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14 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations


SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The New Field
Service Regulations of the Armed
Forces of the USSR

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article provides an organized and informative discussion of the Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which are a revised and updated version of the 1959 regulations, and as such reflect the changed nature of combat actions brought about largely by the development of weapons of mass destruction and the increased fire power and capabilities for maneuver. Among the specific matters highlighted in the article are command and control, reconnaissance, the conduct of a meeting battle, organizing an offensive both with and without nuclear weapons, and defensive actions. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon

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
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 32 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF INFO. Early 1964

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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The New Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov. This article provides an organized and informative discussion of the Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which are a revised and updated version of the previous regulations of 1959, and as such reflect the changed nature of combat actions brought about largely by the development of weapons of mass destruction and the increased fire power and capabilities for maneuver. Among the specific matters highlighted in the article are command and control, reconnaissance, the conduct of a meeting battle, organizing an offensive both with and without nuclear weapons, and defensive actions. End of Summary

[Redacted]

Comment:

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov was Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR from 1961 to 1972. He also wrote "Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War" in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 ([Redacted]) and "Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War" in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966 [Redacted]

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The New Field Service Regulations of
the Armed Forces of the USSR


by
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. CHUYKOV

The issuance of new regulations is always a major event in the life of the Armed Forces. This is due to the fact that in the regulations which are derived from the level achieved in the development of means of armed combat, the methods of their employment are set forth in the most concise way and methods of combat training of troops are specified.

As the means of armed combat develop, the organization of the troops changes, the theory of their combat employment develops, and this, naturally, requires a revision of the regulations. In the past, inasmuch as the means of armed combat developed slowly, regulations were in existence for a long period of time. Thus, for instance, in the Russian Army the military regulations of 1716 were in existence for 39 years, the infantry regulations of 1763 for 33 years, and the military regulations of 1855 for 26 years. Subsequently, under conditions of rapidly developing capitalism when the rate of development of industrial forces and, along with that, the development of means of armed combat grew immeasurably, the regulations were changed more often as well. The length of their existence on the average amounted to seven to ten years.

The regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces, being sort of landmarks, marking the level of development of Soviet military theory and practice, changed as the economic and military strength of the Soviet state grew. Thus, the appearance of nuclear weapons and of other of the latest technical means of mass destruction brought about a revolution in military affairs. It is natural that this required a fundamental revision of the existing regulations.

The accomplishment of this complex and large task occurred gradually. And this is completely natural. We were dealing with weapons which were new in principle, but we lacked experience in their employment. In the initial period when nuclear weapons



were just being mastered, regulations documents being drafted reflected the search for the most suitable methods for their employment and for new forms of combat employment of the troops. These matters were more completely reflected in the form of a specific system of views, only in the Field Service Regulations of 1959 and in the corresponding combat regulations, which played a positive role in the training of our troops for actions in a missile/nuclear war.

At the present time, the Ground Forces have missiles capable of employing nuclear warheads with a yield up to 600 kilotons and of delivering nuclear strikes to a depth of 500 kilometers. Motorized rifle and tank divisions have missile battalions in their composition which can employ nuclear warheads with a yield of from three to 20 kilotons. Divisions have modern means of reconnaissance, qualitatively new tanks, rocket and tube artillery, highly effective antitank means including antitank missiles, improved means of air defense, various engineer equipment, new types of transport vehicles with a cross-country capability, and radioelectronic means. The fire power, striking power, and mobility of our combined-arms large units and units and the Ground Forces as a whole have grown. In recent years, other branches of the armed forces have also undergone rapid development.


All of this has led to further change in the content of the modern operation and battle. They have acquired an exceptionally decisive, highly maneuverable, and dynamic nature. Combat actions are developed on a broad front and to a great depth and are conducted at high rates of speed.

Changes in the means of combat and the nature of the operation and battle have required solving the problems of their organization and conduct in a new way. This brought about the fact that at the beginning of 1961 a decision was made concerning the revision of the Field Service Regulations and combat regulations.

At the present time, the new Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR which have been received by the troops have been drafted and approved by the Minister of Defense. It is a document of major importance in which is expressed a system of views accepted by us on the nature of modern

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
combined-arms combat, the methods of its organization and conduct, and methods of combat training of the troops.

The present article does not have as its goal a discussion of the entire contents of the regulations or even of all the new provisions included in them. That would be too far-reaching a task for one article. Its goal is to focus attention on certain of the most important fundamental provisions and, at least briefly, reveal why they were so stated and why they are so resolved in the new Field Service Regulations, so as to assist generals and officers in correctly understanding them.

The theoretical foundations of the regulations. First of all, it is necessary to dwell, at least briefly, upon the most important principles which formed the basis in drafting the regulations.

In order to fulfil their historical purpose -- to reliably protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people who are building communism, the Soviet Armed Forces must be prepared at any time to deliver a crushing blow against the imperialist aggressors who have dared to attack our Homeland and other countries of the socialist camp. If the imperialists unleash war, then the Soviet Armed Forces will conduct combat actions with the goal of the complete (annihilation) of the enemy. For this purpose they have all of the necessary modern means of armed combat at their disposal and are ready for combat actions both in a nuclear war and in any armed conflict in which only conventional types of weapons will be employed.

In a nuclear war, the main means of destruction of the enemy are nuclear weapons. The increase within the Ground Forces of the means of employing nuclear weapons, the quantity of allocated nuclear munitions, and their overall yield leads to the fact that nuclear weapons have begun to play a decisive role in the defeat of the enemy not only in war as a whole but in an operation and battle. Their skilful employment provides the capability of destroying the enemy's means of mass destruction, of inflicting heavy losses on his personnel and equipment in a short time, of destroying installations and other targets, of creating zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain, and also of exerting a strong influence on the morale of the enemy's troops.





