~~TOP SECRET (When Filled In)~~

1176

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

19 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : [redacted] Report

1. Enclosed is a [redacted] report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword [redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [redacted] is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. This report must be handled in accordance with established security procedures. It may not be reproduced for any purpose. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]
John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

FIRDB-312/00112-84

Distribution:

Director of Central Intelligence

Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

[redacted]

Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR/Warsaw Pact/Poland

DATE OF INFO. 1970

DATE 19 January 1984

SUBJECT

Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document, classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE, on training material from a course of the Soviet General Staff Academy, entitled "Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery." The material emphasizes the necessity for constant readiness of rocket troops for a first nuclear strike against enemy installations. The role of the Special Purpose Missile Forces is discussed, and the objectives of the first nuclear strike. Cooperation and coordination between missile forces and aviation is stressed. Artillery is cited as the primary fire support of the ground forces, and certain changes have been made in the structure of artillery units to aid in fulfilling this mission.

End of Summary

[redacted]

[redacted]

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
GENERAL STAFF

SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

TRAINING MATERIALS

FROM A COURSE CONDUCTED
AT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Compiled by
Brig Gen Jerzy SKALSKI
Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery
of the Warsaw Military District

EMPLOYMENT OF ROCKET TROOPS AND ARTILLERY

Combat operations in a future war will take place under conditions of use of mass destruction weapons or threat of their use. However, in any case rocket troops must be in constant readiness for conducting the first nuclear strike. Up to the time weapons of mass destruction are used the artillery, in coordination with aviation, will be involved in support of operations. The artillery becomes the principal means of fire response in front operations; therefore, special attention must be paid to its further qualitative and quantitative development.

I. EMPLOYMENT OF ROCKET TROOPS

The current principles on the use of rocket troops in operations remain in force as before. Only the concept of the first nuclear strike has been expanded. The role, position, and task of front rocket troops in a first nuclear strike launched by strategic nuclear forces has been defined more accurately.

The first nuclear strike launched by strategic forces is defined as the delivery of a first massed strike by all nuclear delivery means, conducted at the beginning or during war, in a short period of time, in accordance with a uniform plan prepared by the High Command already in peacetime, for the purpose of attaining the main strategic objectives in combat.

A decisive role is played by Special Purpose Missile Forces who maintain missiles in [illegible] combat readiness.

The first nuclear strike consists of the following:

[redacted]

- a first nuclear strike launched against enemy targets throughout the world. In this case strikes are launched by Special Purpose Missile Forces, long-range aviation and nuclear-powered submarines;

- a first nuclear strike launched against targets in each theater of military operations. Strategic nuclear forces, rocket troops and aviation of the fronts take part in this strike.

The duration of the first nuclear strike in the case of the aforementioned nuclear forces varies between H and H + 5 hours. A schematic diagram of the first nuclear strike is in Attachment 1.

The main strategic objectives of the first nuclear strike are as follows:

1. Disrupting and weakening the enemy military-economic potential, disorganizing state control systems and national armed forces, and weakening the morale of the population and armed forces.

Destroying enemy ground and air strategic nuclear attack means, making it impossible to conduct a first mass nuclear strike against theaters of military operations.

3. Inflicting upon the enemy in a short period of time losses in principal forces and means of main branches of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations, depriving the enemy of the ability to offer organized resistance.

It was assumed during front war games that the strategic nuclear forces will deliver in the zone of operations of the front [3 digits illegible] nuclear strikes amounting to 220.5 MT, destroying [3 digits illegible] targets situated west of the strike area of the strategic nuclear forces at the distance of [illegible] km from the national borders. Consequently, [illegible] were not utilized. Of the total number of [illegible] nuclear strike objectives, the plan called for the following:

- destruction of most important industrial projects [illegible];

- [illegible].

[Seven paragraphs illegible.]

In the first variant--the plan called for conducting a first nuclear strike against the enemy permanent troop installations.

For this purpose:

1) the following forces and means were committed:

- rocket troops--all operational-tactical missile brigades of the first echelon army of the front and front brigades--69 launchers altogether;

- aviation--24 nuclear weapons carrier aircraft each from fighter-assault aviation and bomber aviation divisions--total 72 aircraft.

