





# Intelligence Information Report



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HR70-14

COUNTRY

Warsaw Pact/USSR

SUBJECT

Armaments Planning Within the Framework of the Warsaw Pact


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
Summary: The following report is a detailed account of the institutions and procedures established since 1969 for planning armaments acquisition for the Combined Armed Forces. It provides information on the workings of the Warsaw Pact Technical Committee, the CEMA Permanent Commission for Defense Industry, Combined Armed Forces representatives stationed with the national Armies, and other organizations and personnel involved in the acquisition planning process. A primary theme of the source's reporting is Soviet manipulation of these mechanisms to further Soviet economic, political, and military goals.



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
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
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
Diagram of Warsaw Pact Defense (Armament) Planning

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Since the conclusion of WWII, the subject of armaments has become a focal point in international relations, particularly between East and West. While declaring a policy of "peace and disarmament," since the end of WWII the Soviet Union has maintained its military potential at a dangerously high level greatly exceeding the actual defense needs of the USSR. It has continued to modernize, expand and improve that potential. The other member states of the Warsaw Pact (WP), dominated by the Soviets, are obliged to follow the same course. Despite the severe economic difficulties of these countries, the armaments mechanism operates with unquestionable effectiveness, without public discord among its members, the Romanian deviation being the only exception.<sup>1</sup> The only evidence of friction is provided by the data from Western intelligence services.

How is this mechanism organized and how does it work? Who in reality decides about armaments of the WP member states? Who executes the decisions, and what are the related processes? How deeply does Soviet influence affect the military preparations of the individual member states of the WP? What is the real role of the national leadership (executive and legislative organs) of the states allied to the USSR? Are there among the WP states dissenting views with regard to armaments? What is the nature of that dissent? To which policies does it apply? Does the defense budget cover all outlays for war preparedness? What is the nature of Soviet assistance and what in return are the obligations of the allied states on behalf of common defense? Finally, how are research and development, production, mutual arms deliveries, maintenance and repair of military equipment coordinated?

This report will deal with these questions by describing Poland's economic defense planning process within the framework of WP agreements, as well as the procedures and the most important objectives set forth in plans for 1981-85. A broad


<sup>1</sup> Since the mid-1970s, Romanian presence in the integrated WP military structure has been a mere formality, and its effect on the overall strength of the WP forces has been insignificant.

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and objective treatment of WP armaments planning is intended in order to assist the analysis of the economics of the military capacity of this political-military grouping of nations.

In order to present a complete and accurate picture, it is necessary to explain that there are no legal documents in existence regulating these WP activities in a comprehensive manner. There are no detailed studies of overall WP armament planning; for example, Polish drafts of planning instructions pertain only to the Polish system, and therefore, provide only fragmentary information and do not depict the broad background or show relations and interdependence among the WP states. This distorts the picture of the whole process for Polish planners, and the resulting ambiguities cause frequent misunderstandings among them.

The best example of such a misunderstanding is a deal between the Soviets and the Poles, well known in Poland (or as well as it can be in a state where defense matters are subject to the strictest security regulations and total censorship), which involved the antiaircraft missiles DVINA and VOLKHOV. These missiles, despite many modifications, were already obsolescent by the mid-1970s. Knowing this, the Polish National Air Defense Forces deliberately postponed stockpiling full war reserves of them. However, in 1976 air defense units, particularly lower echelon units, unexpectedly began to receive full allocations of these missiles, a total of approximately 1000 systems. Complaints by unit commanders that higher headquarters were wasting money and that the receiving units had no appropriate storage facilities for the missiles went unanswered. The revelation by the Soviets in 1979 that the DVINA and VOLKHOV systems, including new missiles, would be replaced in the WP forces by VOLKHOV-M and NEVA systems by no later than 1985 caused a major sensation, particularly since it was known that in their own forces the Soviets in the near future planned to replace VOLKHOV-M and NEVA systems with an even newer generation of antiaircraft missiles. The air defense commanders were outraged. However, in a Communist system, outrage against superior authority, even though fully justified as in this case, can be expressed only in a constructive manner. Therefore, after some "irresponsible" statements, the argument boiled down only to the question of keeping or not keeping DVINA, if for no other justification than because there were so many missiles on hand for that

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system. Nevertheless, the death sentence for DVINA was irrevocable. Those who fervently presented their technical-economic-combat data defending advisability of retaining this weapon in the armament of the National Air Defense Forces until at least 1987-88, could not understand the basis for the decision by the principal planners of armaments of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF)--the PAF General Staff.

