The Secretary noted, however, that the record was "replete with other
mitigating factors", such as a first time offense, the respondent's effort to comply, and
absence of a reason to believe that the violations were knowing and willful.
The Secretary also directed that the ALJ consider on remand the
regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b), which provides:
(b) In determining the amount of penalty to be assessed for any
violation of the Act or this part, the Administrator will consider the previous record of the
employer in terms of compliance with the Act and regulations, the gravity of the
violations, and other pertinent factors. The matters which may be considered include, but
are not limited to, the following--
(1) Previous history of investigation(s) or violation(s) of the Act or this
part;
(2) The number of employees or prospective employees affected by the violation or
violations;
(3) The seriousness of the violation or violations;
(4) Efforts made in good faith to comply with the provisions of the Act and this part;
(5) If the violations resulted from the actions or inactions of an examiners, the steps
taken by the employer to ensure the examiner complied with the Act and the
regulations in this part, and the extent to which the employer could
reasonably
[Page 3]
have foreseen the examiner's actions or inactions;
(6) The explanation of the employer, including whether the violations were the result
of a bona fide dispute of doubtful legal certainty;
(7) The extent to which the employee(s) or prospective employee(s) suffered loss or
damage;
(8) Commitment to future compliance, taking into account the public interest and
whether the employer has previously violated the provisions of the Act or this
part.
Prior record
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(1)]
In this case, Respondents have not been shown to have a previous record
of any kind in regard to compliance or noncompliance with the EPPA. I find that the absence of
a previous record of noncompliance is a significant mitigating factor.
Gravity of the violation
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(2) and (3)]
The gravity of the violation factor has both mitigating and nonmitigating
elements. Only one employee was involved. (see Tr. at 217) The Secretary held that
there were sufficient grounds to discharge that employee even prior to the administration of the
polygraph test, and that Respondents were entitled to administer a polygraph test pursuant to the
ongoing investigation exception (although that entitlement was nullified when they didn't comply
with post-test requirements). Respondents' non-compliance only involved one element of the
post-testing requirements for the ongoing investigation exemption. I also note Respondents'
somewhat ironic argument that its choice to administer a polygraph test before implementing any
discipline was, in a sense, an exhibition of restraint. I note that the employee did not believe that
there was any malice involved by Respondents in administering the polygraph test. (Tr. at 217)
It appears, however, that the final decision to suspend the employee was
made as a proximate result of the polygraph test, even if it was only a contributing factor to the
suspension. When Respondents' chose to administer a polygraph test, the employee was entitled
to the specific protections of the EPPA. Moreover, compliance with the requirement of
providing an employee with copies of the test examiner's opinion and questions used during the
test prior to taking any adverse employment action should not have been a difficult or ambiguous
matter with which to comply. Respondents' decision to almost immediately suspend the
[Page 4]
employee, many days before the materials were provided to her, cannot be easily written off as a
"technical" violation. (see Respondents' remand brief at 19).
Balancing these factors, I find that the gravity of the violation element is
neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor in this matter.
Good faith compliance
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(4)]
In regard to the factor of good faith compliance with the EPPA, nothing
in the circumstances surrounding the violation at issue show a reason for mitigation
(e.g ., that attempts to provide the employee with the materials had failed, or that
Respondent had a good faith belief that the employee had been provided with the materials). It
appears that Respondents otherwise complied with the EPPA - but I find that this is a neutral
factor in regard to the violation at issue rather than a mitigating factor.
Test examiner's inactions
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(5)]
Respondents testified that the charted responses were never sent to the
employee because they were never received from the examiner. See Sec'y Dec., Slip op.
at 5, citing Tr. at 163, 183. I do not consider this to be a mitigating factor, however, because
there is no evidence that Respondents made any effort to obtain the materials after they became
aware that they were missing. Rather, this factor has a slight aggravating effect in that it shows a
lack of commitment by Respondents to supplying the employee with test results in compliance
with the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.25(a)(2). The aggravating effect of this lack of
initiative, however, is dampened by the test examiner's evidently being the person who did not
supply the test results.
Respondents' explanations, including "doubtful legal certainty"
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(6)]
Respondents' explanation is essentially that it only suspended the
employee, and gave her a chance to respond to the test. (see Respondents' remand brief
at 6-7, 14-15) Thus, Respondents pin part of the blame on the employee for not responding to a
note enclosed with the test questions when they finally were sent to the employee asking her to
call if she wished to discuss the examination. I do not find any particular mitigating effect of the
fact that Respondents technically only suspended the employee or that the employee did not
respond to the note. The EPPA requires refrain from "any adverse employment
action" prior to providing the required materials to the employee.
Respondent has not argued that the violation at issue was "the
[Page 5]
result of a bona fide dispute of doubtful legal certainty", and I find that this is not a
mitigating factor.
I find that the element described by section 801.42(b)(6) of the
regulations is neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor in this case.
Extent of loss or damage to employee
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(7)]
The employee in this matter was suspended and ultimately replaced. The
Secretary invoked an inference that the test result was the likely reason for the suspension.
