

1497

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Collection and Recording of Situation Data


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article describes communications problems in the collection and recording of situation data in an air army, and ways of solving them. The authors recommend holding specialized training sessions in the transmission of reports and intelligence information, working out control problems in detail, and utilizing a card index. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers

Director of Strategic Research

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 12 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
INFO. December 1970

DATE 22 August 1975

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Some Problems of Troop Control

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by General of the Army Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, who presents his views on the nature and problems of troop control and the role of staffs in the command of troops. The components of command include foresight based on rapid estimates of a situation, the adoption of a decision, methods of influencing the course and outcome of operations, and comprehensive support of decisions. The introduction of automated systems and the mobility of control organs also are important. This article appeared in Issue No. 1, which was published in 1970.

End of Summary

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of 12 Pages

Some Problems of Troop Control

by

General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko
Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces
of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact

"To control," wrote V. I. Lenin, "one must know the subject and be an excellent administrator." He has emphasized that it is impossible to control without competence, without a knowledge of the "science of control". Lenin's instructions are fully pertinent to the organs of military control. A scientific approach to the solution of the problems of improving troop command is dictated by those revolutionary transformations which have taken place in recent years in the armies and navies of the allied countries.

A tension, fluidity, and speed of movement exceeding those of former times; great scope, intensified crisis situations on various axes, and drastic changes in the situation -- these are the characteristic features of present-day operations and combat. During armed conflict, therefore, it will be necessary, more often than in the past war, to alternate from certain methods of actions to other ones, to concentrate forces quickly and to disperse them rapidly.

Naturally, under these conditions it also becomes more difficult to exercise troop control, which, as we know, in the final analysis must ensure victory and the least possible losses in personnel and combat equipment.

For firm and continuous control, we demand from formation commanders and staffs a high level of organizational work, a profound understanding of the nature and means of conducting combat actions, an unceasing study of the situation, a knowledge of present-day means of warfare, particularly weapons of mass destruction, and a knowledge of their combat capabilities and principles of employment.

The increased requirements for troop control have given rise to the necessity of maintaining the high combat readiness of staffs -- the fundamental organs of command ensuring troop control. For this, it is important to keep staffs at full strength and to man them with well-prepared generals and officers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 5 of 12 Pages

Furthermore, to maintain the necessary combat readiness of staffs of all levels, the quality and efficiency of their work is very important. To raise and improve the quality and efficiency of the work of staffs is a continuous process requiring day-to-day attention.

The quality and efficiency of staff work depend on the professional training of generals and officers. The present-day staff officer and general must have a broad operational-tactical outlook and sound knowledge and skill in his work.

The quality and efficiency of the work depend greatly on the style of work used in one situation or another:

- on the cohesion of the organs making up the staff, the coordination of the activities of the entire staff mechanism, and the effective organization of its work;
- on an analysis of the state of affairs on the scene;
- on the uninterrupted operation of communications upwards, downwards, and with adjacent forces; and
- on the skilful direction of staffs by the appropriate senior officers.

All that has been mentioned above constitute the main pivots, if one may so word it, on which control is supported.

The successful work of a staff also depends, of course, on the use of staff techniques when working, the automation of work processes, the use of standard documents, and the state of training of the staff's technical personnel.

So as to have an efficient, highly-trained staff, which would be a true organ of control under present-day conditions, one must devote and adapt himself to the officers in particular and to the staff as a whole.

Control is a concrete category, not an abstract one; control in military affairs is executed primarily by people, and also by processes.

And to control people means to weld them together by common interests and views, and to coordinate and direct their efforts and actions to the fulfilment of the combat tasks.

This proposition has great practical importance while organizing and conducting operations with the Combined Armed Forces and when commanders, staffs, formations, and large units of differing national affiliations are

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6 of 12 Pages

going to operate within the composition of fronts and armies. This characteristic definitely must be taken into account if we wish control to be effective.

The process of troop control is many-sided but unified. This unity is made up of a number of component parts.

The main ones are:

- foresight, or in other words, determining the probable course of military actions;
- making a sound decision and developing operations plans which are carried out on the basis of foresight.
- determining the methods of exerting influence on the course and outcome of operations; and
- providing the plan with comprehensive materiel support and organizational support.

Let us examine briefly the aforementioned component parts of the operational commanding of troops.

Foresight. It is often said that to control means to foresee. This is correct, but under present-day conditions it has become more complicated and difficult than in the past to foresee the course of events.

To foresee means to picture the possible development of events in an operation and battle so that one may on this basis forestall the enemy in carrying out appropriate combat actions or measures. Foreseeing is not the result of the groundless fantasy of a military leader. It is established on strictly scientific principles determined by the nature of present-day warfare. So that foresight may approximate the actual development of events, one must know the laws of war, the nature of the operation and the battle, and how to use forces and means to achieve victory.

But this is only the foundation, or if one may say so, the backbone of foresight. A military leader can formulate a vivid picture of the possible development of events in military actions only by correlating the actual quantities of the forces and capabilities of the enemy and of one's own troops, and the time, place, and other aspects of the situation under which events may develop.