The total yield of all nuclear means amounted to 5.8 MT.

2) The following missions were outlined:

- to destroy all enemy operational-tactical nuclear attack means and parts of airfields with nuclear ammunition depots --13 targets;

- to destroy (neutralize) all enemy divisions deployed in the first operational echelon --13 targets;

and to inflict upon them the following losses:

a) on the main axis--about 60 percent losses;

b) on secondary axes--about 30 percent losses;

- to disorganize the command system and antiaircraft defense (HAWK battalions) --22 targets

Total: --48 targets.

3) The procedure of the first nuclear strike:

- the missile troops conducted the strikes within a period of 5 minutes;

- immediately following the strikes of the missile troops, the air force conducted strikes against newly detected nuclear attack means and troops who had departed from garrisons.

In the second variant --the plan called for conducting a first nuclear strike against enemy fixed targets and troops departing from garrisons, and on routes leading to their deployment areas. For this purpose:

a) 12 additional tactical missile battalions were committed from tactical large units deployed in the border zone.

The total volume of means increased from 141 in the first variant to 170, whereas their yield increased to 7.5 MT.

b) not substantively changing, a different procedure was defined for conducting a first nuclear strike, the time of which increased to 40 minutes;

- in the first sequence the plan called for missile troops to conduct strikes against fixed targets, i.e. "S" and HAWK missile battalions, and also against nuclear ammunition dumps and airfields, thereby creating conditions for air strikes (25 nuclear strikes);

- in the second sequence the plan called for air strikes from H + 10-15 minutes and H + 30-40 minutes (72 strikes) against moving targets with additional simultaneous reconnaissance on behalf of the missile troops;

- in the third sequence the plan called for conducting, based on additional reconnaissance, strikes lasting between H + 25 minutes and H + 40 minutes by all other missile means (70 strikes) against installations and targets of enemy tactical large units.

Under the third variant--possibilities were studied for conducting a first nuclear strike in the course of an operation which started without the use of nuclear weapons. Under these conditions a partial decentralization was assumed, transferring some tasks to armies and divisions. Maintaining general control on the front level, tasks were assigned to be executed on specific levels of command, as follows:

a) On the front level:

- organization of reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance with front means;
- specifying the sequence of attaining a degree of readiness by the army operational-tactical missile brigades and artillery, and also the preparation time for conducting a first strike;
- planning the movements of front operational-tactical missile brigades and army operational-tactical missile brigades;
- accurately identifying tasks for tactical missile battalions of individual armies.

b) On the army level:

- organization of reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance with army means;
- ensuring readiness of army operational-tactical missile brigades to conduct tasks envisioned in the plan for a first nuclear strike by the front;
- planning the use of tactical missile battalions in a first nuclear strike and organizing their movement to other locations during operations.

c) On the division level:

- organization of reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance with division means;

- ensuring readiness of tactical missile battalions for conducting tasks envisioned in the plan of the first nuclear strike by the front in the portion pertaining to a specific army.

Characteristic of planning a first nuclear strike under this variant will be continuous [illegible] nuclear strikes and maintenance in a state of full readiness of the maximum number of missile launchers for launching strikes, particularly [illegible].

Under conditions of appropriate organization of command, [illegible], reconnaissance (additional reconnaissance) and maintenance of missile troops in a high state of combat readiness, it is possible to ensure simultaneous [illegible] of all launchers envisioned for participation in the first nuclear strike.

II. USE OF ARTILLERY

Artillery continues to remain the primary fire support of the ground forces. Its role on the modern battlefield is not only not diminishing, but on the contrary, it is increasing, particularly in operations conducted with the use of nuclear weapons, where artillery discharges the principal tasks of preparatory fire and operational support. Its main tasks during the past war included engaging tactical attack means of the enemy.

In operations conducted without the use of nuclear weapons the basic factors for using artillery will be the following:

- mass use of artillery on axes of the main assault. In such a case, in conducting the tasks for a short period of time [...illegible].

- constant support of infantry operations [illegible] during the entire offensive operation.

