


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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Basic Problems of Troop Control and Possible Ways of Resolving them



1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article consists of comments and elaboration upon a previous article, based on the authors' experience in the Volga Military District. The first part stresses the importance of improving and increasing the communications means with which units are equipped, and of standardizing the communications system. Other problems examined include the organization of control posts and control organs, and the need for mobile control posts. The second part explores various aspects of the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation, which in the author's opinion encompasses more than the allocation of tasks. This article appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962.



2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned




WILLIAM L. NELSON
Deputy Director for Operations



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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 13 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Late 1962

DATE
22 December 1975

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Basic Problems of Troop Control and Possible Ways of Resolving Them

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of the first part of this article is Colonel V. Lyadov and of the second part, Colonel G. Zubarev. This article consists of comments and elaboration upon a previous article, based on the authors' experience in the Volga Military District. The first part stresses the importance of improving and increasing the communications means with which units are equipped, and of standardizing the communications system. Other problems examined include the organization of control posts and control organs, and the need for mobile control posts. The second part explores various aspects of the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation, which in the author's opinion encompasses more than the allocation of tasks.

End of Summary

Comment:

Colonel Zubarev published an article entitled "Troop Control in Modern Combat" in Voyenny Vestnik in 1971, and a book entitled "Cooperation in Battle Involving Forces of All Arms" (Military Publishing House) in 1965. There is no information in available reference materials which can be firmly associated with Colonel Lyadov.

The article to which it refers was [redacted] with the same title. After 1962 the ~~SECRET~~ version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Basic Problems of Troop Control and Possible Ways of Resolving Them*

by
Colonel V. Lyadov
and
Colonel G. Zubarev

Recently our military press has begun to devote more attention to the problems of troop control, and this can only be welcomed. For a long time it has been necessary to decisively improve troop control at all levels and to bring troop control in line with the demands made of it by the present-day level of development of the armed forces and the nature of troop combat actions.

In our opinion, the article by General-Mayor V. Yanov and Colonel P. Shemanskiy in general correctly sets forth the basic problems of troop control and several ways of resolving them. At the same time, there are a number of proposals in it with which we cannot agree.

As is known, methods of controlling the troops of formations and large units have undergone considerable changes in recent years. However, as the experience of command-staff exercises shows, they still are a long way from meeting the demands made of them. What is the reason for this?

The authors of the article consider the poor quality of staff work of some of the officers and their use of obsolete work methods one of the main causes of the shortcomings in control. They believe the other reasons to be the poor technical equipping of control organs and the fact that the structure of control organs does not fully conform to present-day requirements.

It would appear that the subjective factor, not the objective factor, is the principal cause of the shortcomings in troop control. Is this actually true? We do not intend to underestimate the role and importance of highly qualified staff officers at all levels or of their experience and work skills. On the contrary, we shall attempt to stress this role below. However, when analyzing the shortcomings of troop control, to attribute the greatest importance to this essentially subjective element is, in our opinion, incorrect.

*Comments on an article by General-Mayor V. Yanov and Colonel P. Shemanskiy, published in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 2 (63), 1962.





The experience of operational training shows that given the extremely limited capacity and operational reliability of the small number of communications means available, and given the existing structure of some control organs (in particular those in the interior districts), a high degree of efficiency and stability in troop control cannot be achieved, regardless of how highly qualified and trained the officers who staff the control organs are.


We believe that improving communications means should constitute the main course of action in resolving the problems of increasing the efficiency and stability of troop control.

With regard to modern communications means, particularly radio and radio-relay means, it must be pointed out that the trends established in the development of new radio equipment after World War II to a large extent also determine the level and degree to which the tasks confronting communications are fulfilled under modern conditions.

The majority of existing communications means were developed without regard for their use under conditions of the employment of means of mass destruction, of high rates of advance, and of large-scale operations. Consequently, in many of their indices they do not satisfy the new, higher demands now made of troop control.

Modern radio sets, which are the basic means of communications in a battle and operation, have inadequate power, are bulky, are serviced by a large crew, and require a large amount of time for setting up and radio traffic. Because there are many different types of radios, they are costly to produce, and the operation and repair of radio equipment is complicated. The majority of the communications means installed in motor vehicles have low mobility and little protection against destruction by modern weapons.

The modernization of communications means, principally of radio and radio-relay means, carried out in recent years on the basis of our country's technological growth, and the installation of communications means in transport with better cross-country capability have substantially improved the qualitative indices of communications means, but have not resulted in a basic improvement in our radio inventory. We fully agree with the authors of the article that the efforts of everyone working in this field should be directed toward overcoming the lag in equipping control organs with the newest communications means.