The decisive role of nuclear weapons, however, does not mean that they are the only means of achieving victory in a battle, in an operation, or in war as a whole. And under modern conditions, success in battle is achieved through the combined efforts of all branch arms of the Ground Forces and other branches of the Armed Forces. The combined-arms nature of battle is corroborated to an even greater degree. And in connection with this, the role of cooperation among all the forces and means participating in it is growing.


The decisive role in the ultimate defeat of the ground enemy belongs to the Ground Forces. By exploiting the results of the employment of strategic means of mass destruction and also their own nuclear, chemical, and conventional means, and widely employing airborne landing forces, they are able to advance swiftly, inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy troops, take control of his territory, and firmly hold the captured lines and areas.

All branch arms and special troops within the composition of the Ground Forces will take part in accomplishing these tasks. At the present time, the Ground Forces consist of motorized rifle, tank, and airborne troops, rocket troops and artillery and air defense troops, and also special troops, i.e., engineer, chemical, communications, radiotechnical, motor transport, road, railroad, and others. Special troops are designated for support of the combat activity of the Ground Forces.

Thus, instead of infantry, we have a qualitatively new branch arm -- the motorized rifle troops who possess a significantly greater combat capability and who are better adapted for actions under conditions of nuclear war.

A new branch arm has appeared within the composition of the Ground Forces -- the rocket troops, who are the main means of employing nuclear weapons. They are designated for destroying with nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions, the enemy's nuclear attack means, the main groupings of his troops, and other important targets throughout the depth of the operational disposition.

As before, the tank troops remain the main striking force of the Ground Forces, the combat characteristics of which allow them





to most efficiently exploit the results of the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, to conduct efficient, highly maneuverable combat actions, and to strive for a decisive defeat of the enemy in a short time, and also to rapidly negotiate large contaminated zones.

The troops must primarily be ready to operate in the initial period of war, the role of which at present has grown immeasurably. Therefore, in the regulations, the conditions of combat actions in the initial period of a war are considered first.


The main type of combat actions of troops, as in the past, is the offensive. Only a decisive offensive conducted at high rates of speed and to a great depth will ensure the complete defeat of the enemy. The role and relative proportion of meeting engagements in the overall system of combat actions has grown considerably, especially in the initial period of war.

In a situation when an offensive is impossible or inadvisable and also when it is necessary to conserve the forces and means to ensure an offensive on other more important axes, the troops will go over to the defense.

At the present time, in connection with the high rates of speed and mobile nature of combat actions, the role of marches, especially over great distances, has grown considerably.

In any type of combat actions it is necessary first of all to strive for the timely and dependable destruction and neutralization of enemy nuclear attack means. As they appear they must be rapidly destroyed with strikes of the rocket troops and aviation, with artillery, tank, and other fire means, with decisive actions of attacking troops, and also with tactical airborne landing forces and specially allocated detachments. For the neutralization of control and guidance posts for enemy nuclear attack means, radio and radiotechnical means should also be utilized.

In a modern battle, the role of surprise and maneuver is increasing a good deal. More independence is required of large units, units, and subunits than in the past. The importance of the initiative of their commanders is growing.



The development of means of armed combat not only does not lessen but rather the opposite, increases the role in combat of the man, the high moral, combat, and physical qualities of each soldier. The well-known statement of V. I. LENIN that "without soldiers and sailors who have initiative and who are intelligent, success in modern warfare is impossible" (Works, Volume 8, page 35) is even more significant at the present time.

These are the principal theoretical foundations on which the content of the new Field Service Regulations is built.

In the new Field Service Regulations, as distinguished from the 1959 regulations, matters of the organization and conduct of combat actions of the division and regiment are discussed. This results from the inseparable connection between the two in their combat employment. The practice of troop training has shown the inadvisability of examining problems of combined-arms combat in two sets of field service regulations. Thus, it was thought necessary to establish standard Field Service Regulations for the motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions and regiments making up their composition. Thus, the regulations became a genuine concise encyclopedia of modern tactics.

But this does not at all mean that tactics are isolated from operational art in the regulations. At the present time, the interrelationship between tactics and operational art has grown significantly, especially in matters of employing nuclear weapons and other means of destruction, exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, etc. In their nature, content, and significance, the actions of large units of the Ground Forces are becoming more and more operational-tactical in nature. This is especially convincingly evident in the problems of high rates of advance. The matter of achieving these high rates epitomizes the level of development of tactics and at the same time most visibly reflects the relationship between tactics and operational art. Therefore, matters of operational art are significantly more broadly reflected in the regulations than before.

The structure of the regulations. In the new regulations, their structural layout has undergone fundamental changes. The actions of troops are examined in them in the sequence in which they might occur in the initial period of a modern war. Thus, inasmuch as actions for the majority of large units of the Ground



Forces in a war will begin from a movement, the chapter "Movement of Troops" is placed ahead of the chapters in which the main types of battle are discussed. This achieves a greater logical sequence and a better continuity of the material set forth.

As has already been noted, meeting battles with deployment from the march will be especially characteristic of combat actions in the initial period of a war. In connection with the fact that the march has many specific peculiarities when a meeting battle is foreseen, the special features of its organization and execution are examined in a special section of the chapter "Meeting Battle."

Under modern conditions, the role of reconnaissance, the protection of the troops from weapons of mass destruction, and air defense has grown considerably. Therefore, they are allotted separate chapters. Specific recommendations on these problems as they relate to any given type of combat actions are given in the appropriate chapters of the regulations.

In connection with the fact that the new regulations are standard not only for motorized rifle and tank large units and units but also for airborne large units and units, a chapter "Landing and Combat Actions of an Airborne Division (Parachute Regiment)" is included in them for the first time.

Unlike the 1959 regulations, the peculiarities of an offensive against a defending enemy without the employment of nuclear weapons are discussed in a special section of the chapter "The Offensive".