The reason they could not understand it was because they did not and could not know the basic fact that the PAF General Staff, the Ministry of National Defense and even the Party constitute merely one cog in the armaments mechanism of the Soviet Union. The working of such cogs depends not so much on their own energy as on the resistance they can exert against the forces which move them.

The missile incident of the air defense forces was not an isolated occurrence. Practically all the branches of the armed forces have experienced similar deals on a greater or lesser scale. Over the years one frequently met people who wore the same uniforms and spoke the same language yet who viewed the same nagging problems from an entirely different point of view--the Soviet versus the PAF point of view.

Thus the WP armaments mechanism is not easy to understand even for those who are its organic members. Correct reading and interpretation of this mechanism from a distance in the West is complicated still further when Western ethical-moral norms and models are used in the analytical process. Keeping this in mind, this study specifically focuses on explaining the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact system and its effectiveness in armaments planning and acquisition.

Two closely related factors, both of which conflict with national interests, determine participation of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) in Soviet armaments acquisition: the limited sovereignty of Poland and her totalitarian internal system. Both of these factors are organic to the creation of "real socialism."


The vanguards of the Communist political order crossed Polish borders with Soviet troops on several occasions: in 1920, 1939 and 1944. The population rejected them every time as threats to Polish independence, as being foreign to Polish

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tradition, culture and mentality. The aborted concept of the "Polish Soviet Republic," which was the result of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, survived less than a month, exactly the length of time the Red Army under Tukhachevskiy was capable of holding eastern territories of Poland by means of combat operations.


Sovietization of Polish territories occupied by the USSR since September 1939 was thwarted by the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR and the initial success of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front. It was only the new European order established by the allies at the end of WWII that again gave the Soviet Union the freedom to impose upon Poland a new regime--one which denied the population the right to make unrestrained decisions about its own destiny, and granted the Communist authorities and the party-state elite the role of guardian over the Soviet political system transplanted on Polish soil, and of spokesman for Soviet interests. The process begun in 1944 of simulating Soviet patterns in Poland continues to this date. Although there is only the slightest chance that producing a true replica will even be possible, Poland already is a fully subjugated country, sharing common political features with the Soviet Union. The year 1949 is generally considered the turning point. By that year, the final armed resistance of the population was broken and all forms of open opposition were eliminated. Also, at that time basic political, social and economic unifications were carried out between Poland and the USSR. Political unification became particularly evident when Polish authorities declined participation in the Marshall Plan in July 1947, when the Cominform was created in September 1947, when Yugoslavia was jointly condemned in June 1948, and finally when the Iron Curtain was drawn, isolating the Soviet Bloc from the influence of the West.

Inside Poland, following the Soviet example, some social organizations and political parties were denied legalization (e.g. the National Party), and others were gradually eliminated (e.g. the Labor Party, the Polish Peasant Party). In 1948, activists of the Polish Socialist Party, which had existed since the turn of the century, were tried and sentenced to longterm imprisonment, effectively eliminating that party. Officially, this political unification took place at the Unity Congress (15-21 December 1948) where the Polish Labor Party and Polish Socialist Party were combined, forming one Marxist-

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Leninist type party, the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). This act conclusively closed the period of residual pluralism in the Polish leadership system, establishing in its place a one-party regime.

Changes in the economic system were initiated in 1944 and 1945 when heavy and light industries, banks, transport, communications and wholesale commerce were nationalized. In 1947, practically all private retail trade was eliminated, and the cooperative movement was centralized (thus eliminating its authenticity and independence). The only survivors from the free economy were small farms of up to 50 hectares (124 acres) of cultivated land.

