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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Radio Counter-  
measures in Ground Troops' Operations", by  
Engineer Colonel V. Seroshtan and Lieutenant-  
Colonel G. Terekhov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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*Richard Helms*

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: DEC 2004

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Radio Countermeasures in Ground Troops Operations" by Engineer Colonel V. Seroshtan and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Terekhov

DATE OF INFO: August 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Radio Countermeasures in Ground Troops Operations", which was written by Engineer Colonel V. Seroshtan and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Terekhov.

This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue 5 (60) was sent to press on 25 August 1961. [REDACTED] contained the Table of Contents for this issue.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE

Radio Countermeasures in Ground Troops' Operations

by

Engineer Colonel V. Seroshtan

and

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Terekhov

Colonel A. Ovchinnikov's article,\* in which the more important problems relating to the organization of radio countermeasures in ground troops' operations are examined, is, in our opinion, of interest for all officers of operational staffs.

In it are quite correctly disclosed the shortcomings delaying further development of radio countermeasures, and a number of useful recommendations to improve planning and organization of radio countermeasures in modern operations are substantiated.

However, certain of the author's proposals do evoke objections.

The author, for example, thinks that it is necessary to jam all of the enemy's radiotechnical equipment, no matter what part they play in the overall radiotechnical system.

We consider that the forces and equipment used in radio countermeasures should, as a rule, be brought to bear suddenly and massively, on the main axes and at the decisive periods of operations. It is known, moreover, that effective radio countermeasures are achieved only when brought to bear on the enemy's radiotechnical means in close coordination with the overall concept of the operation and assuming the troops execute their main combat tasks.

\* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. I (56), 1961

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If, as Comrade Ovchinnikov recommends, we attempt, prior to the beginning of an operation, to neutralize by radio jamming the work of those radiotechnical resources of the enemy which have been discovered, then the cardinal requirement of radio countermeasures, surprise, will not be satisfied. Therefore, in our view, radio jamming against individual -- even, at first glance, important -- radiotechnical equipment of the enemy should not be carried out before the beginning of an operation. During this period it is necessary to confine activity to intercept and analysis of intelligence information (razveddannyye); only in exceptional cases, when it is determined that the enemy is preparing a blow against our troops, should radio jamming capabilities be used to neutralize his control system for nuclear/missile weapons and aviation.

In examining the principle of the use of radio countermeasures forces and equipment, the author comes to the conclusion that the coordinated functioning of all forces and equipment can be achieved only through strict centralization of radio countermeasures control at the front level.

However, it is not clear why Comrade Ovchinnikov proposes to centralize control and to subordinate to a single radio countermeasures organ of a front only those special designation (spetsnaz) units which are assigned to create radio jamming of the radio communications equipment of ground troops. It seems to us that such a proposal does not adequately assure the solution of this important problem.

It is known that for the control of his troops and combat means the enemy makes coordinated use of various radiotechnical equipment such as radio and radio-relay communications, radar, radionavigation, radio remote control equipment, etc. Naturally, the neutralization of one of the enumerated elements will not assure the disruption of the entire system.

When the fact is considered that the operation of

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radioelectronic equipment: is always limited in time, then it will be quite obvious that there will be no time to coordinate the efforts of the forces and equipment which are subordinated to the various commanders of arms of troops. Furthermore, the commanders of communications troops and antiair defense troops will not be able to exercise direct control over the combat work of special designation units because of the unique nature of their tasks.

The above is confirmed by the experience of a number of exercises. For example, at the command-staff exercise carried out in 1960, a special group was created in the Communications Directorate of the Don Front to carry out planning and control of special designation radio units. Overall radio countermeasures planning was carried out by the 9th Department of the staff, under the direct control of the chief of staff of the front. On the basis of the overall plan, the special group of the Communications Directorate of the front drew up a separate plan for jamming radio communications equipment, which, strictly speaking, duplicated the overall radio countermeasures plan.

We feel there is no need for such duplication.

Precisely the same situation is created in the planning of radio countermeasures by the chief of antiair defense troops.

Experience shows that all direction and control by the commanders of the arms of troops over special designation units is confined to drafting individual plans and issuing combat orders.

During the exercise cited above, special designation battalions failed to receive timely information about the operational situation, and had no specific instructions for combat reconnaissance and neutralization of the enemy's radio communications. Moreover, coordination with separate designation units was organized in a formalistic manner, which did not permit effective utilization of radio jamming equipment during the entire course of the exercise.

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The special group created in the Communications Directorate was unable to ensure operational control over special designation units for quite a number of reasons. One of them was the fact that the special group found itself in the situation of a useless, redundant organ which failed to receive any information about the operational situation or about newly fixed radio technical equipment, since this would have increased the already complex system of coordination and information.

But this was not the basic reason. The main task of a communications troops chief is to assure uninterrupted communications for his troops. Neutralization of radio communications by jamming is, strictly speaking, a form of combat with the enemy, and naturally does not, under any circumstances enter into the province of a chief of communications troops. As a result, the creation of radio jamming of the enemy took on secondary importance, the detached special group was diverted to other assignments unconnected with jamming, no one actually directed the special designation units and they failed to fulfil their assignments.

Under combat conditions, such a situation can lead to serious consequences.

At the present time, special designation units assigned to the jamming of the radiotechnical apparatus of the enemy's air attack means are entirely subordinate to the chief of PVO troops of a military district.

It is evident that these units can only fulfil limited assignments, constituting only one element in the overall complex of radio countermeasures activity. They are capable of jamming 3cm wave band radar bombsights, ultra shortwave communications between aircraft (UKV radiosvyaz "bort-bort") and the receiving sets of short-range radionavigational systems on board aircraft or pilotless means of air attack.

But these are only isolated links of the overall radio-technical systems used by the enemy for control of his aircraft and pilotless means. Special designation units sub-

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ordinate to a communications troops chief must neutralize other, often more important, links in the overall chain.

Thus, in order to deny the enemy the use of his entire complex of radiotechnical systems, it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of special designation units who are subordinate to the chiefs of the different arms of troops. But usually a lot of time is spent on coordination, and further coordination is required between the commanders of troops of communications and PVO, the chief of the intelligence directorate, etc.

Therefore, we envisage that when the enemy's radio-technical system operates on a strictly limited time basis, it can be effectively neutralized only when all radio countermeasures equipment is subordinate to a single control organ. The currently existing fragmentation of radio countermeasures forces and equipment almost entirely excludes a solution to the pressing problems of automating the planning and control of forces and equipment which can no longer be permitted.

When radio and radiotechnical units of special designation have been subordinated to a single organ for planning problems as well as for control over all radio countermeasures forces and equipment, then we can solve even in peacetime a number of pressing problems pertaining to combat preparation, tables of organization of units, improvement of the control system for special designation units in an operation, resolve more competently the problems of their combat utilization, and, finally, radically improve the training of officer specialists in radio countermeasures.

In our opinion, it would be expedient to launch in the press a broad discussion of the problems touched on in Colonel Ovchinnikov's article, with participation by the chiefs of communications and PVO troops of the military districts. This will permit development of a unified viewpoint on the organization of combat with the enemy's radio-technical equipment, which acquires special significance under contemporary conditions.

