

[Redacted]

1599

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

12 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The
Initial Naval Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article is a review of an earlier article concerning the make-up of the initial naval operation and the nature of the actions of the participating forces. The reviewer disagrees with the author's view that actions of strike submarines and missile-carrying aircraft against carrier strike large units cannot be combined into one operation with actions of antisubmarine forces against missile submarines. He asserts that these actions are tightly interwoven. In addition, he believes that these forces should be coordinated through a single concept and plan. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1964.

[Redacted]

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

William W. Wells

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Science and Technology


Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers

Director of Strategic Research

Director of Weapons Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~





Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 9 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



DATE OF INFO. Early 1964

DATE 12 July 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Initial Naval Operation

SOURCE Documentary



Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Captain First Rank I. Ignatyev. This article is a review of an article by Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev concerning the make-up of the initial naval operation and the nature of the actions of the participating forces. The reviewer disagrees with the author's view that actions of strike submarines and missile-carrying aircraft against carrier strike large units cannot be combined into one operation with actions of antisubmarine forces against missile submarines. He asserts that these actions are tightly interwoven. In addition, he believes that these forces should be coordinated through a single concept and plan.

End of Summary

Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language version of this article was disseminated [redacted] article to which it refers was "Initial Naval Operations"





The Initial Naval Operation
by
Captain First Rank I. Ignatyev

The question raised in Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev's article* concerning the make-up of the initial naval operation and the nature of the actions of the participating forces has great practical and theoretical significance. Its correct solution will allow more effective methods for the preparation and conduct of the initial naval operation to be worked out quickly and will allow the operational training of formations and large units of the Navy to be carried out in the necessary direction. This question plays an important role in the solution of the problems of building the Navy.

The author considers that at the beginning of a war a fleet will conduct actions in the form of an operation only against the enemy's carrier strike large units, and that the actions of strike submarines and missile-carrying aircraft against the carrier strike large units cannot be combined into one operation with the actions of the antisubmarine forces against missile submarines. We will try to show that combat between antisubmarine forces and enemy submarines is also a part of the make-up of the initial naval operation.

Combating missile submarines is one of the navy's basic tasks, the carrying out of which from the very beginning of the war will play a very important role in undermining the nuclear might of the enemy navy and in protecting our country's installations against missile/nuclear strikes from the sea. Therefore all the actions of our navy's forces at the beginning of a war cannot be examined separately, and combat with carrier strike large units should not be set apart from the search for and destruction of missile submarines and the delivery of strikes by our missile submarines against enemy shore installations. We consider that all these types of actions have a fundamental importance and since they, specifically, lead directly to the achievement of the basic goals of combat actions at sea in the initial period of war, they must be examined as one process of the navy's combat activity. Let us take, for example, combat with enemy submarines.

*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (68), 1963.







The author, of course, is right in speaking about the differences in actions against submarines operating in the depths of the ocean, and actions against carrier strike large units on the surface of the sea. To what has been said it can be added that it is these very differences which make it necessary for the Navy to have special antisubmarine forces which, at the present level of technical development are distinct, not only in their purpose but also in the composition of their armament and combat equipment, from the forces designated to seek out and destroy carrier strike large units and other surface ships. However, combat with submarines and actions against carrier strike large units have much in common, which necessitates examining them as an inseparable unity and within the framework of one operation.

Generally, this above all is the goal -- all actions to destroy the strike forces of an enemy fleet are directed toward frustrating its missile/nuclear strikes from the sea and ensuring favorable conditions for the subsequent actions of our forces in the naval theaters.

Naturally, in order to achieve this goal, the decisive destruction of the carrier strike large units and missile submarines is necessary in the shortest possible time after the onset of combat actions, as Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev justly points out. It is for this reason that even in time of peace not only missile submarines, but, to a lesser degree the location and nature of the actions of strike aircraft carriers, should be regularly watched. As the situation becomes more complex, this surveillance of the strike forces of the enemy fleet should develop into continuously conducted reconnaissance and pursuit by forces capable of destroying it. And this is possible if the actions of all the forces of the fleet make up one operation.

There also is immediate concern as to the coordinated actions of all the forces of the fleet which conduct combat with enemy carrier strike large units and submarines. We have no right to say that the connection between the actions of our forces against aircraft carriers and missile submarines is to be confined only to the fact that during these actions we are destroying various carriers of enemy missile/nuclear weapons. This connection has a more profound nature. Thus, the deployment of the major large units of our submarines and antisubmarine forces for participation in combat actions actually will be carried out from the same basing areas, in strictly coordinated succession, and along the same or adjacent zones of routes, and, what is most important for us, with the indispensable mutual protection of deploying forces from the possible sudden strikes of the enemy who had intended even before the beginning of the war to bring his





own antisubmarine forces into the paths of deployment of our submarine forces.

While destroying enemy submarines, our antisubmarine forces should ensure that our submarines break through to areas of actions against the carrier strike large units, whereas the submarines and missile-carrying aviation destroying the aircraft carriers with their strike and antisubmarine aviation, as well as our other surface ships, will be ensuring freedom of action for our antisubmarine submarines and aviation which are carrying out the search for and destruction of the enemy missile submarines, and at the same time, possibly, his antisubmarine submarines. All the tasks should be performed at the same time. This means that combat with carrier strike large units and the destruction of missile submarines, as well as antisubmarine submarines, are not only contiguous actions, but they are tightly interwoven. On what grounds then, are the actions of antisubmarine forces to be examined separately from the actions of submarines and aircraft aimed at combat with carrier strike large units? Apparently, the reference to the specific character of submarine warfare, requiring a special organization and operational disposition of forces, methods of controlling them and, in the final analysis, of conducting everyday actions, cannot constitute a substantial argument in favor of the assertions of Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev.

