


~~SECRET~~

2967




CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505



20 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Conduct
of Subsequent Operations in the Initial
Period of War



1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article describes the second stage of the FALLEX-60 maneuvers conducted by NATO in September 1960. The author also presents some of the conclusions reached by the Soviets after analyzing the maneuvers. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.



2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned



John N. McMahon
JOHN N. MCMAHON



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency


Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 16 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



DATE OF INFO. Early 1962

DATE 20 October 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Conduct of Subsequent Operations in the Initial Period of War

SOURCE Documentary



Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel D. Fedin. This article describes the second stage of the FALLEX-60 maneuvers which were conducted by NATO forces in September 1960. The author also presents some of the conclusions reached by the Soviets after analyzing the maneuvers.

End of Summary

Comment:

After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 4 of 16 Pages

The Conduct of Subsequent Operations in the Initial Period of War

by


Colonel D. FEDIN

In the operational training plans of the armed forces, the American military command pays much attention not only to the first nuclear strike and the first operations in the initial period of war, but also to the conduct of subsequent operations for the purpose of exploiting the success achieved. Attesting to this in particular is the experience of the second stage of the FALLEX-60 maneuvers, conducted from 26 through 30 September 1960 (according to operational time, from D11 to D15).*

The main objective of this maneuver was to work out the problems of organizing and conducting subsequent combined and independent operations by the allied armed forces of NATO in the European Theater of War. Also studied in this stage were the planning and organization of subsequent operations of the allied armed forces of NATO; continuation of the operations of the allied air forces and naval strike forces to retain nuclear superiority and supremacy in the air and on the sea by destroying the remaining nuclear weapons and aviation of the enemy and to offer close air support to the ground forces, disrupt transportation lines, and prevent the approach of strategic reserves from the interior and the delivery of enemy supply items; preparation and transition of the allied ground forces of NATO to a counteroffensive in the Central European Theater and on the most important axes of the Southern European Theater of Military Operations for the purpose of completing the defeat of the main enemy groupings before the approach of his strategic reserves, and of restoring the situation and creating conditions for the subsequent development of the offensive on enemy territory.

* For the first stage of the FALLEX-60 maneuvers, see Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought," No. 5 (60), 1961.

~~SECRET~~




In addition, the effectiveness of the whole rear services system and the training of the rear services organs in organizing materiel, technical, and medical support of subsequent operations of the allied armed forces were tested.

In the second stage of maneuvers eight exercises were conducted simultaneously, the main ones of which were the exercises under the codenames LIGHTNING RESPONSE-2, SWORD THRUST-2, and HOLD.

The exercise LIGHTNING RESPONSE-2 was a combined strategic operation of the allied armed forces of NATO in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. Its main content was the retention of nuclear superiority and air supremacy, as well as the preparation and conduct of a counteroffensive by the allied ground forces. Judging by the tasks and the nature of combat actions of the armed forces, this operation was an integral part of the subsequent (second) stage of the initial period of war.

The exercise SWORD THRUST-2 was conducted in the Bay of Biscay and over the territories of France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and West Germany. In essence, these were operations of an American carrier strike large unit of the NATO Striking Fleet in the Atlantic in support of the allied armed forces of NATO in the Central European Theater of Military Operations during their conduct of operations from D13. Participating in it were 55 ships and vessels (mainly American), including two strike aircraft carriers (Saratoga and Shangri-La), a heavy antisubmarine warfare aircraft carrier, a heavy cruiser with guided missiles, a heavy cruiser with surface-to-air guided missiles, as well as about 200 aircraft and helicopters of carrier-based aviation and 100 aircraft of the shore-based antisubmarine, reconnaissance, and bomber aviation.

The exercise HOLD began as a continuation of the exercise LIGHTNING RESPONSE-1, which was conducted within the boundaries of the Southern European Theater of Military Operations. In it were being worked out the operations of carrier-based and tactical aviation in retaining nuclear superiority and supremacy in the air and on the sea, a counteroffensive operation of NATO ground forces in northern Greece and the western part of Turkey with limited objectives, including a landing operation on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea, a defensive operation of ground forces in the northeastern part of Italy, and the antilanding defense of the Black Sea straits zone.



