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16 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Against Landing Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses at length what it says are the plans of the American-NATO command to combat airborne and amphibious landing forces of the Soviet Union and its allies, stressing that antilanding actions were worked out against the background of such exercises as QUICK KICK-5, GOLD BOX, etc., which were held in 1964. Examined in the article are the types of weapons, the composition of the forces, and the tactics which the American-NATO forces intend to employ in the antilanding actions. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965. [redacted]

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned [redacted]

for John N. McMahon

[redacted]

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Captain First Rank Z. Slepenkov. In it he discusses at length what he perceives to be the plans of the American-NATO command to combat airborne and amphibious landing forces of the Soviet Union and its allies, stressing that antilanding actions were worked out against the background of such exercises as QUICK KICK-5, GOLD BOX, etc., which were held in 1964. Examined in the article are the types of weapons, the composition of the forces, and the tactics which the American-NATO forces intend to employ in the antilanding actions.

End of Summary

[redacted] Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Combat Against Landing Forces

(According to Views of the American Command)
by
Captain First Rank Z. SLEPENKOV

In its plans for the preparation and unleashing of war against the countries of the socialist camp, the American-NATO command assumes that the Soviet Union and its allies may possibly, in the initial period of war, land operational- and tactical-scale joint airborne and amphibious landing forces on the coast of the NATO countries adjacent to the borders of the Soviet Union, then follow these up with still larger landing forces.

The most probable axes of the actions of our landing forces, in the opinion of Western military specialists, may be the Baltic and Black Sea straits zones -- coastal sectors that ensure the advance of the ground forces on the coastal axes of the Baltic and Black Sea theaters -- and individual islands and sectors of the coast of the northern part of Norway and the western part of the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, it is emphasized that we may carry out the preparation of landing operations secretly, and the operations themselves with the element of surprise and at any time.

Accordingly, considerable attention has been devoted in recent years in the NATO and SEATO system to working out antilanding actions during both special antilanding exercises and landing exercises.

The most characteristic landing exercises, against the background of which antilanding actions were worked out, are QUICK KICK-5, (1 to 15 April 1964), LIGTAS [League Toss?] (12 May to 4 June 1964), GOLD BOX (30 June to 3 July 1964), and MEDLANDEX-64 (8 to 13 August 1964), conducted in the western part of the Pacific Ocean and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

The views of the American-NATO command concerning the conduct of antilanding exercises take into account the probable nature of our landing actions and the changes that have taken place in the development of the means of armed combat, primarily missile/nuclear weapons. In the overall picture, according to this command, antilanding actions consist of the delivery of nuclear strikes against the landing force at concentration and embarkation points and against the naval forces at naval bases, the blockading of naval bases and ports, the delivery of strikes against the landing force and against its support and covering forces during sea passage and on the approaches to the landing area, and the destruction of the disembarked landing force on the shore and its isolation from sea and air support.

It is planned to combat landing forces with all the branches of the armed forces and on the basis of the massed employment of missile/nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction.

Whereas carrier-based and tactical aviation constitute the main force operating against landing force concentration and embarkation areas and dispersed naval basing points, submarines and carrier-based aviation are given the main role in warfare against a landing force and support and covering forces during sea passage. In this instance, it is considered advisable to concentrate the main efforts on the destruction of the first echelon of the main forces of the amphibious landing force, especially the advance landing detachments, and to carry out simultaneously containing actions against the support and covering ships with part of the forces. In the course of repelling the landing of the landing force, the main role is played by the ground forces with their fire means, supported by the tactical aviation and the navy.

Air defense units are designated to repel air strikes and airborne landings in the disposition areas of friendly troops.

Depending on the scale of the antilanding actions, large units and units of different branches of the armed forces allocated for combat against landing forces can be put together in a joint command, a joint operational group, or a special operational command. The commander of the ground forces defending the coast may be appointed commander of the joint forces. To achieve coordinated actions of the different

groupings, it is planned to form a "joint operations center".

The possible composition and organization of troops allocated to conduct antilanding actions is shown in Chart 1 (page 21).

To deliver strikes against a landing force at concentration and embarkation points and against the support and covering forces in the forming-up areas, provision is made to use carrier-based and tactical aviation and also operational missile units (Mace cruise missiles and Pershing ballistic missiles).

