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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

30 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Troop Marches  
Over Great Distances

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article critiques a 1961 Frunze Academy publication on the organization and conduct of marches over great distances, and consists primarily of enumerations of its various omissions, dubious assertions and recommendations, and other shortcomings. Among the most blatant defects cited are the book's cursory treatment of matters of control, reconnaissance, and rear services and technical support, and the arbitrary introduction of new terminology. This article appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

*for* John N. McMahon

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# Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 17 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Troop Marches Over Great Distances

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel A. Bulatov. This article critiques a book published by the Frunze Academy in 1961 on the organization and conduct of marches over great distances, and consists primarily of enumerations of its various omissions, dubious assertions and recommendations, and other shortcomings. Among the most blatant defects cited are the book's cursory treatment of matters of control, reconnaissance, and rear services and technical support, and the arbitrary introduction of new terminology. The author provides his own recommendations on these and other topics. End of Summary



[Redacted] Comment:

The author also wrote "Ways of Increasing the Rates of Advance of a Combined-Arms Army" in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 [Redacted] and "Some Questions of the First Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of a War" in Issue No. 2 (63) for 1962 [Redacted] After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. [Redacted]

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Troop Marches Over Great Distances

by

Colonel A. BULATOV

In a future war, especially in its initial period, regroupings will have exceptionally great importance, and, consequently, so will troop marches over great distances. The reason for this is that many of our large units and formations are now located at a considerable distance from the probable areas of their operational assignment. Suffice it to say that the troops of the western border military districts are located 900 to 1,000 kilometers and more from the line of contact with our probable enemies. The troops of the interior districts are located at an even greater depth. Consequently, when there is a clear threat of war, and especially during the first operations (these will be predominantly offensive operations), formations and large units of ground forces will have to be moved up in a timely manner over great distances in order to reinforce the operating groupings and form new ones.

Therefore, it is not by chance that of late more and more attention has been devoted both in theory and in practice to the problem of organizing and carrying out marches at high rates of speed over great distances. This problem has been discussed repeatedly at military science conferences in a number of military districts and military academies, and articles have also been devoted to it in classified journals. The recommendations worked out have been tested in command-staff exercises in the Belorussian, Moscow, and North Caucasus military districts and the Northern Group of Forces. The movement of large groupings of troops from the interior of the country in the initial period of war was worked out to the fullest extent in the command-staff exercise BURYA (STORM), conducted in the fall of 1961.

Nevertheless, till now not one serious work has been produced that fully analyzes this theme and that contains the necessary recommendations for the troops.



The first attempt to fill this gap is the work of Colonel M. I. STRYGIN, Troop Marches Over Great Distances.\* In it, the author, on the basis of the nature of modern armed combat, defines the role, conditions, and special features involved in the conduct of marches over great distances in the initial period of a war and gives some recommendations on their organization and execution.

We believe that in its examination of the role and place of marches in troop combat activity, as well as of the conditions of conducting them, this book makes, along with correct and sound conclusions and propositions, very dubious assertions.

We cannot agree, for instance, that the category of ordinary marches includes those made over a distance of up to 700 kilometers, i.e., in the course of one or two days (page 7). It seems to us that it is more advisable to include among ordinary marches those marches carried out by troops over the distance of a day's (normal or forced) march, i.e., over a distance of up to 250 to 350 kilometers. As for a march of over 500 to 700 kilometers, it should already be considered a march over a great distance. This will be the lower limit of such marches.

The work maintains that ordinary marches will be made mainly in the zone of the combat actions carried out by the ground forces, and more rarely in interior districts (page 8). This is not quite correct, since the need for troop movements over short distances in military districts, especially border districts, in peacetime and wartime will also be sufficiently great.

Marches over a great distance are defined as "movements of troops by their own organic means mainly outside of a front zone (page 8)." We cannot agree with this definition. Marches over a great distance may begin at different depths (in the interior of the country, in interior or border military districts), but they will most often end with the deployment of the troops and their commitment to an engagement from the march. Here, the last one- or two-day marches will usually be made in the zones of actively engaged fronts. Consequently, it would be wrong to regard a march up to the rear boundary of the front zone as a march over a great distance and one that cuts across it as an ordinary march. In individual cases, a march over a great distance can be made by formations (the second echelon of the front) and large units (reserves of the front) completely within the zone of an actively engaged front in the event of their commitment to the engagement or relocation to new areas. Nor, in addition, can one rule out

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\* Colonel M. I. STRYGIN, Troop Marches Over Great Distances. Publication of the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, 1961, 80 pages.




movements over great distances along the front.