The development of new communications means is only one side of the matter. The other side is to have an adequate quantity of these means. At present the inventory of radio and radio-relay sets, particularly in interior districts, is so small that it cannot provide communications either on the scale of a large unit and unit, or on the scale of a district. The small number of communications means decreases the combat and mobilization readiness of units, large units, and formations.



The main course to take in developing a new radio inventory is to increase the operating range of the sets; this can be achieved by increasing the resistance of the radios to jamming, increasing the effectiveness of antennas, and by increasing the emissive power of transmitters to a useful level. Further reduction in the weight and size of radios, mechanization and automation of the setting up and dismantling of the antenna systems, automation of the tuning and retuning of radios to the required frequency, and the development and introduction of new and improved sources of power are acquiring great importance.

In our opinion, the most important requirement made of a prospective communications system should be that it be standardized not only for all branch arms but also for all branches of the armed Forces. This would create favorable conditions both for the achievement of stable communications of control and cooperation, and also, with the integrated automation of troop control, for the effective use of multichannel communications equipment.

Until our troops are completely reequipped with new communications equipment, the shortcomings of existing means to a certain extent can and must be compensated for not only by taking a number of organizational measures and more effectively using existing means, but also by employing so-called means of minor automation. However, it must be said that the introduction of means of minor automation is proceeding very slowly even though their great importance is recognized by all.

> Take even the simplest semi-automatic calculators. According to the experience of the Volga Military District, the employment of these calculators produces an exceptionally great effect. During one of the staff exercises, the operations department calculated the density and balance of forces in the army zone in five minutes on a semi-automatic keyboard calculator, whereas up to 35 minutes are spent in doing this without the calculator. During the same exercise the rear staff using a semi-automatic calculator calculated the amount of fuel the army needed for refueling in 2.5 hours; without the calculator it would take two officers





seven to eight hours to make this calculation. The trouble is that there are very few of these calculators in the headquarters of the district and none at all in the divisions.

As is known, the correct organization of control posts is of great importance in improving troop control. The experience of postwar troop and command-staff exercises makes it possible to draw certain conclusions as to the most desirable composition for army control posts.

During exercises, a command post, a forward command post, and a rear control post usually were set up.

At the command post were located the commander, the chief of staff, the chief of the political department, the chiefs of the operations and intelligence departments, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the chief of the air defense troops, the chief of the engineer troops, the chief of the chemical service, and the required number of other officers. In the absence of the commander the command post was headed by the chief of staff.


The personnel of the forward command post included two or three officers from the operations department; one or two officers from the staff of the rocket troops and artillery; one officer each from the intelligence department, the organization of the chief of the air defense troops and the organizations of the chiefs of the engineer and chemical services; and the deputy chief of the communications troops. The deputy chief of staff headed the forward command post.

The forward command post moved forward to the most important axis, deployed, and established communications with the large units. After this the army commander drove to it and assumed control. The command post then closed down and moved to the area of the location of the forward command post, which thus had become the command post, or assigned from its complement a group of officers with communications means and transport which moved to a new area and set up a forward command post in it.

This method of organizing control posts and of moving them, as experience has shown, has fully proven its value.

The high speeds of the combat actions of motorized rifle troops, and especially tank troops, have for a long time given rise to the problem of ensuring control during the march. In the near future control from fixed posts at the division-regiment level will be virtually precluded since both





the regiment commanders and the division commander are themselves on the move more than half the time in an offensive. The army commander must also be on the move a considerable part of the time, but for want of a mobile control post is compelled to direct the course of combat actions from the command post, and sometimes from the forward command post, which can be moved a total of only one or two times and three or four times per day, respectively.

The nature of a modern battle and operation dictates the necessity of organizing mobile control posts not only in the regiment and division, but also in the army. By a mobile control post we mean a collection of combat, command-staff, staff, and special vehicles equipped with means of communication and observation and with staff equipment, and intended to provide the formation (large unit) commander and staff with continuous troop control both when in place and when on the move under any conditions of the situation.

Commanders and staffs should be capable of quickly following troop battle formations, having for this purpose commander's and staff cross-country vehicles with protective armor. At present organic combat vehicles and transport means are used for mobile control posts, i.e. command tanks, BTR-50P, BTR-152, and BTR-40 armored personnel carriers, GAZ-69 light trucks, GAZ-63 and ZIL-151 sideboard trucks, and others. As a result of such a great diversity of transport means, control posts are overburdened, have low mobility and, consequently, present a good target for enemy nuclear strikes.

