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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Daily Attention to
the Combat Readiness of the Troops


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article outlines specific proposals and recommendations worked out by representatives of the Warsaw Pact armies to further improve mobilization expansion, notification, and the manning and equipping of large units and units, while reducing the time periods for complete mobilization. The representatives also agreed that they must constantly search for methods to improve and perfect combat readiness. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 1, which was published in 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Page 2 of 13 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~



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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 13 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
INFO. 1970

DATE
29 November 1977

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Daily Attention to the Combat Readiness
of the Troops

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article outlines specific proposals and recommendations worked out by the joint efforts of the representatives of the Warsaw Pact armies. These pertain to further improvement of the mobilization expansion of troops, the notification system, and the manning and equipping of large units and units, while reducing the time periods for complete mobilization. The representatives also agreed that they must constantly search for methods to improve and perfect combat readiness, and find new ways to resolve any problems of its make-up. This article appeared in Issue No. 1, which was published in 1970.

End of Summary

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of 13 Pages

Daily Attention to the Combat Readiness
of the Troops

Operations Directorate of the Staff
of the Combined Armed Forces

The maintenance of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in a high degree of combat readiness is of great importance under the complex conditions of the modern international situation. Combat readiness is an integral factor in the building of the Armed Forces, ensuring not only the reliable protection of the peaceful labor of the peoples of the socialist commonwealth, and the disruption of any aggressive enemy actions, but also the successful defeat of the enemy regardless of the conditions of the beginning of the war or its course.

The Communist and worker's parties, governments and higher military leadership of the Warsaw Pact member states display tireless concern for strengthening the defensive might of our coalition, for increasing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces in every way possible, and for consolidating their combat alliance.

In the directive concerning operational and combat training of the Combined Armed Forces for the 1971 training year it is emphasized that the main task is "as before, to consider the further all-round strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, the unswerving perfection of their combat alliance, and the capability to decisively repulse any imperialistic aggression and to soundly defeat the enemy. To further reduce the time periods for bringing the troops, the naval forces, and control and rear services organs into combat readiness. To increase the capability of formations, large units, and units, and of all branches of the armed forces to perform a rapid and secure complete mobilization and to bring them into full combat readiness under any situational conditions."

The sessions of the Committee of Ministers of Defense in December 1969 and in May 1970, as well as those of the Military

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 5 of 13 Pages

Council of the Combined Armed Forces were extremely important for strengthening the combat readiness of the allied armies. At these sessions the primary directions for the development and training of the ground forces, front aviation, air defense forces, and navies of the allied countries were defined.

The meeting in May 1969 of the chiefs of general (main) staffs and workers of the mobilization organs of the armies of Warsaw Pact member states was one of the important measures among the problems of increasing the troop mobilization readiness as an integral part of the combat readiness of the allied armies. Proposals directed toward the further improvement of the mobilization expansion of troops, the setting up of notification, the manning and equipping of large units and units while reducing the time periods for complete mobilization, as well as those concerning the direction of mobilization work and control of troop mobilization expansion were worked out at this meeting.

In November 1969 in Budapest a conference of representatives of the general (main) staffs of the fraternal armies was conducted at which problems of the further improvement of notification systems for troops, staffs, and organs of local military control (military commissariats) were examined.

Many of the specific proposals and recommendations worked out by the joint efforts of the representatives of the fraternal armies at the aforementioned meetings and conference were very useful and are being successfully put into practice.

At present the degree of combat readiness of the national armies and of the Combined Armed Forces as a whole is such that they are capable of delivering a crushing repulse to any aggressor at any moment. However, we must not stop here. We must constantly search for methods to improve and perfect combat readiness, and find new ways to resolve any problems of its make-up.

When the essence of combat readiness is examined, we have in mind not only well-organized troop notification at all levels and their training to quickly leave their place of permanent disposition and move out to the appropriate areas, but above all the ability of units, large units, and formations to engage in battle in an organized manner and successfully operate under the

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6 of 13 Pages

most complex situational conditions. In other words, troop combat readiness is the essential degree of preparedness in all respects in peacetime for the immediate and efficient fulfilment of the combat tasks at the beginning of combat actions.

Combat readiness includes a number of interrelated factors which are common to all the armies of the Combined Armed Forces. They include:

- concise planning for bringing the troops into combat readiness and conducting mobilization measures based on the special features of each army of the socialist commonwealth;
- desirable location of troops;
- reliable notification and stable troop control;
- skilful actions of commanders, staffs and mobilization organs when making the transition of the troops from peace to war status;
- high degree of field, air and naval training of the forces and fleets;
- irreproachable technical condition of armament and combat equipment;
- capability to reliably cover the state border within a minimal period of time;
- high degree of morale-political and psychological preparation of the troops;
- comprehensive materiel and technical support.