During maneuvers and exercises, strikes against the installations and troops of the landing force in concentration areas were delivered by carrier-based aviation consisting of small groups of aircraft and single aircraft operating on a wide front from low altitudes. If an installation had a strong air defense, several groups of aircraft were brought in to destroy it, their actions being echeloned in respect to altitude and time. In such cases, the time interval between groups was 25 to 30 minutes, and between aircraft in a group, two to five minutes.

The tactical aviation in the exercises usually acted against the same kind of targets in small groups (four to six or nine to 12 aircraft).

To hit the shore installations and troops of the landing force, nuclear and conventional (high-explosive and fragmentation) bombs may be used.

At the present time, new models of aerial bombs designated for use from low altitudes are being introduced into the armament of carrier-based ground-attack aviation. These are the bombs of the Snake Eye-1 (consists of the body of the MK-81 112.5-kilogram bomb and an MK-14 tail unit of special design; the bomb can be dropped from an altitude of 30 meters and more with the aircraft flying at a speed of 850 kilometers per hour) and Snake Eye-2 (consists of the body of a 225-kilogram bomb) types. In tests of the Snake Eye-1 bomb, the mean probable error in the bombing of a visible target from low altitudes was six to nine meters, i.e., the accuracy of bombing was 30 to 40 times as high as with existing bombs.

To deliver strikes against ships in forming-up areas, provision is made to use predominantly carrier-based aviation. During the exercises, aircraft of the carrier-based ground-attack aviation delivered strikes against ships standing at dispersed basing points, in small groups (six to nine aircraft) and operated at low altitudes using Bullpup guided missiles. In the near future, one should expect the use of Snake Eye-1 and Snake Eye-2 bombs against ships.

Plans are being made for submarines and aircraft to mine naval bases, ports, and landing force concentration and embarkation points during the period in which missile and air nuclear strikes are being delivered against these targets. Thus, during some exercises, such areas were mined by groups of aircraft (six to nine or nine to 12 aircraft) operating at an altitude of 300 to 3,000 meters. During World War II, on the average of 300 to 400 mines were used to blockade a naval base (port). This norm may be preserved in the future in the laying of conventional mines. The depth of the spot in which they are laid may reach 400 to 1,900 meters. Mines with a 10-kiloton yield nuclear charge can also be laid as deep as 700 meters. It is assumed that 18 to 20 conventional mines per mile are required to achieve a probability of blowing up a ship equal to 0.4, and six nuclear mines per mile, for a probability of 0.8.

In this same phase, the actions of the multiple-arm forces of the navy on the sea lanes may be reinforced for the purpose of destroying transports and vessels travelling to the concentration and embarkation points of the landing force.

To deliver strikes against a landing force and the support and covering forces during sea passage, provision is made to use carrier-based aviation, tactical aviation, and submarines; and, on the approaches to the coast (or in inland theaters), to use surface ships.

During the exercises, carrier-based aviation and tactical aviation delivered strikes against landing detachments by day in small groups of three to five aircraft, with an attack interval of 30 to 40 seconds; and by night, in individual echelons in respect to altitude, with time intervals between the attacks of two to four minutes.

Strikes against combat ships of the support and covering forces were usually delivered by carrier-based aviation from high altitudes, with the use of guided missiles of the Bullpup type; and against transports and landing ships, from medium and low altitudes, with the use of guided missiles, free rockets, and cannon. The attacks of aviation against surface ships were carried out from bow angles of approach in a sector not over 60 degrees; at high altitudes (10,000 to 12,000 meters), they launched Bullpup guided missiles, and at low altitudes (from hedge-hopping to 5,000 meters), they delivered bomb strikes.

In the final stage of tests at the present time are the new Bullpup AGM-12c guided missile (maximum range of fire 17 kilometers, radio-command guidance system guaranteeing a mean probable error of nine meters), the Walleye guided glide bomb missile (maximum range of fire 45 kilometers, television guidance system guaranteeing a mean probable error of three meters), and the Condor AGM-53A guided missile (maximum range of fire 110 kilometers, television guidance system guaranteeing a mean probable error of three to six meters). The use of new guidance systems in these missiles guarantees high accuracy of fire and, consequently, the destruction of small-sized (sea and shore) targets with conventional warheads at comparatively great distances; it also permits the delivery aircraft to carry out any maneuver after launching the missile.

