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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance
in a Front Offensive Operation in
the Initial Period of War


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article, reviewing a book of the same title, criticizes it for failing to stress or define more precisely the role, nature, means, and targets of reconnaissance in this period, but concedes that it contains many useful pieces of information. The article also comments, in particular, on the book's treatment of the organization and use of special-purpose and OSNAZ units. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon

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
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Early 1964

[Redacted]
DATE

28 June 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of War

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This is a two-part article, the first part of which is authored by General-Major I. Aleshin, Colonel B. Yefimov, Colonel I. Mayviyenko, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Galushko; the second part is authored by General-Major M. Ankudinov, Colonel D. Kodola, and Colonel A. Buyev. This article, reviewing a book of the same title, criticizes it for failing to stress or define more precisely the role, nature, means, and targets of reconnaissance in this period, but concedes that it contains many useful pieces of information. The article also comments, in particular, on the book's treatment of the organization and use of special-purpose and OSNAZ units.

End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation
in the Initial Period of War

by

General-Major I. ALESHIN
Colonel B. YEFIMOV
Colonel I. MATVIYENKO
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
Being discussed lately in our military press are the questions of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in the initial period of war. In a number of articles placed in the Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" and in some works of the military academies, new requirements for operational reconnaissance have been put forth and substantiated, and the forms of organizing it, as well as the use of different kinds of reconnaissance and methods of conducting it, have been examined. However, until lately there had not been published an entire work that fully examined the problem of operational reconnaissance and contained the necessary practical recommendations.

The first, most complete work in this respect, in our opinion, is the work Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of War.*

Examined in the five chapters of the work are the probable character of the first offensive operation of a front, the role and tasks of reconnaissance in a front offensive operation in the initial period of war, the reconnaissance forces and means of the front and their use, the organization of reconnaissance in the operation, reconnaissance of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, the collection, study, and processing of reconnaissance information and transmitting of it to the command, staff, and troops.

* Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of War. Military Publishing House, 1962, 100 pages.

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


The authors of the work do not set apart the main points of the research -- the theoretical and practical recommendations on reconnaissance conducted under peacetime conditions in preparation for the first offensive operation of a front, reconnaissance conducted at the start of combat actions, and reconnaissance during the course of the operation. Therefore, many important reconnaissance tasks and measures in these periods are treated as though in passing or are not examined at all.

It is known that the first offensive operation of a front is prepared under peacetime conditions and that this produces important special features in the reconnaissance activity carried out by a border military district (group of forces) in this period. Included primarily among these special features must be: limited opportunities to use the forces and means of reconnaissance; the necessity of consolidating the peacetime reconnaissance forces and means for the constant and continuous observation of the most important enemy targets to be hit in the first nuclear strike; the immediate commitment to action of all the forces and means of operational and tactical reconnaissance upon the surprise unleashing of war by an aggressor; etc.

The special conditions and the significance of the organization of reconnaissance in peacetime on behalf of the first offensive operation of a front deserve, in our opinion, treatment in a separate chapter.

With the start of combat actions and during the course of the operation, the conditions of organizing and conducting reconnaissance change drastically. All the forces and means of reconnaissance are directed towards supporting the accomplishment by the troops of the front of the most important tasks with respect to delivering the first nuclear strike, organizing and conducting meeting battles and engagements, the occurrence of which from the very beginning of combat actions will be most characteristic of an offensive operation in the initial period of war, supporting the swift combat actions of the strike groupings of the front in the commitment to the engagement of the second echelons and reserves, and other tasks. Moreover, it is known that, with the beginning of combat actions, as a result of the delivery of nuclear strikes and the use of other means of mass destruction, there will be large areas of contamination and destruction, which will have a substantial effect on the



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character of the actions of our own and the enemy's troops and, consequently, on the organization and conduct of reconnaissance. A separate chapter should have been devoted to this question, and some practical recommendations should have been made about the tactics of the actions of reconnaissance subunits and units under conditions of strong radioactive contamination of the terrain.

