Sec'y May 1, 1995). In the remand order, the Secretary directed that the ALJ be guided by the discussion concerning the appropriateness of civil money penalties found in State Employees Credit Union, 93-EPP-9 (Sec'y Mar. 31, 1995). In that decision, the Secretary stated that "[w]ith respect to the appropriateness of a particular civil money penalty, it is a matter generally left to the discretion of the ALJ." The Secretary affirmed the ALJ's reduction of the penalty from $2,000 per violation to ,000 per violation in State Employees Credit Union, the reduction being based largely on the Administrator's erroneous conclusion that the reasonable suspicion test was not satisfied.2 The Secretary noted, however, that the record was "replete with other mitigating factors", such as a first time offense, the respondent's effort to comply, and absence of a reason to believe that the violations were knowing and willful.

   The Secretary also directed that the ALJ consider on remand the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b), which provides:

(b) In determining the amount of penalty to be assessed for any violation of the Act or this part, the Administrator will consider the previous record of the employer in terms of compliance with the Act and regulations, the gravity of the violations, and other pertinent factors. The matters which may be considered include, but are not limited to, the following--

(1) Previous history of investigation(s) or violation(s) of the Act or this part;

(2) The number of employees or prospective employees affected by the violation or violations;

(3) The seriousness of the violation or violations;

(4) Efforts made in good faith to comply with the provisions of the Act and this part;

(5) If the violations resulted from the actions or inactions of an examiners, the steps taken by the employer to ensure the examiner complied with the Act and the regulations in this part, and the extent to which the employer could reasonably


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have foreseen the examiner's actions or inactions;

(6) The explanation of the employer, including whether the violations were the result of a bona fide dispute of doubtful legal certainty;

(7) The extent to which the employee(s) or prospective employee(s) suffered loss or damage;

(8) Commitment to future compliance, taking into account the public interest and whether the employer has previously violated the provisions of the Act or this part.

Prior record
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(1)]

   In this case, Respondents have not been shown to have a previous record of any kind in regard to compliance or noncompliance with the EPPA. I find that the absence of a previous record of noncompliance is a significant mitigating factor.

Gravity of the violation
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(2) and (3)]

   The gravity of the violation factor has both mitigating and nonmitigating elements. Only one employee was involved. (see Tr. at 217) The Secretary held that there were sufficient grounds to discharge that employee even prior to the administration of the polygraph test, and that Respondents were entitled to administer a polygraph test pursuant to the ongoing investigation exception (although that entitlement was nullified when they didn't comply with post-test requirements). Respondents' non-compliance only involved one element of the post-testing requirements for the ongoing investigation exemption. I also note Respondents' somewhat ironic argument that its choice to administer a polygraph test before implementing any discipline was, in a sense, an exhibition of restraint. I note that the employee did not believe that there was any malice involved by Respondents in administering the polygraph test. (Tr. at 217)

   It appears, however, that the final decision to suspend the employee was made as a proximate result of the polygraph test, even if it was only a contributing factor to the suspension. When Respondents' chose to administer a polygraph test, the employee was entitled to the specific protections of the EPPA. Moreover, compliance with the requirement of providing an employee with copies of the test examiner's opinion and questions used during the test prior to taking any adverse employment action should not have been a difficult or ambiguous matter with which to comply. Respondents' decision to almost immediately suspend the


[Page 4]

employee, many days before the materials were provided to her, cannot be easily written off as a "technical" violation. (see Respondents' remand brief at 19).

   Balancing these factors, I find that the gravity of the violation element is neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor in this matter.

Good faith compliance
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(4)]

   In regard to the factor of good faith compliance with the EPPA, nothing in the circumstances surrounding the violation at issue show a reason for mitigation (e.g., that attempts to provide the employee with the materials had failed, or that Respondent had a good faith belief that the employee had been provided with the materials). It appears that Respondents otherwise complied with the EPPA - but I find that this is a neutral factor in regard to the violation at issue rather than a mitigating factor.

Test examiner's inactions
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(5)]

   Respondents testified that the charted responses were never sent to the employee because they were never received from the examiner. See Sec'y Dec., Slip op. at 5, citing Tr. at 163, 183. I do not consider this to be a mitigating factor, however, because there is no evidence that Respondents made any effort to obtain the materials after they became aware that they were missing. Rather, this factor has a slight aggravating effect in that it shows a lack of commitment by Respondents to supplying the employee with test results in compliance with the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.25(a)(2). The aggravating effect of this lack of initiative, however, is dampened by the test examiner's evidently being the person who did not supply the test results.

Respondents' explanations, including "doubtful legal certainty"
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(6)]

   Respondents' explanation is essentially that it only suspended the employee, and gave her a chance to respond to the test. (see Respondents' remand brief at 6-7, 14-15) Thus, Respondents pin part of the blame on the employee for not responding to a note enclosed with the test questions when they finally were sent to the employee asking her to call if she wished to discuss the examination. I do not find any particular mitigating effect of the fact that Respondents technically only suspended the employee or that the employee did not respond to the note. The EPPA requires refrain from "any adverse employment action" prior to providing the required materials to the employee.

