

~~TOP SECRET~~

3628

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


27 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Preparation  
of Motor Transport for Operations Under  
Conditions of War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article, a rebuttal of a previous article in this Collection that was critical of current and World War II Soviet motor transport, supports current planning, organization, and developments in motor transport and asserts its ability to cope with wartime requirements. It points out that Soviet motor vehicles were not and are not now inferior to foreign vehicles, especially US vehicles, and that the centralized and planned direction of Soviet motor transport has conferred definite advantages on it. It indicates that work is under way to reduce the excess weight of Soviet trucks, the only deficiency admitted by the author. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

*[Signature]*  
John N. McMahon



Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency


The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army


Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research






# Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 11 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



DATE OF INFO.

Early 1964

DATE

27 April 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Preparation of Motor Transport for Operation Under Conditions of War

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:


The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel Engineer V. Khlystov. This article, a rebuttal of a previous article in this Collection that was critical of current and World War II Soviet motor transport, supports current planning, organization, and developments in motor transport and asserts its ability to cope with wartime requirements. It points out that Soviet motor vehicles were not and are not now inferior to foreign vehicles, especially US vehicles, and that the centralized and planned direction of Soviet motor transport has conferred definite advantages on it. It indicates that work is under way to reduce the excess weight of Soviet trucks, the only deficiency admitted by the author.


End of Summary

Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_ the article to which this refers was disseminated as \_\_\_\_\_





The Preparation of Motor Transport for Operation  
Under Conditions of War


by

Colonel Engineer V. KHLYSTOV

The present stage in the development of Soviet operational art is characterized by the persistent search for new organizational forms, new methods of conducting the combat actions of troops, and for the most efficient system of supporting them from the materiel and technical standpoint in keeping with the conditions of the initial period of war. In the preparation of offensive operations, as we know, it is important not only to determine desirable methods of employing the present-day means of combat of all the branch arms and the maximum utilization of their capabilities, but also to provide for the buildup of efforts during operations.

There is no doubt whatsoever that under the new conditions of waging war the organization of the delivery of supply cargoes, and the motor transport shipments in particular, constitute one of the most important and complex tasks of the operational rear services.

But, for some reason, we give little attention to this matter. Scientific research work in the area of searching out new forms of organizing delivery in the tactical, operational, and deep rear at the present time lags considerably behind the general level of the combat readiness of staffs and troops. In the first ten years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, quite a lot of major research was done and many solid works were written on matters of the organization of supply shipments. The stimulus for such work was apparently the freshness and sharpness of the impressions of the substantial mistakes made in the past war. Unfortunately, in recent years interest in these matters has dropped noticeably, not only in the sense of their theoretical elaboration, but also along the lines of the practical development and testing of certain principles in the field exercises of troops, in maneuvers, and in command-staff exercises. Nevertheless, the working out of general fundamental principles for the organization of military shipments using motor transport has not, under the new conditions, lost its former



~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 5 of 11 Pages

significance but, on the contrary, has acquired an even greater degree of significance than it had ten years ago.

New means of armed combat and new kinds of combat and transport equipment, having brought about new methods of conducting combat actions, certainly cannot fail to affect the structure of the operational rear services, their forms of working, and, in particular, the manning and equipping of motor transport units, as well as the system of mobilization preparation of motor transport.


In this connection, the article by Lieutenant Colonel N. PANKOV, "Problems of Preparing Motor Transport for Wartime Operations"\* is of considerable interest. In it the author has dwelt on very important problematical principles associated with the intelligent organization of transport matters in the country and the support of the operation of transport in wartime.

However, we cannot agree with some of his principles and recommendations, inasmuch as they have not, in our opinion, been validated sufficiently. And in a number of cases the author has not objectively approached the assessment of the factors affecting the preparation of motor transport under present-day conditions nor the mistakes made in the preparation of the rear services in the period preceding the Great Patriotic War.

For instance, in defining the paths of the development and improvement of motor transport, the organizational forms of its work, and the appropriate preparatory work in peactime, the author to some extent tries to make all of this serve the interests of preparation for war. His arguments amount to this -- that the future of the development of an entire branch of the national economy, which is what transportation is, should be determined on the basis of the tasks of preparing the armed forces and country as a whole for war. To adopt this point of view means to disregard the many years' experience in the peaceful and planned development of our economy and to lose sight of the main direction in the implementation of the external and internal policies of our country.

-----  
\* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (68), 1963.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Such an interpretation basically fails to reflect reality, inasmuch as, for the duration of the entire existence of our country, in resolving any matters of the development of this or that branch of the national economy, the interests of the development of the economy as a whole have always been put in the forefront, and at the present stage, the interests of establishing the material-technical base of communism come first.


Therefore, it appears to us that the most correct way of developing motor transport is to find such intermediate organizational forms as would first of all ensure the strong advance of our economy and at the same time promote the increased defensive strength of the country.


