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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 October 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems
of Military Science Work Among the Troops

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses certain shortcomings in military science work, manifested largely by the fact that the working out of methods of combat actions lags behind the development of means of combat. The author maintains that military science work must be closely tied to the tasks of operational and tactical training of troops and that military science conferences must have a higher scientific and organizational level to effectively deal with present-day problems and conditions. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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John N. McMahon

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
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research



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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 11 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF INFO. Mid-1962

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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems of Military Science Work Among the Troops

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Leytenant of Tank Troops M. Lugovtsev. This article discusses certain shortcomings in military science work, manifested largely by the fact that the working out of methods of combat actions lags behind the development of means of combat. The author maintains that military science work must be closely tied to the tasks of operational and tactical training of troops and must form an organic part of the training process. Regarding military science conferences, the author feels that their scientific and organizational level must be raised in order to effectively deal with present-day problems and conditions. Finally, he proposes improving military science work by reorganizing it and instituting a definite schedule for carrying out research.

End of Summary


[Redacted] Comment:

After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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
Some Problems of Military Science Work Among the Troops


by
General-Leytenant of Tank Troops M. LUGOVTSSEV

The successful accomplishment of the primary tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will depend to a large extent on the level of development of military science and, specifically, on how effectively and actively military science work, which is called upon to find and introduce everything new and advanced in military affairs and on this basis to raise the combat effectiveness and the combat readiness of the units and large units, is conducted among the troops.

The tremendous development of missile equipment, radioelectronic equipment, aviation equipment, and other military equipment resulted in a radical reorganization of our Armed Forces. A complete rearmament of the troops with missile equipment was carried out; the capability to deliver nuclear warheads to practically an unlimited distance came into being. The mobility of the troops increased sharply. All this considerably increased the capabilities of the ground forces to conduct combat actions. However, as the Minister of Defense notes in his orders on combat training, the working out of methods of combat actions still lags behind the rates of development of the means of combat.

One must look for the principal cause of such a situation first of all, it seems to us, in the unnatural isolation of military science work from the operational and combat training of troops and staffs and also in the fact that the forms and methods of military science work being employed among the troops have become somewhat antiquated and do not fully meet the requirements being levied on the training of large units and units. On account of this, military science work basically comes down to writing reports on assigned subjects and carrying out individual seasonal measures (i.e., having a military science conference once a year and three to five so-called scientific information sessions and meetings).





At the June scientific workers' meeting, conducted by order of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade KOSYGIN noted, "During our time not only has science been the basis of any production process but also scientific activity itself and scientific research have acquired, in a sense, a productive nature." This means that in the army military science work must not only be closely tied to the tasks of operational and combat training of troops, but also subjected directly to the interests of the army to form an organic part of the training process.

The task of achieving high rates of advance and of increasing the average rates of march of the units and large units already has been put before the troops for several years. In the past academic year the task of advancing at a rate of 100 kilometers per day was the guideline in the work of the district, army, and troop staffs, but the research conducted on this question was one-sided and mostly theoretical, without practical verification during troop exercises, especially during regimental and divisional troop exercises.

Exercises of such a scale are conducted among the troops, as a rule, by way of fulfilling the training program, and, essentially, do not contain elements for research or for searching for something new. Let us say frankly that many troop exercises and other combat training and operational training measures do not have a scientific foundation. Essentially, the scientific work among the troops has not become the "productive activity" of the commanders and officers at all levels who engage in the training and instruction of troops.

Such a state of affairs not only weakens the efforts of a group of generals and officers toward finding new, more improved methods of combat actions and of employing combat equipment, but also has an adverse effect on the training of the large units and units.

One must emphasize that up to this time we have not had any unity in the planning and the carrying out of military science measures related to the combat and operational training of the troops and to the commander training of the generals and officers. These plans are poorly coordinated among one another in content. Actually, combat training measures and, first of all, tactical exercises, are carried out only for the purpose of






fulfilling the training program. The combat training plan does not specifically oblige the staffs and commanders to find in the actions of the troops new, more expedient methods which would result in attaining the desired results. During officer training, operational exercises, war games, and staff training practices the efforts of those being trained are insufficiently concentrated on settling problem questions concerning tactics and operational art which stem from the tasks of military science work, inadequate conditions are created for the trainees to display creative thinking, and the limits of thinking are predetermined by the framework of the training problems.