   Respondent has not argued that the violation at issue was "the


[Page 5]

result of a bona fide dispute of doubtful legal certainty", and I find that this is not a mitigating factor.

   I find that the element described by section 801.42(b)(6) of the regulations is neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor in this case.

Extent of loss or damage to employee
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(7)]

   The employee in this matter was suspended and ultimately replaced. The Secretary invoked an inference that the test result was the likely reason for the suspension. Moreover, Mr. Scrivener testified that he based the suspension on "[t]he information I had collected, the still unresolved shortage of $134 and the disappointing results of the test." (Tr. 207, emphasis added) The Secretary also found, however, that there had been sufficient ground for discharge of the employee even prior to administration of the polygraph test, and that Respondents were entitled to the administer the test under the ongoing investigation exemption (although that entitlement was nullified by its failure to heed post-testing requirements). I find that it was quite possible that this employee would have been discharged or suspended even if the polygraph test had never been administered. (see Respondent's Exhibits 3 to 8; testimony of Richard Scrivener, Tr. at 143 acceptable levels of cash shortages, Tr. at 144-157, 159-161, 173-182, 185-187, 207-208, discussion of circumstances relating to suspicion of employee; and Patsy Dennis, Tr. at 190-206). On the other hand, it cannot be denied that at least part of the immediate motivation for the suspension was the result of the polygraph test, and that it was the proximate contributing factor in the decision to suspend the employee. Thus, at least some of the employee's ultimate loss of employment with Respondents is related to the administration of the polygraph test.

   Although it is likely that the employee suffered some denigration of income by the suspension, the record is devoid of evidence of the quantity of any such loss. In fact, the employee testified that she was working another job at the same time she was working for Respondent, and that she continued that work after the suspension by Respondent. (Tr. 123) Accordingly, I cannot find that the employee suffered any specific economic loss or damage as the result of Respondent's administration of a polygraph test.

   Not all loss or damage is quantifiable in pecuniary terms. The employee here did suffer damage to her legal right to be provided with a copy of the examiner's opinion and questions prior to adverse employment action. Undoubtedly this is the very loss or damage that the civil money penalty is meant to address, however, and it is a neutral factor in terms of mitigation or aggravation of the penalty under the facts and circumstances of this case.

   Thus, I find that although there was probably some pecuniary loss or damage to the employee's income, it is not a significant aggravating factor in this case because


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only part of that loss was directly attributable to the polygraph test (the rest being attributable to the pre-test events leading up to the suspension, such as the employee's history of problems with resolving her cash drawer) and because there is no evidence in the record identifying the scope of that probable loss or damage.

Commitment to future compliance
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(8)]

   In regard to this element, Respondents' point to their commitment "to the field auditor to forego the administration of any other polygraph examination until this matter was finally determined." (Respondents' remand brief at 20; see also Tr. 89-90). This is not a commitment to future compliance, and cannot be considered a mitigating factor. I note the Regional Deputy Administrator's testimony that, in fact, Respondent considered the EPPA to be designed to protect thieves and similar individuals. (Tr. 89) Given the hearsay nature of this testimony, and the fact that this point was not developed at the hearing, I do not consider it to be an aggravating factor in this case.

Knowing and willful violations

   In State Employees Credit Union, the Secretary mentioned as a mitigating factor the absence of a reason to believe that the violations were knowing and willful. In the instant case, the record shows that Respondent provided the employee with a notice that explicitedly states the post-testing requirements. (JX 2, p 3) Thus, it appears to have been a knowing violation. I cannot, however, find that this was a willful violation because Mr. Scrivener's testified that he suspended the employee because he wasn't sure what to do, and needed to talk to the manager and other office personnel. (Tr. at 162) Nonetheless, Mr. Scrivener acted with reckless disregard for the post-testing requirements when he almost immediately suspended the employee upon learning the results of the polygraph test. I find this to be an aggravating factor.

Summary of mitigating and aggravating factors

   In sum, I find one strong mitigating factor in this case -- absence of prior violations. I find as a significant aggravating factor that Mr. Scrivener recklessly disregarded the post-testing requirements of the EPPA, and as a slight aggravating factor Respondents' failure to take steps to obtain the charted responses from the examiner. All other factors listed in 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b) in this case are neither mitigating nor aggravating under the facts of this case, and I find no other mitigating or aggravating factors in the record.

VIOLATION(S) ASSESSED


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   In this matter, the Administrator assessed a penalty of $2,000 for the violation of section 3(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1) (administering an unlawful polygraph), and $10,000 for the violation of section 3(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(3)(taking adverse employment action based on the polygraph results). Specifically, the Administrator provided the following "Penalty Assessments by Statutory Section" as an attachment to its determination letter to Respondents:

Section 3(1): In contravention of this section, the employee named below was unlawfully administered a polygraph examination. The examination was not administered within the scope of the ongoing investigation exemption in that the employee was not provided with a written statement specifying with particularity reasonable suspicion and in that the employer, prior to suspending/terminating the employee, did not satisfy the post-test phase requirements of section 8 of the Act.

