

TOP SECRET

3820

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations


SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Certain Problems in the
Operational Training of Intelligence Officers

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses the shortcomings of the existing system of operational training of intelligence officers. The author feels that playing out of military actions in the initial operation according to the same pattern without taking the actual situation into account is incorrect. The article cites several examples of where the training situation does not correspond to reality. The author discusses them briefly and proposes corrective measures. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

JOHN N. MCMAHON

TOP SECRET



Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army


The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research






Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 12 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



DATE OF INFO. Mid-1963

22 November 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Certain Problems in the Operational Training of Intelligence Officers

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel Z. Moseyev. This article discusses the shortcomings of the existing system of operational training of intelligence officers. The author feels that playing out of military actions in the initial operation according to one and the same pattern without taking the actual situation into account is incorrect. The article cites several examples of where the training situation does not correspond to reality. The author discusses them briefly and proposes corrective measures.


End of Summary

Comment:

The author also wrote "Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Information Service in Operational and Tactical Reconnaissance" in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

The article to which it refers was





Certain Problems in the Operational Training of
Intelligence Officers

by

Colonel Z. MOSEYEV


At the present time it is of great importance to discover and apply new, most desirable forms and methods of operational training which are best suited to the nature of operations in nuclear war. Experience shows that in the operational training of officers and generals, depending on where the military district is located, a specific orientation must be observed. This is particularly necessary for intelligence officers. It is due to the great differences between theaters of military operations. For example, the number and status of enemy armed forces, as well as the operational preparation of the Central European Theater, differ greatly from the Southern European Theater.* Also different, as is known, is the status of the troops of each military district (group of forces) in relation to the armed forces of NATO and other blocs. Some immediately adjoin the member states of these blocs, others are located a considerable distance away from their borders. There are also differences in the physiogeographic and economic conditions of each theater.

All this has a substantial effect on operational training and must definitely be taken into account when planning it and carrying it out. It is particularly necessary to consider the possible types of operations by the enemy's armed forces. In this connection it is also necessary to teach intelligence organs the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in initial operations. In practice these problems must be worked out at operational exercises, war games, staff training sessions, etc.

However, the playing out of military actions in initial operations is often conducted for a number of years according to one and the same pattern, without taking account of the actual situation. For example, there are sectors and axes in almost every theater of military operations which cannot be used by troops under conditions where nuclear weapons are

* The designations of theaters are based on the views of the NATO command.





employed. Yet despite this, combat actions by attack groupings are played out there rather often. Problems of assault crossings of large rivers and straits are often worked out during the exercises using the most convenient places in each case for carrying them out, whereas in reality there may be other possibilities.

Another fact not always taken into account is that the enemy, once war begins, will often make changes in his plans and alter his groupings of nuclear means, aviation, and ground forces. Rigid patterns, therefore, in a system of operational training, are especially harmful, and this applies most particularly to the training of intelligence officers.

Consequently, each exercise and measure of operational training must differ significantly from the others in the nature of its organization and the place where it is carried out. This is not the first time that this point has been made, but we are obliged to repeat it since in the practice of operational exercises and war games this requirement is often not taken into consideration. An article by General V. MERNOV* correctly states that, despite a significant, even revolutionary change in means of combat and methods of conducting a battle and an operation, or an entire war as a whole, there are still very few new forms and methods of operational training which it would be advisable to work out and use in practice. But as the experience of work by intelligence directorates of staffs of military districts (groups of forces) shows, this is entirely feasible not only in the process of operational training, but also in the activity of military science societies. The latter may organize and conduct competition in working out timely problems of military art, and the most interesting works might be published.

It is especially important for reconnaissance personnel to pay attention to methods of analyzing data on the actual enemy that will be encountered during initial operations. For this purpose, it seems to us, during the training year each officer of an intelligence directorate should be given individual assignments, and then, following their reporting on them, a detailed analysis should be made at operational training sessions.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought," No. 3 (64), 1962.