A distinctive feature in the use of artillery on the contemporary battlefield is full exploitation of experiences gained during the final phase of World War II. In this connection, after the introduction of appropriate changes adapted to the situation and conditions suitable for the contemporary battlefield, the artillery successfully carries out the most complex tasks. To this end, many changes were made in the field of organization, and its quality has also been improved.

These changes are as follows:

a) in the field of organization of individual levels of command the following have been introduced:

- in the mechanized infantry battalion:

  a) 120-mm mortar battery--6 mortars;

  b) antitank platoon --2 MALYUTKA ATGM launchers;

  --2 SPG-9 guns.

- in the mechanized regiment:

  a) 122-mm howitzer battery--6 guns;

  b) SHMEL ATGM battery --9 launchers.

- in the mechanized (armored) division:

  a) artillery regiment composed of two 122-mm howitzer battalions and one 152-mm howitzer battalion (in armored division--three 122-mm howitzer battalions).

  Total--54 guns;

  b) BM-21 rocket artillery battalion--18 launchers;

  c) antitank artillery battalion (only in mechanized divisions--[illegible]...smooth-bore guns--18 guns.

- in combined arms army:

a) army gun artillery brigade composed of;

- two 130-mm gun battalions;

- two 152-mm gun battalions.

Total--72 guns

b) army antitank artillery regiments composed of:

- two 100-mm smooth-bore battalions;

- one SHMEL ATGM battalion.

Total--34 [?] antitank weapons.

In addition, the following appear in the composition of the artillery of the high command reserve:

a) artillery divisions, each having:

- one 130-mm gun artillery regiment [...illegible] battalions;

- one BM-21 rocket artillery regiment [...illegible] battalions;

- two heavy artillery regiments with six 152 [?] -mm howitzer battalions each.

Total in division--232 [?] guns.

b) antitank artillery brigades, each having:

- two or three regiments (battalions) with [illegible] 100-mm smooth-bore guns each;

- one or two SHMEL ATGM regiments (bn) with 26 launchers each.

Total--96 antitank weapons.

In sum, tactical large units have the following weapons:

	Mech div	Armd div
- for indirect fire	144	96
- antitank weapons	99	27
Total	243	123

On the basis of these weapons, depending on the role and position in an operation (combat) of the operational (tactical) large unit and its task, artillery support may be as follows:

- a front composed of six armies (including two armored) may receive 2-4 artillery divisions and 2-3 antitank brigades;
- a combined arms army composed of 5-6 divisions (including 1-2 armored) may receive 0.5-1.5 artillery divisions and up to one antitank brigade;
- mechanized (armored) division [illegible] artillery battalions.

Qualitative improvements in artillery equipment were achieved by introducing the following:

- in a battalion--20-mm mortars replaced 82-mm mortars;
- in a mechanized regiment--122-mm battery replaced [?] battery;
- in the division artillery regiment one battalion of 122-mm heavy [illegible] was introduced, and in rocket artillery battalion BM-21 launchers were replaced [illegible] by BM-24 launchers.

In addition, the necessity is stressed for greater use of self-propelled artillery, which in the future will replace towed artillery. This is justified by the necessity for conducting operations under conditions of use of nuclear weapons, and in contaminated areas, and also due to the fact that self-propelled

artillery because of its armor will maintain greater survivability. In addition, since it is more maneuverable, self-propelled artillery is more capable of providing continuous support for mechanized and armored units.

In general, it should be emphasized that the trends of artillery development in the Soviet Army are:

- to further improve the maneuverability of basic equipment;
- to increase the range and accuracy of fire;
- to increase the fire destruction force (power) of artillery rounds;
- to ensure protection for crews against effects of enemy nuclear strikes.

In addition to the aforementioned changes, procedures in use of artillery are being improved, utilizing fully the experience gained in the past war. I will discuss in succession the most essential changes.

1. Artillery support for a breakthrough of enemy defenses prepared in advance.

In a developing front offensive operation the troops may encounter enemy defenses prepared in advance. Therefore it will be necessary to effect a breakthrough. The front is capable of breaking through enemy defenses prepared in advance:

a) at separate army breakthrough sectors (1-2 breakthroughs for each first operational echelon army);

b) at joint breakthrough sectors, at a contact point of two adjacent armies;

c) with simultaneous participation of both armies in the aforementioned cases.