These are the main changes in the structure of the new regulations. The new structure, for the most part, has permitted the highly maneuverable nature of modern combat actions and the influence of new means of armed combat on tactics to be revealed.

Problems of the employment of nuclear weapons. The experience accumulated by the troops in recent years in employing nuclear weapons in various types of battle is synthesized in the regulations, and the further improvement of the nuclear weapons themselves and the means of employing them as well as the possibility of increasing the nuclear munitions allocated to large units of the ground forces and the availability to them of





their own means of employing them are considered. Recommendations on the employment of nuclear weapons are made more specific.

In the regulations it is emphasized that "nuclear weapons are employed by surprise, in a massed manner, and usually on the main axis to fulfil the most important tasks in a battle" (page 6).

Strikes with nuclear weapons can be delivered as individual, grouped, and massed strikes. Since a considerable difference in the interpretation of the purpose and essence of these strikes has occurred, a brief sketch of them is given in the regulations.


"An individual nuclear strike is delivered for the destruction of one target (installation) or a group of targets with one nuclear warhead which will ensure the necessary degree of destruction.

"A grouped nuclear strike is delivered simultaneously with several nuclear warheads for the purpose of destroying a main grouping of enemy troops or one important target.

"A massed nuclear strike is delivered with a large number of nuclear warheads in a specifically limited time for the purpose of destroying several important groupings of troops and other targets of the enemy.

"In delivering a massed nuclear strike, missile large units and units of various designations and aviation take part" (page 6).

In the regulations, special attention is paid to the necessity of delivering massed nuclear strikes against important groupings. This is called for by the fact that within the troops, as the practice of exercises shows, they do not always correctly understand the meaning and function of these strikes. Nuclear strikes are dispersed among many objectives over great areas, and are delivered against secondary targets or against targets whose destruction the troops cannot immediately exploit.





Specific recommendations on the employment of nuclear weapons in various types of battle are given in the appropriate chapters.


Troop control. The nature and conditions of the conduct of a modern combined-arms battle have made troop control considerably more complex and have increased the requirements for it a great deal.

In the new regulations, the substance of the concept "troop control" is given more concrete expression. In Article 46 it is pointed out that "troop control includes: maintenance of a high political-morale condition of the troops and their constant combat readiness to fulfil assigned tasks; the uninterrupted and persistent acquisition and evaluation of data on the situation and disclosure of the enemy's intentions; timely decision making and transmission of tasks to subordinates; preparation of troops for combat actions and their all-round support; organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation; constant verification of the fulfilment of the assigned tasks and rendering of assistance to the troops."

The commander bears full responsibility for the control of subordinate troops and the successful fulfilment of their combat tasks. For this reason, the main requirements which are levied on the commander under modern conditions are specified in the regulations: great organizational abilities, thorough knowledge of the means of combat and nature of modern battle, strong will and personal courage, constant knowledge of the situation, the ability to foresee the course of events, and the ability to make a decision quickly and resolutely put it into action. It is emphasized that a commander must personally assess the situation and, at decisive moments of the battle, be with the troops who are operating on the most crucial axes, personally have an influence on the course of their combat actions, and render assistance in the fulfilment of the combat tasks.

In the new regulations, the role of the staff in troop control is enhanced and it is pointed out that the staff of a division (regiment) is the main organ providing troop control.

The work of the commander and staff must be distinguished by creativity and good organization and efficiency.




The basis of troop control is the decision of the commander which is, as is written in the regulations, made by the individual himself. Before making a decision the commander may utilize information from subordinates but he must make the decision rapidly and independently. Indecisiveness and slowness in making a decision under modern conditions are intolerable.

In the regulations, the work methods of the commander and staff in preparing a decision, transmitting it to the troops, and thoroughly organizing, preparing, and supporting the battle are revealed in sufficient detail. The main stress in this is laid on shortening the times for organizing combat actions but not to the detriment of their quality. In order to give the troops more time to prepare for the upcoming combat actions, the role of preliminary instructions is emphasized. The significance of the combat order is also raised in the regulations as this document is sometimes underestimated. Some consider the planning of combat actions as most important, but troops in battle do not operate according to plans but rather according to combat orders or instructions.

Recently, in the troops, staffs, and military educational institutions a tendency has been noted of separating the organization of cooperation into an independent process artificially removed from the setting of combat tasks. As the experience of exercises shows, such a separation contradicts the very nature of modern combined-arms battle and leads to formalism in the organization of cooperation. In order to eliminate this serious shortcoming, it was specially mentioned in the regulations that the commander organizes cooperation simultaneously with the assigning of combat tasks and refines it on the terrain itself, on relief models, or on maps.

The effectiveness of troop control to an exceptionally great degree depends on the skilful organization of control posts and the correct designation of their function, tasks, and composition. The study of this problem in many exercises required a refinement of the existing system of control posts.

For troop control in a division, a command post, forward command post, and rear control post are set up during an offensive. In a defense, as practice has shown, there is no need



to set up a forward command post. At the same time it is not possible to allow all the means of control to be concentrated in the command post. In this regard, the establishment in a defense, simultaneously with the command post, of an alternate command post designated for rapidly assuming troop control in case the command post is taken out of action is stipulated in the regulations.


Within the composition of the alternate command post are the deputy commander of the division with officers of the staff, branch arms, and services whom he needs and who must constantly know the situation and be up-to-date on all orders and instructions being given to the troops.



In all types of battle, the establishment of a command post and rear control post in a regiment is stipulated.

Under modern conditions, along with ensuring steady and continuous troop control, the disorganization of enemy troop control acquires more and more significance. In connection with this, the special importance of warfare against the radioelectronic means of the enemy is emphasized in the regulations for the purpose of making troop control and the guidance of missiles, unmanned means, and tactical aviation by radio difficult for him and also to indicate measures with the aid of which this goal can be achieved.