In the work under review, both in the preparation of the operation and during its conduct, the organization of reconnaissance and the questions of utilizing its forces and means are examined together in the corresponding chapters. This does not give an accurate and clear representation of the reconnaissance activity of the front (border military district, group of forces) under peacetime conditions and with the beginning of combat actions. By virtue of this, evidently, the authors have essentially not given recommendations on the integrated use of the forces and means of reconnaissance to accomplish the most important tasks both in the preparation of and during the course of the operation.

No place was found in the work for a characterization of the possible most important enemy targets in the reconnaissance zone of the front. In our opinion, this is of no little importance. It is known that on the whole the number of enemy targets will considerably exceed the capabilities of the reconnaissance means of the front, especially in peacetime, when reconnaissance is conducted with limited forces and means. This necessitates concentrating the main efforts on detecting and constantly observing the most important enemy targets. In this connection, the role of strategic reconnaissance conducted in peacetime on behalf of the front should have been shown more clearly.

Hence, it would have been advisable, in our opinion, to set forth the content of the work in the following sequence: probable character of the first offensive operation of the front (briefly); purpose, tasks, and targets of front reconnaissance in the operation; reconnaissance forces and means of the front and their capabilities; reconnaissance activity of the front (border military district, group of forces) under peacetime conditions during the preparation of the first offensive operation; organization and conduct of reconnaissance with the beginning of combat actions and during the operation.

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The questions of control of the forces and means of reconnaissance, as well as the collection and processing of reconnaissance data, could have been set forth in a separate chapter and more concretely.

The structure suggested by us, in our opinion, would have allowed the subjects to be set forth in logical sequence and more purposefully, which on the whole would have increased the value of the work.

Let us dwell on some positions of the work which, in our opinion, need refinement.

The authors write that "already in peacetime, reconnaissance must collect, accumulate, and update information about the probable enemy, since under any conditions of the possible occurrence of war it will be the basis for refining the decision made about the conduct of the first offensive operation (page 12)."

Consequently, it is apparently a matter of the command and staff of a border military district (group of forces) having to have at their disposal at every given moment complete and reliable data about the enemy that guarantee the delivery of an effective initial nuclear strike and the development after it of aggressive offensive actions with all available forces and means for a decisive defeat of the aggressor.

But this contradicts what is said on page 58, where it is emphasized that "these data will not be exhaustive and precise; therefore, in the period of the immediate preparation of the operation it will be necessary to refine them in the very shortest times, for which there is organized reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the enemy, especially of targets against which the delivery of nuclear strikes is planned."

The very designation "period of immediate preparation of the operation" seems to us erroneous. There is no such period, for the first offensive operation is prepared, as has already been said, beforehand, in peacetime, and the decisions made, including those on the organization and conduct of reconnaissance, must be refined systematically in conformity with the specific conditions of the situation, especially if there are signs of enemy

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preparation for delivery of a strike. Consequently, one cannot count on receiving or refining exhaustive and precise data in the "period of immediate preparation of the operation."

The recommendations set forth on page 62 with respect to the working out of a reconnaissance plan raise doubts. The authors suggest having a single reconnaissance plan for peacetime, for the period immediately preceding the beginning of war, and for the period of the fulfilment of the immediate and subsequent tasks by the troops of the front.

In our opinion, the reconnaissance measures to be carried out under peacetime conditions for the preparation of the first offensive operation are advisably planned in systematically worked out plans for a definite period on the basis of the instructions and tasks set by the General Staff and the commander of the border military district (group of forces). Moreover, a reconnaissance plan of the front for the first offensive operation should be worked out separately beforehand. The plan must include measures for fully deploying the forces and means of operational and tactical reconnaissance and immediately committing them to action, as well as all the other measures usually contained in a reconnaissance plan. This plan must be periodically refined on the basis of reconnaissance data obtained in accordance with peacetime plans and also on the basis of the changes taking place in the combat strength of the forces and means of reconnaissance.

The positions taken on the capabilities and use of the forces and means of reconnaissance raise serious objections.

