

1/16/2006

HR 70-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

3748

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Regrouping of
Troops in the Initial Period of a War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article summarizes a conference held by the North Caucasus Military District on the movement forward when war begins of a combined-arms army from the interior to the frontline area in a mountain theater of operations. The main topics were the daily rates of movement, the various means of transportation, the overall distances to be covered, the capabilities and limitations of the transport means, the effect of mountain terrain on movement, and the movement support provided by the different services. Although adverse factors were recognized, very optimistic rates of movement forward in a mountain area were expected. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon


~~TOP SECRET~~



Distribution:

- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
- Director, National Security Agency
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
- Director of Strategic Research

~~TOP SECRET~~



[Redacted]



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 20 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO. Early 1962

DATE 17 November 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Regrouping of Troops in the Initial Period of a War

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel L. Sapozhnikov. This article summarizes a conference held by the North Caucasus Military District on the movement forward when war begins of a combined-arms army from the interior to the frontline area in a mountain theater of operations. The main topics were the daily rates of movement, the various means of transportation, the overall distances to be covered, the capabilities and limitations of the transport means, the effect of mountain terrain on movement, and the movement support provided by the different services. Although adverse factors were recognized, very optimistic rates of movement forward in a mountain area were expected. End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



Regrouping of Troops in the Initial Period of a War

(based on materials of a military science conference)

by

Colonel L. SAPOZHNIKOV

The North Caucasus Military District held its ninth military science conference which discussed the matters of regrouping troops over great distances in the initial period of a war.

The conference which was held was, so to speak, the final stage of the military scientific work on this subject. Over a period of three years, not only was theoretical research conducted by district troops into the matters of regrouping, but these matters were also studied in actual practice -- during troop combat training and the operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs. For this purpose we held an operational command-staff game on maps, a two-level army command-staff exercise with communications means, and also exercises with large units and units.

As a result the district amassed sufficient practical material to enable it to formulate generalized recommendations on such important matters as the planning and carrying out of troop regroupings over great distances under conditions of considerable destruction and strong enemy actions against transportation lines, the organization and support for the commitment to the engagement of a second-echelon army in a mountain theater of military operations, and the control of the army's troops during its movement and commitment to the engagement.

The report on the subject, "The regrouping of a combined-arms army over a great distance under conditions of strong enemy action against transportation lines and the commitment of the army to an engagement from the march in order to develop the offensive of the front in a mountain theater of military operations in the initial period of a war," was given by the district chief of staff, General-Mayor STEPSHIN. He examined four main topics: the conditions for the movement and commitment to the engagement, the preparation of the regrouping, the





carrying out of the regrouping and the preparation for the commitment to the engagement, and the commitment of the army to the engagement to develop the offensive.


Afterwards co-reports were heard on matters of the organization and content of party-political work (by General-Leytenant IVASHCHENKO), the regrouping of missile large units and units over great distances (by General-Leytenant of Artillery PAROVATKIN), the organization of the air defense of troops being regrouped (by General-Major of Artillery GATSOLAYEV and General-Leytenant of Aviation YEREMIYA), the organization of engineer support (by Colonel ROZHKOVA), and the organization of materiel-technical support (by General-Major GORLANOV).


Primary attention of the conference participants was devoted to a discussion of the first part of the subject, that is, to matters of the regrouping (movement forward) of a combined-arms army designated to develop the offensive in a front's first offensive operation of the initial period of war.

In the main address General-Major STEPSHIN emphasized that under conditions of the first operations of a missile/nuclear war regroupings of troops from the interior of the country to the front will be prevalent. The troops and transportation lines, naturally, will be subjected to enemy action at any distance from the front line. The possible scales and effectiveness of this action will prove to be extremely great. Therefore, troop movement forward will involve the need to frequently negotiate wide zones of destruction and contamination and to repulse air strikes and attacks by enemy landing forces and sabotage and reconnaissance groups, with frequent changes in the methods of advancing. All of this requires the advance preparation of the troops and transportation means for the regroupings and of their fire support and protection against enemy means of mass destruction.