In 1946 a central planning system was organized for the nationalized economy. That year the Central Planning Office prepared the first multi-year economic plan, the "Three-year Economic Reconstruction Plan for 1947-49". In April 1948 the Central Planning Office was dissolved because its economic concepts were too independent and incompatible with the policies of the Party. In its place, the State Economic Planning Commission was created to serve as the governmental organ for directing the Polish economy. The Planning Commission was staffed with Soviet advisors and specialists. In 1949, the "Six-year Plan for Economic Development and Construction of a Base for Socialism for 1950-55" was prepared on the model of Soviet economic concepts. The plan encompassed all fields of economic life, including national defense potential. Based on the multiyear central plan, an enormous system of derivative plans was created, classified according to the subject (general economic, ministries, branches, investments, employment, finance and others). All these plans were given the authority of directives, making them the principal policy instrument of a totalitarian state through which the unhindered authorities were able to shape the entire process of production, distribution, stockpiling and consumption, according to strategy guidelines formulated by

2 It is true that the activities of other political parties such as the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, and the Catholic Association were legalized. The condition for their continued existence, however, is acknowledgement that the PUWP will retain the "leading role."

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themselves.

In the field of armaments, transfer of Soviet economic concepts to Poland was particularly important. It should be kept in mind that--as in the case of the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s--economic development was based on three principal conditions: (1) to create heavy industry which would serve as the basis for other industries, and ensure the economic strength of the nation, creating prosperity for future generations; (2) give priority to the development of those branches of economy and infrastructure which were related to national defense because the new political system was threatened by capitalist surroundings; and (3) to fulfill under the leadership of USSR the international mission of the socialist states to save oppressed nations. All of this would demand dedication and sacrifices but for "real socialism," there was no other alternative.

Accordingly, the Polish economy was divided into two groups: A and B. Included in Group A were branches of the means of production, i.e. heavy industry and arms industry. Group B included branches of consumer goods. Group A was designated the priority group--a privileged group at the expense of Group B. Policies pertaining to investments, prices, supplies, labor and wages were formulated accordingly.


Although division of the economy into Groups A and B created favorable conditions for concentrating forces and means on selected sectors, at the same time this division became the primary cause of the glaring disproportions developing in the Polish economy. The Polish economic system was and still is capable of participating in the arms production system and of producing increasing numbers of sophisticated weapons and military equipment. However, this has only been possible at the expense of ensuring the population adequate food and other articles of mass consumption.

This state of affairs began to create dissatisfaction and social tensions as early as the 1950s. The first postwar mass protests against the system and inequality of relations with the Soviet Union took place in Poznan in June 1956. Subsequent Polish protests took place in December 1970 on the coast, and in June 1976 at Radom and Ursus. Each time the protests were brutally suppressed. In August 1980 the strongest postwar

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economic and social crisis yet developed, involving the entire nation and leading to the creation of the "Solidarity" labor union. Overcoming this crisis to the satisfaction of the will of the nation this time proved to be impossible.

One of the main reasons why Poland could not free itself from the Soviet grip during the 40 postwar years, and why the Polish national authority must first of all consider Soviet interests, is the emphasis placed by the Soviets on the concept of "common" rather than "national" defense. According to Soviet interpretation, the concept of "common defense" is very broad, in reality encompassing everything that serves the strategic objectives of the USSR. The result is the unlawful exclusion from the national jurisdiction of WP member states of crucial decisionmaking authority regarding their own armed forces and their national defense. National jurisdiction is reduced to a grotesque administrative and executive realm, and the state to a figurehead role, executing Moscow's decisions.


In Poland's case, the basis for this kind of interpretation of "common defense" was stated in the "Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration" concluded at the end of the war in April 1945 between the Provisional Polish Government (created in the USSR) and by the Soviet government. It was ironic for the Poles that while the Treaty was being signed, its provisions for "common defense" were already a reality decided upon long ago by the Soviets.

The structure and the mechanism of "common defense", formulated under conditions of absolute domination by the USSR, not only did not stop working at the conclusion of hostilities, but on the contrary became a primary instrument of control and direction of Polish internal and foreign policy, economy and defense for the benefit of Soviet objectives.

The presence of Soviet troops in Poland from 1944 to 1956 and the full control over Polish Armed Forces exercised by Soviet generals and officers played a particularly important role in formulating the structure and mechanisms of common defense.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Presence of Soviet troops in Poland was sanctioned by the Potsdam Treaty signed by the four victorious powers. However, staffing key positions in the PAF with Soviet cadre was accomplished by Polish communists of the "Polish Patriots Union," residing in the USSR, who "ask" Stalin for it.

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During the early postwar years all key positions--in the PAF--from Minister of National Defense through commander of arms of services and military district commander down to divisional and even sometimes regimental commander--were held without exception by Soviet generals and officers.