However, to correlate these elements one must energetically obtain data on the enemy and know the situation and status of one's own troops, determine the balance of forces in all of the possible phases of an

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 7 of 12 Pages

operation or battle, and solve numerous other problems which constitute the substance of the work of a commander and a staff.

All of this is neither easy nor simple. We cannot get along here without much strenuous work tied to the production of various types of operational and tactical estimates.

At the same time, present-day operations and battles are extremely fluid. Therefore, it is far from adequate to simply produce estimates; it is important that estimates should keep pace with the course of events and afford a commander the opportunity of determining, on the basis of them, the trend of developments in the situation and of making a decision with the requisite foresight.

Thus, the dialectical chain of events becomes visible: from a concrete knowledge of the situation to foresight, and from this to practical actions.

Accordingly, estimates must be produced rapidly, and some of them must be made not only rapidly, but literally instantly. This is a universally known proposition, but the importance of its meaning does not change because of this. Sometimes staffs still expend too much time in accomplishing tasks before ascertaining the situation and status of one's own troops, and before obtaining and processing data on the enemy. In exercises with troops, from three to five hours are often expended in the headquarters of a front and of armies in collecting and analyzing information received from the troops. Up to ten hours are spent collecting data on enemy nuclear strikes and assessing their aftereffects. Approximately the same period of time will be required by some people to interpret reconnaissance data, especially from aerial reconnaissance. Because of the fluid nature of combat actions, such periods of time have been exceeded, and if we do not shorten them, it will inevitably lead to the information obtained, such as that on the enemy, becoming outdated before it can be used.

How can we gain time and curtail these time periods? It appears that great savings in time will be achieved by those staffs which are able to select from the great stream of information, which is at times contradictory, only that which is important and reasonable, that which is needed at the given phase of combat actions for successful commanding of the troops.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Page 8 of 12 Pages

The experience of exercises has disclosed that not all generals and officers have mastered to a proper degree the skills needed to immediately arrive at and grasp what is important and fundamental. The reasons for this are many, and the first one is a lack of self-discipline in work. Frequently the same information on the situation is transmitted both by way of the combined-arms staffs and also by way of the chiefs of branch arms and services. It is not enough that much time is required to process the information received, but this procedure, furthermore, introduces unnecessary parallelism in the work of commanders and staffs and burdens communications means.

Some staffs strive to know the situation in greater detail than is at times needed for troop control.

Thus foresight is the most important factor in successfully commanding troops. It is also a necessary and inherent quality for military leaders and control organs, and primarily, for staffs at all levels. The timeliness, accuracy, and profoundness of foresight, and consequently the soundness of a decision, will depend on how quickly and accurately they are able to process, examine, and collate data on the situation.

Working out decisions. We know that a decision constitutes the basis of troop control. Adopting a decision is a complex, labor-consuming, and at times contradictory, creative process, accomplished as a rule in a limited time. A decision should be based on a scientific foreseeing of the development of events, foresight being based, as already stated, on a profound knowledge of the objective laws of armed conflict and on the principles of its organization and conduct. A knowledge of these laws will permit commanders and staffs to determine beforehand possible changes in the situation and the probable course of combat actions so as to take appropriate measures ahead of time.

A sound decision is possible only as a result of the creative processing of a large volume of information on the situation and status of one's own troops and the enemy. This work, as a rule, has to be accomplished under conditions of rapid and drastic changes in the situation, and, as already stated, in the shortest possible periods of time.

Therefore, working out a decision is not now a matter for a single man. It is the result of the collective and purposeful activity of staffs and chiefs of branch arms and services. But this activity must be efficient, flexible, and specific so as to provide a commander with the



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 9 of 12 Pages

opportunity of adopting a sound decision in a timely manner.

The previously held long deliberations and prolonged conferences, coordinations, and synchronizations with subordinates can only lead to a loss of time. This does not at all mean that we do not have to seek counsel and coordinate actions, but all work must be conducted in a manner which does not "eat up" the time necessary to organize the operation and the battle.

To achieve this we must increase the work productivity of staffs to the maximum. In each staff all work processes should be calculated ahead of time and in detail, the functional duties of generals and officers should be determined with precision, and all staff duties should be established by strict regulations.

Methods of exerting influence on the course and outcome of operations. To control means to exert influence, not only by words, but by deeds, on the course and outcome of operations of any scale.

In the past, as we know, this influence was exerted in two basic ways.

First by the availability and skilful use of reserves.

When preparing and conducting operations, one of the principal questions was the problem of reserves: their availability and the time for committing them to combat.

The ability to maneuver with reserves and to use them in a timely manner in the place most favorable to the success of an operation was and remains one of the distinguishing features of troop command.

This proposition can be supported by several examples from World War II experience. At the very inception of this war, the Soviet Supreme High Command had to use five combined-arms armies moved up from interior military districts to reestablish the defense of the Western Front.