The practical recommendations of the author relating to this problem touch on essentially three basic directions -- the technical improvement of present-day transport means, the organization of the work of motor transport in the national economy, and the support for the operation of this transport from the technical standpoint.

The importance of these matters is generally known. However, from the author's reasoning one could get the idea that they are all somehow decided by us without giving enough consideration to the interests of preparation for war and that these decisions do not completely meet the demands for the further improvement of these matters. But in fact this is not so. The development of technical means of motor transport in our country is prescribed, as we know, by the control figures for the development of the national economy. The plan, presented in the form of a prospective list of all types of domestic motor vehicles, provides for the renovation of the production of the motor vehicle industry through improved types and models of motor vehicles, and trailers and semi-trailers.

The prospective list of the types of motor vehicles has been approved by a special resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR which coordinates the requirements of the various branches of the national economy and the country's defense needs. Also approved by a separate resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was the nomenclature of the Soviet Army's wheeled vehicles which was designed to completely satisfy the present-day requirements of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The overall improvement of the basic technical and operating specifications of the latest Soviet motor vehicles is seen convincingly enough if one compares them with the better models of foreign vehicles now being produced by foreign firms enjoying world-wide popularity. This





comparison shows that in most respects our motor vehicles right now, to say nothing of the future ones, are not inferior to the celebrated American models, and in a number of specifications (weight, range, etc.) are even superior to them. From this it follows that the task of technically improving motor transport means is being successfully accomplished by us not only in the sense of general technical progress but also taking into consideration the defense needs of the country.

The same can be said about the organizational forms of the work of motor transport in our country, these forms being ever more improved by way of centralization and specialization in the handling of priority and routine cargo flows. Finding ever wider practical application in the planning of this work are modern progressive methods of mathematical programming.


In the course of preparing motor transport for work under conditions of war, in our opinion, the accomplishment of three basic tasks comes to the forefront.


In the first place, we should still continue to centralize the work of the common carrier motor transport in the future, concentrating the bulk of it on axes more or less near the main operational axes of the main theaters of military operations. For secondary theaters this task can be accomplished by coordinating the main cargo flows with the axes of probable troop combat actions.

In the second place, the work of motor transport in combination with the other types of transport, primarily with the basic types of military transport, is acquiring no little importance. In the accomplishment of this task there arise many problems, both technical and organizational, connected with the establishment of stable tonnage ratios for the standard groupings of the different types of transport, and with the determination of the optimum norms for the capacity of each type of transport, etc.

Third, it is advisable to more boldly pursue the idea of coordinating transport problems throughout the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

As for the tasks of a special nature reflecting mobilization requirements, one obviously should give first priority to those which will stem directly from the distinctive features of using the motor vehicle and motor transport units and large units of an operating army, namely:





-- the peacetime training of experienced personnel capable without preliminary retraining of driving military vehicles in military convoys according to wartime laws and practices;

-- the accomplishment of the matters of transferring materiel without reloading from one command level with supplies disposed in depth to an adjacent command level;


-- the exploring of methods for the maximum simplification and reduction of cargo and route documentation by going over to a token/chit system or to a system of preliminary packaging of cargo with sealed packing containers; ✓

-- the working out of sophisticated methods for the rapid performance of loading and unloading jobs so as to shorten the idle time of transport while these are being done so that this time amounts to five to ten percent of the total time expended in transporting cargo;


-- the equipping of the transportation groupings of the national economy with means of communications to control the movement of motor vehicle convoys on delivery routes.

As can be seen from the content of the tasks of the first and second lists, the solution of the basic problems of the preparation of motor transport for work under the conditions of modern war does not run counter to the line of the general development and progress in the development of our country's transportation, but follows from it and promotes it. And, along with this, the successful accomplishment of the tasks mentioned ensures that favorable conditions are established for the quick transfer of the work of motor transport to the needs of the active army.

In his analysis of the mistakes and shortcomings in the preparation of the rear services in the period preceding the Second World War, the author, in our opinion, has made a number of inaccuracies and incorrect interpretations -- he has tried to evaluate from a modern standpoint the level of technical efficiency and degree of development of the given ideas of the past. As a result of this, with a complete lack of objectivity, he classes the domestically produced motor vehicles of the 1940's in the category of "technically deficient" vehicles. There is no doubt that the GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 motor vehicles are, in quality and design, greatly inferior to the current models of the GAZ-52 and ZIL-130 type. But, one must not forget that a period of over 20 years was required to develop these models.







Lieutenant Colonel N. PANKOV, for no reason at all, omits the important argument that the success of the transportation support for operations in the last war was accomplished by means of the domestic "one-and-a-half-tonners" and "three-tonners", and not by the American "Studebakers" and "Fords" we received. This can be seen from much of the quantitative and archival data presented by him in the article.