Stemming from this, regroupings from the rear to the front, which in the past were in the nature of "peaceful movements", will in a future war acquire all the features of combat operations.

Concerning the preparation for the movement forward of an army, the speaker pointed out that it is begun during peacetime.







However, with the initiation of a missile/nuclear war, changes in the situation, resulting from the initial nuclear strikes and the actions of the ground troops of both sides, may lead to a situation where the destination, strength, and preparation times of the army, and also the condition of the transportation lines, will be changed. Therefore, the greater part of the work in preparing the movement of the army will have to be carried out within extremely short time limits, at the same time that mobilization measures and the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy missile/nuclear and chemical strikes are being carried out.

Regrouping over great distances under conditions of mass destruction requires extremely great effort. Therefore, it was proposed that the average daily rates of movement forward be such that they do not exhaust the personnel and do not lead to the massive breakdown of combat equipment. Before entering the mountain area, these rates may amount to 300 kilometers and more; in the mountains, depending on the conditions of the transportation lines, the rates of movement can fluctuate within very broad limits -- from 100 to 200 kilometers a day and more. The rate of transportation by rail ought to be 500 kilometers a day or more. The duration of a daily march when proceeding by organic means should not exceed 12 to 13 hours. In the middle of the march it is necessary to designate a halt of up to three hours; when movement is over a distance of up to 1,000 kilometers, the daily rest may be omitted. In addition to this, according to the speaker, under conditions of the initial period of a war, when both sides are conducting an intense battle for the initiative, and forestalling the buildup of forces is the main way of gaining this, a maximally high rate of regrouping is to be achieved even at the cost of somewhat reducing the combat effectiveness of the troops.

In discussing the role of the different types of transportation in carrying out regroupings, General STEPSHIN expressed the opinion that under present-day conditions rail transport has lost its former importance. This is explained by the sharp reduction in the throughput capacity of railroads due to massive destruction and the great amount of restoration work.

Transport aviation can ensure the most rapid rate of regrouping. But, the speaker emphasized, the troops lack experience in using it: there is no transport aviation in the






organs of the Military Transportation Service, and yet, in the conditions of a mountain theater of military operations, where roads are limited, aviation may be the only method of transporting troops to the area of combat actions. Concerning water transport, although it can and must be used for shipments, its capabilities are limited by the capacity of the loading and unloading means, the difficulty of rapidly assembling a sufficient number of ships, and the considerable destruction of ports, piers and hydrotechnical installations.

In this connection, the report propounded the idea that the main method of regrouping (over a distance of up to 1,000 kilometers) is movement by organic means. Its advantages are reliability, a sufficiently high speed of movement, and the capability of quickly changing the axis of movement when necessary.

Examining regrouping and the commitment to the engagement as a single set of actions, General STEPSHIN emphasized that the commitment of an army to the engagement will, as a rule, be carried out from the march, without preliminary concentration. In his opinion, at present even large units of the army's first echelon cannot enter a battle at the same time due to the irregular development of combat actions on the separate axes, and consequently, due to the impossibility of simultaneously preparing the large units for commitment to battle. This provided grounds for concluding that the prior designation of a concentration area and of a line for the commitment for an army makes no sense. It is now necessary to indicate the commitment area, that is, the area from which the army must enter into combat with the ground enemy.

In a number of speeches other opinions were expressed about troop regrouping methods. Colonel MIKHAYLIK and Lieutenant Colonel AKULOV emphasized that now and in the near future rail transport will remain the main type of transportation for troops. All the remaining types of transportation -- water, motor, and air -- must be regarded as supplementary, to be used in combination with rail transport. This, in their opinion, is due to the fact that the capabilities of sea (river) transport are limited in general, while the weakest point of military transport aviation is its inability to transport heavy equipment. Moreover, a very large number of aircraft is needed to transport






the large units of an army, a number which in actual practice cannot be supported. But movement of troops by organic means also has a number of negative aspects, the main one being the lowering of the combat effectiveness of the troops during extended regroupings.