Political work in a combat situation. In the regulations the content of political work in a combat situation is cited in complete accordance with the decisions of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the requirements of the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is especially emphasized that the primary source of combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is the organizing and guiding role of the Communist Party and that successes of the troops in a modern battle depend to a decisive degree on the state of the spirit of morale and the level of political and military indoctrination of the personnel.

Specific recommendations are given in the regulations, the fulfilment of which will facilitate raising the political-morale state of the soldiers and strengthening the one-man command and military discipline, and will ensure a constant high level of combat readiness and better fulfilment of tasks under the most





complex conditions of the combat situation.


The regulations are supplemented by instructions on the content of political work in reconnaissance units and among the airborne and rocket troops.

Reconnaissance. The nature of modern operations and battle and the development of means of armed combat have increased the role of reconnaissance immeasurably and make greater demands on it. As emphasized in the regulations: "Tactical reconnaissance is the most important type of support of the combat activity of troops" (page 83).

In view of the growth of the importance of reconnaissance, problems of its organization and conduct are considered in significantly greater detail than before in the new Field Service Regulations. The main requirements are formulated in more detail as they relate to reconnaissance. They consist of: continuity, timeliness, and reliability of reconnaissance data.

Since the means of employing nuclear weapons, the main groupings of enemy troops, and other very important targets are situated at a considerable depth, the thrust of reconnaissance efforts has been switched at the present time to the depth where the enemy is located. Now it is required to conduct reconnaissance at a significantly deeper depth than in the past. This very important change in the nature and content of reconnaissance runs throughout the regulations. In them it is pointed out that "the depth for conducting reconnaissance in a division (regiment) depends on the nature of the task and combat actions of the troops and must ensure the acquisition of data on the enemy grouping and the nature of his forthcoming operations, the detection of targets for the employment against them of fire means at maximum range, and must also guarantee the capability of foreseeing changes in the situation in advance" (page 89).

In order to ensure this, and also in connection with significantly growing rates of advance and march speeds, the regulations also provide for the appropriate distances of reconnaissance organs from the forward security line of one's own troops. For a reconnaissance group sent from a division it can reach 80 kilometers, and from a regiment, 50 kilometers.






Basic changes were introduced into the composition of reconnaissance organs by the Field Service Regulations of 1959 when it was stipulated for the conduct of reconnaissance to send out reconnaissance detachments ranging in strength from reinforced companies to reinforced battalions, separate reconnaissance patrols ranging from squads to reinforced platoons, and reconnaissance groups designated for conducting reconnaissance in the rear of the enemy and for conducting raids or ambushes.

The practice of exercises has shown that such reconnaissance organs do not correspond to the modern nature of the combat actions of a division and regiment and do not ensure the efficient accomplishment of the tasks assigned to reconnaissance.

Under conditions when a division conducted combat actions in a zone six to eight kilometers wide, a reconnaissance detachment in the strength of a battalion was able to ensure reconnaissance of this entire zone. At the present time, with a width of action zone of a division at 20 to 30 kilometers, we would not send out a reconnaissance detachment of such a size; it is not in a position to ensure reconnaissance of such a zone. Moreover, being unwieldy in its size, a detachment considerably loses the capability of conducting reconnaissance at a high rate of speed and of penetrating to a great depth. Figuratively speaking, it is unnecessary for reconnaissance to break through the wall when the enemy's house has many open windows and doors for it. Reconnaissance must primarily operate not through numbers but through know-how.

In connection with this, the regulations provide for sending reconnaissance groups at a strength ranging from a platoon to a company, officer reconnaissance patrols, divisional groups for long-range reconnaissance, subunits for the conduct of raids and laying of ambushes, and engineer and chemical reconnaissance patrols for the conduct of reconnaissance ahead of the front, on the flanks, and in the depth of the battle formations of the enemy.

For the conduct of reconnaissance, radio, radiotechnical, radar, and sound-ranging reconnaissance posts and observation posts (points) of all branch arms and special troops are also deployed.







In particular, a great deal of attention is given in the regulations to the organization of long-range reconnaissance in the rear of the enemy for the purpose of discovering his nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, troops in concentration areas and in movement, control posts, and radiotechnical means. Specially trained organic reconnaissance groups of the division must conduct such reconnaissance. Depending on the combat task of the large unit and the situational conditions, they may be sent to a depth of up to 100 kilometers by aircraft and helicopter, by motor vehicle, and on foot.

In the regulations, the procedure for assigning reconnaissance tasks is refined. The chief of staff or chief of intelligence and in some cases the commander of the division (regiment) must personally assign the task for commanders of subunits which have been allocated for reconnaissance. The advisability of such a procedure has been confirmed by the practice of exercises.

Some problems of the march. As is known, in the Great Patriotic War, the distances covered by troops in offensive operations by marching at high rates of speed consisted of many hundreds of kilometers. At the present time, the relative proportion and significance of marches has grown even greater. They have become an important component part of combat actions. In connection with this, the importance of march preparation of the troops and of further raising their march capabilities has increased sharply. The experience of exercises shows that in recent times the march capabilities of tank and motorized rifle divisions have increased somewhat. This was reflected in the regulations. Thus, for instance, the average speed of movement of tank and mixed columns by day has increased to 25 to 30 kilometers per hour instead of 20 to 25 kilometers. The average speed of movement of motor vehicle columns on roads is determined to be 30 to 40 kilometers per hour by day and 25 to 30 kilometers per hour by night.

It is especially emphasized in the regulations that in all cases a march must be accomplished with the maximum possible speed of movement for the given conditions.






To provide protection from weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of accomplishing a maneuver in case the enemy sets up demolitions, obstacles, or zones of contamination, the regulations recommend designating a zone of such a width for the march of a division as would ensure a sufficiently large number of routes from which to select. During a march over great distances without the threat of an encounter with the ground enemy, it is stipulated that a division may follow one or two routes. The feasibility is specially pointed out of designating alternate and lateral routes which must be prepared simultaneously with the main ones and utilized by order of the division commander in case one of the main routes is knocked out or when necessary to accomplish a maneuver.