~~SECRET~~

Page 6 of 16 Pages

What are the main conclusions issuing from the concept during the second stage of the FALLEX-60 maneuvers and chiefly from the exercises mentioned by us?

The second stage of maneuvers was conducted on the basis of the operational-strategic situation that had taken shape by D11 after an initial strategic operation of the allied armed forces of NATO.

Maneuvers began in a situation where the armed forces of both sides had sustained considerable losses: in tactical aviation, 80 to 85 percent; in personnel, armament, and combat equipment of the ground forces, 30 to 50 percent; and in means of materiel-technical support, 30 to 40 percent. In the theaters of military operations a large part of the airfields and positions of the missile troops, communications and control posts, bridges, transportation centers, and other important installations had been destroyed or damaged. But the NATO armed forces had successfully conducted a nuclear offensive and achieved nuclear superiority and air supremacy, as a result of which they had considerably weakened the enemy groupings of ground forces and reduced his capabilities for transferring reserves and supply items from the interior.

The NATO command decided to continue the joint operations of the allied air forces and naval strike forces of NATO in the Atlantic and the Southern European Theater of Military Operations to retain nuclear superiority and air supremacy by destroying the remaining nuclear weapons and aviation of the enemy, as well as to disrupt transportation and to prevent the approach of strategic reserves from the interior.

At the same time, the decision was made to carry out the necessary regrouping and concentration of troops and go over in the shortest time to a counteroffensive in the Central European Theater and on the most important axes of the Southern European Theater of Military Operations for the purpose of completing the defeat of the main groupings of enemy troops before the approach of his strategic reserves, restoring the situation and creating conditions for a successful subsequent offensive.

In the Northern European Theater and the southern part of the Southern European Theater of Military Operations, it was intended to continue defensive operations with the ground forces.

Let us dwell briefly on the characteristics of the counteroffensive operation of the allied ground forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. By way of an example, let us look at the exercise

~~SECRET~~

LIGHTNING RESPONSE-2.

The counteroffensive in this theater was undertaken on the thirteenth day of the war from a line east of the Rhine: 130 to 160 kilometers on the Ruhr axis, 40 to 80 on the Frankfurt axis, 140 on the Nuremberg axis and about 200 on the Munich axis.

The operation was planned to a depth of 250 to 350 kilometers, with the arrival of the Northern and Central Army Groups at the line of the Elbe River. For preparation of this operation (from the moment of making the decision until the start of the operation) five days were set aside. In content and depth the immediate tasks of the army groups were different. The Central Army Group went over to the offensive on the whole front about 400 kilometers in extent, pursuing the decisive objective of smashing the grouping of enemy troops which had penetrated, restoring the situation at the eastern frontier of West Germany, and taking an important natural boundary for the subsequent development of the offensive, the Thuringer Wald Mountains. The depth of its immediate task came to 180 to 240 kilometers on the Nuremberg and Munich axes, and 120 to 140 on the Frankfurt axis; that of the next task was 150 to 170 kilometers.

The immediate task of the Northern Army Group was limited: to annihilate the enemy who had penetrated into the defense of the "Blues" west of the river Weser and restore the situation with the arrival at a forward defensive line on this river and the simultaneous taking of beachheads on its eastern bank. The depth of the immediate task of the group on its main axis reached 40 to 60 kilometers, and up to 80 kilometers on its right flank; the depth of the next task was 150 to 200 kilometers.

Upon fulfilment of the next task, the main efforts of the Central Army Group were supposed to be concentrated on the Berlin and Dresden axes in a zone 200 kilometers wide. On the rest of the front over 300 kilometers in extent, it was planned to go over to the defense with limited forces.

The grouping of allied ground forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations was brought up to 35 divisions (including two equivalents) by transferring to the theater of military operations three French divisions from Algeria and one British division (two brigade groups) from Great Britain and by also mobilizing one Dutch, one Belgian, and three French reserve divisions.

For the conduct of the operation, the Northern Army Group had been reinforced with three divisions and had 14 divisions in its composition.