In speaking of the special features of marches over great distances, the author indicates that, under modern conditions, motorized rifle large units and units may make lengthy marches on foot both in a zone of combat actions and in interior districts (page 9). He does not say what specifically is to be understood by the term "lengthy marches" in terms of their length in distances. If he is identifying this term with the concept "march over a great distance," then his assertion is wrong. It is altogether difficult now to imagine a motorized rifle division in a march on foot with its rocket launchers, tanks and artillery, and reserves. In our opinion, a march on foot over any considerable distance may, by way of exception, be made only by individual motorized rifle subunits and, in special terrain conditions, by troop contingents with a special (stripped-down) organization.

In its examination of the conditions for the conduct of marches over great distances, the work under review emphasizes that "...troops may be subjected to serious enemy action ...differing from the action to which troops making marches in a front zone will be subjected" (page 10). For this, the author writes, the enemy employs primarily nuclear weapons, missiles, aviation, sabotage and reconnaissance detachments, and airborne troops. In our opinion, though, the enemy will carry out the same if not more aggressive and decisive actions against troops making a march in a front zone.

In our opinion, marches over great distances will be characterized by the following special features: first, for the greater part of the march, the immediate threat of an encounter with large forces of enemy ground forces will be absent. Therefore, at the start of the march, the columns can be made up of units with the same march speed. For instance, in large units, tanks and heavy equipment can travel on certain routes, and units riding in motor transport, on others. Only upon approaching the front or a line of possible encounter with the ground enemy (in areas of the last day's rest or major stop) should the columns be restructured in conformity with the concept of the conduct of impending combat actions and with the tasks of the large units and units. Second, marches over great distances require increased intensity of work of all personnel. Third, such marches will entail the need of frequent negotiation of extremely extensive zones of radioactive contamination and destruction (nuclear barriers) created by the enemy for the purpose of preventing the flow of fresh reserves to the areas of combat actions. And finally, when making such marches, there arise great difficulties in providing stable control and reliable air





defense of troops.


Not analyzed completely enough in the work are the requirements placed on troops making marches over great distances and the march capabilities of troops. Strictly speaking, the author very briefly discusses only two main requirements -- timeliness of completing the march and preservation of the combat readiness of troops. The remaining requirements, for instance surprise and concealment, are only mentioned, and those such as the necessity of dispersed dispositions and constant support of the organized commitment of troops to battle, for some reason, are not even indicated.

The author correctly asserts that the timely arrival of troops in the assigned areas is directly dependent on their ability to complete the march with the maximum possible speed of movement. Here, as one of the basic methods of increasing the average speed, he recommends "...giving up long stops and shortening the length and number of short stops" (page 23). It goes without saying that in this case the average speed of movement is increased. However, there are unfortunately no specific recommendations in the book as to just how all of this can be carried out in practice -- in particular, how refuelling and technical servicing of vehicles and food and rest for personnel can be provided without stops. Yet, on page 29, the author himself points out the necessity of all these measures.

In those cases where stops cannot be avoided, it is recommended in the book to make the march by a "sliding schedule" method, the essence of which consists in combining the movement of some subunits (units) with a stop of others. This method has already been examined in our military press and tested in some command-staff exercises. But it has to be tested in exercises with troops in order to make final conclusions about the possibility of using it in practice.

The march capabilities of troops are not examined consistently and completely enough. The author has not cited specific figures on each of the elements which make up the march capabilities of the troops. There are no generalized conclusions and data on the march capabilities of subunits and units of branch arms under various conditions. The question of what the march capabilities of rocket troops are limited by is omitted altogether.

In the work under review, quite a lot of space is devoted to examining questions of the organization of marches over great distances. Here, the content and procedure for the basic undertakings to be carried out by the higher control organs, commanders, and staffs for organization and support





of the march are set forth in detail.