In order for troops on the march to be less vulnerable to nuclear strikes, distances between battalion columns have been increased to five kilometers from three kilometers and the distances between regimental columns have been changed from five kilometers to ten kilometers.

Serious attention has been given to the organization of march security. The experience of exercises shows that one of the existing shortcomings in the organization of security is the insufficient distance of march security organs from the troops being protected. In this regard, it has been specified in the regulations that during the accomplishment of a march in anticipation of a meeting engagement, advance guards are sent out a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers and the advance parties and march security patrols at five to ten kilometers.

The meeting battle is a type of combat action in which both sides strive to accomplish their tasks through an offensive. This specific feature determines its nature as a separate type of combat actions and requires other methods of organization and conduct in comparison, for instance, with an offensive against a defending enemy.

In the past, meeting battles usually occurred as a result of a vague situation. But now the sides, pursuing definite goals and having the necessary means to achieve them, will go into a meeting battle deliberately, achieving decisive and rapid results.



Meeting battles can occur under the most varied situational conditions in the course of combat actions both in an offensive and in a defense. But most often, especially in the initial period of a war, meeting battles occur with the deployment of the main forces of a division or regiment from the march. In the regulations, therefore, it is namely this variant for the occurrence of a meeting battle which is examined in especially great detail.

Success in a meeting battle depends in large measure on its organization even though the organization, in comparison with other types of combat actions, is very complicated. It should be noted that because of the insufficiently clear-cut exposition of these problems in previous regulations, the methods of organizing a meeting battle which are in essence the same as those in an offensive against a defending enemy have begun to be legitimized among the troops. This contradicts the very nature of a meeting battle. Therefore, the problems of organizing a meeting battle are made significantly more specific in the new regulations.

In a meeting battle, he who preempts wins. In connection with this, preempting the enemy in delivering fire strikes, deploying troops and in going over to the attack is of decisive importance. This is, of course, provided that this will not be transformed into an end in itself but will be utilized for the destruction of main groupings of the enemy.

An enemy can only be preempted through advance organization of the battle. To organize a meeting battle immediately before its onset means to doom oneself to failure. In this case it is too late to organize a battle, but one must command and operate. It is naive to hope to set up some sort of special battle formation at this time. Units and subunits must be committed to battle just as they were moving in the march. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand how large a role the decision concerning the march plays in a meeting battle which arises from a march. In this case, the commander should have already laid down the fundamental idea -- the concept for the impending battle -- in organizing the march and in laying out the march columns.

In connection with this, it is pointed out in the regulations that "the concept of actions and the grouping of forces and means of a division (regiment) in expectation of a



meeting battle must ensure the preempting of the enemy in delivering fire means, in capturing advantageous lines, and in deploying the main forces into battle formation. Reinforcement means which ensure independent commitment of units (subunits) to battle from the march should be attached in advance" (page 182).

Based on the indissoluble relationship between the organization of a march in expectation of a meeting battle and the meeting battle itself, these problems are examined in one chapter.


Based on data received from air, ground, and other types of reconnaissance, and also as a result of the battle of the forward detachments and advance guards, the commander of a division assigns tasks for delivering nuclear strikes and makes a decision on the deployment and battle of the main forces; in this decision the enemy grouping to be destroyed first, the axis of the main attack, the combat tasks of subordinate units, and the main matters of cooperation are determined.

The main principle of actions in a meeting battle must be the attempt to disperse the enemy grouping and destroy him in detail. In connection with this, the regulations stipulate that "for the disruption of the organized movement forward of the enemy and the creation of conditions for his destruction in detail, aviation, missile units, and artillery will deliver strikes even before the deployment of the main forces of the division (regiment) against moving enemy columns especially in crossing areas, defiles, and marshy sectors" (page 183).

A large role in the creation of conditions for destroying the enemy in detail and achieving overall success in a meeting battle is played by the actions of tactical airborne landing forces and forward detachments. Recommendations are given in the regulations on their most effective employment.

Actions of the main forces of the division in a meeting battle, figuratively speaking, can be compared to the actions of a good boxer who tries to take an antagonist's blow on one of his arms and with the other, stronger arm deliver a decisive blow at him. In the regulations, it is determined that in a meeting battle following nuclear strikes, an attack should be carried out by the main forces on the flank and in the rear of the enemy





while immobilizing his main grouping from the front with part of the forces.

The role of maneuver in a meeting battle is especially great. At its base must be the attempt to disperse enemy columns or a battle formation and with decisive actions to destroy him in successive stages. However, the maneuver cannot become a goal in itself. If the maneuver for going to the flank or rear of the enemy is made difficult or requires a long time, then it is more advisable to deliver the main attack from the front. In this case it is necessary, using nuclear strikes and swift actions of the troops, to split the main grouping and then destroy it in detail.


Thus, the recommendations of the regulations give sufficiently broad latitude to commanders to show reasonable initiative in a meeting battle and require that they proceed from the specific situational conditions each time.

An offensive against a defending enemy. Problems of organizing and carrying out an offensive, naturally, occupy a central place in the regulations insofar as they are the main type of combat action and are of decisive importance to achieving victory over the enemy.

First of all, the formulation of the purpose of an offensive was refined. In Article 216 it states that "the purpose of an offensive is the complete destruction of a defending enemy in a short time and the seizure of important areas." Here, unlike the previous regulations, the necessity is emphasized of the complete defeat of the enemy, specifically, in a short time.