Also of use against small sea and land targets is the new Sparrow AIM-7E self-guided missile with a range of fire at low altitudes of up to 20 kilometers.

Submarines worked out independently and in cooperation with aviation the delivery of strikes against landing detachments and against the ship large units that were supporting their passage. After delivering strikes against one landing detachment, the submarines retargeted against another landing detachment or ship large unit. The delivery of the strikes was carried out mainly on the basis of air reconnaissance data.

During the exercises, surface ships delivered strikes against the landing force on the approaches to the landing area.

In some exercises, for combat against a group of enemy combat ships, one or two cruisers with surface-to-air guided

missiles and two to four destroyers were included in the detachment of surface ships. The "skirmishes" between these groups of both sides were conducted at distances of six to 20 miles with the simulated use of general-purpose missiles of the Terrier and Tartar types. A large part of these encounters took place in darkness or under conditions of poor visibility. Also characteristic of the actions of groups of surface ships against the support forces of the landing force is the delivery by carrier-based and tactical aviation of preemptive strikes for the purpose of disrupting the cruising or battle formation.

For actions against landing detachments and support forces on the approaches to the landing area, use was also made of torpedo boats.* Characteristic of the actions of the torpedo boats was their surprise appearance in the battle area and their speed in delivering strikes. A tactical group included eight to 12 torpedo boats and two to three destroyers. Usually, small groups of aircraft were the first to deliver a strike against a large unit of surface ships or against a landing detachment, doing so five to six minutes before the attack by the torpedo boats. At the same time, destroyers conducted fire from maximum distances (on the order of 70 to 90 cable lengths) against the combat ships or escorts of the landing ships.

Thus, during the sea passage of a landing force and its support and covering forces, one should expect actions of the multiple-arm forces of the navy and of carrier-based and tactical aviation. Here the main efforts are to be concentrated on the main forces of the first echelon of the amphibious landing force, with containing actions conducted against the support and covering ships.

The main goal of antilanding defense is the defeat of the landing force before it lands on the shore or during its attempt to seize a beachhead on the coast. It is planned to accomplish this task through the combined efforts of the ground forces and the naval and air forces.

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* The use of torpedo boats is characteristic in the defense of straits zones and areas where there are skerries.

Thus, the basis of the antilanding defense of the coast of Norway (excluding the northeastern part over to Alten Fjord) is stationary and mobile coastal artillery,* as well as ground forces whose task is to prevent, in cooperation with the naval forces, the landing of a landing force on the coast, especially in the Tromsø-Narvik-Bodø area. Here it is planned to defend the coast of the fjords on the principle of holding separate important sectors with forces of infantry brigades and battalions (reinforced with tanks) located five to 10 kilometers from the edge of the water, and of field and coastal artillery, Honest John free rockets, tactical aviation, and large units of naval ships (submarines, destroyers, escort vessels, and torpedo boats). Furthermore, it is planned to allocate airborne troops to organize an antilanding defense in new areas where enemy intentions of landing amphibious landing forces are detected.

Charged with the defense of the Baltic straits are the naval and ground forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and, partially, Norway. With the beginning of a war, it is planned to reinforce them with US and British naval forces.

Established in the NATO system in December 1961 was a special command for the defense of the Baltic straits, the COMBALTAP. Forming the basis of the antilanding defense of these straits are forts and separate batteries,** as well as powerful mobile mechanized and armored units supported by light naval forces and tactical and carrier-based aviation. Antilanding actions are planned within the overall system of blockade actions in the straits zone.

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* At the present time on the coast of Norway there are 53 batteries of 100-mm, 120-mm, and 180-mm artillery, of which eight batteries are in service, 37 in reserve, and eight in standby storage.

** At the present time on the coast of Denmark in the straits zone there are six forts and two separate 100-mm and 120-mm artillery batteries.