To work out special problems, in addition to command-staff exercises and experimental exercises with troops, the holding of special exercises should be expanded. For example, to raise the operational training of intelligence officers, operational-tactical reconnaissance exercises and games may be held involving the intelligence directorate of the staff of a front, intelligence departments (sections) of staffs of armies and corps (divisions), as well as staffs of reconnaissance units. In a number of cases it is advisable to bring reconnaissance units and subunits into these exercises, including OSNAZ and special-purpose units which have been assigned reconnaissance tasks and the actual execution of them. In the process the enemy must be skilfully represented, using inflatable mock-ups, as well as training ground simulations of the mobile means that employ nuclear weapons which, as we know, already exist in certain military districts.

During a special reconnaissance exercise problems such as the following may be worked out: the collection, processing, analysis, and delivery of reconnaissance data within a limited period of time, the organization and conduct of reconnaissance and final reconnaissance against nuclear weapons, the determination of target coordinates, faster processing of aerial photography data, etc.

An exercise of this type was held in the Odessa Military District in July 1961 with the participation of intelligence organs and reconnaissance means of armies, corps, divisions, and regiments. The exercise lasted two days. The overall depth of operations and movement of reconnaissance was 250 kilometers. In addition to working out the practical operations of the intelligence organs and reconnaissance means, it was possible at the exercise to test and study a whole series of problems in controlling them during an operation (battle) under conditions of the initial period of a war, as well as methods of planning reconnaissance and the most advantageous distribution of channels for the passage of reconnaissance information at various levels, etc.

The experience has shown that these exercises can be of great benefit not only to intelligence officers, but also to operational staffs in general.

When planning operational training it is advisable, in addition to the special reconnaissance exercises, to include special lectures, seminars, and even short operational problems and group exercises with the participation of officers from the departments and directorates concerned. Obviously combined study groups for practical exercises in special





reconnaissance must also be organized.


In studying the plans of the aggressive military blocs for the use of combined armed forces, and especially the use of nuclear weapons in theaters of military operations, seminars may play an important role. But their purpose should be not to test the officers' knowledge, as is generally the case now, but mainly to creatively study the problems posed by means of debate and interchanging ideas.

During operational training there should be more study of reconnaissance indications of enemy preparations for war in general and for the delivery of the first nuclear strike in particular. Unfortunately, in the staffs of border military districts very little attention is given over to this important problem. And it is no accident that serious difficulties are encountered when, for example, it becomes necessary to distinguish between enemy preparations for war under the guise of maneuvers and regular exercises that are held periodically. The ability to correctly assess a probable enemy and discover his actual plans for creating possible groupings of forces and means, as well as knowledge of his military doctrine -- all this must be included in operational training, which is of great significance in determining the goals and nature of armed combat in the initial period of a future war.

At reconnaissance and command-staff operational exercises, work should also be done on problems of organizing and conducting combat against enemy special-purpose units and subunits. The NATO command devotes great attention to these troops and allots them a significant role in nuclear warfare. For this reason they are now, as is known, being organized in the armies of Great Britain and the US with all due speed.

As of now, however, none of these factors are being given sufficient weight in the system of operational training, even when training the officer specialists concerned in the staffs of military districts and armies. Among those factors not being fully studied are the capabilities and forces and means for detecting these means of the enemy, their operations, tactical-technical data, the procedure for using them in an operation, and other important problems.

In the present international situation, as is known, the possibility of local wars occurring is not out of the question. The planning of operational training, therefore, should also include working out questions of organizing and conducting reconnaissance against a probable enemy given this type of war and the particular features inherent in it.






As for front command-staff one-sided exercises on the terrain, the working out of training problems would be more effective if at each exercise a special group playing the role of the enemy were set up in the staff of the directing body, consisting mainly of intelligence officers. The latter, as part of their training for the exercises, would have to carefully study the views of the NATO command and other blocs on the conduct of military operations, and the tactics, organization, and armament of foreign armies. During the exercise they must make decisions themselves on behalf of the enemy for the subsequent playing out of combat operations by the two sides. But such groups are often lacking at exercises and the enemy's decisions are made hastily by the staff of the directing body, without adequate consideration of the views of foreign armies. In this case, of course, we cannot expect to create an intense, interesting, and instructive situation, as close as possible to a real one.