Correctly determining the volume of undertakings and methods of work of the various command levels in the organization and support of marches is possible only after an analysis of the conditions under which they will be planned and conducted. Here, it must be taken into consideration that the conditions of organizing a march during a threat situation will differ substantially from the conditions of organizing a march to be conducted when military actions have begun suddenly. Whereas in the former case one or two days can be set aside for all the work to prepare for the march, in the latter case the time is very limited. Here, the troops designated for use in the first operations of the initial period of a war will, as a rule, begin moving forward upon the sounding of a combat alert signal. The volume, procedure, and methods of work of commanders and staffs will be different, depending on these conditions. Unfortunately, none of this is examined in the book. Therefore, it is hard to judge the advisability of certain recommendations, but some of them one cannot agree with.

For instance, on page 32 it says that "the process of preparing a movement, as a rule, will begin with working out a directive (order) for making a long march by the large unit or formation." It seems that this process will in all cases begin with the performance of other measures and will end, rather than begin, with the working out of the directive for the march. Thus, for instance, for troops located in border military districts and designated for participation in the first operations, the basic preparation measures for moving forward up to the axis of impending combat actions must be worked out beforehand, already in peacetime. Only in this case will the level of readiness of troops for the march be such that they can set out literally upon the first signal. In the process of preparing troops to make marches over great distances, special attention must be paid to ensuring the constant high readiness of troops to make such marches, to their ability to deploy quickly for the conduct of combat actions, to the preparation of the routes of movement in respect to roads and engineer works, to the timely establishment of reserves of materiel and technical means in the necessary areas, and to their distribution for transporting. The routes and zones of probable movement of troops must be studied in advance from maps and military geographical descriptions, as well as during exercises and field trips. To begin all this work after working out directives (orders) for the march is too late. The preparation process of marches to be made over great distances during a war must begin with the issuing of preliminary instructions to formations and large units. And on the basis of these the preparation of materiel and personnel for the march, the accumulation of reserves, and the performance of other measures will be







carried out.


Colonel STRYGIN proposes to arbitrarily divide the organization of a march over great distances into two phases -- initial and subsequent. "The initial phase," it says in his book, "is implemented in the preparatory period and it is the determining one, inasmuch as it is in this period that the main questions of the movement are decided. The subsequent phase is implemented in the process of moving" (page 38). In our opinion, there is no need to introduce this sort of unwarranted terminology about "phases." For, the first "phase" is nothing but the preparation of the march. As for the second "phase", it goes altogether against logic. How can one really speak of how the subsequent phase of the organization of a march is "implemented in the process of moving (of the march)"?!

Also completely unnecessary is such a new term as "stages of the march." Hardly anyone will agree with the author that dividing a march into stages will favor "the more purposeful and detailed organization of a march over a great distance" (page 38). We believe that in planning a march it should be subdivided not into stages, but into day's (daytime, night) marches. Incidentally, the author himself on page 42 indicates that it is advisable to study the axis of the movement of troops to the depth of two or three day's marches. Depending on the specific conditions of each day's march, the necessary corrections can be introduced into the estimate worked out for the march, and the appropriate instructions can be issued to the troops for the next march. Consequently, the concept of stages of the march is unnecessary and superfluous, like the concept of stages of a battle, discarded in its time.

And it is hardly necessary to bring in such terms as "immediate," "subsequent," and "ultimate objective of the march" (page 50). It is characteristic that the author himself does not give definitions to these concepts.

Very unsuccessfully presented are the propositions about the march formation of troops. Here, for instance, is how the basic difference in the march formations of troops making an ordinary march and a march over a great distance is defined: "The basic difference between the march formation of troops making a march over a great distance and the march formation of troops making an ordinary march is that the former is based on ensuring the safe movement of troops and establishing the most favorable grouping for overcoming active enemy resistance during the march, and on conducting aggressive combat actions immediately after their arrival in the assigned area or on the approaches to it, while the second, as a rule, is






based on the concept of a probable encounter with the enemy during the march or when the troops are going over to aggressive combat actions from the march" (page 43). It is perfectly obvious that this description does not reveal the difference in the march formations of troops making the indicated marches. For this reason, apparently, the author himself in examining the requirements made on the march formations of troops has not set out to differentiate them in conformity with a march over a great distance and an ordinary march (page 44).