Speaking of the combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces it should be stressed that it must be examined on strategic, operational, and tactical scales.

On a strategic scale combat readiness signifies the capability of all the Combined Armed Forces to make the transition from peace to war status in an organized manner with the necessary numbers and quality of personnel at the time stipulated by the plans to engage in armed combat and conduct it successfully.

The primary indicator of the combat readiness of the armed forces is the timely deployment of strategic groupings and their complete readiness to conduct combat actions. The constant readiness of the rocket forces, Air Defense Forces of the Country, and naval forces is crucially important under modern

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 7 of 13 Pages

conditions.

On an operational scale combat readiness signifies the capability of operational groupings of troops, naval forces and their formations to deploy and go over to fulfilling operational tasks in the shortest possible time in an organized manner.

Combat readiness on a tactical scale is characterized by a high degree of combat skill of personnel, and the precise and skilful actions of large units, units and subunits when making the transition to full combat readiness to fulfil combat tasks. Accordingly, it should be stressed that the irreproachable condition of armament and combat equipment is especially important.

An important indicator of combat readiness is the time factor. Bringing the troops rapidly into a condition of full combat readiness has always been one of the main problems confronting the commanders and staffs. However, this problem has never been as important as it is now.

While stressing the importance of the time factor, we should not, of course, hold it as an absolute or attribute all the problems of combat readiness to it. The time itself is not important; what is important is to precisely determine what the troops must do by a specific time, and in what minimum necessary time they can bring themselves up to an increased degree of combat readiness.

Let us examine in greater detail some of the aforementioned factors.

As is known, in peacetime the ground forces of the fraternal armies of the socialist countries are in a [varied?] state. Some large units and formations are manned sufficiently with personnel and equipment and can set about fulfilling the combat task at any time. Such large units and formations are regarded as being in constant readiness. However, with the emergence of a threatening period they too have to undergo additional measures to raise their level of combat readiness.

Other large units and formations are maintained on reduced T/O's, and naturally they can be utilized only after full

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mobilization,

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Increased combat readiness is usually introduced by a signal or an order without declaration of a combat alert. Large units and units continue to remain in permanent disposition (basing) areas and carry out measures according to existing plans, which make it possible to significantly reduce the time for their transition to full combat readiness.

The scope of the measures which are carried out by the troops in this period is worked out in advance taking into account the living conditions and the activity of every fraternal socialist army and is determined by the directive of the Minister of National Defense. These measures in the majority of fraternal armies are identical and the implementation sequence of them is approximately the same.

The matter of increasing the readiness of the communications means and methods of notification, measures for combat and materiel-technical support, as well as matters of control, verifications of various estimates, etc. are included in these measures.

It must be stated that the scope of the measures which are carried out for increasing the readiness of the troops, depending on the conditional situation may be changed and expanded at any time. The sequence of implementing the measures themselves may vary. In addition, all measures for bringing the troops to increased combat readiness are carried out without disrupting the established daily life routine of units and large units in order to conceal actual intentions from enemy reconnaissance.

Finally, it is necessary to note that increased combat readiness does not have to be implemented, and the troops may right away go into a condition of full combat readiness.

Full combat readiness is the highest degree of readiness, which permits troops (naval forces), after they have received the combat task, to immediately begin executing it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 9 of 13 Pages

The need for bringing the troops up to full combat readiness may arise at the time when the threat of an attack on the part of the enemy has become a reality, and they are assigned to carry out such measures, which affirm the possibility of unleashing combat actions in the immediate future.

Troops are shifted to full combat readiness, as a rule, by the declaration of a combat alert, when they are in an increased combat readiness or in a condition of everyday readiness.

On the alert signal troops move out from the place of permanent disposition to concentration (dispersal) areas designated beforehand and are brought to full readiness to carry out the combat task, and when necessary, they can move right away to the national border to create a grouping of forces and means in accordance with the combat actions plan.

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As a rule, the transition of the armed forces to full combat readiness will be the beginning of the conduct of mobilization measures, if they had not been fulfilled earlier.

However, these measures do not make up the entire volume of work being carried out among the troops during the period in which they are brought to full combat readiness (here only part of the main measures are enumerated).

It must be stressed that as the formations and large units of the branches of the armed forces are brought to full combat readiness the success of their actions will depend on the degree of preparedness and interest of all personnel for putting into practice the measures stipulated by the plans, and on the speed and precision with which they are carried out.