The Central Army Group numbered 21 divisions (including two equivalents).

On going over to the counteroffensive, the main efforts of the Central Army Group were concentrated on the Nuremberg axis, on which were operating the American 7th Army Corps (three divisions), the West German 2nd Army Corps (three divisions), and the French 3rd Army Corps (three divisions), and on the Eisenach axis, where the attack was delivered with the forces of the West German 3rd Army Corps (two divisions), the French 2nd Army Corps (two divisions), and part of the forces (one division) of the American 6th Army Corps. It should be noted that during the preparation of the counteroffensive very insignificant regroupings of troops, mainly of the missile/nuclear weapons units, were carried out.


Thus the 3rd Armored Division, which had been operating on the Frankfurt axis, was withdrawn from the American 5th Army Corps and placed in the American 7th Corps, which had been designated to deliver the main attack. In place of this division, the 8th Infantry Division, which had been in the reserve of the American 7th Army, was placed in the 5th Corps.


The French 2nd Army Corps, which had constituted the reserve of the commander of the ground forces in the theater of military operations, was transferred to the American 7th Army and deployed in its first operational echelon.

In this way, as the result of carrying out a partial regrouping of the large units and units of the Central Army Group, the troops of the first operational echelon of the 7th Army, intended for actions on the Nuremberg and Frankfurt axes, were reinforced.

On the basis of the exercise LIGHTNING RESPONSE-2, one can conclude that the NATO command will endeavor to conduct an offensive at relatively high rates. Thus, during the fulfilment of the immediate task (in 2.5 days of the offensive), the rate of advance in the zone of the Central Army Group on the axes of the main attack reached 70 to 72 kilometers per day on the Nuremberg axis, and 50 to 60 on the Frankfurt axis. On the Munich axis (the axis of the subsidiary attack) and in the zone of the Northern Army Group, the average daily rate of advance was 30 to 35 kilometers.

The high rates of advance on the axes of the main attack were achieved as the result of the massed employment of nuclear weapons, the allocation of a considerably larger part of the tactical and carrier-based aviation for close air support of the ground forces, some reinforcement of the troops of the Central Army Group with new large units (seven divisions), as





well as the effective isolation of the zone of combat actions from the influx of the approaching operational and strategic reserves of the enemy. :


Characteristic of the exercises LIGHTNING RESPONSE-2 and SWORD THRUST-2 is the fact that for the first time the carrier-based aviation of the NATO striking fleet in the Atlantic was used for the purpose of supporting operations of the allied armed forces of NATO in the Central European Theater of Military Operations.

By D11, in the composition of the allied air forces of NATO in the Central European Theater and the American 3rd Air Army there were 600 aircraft (220 fighters and light bombers and 380 air defense aircraft), which slightly exceeded the number of aircraft the enemy had. Besides that, with the arrival at the end of D12 in the Bay of Biscay of the American carrier strike large unit from the striking fleet in the Atlantic, the aircraft grouping in the theater of military operations was reinforced by 160 aircraft of the carrier-based aviation. In evaluating the air situation, the NATO command came to the conclusion that to retain air supremacy and carry out measures to create obstacles for the purpose of isolating the zone of combat actions they would be required to use the greater part of the remaining air forces.

The decision to use the carrier-based aviation to support the combat actions of the NATO forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, was adopted by the NATO command apparently because, as a result of massed nuclear strikes delivered by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the NATO air forces had sustained considerable losses (about 80 percent), and the transfer of aviation from the US could not be effected before the destroyed airfields were restored. The allocation of carrier-based aviation to accomplish operational-strategic tasks in the main Central European Theater of Military Operations permitted the NATO command to alter the overall balance of aviation forces to its own advantage from 1.1:1 to 1.4:1, and of strike aircraft from 1.5:1 to 2:1.

The daily losses in the attacking large units of the NATO forces averaged five to seven percent in the divisions advancing on the main axes, 1.4 percent on secondary axes, and one to two percent in supporting and rear services units.

