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C H I C K A D E E

The following is a verbatim translation of a TOP SECRET Soviet document which was read by Commander of Missile Troops and Artillery Varentsov at a meeting of the senior officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense sometime in late 1961.

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THESES

ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF MISSILE TROOPS AND ARTILLERY,

CHIEF MARSHAL OF ARTILLERY COMRADE S.S. VARENTSOV

1. The experience of tactical exercises in which missile and missile-technical units participated, which were carried out in the years 1959-61, has posed the question of working out a new form of combat support for the functioning of missile-technical support in operations.

The objective necessity for this new form of combat support makes the indissoluble unity of combat work essential in the preparation of missiles and special charges for combat use, with the preparation for firing, and control of missile/nuclear fire. Hence, logic demands close coordination between the combat work of missile brigades and battalions and combat work with missile-technical units (Mobile Repair-Technical Base - Podvizhnaya remontno-tekhnicheskaya baza - PRTB).

Experience shows that missile and missile-technical units are a single and indivisible whole. One cannot speak of the combat readiness of missile units or of the combat readiness of missile-technical units separately. One can speak only of the combat readiness of the missile troops as a whole.

2. At the present stage of development of the missile troops the combat readiness of missile brigades and battalions of operational-tactical and tactical designation /three lines missing/.

However, the readiness of missile troops, especially their readiness to deliver the first and second salvoes in the operations of the initial period of a war, is completely dependent on the time needed by the PRTB for the delivery of the missiles to brigades and battalions.

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At present, we have many shortcomings on this point. We still have no right to report the full combat readiness of missile-technical units (PRTB), since the experience of the exercises which have been carried out, and in particular of exercise "Don" in 1960 and of the operational rear area exercises of the Carpathian Military District in 1961, showed that in practice not a single missile was delivered by the PRTB to the missile units in a condition to be placed on the launch pad and fired.

The principal reason for this is that among certain responsible leaders of our Ministry there still exists a tendency to consider missile-technical support as being on the level of a supply function, and a failure to understand that the combat work of preparation of missiles and special charges in the PRTB is an integral part of the single complex of tasks in preparing a nuclear-missile strike. This arises from an underestimation of the complexity of the preparation of a missile and a special charge for combat use and from an inclination to transfer /arbitrarily/ to the missile troops the principles of the organization of supply which were developed for conventional ammunition during the years of the Second World War.

This is incorrect, because missiles and special charges have brought with them a fundamentally new quality, requiring a new form of combat support for operations -- missile-technical support. This, of course, is a form of combat, and not of material-technical, i.e., rear services, support, and the PRTB is not an organ of supply nor a repair shop of the artillery armament service, but a full-fledged combat unit.

It is clear, therefore, that the term missile rear services or missile-technical rear services has no meaning, and that the system of supply of missiles and special charges is limited to their delivery from the arsenals and bases of the remote rear to the PRTB, for which there are corresponding transport units and subunits.

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3. The analysis which we made in the period from September to November of this year [1961] of the feasible times for readiness to launch the first nuclear/missile strike by the missile troops of the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), SGF (Southern Group of Forces), and of a number of border districts -- Turk VO (Turkestan Military District), Zak VO (Transcaucasian Military District), DVO (Far Eastern Military District) -- shows that the time needed for readiness is absolutely dependent on the mutual deployment of the missile brigades and the PRTB, on the degree of coordination between them, on the system of control, and on the extent to which the preliminary working out of a whole complex of technical questions has been completed (preliminary adjustment work on the missiles and special charges, maintenance of storage batteries, the location and procedure for the storage of the missiles and special charges, provision for the transport of missiles and special charges at low temperatures).

The analysis shows that with great separation between the PRTB and the brigades and battalions, the absence of close coordination between them and the dissipation of the efforts of the PRTB in the preparation of missiles and special charges of various designations, the period for making ready the first and second salvoes becomes unacceptably great. This is clearly shown in the diagrams of sketch No. [?] and No. [?]. As one can see, the making ready of the first salvo of operational-tactical missiles requires about 31.5 hours, and of the tactical missiles about 35 hours after the announcement of a combat alert. To be sure, it must be said at once that the alert [does not correspond] to the actual conditions to be expected in a state of [attack].

If we change the conditions for the relative dispositions of the missile units and the PRTB, deploy them in the siting area at not too great a distance, organize close coordination between them, create a single system for the control of

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the missile brigades and the PRTB, and overcome the dissipation of the efforts of the PRTB in the preparation of missiles and charges for units of various designations, i.e., resolve the problems of missile-technical support which have arisen, and similarly resolve a number of technical problems, which will be discussed below, then the picture is changed sharply with regard to the reduction of time for the preparation of the first and second salvoes.

The results which can be obtained by such a solution of the task of missile-technical support are shown in the diagrams of sketch No. [?] and No. [?]. As one can see, the time for the preparation of the first salvo of the operational-tactical missiles in this case is 22.5 hours, and of the tactical missiles 17 hours. It is not difficult to calculate that the reduction in the time for the preparation of the operational-tactical missiles is 9 hours, or 28 percent, and for the tactical missiles 18 hours, or 52 percent.

Such are the objective results of the analysis of our actual combat readiness.