For the first time in regulations, an offensive against a defending enemy is examined without dividing defense into prepared and hastily occupied. This is brought about by the fact that the availability to the enemy of nuclear weapons, a large number of tanks, antitank, and other fire means, and engineer vehicles as well allows him to quickly establish a stable and aggressive defense. However, it is indisputable that the more time given to preparation, the greater grows the strength of the defense. In the regulations, therefore, special attention was given to the necessity of organizing an offensive in a short time





in order to deprive the enemy of the capability of improving his defense.


The possibility of an offensive against a defending enemy from the march or from a position of direct contact with him is provided for by the regulations. The practice of many exercises conducted in recent years has shown that the offensive from the march is the most effective. It ensures to a greater degree the concealment of preparations, surprise of actions, and lower vulnerability of the troops to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is emphasized in the regulations that the main method of an offensive is from the march with movement forward from the depth.

An offensive from the march against a defending enemy will usually be carried out after moving troops forward from the depth and occupying the assembly area. In the initial period of war, the offensive may be begun directly from areas of permanent location or areas of assembly on alert. With the development of combat actions in the depth, when the enemy tries to hold back our troops by defending on favorable lines, the offensive from the march is conducted without occupying a waiting area. In this case it is especially important with rapid and decisive actions to prevent the enemy from occupying the defense and building up his forces.

The power of contemporary means of destruction, the equipping of motorized rifle troops with armored vehicles capable not only of moving but of conducting battle, and the increase in the combat capabilities of tanks has engendered doubts among some generals and officers about the legitimacy of the existence today of such a method of troop actions as a breakthrough of the enemy's defense. On the pages of the military press the proposal has appeared to renounce it insofar as all tasks in destroying a defending enemy in battle will be accomplished by nuclear weapons, basically without the participation of the troops, and consequently, the troops will negotiate but not break through the defense.

Close study of the problem has shown that it would be a serious mistake, fraught with great danger, to underestimate the defensive capabilities of the enemy and orient the troops toward such an easy method of actions. In a battle, as has already been





noted at the beginning of the article, the destruction of the enemy can be achieved only with powerful fire strikes of all types of weapons in combination with decisive actions of the troops. Under modern conditions, a breakthrough retains its significance even though its essence is changing considerably. Therefore, it is specified in the regulations that "an offensive against a defending enemy usually begins with a breakthrough which concludes in breaking open the defense with strikes of nuclear weapons and aviation, with artillery fire, and with an offensive of motorized rifle and tank troops with the subsequent development of actions into the depth" (page 231).

Thus, a modern breakthrough does not have anything in common with the slow, steady gnawing away at the enemy defense which was not an uncommon occurrence in the previous war. But it is still not, figuratively speaking, an easy pleasure excursion but requires thorough organization, reliable fire destruction of the enemy's defense, and intensive, skilful actions of the troops.

The distinguishing feature of an offensive under modern conditions is the rapid switching of the troops' efforts into the depth of the enemy's disposition and the development of the offensive at high rates of speed. The entire content of the regulations is permeated with the idea of achieving the maximum possible rates of advance. Theoretical calculations based on the present combat capabilities of the Ground Forces and the practice of exercises have shown that an offensive may be conducted at a speed of 80 to 100 kilometers per day. But this is possible with its development in the operational depth and under favorable conditions. The experience of exercises convincingly shows that, considering the growing capabilities of the enemy to set up a strong defense, in a breakthrough of the defense the rates of advance will be somewhat lower and, actually, will reach at the present time 50 kilometers per day.

The capability of advancing at such high rates of speed requires assigning deeper tasks to the troops, that is, per full day of combat actions, and also to designate the combat tasks for large units and units somewhat differently. As is known, previously, combat tasks of a division per full day of combat actions were divided into immediate, subsequent, and follow-up tasks. Practice shows that with high rates of advance such detail is not advisable. Therefore, the regulations provide for



designating for a first-echelon division the immediate task, the axis of further offensive, and the task of the day; for a first-echelon regiment -- the immediate and subsequent tasks and the axis of further offensive.

The immediate task of a division may include the destruction of the enemy in the zone of the offensive, the breakthrough of his defense to the entire depth of the battle formation of the first-echelon division, and the capture of a line which ensures favorable conditions for follow-up actions, while the task of the day during the breakthrough of the defense may be to seize a line (objective) at a depth of up to 50 kilometers. With the development of an offensive in the operational depth and under favorable conditions it may reach 80 to 100 kilometers.

Thus, in the regulations the depth and content of the combat tasks of tank and motorized rifle large units are cited in accordance with the requirement to achieve high rates of advance and are based on the actual capabilities of the large units.

Changes in the nature of the defense of the enemy and also the growth of the fire, strike, and maneuver capabilities of tank and motorized rifle units and large units permit them to advance in a considerably wider zone than previously.

In the course of experimental exercises, this matter was studied especially thoroughly. In determining the width of the offensive zones for divisions and regiments they proceeded, on the one hand, from the necessity of providing the best conditions for antinuclear protection of troops and extensive employment of maneuver and, on the other hand, from the possibility of reliably destroying the enemy and of achieving high rates of advance. To a great extent these demands are answered at the present time by the width of the offensive zone which is, for a division, up to 20 kilometers (instead of six to 12 kilometers), and for a regiment, up to five kilometers; a battalion may advance on a front up to two kilometers wide.

The designation of such wide zones for an offensive by no means signifies that the forces of the advancing troops must be equally distributed throughout the zone. The principle of concentrating efforts on selected axes is completely preserved under modern conditions. Therefore, it is noted in the



regulations that motorized rifle and tank divisions of the first echelon deliver an attack, as a rule, in two sectors, concentrating the main efforts on the main one, and a regiment delivers an attack in one sector.

The possibility of conducting an offensive in wide zones and at high rates of speed depends directly on the degree of destruction of the defense of the enemy. The decisive means for this at the present time are nuclear weapons. But along with these, artillery and aviation must be utilized with maximum efficiency. Previously, to support an offensive, the conduct of artillery and aviation preparation for the offensive were provided for and, after going over to the offensive, artillery and aviation support of the offensive.