For the planning of military science work, as the experience from past years has indicated, the headquarters of a district is given from above a compound operational theme, often without considering the possibilities of carrying out even one theme-related operational exercise with the troops, during which one could check questions which have been worked out theoretically. The majority of exercises conducted in the district, as is generally known, do not exceed divisional scale.

We do not rule out the fact that one can research some problem questions concerning operational art also during command-staff (staff) operational exercises with skeleton troops. However, the results thereby obtained will be less objective in contrast to those one can attain during troop exercises.

It is natural that the above shortcomings in the planning of military science work and operational and combat training measures not only have an adverse effect on the practical carrying out of the assigned tasks, but also result in the fact that among the troops military science work essentially comes down to one-time measures in the form of military science conferences, meetings, information sessions, and the writing of individual articles. The carrying out of such military science measures, which are separate from the operational and combat training process and which form the official activity of the commanders, requires the allocation of special (free) time, which, by the way, most often is not found. Often, therefore, one may hear among the troops as justification for failure to carry out a measure mentioned in the military science work plan, that there was not enough time.






Military science conferences are a good form of military science work among the troops. However, in our opinion, their organizational and scientific level needs to be raised. As a rule, the conference material includes a basic report, supplementary reports, theses from the speeches of conference participants, and the director's concluding remarks. But there usually are few concrete recommendations and practical proposals in all these speeches, and therefore, some conferences actually are no different from ordinary training periods.

In our opinion, this shortcoming is explained by the fact that the material being submitted for discussion sometimes is written by one or two officers and not by groups of authors, and the results of research and the experience of exercises are inadequately exploited; therefore, the work on the reports most often is accomplished by compiling and transforming "authoritative" works and magazine articles. In addition, such a large number of questions are submitted for discussion that a considerable portion of them remains totally unanswered. As a result, such a conference turns into a measure artificially isolated from the vital combat training and operational training matters which are far from resolved.

Many measures in military science work, and especially military science conferences and meetings, are conducted at the end of the year; as a result, the recommendations cannot be incorporated into troop training until the following year, which obviously contradicts the requirement concerning the need for systematic utilization of the results of military science work during the entire academic year.

Up to now, for some reason, the scornful attitude toward military science work, on the part of some staffs and commanders, has been considered tolerable. In our opinion, the position whereby the condition of military science work is not taken into consideration when testing combat training and political training during the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of large units and units, serves as the basis for such an attitude. Therefore, military science work continues to be regarded as a semi-obligatory, secondary official duty, a duty restricted to a very limited circle of people. As a result of military science work's lacking legal "civil rights", many commanders are teaching the troops outdated material and do not bother themselves with






searching for and applying new ideas for combat training and operational training of the troops and staffs.

It seems to us that improvements in military science work can be attained, first of all, by reorganizing it. It is necessary to subordinate military science work to the interests of combat training and operational training not formally, but in fact, to make it a really important means for increasing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the troops, and to make it the direct responsibility of the commanders and officers at all levels. It must be closely linked with the practical activities of the troops, and become an organic integral part of them.

Such stating of a question will require that military science tasks and measures to be carried out be determined not by one channel (through military science organizations), but by all sectors of our official activities. Perhaps it is even worthwhile to exclude the executive military science organizations from the tables of organization of the headquarters of the military district (and possibly those of other institutions) and to assign the duties being carried out by them to all the directorates, departments, and services. This will increase the responsibility of each chief for organizing military science work and for solving urgent problems of military theory.

In our opinion, it is not desirable for the headquarters of a military district to give out a compound operational-tactical theme for research: first of all, it is impossible in the course of one year to verify the numerous questions of the theme in practice (in operational exercises); secondly, in such compound themes, a considerable part of the questions are not novel; they are already well known and the unsettled questions are lost among the well-known ones.