Thus, in examining aerial reconnaissance (page 40), its most typical forces and means should have been defined more precisely. It should have been borne in mind that, on behalf of the front, aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by an operational reconnaissance air regiment and a tactical reconnaissance air regiment (possibly a squadron in the first days of a war). As for non-organic reconnaissance forces and means, in the air regiments of fighter-bomber aviation, all its flight personnel are trained to conduct aerial reconnaissance. But the authors indicate that "in all the air regiments making up the large units of the air army of a front, one squadron each is usually trained to conduct aerial reconnaissance..." (page 41), which is not

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


quite accurate.

Further, The depth is somewhat overstated for the conduct of aerial reconnaissance (800 to 900 kilometers) by operational reconnaissance aircraft, and also by the aircraft of the non-organic reconnaissance bomber squadrons (page 41). Practical experience in using reconnaissance aviation shows that the IL-28R operational reconnaissance aircraft now in service guarantee reconnaissance to a depth up to 800 kilometers, and the YAK-27R reconnaissance aircraft, up to 600 kilometers.

Not altogether accurate is the assertion that "tactical aerial reconnaissance is usually conducted by pairs of reconnaissance fighters, but at night and under adverse weather conditions, also by single aircraft (page 45)." Currently, aerial reconnaissance sorties of reconnaissance fighters may be carried out both by pairs and by single aircraft even in the daytime in fair weather conditions, which permits a considerable increase in the number of reconnaissance sorties under daytime conditions.

Also very unconvincingly shown in this work is the calculation of the required number of aircraft sorties for aerial reconnaissance. Thus, the authors assert (page 45) that, for reconnaissance of the operational-tactical means of nuclear attack, which constitute up to about 30 percent of the targets (in our opinion, this figure is understated), there will be required in the zone of conduct of tactical reconnaissance on the average of up to 65 sorties per day of pairs of reconnaissance fighters. In our opinion, the authors here are obviously not taking into consideration the basic requirements for aerial reconnaissance: the detected missile/nuclear means of the enemy must be monitored by the reconnaissance aircraft till the moment of their destruction; the areas in which there are probably located units and subunits of guided missiles, free rockets, atomic artillery, and cruise missiles (on the basis of the average periods necessary for the enemy to prepare missiles for firing, and of the time required to hit them) must be observed with a frequency of no less than 1.5 to two hours. If, in addition, one considers the particular features of the main targets of aerial reconnaissance conducted on behalf of the ground forces (their small size, high mobility, and careful camouflage), it becomes obvious that the authors' calculation of



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the aircraft sorties for reconnaissance of nuclear attack means cannot be considered even approximate.

In discussing aerial photography, the authors indicate that "the effective range of oblique aerial cameras under favorable weather conditions may be 50 to 60 kilometers (page 38)." Does this mean, for instance, that on the eve of a war, without overflying the national border, it is possible to conduct reconnaissance by oblique aerial photography to the indicated depth? No. The aerial cameras in service make it possible to carry out oblique photography (taking into consideration the capability of interpretation) of targets situated at a depth of up to only 20 kilometers.

It is surprising that the authors go on at rather great length about reconnaissance means which are in a developmental stage. Mentioned in this connection are systems that make it possible to process the exposed frame directly on board the aircraft (page 39), as well as panoramic radars that have high resolving power (page 40). At the same time, means of aerial reconnaissance which are already in service and are able to accomplish one of the main tasks -- determination of the coordinates of reconnoitered targets with the necessary accuracy to hit them with missiles -- are passed over in silence.

Thus, for instance, currently acquiring important significance is the determination of the coordinates of small-sized targets through the use of a tactical bombing system based on the measurement of the slant ranges from two ground stations to the reconnaissance aircraft at the moment of flight over the reconnoitered target. The experience of a command-staff exercise conducted in the Leningrad Military District in September 1962 showed that the time needed to determine coordinates at the ground station is seven to ten minutes after the flight of the reconnaissance aircraft over the target and that the accuracy is within 90 to 100 meters (when working with an IL-28R aircraft).