General-Mayor of Aviation ZALKIN noted in his speech that transporting troops by military transport aviation will be of a priority nature and under conditions when other types of transportation cannot be used. In his opinion, the transporting of combined-arms armies at full strength by air is scarcely probable. Most often military transport aviation will be allocated to shift individual units and large units without heavy equipment.

In general, doubt was expressed about the advisability of carrying out troop regroupings at the strength of formations in a future war. After all, no matter how well the movement is organized and supported, it will be difficult to achieve the simultaneous arrival of all the large units of an army at the designated area at the specified time. Therefore, an army can be used at full strength only after the completion of the concentration of its main forces and means, which under conditions of the initial period of a missile/nuclear war will hardly be possible. Regrouping in such conditions will most likely be carried out by individual large units.

We would also like to make some comments on other theoretical propositions of the main address, in particular, on the basic thesis that "... in a future war regroupings will acquire all the characteristic features of a combat operation." We know that by an operation we mean the totality of the battles, engagements, and maneuvers of the operational formations and large units of the different branch arms and branches of the armed forces that are taking action according to a single concept and plan in order to achieve a specific operational or strategic goal; the main part of each operation is the engagement. Will the regrouping have, if not all, then at least most of the characteristic features of an operation? No, because its content is primarily the relocation of troops from certain areas to others for the purpose of setting up a new troop grouping or of reinforcing a prior grouping so as to carry out the assigned combat tasks. To call this type of combat activity an operation






only because during its conduct the troops will repulse the attacks of enemy aviation, airborne landing forces, and sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and negotiate zones of contamination and destruction, that is, actions directed toward maintaining their combat effectiveness, is unsound in our opinion.

Another question arises in connection with this: can we in this case regard the movement of a combined-arms army from the interior of the country as a regrouping? We do not think so. In the conditions under consideration we are not speaking about changing a previously established grouping, but precisely about the movement forward of a combined-arms army from the interior of the country to a theater of military operations for the purpose of reinforcing groupings located there.

The shifting of the major forces of troops after their mobilization expansion in the initial period of a war, in our opinion, should be regarded as the movement forward of them from the interior of the country to the areas of combat actions, a movement which will be carried out by various methods using all types of transportation.

It is also necessary to more precisely define the idea expressed in the report that the regrouping and the commitment to an engagement should be regarded as a single natural chain of actions.

Under conditions where the movement forward of troops takes place from the interior of the country to a theater of military operations for the purpose of reinforcing groupings operating there or for setting up new ones, the statement that was made is not entirely accurate in our opinion. The fact of the matter is that the shifting of troops over great distances can be implemented by various methods and by employing various types of transportation, points which were discussed at the conference. Frequently, in these conditions, personnel with light weapons can complete the march by organic means, while heavy equipment -- tanks and missile launchers -- can be transported by rail and water transport or in heavy-duty trailers. On the other hand, the destruction of transportation lines and the necessity of crossing zones of contamination do not provide the opportunity of organizing the simultaneous arrival of the large units and units being transported by this method at the area where they will be





committed to the engagement. This, undoubtedly, must be kept in mind. Obviously, so that a large unit, not to even mention an army, can accomplish its combat tasks, it needs some minimum time to prepare personnel and equipment for combat actions. Even during the movement of the army by organic means over a distance of up to 1,000 kilometers where the daily marches last 12 to 13 hours, as was mentioned in the report, it is necessary to round up and inspect the materiel and replenish the necessary reserves, especially of fuel and lubricants.


We cannot agree with the speaker that in some cases "... the rate of speed of the regrouping will be achieved by somewhat lowering the combat effectiveness of the troops." By means of this recommendation, one can justify any miscalculation made in organizing and supporting the movement of the troops, as well as in committing them to an engagement and in conducting combat actions. Regardless of the conditions under which the shifting of troops is carried out, its rate of speed must not lead to the exhaustion of the personnel or to the massive breakdown of the combat equipment.

In view of the fact that it must move under conditions of great destruction, fires, contaminated terrain, and roads blocked by a demoralized populace, a combined-arms army which is being transferred from the interior of the country to a theater of military operations, regardless of its methods of movement, will hardly constitute a unified entity which could be employed from the march as an operational echelon of the front.