In order that the actions of all the forces of a fleet in the initial period of a war be most successful, it is necessary to plan them within a single plan of the initial naval operation. In so doing, the anticipated variants of the possible situation must provide for precise allocation of the efforts of each type of forces according to the targets of strikes, areas of actions and time; their cooperation, mutual support, and the organization of their control.

It is desirable to work out the plan of the operation and the preparation of the forces for its conduct in advance. In so doing, of course, all possible variants of the situation cannot be accurately foreseen. The complex dynamics of combat may not coincide with the proposals which were made before the beginning of the combat actions as to the most desirable allocation of the efforts of our strike submarines, missile-carrying aviation and antisubmarine forces. In particular, one can assume that, in order to achieve surprise, the enemy will not employ his aircraft carriers in those areas where they conduct exercises and where they are deployed when local conflicts occur. Also not excluded is the possibility of the movement of enemy missile submarines from previously identified areas of systematic combat patrolling into other areas where new





missile launching positions will be established. In connection with this, it will become necessary to retarget the forces of our fleet, and to assign them new targets, time and areas for the delivery of strikes. It will be more convenient to do this in the case in which a single operation is conducted by the forces of a fleet and there is one level of command in the person of the commander of the fleet and his staff. This circumstance also speaks in favor of our understanding of the matter of the make-up of the initial naval operation.

The author's assertion that the plan and concept for the employment of aviation and submarines against missile-carrying submarines is set apart from the plan and concept of the fleet's strike forces, cannot be acknowledged as correct. It is true that sometimes, for the purpose of a more thorough definition of the specific character of the actions of various forces, these questions are examined individually. But in practice it is necessary that the strike and antisubmarine forces of the fleet, especially at the beginning of the war, be coordinated through a single concept and plan.

We have our own opinion about the characteristics of the operation. It is difficult to predict the spatial scope and duration of the initial naval operation; the operation is defined by the specific conditions of the situation in each naval theater. In reasonable approximation it can be estimated that the depth of the actions of our forces against the enemy carrier strike large units and missile submarines, which are equipped with the most improved carrier-based aviation and Polaris missiles, will be 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers from our seacoast. The possibility of increasing these distances to 3,500 to 4,500 kilometers in the next few years is not excluded.

The duration of the actions of the main groupings of our forces against the aircraft carriers and missile submarines is approximately several days. During this time the enemy's carrier strike large units and the grouping of missile submarines will either be destroyed or, having sustained losses, they will run out of on-board reserves of nuclear weapons and attempt to break away from our forces.

Somewhat later, but nevertheless within the framework of the initial naval operation, the actions of our submarine forces directed toward combating the antisubmarine submarines of the enemy probably will proceed. However, they too will be limited by the time our strike submarines are in the ocean which is required for the defeat of the carrier strike large units, and by the period during which the main grouping of these submarines





returns to our bases or is redeployed to carry out the next tasks.

The subsequent continuation of combat with the enemy's antisubmarine forces at sea, including submarines, will most likely go beyond the bounds of the initial naval operation. It will take the form of systematic actions, which should be organized depending on the outcome of the initial operation to defeat the missile-carrying naval forces.

We will express some views about the role of diesel submarines in actions against enemy nuclear missile submarines. Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev, of course, is right in asserting that the most promising forces for combating missile submarines, especially in their distant combat patrol areas, are nuclear antisubmarine submarines and long range aviation. The advantages of these types of forces are indisputable, and it is desirable to exert the maximum efforts to establish them in the necessary numbers. However, it cannot be asserted that, as a rule, only submarines with nuclear power plants will be capable of conducting combat with enemy submarines at the beginning of a war. The desire to emphasize the great effectiveness of the new nuclear antisubmarine submarines is completely natural. But it is inadmissible, in so doing, to reduce to zero the importance of the existing diesel submarines which are part of the armament of the Navy and will be employed for a long time to come to carry out various tasks, including the task of combating nuclear missile submarines.

The process of establishing new nuclear submarine forces is complex, long, and requires great material expenditures. For example, the US stopped building diesel submarines in 1957 and after that has been building only nuclear submarines for six years. Yet, with excessively large budget appropriations and a powerful shipbuilding industry, only 19 percent of the submarine forces of their navy are nuclear submarines. There are grounds to assume that even by 1970-1972 the number of nuclear submarines in the US navy will be approximately equal to or a little higher than the number of diesel submarines. Consequently, now as in the next few years, by force of historical necessity diesel submarines will be in existence and be employed along with nuclear submarines in the event of war. This means that they must not be left out of consideration for armed combat at sea.

Speaking about the possibility of employing diesel submarines in combat with nuclear missile submarines, it must be noted that the latter cannot always effectively use their inherent characteristic of a high level of maneuverability under water. When located in launch positions, especially during the preparation and launching of Polaris missiles, nuclear missile submarines have to maneuver on fixed courses with speeds of





four to six kilometers per hour. Under these conditions the probability of their being detected by diesel submarines may amount not to 20 percent, as the author asserts, but to 50 to 60 percent. It is true, to achieve such a probability would require that there be more diesel submarines than nuclear submarines, and their employment would be more complex.

The experience of recent years shows that even with the existing technical equipment, when properly employed under present-day conditions, diesel submarines can detect nuclear submarines at sea, and in doing so the conditions of establishing contact with them and the duration of the maintenance of contact are sufficient in the majority of cases for the employment of weapons. In order to achieve better results, it is necessary to modernize the means of hydroacoustic detection and the antisubmarine weapons of the diesel submarines.

Along with the development of new forces and means, our task consists of constantly searching for more effective methods for the employment not only of future, but also of existing forces and means. It is necessary to ensure in every way possible their high level of combat readiness for actions in the system of combat with the nuclear missile submarines of the probable enemy.