          Employee Name                     Penalty Amount
          _____________                      _____________  
          Deana M. Box                              $2,000.

Section 3(3)(B): In contravention of this section, the employee named below was discharged based on the results of an unlawful polygraph examination.

          Employee Name                     Penalty Amount
          _____________                      _____________
          Deana M. Box                            $10,000.

                                                    ___________
      Total Amount of Assessment         $12,000.

(JX 7, p 3)

   In addition, the record contains W-H Form 525 Employee Polygraph Protection Act Civil Money Penalty Report which shows a similar calculation of the civil money penalty by the Compliance Officer. (Respondent's Exhibit 13). The record also contains the testimony of the Deputy Regional Administrator in which he describes how the civil money penalty amount was determined. (Tr. 54-92) In all of this evidence, it is clear that the $2,000 penalty was intended to cover violations of both pre-testing and post-testing requirements, and that the $10,000 penalty was for the actual suspension.


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   The Secretary's Decision and Order in this matter, however, does not rely on § 2002(1) and § 2002(3) violations, but rather only on a § 2007(b) violation. The section 2007(b) violation was that the adverse employment action was taken against an employee without first providing the employee with a written copy of the examiner's opinion and the questions used. This is a single violation.3

   In considering an appropriate penalty, I have considered penalties assessed in other cases reviewed by the Secretary. In State Employees Credit Union, where the record was "replete with mitigating factors", a penalty of ,000 per violation for improper testing was assessed. A separate assessment for discharge was not reached because the Secretary affirmed the ALJ's finding that the employee was not terminated from employment based on the test. In Rapid Robert's Inc., 91-EPP-4 (Sec'y May 1, 1995), the Secretary affirmed the ALJ's assessment of a civil money penalty of $26,000, a case involving 23 separate violations, including unlawful administration of polygraph tests, unlawful threats, unlawful suspensions for refusals to take tests, and an unlawful discharge. In that case mitigating factors included the company's size, good faith attempts to comply, the relative seriousness of the violations, and the finding that the employee's termination was for legitimate business reasons and not as result of the polygraph test.

   Thus, in prior cases involving first offenses with many mitigating factors, civil money penalties fell into the range of ,000 to ,130. In the instant case, the only mitigating factor is the fact that this is a first time offense. A significant aggravating factor is Respondents' reckless disregard for the post-testing requirements. A second aggravating factor, although not a significant one, is the Respondents' weak attempts to obtain the charted responses from the examiner.

   Based on the foregoing, I conclude that a civil money penalty of $2,500 is appropriate in this case.

INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY

   In its remand brief, Respondents contend that Mr. Scrivener should not be held liable individually for the penalty. I find, however, that Mr. Scrivener was properly named as a Respondent pursuant to the reasons stated in Rapid Roberts, Inc., 91-EPP-4, slip op. at 7-8 (May 1, 1995). (see Tr. at 139, sole stockholder; intimately involved in operations; Tr. at 155, made decisions relating to administration of test)

ORDER


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    Respondents are hereby ordered to pay a civil money penalty of $2,500 for the violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(4).

At Washington, D.C.

JOHN M. VITTONE
Chief Administrative Law Judge

JMV/trs

NOTICE OF REVIEW: Within twenty days after the date of this Decision and Order, Respondents, the Administrator, or any other party desiring review, may file with the Secretary a petition for issuance of a Notice of Intent to modify or vacate this Decision and Order. Any such petition must conform to the procedural requirements stated in 29 C.F.R. § 801.69. It should be noted that on April 17, 1996, the Secretary delegated to the Administrative Review Board the authority and responsibility to act for the Secretary of Labor in issuing final agency decisions on questions of law and fact arising in review or on appeal of decisions by ALJs under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (1996).

[ENDNOTES]
1 In this Decision and Order, JX = Joint Exhibits, RX = Respondents' Exhibits, and Tr. = Transcript.

2The ALJ in State Employees Credit Union mischaracterized the reasonable suspicion test, but the Secretary indicated that even under the correct standard, the Respondent meet the test.

3Under the Administrator's logic, many violations could have been found: (1) failure to provide the examiner's opinion, (2) failure to provide the charted responses, (3) failure to provide a copy of the questions, (4) administration of the test in the first place (because the § 2007(b)(4) violation nullified what was, as the Secretary found, an appropriate use of the ongoing investigation exemption, making the administration of the test itself also a violation), (5) taking adverse employment action based on the administration of an improper test. This is a patently unfair scheme for determining a civil money penalty.

   I note that Respondents cited 29 U.S.C. § 2005(a)(1) for the proposition that the maximum civil money penalty that may be assessed under the Act is $10,000. (Respondent's Remand Brief at 11-12) In view of my finding that only a single violation is involved in this case, it is not necessary to address this contention. I observe, however, that the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.40(a)(2) unambiguously states that a civil money penalty may be assessed "for each violation", and I find that this regulation appears to permit cumulative penalties that could exceed $10,000. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 801.67(b), I would not have been permitted to rule on whether section 801.40(a)(2) applies a correct legal interpretation of the Act's limitation on civil money penalties.



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