The NATO air forces, with the start of the counteroffensive, to retain nuclear superiority and air supremacy, delivered nuclear strikes on the surviving and restored airfields, positions of missile units, and nuclear weapons depots, as well as on transportation lines and operational and



~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 10 of 16 Pages

strategic reserves of the enemy approaching from the interior. It is necessary to mention that with the start of the counteroffensive, the needs of the ground forces for close air support grew considerably (about double) in comparison with the period of the nuclear offensive.

Aerial reconnaissance in support of the army groups was conducted to a depth up to 600 kilometers, and in support of the field armies, up to 300 kilometers. Aerial reconnaissance of the positions of enemy missile units was not considered by the NATO command to be very effective.

Serious attention during the exercise was devoted to the organization and utilization of army aviation for airlifting extremely necessary supply items to the advancing large units and units. This was caused by the considerable destruction of transportation lines and supply bases in the zone of combat actions, as well as by the relatively high rates of advance.

To support the allied armed forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations it was planned to deliver 155 nuclear strikes. The greater part of them were delivered during the operation from D13 to 1400 hours on D15.

Support by carrier-based aviation of the allied armed forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations was carried out on the basis of requests which came in daily from the staffs of the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces through the staff of the allied air forces in the Theater of Military Operations and the staff of the 201st Task Force. The latter would usually issue, by the end of the day, an order in which it allocated the tasks for the next 24 hours among the strike aircraft carriers.

Let us briefly examine the special features of the exercise HOLD, which was conducted in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations.

In composition of participating staffs and troops, this exercise was analogous to the exercise LIGHTNING RESPONSE-1. To it were additionally allocated the 1st Battalion of the 8th Regiment of the US 2nd Marine Division and a few ships of the Greek navy.

The counteroffensive on the main axes of this theater of military operations was begun on the eleventh day of the war and conducted by the troops of the Greek 1st and Turkish 1st armies with a limited objective -- to smash the opposing grouping of enemy troops, get to the national borders

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]



of Greece and Turkey with Bulgaria, and thereby create conditions for a subsequent offensive with decisive objectives. Seven days were set aside for preparation of the counteroffensive.


The Greek 1st Army went over to a counteroffensive in northern Greece on the Salonika axis from the line of the river Struma (60 kilometers northeast of Salonika) with delivery of the main attack by the forces of the 3rd Army Corps (three infantry divisions) and the reserve of the army (one infantry and one armored division) and of the subsidiary attack with the employment of part of the forces of the 2nd Army Corps (one infantry division).


The Turkish 1st Army undertook a counteroffensive in eastern Thrace on two axes: the Istanbul axis, from a line 100 kilometers west of the Bosphorus (the 5th and 15th Army Corps), and the Gallipoli axis, from a line 30 to 40 kilometers north of the Gallipoli Peninsula (the 2nd Army Corps).

During counteroffensive actions the average rate of movement of the Greek and Turkish troops per day came to about 35 kilometers on the Istanbul axis, 20 kilometers on the Gallipoli axis, and 25 to 30 kilometers on the Salonika axis.

To support the counteroffensive of the 3rd Greek and 2nd Turkish army corps and to capture western Thrace in conjunction with them, on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea in the area of Alexandroupolis (Greece) was landed (simulated) an amphibious landing force made up of two divisions -- an American marine division and a Greek infantry division. The landing was carried out by the American marine division from the morning of D11, and by the Greek infantry division, from the morning of D13; it was supported by the US 6th Fleet and ships of the Greek navy.

Within the attack grouping of NATO forces on the Istanbul axis were the large units of the Turkish 15th Army Corps. This corps had originally been planned to be used to cover the Black Sea coast of Turkey in the area 60 to 100 kilometers northeast of Istanbul. Subsequently, as the threat of the landing of an enemy landing force was eliminated, the task of antilanding defense was entrusted to the 2nd Infantry Division of the corps. The rest of the large units and units of the corps (the 23rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Separate Armored Group, and corps units) were transferred to the zone of combat actions in eastern Thrace. The transfer was carried out in two echelons: in the first were the 2nd Separate Armored Brigade and corps units, in the second the 23rd Infantry Division. The 23rd Infantry Division was carried to the Bosphorus by three motor





transport battalions. About 24 hours were set aside for the division to cross the Bosphorus.