It is known that one of the important problems of aerial reconnaissance is the processing of the results of aerial photography. The authors say nothing about the possible introduction of high-speed methods of processing reconnaissance data. There should have been set forth at least recommendations

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on the work of the photogrammetric centers, which are currently providing for the carrying out of this task.

In the work under review, much attention is given to radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, and this is not by chance. The great saturation of the probable enemy's armed forces with radioelectronic means affords the opportunity for radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance to acquire important reconnaissance data both in peacetime and, especially, during the first offensive operation.

However, in revealing the capabilities of these means of reconnaissance, the authors also make a number of substantial errors.

[Thus, on page 28 it is indicated that radiotechnical reconnaissance in combined-arms and tank armies is conducted by the army OSNAZ radiotechnical battalions. But it should be well known to the authors that there are OSNAZ radiotechnical battalions only in the combined-arms armies.]

Also perplexing is the arbitrary treatment of the capabilities of the army OSNAZ radio and radiotechnical battalions and the radio and radiotechnical companies of the separate reconnaissance battalions of the combined-arms large units. It is indicated that "the army OSNAZ radio battalions are used for reconnaissance of the enemy's radio, radio-relay, and phototelevision means of communication operating in the ultra-shortwave and shortwave ranges" (page 28), even though it is known that the tasks of conducting reconnaissance of the enemy's phototelevision means of communications can be accomplished only by the front OSNAZ units.

In examining the capabilities of the army OSNAZ radiotechnical battalions (page 29), the authors, by the way, assert that these can conduct reconnaissance of the control systems of the antimissile defense and of the airfield and onboard means of radio navigation at a depth of up to 100 to 200 kilometers. This is incorrect.

The army OSNAZ radiotechnical battalions are designated to conduct reconnaissance of ground radar stations that detect air targets and that determine the altitude of air targets, of radars

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of the field artillery, and of radars that detect ground targets. In addition, battalion means make it possible to conduct reconnaissance of some radar stations forming part of the control system of guided missiles. In this case, the depth of reconnaissance does not exceed 60 to 70 kilometers. As for reconnaissance of airfield and onboard radio-navigation systems, these tasks are accomplished by the front OSNAZ radiotechnical regiments, which are equipped with the necessary reconnaissance apparatus for these purposes.

The authors also set forth very arbitrarily the capabilities of the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance company of the separate reconnaissance battalion of a motorized rifle (tank) division. They assert that "the company is used for reconnaissance of the enemy's radio, radiotechnical, and phototelevision centers and networks operating in the ultra-shortwave range, as well as the systems of radar, radio navigation, and radio remote control at the battalion-brigade-division-corps level of his first echelon (page 48)." Thus, according to the authors, the company is able to fulfil the same tasks as the front OSNAZ units.

But, in fact, a radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance company is designated only for the reconnaissance (intercept and direction finding) of the ultra-shortwave radio communications at the company-battalion-brigade-division level to a depth of up to 25 to 30 kilometers and for the detection of ground radar stations at a depth of 60 to 70 kilometers. Intercept of the enemy's operation of aircraft ultra-shortwave radio sets with the means of the company is possible to a depth of up to 350 to 400 kilometers.

Nor can one agree with the recommendations of the authors concerning the deployment of the forces and means of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance.

Thus, on page 30 it is indicated that "the forces and means of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance of a front are, with the beginning of combat actions, usually deployed in two echelons. The first echelon is made up of the means of the army OSNAZ radio and radiotechnical battalions, and the second echelon, of the subunits of the OSNAZ radio and radiotechnical regiments of the front." In this connection, it is fair to ask

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the question: To what echelon do the radio and radiotechnical companies of the reconnaissance battalions of the divisions belong? After all, they too conduct radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. And why are the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance means of the armies suddenly transformed into the first echelons of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance of the front?

Such a division into echelons is, in our opinion, artificial and only brings confusion.

The radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units primarily carry out their tasks on behalf of the formations and large units to which they belong. And they set up their battle formations on the basis of the best conditions for fulfilling the tasks set before them. Usually the army units and the radio reconnaissance subunits of the divisions set up their battle formations in one echelon. True, because of the cumbersomeness of the antenna equipment, the shortwave radio direction finders of the army OSNAZ radio battalions are usually set up at a distance of 10 to 15 kilometers from the forward edge, and the intercept and direction finding means in the ultra-shortwave range, four to six kilometers from it. This is a compulsory measure which has the purpose of concealing the shortwave direction finding stations from enemy observation.

The question is different with the deployment of the front radio reconnaissance regiments. The subunits of these regiments are deployed, as a rule, in two echelons. This is called for by the fact that, to conduct the intercept and direction finding of enemy radio stations operating in the shortwave range and situated at a depth of up to 100 kilometers, it is necessary to bring the radio reconnaissance posts up to the forward edge so that they are located in the effective zone of the ground waves of the stations being reconnoitered. Enemy radio stations located at a distance of 100 kilometers and more can be reconnoitered only by reflected waves coming in from them. For this, a second echelon of intercept and direction finding means is formed, which is situated 150 to 200 kilometers from the forward edge.

The authors of the work speak of ground and air television sets and systems. Here they indicate that "one of the systems of

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our ground forces is the television complex which makes it possible to observe sectors of the front and look at pictures of them on screens set up at control posts. Entering into this complex are television cameras mounted on tanks, reconnaissance patrol vehicles, aboard reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters, and also portable cameras (page 35)." But it is surely known that there is no such complex in the ground forces.

Concerning the collection, study, and processing of reconnaissance data and transmitting them to the command, staffs, and troops (Chapter 5), the authors on the whole correctly define the basic information documents, their content, and the amount of information work. But here, too, the main thing is missing -- how to guarantee accurate information work and effective control of the reconnaissance forces and means with the existing organizational structure of the intelligence directorate of the staff of the front (border district, group of forces), especially on the eve of war. The reader has a right to expect suggestions on improving the organizational structure of the reconnaissance organs of the staff of the front (army) and their methods of working in conformity with the scope of the tasks to be accomplished. Obviously, for working out the questions taken up in the book, a wider circle of authors should have been enlisted, mainly from among the generals and intelligence officers of the staffs of border military districts and groups of forces.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that, in spite of its shortcomings and inaccuracies, the work on the whole contains many useful pieces of advice and recommendations on questions of the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in a front offensive operation in the initial period of war which may offer much help in the practical activity of the generals and senior officers of operational staffs.

* * *

Basing themselves on the experience of the Great Patriotic War and postwar exercises, the authors of the work Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of War correctly consider that it is advisable to use special-purpose subunits to carry out reconnaissance tasks in small groups, of which the organic squads form the basis, while for actions to disorganize the work of the enemy control posts and rear services

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
and to knock out his missile/nuclear weapons and other important targets, to use them in the strength of detachments consisting of several groups.

As regards the distribution of the zones of actions of the front and army reconnaissance groups, in our opinion, the data cited are overstated. If one takes into consideration that the siting areas of the operational-tactical missile/nuclear means of the enemy (Redstone guided missiles and cruise missiles) will be situated at a distance of up to 100 to 150 kilometers, and their concentration areas, up to 200 kilometers, then obviously it is necessary to use the front reconnaissance groups with the start of an operation at a depth of 60 to 100 kilometers and more from the forward units of our troops. But we consider it advisable to use the reconnaissance groups of the army special-purpose companies at a depth of up to 150 to 200 kilometers in the interests of using the missiles of army subordination.

On the whole, the work gives a correct characterization of the capabilities of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, and presents recommendations on the use of the OSNAZ units of the front and army. The most important advantage of this kind of reconnaissance over other forms of reconnaissance is the fact that it is capable, without revealing its radio intercept and direction finding means, of fulfilling tasks already in peacetime and long before the start of combat actions.

Taking into consideration the technical capabilities of the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance means, the authors also present recommendations on the echeloning of the OSNAZ subunits. However, not altogether accurate, in our opinion, is the assertion that "the direction-finding subunits of the OSNAZ radio regiment of a front may be deployed in one or two echelons (page 31)." In order to exclude a dead zone in direction finding and to be sure to fix the shortwave radio stations in the effective zones of ground and reflected waves, it is necessary, as the experience of exercises shows, to set up the battle formation only in two echelons. In this, the subunits of the first echelon must be deployed 20 to 25 kilometers from the forward units of our troops, and those of the second, 150 to 200 kilometers from the first.