At the present time, these concepts do not correspond to the capabilities of the existing means of destruction and do not reflect the nature of their employment in battle. Therefore, new concepts have been introduced into the regulations -- preparatory fire and fire support.

The matter of the feasibility of conducting preparatory fire and fire support of an offensive, their nature and content, and methods of implementing them have been very widely discussed in our military press. Moreover, the most contradictory points of view have been advanced. Thus, the necessity has arisen in the regulations to define clearly and in detail the content of these concepts, their purpose, their interconnection with nuclear weapons, etc.

In Article 224 it is stated: "Before the troops go over to the offensive, nuclear strikes are delivered by operational-tactical missiles and aviation for the purpose of destroying means of mass destruction and routing the main grouping of the enemy on the axis of the main attack of the advancing troops. Nuclear strikes are delivered, as a rule, at the onset of preparatory fire. They can, however, be delivered in the middle or at the end of it.

For the neutralization and destruction of the enemy not destroyed by nuclear weapons at the forward edge and in the tactical depth, in the offensive zone of the division, preparatory fire is conducted and fire support of advancing





troops with the employment of conventional and chemical munitions is carried out."

From this it is clear that nuclear strikes accomplish the main tasks in destroying the main enemy groupings and in destroying the most important areas of defense, but they are not included in the preparatory fire and fire support of the offensive.

In connection with the great complexity of organizing an offensive from the march, these problems are examined in detail in the regulations, especially the organization of the movement forward; the importance of synchronization of the attack by units of the first echelon is emphasized.

An attack by motorized rifle subunits under modern conditions, as a rule, will be carried out on armored personnel carriers (infantry combat vehicles) along with tanks. However, the possibility is given of an attack dismounted when the enemy is not sufficiently damaged and under complex conditions of the terrain.

Proposals were further developed in the regulations regarding the support of the rapid development of an offensive into the depth. In this, the role of tank divisions is especially emphasized and they must, in cooperation with airborne landing forces and aviation, rapidly exploit success into the depth, boldly disengage themselves from the main forces of the army, without engaging in drawn-out battles for the capture of individual centers of resistance, and widely utilize maneuver to destroy enemy reserves, not allowing them to go over to the defense on intermediate lines.

In examining the problems of an offensive against a defending enemy without employing nuclear weapons, the necessity of concentrating superior forces and means and of conducting prolonged preparatory fire is emphasized.

In this case, a division on the axis of the main attack may advance in a zone up to ten kilometers wide, usually accomplishing a breakthrough in one sector with a width of up to four kilometers. A regiment may advance in a zone up to five kilometers wide breaking through a defense on a front up to two





kilometers wide, and a battalion advances on a front up to 1,000 meters wide. The regulations recommend that motorized rifle divisions be used to break through a defense under these conditions, and that tank divisions be utilized for the development of the breakthrough and the offensive into the depth.

When breaking through a defense, the depth of the task for a division for a full day of combat actions which is subdivided into immediate and subsequent tasks and the task of the day may be 25 to 30 kilometers, and during the development of the offensive, up to 50 kilometers.


Defense. Recognition of the offensive as the main type of combat action does not by any means signify that defense has now lost its importance and that it now can be renounced.

V. I. LENIN in his own day said that "a war which was an uninterrupted victorious advance from beginning to end has never occurred, and were it to occur it would be an exception" (Works, Volume 33, page 74). The same situation remains today as well.

Defense is a necessary type of combat action. It allows one to gain time, conserve forces and means on some axes, and create conditions for an offensive on others.

As defined in the regulations, the purpose of defense is to repulse superior forces of the enemy, inflict substantial losses on him, hold important terrain areas, and create, thereby, favorable conditions for going over to a decisive offensive. The employment of nuclear and chemical weapons by the defending troops permits them not only to repulse the offensive of superior forces of the enemy but to frustrate an offensive being prepared by the enemy and to go over from defense to aggressive offensive actions in a short time.

The problem of the capability of disrupting an offensive being prepared by the enemy is of fundamental significance and deserves to be dwelt upon in more detail. Recently, views have begun to be expressed that the massive destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and other modern means of armed combat have made the main purpose of defense the disruption of an offensive being prepared by the enemy and not its repulse. Such a rigid solution to the problem is simplistic. If the troops have the




necessary combat capabilities for aggressive offensive actions, and primarily a large enough quantity of nuclear munitions at their disposal, then it hardly makes any sense to go over to the defense. The fact of the matter is namely that the troops go over to the defense when combat capabilities fall short and especially when there is a limited amount of nuclear munitions. Under such conditions it is necessary that the available forces and means be utilized with maximum efficiency to inflict great losses on the enemy and to weaken him in order to gain time to concentrate the necessary forces for the purpose of going over to a decisive offensive.

The regulations make provision for a whole system of measures to disrupt an offensive and to destroy the enemy, among which are the delivery against him of surprise nuclear strikes and also strikes by aviation and artillery from maximum ranges. Counterpreparation is organized and conducted according to the plan of the army against an approaching enemy or an enemy preparing for an offensive. It includes strikes with nuclear weapons and conventional means. In certain cases, for the purpose of ensuring the destruction of the first-echelon troops of the enemy, a strike may be delivered after the counterpreparation with part of the forces in front of the forward edge of the defense according to the plan of the senior commander.

The employment of new combat means and especially of nuclear weapons has a substantial influence on the methods of organizing and conducting a defensive battle. At the present time they must ensure that the defense is stable and aggressive with the maximum, careful expenditure of forces and means under conditions when the enemy employs nuclear weapons and large tank forces.

In order to achieve this, modern defense is based primarily on strikes of nuclear, (chemical) and other types of weapons, on broad maneuver by fire, forces, and means, and on counterattacks while simultaneously stubbornly holding important areas which lie across probable axes of the enemy offensive, and also on the wide employment of obstacles.