The speed with which the troops are brought to the highest level of combat readiness, as was noted above, has always been one of the main problems, and at the present time it has become particularly critical.

This is determined by the enemy's increased capabilities for a sudden attack employing nuclear weapons: the flight time of enemy missiles and aviation to the main installations of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 13 Pages

socialist countries is very short; in the Central European Theater of Military Operations the probable enemy already has a considerable number of operational-tactical missiles and carrier-based aircraft on combat alert having periods of readiness for launch (actions) of 15 to 30 minutes.

Thus it follows that the main direction for increasing combat readiness at the present time is to accelerate the deployment of large units and units, to have them occupy their departure position within the shortest possible time, and to prepare them in an organized manner to fulfil combat tasks.



It is possible to resolve these problems by introducing new technical means of notification, by reducing the time for preparing combat equipment and armament for action and for moving units and large units out of permanent disposition (basing) points. Playing a great role in this regard are continuous exercises in bringing units and large units into readiness to fulfil various combat tasks.

The next direction for increasing combat readiness consists of bringing the condition in which the troops and naval forces are maintained in peacetime closer to the wartime condition in a most expedient manner. This will enable the volume of measures for the transition of the troops from peace to war status to be decreased, and the time for bringing the armed forces to full combat readiness to be reduced.

The quality of field training is very important for increasing troop combat readiness. It is known that even troops who are well equipped technically cannot be considered combat effective if they are not sufficiently trained. This is why there is full justification for saying that the level of combat and political training, organization and discipline, and morale-political and combat qualities of the armed forces personnel has a great effect on the degree of combat readiness of the troops. Only when large units and formations are well trained, when they are cohesive and capable of defeating a strong and technically equipped enemy can we speak of their high combat readiness.

It is by taking precisely these requirements into consideration that the combat training of the troops in the

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armies of the Warsaw Pact member states is organized. Accordingly, primary attention is devoted to constantly increasing field, air, and naval training of the troops, air forces, and naval forces.

Combined combined-arms exercises are conducted, as a rule, with the participation of all branches of the armed forces and branch arms of various nationalities, with the field firing of artillery, mortars, and tanks, and with bombing by aviation and launching of missiles.


Good examples in this regard are the combined operational-tactical exercises ODER-NEISSE, conducted on the territory of the Polish People's Republic under the leadership of the Polish Minister of National Defense in 1969, the operational-tactical exercise of the Czechoslovak People's Army with field firing and bombing conducted under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense in 1970, and the operational-tactical exercise of the Combined Armed Forces, BRATSTVO PO ORUZHIIYU [BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS], conducted on the territory of the German Democratic Republic under the leadership of the GDR Minister of National Defense in 1970. Many similar examples could be cited from the practice of each allied army.

One of the tasks of commanders and staffs is the further improvement of methods of field (air, naval) training for units, large units, and formations. This task can be carried out if each exercise, regardless of its scale, is as close as possible to reality and conducted in a complex situation.

Those exercises which begin when the troops (naval forces) are suddenly put on alert and subsequently led out into "unfamiliar areas" where they fulfil unexpected tasks demanding a great degree of creativity and initiative on the part of the commanders and staffs, and the maximum physical and morale efforts of all soldiers, are very instructive.

Notification is an important element in the system of troop combat readiness.

The speed with which large units and units are brought to combat readiness depends to a considerable degree on timely notification.



~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 12 of 13 Pages

In connection with this, at any level the following demands are made on automated systems and technical means of notification:

- rapid (in one or two minutes) transmission of signals and instructions to the troops (naval forces), and the capability to duplicate them and receive return information;
- the capability for collective and selective notification;
- security in transmitting signals and monitoring their passage.

This is achieved not only by the presence of improved systems (means) of notification, but also by conducting systematic training of the duty crews of control post and daily checking of the work of systems (means) for technical malfunction.

At the present time in all allied armies semiautomatic systems of notification have been developed and introduced. They are maintained by the organic service of operations duty officers and communications centers. On the whole they operate reliably. But as the experience of their work shows, the further improvement of matters of notification must take the course of developing automated devices which ensure that the signals are transmitted instantaneously to subunits, units, and large units, and that confirmation of the reception of signals by the addressee is rapidly received.


Stable troop control has special meaning in ensuring high combat readiness.

This demands that on all levels a determination be made in advance as to how control of units, large units and formations will be carried out when they are brought up to increased and full combat readiness, and from which control posts.



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Page 13 of 13 Pages



~~TOP SECRET~~