Moreover, Mr. Scrivener testified that he based the suspension on "[t]he information I had
collected, the still unresolved shortage of $134 and the disappointing results of the
test ." (Tr. 207, emphasis added) The Secretary also found, however, that there had
been sufficient ground for discharge of the employee even prior to administration of the
polygraph test, and that Respondents were entitled to the administer the test under the ongoing
investigation exemption (although that entitlement was nullified by its failure to heed
post-testing
requirements). I find that it was quite possible that this employee would have been discharged or
suspended even if the polygraph test had never been administered. (see Respondent's
Exhibits 3 to 8; testimony of Richard Scrivener, Tr. at 143 acceptable levels of cash shortages,
Tr. at 144-157, 159-161, 173-182, 185-187, 207-208, discussion of circumstances relating to
suspicion of employee; and Patsy Dennis, Tr. at 190-206). On the other hand, it cannot be
denied
that at least part of the immediate motivation for the suspension was the result of the polygraph
test, and that it was the proximate contributing factor in the decision to suspend the employee.
Thus, at least some of the employee's ultimate loss of employment with Respondents is related to
the administration of the polygraph test.
Although it is likely that the employee suffered some denigration of
income by the suspension, the record is devoid of evidence of the quantity of any such loss. In
fact, the employee testified that she was working another job at the same time she was working
for Respondent, and that she continued that work after the suspension by Respondent. (Tr. 123)
Accordingly, I cannot find that the employee suffered any specific economic loss or damage as
the result of Respondent's administration of a polygraph test.
Not all loss or damage is quantifiable in pecuniary terms. The employee
here did suffer damage to her legal right to be provided with a copy of the examiner's opinion
and
questions prior to adverse employment action. Undoubtedly this is the very loss or damage that
the civil money penalty is meant to address, however, and it is a neutral factor in terms of
mitigation or aggravation of the penalty under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Thus, I find that although there was probably some pecuniary loss or
damage to the employee's income, it is not a significant aggravating factor in this case because
[Page 6]
only part of that loss was directly attributable to the polygraph test (the rest being attributable to
the pre-test events leading up to the suspension, such as the employee's history of problems with
resolving her cash drawer) and because there is no evidence in the record identifying the scope of
that probable loss or damage.
Commitment to future compliance
[29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(8)]
In regard to this element, Respondents' point to their commitment
"to the field auditor to forego the administration of any other polygraph examination until
this matter was finally determined." (Respondents' remand brief at 20; see also Tr.
89-90). This is not a commitment to future compliance, and cannot be considered a mitigating
factor. I note the Regional Deputy Administrator's testimony that, in fact, Respondent
considered
the EPPA to be designed to protect thieves and similar individuals. (Tr. 89) Given the hearsay
nature of this testimony, and the fact that this point was not developed at the hearing, I do not
consider it to be an aggravating factor in this case.
Knowing and willful violations
In State Employees Credit Union , the Secretary mentioned as a
mitigating factor the absence of a reason to believe that the violations were knowing and willful.
In the instant case, the record shows that Respondent provided the employee with a notice that
explicitedly states the post-testing requirements. (JX 2, p 3) Thus, it appears to have been a
knowing violation. I cannot, however, find that this was a willful violation because Mr.
Scrivener's testified that he suspended the employee because he wasn't sure what to do, and
needed to talk to the manager and other office personnel. (Tr. at 162) Nonetheless, Mr.
Scrivener acted with reckless disregard for the post-testing requirements when he almost
immediately suspended the employee upon learning the results of the polygraph test. I find this
to be an aggravating factor.
Summary of mitigating and aggravating factors
In sum, I find one strong mitigating factor in this case -- absence of prior
violations. I find as a significant aggravating factor that Mr. Scrivener recklessly disregarded the
post-testing requirements of the EPPA, and as a slight aggravating factor Respondents' failure to
take steps to obtain the charted responses from the examiner. All other factors listed in 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.42(b) in this case are neither mitigating nor aggravating under the facts of this case,
and I find no other mitigating or aggravating factors in the record.
VIOLATION(S) ASSESSED
[Page 7]
In this matter, the Administrator assessed a penalty of $2,000 for the
violation of section 3(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1) (administering an unlawful
polygraph), and $10,000 for the violation of section 3(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
2002(3)(taking adverse employment action based on the polygraph results). Specifically, the
Administrator provided the following "Penalty Assessments by Statutory
Section " as an attachment to its determination letter to Respondents:
Section 3(1) : In contravention of this section, the employee named
below was unlawfully administered a polygraph examination. The examination was not
administered within the scope of the ongoing investigation exemption in that the
employee was not provided with a written statement specifying with particularity
reasonable suspicion and in that the employer, prior to suspending/terminating the
employee, did not satisfy the post-test phase requirements of section 8 of the Act.
Employee Name Penalty Amount
_____________ _____________
Deana M. Box $2,000.
Section 3(3)(B) : In contravention of this section, the employee
named below was discharged based on the results of an unlawful polygraph examination.