The main peculiarity in the disposition of the march formation, in our opinion, will be that in making a march over a great distance in the rear of our own troops, where there is no immediate threat of encountering the ground enemy, the columns can be drawn up in such a way as to ensure the highest march speeds, the preservation of combat equipment, and convenience of movement. Another peculiarity may be the formation of columns by a "sliding schedule" method. For instance, at the start of each day's march the columns of heavy tank regiments, having a range of 110 kilometers on one fueling, can move out ahead. The heavy tank regiments, covering this distance, must pull off the routes, stop, fuel up, and let the regiments of medium tanks, whose range on one fueling equals 250 kilometers, pass through, and then rejoin them at the tail end. This second peculiarity will also involve changing the disposition of the columns of large units during the march.

The author indicates on page 45 that the march formation of a division will consist of columns of the main forces and columns of rear services subunits. However, this is right only in that case where the march is being made in the rear of our own troops. It should have been pointed out that in making a march in anticipation of an encounter with the enemy the march formation will include reconnaissance, security, a forward detachment, and movement support detachments.

A fundamental defect of the book, in our opinion, is the recommendation to introduce a correction "for difficult conditions" in the preliminary estimates when planning a march. By this correction is understood the time that may be required for troops to bypass destroyed sectors of roads and negotiate zones of radioactive contamination and destruction. Here, to the total time calculated for movement (taking into consideration a 10 percent coefficient for geographical relief) it is proposed to add another 20 to 30 percent of the time. To illustrate, let us cite the example given by the author in the book. The length of a march measured on a map, counting the correction coefficient for the relief, equals 1,100 kilometers. To negotiate this distance with a movement speed





of 30 kilometers per hour will require 36 hours of actual movement. With the introduction of the correction "for difficult conditions" equal to 25 percent, the total time is increased by another nine to ten hours, i.e., by nearly a day's march. Analogous corrections "for difficult conditions" are recommended to be introduced also when transporting troops by rail (water) transport.

Such a recommendation by the author is hardly acceptable. And we do not agree that such a correction "for difficult conditions" will be "one of the important conditions for ensuring the orderliness of movement of the troops and the timely fulfilment by all the elements of the march formation of the tasks facing them," as is stated on page 46.

A commander and staff, in producing a calculation of the march, proceed from an evaluation of the possible movement speeds of troops in different sectors of the routes, taking into consideration the actual conditions under which the march will be made. In conformity with this are determined the total length of the march, the speed of movement by day and night, and the time for movement. All these calculations are performed with down-to-the-minute accuracy. And here it is now being proposed to introduce a rough correction "for difficulties in moving" on the order of 20 to 30 percent. To accept such a recommendation is in essence to negate the importance of all the work of the commander and staff on planning the march.

Such a method of computing, in our opinion, can only bring harm. To enter on such a path is to give a disincentive to staffs for producing precise calculations, and to troops for maintaining the schedule of the movement. The proposed method will not shorten, but increase, the times for moving troops.

In examining this question at the critique of the exercise BURYA, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY pointed out: "In working out plans, it is necessary to proceed on the basis that the established times for the concentration of troops in new areas must always remain firm and inexorable. Whatever happens, it is necessary to endeavor to the utmost to bring the troops to the assigned areas at the established time in combat-effective condition..."

Rightly stressing the importance and complexity of control of troops while making a march over a great distance, the author of the work under review proposes forming operations groups "for the immediate direction of the main elements of the march formation," made up of several officers



provided with means of communications and transport. Here he asserts that they may "be the basis of maximum centralization of control." This proposition clearly contradicts the preceding, where it is said that such groups "must ensure the autonomous control of the separate elements of the march formation" (page 48).

In our opinion, the establishment of such groups will only lead to the dissipation of forces and means of control and will hardly promote better organization of the control of troops on the march. Control on the march must be carried out by commanders and staffs from mobile control posts, the movement locations of which will be determined in conformity with the conditions of making the march. Only such control can be centralized. The experience of the last war and postwar exercises provides a good example of the use of axis officers and liaison officers on the march for purposes of control. It fully justifies itself also under modern conditions.