A serious defect in operational training is the misuse in certain exercises of operational transitions. Often the playing out of the most critical parts of an operation immediately follow these transitions, and the participants do not always have a chance to study the situation in detail. In our view, therefore, the participants must be brought into one aspect or another of an operation that needs to be worked out by means of a gradual buildup of the situation, provided that the operational time corresponds to the sidereal time. As for the operational transitions themselves, they should, when necessary, be carried out on a somewhat different pattern than is done at exercises. It would be best if the transition itself were to be coordinated with a general break of five to six hours in the exercise. During this time it would be possible to prepare the umpires properly and gather the material on the stage of the exercise just completed. After the break the buildup of the situation must begin immediately, and then, after a certain time, the work should begin on the problem that has been planned -- for example, committing the second echelon of a front (army) to battle, etc. Then during the entire front or army command-staff exercise it would not be necessary to make more than two transitions.

The suggested procedure for holding exercises will make for better instruction and practical training in the actions of operational intelligence organs, as well as a realistic use of reconnaissance means. By contrast, under the existing procedure and number of operational transitions, this, as a rule, is impossible.

We are in full agreement with the opinion that in forming the staff of the directing body, groups playing the role of the enemy, and the team of





umpires, it is advisable to take more or less cohesive collectives, preferably staff departments or sections. Experience has shown that improvisation in this matter adversely affects the quality of operational training. This is particularly true of those operations and intelligence organs which are set up at exercises to build up the situation and are called upon, based on the decisions of the trainees, to play out the combat actions of the two sides.


However, the creation of a separate information group in the staff of the directing body, as has been done at exercises up to now, is completely unnecessary in our opinion. It is preferable to have a single staff of the directing body, consisting of officers of the operations and intelligence directorates of the staff of the district and representatives of the branch arms and services.

In the staff of the directing body there must be both intelligence officers on general matters, as well as specialists on agent reconnaissance and special-purpose troops and on radio, radiotechnical, and aerial reconnaissance. It must be considered an abnormal phenomenon for the staff of the directing body to be limited to only one representative of reconnaissance, who naturally would not be in a position to carry out the great volume of work that would be entrusted to him during the course of the entire exercise.

The staff of the directing body, as is known, must systematically keep track of the results of the employment of nuclear weapons by both sides. The experience of exercises has shown that for a more graphic assessment of losses from enemy nuclear weapons and of the effectiveness of our own nuclear strikes, we must collect data from both sides within a certain period of time, utilizing for this purpose equipment that makes it possible to transmit images over a distance.

A major defect in working out questions of organizing and conducting reconnaissance is the fact that during command-staff exercises most attention is paid, as a rule, to assessing data on the enemy that are already known, whereas problems of planning reconnaissance, obtaining reconnaissance data, and of control of the organs and means of reconnaissance -- especially during the most critical moments of an operation -- are often completely overlooked. This leads to a situation in which the practical skills of officers in the organization of reconnaissance are gradually lost and reconnaissance against the actual enemy is not carried out. As a result the trainees use only data on the enemy that are received from the staff of the directing body and try to






confine themselves to them.

During a command-staff exercise the director is usually briefed only by the chief of intelligence of a front (army). This has an adverse effect on the operational training of officers of the intelligence directorate (department). In our view it is desirable that he also receive reports, if only brief ones, on the situation from the enemy's point of view from the chief of the information department, and on questions of reconnaissance planning from the chiefs of other departments and from senior officers of the departments. This will give him a clear picture of the work of the intelligence directorate (department) as a whole and not just of the chief.

At present more time should probably be given over to studying the particular features of the operational preparation of theaters of military operations. To accomplish this officers and generals should make more frequent operational trips, both in their own district and in adjacent ones, to familiarize themselves with the conditions of the terrain, the road network, the nature of water obstacles, etc. This will enable them to determine for a given theater of military operations the conditions of moving up and concentrating troops, measures to protect them from nuclear weapons, air defense, etc. After each such trip it is essential to synthesize the material and organize a discussion of it at operational training sessions.