To prevent a landing of joint airborne and amphibious landing forces in the straits zone, it is considered advisable to conduct offensive actions to destroy the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact countries on the distant approaches to the straits. Actions against our landing forces are to begin with air strikes against the embarkation points. The antilanding defense of the coast is planned to be set up on the principle of holding individual islands; part of the troops must organize the defense at the edge of the water on accessible landing axes, and the main forces -- the mechanized brigades or motorized infantry battalions -- are to be positioned in the depth of the defense, eight to 16 kilometers and more from the shore. These reserve groups are to be reinforced by tanks, which are designated to conduct counterattacks on the probable axes of actions of the landing force and to occupy first-echelon defense sectors within 45 to 50 minutes after these are hit with nuclear weapons. To support the counterattack, it is planned to use aviation, free rockets, and surface-to-air guided missiles.

In the Baltic straits, it is planned to make wide use of mines to obstruct channels and narrows and to blockade the ports and naval bases of the Warsaw Pact countries.

At the present time, in Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway, there are about 4,500 mines of different types and models. The establishment of reserves of mines continues in these countries. In order to lay a considerable number of mines on the very first night of war in the Baltic straits (The Sound, Great Belt, Little Belt, Kattegat, and Fehmarn Belt), the construction of surface minelayers has been developed in the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark.

The defense of the Black Sea straits is to be carried out by the Turkish armed forces located in this area. This is considered the main task of the Turkish navy. The main efforts in the defense of these straits are to be concentrated on the areas located on both sides of the entrance to the Bosporus. Planned for use in combat against a landing force during sea passage are submarines, torpedo boats and gun boats, and tactical aviation. On the approaches to the Bosporus, it is planned to lay a series of large minefields.

To be used in order to repel the landing of amphibious landing forces are the coastal artillery of the Bosporus fortified area, the ground forces with their fire means, and support forces -- tactical aviation and naval ships.

Charged with the defense of the Japanese Islands are the ground forces, tactical aviation, and naval forces of Japan and the US. At the present time, work is being carried out to restore old fortified naval areas and establish new ones. In the straits, it is planned to make wide use of mines, particularly in the Tsugaru Strait -- up to 3,000 mines.

In areas that have beaches suitable for landing a landing force and terrain relief favorable to actions of the ground forces, and from which it is possible to carry out enveloping and outflanking maneuvers into the depth of the territory, it is planned to defend the seacoast on a broad front with the fortification of the most important sectors and areas. In these areas, it is considered advisable to establish the antilanding defense of the coast on the principle of holding important sectors of the coast through the use of mobile mechanized and armored units with their own and attached fire means, primarily nuclear ones, capable of conducting powerful counterattacks from the depth of the defense for the purpose of crushing the main forces of the amphibious landing force in previously selected areas favorable to the defender.

In a case in which an army corps* is allocated for the defense of a seacoast, its zone includes a forward defense area (first zone) occupied by the first-echelon divisions, and an intermediate defense area (second zone) at a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers from the edge of the water. Positioned in this zone is the reserve (second echelon) of the corps. The width of the defense of the corps along the front may be 80 to 120 kilometers.

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* An army corps may include one infantry, two mechanized, and one armored division.

In the first echelon of the army corps there may be an infantry and a mechanized division, and in the second echelon, an armored and a mechanized division. It is planned to allocate nuclear warheads (eight to ten each) to the first-echelon divisions and to reinforce them with a field artillery group of three or four battalions, an Honest John battalion, and a self-propelled antiaircraft automatic weapons battalion or a Hawk surface-to-air guided missile battalion.

The second echelon of the corps is reinforced with a field artillery group, an Honest John battalion, and a self-propelled antiaircraft automatic weapons battalion.

A tank group and an infantry brigade are allocated to the reserve of the corps commander and are intended to reinforce the divisions of both the first and second echelons.

The mechanized or infantry division defending the seacoast may receive a zone 40 to 50 kilometers wide along the front and 20 to 30 kilometers in depth. The defense zone of the division includes a forward defense area eight to 12 kilometers in depth and a disposition area for the division reserves that is located 16 to 20 kilometers from the forward defense area.

The mechanized or infantry division draws up its battle formations in two echelons, with one-third of its troops in the first echelon, and two-thirds in the second.