Not enough attention is given in the work to questions of the organization of the provost and traffic control service. Moreover, its importance for support of the timely and organized completion of the march is somewhat underestimated. In place of the existing scheme of organizing it, presupposing the development of provost and traffic control areas and sectors, it is proposed to have only provost and traffic control detachments, formed for the purpose "...of quickly setting out traffic control posts in the most crucial sectors of the routes of movement and, if necessary, of carrying out additional marking of the axes of movement. They should be sent out at the request of the intelligence organs or movement support detachments" (page 67). This recommendation clearly narrows the functions of the provost and traffic control service. Besides the direction of traffic, this service is obliged to accomplish other important tasks: monitor the progress of the movement of troops and their observance of camouflage measures, fight sabotage and reconnaissance groups and enemy agents on the routes and in concentration areas, guard the routes, and gather up men, combat equipment, and transport vehicles and direct them to their units. The work of the provost and traffic control subunits is further complicated by the fact that in the initial period of a war there will naturally occur a spontaneous flow of evacuee population hindering the movement of the troops.

To accomplish these and other tasks, the provost and traffic control service will have to be organized on all routes of the movement of troops, in concentration areas, and on lines of deployment, independently of the road traffic control service to be organized by the rear services of the front (district) on the most important motor roads. This will require



allocating the organic provost and traffic control subunits, and sometimes also motorized rifle subunits of the large units making the march.

The provost and traffic control subunits must be provided with high-speed means of locomotion (armored personnel carriers, helicopters) and dependable means of communications permitting the organization of a sort of "dispatcher service" on the routes of movement. Route commandants and staff officers located at movement phase control lines must constantly have complete data on the movement of columns on the scale of a large unit (formation). For this it is necessary to use the entire array of wire and radio-relay communications lines of the border military districts and specially established communications centers and to employ helicopters extensively.

Successful completion of a march over a great distance will greatly depend on the well thought out organization of rear services and technical support of the troops and their timely provision with materiel and especially with fuel. However, in setting forth these important matters, the author has limited himself merely to remarks of a general order.

In making a march over a great distance the biggest requirement of the troops is for fuel. Thus, for the march of a tank army four divisions in strength over a distance of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers, up to 10.5 to 12.5 thousand tons of fuel will be required. For a combined-arms army made up of three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division for the same distance, 13 to 15 thousand tons are needed. Therefore, the troops need specific recommendations on how to replenish this great expenditure of fuel in good time and organize the quick refueling of equipment during the march. It is possible, for instance, to establish increased reserves of fuel by placing barrels or cans of fuel on the vehicles. This, as experience shows, will increase the range of tanks in fuel 1.5 times, and of motor vehicles two to 2.5 times.

Of course, even this is still not enough. Therefore, one can agree with the author that it will be of decisive importance to deliver fuel from depots previously established in the zones of movement and concentration areas of the troops. Obviously, it is advisable to locate these depots, as well as depots with other materiel, at a distance of approximately one day's march from one another and as close as possible to the probable daytime rest areas. Such a measure, in our opinion, will permit troops to deliver the necessary means with their own transport on time, which is especially important in the initial period of war with the limited capabilities of front and army transport.





If the depots are considerably removed from the routes of movement of troops and organic transport cannot replenish expendable reserves, then it will be necessary to deliver fuel and other materiel with the motor transport of the military district (front) and sometimes to airlift them to previously designated points for transfer to organic transport.

Marches over great distances will frequently have to be made on the territory of the other socialist countries, and in regard to this, at the military science conference conducted in the Carpathian Military District in the fall of 1961 it was recommended that the question be raised of establishing base fuel depots in these countries. Besides that, the need for a design change in the existing fuel supply vehicles was pointed out.

The author has said nothing at all about organizing support with missiles, warheads, and special fuel on the march. Under conditions where military actions have already begun with intense action of aviation, the expenditure of surface-to-air missiles will be especially great. According to the experience of some exercises, in the time it takes to move a tank army from the interior of the country this expenditure may be as much as two units of fire. Therefore, recommendations ought to have been made as to how the timely replacement of these missiles should be organized.

The most important questions of planning the organization of the work of the rear services should have been at least briefly examined. For instance, the procedure for laying out depots and supporting troops during the march -- what reserves to establish and in what quantities -- and the procedure for the receipt and delivery of materiel and the use of transport should have been shown. It should have been emphasized that, for troops participating in the first operations of the initial period of a war, the plans for materiel, technical, and medical support must be carefully worked out already in peacetime and all the main calculations tested during command-staff exercises, war games, and exercises with troops.