In a system of operational training it is very important to utilize the experience of operational exercises. The first requirement is to thoroughly synthesize it theoretically, rather than relying on conclusions drawn from some individual exercise as is often done in practice. On the basis of such "experience" in organizing reconnaissance, highly dubious recommendations are sometimes made, a fact subsequently confirmed in practice. For example, at one exercise, to reduce the time required to receive reconnaissance information it was decided to reduce the number of command levels through which the reconnaissance data normally had to pass. In practice this led to a situation in which badly or hastily processed reconnaissance information, dealing with individual matters and of no operational significance, began to be forwarded directly to the staff of a front. As a result, it became necessary to abandon this practice at the same exercise. Thus, this measure did nothing to help reduce the time needed to collect and receive reconnaissance information. We must state, unfortunately, that at the present time this problem remains completely unresolved.





At exercises, as is known, reconnaissance by front forces was often conducted to a depth of 40 to 60 kilometers. In so doing we were often guided by previously existing principles and did not take into account changes that had occurred. Later this turned out to be completely unnecessary, since it led to the dissipation of the reconnaissance forces and means of the front, and diverted them from the performance of their main tasks in support of the front operation. At this depth reconnaissance tasks may be accomplished successfully by forces of armies, corps, and even divisions.


Consequently, before drawing one conclusion or another from an exercise that has been held, one must have a thorough understanding of its very nature, compare it with the experience of other exercises, and synthesize it. It is particularly necessary to take account of any arbitrary situations that were permitted to occur in the exercises, and which for a number of reasons simply cannot be avoided.


Some comrades believe that when organizing an exercise, information about the enemy should be given to the trainees one month prior to the beginning of the exercise. This is hardly a good idea, since it would increase unnecessarily the overall length of the exercise, and the officers and generals taking part would be obliged, when preparing for the exercise, to absent themselves almost entirely from their official duties. In point of fact, the delivery of data about the enemy actually marks the beginning of the exercise; subsequently these data must be continuously built up right up until the time that the trainees depart for the area of the exercise.

Experience has shown that seven to ten days are entirely adequate to study a situation and fully prepare staffs and directorates (departments) to hold an exercise. Moreover, directorates and staffs of border military districts that are taking part in the exercise have actual data on the enemy in their possession. For this reason it can hardly be correct for the initial situation or the tasks of an exercise to contain unnecessarily extensive and even exhaustive information on the enemy.

On the whole we should probably confine ourselves to the information which intelligence directorates of staffs of districts actually have in their possession in peacetime.

But in addition we should also deliberately give certain contradictory information, which also contains elements of operational camouflage (disinformation) that is used by the enemy. This will force the trainees





to undertake active reconnaissance operations in order to obtain new data and make existing data more exact. Then during the exercise reconnaissance information should be built up on the basis of possible actual enemy actions in the situation that has been created, but it should not be revealed completely. In our view, prior to the start of the exercise it is advisable to work out the plan for building up the situation, which must reflect the operational time, content of reconnaissance information, its source, to whom and at what time it is to be delivered, and other questions. In the process it is necessary to bear in mind the use of various actual sources of information prior to the beginning and during the operation -- including border guard troops, agents, aerial reconnaissance, and others -- and convey to the appropriate staffs information in such volume and by such methods that would actually occur in a real situation.

We believe that the building up of the situation during an exercise must be carried out not only by umpires attached to staffs and intelligence organs, as is done at present, but also by umpires attached to reconnaissance units and subunits that are brought into the exercise. And we must try to give them the opportunity to act realistically in carrying out reconnaissance tasks assigned in support of the operation.

In conclusion we would point out that the operational training of intelligence officers, assuming it is properly organized and carried out, will make it possible to purposefully teach staffs and troops how to quickly detect and convey data on the enemy to the command levels concerned. This is particularly necessary for the effective delivery of nuclear strikes and the successful achievement of the final goals of modern high-speed operations.