In all instances the density at breakthrough sectors should be 80-120 guns per kilometer. At the same time the following density of guns is taken into consideration, contingent on the enemy, e.g., for the breakthrough of a defending mechanized Belgian or Netherlands division 80 guns per kilometer are required and for FRG, UK, and U.S.--100 guns per kilometer; for a breakthrough of FRG and U.S. armored divisions--110 to 120 guns per kilometer.

The width of a breakthrough sector for a Soviet division is designated at up to 4 kilometers, and for an army--8 to 12 kilometers, depending on the number of divisions participating in the breakthrcugh of enemy defenses.

During one war game the 12th Army (4 mechanized divisions and 2 armored divisions), with forces of two armored divisions, made a breakthrough of the defenses of a FRG armored division. At a joint breakthrough sector were concentrated the organic artillery of two armored divisions, an army gun artillery brigade, and one artillery division of the High Command reserve, in all 516 guns and mortars, making it possible to attain a concentration of 100 guns per kilometer on a 5.2 kilometer sector. Consequently, the divisions broke through enemy defenses in sectors of 2.6 kilometers each.

2. Organization of artillery groups.

Under current practice the organization of tactical artillery groups is adapted to the level of regiment (regimental artillery group) and division (divisional artillery group). Army artillery groups composed of 4-5 battalions are also organized in the Soviet Army for the following purpose:

- combatting enemy tactical nuclear attack means and his artillery, primarily nuclear;
- supporting the repulse of counterattacks and counteroffensives;
- supporting the commitment of the army second echelon to battle and carrying out other army tasks.

In justified instances the army artillery group may be divided into two groups. It is also planned to subordinate the army artillery groups or subgroups to the division operating on the main axis of attack or to the division committed to battle.

3. Deployment of artillery.

In order to support the continuity of defense of the border zone, and to ensure deployment of the main front (army) forces for offensive operations, a forward defense zone and subsequent defense zones are established in the border region. Directly on the border detached units are deployed, one each per first echelon tactical large unit of the army, within the composition of a reinforced mechanized (tank) regiment. Under cover of a detached unit the artillery is deployed in the following order: a regimental artillery group of a detached unit (2-4 battalions), a divisional antitank reserve unit and all or part of the tactical missile battalion.

All other artillery is deployed within groupings of main division forces.

In the course of offensive operations a situation may arise where it will be necessary to cross the enemy forward defense area in order to make a breakthrough in his previously prepared defense zone. In such an event artillery should be deployed in advance forward of the enemy defense line for the following purpose:

- [illegible] likely countermeasures; and

- in order that the artillery may take part in preparatory fire necessary to penetrate the enemy defenses.

The sequence of artillery deployment will be as follows:

a) artillery subunits from the composition of detached units (advance guard);

b) artillery reconnaissance subunits of tactical and operational large units;

c) regimental artillery groups, [illegible], division antitank units, and division and army artillery groups.

For deploying artillery, conducting reconnaissance, amending prepared plans, and for assigning tasks for divisional artillery the time is set at 2-4 hours.

On the army level the time for organizing a breakthrough of an enemy defense previously prepared on the main axis of attack is set at 2 to 4 [?] hours, including 1 to 2 [?] daylight hours.

4. Fire support of an offensive.

This is organized at appropriate command levels in accordance with currently approved and applied principles; however, a new factor is the conduct of offensive support by successive concentration of fire for more effective neutralization of enemy antitank means and armored combat vehicles deployed at company (platoon) resistance points. Successive concentration of fire in this instance is conducted on two lines:

a) first line--enemy resistance points will be [illegible] of attacking troops;

b) second line--resistance points located [illegible] at a near distance from the first line, from where the enemy antitank means could conduct--[illegible]. [Remainder of text illegible.]

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM AND TIME OF USE OF FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE (VARIANT)

Legend:

LRBA--long-range bomber aviation
LRA--long-range aviation
SPMF--special purpose missile forces
[illegible]--illegible

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/HANDLE VIA

Page 18 of 18 Pages

Attachment 1