In the northeastern part of Italy, NATO ground forces, combined into an army group made up of two Italian armies (up to 12 divisions) and an American missile command, continued to conduct defensive actions. To conduct the defense, the troops were deployed on a line along the river Tagliamento and the Italian-Austrian border. In the strip near the border with Yugoslavia was created a cover zone 30 to 50 kilometers deep, which was defended by separate armored cavalry units and border guard troops. Combat actions on Italian territory began seven days after the outbreak of war. In five days the Italian large units and units withdrew 80 to 130 kilometers from the Italian-Yugoslav border.

In connection with the great losses sustained by tactical aviation (up to 80 percent), close support of the ground forces in this theater was carried out mainly by the carrier-based aviation of the naval strike forces.


In the exercise HOLD, the expenditure of nuclear weapons in comparison with the period of the nuclear offensive (the exercise LIGHTNING RESPONSE-1) was reduced roughly by a factor of three. Thus, whereas during the nuclear offensive in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations in order to fulfil tasks to retain nuclear superiority and air supremacy as well as to support the combat actions of the ground forces 350 nuclear strikes were delivered in the course of three days, in the exercise HOLD in the same period the number of strikes did not exceed 120.

This is due to the fact that by D11 a considerable part of the stationary targets such as airfields, missile positions, ports, bridges, and crossings had been destroyed; simultaneously with this, the reserves of nuclear weapons and delivery means were also reduced.

Nuclear strikes were delivered by four American tactical air squadrons (two squadrons were stationed in Italy, one in Greece at Larissa Air Base, and one in Turkey at Adana Air Base) and by the carrier-based aviation of the US 6th Fleet (the strike aircraft carriers Intrepid and Independence). The ratio between the number of nuclear strikes delivered by carrier-based aviation and tactical aviation was 1:1.

In the exercise were employed (in simulation) nuclear warheads with yields from 2.5 to 300 kilotons.





Nuclear strikes were delivered mainly during daylight hours. Thus, out of the total number, i.e., 120 strikes, 82 were delivered in the daytime, and 38 at night (68 and 32 percent, respectively).

Nuclear weapons were used to hit the most important enemy targets -- airfields, naval bases and ports, positions of missile units, transportation centers, and large groupings of troops and reserves.

In the second stage of maneuvers, a number of exercises were also conducted in other areas of the European Theater of War and the Eastern Atlantic.

In northern Norway and the Norwegian Sea were jointly conducted the exercises COLD SEASON and SWORD THRUST-2, in which were worked out the problems of organizing and conducting an antilanding defense of northern Norway with limited forces of the Norwegian ground forces supported by the Norwegian air force and navy and a British carrier strike large unit.


These exercises showed that the NATO command continues to pay serious attention to the defense of the zone of northern Norway where there are located a number of ports, naval bases, airfields, and supply bases supporting the delivery of strikes on the northwestern areas of the Soviet Union and the successful conduct of operations for supremacy in the Norwegian Sea.

In working out the concept of the exercise, the NATO command proceeded on the premise that in the initial period of war the armed forces located in northern Norway will not be able to prevent the landing of enemy amphibious and airborne landing forces. The success of their conduct of combat actions is made to depend to a significant degree on the support of the ground forces by the NATO striking fleet in the Atlantic. However, such support, according to the estimates of the NATO command, can be offered only after the striking fleet fulfils the tasks of the nuclear offensive entrusted to it.

In the exercise SECOND WATCH, which was a continuation of the exercise FIRST WATCH, were worked out the problems of escorting convoys coming from America to the ports of the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea in the period from D11 to D15.

According to the concept of the exercise, by this time considerable reserves of materiel and technical supply items had been destroyed in the European member countries of NATO. To replenish the losses, the NATO





command organized the transfer of troops, armament, and the necessary supply items from the US and other areas of America to Europe. The escort of convoys was entrusted to the NATO armed forces located in the Atlantic and the zone of the English Channel. From D11 to D15 15 convoys were escorted from the Atlantic into the English Channel and between the ports of the Channel. During the exercise the antisubmarine defense forces of NATO were able to attack up to 30 percent of the enemy submarines detected in the zones of their combat activity, while in the exercise STUBBORN DEFENSE, conducted in 1957 in the zone of the English Channel (during the FALLEX maneuvers), 25 percent of all the detected submarines had been attacked. This testifies that the effectiveness of the action of the antisubmarine forces has risen very insignificantly.