In the battle around Moscow, although the situation was very difficult, the General Headquarters committed its reserves only when it became convinced that these were in a condition to bring about a turning point in the course of the operation.

Reserves also played a decisive role in other major engagements, especially at Kursk, where the Soviet command had at its disposal the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 12 Pages

reserve Steppe Front made up of several armies.

At present, powerful means, such as missile/nuclear weapons, are in the hands of strategic and operational commands. Without a doubt, these weapons are decisive in achieving the final aims of operations. But to exploit quickly and most fully the results of the use of nuclear weapons, we attach great importance to the high combat skills of troops and the skilful use of second echelons and reserves which have various purposes and whose role in present-day operations not only has not decreased, but on the contrary, has increased even more.

Secondly, influence on the course and outcome of operations is exerted by appropriately organizing cooperation between troop groupings (formations) operating on various axes. This is a very important method of exerting influence on the course of operations, permitting us to deliver a surprise strike at the requisite moment with combined forces at a place where it is not expected by the enemy, which spreads his forces and compels him to use them piecemeal.

When we speak of cooperation, we not only have in mind the coordination of efforts among fronts, but we also emphasize the great importance of cooperation among branches of the armed forces, branch arms, adjacent forces, and internally within formations and large units.

Some of the difficult tasks of control are maintaining cooperation, amplifying tasks, and coordinating troop combat actions, especially when the troops have a coalition complement.

During the past war we accumulated experience in this respect. To maintain cooperation, operations groups which had been delegated varying authority were detailed from fronts to the allied armies. Obviously, in present-day conditions when front troops have a coalition complement, it will also be advisable for staffs at various levels to exchange operations groups of this kind.

In this connection, our accumulated experience in combined measures for the operational and combat training of the Combined Armed Forces already poses for us a number of questions:

- the composition of the operations groups;
- the principles of the exchange -- from whom and to whom (mutual exchange or one-sided exchange):
- where are the operations groups are to be located -- at the command

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 11 of 12 Pages

post or at the forward command post;
-- whether they should arrive with their own communications means or only with documents for secure troop control.

All of these questions require further research. In the actual operational training of the Combined Armed Forces we must henceforth examine in detail the work of such groups so as to synthesize and disseminate the experience obtained.

Comprehensive materiel support and organizational support of decisions. Adopting a decision is still not the culmination of the entire matter. Even a good decision may fail if we do not support its fulfillment. I would like to say a few words about this.

Supporting a decision is no less important an aspect of command than foresight. We can see how important this problem is from the following examples. The intent of Hitler's command to attack towards Minsk and then in the direction of the capital of the USSR was detected by the Soviet command literally from the first days of military actions.

However, we were then not as yet in a condition to disrupt the enemy offensive, much less support the bringing about of a turning point in the situation. The reason for this lay not only in the insufficient number of troops but, most importantly, in the shortage of modern armament and of reserves.

As is known, we succeeded in halting the enemy and in achieving a turning point in the course of the war only at Moscow, when support of the decisions of the strategic and operational commands was implemented much more fully.

Of great importance in this matter are the status of materiel and manpower resources and the precise work of formation commanders (commanders) and staffs -- the immediate organizers of troop combat activities.

When organizing and conducting combined operations by the Combined Armed Forces, the problem of supporting the decisions adopted acquires special urgency and acuteness.

Under these conditions, we must of necessity decide and coordinate matters associated with the stockpiling of materiel reserves, the equipping of national armies with weapons, equipment, and ammunition; the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Page 12 of 12 Pages

reinforcement of troops with personnel, and so forth.


Naturally, we must get ready for this in advance, in peacetime.

In discussing troop control, we must devote attention to one important detail. As is known, combat actions are always fraught with all sorts of surprises, even with the best planning, since warfare is a two-sided process. The best thought-out plan, when being implemented, will be sure to encounter no less well thought-out and effective countermeasures on the part of the enemy. Therefore, we must incorporate necessary changes into a plan in a timely manner, skilfully correct it, and amplify the decision which was made earlier.

Amplifying the decision and the plan for subsequent actions requires that new tasks be transmitted quickly to the troops. And here the staff plays a large role. The time for transmitting combat tasks to subordinates can be shortened by reducing the volume of orders transmitted to the troops, but, of course, not at the expense of their clarity. A staff must be able to control subordinates by means of brief orders and signals.

And lastly. In order to radically increase the work productivity of staff generals and officers, and to sharply reduce the time required to prepare all types of estimates, to send information and transmit tasks to troops, we must widely introduce new equipment and automated systems which facilitate control. It is precisely this which constitutes one of the most important aspects of the scientific organization of modern troop control. But at the same time we must increase the mobility of control organs; this mobility must, in all circumstances, not be lower than that of the troops.

Our task consists of training the staffs daily as the most important organs of control, of strengthening by all means the combat collaboration of our armies, and of constantly raising their combat readiness so as to always be ready, fully armed, to deal a crushing rebuff to any aggressor should he dare attack the countries of the socialist commonwealth.



~~TOP SECRET~~