Consequently, in the first echelon of an infantry division there can be three infantry battalions, and in the second, five infantry and two tank battalions; in the first echelon of a mechanized division, two motorized infantry and one tank battalion, and in the second echelon, five motorized infantry and two tank battalions.

The forward defense area represents the defense sector of a brigade. It includes battalion centers of defense, company defense areas, and platoon strongpoints. Each battalion center of defense is set up on a front of five to six kilometers and depth of three to four kilometers, and the company defense areas, on a front up to two kilometers and depth of one kilometer. It is considered necessary to situate the battalion centers of defense and the company defense areas at a distance from one

another at which the enemy cannot destroy two adjacent centers or areas of defense with one nuclear strike.

The disposition area of the division reserves (second echelon) includes concentration sectors,* positions of the division reserves, lines of deployment for counterattacks, switch and blocking positions, and fire means positions. Allocated to the second echelon are the most mobile units, usually tank battalions, which are situated on the most important axes and designated to complete the destruction of an amphibious landing force that has landed in a previously selected area by exploiting the results of nuclear strikes.

The fire positions of the division field artillery are prepared four to eight kilometers from the edge of the water, while those of the coastal artillery, one or two kilometers. The Honest John free rocket battalion is situated at a distance of six to 12 kilometers from the edge of the water.

The antilanding defense of the coast rests upon a developed system of surveillance of air, surface, and underwater targets, antilanding obstacles on the ground and in the water, and also engineer structures.

Used for the surveillance of air and surface targets are shore radar stations and radar picket ships and aircraft, which guarantee an overall depth of surveillance of up to 250 to 300 miles and more.

Used for the surveillance of submarines and underwater sabotage forces (midget submarines, underwater demolition teams, and others) are the sonars of ships in the ship hunter-killer groups and shore-based hydrophone listening stations, which ensure an overall depth of surveillance up to 150 to 200 miles and more.

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* A mechanized brigade in a concentration area may occupy an area of around 20 to 30 square kilometers, and a tank battalion, 15 to 20 square kilometers. A tank battalion and a motorized infantry battalion on the march may have a length of 7,000 to 8,000 meters.

Antilanding obstacles on the land include minefields (antitank, antipersonnel, and mixed) and barbed-wire obstacles set up in front of the forward edge of the land defense and in its depth. The minefields may consist of three to five strips with a distance between them of 13 meters. In each strip of the minefield, groups of mines are placed checkerboard fashion in two rows. The distance between the rows of mines and between the groups of them in a row is 4.5 meters. The depth of a three-strip minefield is 32 meters and of a five-strip one, 60 meters; but, with the separate groups of mines placed in front of the minefield taken into account, the depth may reach 40 to 50 and 70 to 85 meters, respectively. The density of minefields in a tactical zone may reach 2.5 to 4.5 kilometers of minefields per kilometer of frontage (from one to five mines per linear meter of the defense sector). Along with conventional mines, chemical and napalm mines are used. All these obstacles are covered by artillery and infantry fire, and at night and under conditions of limited visibility they are guarded by subunits specially allocated for this.

The obstacles in the water are a combination of mixed minefields (antipersonnel, antitank, antiboat mines, and controlled charges) and antiship moored and bottom mines with conventional and nuclear charges. It is planned to lay the mixed minefields up to 1.5 miles from the shore, and the antiship moored and bottom mines, up to 15 to 20 miles from the shore.

From what has been set forth above, it follows that the main elements of the antilanding defense of a division may be the company areas and battalion centers of defense, the division reserves, the Sergeant guided missile batteries, the Honest John free rockets, the field and coastal artillery,* the Nike-Hercules and Hawk surface-to-air guided missiles, the division and brigade control posts, and the system of obstacles in the water and on the shore.

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* According to the experience of World War II, in areas of important or landing-accessible sectors of the coast and of naval bases, the density of medium-caliber (100- to 152-mm) artillery installations per kilometer of front of coastal defense came to one or two batteries. At the present time, the density of artillery at the edge of the water may reach two or three batteries per kilometer of frontage.

Of these elements of an antilanding defense, the company areas and battalion centers of defense and the division reserves and fire means, primarily missile/nuclear ones, whose destruction will ensure the landing of an amphibious landing force, should be considered the most important.