Analogous was the exercise GRAY TIGER-2. The main content of this was the escorting of convoys arriving from the Atlantic to the ports of West Germany and Denmark under conditions of the opposition of enemy submarines, aviation, and torpedo boats and with the presence of danger from mines.

The exercises showed that the NATO command manifests zealous concern about safeguarding the shipping lanes in the southern part of the North Sea and in the English Channel, through which is planned the transfer of troops and necessary supply items from the US and other areas for the Central European Theater of Military Operations.

The exercise BULKHEAD was devoted to working out the actions of surface ships and shore-based aircraft on the antisubmarine line for the purpose of preventing the breakthrough of enemy submarines through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea.

To combat enemy submarines breaking through the strait, the NATO Command used surface ships and antisubmarine aircraft. The surface ships, combined into hunter-killer groups (three to four ships in each one), carried out submarine search for a distance up to 130 miles west and 100 miles east of Gibraltar. The antisubmarine aircraft conducted submarine search over a distance up to 250 miles west and 180 miles east of Gibraltar, making extensive use of sonobuoys in the process. On detecting submarines, the aircraft would guide hunter-killer groups to them. According to the assessment of the NATO command, during the exercise the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy submarines through the Strait of Gibraltar was basically fulfilled.

The experience of the exercise BULKHEAD showed that the Iberian part of the Atlantic is acquiring great importance to the security of NATO



~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 15 of 16 Pages

shipping lanes in the Atlantic.

The main content of the exercise DEFENSE-2 was to escort convoys traveling from the Atlantic and from African ports to the ports of Italy, Greece, and Turkey and to combat enemy submarines in the Mediterranean Sea basin. To fulfil this task, considerable antisubmarine and minesweeper forces were allocated. In combating enemy submarines, the NATO command plans to concentrate the main antisubmarine forces at points where shipping lanes converge and in areas of ports and bases. During the exercise, in each of the six regions of the Mediterranean Theater of Military Operations there was created an antisubmarine forces operations group, to whose commander were directly subordinated hunter-killer groups cooperating with shore-based antisubmarine aircraft. The search for submarines in the detection area was conducted with the aid of sonar, and the distance between ships was 30 cable lengths, and the speed, 14 knots. On searches for submarines by aircraft of antisubmarine aviation, the width of the reconnaissance zone of an aircraft when patrolling in narrows equalled five to six miles; on a search in an open area it was about ten miles. During the exercise, 60 percent of all the sightings of submarines were done by antisubmarine aircraft. The main weapon of the aircraft was an air-launched homing antisubmarine torpedo. It was considered that the effectiveness of the actions of the antisubmarine forces from D11 through D15 had grown considerably. Thus, whereas in the exercise DEFENSE-1 only ten percent of all the detected submarines were destroyed as the result of the actions of the antisubmarine forces, in the exercise DEFENSE-2 30 percent were destroyed.



The NATO command, judging by the experience of the second stage of the maneuver, believes that subsequent operations of the initial period of war will begin under conditions where the armed forces of both sides have sustained considerable losses in personnel, combat equipment, and means of materiel and technical support, where in theaters of military operations a large part of various facilities and installations have been destroyed, and where as a result of the massed use of nuclear weapons by both sides large zones of radioactive contamination have been formed.

With this, the command is proceeding on the assumption that with successful fulfilment of the tasks of the nuclear offensive there will take shape an operational-strategic situation which, though difficult, is yet more favorable for the allied armed forces of the bloc than for the enemy.

~~SECRET~~


[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



Page 16 of 16 Pages

This will permit them not only to preserve the nuclear superiority and air supremacy already gained, but also to undertake the offensive of the ground forces on the most important strategic axes with the support of aviation and the navy in order to complete the defeat of the main enemy groupings.



~~SECRET~~