We think that it is better to give individual unsettled and poorly researched problem questions to a military district, taking into consideration the possibility for conducting practical research on them, and reliable and repeated testing of them in troop and experimental exercises. Proceeding from the tasks concerning military science work assigned to the military district, two to four problem questions should be allotted to the large units and armies.







In this instance the military science work plan for a large unit (unit) and army headquarters will include: problem questions, a list of exercises or other measures in which assigned questions are practically investigated or summarized, and the times for summarizations of individual questions to be ready; the forms and times for implementing the results attained; the time for completing the final synthesis and discussion of it at a military science conference or meeting; and recommendations for introducing the results attained in the academic year from military science work.

It is necessary to plan the conduct of research by schedule so that the realization of results attained is ensured throughout the academic year. Selection and determination of problem questions for research must be subordinated to the primary tasks of training and combat readiness of troops in the academic year being planned.

In order to raise the level of activity of the generals and officers in military science work, to increase efficiency in solving urgent problems in military affairs, and to eliminate the seasonal prevalence in carrying out military science measures, officer (operational) training (especially group studies, group training periods, war games), command-staff exercises, and staff exercises must be more broadly utilized. For this purpose, when carrying out these measures not only the working out of the necessary training tasks must be stipulated, but also the solution of individual problem questions by way of a wide, free exchange of opinions. The main thing here is reliance on the creativity of the generals and officers and their proposals in the development of unsettled questions concerning tactics and operational art. Accordingly, an important place must be set aside for critical analysis of unsettled questions in the troop (operational) exercises just conducted, and for the working out of recommendations based on them with the goal of making a final check or implementing them while conducting the usual exercises. In this case, the theoretical and technical training of generals and officers and, consequently, military science work as well, will rest upon the specific current experience of exercises being conducted, the participants of which are the trainees themselves. The results from such a method of officer training will have a constant and positive effect on the improvement of the methods for conducting the next tactical exercises.





The majority of troop exercises should not be carried out simply as the fulfilment of a training program, but should be subordinated to the completion of the military science tasks and to the identification of the most acceptable solutions to debatable questions. One should not think that the troops will not learn when practical scientific research is being conducted during exercises. On the contrary, such research is also a training period, but is conducted on a higher and more complete basis. The results of the research can be discussed in the critique of the exercises. Such a method of conducting critiques not only includes elements of military science work but also ensures the timely realization of the results of military science work. It is necessary to set aside up to half of the time devoted to the critique for a scientific analysis of research questions.

Summarization of individual problem questions assigned during an exercise should be entrusted to the staff which worked out and conducted the exercise. To achieve this goal during each exercise a summarization group must be created which includes in its membership the main persons who worked out the exercise. The summarization must be completed no later than two or three weeks after the exercises are finished.

It is desirable to give to the army and its divisions and regiments questions for research which are the same in content but different in scale; for example, for the army headquarters -- "the deployment of a motorized rifle division in the mountains for an attack from the march"; for a division -- the corresponding deployment of a regiment; for a regiment -- the deployment of a battalion. This will permit the very same question being studied to be verified as a whole and in parts at different troop command levels and under different conditions of the training combat situation.

At military science conferences, which are the concluding measures for the summarization of the questions being researched, they should submit not 60 to 100 pages of "raw" material, but rather clearly well-founded conclusions and recommendations which were repeatedly tested by the experience of several exercises. This, in essence, must be the summarization of the practical work of the conference participants themselves who had the opportunity to nurture and critically think over their own opinions on



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assigned debatable questions over a long period of time. In this case, the conference discussion will assume from the very beginning a really businesslike, purposeful, and creative nature. And vice versa, if the material being submitted for discussion at the conference is not prepared beforehand in a series of concrete conclusions and recommendations, the discussion will appear pointless and futile.

In our opinion, such are the ways of reorganizing military science work among the troops. The proposals stated are not exhaustive. But the need for a radical change in the existing state of affairs in military science work is not only indisputable but also urgent.

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