The work would have gained considerably if the most important questions of technical support had been more fully examined in it, in particular, ways and methods of ensuring the dependable operation of vehicles, increasing the march capabilities of troops, and the most urgent questions of the organization of repair and recovery, especially of armored equipment.

On questions of medical support only a few generally-known recommendations are repeated in the book.



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The concluding chapter examines along the most general lines only a few questions of the control of troops on the march. This chapter is six pages -- half as long as the section in which the conditions of the conduct of marches are examined. Its content by no means fully covers even basic questions. Even so important a question as control of troops in the period of making the march has not found proper reflection.

The recommendation on methods of negotiating zones of radioactive contamination is dubious. Thus, in the book it is stated that on encountering an extensive zone of radioactive contamination "the head unit (or a number of units of the large unit), detecting a zone of contamination, stops, disperses, and withdraws to a safe place. The column following behind it is directed to a bypass, while the subsequent columns negotiate the zone, inasmuch as by the moment of their approach the levels of radiation will have dropped sharply" (page 76).

First of all, it is not clear just what the head units are supposed to do -- stop, disperse, or withdraw to a safe place?!



Second, any stop before the zone is advantageous only for the enemy to deliver strikes on the halted troops with nuclear and chemical weapons or aviation. Besides that, stops lead to the loss of time and a reduction in the rate of the march.

Third, the presence of a contaminated zone in the path of a movement is regarded as some kind of surprise. The question is, just what role must reconnaissance then play?

Finally, if his recommendation is followed, it comes out that the units located at the tail end of the column will find themselves at the front, and vice versa; the combat units will be left in the back, and the rear, up forward. This is hardly advisable, for the commander draws up the battle formation of troops on the basis of a definite concept, especially in anticipation of an encounter with the enemy.

We picture the actions of troops in the presence of an extensive zone of radioactive contamination differently. First of all, reconnaissance must be sure to give the commander the necessary information in good time about the location, configuration, and dimensions of the zone and the levels of radiation on the main routes. On the basis of this, the commander and staff, in advance, before the arrival of the columns in the zone, must make a decision on negotiating or bypassing the zone and, without stopping the troops before the zone, issue the appropriate

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instructions.

With high levels of radiation, the head units must not stop and wait until the other troops bypass or negotiate the zone of contamination. They must immediately, without losing time or causing troops to accumulate, carry out a maneuver to the indicated axis for bypassing the zone. The following columns, as the levels of radiation subside, will negotiate the zone over the safest routes. It should be noted that the author himself obviously understands the vulnerability of his recommendation when he says that "the chief defect of this variant consists in the complexity of the action and, consequently, in the complexity of control" (page 76).

It must be noted that in the book there are imprecise formulations, and arbitrary and unsound terms are introduced. For instance, on page 39 it uses the expression "overall assessment of the situation and the concomitant working out of a decision." It is well known that the assessment of the situation is already part of the process of working out a decision, the beginning of it. Consequently, working out a decision is not "concomitant to the assessment of the situation," but the situation is assessed to work out a decision. Such terms as "initial decision" (page 40) and "fundamental decision" (page 43) should hardly be introduced. It is clear that there can be only one decision.

In the book the front zone is called "front strip" (page 8), and a march over a great distance, a "long march" (page 32), which contradicts generally accepted terminology.

Evaluating the work as a whole, it should be noted that overly general statements predominate in it and there are far too few specific recommendations. The author has made little use of the experience of exercises with troops and the materials of military science conferences which have been conducted in military districts and groups of forces. Many important questions are examined in insufficient depth without proper substantiation, and some have been left out altogether. For instance, nothing is said about the peculiarities of organizing the march over a great distance with missile large units and units, but there is very much of a special nature to this. The entire work has an abstract character, since the author examines the greater part of the questions without reference to who is making the march over a great distance, a front, an army, or a large unit. Several special questions are not explored at all.







In our opinion, the production of valuable work on so important a theme as the organization and conduct of marches over great distances remains on the agenda. It is very much needed in the troops. Producing such a work can be done only by a group of officers, specialists in different areas of military knowledge. This is how the solution of this problem should have been approached when working out the work just reviewed, instead of rushing ahead with the publication of a book having such serious defects.