Accordingly, it is planned to establish the system of antilanding defense of a seacoast on the principle of holding separate important sectors of the coast by means of the extensive maneuver of the second-echelon reserves, with the use of missile/nuclear weapons and the setting up of obstacles in the water and on the shore. However, during some antilanding exercises (NORD-EXPRESS, 2 to 13 June 1964) and landing exercises (QUICK KICK-5, 1 to 15 April 1964), no provision was made to organize the antilanding defense and actions of the forces right on the coast. The landing of the "enemy's" landing force and its penetration into the depth of the territory were permitted, and, after the main axis of its actions and the strength of its forces were determined, it was cut off from the units supporting it from the sea and destroyed by large-scale maneuvering forces with strikes from the depth of the coast.

The repelling of an amphibious landing begins the moment the landing forces approach the landing area and ends either with their being defeated on the shore and thrown back into the sea or with their firm consolidation of the selected beachhead.

With the approach of a landing force to the landing area, land-based, tactical, and carrier-based aviation, submarines, and surface ships continue delivering strikes against the landing detachments in the first echelon of the main forces of the landing force and against the support and covering forces, against which it is also planned to deliver nuclear strikes (up to 70 percent with tube artillery, guided missiles, and free rockets, and up to 30 percent with aviation).

The use of nuclear weapons is considered most advisable during the period of transfer of the landing force from transports and vessels to amphibious landing means,* and during the forming up of waves of landing craft and amphibious tanks and

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* It is assumed that the transfer of men and equipment from transports to amphibious landing means will be taking place over a period of at least two hours before the start of the landing and in a sector of the sea that is of limited dimensions.

their movement to the shore. The setting up of nuclear munitions for air and underwater bursts is a possibility.*

During the exercises, nuclear strikes were also delivered against the landing force troops located at the landing points. These bursts took place at an altitude of 300 meters and at a distance of 1,000 to 500 meters from the shore. It was assumed in doing this that one burst of such a bomb would put out of action most of the personnel and amphibious landing means in a sector of the landing extending up to 1,000 meters.

With the approach of the assault transports and the fire-support ships into artillery range, the long-range (coastal and field) artillery, and then all the artillery, join in the battle to repel the landing. At the same time, provision is made to use the atomic artillery of the ground forces (203.2-millimeter and 150-millimeter) and the Honest John free rocket launchers against the enemy landing forces approaching the landing area. Thus, with the approach of the landing force to the landing area and with the beginning of deployment of the landing ships, the efforts of the long-range coastal artillery are concentrated on the destruction of the assault transports.** Brought into action as the landing ships and craft get closer to the shore is the field artillery, which conducts moving barrage fire. It also organizes standing barrage fire on previously determined and sighted lines. Part of the forces of the artillery continue to fire on the enemy's obstacle-clearing ships in order to prevent the breaching of passages for the landing means.

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* The zones of destruction for landing ships and vessels with the use of nuclear weapons in an air burst are: for a two-kiloton yield, about 250 meters; for a 10-kiloton yield -- 420 meters; for a 20-kiloton yield -- 530 meters; and for a 50-kiloton yield -- 720 meters.

** Concentrated fire is usually prepared in a zone up to 10 kilometers in depth. Prepared beyond this are long-range fire attacks of heavy rifled artillery and rocket launchers of the Honest John type.

The guns allocated for direct fire, as well as self-propelled artillery and tanks, are intended to be committed to action against landing craft, landing barges, amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers, and direct support boats when these means have approached to the distance of direct fire (about 1,000 meters). With the approach of the amphibious landing means to the distance of rifle and machinegun fire, all fire means usually will fire on the landing craft, amphibious transports, and personnel, bringing the fire to its maximum intensity at the moment the troops start landing on the shore. Activated at the same time are land mines and other engineer explosive antilanding obstacles.

The next task of the troops defending the coast is to establish the axis of the landing of the main landing forces and to conduct counterattacks quickly before the consolidation of the landing force units on the shore. Used to conduct the first counterattacks are the mobile reserves of the brigade. In this period, nuclear weapons may be used against the landing force gathered in the landing sector before its troops manage to prepare antinuclear shelters.

