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5 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY NEWS: "Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel M. Masterov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the Soviet Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal Military News (Voyenny Vestnik). This publication is classified SECRET by the Soviets, and the issue in which this article appeared was distributed to officers from regimental commander upward.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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cc: Military Representative of the President

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National Security Affairs

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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: MILITARY NEWS: "Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel M. Masterov

DATE OF INFO: January 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Documentary

SOURCE: A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel M. Masterov. This article appeared in Issue No. 34, 1961, of the Soviet military publication Collection of Articles of the Journal Military News (Voyenny Vestnik.) This publication is classified **SECRET** by the Soviets and is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

According to the Preface, Issue No. 34 was sent for typesetting on 14 December 1960 and released to the printer on 25 January 1961. The Preface states that articles express the opinions of their authors and are published as a form of discussion. Distribution of Issue No. 34 was to officers from regimental commander upward.

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Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction

by

Engineer Colonel M. Masterov

In the last phase of the engagement, at the time of the battle of Stalingrad in World War II, the headquarters of the 6th German Army tried to establish direct radio contact with Field Marshal Manstein's grouping. For a long time, the radio station of the headquarters of the 6th Army called a collaborating station (vzaimodeystvuyushchiy korrespondent) to make contact, but could not get a reply. Then our radio intelligence personnel (radiatorazvedchik), posing as the station being called, established a two-way link with the radio station of the headquarters of the 6th Army and during the course of 24 hours received 16 messages from it amounting to over 1500 groups.

Other instances of radio deception (dezinformatsiya) are also well known, but they were isolated, and on the whole, contributed little to the disorganization of the enemy's ability to control and coordinate.

In the postwar period, ever-increasing importance is attached to radio deception. For example, in the strategic command-staff exercise in 1959, the headquarters of one of the fronts allotted 10 organic (tabelnyy) shortwave radio sets of medium power and 12 radio-jamming sets in the shortwave band for radio deception and radio-jamming. During the course of the exercise, when the attacking "Eastern" army was conducting battles to liquidate a bridge-head on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River, the "West" unexpectedly employed massed radio-jamming of the main army radio networks and of two-station links (radionapravleniye). While the "East" was trying to reestablish its interrupted radio communications, the

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"West", carrying out radio deception, made contact with the "enemy". In the most tense period of the operation they transmitted up to 90 training cipher messages (uchebnyaya shifrogramma) amounting to more than 5000 groups, as a result of which they misled the "enemy's" radio stations for about 100 hours.

Another example. On an aviation exercise in the Carpathian Military District in 1958, false commands were transmitted to fighter aircraft in order to deceive the "enemy" bombers. The objective was attained: the "enemy" bombers took appropriate countermeasures (cover, maneuver etc.) according to the false commands they had intercepted.

Radio deception is effective if it is practiced unexpectedly on the enemy in critical periods of a battle or an operation, when the enemy's radio and radio relay communications are loaded to maximum capacity with operational conversations or with the interchange of cipher messages, and especially when there is loss of radio contact between headquarters and control points.

It is possible to enter into communications with enemy radio stations under the guise of a main, subordinate, or neighboring radio station.

It is advisable to employ the first two methods primarily in command and headquarters radio networks and the third in collaborating radio networks. In headquarters and command radio networks and two-station links, contact is made on the principle of the subordination of radio stations of the lower headquarters to the higher (main radio stations). Collaborating radio communication is conducted either by special radio networks or by collaborating units and large units entering into communications with adjacent headquarters radio networks.

It is most convenient to enter into communications under the guise of a main radio station when it appears that as a result of moving, defective equipment, or inattention of the crew (team)

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or the duty shift, it does not answer the repeated calls of subordinate stations

It is most advisable to enter into communications under the guise of a subordinate radio station at those times when the subordinate radio stations, for any reason, do not answer the calls of the main radio station of the radio network (two-station link).

When trying to enter into communications under the guise of a neighboring radio station, one should distinguish the principles of organization of the radio networks. If the enemy's collaborating radio networks are organized on receiver wavelengths when each headquarters has its own individual and rigidly fixed frequencies and callsigns, then by having complete data on such radio networks one can make contact without particular difficulty with any of them. But if collaborating radio networks are working on general frequencies, then as in the first two instances, it is most advisable to make use of unstable contact or the loss of contact between collaborating stations.

If communications between the stations of an enemy radio network (two-station links) are stable, radio deception is not advisable, for the enemy can immediately detect an "outsider" station and take appropriate measures for the protection of his radio network.

During the course of working with the enemy, such measures may be recommended as, for example, requesting a repeat of cipher messages transmitted earlier to the actual stations, the transmission of long cipher messages (code messages) to the enemy with correct addressees, assigning long breaks in communications to enemy radio stations (assigning hours of operation), and others.

Radio equipment assuring dependable communications with enemy radio stations are selected for radio deception. It is very important that the characteristics of emission of the sets selected should correspond to the characteristics of enemy radio sets. Any deviation from the accepted form of transmission, alteration in the stability of frequency, tone, and other technical characteristics may give away

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the deception. No less important is the training of the operators. It is clear that only radio operators of the highest grade, completely conversant with the rules of the enemy army's radio traffic, must be allowed to do this work.

The fundamental principles of employing radio deception are surprise and concentrating it in the most crucial periods of a battle (operation) and in the most important enemy radio networks (two-station links).

The surprise factor has great importance. As experience shows, it is advisable to employ various methods of radio deception simultaneously with radio-jamming.

By the term concentration one should understand the simultaneous putting into action of all forces and equipment allotted for radio deception. At the same time their efforts must be aimed at disorganizing radio communications in specific large units. It is not advisable to dissipate resources among radio networks of large units. It is essential to concentrate the main efforts on the disruption of those radio networks and two-station links, the frustration of whose work materially affects the control and coordination of the enemy groupings that are most important at a given moment. Let us note that it is advisable to make use of moments when the control of enemy troops is based mainly on radio communications not duplicated by other means.

For organizing and carrying out effective radio deception, it is important to have full data about the enemy's radio system, to know which of his radio stations belong to one or another radio network, the list of frequencies and call signs being used, the procedure for their change, the system of addressing and identification (parolirovaniye).

Radio deception is a difficult and complex matter. It is an art of its own which consists in the ability to deceive an experienced enemy, and it is necessary to master it in peacetime.