At the present time, several models of vehicles for mobile control posts have been developed from the basic GAZ-63 and GAZ-69 trucks and the BTR-50P armored personnel carrier. Of these, only the BTR-50PU to some extent satisfies the demands made on it; it, however, has a short overhaul interval and a high production cost.

We think that mobile control posts must have other vehicles in addition to BTR-50PU command-staff vehicles. Most suitable for these purposes are the armored reconnaissance patrol vehicle and the wheeled amphibious armored personnel carrier which, incidentally, are called for by the equipment table of a motorized rifle division.

A mobile control post located in vehicles of this type and provided with the necessary communications means will be able to promptly follow the advancing troops and provide control when stationary, but primarily when on the move.



We consider it advisable that each motorized rifle and tank division, and also the army have an organic mobile control post: the division control post should comprise five to seven officers of the branch arms and services, seven or eight armored reconnaissance patrol vehicles and BTR-50PU command-staff vehicles, and one or two command tanks; the army control post should include 10 to 12 officers of the branch arms and services, 12 to 14 armored reconnaissance patrol vehicles and BTR-50PU's, and two or three command tanks.

The efficiency of command post work to a large extent depends on the grouping of the personnel assigned to it. This grouping must ensure the efficient allocation of functional duties on the one hand, and the swift collection of information on the situation and its timely reporting at the command post on the other hand. The authors of the article being examined present a variant of the breakdown of assigned personnel at a control post by groups. We wish to present an example of how groups are set up at a control post, based on the experience of the staff exercise held in the Volga Military District in 1962. In this exercise no groups other than the command group were set up. However, in the operations department the following groups were designated: planning - five persons; reporting - three persons; axis officers - 11 persons; forecasting and evaluation of radiation conditions - four persons.

The colocation of the axis officers and reporting group and the availability of loudspeaker communications at the command post ensured timely reporting on the situation as well as the rapid collection of data on it. The planning group was located separately, but it cooperated with the chiefs of the branch arms and services during the preparation of proposals relating to the decision.

The last question on which we would like to dwell is the organizational structure of control organs.

The condition in which the majority of control organs at the tactical level and, especially, at the operational level function during peacetime is such that unless additional officers are assigned and the structure of the control organs is altered, they are incapable of assuming control of the troops in the event military actions begin.

The experience of operational and combat training, especially command-staff exercises, shows that it is difficult for some control organs with their existing T/O to handle not only the entire complex of problems relating to planning, preparing, and supporting operations during



operational exercises, but even the planning and support of measures for the combat training of troops and the operational-tactical training of officers and staffs.

The practice of assigning to operational command-staff exercises officers comprising the main departments and directorates of other military chains of command, not to mention reserve officers attached in accordance with the mobilization plan, shows that not all officers are adequately trained to fulfil their functional duties at the operational formation level. This factor adversely affects the cohesiveness not only of directorates and departments, but also of the entire field headquarters as a whole.

We agree with the authors of the article that the structure of control organs should be altered. We also consider it necessary to revise the T/O's of a number of control organs. Only if this is done will they be capable of immediately, without any reorganization, implementing firm troop control at the beginning of military actions.

* * *


Extremely urgent problems are raised in the article by General-Mayor V. Yanov and Colonel P. Shemanskiy. It is quite obvious that they must be further explored and discussed as well as checked during exercises with troops.

In our opinion, the authors have not fully defined the control problems raised in the article. Take just the first problem, which the authors define as that of "sharply increasing the efficiency of the work of commanders and staffs of all levels when commanding troops under combat conditions, and especially when collecting and analyzing data on the situation, making a decision, and transmitting the combat tasks to the executors". The content of this problem omits one of the basic issues -- the organization and maintenance of the continuous cooperation of troops.

The importance of troop cooperation to the successful achievement of the goals of a modern battle and operation is well known. One of the principal troop control measures taken by commanders and staffs of all types is the organization and maintenance of cooperation.

The presentation in the article of the problems of the organization and implementation of cooperation is one-sided -- from the point of view only of saving time, without adequately taking into account the essence of





cooperation of troops under modern conditions.


In the opinion of the authors, the proposed new organization of units and large units, which gives them the capability to perform any tasks without additional reinforcement by other troops, practically makes the organization of cooperation unnecessary. They claim that to achieve continuity of cooperation, all that is necessary is for the commander to efficiently assign combat tasks to subordinates, and for the staff to ensure reliable communications and to establish cooperation signals and strict monitoring of the accurate performance of these tasks.