If the first counterattacks are unsuccessful, it is considered necessary next to use ship, shore, and field artillery fire, as well as air strikes to prevent a subsequent landing of the landing force, and the fire of the ground forces to stop attempts of the landing force to penetrate the defense.

If this cannot be done, then steps are taken with the actions of all the ground forces and the system of obstacles and artillery fire* to force the enemy to advance in the necessary direction and to draw his main forces into a previously prepared area ("pocket"). With the penetration of the enemy into the battle formations of the troops occupying the forward area of defense, it is necessary to hold strongpoints on the flanks of the pocket and draw the main forces of the landing force into it, and also to repel all attempts of the landing force to extend the landing sector in the direction of the flanks. For this, the units that are occupying the all-around defense at strongpoints in the forward area and that have not been crushed by the enemy must hold back the advance of the landing force, thereby preparing conditions for the delivery of a nuclear strike and the

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* In this case, sectors of standing barrage fire are prepared.

conduct of counterattacks by the second-echelon troops of the division. The rest of the troops conduct the battle by the method of holding actions in a number of successively occupied positions, withdrawing to switch or blocking positions and offering basically fire resistance.

At the last of the planned lines in the depth of the defense -- the line of allowable enemy penetration -- the defending troops go over to a rigid defense, striving to prevent further enemy advance into the depth, and they force him to draw additional forces and means into the pocket to develop the success of the offensive. Simultaneously, nuclear strikes are delivered against the penetrating landing force, and the forces of the division reserves carry out counterattacks supported by aviation, tanks, and all available fire means.

Thus, in repelling the landing of an amphibious landing force, the main force is the ground forces with their fire means, above all their nuclear ones. The naval forces, on the other hand, blockade the landing area, not permitting the approach of the second echelon of the landing force.

Simultaneously with combat against amphibious landing forces, provision is made to carry on combat against airborne landing forces, which may be landed by transport aircraft and helicopters 10 to 15 minutes after the delivery of nuclear strikes against targets of the antilanding defense system. As the Americans figure, a landing force can be landed from aircraft in the depth of defense of a coast at a distance of 75 to 90 kilometers from the edge of the water, and from helicopters, at distances of one or two kilometers and 10 to 15 kilometers.

It is planned to conduct combat against airborne landing forces by means of operational (tactical) groups, with the extensive use of armed helicopters, nuclear and chemical weapons, and various obstacles and barriers.

The mobile operational (tactical) groups are made up of airborne troops, and armored, armored cavalry, and infantry units. These groups are reinforced by army aviation, means of cover against enemy air attack (antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air guided missiles), and artillery and combat engineer subunits. Fundamentally new is the use in these groups

of airborne and airmobile troops, who, since they ensure the highest troop mobility, are to be used to destroy a landing force during its landing.

Armed helicopters are also regarded as a highly mobile and powerful means for the delivery of strikes against an airborne landing force. They possess high mobility and have various kinds of modern armament (105-mm recoilless rifles, antitank guided missiles which are reloaded right on the helicopter, and also nuclear warheads), which guarantees the surprise delivery of powerful strikes.

The ability of armed helicopters to change their location quickly and securely makes them extraordinarily invulnerable to the existing means of a landing force. While tanks were previously considered the most threatening enemy of a landing force at the moment of its landing and deployment for battle, at the present time, along with tanks, it is armed helicopters.

Thus, the forces and means designated for combat against airborne landing forces can offer serious opposition to the landing and development of actions in the depth of the antilanding defense of the coast.



Chart 1. Fundamental organization of a seacoast defense forces command in the NATO system.

Notes. 1. The overall direction of the defense of the seacoast is carried out by the command of the ground forces of the theater of military operations (zone), for which there is created in the staff of the command a coastal defense coordination center which includes representatives of all branches of the armed forces.

2. The basic groupings (groups) called on by the defenders for combat against an amphibious landing force may be: the ground forces missile/nuclear weapons groupings designated to repel the landing of the landing force, the missile/nuclear means of the tactical and carrier-based aviation, the missile/nuclear means of the ships taking part in combat against the landing force, the fire means of the ground forces, and their battle formations.