The role of fire has grown considerably in defense. Therefore, its success to a large degree will depend on how efficient and flexible the system of fire is, especially antitank





fire. It must ensure the delivery of powerful fire strikes on the approaches to the defense and the setting up of zones of massed, multilayered fire of all types in front of the forward edge, on the flanks, and in the depth of the defense and also the concentration of fire in a short time on any threatened axis or sector. Moreover, as is emphasized in the regulations, it is very important to ensure the cumulative force of fire, to lure the enemy into prepared fire pockets, and to destroy him with powerful fire strikes of all types of weapons and with counterattacks.

Antitank defense was previously based on compact antitank areas which were limited in size and on battalion antitank centers. But such areas and centers might be profitable targets for enemy nuclear strikes, and their destruction might rapidly disrupt the stability of the defense. Therefore, provision is made in the regulations for the system of antitank defense to include: company strongpoints with antitank means located in them, tank ambushes, tanks of the second echelon and reserves, antitank reserves and fire lines prepared in advance for them to occupy in the course of battle, artillery distributed on axes of tank threat, and antitank obstacles.

Under modern conditions when a defense is laid out and a grouping of forces and means is set up, it must be based on the possibility of ensuring maximum protection from nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction of the enemy and also on favorable conditions of the terrain. The experience of many exercises has shown that it is most advisable to form the defense of a division in a system of positions. The disposition of motorized rifle and tank subunits in positions at a depth of up to two kilometers permits them to sufficiently fully utilize their own fire power and that of attached means and also significantly reduces the vulnerability to nuclear strikes. At the same time there are greater possibilities for tying positions to favorable natural boundaries and for eliminating a linear arrangement of them.

In the regulations it is pointed out that strongpoints of motorized rifle and tank companies are usually the basis of each position and are included in the position and distributed so that they interdict the most probable axes of advance of the enemy with their fire. Thus, company strongpoints, at the present





time, are becoming the main nuclei of defense. As the experience of exercises shows, this is completely well-founded insofar as companies have become considerably stronger with respect to fire, especially with respect to antitank fire, and with the appropriate reinforcement they are able to successfully repulse an enemy tank and infantry attack.


In all, a division may occupy three positions or more and a regiment two positions.

To mislead the enemy regarding the defensive layout, to protect units (subunits) of the first echelon from enemy surprise attack, to repulse his reconnaissance in force, and also in order to force the enemy to deploy his main forces prematurely, the regulations recommend setting up a forward position at a distance of three to five kilometers from the forward edge. Motorized rifle (tank) battalions (companies) from the composition of first-echelon regiments with the necessary means of reinforcement should defend it. Regimental commanders control the conduct of battle at these positions.

A division located in the second echelon (reserve) occupies a line for defense on the most important axis, preparing it in the engineer aspect and is in constant readiness to conduct a counterthrust (counterattack) or to maneuver to a threatened axis.

Considering the growing combat capabilities of large units and units and also the necessity of dispersing troops in order to better protect them from nuclear weapons, the width of the zone of defense of a division has grown to 30 kilometers and the width of a sector of defense of a regiment is designated at ten kilometers. The depth of defense of a division may reach 20 kilometers and of a regiment, ten kilometers. When defending terrain which is not accessible everywhere for operations of troops and when defending a seacoast, the width of the defensive front of a division (regiment) may be even greater.

Naturally, with such a wide defensive front, there will be gaps between units and subunits. And even though with modern means of reconnaissance and destruction these gaps are not as dangerous as in the past war, they should not be turned into open gates for the enemy. Meanwhile, in the practical work of the





troops a tendency has arisen toward groundlessly increasing the number of gaps without sufficient support. In connection with this, it is specially defined in the regulations that gaps of one to 1.5 kilometers are allowed between company strongpoints which must be under constant observation, must be covered by flanking and interlocking fire of all fire means, especially antitank means, and also be covered by obstacles and artillery fire from the depth.

Examining the problems of the conduct of a defensive battle, the regulations require aggressive and decisive actions as a result of which the destruction of the enemy can be accomplished and the conditions for going over to a decisive offensive be created.


Combat actions of airborne troops. Whereas, in essence, in the Field Service Regulations of 1959 and in the Manual on the Combat Employment of Airborne Troops a passive role was assigned to airborne troops, amounting mainly to capturing and holding specific objectives (areas) in the rear of the enemy until the arrival of their own troops, the new regulations demand aggressive, maneuvering, and audacious actions from them. In all cases they must strive to destroy the enemy before he is able to concentrate his forces and offer organized resistance. Therefore, the main methods of their actions are wide envelopment, close envelopment, and the delivery of surprise attacks against the enemy from various axes with subsequent maneuver to other axes and objectives.

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In the regulations the following are examined in detail: the conduct of combat actions under various geographical conditions, combat in encirclement and breakout from encirclement, disposition of troops in place, rear services support, and other matters relating to the combat activity of troops.

In conclusion, it is necessary to say several words on the methodology of developing the new Field Service Regulations. In putting it together, a large number of generals and officers from the central directorates, from military academies and the troops participated directly. The main provisions of the regulations





were thoroughly studied, widely discussed among the troops, and checked out in the course of tactical exercises including special exercises as well. Thus, in 1961, six experimental exercises were conducted, 18 in 1962, and six in 1963. A large number of specific recommendations and observations which were carefully evaluated and put before the regulations commission were received from the troops. This permitted utilizing to the maximum degree the experience of the troops. Thus, the Field Service Regulations were born not in the stillness of offices but on the fields of exercises.

The Minister of Defense in this year's directive on combat training is requiring a thorough study of the Field Service Regulations and their creative employment in the training of troops. This must become the immediate task of all generals and officers. On the basis of the new Field Service Regulations, combat regulations and manuals of the branch arms will be revised and published.