Not altogether understandable and not very convincing is the discussion of the errors committed, in the author's opinion, in the mobilization planning for the period of 1940. For instance, he qualifies as an absolute error the detailing of the maximum percentage of motor vehicles to be withdrawn from the national economy upon full mobilization from within the limits of interior military districts. The greatest withdrawal of vehicles, in the author's opinion, should have been done from border military districts. On the next page, in giving an evaluation of the procedure for the disposition in depth of the reserves of motor transport equipment, he, on the contrary, recognizes as incorrect the overconcentration of reserves, as well as of means of restoring unserviceable motor transport equipment, right there in the five western border military districts.

But what, then, is correct? To direct prewar mobilization measures towards the border areas of the country or towards the interior ones?

It appears to us that in explaining this matter, a certain degree of sketchiness has been allowed to slip in. A mobilization plan is not an end in itself. It cannot be worked out without taking into consideration basic military doctrine and overall operational-strategic concepts. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, these concepts were based on an idea that ruled out the unfolding of military actions on our territory. Mobilization planning based on this proposition naturally could not but provide for the priority preparation of appropriate resources in those areas immediately adjacent to the lines of probable combat actions.

The extremely unfavorable beginning of the war for us, not only not planned by anyone, but not even expected, was responsible for the situation we well remember in which, for the duration of the first years of the war, the reserves and the resources not only of border areas, but also of many interior ones, were in enemy occupied territory.

Also deserving elaboration is the author's conclusion that "the level of development of motor transport is considerably lower in the USSR than in developed capitalist countries". There is no doubt that in the Soviet



~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 11 Pages

Union motor transport is used on a smaller scale than in some other countries. Also incontrovertible is the fact that the relative proportion of motor transport within the total freight turn-over of our country is far less than in, say, Italy.


However, this still does not mean that the level of development of our motor transport in general is significantly lower than in these countries. In the overall organization of transportation matters we look not worse, but better than many countries of the world. No other country has planning principles for the utilization of transportation, nowhere are the problems of the integrated utilization of all types of transportation solved on a nation-wide scale taking into consideration the technical and economic advantages of each type, finding the greatest economic efficiency for the country as a whole.

In what country of the capitalist world is the development of transportation planned for two decades ahead precisely coordinating its progress with the general development of all the other branches of the economy? Where else can one find strictly regulated norms for the relative balances between the various groups of motor vehicles in the interests, not of the individual profits of private firms, but of the overall benefit of the entire country as a whole?

The amounts describing the shares pertaining to motor transport within the total freight turn-over of different countries, some of these amounts being cited by the author in this article, show that these correlations are subject to a definite pattern: the relative importance of motor transport, as a rule, is higher the smaller the territory of the country. And this is understandable. The economic profitability of the motor vehicle for short-distance shipments makes it here the predominant means of transportation.

The author is absolutely incorrect in his comparative evaluation of domestically produced motor vehicles with the same type foreign models as concerns the condition of their cargo-carrying section (page 85). The most criminal thing in this comparison turns out to be the fact that the cargo platform of our motor vehicles is 20 to 30 percent shorter than foreign ones. And this is held out as a substantial defect. The linear dimensions of the body have no "pros" or "cons" in an absolute sense. They acquire practical meaning only when we state how they compare to the overall sizes of the most typical and bulk packaged cargoes.

~~TOP SECRET~~



A vehicle body fully satisfies us when the packaged containers of the cargo fit its interior dimensions lengthwise and sideways a number of times without leftover. A minimum leftover can, to a certain degree, serve as an indicator that an efficient choice of body dimensions has been made for a given type of cargo.

The task consists not in constructing longer platforms, in the image and likeness of American ones, but in finding the optimum size for them that is divisible by the dimensions of the standard national-economy and military cargoes.

It cannot be said that our motor vehicles were formerly inferior to American ones from the point of view of the efficiency with which cargo was accommodated on them. Experience shows that, in respect to cargo capacity characteristics, domestic motor vehicles were and remain better than American "Fords", "Studebakers", "Internationals", and a variety of others.

The shortcoming of our transport motor vehicles that has survived to the present time consists in something altogether different -- in the fact that the relative weight of the vehicle remains too great, i.e., the weight relative to a unit of shippable cargo. Our lagging behind in this respect has solid objective reasons. The fact is that our motor vehicles, in conformity with the characteristics of the road, climate, and other operating conditions, must have running and load bearing parts of greater strength and durability than American, English, and Italian ones. Nonetheless, the task of reducing to the utmost the relative weight of motor vehicles has now been set before our motor vehicle makers and is being accomplished by them quite successfully.

In conclusion, we cannot but mention that the article of N. PANKOV, along with the shortcomings mentioned, contains many extremely useful theoretical generalizations and practical recommendations on a subject that is treated less frequently than it should in the pages of our military press.