We believe that in future operations, especially during the initial period of a war, it is unlikely that new operational formations at full strength will be committed to an engagement simultaneously on the same axis. The buildup of the efforts of the attacking troops will more often be carried out by individual large units.

In the event it becomes necessary to use an army which is moving forward at full strength from the interior of the country, especially when opening a new operational axis during the development of the operation, then, obviously, it will be necessary to first concentrate it in specific areas and then have it committed to the engagement. However, under these conditions it will sometimes prove difficult to achieve a full






concentration. Most frequently the army will initiate actions with part of its forces, subordinating to itself the large units and units reinforcing other armies operating on the given axis. There can be no set model in this respect.


The conference devoted considerable attention to matters of the regrouping of missile large units and units over great distances by enhancing the march capabilities of the troops and organizing and implementing measures that support the movement of large units and formations.

In speaking about the regrouping of missile large units and units, General-Leytenant PAROVATKIN, Colonel SHUMEYKO, and others emphasized that the major bottleneck in organizing the movement of a missile brigade and battalion is the limited capability of tracked heavy equipment to move under its own power. To ensure the combat effectiveness of the rocket troops, heavy equipment will be transferred over great distances on trailers. But the employment of trailers in mountains is limited, and at times simply impossible, since they can move only over roads with a turning radius of at least 18 meters with downward inclines of 30 degrees and uphill slopes of no more than 15 degrees. It is natural that under these conditions rocket troops will most frequently be shifted by rail transport. Experience shows that to ensure the transfer of a missile brigade over a distance of up to 700 kilometers in a day, it is necessary to assign it loading and unloading areas that extend 50 to 70 kilometers with three to four stations available.

Exercises conducted in the district showed that the transfer of missile units and subunits can be carried out just as effectively by water transport. A missile battalion was transported in four 300-ton barges at an average speed of 15 kilometers per hour and the daily distance covered was up to 250 kilometers.

Colonel SHUMEYKO noted in his speech that the organization of the regrouping of missile units by organic means is affected adversely by the varied capabilities of their transportation means. While wheeled vehicles can attain a speed of up to 50 kilometers per hour, special vehicles can reach a speed of no more than 30 kilometers per hour and launcher units of no more than 20 kilometers per hour. Moreover, in the mountains these






figures are reduced by one-third to one-half.

Several proposals were made for the transporting of missiles. In particular, it was stressed that the restrictions on transportation speeds over highways and dirt roads lack sufficient grounds. Experience has shown that these figures can be increased: on highways up to 65 kilometers per hour, and on dirt roads up to 40 kilometers per hour. The permissible distance they may be transported can be raised up to 2,000 kilometers, including "dry" missiles on transporters -- up to 1,500 kilometers, mated missiles on transporters -- up to 500 kilometers, and on a launcher unit -- up to 200 kilometers.

General PAROVATKIN directed attention to the important matter of supporting the crossing of water obstacles by rocket troops. Since it is impossible to count on the bridge crossings being intact, he proposed the extensive use of ferry crossings. The experience of the exercises held in 1961 showed that four ferry crossing points are sufficient for the crossing of a missile brigade: No. 1 (with the K-61) -- for crossing equipment on the GAZ-63 or GAZ-69 truck; No. 2 (specially lengthened 25-ton ferry) -- for extended length equipment and special vehicles; No. 3 (two 50-ton ferries, one of which is 15 meters long with two treadways) for ZIL-157 and GAZ-63 wheeled vehicles; No. 4 (GSP tracked self-propelled ferry) -- for launcher units and tracked heavy equipment. This organization makes it possible, when a river is 330 to 450 meters wide, to cross a battalion in one hour and 20 minutes and a missile brigade in six hours.

In examining the ways to raise the march capabilities of the troops, conference participants emphasized that this is one of the key matters, since the transporting of troops over great distances by organic means depends upon the resolution of this matter. The main speaker and other speakers pointed out that under present-day conditions a march must be carried out at an average speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour. This can be achieved by continuous movement over the course of a day by increasing the cruising range through improved fuel mileage, reducing the time for technical servicing and for replenishing the equipment with POL, and the presence of alternate drivers in the vehicles.