Employee Name Penalty Amount
_____________ _____________
Deana M. Box $10,000.
___________
Total Amount of Assessment $12,000.
(JX 7, p 3)
In addition, the record contains W-H Form 525 Employee Polygraph
Protection Act Civil Money Penalty Report which shows a similar calculation of the civil money
penalty by the Compliance Officer. (Respondent's Exhibit 13). The record also contains the
testimony of the Deputy Regional Administrator in which he describes how the civil money
penalty amount was determined. (Tr. 54-92) In all of this evidence, it is clear that the $2,000
penalty was intended to cover violations of both pre-testing and post-testing requirements, and
that the $10,000 penalty was for the actual suspension.
[Page 8]
The Secretary's Decision and Order in this matter, however, does not rely
on § 2002(1) and § 2002(3) violations, but rather only on a § 2007(b)
violation. The section 2007(b) violation was that the adverse employment action was taken
against an employee without first providing the employee with a written copy of the examiner's
opinion and the questions used. This is a single violation.3
In considering an appropriate penalty, I have considered penalties
assessed in other cases reviewed by the Secretary. In State Employees Credit Union ,
where the record was "replete with mitigating factors", a penalty of ,000 per
violation for improper testing was assessed. A separate assessment for discharge was not
reached because the Secretary affirmed the ALJ's finding that the employee was not terminated
from employment based on the test. In Rapid Robert's Inc. , 91-EPP-4 (Sec'y May 1,
1995), the Secretary affirmed the ALJ's assessment of a civil money penalty of $26,000, a case
involving 23 separate violations, including unlawful administration of polygraph tests, unlawful
threats, unlawful suspensions for refusals to take tests, and an unlawful discharge. In that case
mitigating factors included the company's size, good faith attempts to comply, the relative
seriousness of the violations, and the finding that the employee's termination was for legitimate
business reasons and not as result of the polygraph test.
Thus, in prior cases involving first offenses with many mitigating
factors, civil money penalties fell into the range of ,000 to ,130. In the instant case, the only
mitigating factor is the fact that this is a first time offense. A significant aggravating factor is
Respondents' reckless disregard for the post-testing requirements. A second aggravating factor,
although not a significant one, is the Respondents' weak attempts to obtain the charted responses
from the examiner.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that a civil money penalty of $2,500
is appropriate in this case.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
In its remand brief, Respondents contend that Mr. Scrivener should not
be held liable individually for the penalty. I find, however, that Mr. Scrivener was properly
named as a Respondent pursuant to the reasons stated in Rapid Roberts, Inc ., 91-EPP-4,
slip op. at 7-8 (May 1, 1995). (see Tr. at 139, sole stockholder; intimately involved in
operations; Tr. at 155, made decisions relating to administration of test)
ORDER
[Page 9]
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay a civil money penalty of
$2,500 for the violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(4).
At Washington, D.C.
JOHN M. VITTONE
Chief Administrative Law Judge
JMV/trs
NOTICE OF REVIEW : Within twenty days after the date of this Decision and
Order, Respondents, the Administrator, or any other party desiring review, may file with the
Secretary a petition for issuance of a Notice of Intent to modify or vacate this Decision and
Order. Any such petition must conform to the procedural requirements stated in 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.69. It should be noted that on April 17, 1996, the Secretary delegated to the
Administrative Review Board the authority and responsibility to act for the Secretary of Labor in
issuing final agency decisions on questions of law and fact arising in review or on appeal of
decisions by ALJs under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. See 61 Fed. Reg.
19978 (1996).
[ENDNOTES]
1 In this Decision and Order, JX =
Joint Exhibits, RX = Respondents' Exhibits, and Tr. = Transcript.
2 The ALJ in State Employees
Credit Union mischaracterized the reasonable suspicion test, but the Secretary indicated that
even under the correct standard, the Respondent meet the test.
3 Under the Administrator's logic,
many violations could have been found: (1) failure to provide the examiner's opinion, (2) failure
to provide the charted responses, (3) failure to provide a copy of the questions, (4) administration
of the test in the first place (because the § 2007(b)(4) violation nullified what was, as the
Secretary found, an appropriate use of the ongoing investigation exemption, making the
administration of the test itself also a violation), (5) taking adverse employment action based on
the administration of an improper test. This is a patently unfair scheme for determining a civil
money penalty.
I note that Respondents cited 29 U.S.C. § 2005(a)(1) for the
proposition that the maximum civil money penalty that may be assessed under the Act is
$10,000. (Respondent's Remand Brief at 11-12) In view of my finding that only a single
violation is involved in this case, it is not necessary to address this contention. I observe,
however, that the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 801.40(a)(2) unambiguously states that a civil
money penalty may be assessed "for each violation", and I find that this regulation
appears to permit cumulative penalties that could exceed $10,000. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
801.67(b), I would not have been permitted to rule on whether section 801.40(a)(2) applies a
correct legal interpretation of the Act's limitation on civil money penalties.