The authors are correct in stating that organizing units and large units so that they do not require additional reinforcement by other troops considerably facilitates the organization of cooperation in these units and large units, and that under certain conditions the organization of cooperation may be reduced to merely assigning combat tasks to subordinates without the commander and staff giving additional instructions relating to cooperation. But, we repeat, this is true only under certain conditions.

To organize troop cooperation means: based on the overall objective of the actions of the large unit or formation, taking into consideration the tasks being carried out by the forces and means of senior chiefs and considering possible enemy actions, to assign troops specific tasks aimed at the destruction of the enemy by lines, targets, axes, and time; and, second, to precisely define the place and sequence for the actions of each large unit and formation in the overall plan of the battle or operation. Regardless of what methods are used to organize cooperation, in all cases this organization should rest on certain principles. The following may be regarded as among the most important principles for the organization and maintenance of cooperation.

First, cooperation should be organized to support troops carrying out the main tasks, by lines (targets) and time. It should reflect the step-by-step accomplishment by the troops of the overall combat task, since the modern battle and particularly the modern operation are not limited to one strike. Troop actions will be dispersed in depth, and the destruction of an enemy with a deeply echeloned defense will be achieved by carrying out a number of specific tasks. The troops will have to change the axes of strikes, bring up fire means, move control posts, resubordinate forces and means, and commit the second echelons and reserves in order to intensify efforts. All these actions must be coordinated by goal, place and time.





Second, the organization of cooperation must be based on the maximum and decisive exploitation by the troops of the results of the employment of nuclear weapons against the enemy.

Third, cooperation should be built upon the maximum utilization of the strong aspects of the branch arms and special troops, the conditions of the terrain, and the time of the year and day; and on a calculation of the strong and weak points of the enemy defense.


Fourth, cooperation should be organized to provide for mutual aid and the interchangeability of cooperating troops when carrying out an assigned combat task.


Fifth, troop cooperation should be continuous. Even a brief disruption of it reduces the impact of a strike against the enemy, brings about disorganization in troop actions, reduces the pace of combat actions, and gives the enemy an opportunity to take decisive countermeasures aimed at preventing the accomplishment of the tasks.

Only if these most important principles of cooperation are observed can the successful fulfilment of the assigned combat task be ensured. It is not difficult to perceive that it will not always be possible to limit the organization of cooperation to the assignment of combat tasks alone. Obviously, the commander must give brief, precise instructions on cooperation immediately after the combat order is issued. True, with some commanders these instructions on cooperation turn into a repetition of the combat tasks, a duplication of the combat order, an "amplification" of its contents. But this is just their personal shortcoming. Instructions on cooperation should reflect the coordination of troop actions by lines, targets, and time, ensuring the step-by-step performance of the assigned combat task.

In our opinion, the article underestimates the experience of the work of commanders in organizing cooperation during the last war. The authors bluntly state that this work was "protracted and tedious".

Indeed, during the last war work relating to the organization of cooperation took up a large portion of the time allotted to preparation for a battle and operation. But then this was justified, on the one hand, by the strict centralization of control and by the situation, particularly by the amount of time allotted to the organization of a battle, and on the other hand -- by the state of personal training of command personnel.





It is known that during the war years young command cadres without adequate experience were promoted to command positions. Consequently, to inculcate in them skills in organizing complex combat actions, senior chiefs, besides assigning combat tasks, were forced to show subordinates the best procedure and methods for carrying them out. This work to educate command cadres was not tedious but highly creative, and it made it possible to carry out combat tasks successfully with fewer losses. This work was, and is now, "tedious" only when it was or is not known how to carry it out.

We must not forget the rich experience amassed during the last war but, on the contrary, we must improve upon it in conformity with modern conditions, keeping in mind that a future war will be even more complex. During such a war, because of the considerable fluctuation of command personnel, officers who do not have adequate experience in organizing a modern battle may be appointed to command positions, and organizational skills will have to be inculcated in them as well.

The authors of the article conclude by recommending that a special manual on troop control be published. We cannot agree with this proposal. The forms and methods of the work of commanders and staffs are so diverse that they can hardly be considered in a single manual. New field service regulations, which should set forth the basic principles of the troop control work of commanders and staffs, and should reflect a uniform interpretation of the theoretical bases of troop control essential to them in their practical activities, must be published as soon as possible.