According to Colonel YURPOLSKIY, the main difficulty in organizing marches is that the transportation equipment in large units has an extremely large gamut of technical capabilities. Thus, the cruising range in terms of fuel among wheeled vehicles varies from 250 (BTR-50P) to 650 kilometers (GAZ-63A); in tanks it is from 300 to 500 kilometers (on highways) and from 250 to 360 kilometers (on a dirt road); and in artillery prime movers it is from 250 kilometers (AT-P) to 700 kilometers (AT-G).

It is quite obvious that the diversity in cruising ranges and movement speeds substantially affects the make-up of the columns, each of which in present-day conditions must possess not only superior capabilities as concerns movement speed, but also in their combat self-sufficiency.

Cruising range is an index of the sustained operating time of transportation equipment. And this index is extremely diverse. It is necessary that the vehicles have a cruising range of at least 750 kilometers. Increasing the cruising range by installing additional fuel containers does not yield any special results, since these containers are not hooked to the fuel feed system. That is why during a march considerable time is spent on refueling the vehicles. For example, it takes three to 3.5 hours to refuel the vehicles of a regiment. This time must be decisively reduced to 30 to 60 minutes. This task must be accomplished by industry.

The existing scheduled preventive maintenance system of technical servicing does not meet modern requirements either. During a march up to 30 percent of the time is spent on inspecting and servicing the equipment. We must reduce both the number of inspections and also the time spent on them.

Increasing the duration of movement is also achieved by the continuous work of drivers. Therefore each vehicle must have a minimum of two drivers. The generals and officers who spoke emphasized that the problem of training drivers in modern conditions has acquired great national importance. The army must get drivers by drawing on conscripts. For this it is necessary to widely organize their training through DOSAAF [All-Union Society for Cooperation with the Army, Navy, and Air Force] in special truck and tank clubs. In addition, it is necessary to conduct obligatory instruction on motor vehicle and tractor




matters in secondary educational institutions.


The proposal was made that it is necessary to include trailer subunits for transporting tanks in the T/O&E of armies and divisions and a comment also was made on the unfitness for use in mountain conditions of present night vision instruments.

Many speeches were devoted to the matters of supporting the movement forward of troops and of maintaining their combat effectiveness, which, as the Minister of Defense has pointed out in the directive on operational training in a theater of military operations, are still not being accomplished with sufficient resoluteness in the districts and groups of forces.

General-Mayor DUDNIK said that the depth of the columns has much effect on the speed of movement. In a mountain theater of military operations, an army will be given a limited number of routes, as a result of which no less than two divisions may have to move along each route, which makes each of the army's columns have a total depth of 200 to 260 kilometers with a distance of 20 kilometers between large units. Including the organs for reconnaissance, security, and movement support, the depth is increased to 330 kilometers. In his opinion, the depth of the columns can be reduced by decreasing the overall number of motor transport means found in the servicing subunits and by replacing existing vehicles with heavy-duty vehicles of six to seven tons or more.

Providing the troops with fuel acquires great importance during movement. Authorized mobile reserves (diesel fuel -- three refuelings, gasoline -- 1.75 refuelings) in mountain conditions are enough to move the army only 500 kilometers. This figure can be raised by installing additional fuel tanks on the vehicles. However, after completing a march of 600 to 700 kilometers, the army's transportation will find itself with empty tanks. Naturally the POL reserves must be replenished in order to support the timely commitment of the large units to the engagement and the conduct of combat actions. As calculations show, about 5,000 tons of fuel or 2,000 three-ton fuel tanks are needed for this. Obviously, this amount of fuel cannot be brought up from the army's former depots. This problem can be successfully solved if branches of the appropriate depots or field mainline pipelines are set up in advance on the movement






routes and in the concentration areas or areas for the commitment to the engagement.