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On page 28 it is indicated that, in case of a surprise outbreak of combat actions, the OSNAZ radio and radiotechnical regiments "immediately change their locations and conduct reconnaissance from alternate positions." In our opinion, the immediate relocation of all the OSNAZ units of a front to alternate positions is inadvisable. Obviously, to ensure repulsing the first enemy strike, it will be necessary to leave part of the forces of these regiments in the permanent positions and relocate them after the first echelon has deployed and begun working in the alternate positions. Otherwise, at the most crucial moment, the work of the most effective kind of reconnaissance in this period will be broken off. During the course of an offensive operation, the relocation of OSNAZ units has to be carried out by echelon, for which a detailed relocation plan must be worked out in advance.

In examining the questions of reconnaissance of the means of nuclear attack, an unduly small role, in our opinion, is assigned to technical means and to such an active method of reconnaissance as the search and destruction of the means of nuclear attack by combat aviation and by motorized rifle subunits dropped in the enemy rear by helicopter, and the penetration into the enemy rear by tank subunits, especially amphibious tanks.

Not quite correctly defined, it seems to us, are the capabilities of receiving-and-tracking posts (radio intercept posts) for reconnaissance of means of nuclear attack. In this work, on page 84, it is indicated that "one such post is able to conduct continuous monitoring of the working of enemy radio stations on not more than three or four nets (links)...", in other words, assigned to every two receivers of the post are six to eight frequencies for monitoring. In practice, the opposite is true. To ensure dependable and uninterrupted monitoring several receivers often have to be allocated to each important frequency.

It is necessary to mention that in the work under review the authors examine all the questions of the organization and conduct of reconnaissance only as applied to the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations, considering, probably, that this theater, as the main one, is characteristic for the working out of all theoretical positions. But such an approach to questions of reconnaissance somewhat limits the application of



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a number of the basic propositions of the work in other theaters.

The authors have proceeded from the assumption that all the forces and means of reconnaissance of the operational formations situated in the Western Theater of Military Operations are fully deployed already in peacetime. But in other theaters, they may, as is known, be represented in considerably reduced strength, with basically only radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance operating. These are fundamentally different conditions of the organization and conduct of reconnaissance. The main problem for these theaters is conducting reconnaissance with the available means, maintaining them in a high degree of combat readiness, carrying out organizational-mobilization measures to deploy additional forces and means of reconnaissance in extremely limited periods of time. About all this nothing is said in the work and no recommendations are given.



The initial period of the Great Patriotic War was characterized by the fact that all the types of reconnaissance were not fully prepared and deployed. It required very much time to fulfil these tasks. Therefore, one must not now, in speaking of reconnaissance in the initial period of war, bypass in silence the questions of the state of readiness of the available forces and means and the possible times and procedure of deploying additional ones in a period of threat and in case of a surprise attack.

The present-day forces and means of operational reconnaissance are numerous and varied. They will be operating in vast spaces, sometimes far exceeding the capability of the means of communications available to reconnaissance.

The tasks of reconnaissance have become more complicated and the time for accomplishing them has been drastically reduced. A large part of the tasks may be accomplished only through the cooperation of all the forces and means of reconnaissance. All this taken together requires special, precise control of reconnaissance. However, how to organize the control of the reconnaissance of a front, how to carry out cooperation within the reconnaissance of a front and with adjacent units is not mentioned in this work.


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And, finally, in researching the questions of operational reconnaissance in an offensive operation in the initial period of war, it is necessary, in our opinion, to give a perspective of the development of reconnaissance from an organizational, technical, and operational point of view. This, unfortunately, is not in this work either. While considering the indicated work on the whole useful for troops, we would still wish that the Military Science Directorate of the General Staff republish it, taking into consideration the observations expressed here.



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