4. For greater clarification of the problem under consideration [let us examine in detail the methods of] reducing the time and increasing the reliability of missile delivery:

a. Putting the PRTB closer to the missile brigades, the establishment of close coordination between them, the division of PRTBs into operational-tactical and tactical PRTBs, reduces the time for the preparation of the first salvo by 6 or 7 hours.

b. Proper organization of the adjustment work on missiles and special charges, matching of schedules (grafik) of the adjustment tasks with the schedules for the preparation and recharging of the sources of electric power on the missile, results in

a saving of time for each R11M [?] missile of up to 3.5 hours and for each BA11 [?] charge and R11M [?] missile of 4 hours.

c. With the location of the PRTB at not too great a distance (from 20 to 30 km) from the missile brigades, transport for mated (stykovannaya) missiles is feasible under low temperatures, since the temperature-maintenance capacity of the warhead is assured. If the PRTB is located 100 to 150 km from the brigade the transport of a missile mated with a charge is impossible, because of the lack of heat in the carrier (telezkha), i.e., the reduction of the temperature of the charge to 0°C makes it impossible to use. Therefore, if the PRTB is located nearby we can deliver mated missiles regardless of temperature conditions.

d. In the establishment of close coordination between the missile brigade and the PRTB and between one unit and another, mutually [agreed] schedules are worked out for the maintenance of combat readiness of storage batteries, which assures their constant readiness in the required numbers and eliminates the danger that the batteries will be put out of order during transport over great distance at low temperatures (lower than plus 15°C), that is, the PRTB does not have heated means of transport for the batteries.

e. Close coordination between the PRTB and the missile brigade [one line missing] short distance of the PRTB from the missile brigade [three words missing], that [two words missing] ensures corresponding [four words missing] of nuclear-missile strikes [two words missing] for the transport of missiles from the PRTB to the brigades, which as a general rule provides a saving of time after the first shift of not less than 8 to 10 hours.

f. Close coordination and reliable communication between the PRTB and the missile brigade actually improve the reliability of the timely delivery of missiles and

special charges, because they eliminate the cases of non-delivery and of untimely delivery, and the rambling about of means of transport which occurred on the exercises which we held in 1960 and 1961.

g. With the location of the PRTB 20 to 30 km from the missile brigade and with distribution of the functions of the PRTB according to missile designation, there is considerable simplification of the organization of the security and defense of means of transport with missiles and special charges, and, most of all, there is a sharp decrease in the numbers required for the security forces and for means of reinforcement.

h. With the creation of a unified system for the control of missile brigades and of PRTBs, there is an improvement in the conditions for the establishment of the height of burst for operational-tactical missiles.

5. As for the missile [word missing] 0-5, which is now being accepted, all these problems are resolved in relation to one another. The organization of the missile-technical support of combat operations of 0-5 [word missing], envisages the operation of the PRTB together with the regiment. This considerably reduces the number of PRTBs and all unsolved R11M [?] missile problems are resolved simply and fully.

This fact, although it is a small thing with us, should also be considered in the organization of missile-technical support.

6. Further views, based on large [one line missing] permit us to formulate the following conclusions and proposals:

1) Reality demands the rejection of the creation of two systems for the control of missile troops of a front (army), one under (po linii) the Chief (nachalnik) of Missile Troops and Artillery, and

the other under missile-artillery armament, and their unification into a single system for the control of PRTB missile troops, which includes the control of missile brigades, battalions, and PRTB and the assignment of full responsibility for the control of missile troops to the Chief and the Staff of RV (Missile Troops) and Artillery of a front (army).

2) To strengthen the attention of the Chief of Missile-Artillery Armament of a front (army) to problems of the transport of missiles and special charges to the PRTB, and of the maintenance, use, repair and evacuation of missile equipment, not diverting it to the solution of tasks of the control of troops which are not those of this service.

3) To reorganize existing PRTBs according to the principle: one PRTB to a missile brigade or regiment of operational-tactical missiles, and one PRTB of tactical missiles to an army. Thus, in peacetime, the PRTBs are units of district or group subordination. For the replacement of possible losses, there should be reserve missile-technical units in the front from the personnel of which the necessary number of assembly and technical subunits can be detached. The measures indicated are possible without significant changes in the established number of missile-technical units.

4) To envisage for groups of forces and border districts in peacetime, when possible, a common location or a short distance between the PRTB and the brigade with which it coordinates. During the movement of troops in the period of threat, and also in the course of combat operations, to envisage the location of the PRTB as being no more than 20 to 30 km from the brigade and to establish between them close coordination and reliable communications.

5) In view of the possible necessity for the mating of missiles in the missile units, especially under conditions of low temperatures or during maneuver with special charges within a front or army, to provide for the instruction of the troops of the technical

support battalions in the mating of missiles and for the introduction into their structure of a mating group (one technician and three or four enlisted fitters (soldat-montazhnik)).

6) To work out the technical documentation and to organize the tasks of adjustment so that the missiles and special charges in the PRTB and the missile units which are in constant combat readiness are ready for assembly without a check of the electrical circuit.

These views on the improvement of missile-technical support have been submitted by us for discussion to the command personnel of GSFG, SGF, Turkestan Military District, Transcaucasus Military District, and the [Transbaykal?] Military District, and have already met with approval. Discussions have been carried out with participation by our generals and officers and by representatives of GRAU (Chief Missile-Artillery Directorate).