The provost and traffic control service has a special role in supporting the organization of troop movement. An additional number of personnel is needed to organize the troops when they are being moved over great distances. Thus, based on the experience of exercises, it has been established that 164 persons are needed to regulate the movement of a division executing a 200-kilometer march. Consequently, for the period when an army is making a one-day march, more than 500 to 600 persons will be needed for this. In the opinion of conference participants, the provost and traffic control service must be organized for a single day's march, but forces and means must be available for two marches and used in a leapfrog manner. Helicopters are an effective means of regulating the movement of columns and of monitoring them. A staff officer in an MI-4 can fly over all the army's columns in 30 to 40 minutes and determine precisely their location, order of movement, and reasons for delays.

Engineer support of the routes is also of great importance for successful troop movement. Colonels MAKAREVSKIY and ROZHKOV emphasized in their speeches that engineer support will be based on two principles: the prior maintenance of roads and equipping of routes, and direct support, which presupposes the maximum use of the organic engineer forces and means of the formations and large units. In mountain conditions movement support detachments must be allocated not only to each regiment, but sometimes even to battalions operating separately. Also, on-alert means have to be allocated for the restoration of road and bridge sections.

The limited number of engineer forces and means requires that they be continuously moved from one route to another. This task can be successfully carried out in the mountains only with the assistance of the helicopters attached to the army.

General-Major of Technical Troops SHEVCHENKO dwelled on matters of troop atomic and chemical protection during movement. He feels that the successful accomplishment of these matters depends on equipping the troops with technical means to determine the parameters of destruction during nuclear bursts and also to organize warning and provide continuous information to the troops about the radiation and chemical situation to include the nuclear






and chemical strikes of our own troops. This latter task can be fulfilled if a special organ in the army takes over its accomplishment. It is also necessary in peacetime to set up radiation (chemical) reconnaissance and decontamination treatment subunits in the large units and units. This is due to the fact that the replacements which will arrive during mobilization expansion may be injured and it will be necessary to give them necessary assistance immediately, as the cadre-strength large units will not have the forces and means for this.

In order to ensure the maximum self-sufficiency of large units and the elimination of the aftereffects of nuclear strikes, in wartime it is necessary for them to have in their complement separate chemical defense battalions consisting of a chemical and radiation reconnaissance company, two decontamination treatment companies, and a technical support platoon.

Generals-Mayor of Medical Service SHAPETS and MOGUCHIY spoke about medical support. In their opinion, it is possible to maintain the health of the personnel and to render timely assistance to those injured by radioactive and chemical substances if the medical-sanitary battalions of divisions are mobilized simultaneously with the combat units and subunits, rather than on the third day, as was done in the past, and if the medical service of the army is reinforced with front means and at least two medical detachments are attached to each division. When preparing for movement and regroupings we must not forget about the possibility of organizing the medical treatment of servicemen in civilian hospitals, which must be prepared for this beforehand. General SHAPETS introduced the proposal that the medical service of the army be provided with reliable communications means, without which it is impossible to control medical installations and subunits during the movement forward of the troops.

In examining the matters of party-political work during the movement forward of the troops, General-Leytenant IVASHCHENKO said that at first the nuclear weapons can cause certain changes in the morale and political state of the troops. Naturally, people may show not only terror, a feeling of danger, but even a sense of doom. Therefore, combating atomic fear is one of the most important tasks of party-political organs.




Atomic fear is overcome through knowledge of this weapon and of its casualty-producing elements, and through discipline in carrying out the signals and commands about atomic danger.

All forms of party-political work must foster in the personnel a feeling of confidence in the protective means, and train them in the proper use of those means both during the preparation period and also during the troop movement.

In the organization of the work of the rear, taking into account aggressive enemy action against the transportation lines, the matter of the skilful exploitation of all types of transport and transportation routes acquires special importance. General-Major GORLANOV spoke out in favor of establishing in the body of the rear services of the district (front, army) a single directorate for the transportation service, which would take in all organs concerned with the matters of preparing transportation routes (motor vehicle and Military Transportation Service routes) and the transporting of troops, including air and sea transport. This will make it possible to skilfully resolve the matters of the use of the respective types of transport and transportation routes without superfluous coordination, on which a great deal of time is now spent.

Providing fuel during troop movements over great distances is a very complex task. In order to continuously supply the army's troops with POL during regroupings it was suggested that two truck delivery battalions be incorporated into the T/O&E of the army. Full mobility of the army POL depot will be achieved by this. Concerning the use of a pipeline, in mountain conditions it is better if it is made out of rubberized fabric.

The conference participants spoke about matters which are of practical importance in improving the quality of the combat training of the troops. These are the commitment to an engagement of a motorized rifle division (General-Major SEDOV), the organization of reconnaissance and the actions of reconnaissance subunits during a regrouping (Colonel SNYATKOVSKIY), the nature and conditions of conducting combat actions by a motorized rifle division in the mountains (Colonel SNEZHKOVA), planning the shifting of a division (Colonel VOSKUTOV), and a number of others.



The results of the work of the conference were summed up in the speech of the first deputy commander of the district, General-Leytenant SHAPOSHNIKOV.

In his opinion, successful regrouping under modern conditions, especially in mountain theaters of military operations where there are limited transportation lines, depends directly on the capabilities of destroying the enemy's missile/nuclear means and aviation. And although the destruction of these means is not directly related to the support of troop movement from the interior of the country to the area of combat actions, this factor must be taken into consideration when preparing the troops for the march. He expressed doubt as to the correctness of the term "regrouping", since the movement of troops from the interior of the country in the initial period of a war will be linked with the setting up of troop groupings to conduct combat actions or to reinforce other groupings.

Concerning the commitment of an army to the engagement from the march, General SHAPOSHNIKOV emphasized that this measure requires very careful preparation. Of course, this use of the army cannot be ruled out. However, under conditions where it will carry out a 1,000-kilometer march, the proposed method of committing the greater portion of the army's forces to the engagement may be ineffective in view of the fact that certain means of the large units, especially the heavy equipment, will not arrive simultaneously at the commitment area. Most often, we will build up the efforts of the troops operating forward by committing individual large units to the engagement from the march.

In organizing troop movements over great distances it is most advisable to use the combined method, in which movement by organic means is of decisive importance. This assertion is due, not to an underestimation of the other types of transportation, but rather to their vulnerability. In addition, railroad and water transport afford extremely limited capabilities for carrying out a maneuver. Further, General SHAPOSHNIKOV remarked that the tasks can be allocated to the large units for the entire period of the regrouping provided the regrouping is conducted in the combat actions area. But during troop movement from the interior of the country, during which not only the tasks of the army but also the axis of its movement may be changed, it is best





to allocate tasks to large units a day at a time.

The rates of troop movement are very important in the mountains. Their increase can be achieved by organizing the movement by individual battalion columns with the maximum use of all roads without exception, since a battalion column is more maneuverable in overcoming mountain obstacles and obstructions. In addition, it is necessary to continue mastering new methods of engineer preparation of routes. The director of the conference emphasized that regardless of the difficulty of mountain conditions, we can plan on an average daily rate of troop movement of 250 to 300 kilometers.

General-Leytenant SHAPOSHNIKOV made a number of remarks concerning the technical capabilities of transport and combat vehicles. In particular, he pointed out that in organizing troop movement it is necessary to be guided not by the technical norms but rather by the operating norms, for, as we know, the latter are always two to three times greater.

Regarding the matter of the width of the zone of the army's movement forward, General SHAPOSHNIKOV agreed with the assertion of the main speaker that it should be at least the width of the army's advance, that is, 200 to 300 kilometers, but that in conditions of a mountain theater of military operations it should be even greater. We should mention that these recommendations are hardly acceptable, either from the standpoint of the efficient control of the troop movement, or from the standpoint of the possible use of the troops, especially when it is necessary to commit them to the engagement from the march. When the troops are excessively dispersed, their movement cannot be concealed. Thus, in modern conditions it will be very difficult to conceal the approach of major forces to the front regardless of the methods used for moving and dispersing them.

In concluding his speech General-Leytenant SHAPOSHNIKOV called upon the conference participants to continue developing further the most pressing problems of the theory and practice of military affairs and to study in greater depth the matters of





organizing the movement of operational formations and large units from the interior of the country to the theaters of military operations in the initial period of war and of leading them.