On 6 November 1949, on the basis of an "agreement" between the Polish and Soviet governments, Konstanty Rokossovskiy, Marshal of the Soviet Army, a Soviet citizen of Polish descent, was appointed to the post of the Polish Minister of National Defense replacing Michal Zymierski, Marshal of the Polish Army. Soon after, Rokossovskiy was made a marshal of the PAF and became a member of the Politburo of the PUPP Central Committee. In this privileged position, he formed together with his subordinates an open delegacy of the Soviet Stavka. Thus he not only created the power supporting the new Polish authorities, but also had a hand in shaping Poland's defense policy. As a result, Poland's first armament efforts were based on Soviet solutions and system models. Among other things, this meant raising the achievement of broadly defined defense capabilities to the highest level of national priority, exempting this priority from discussion in the public forum, imposing a law obliging all organs of authority and national administration, state institutions and enterprises, collective organizations and individual citizens to render services on behalf of this defense, and protecting the security of everything related to it. Derived from this obligation was the unofficial principle of secret discretionary drawing of funds from almost all sectors of the national social-economic plan for the war preparedness of the state. Under these conditions, despite enormous damage and losses (over 6 million human lives and 60 percent of national wealth lost) Poland was one of the few countries in Europe which not only did not lower the manpower strength of its armed forces but automatically raised it to over a half million during the time of the Korean War. From almost the very first postwar days these forces participated in liquidation efforts directed against resistance movements in Poland, at the same time adapting their organizational structure and weapons to new missions.

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In 1945 military districts were organized, the PAF Main Staff was renamed the General Staff of the Polish People's Army, and the Internal Security Corps, Navy, and Border Guards were formed. To the extent heavier weapons became available infantry units were reorganized into armored and mechanized units. Military schooling was greatly expanded. In 1952, the Antiaircraft Defense Troops were created, later redesignated as National Air Defense Forces. In the Ground Forces, armored and mechanized corps and breakthrough artillery divisions were activated. In 1953 an anti-landing corps was organized which stalled construction of coastal fortifications on the coast of the Baltic Sea. In the PAF strict ideological indoctrination was introduced. Political education activities became the most important ones during which all other activities in a unit came to a standstill. Old traditions, including military uniforms, were eliminated, and Russian close order drill was adapted.

Timid attempts to regain independence or to create a limited basis for national defense by accepting the prewar officer cadre into military service ended in failure and repressions.

Beginning in 1948, systematic purges were carried out in the ranks of the PAF which removed all individuals suspected of unfavorable attitudes towards the USSR or distaste for political changes in Poland. Many officers were imprisoned. During 1951-53, many generals and higher rank officers of the General Staff, Navy and Air Force were tried for alleged involvement in preparations for a coup d'etat in 1947-48. Many were convicted, and among them 19 were sentenced to death and executed.

During this time, subordination of the PAF to the Polish national government and PAF authority concerning the entire complex of problems related to national defense were only theoretical. In reality, the Polish Armed Forces were subordinate to Moscow. This was particularly apparent during the first major social-political crisis in 1956 when PAF units commanded by Soviet generals and Soviet Armed Forces units were used not only to prevent the population from demonstrating but also against personnel changes at the highest level of the Polish party-state hierarchy not approved by Moscow. The resoluteness of the Polish population on one hand, and uncertainty about how PAF units would behave in eventual

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confrontation on the other, compelled the USSR to make concessions, including removal of the most irritating aspects limiting Polish sovereignty.<sup>4</sup> In October 1956, Moscow reluctantly approved the new PUWP leadership of Gomulka, and silently agreed to certain deviations of the "Polish road to socialism," especially the departure from the unrealistic plan of compulsory collectivisation of farms and limited economic reforms.

On 17 December 1956 the governments of the PPR and the USSR signed an "Agreement on the Legal Status of Soviet Forces Temporarily Stationed in Poland." Although the title of the agreement stated that stationing of Soviet troops in Poland would be temporary, the length of time was not specified. Also not specified was the term of validity of the agreement. Article 1 of the agreement stated, for the first time in postwar history, that stationing of Soviet troops in Poland could not infringe on the sovereignty of the Polish state, and that these troops could not interfere in the internal affairs of the PPR. The number of Soviet troops was established (approximately 42,000) and the limits of their areas of disposition, training and exercising were defined. The commander of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces was to inform the Polish Minister of National Defense about any changes in the status of these forces, and to coordinate with the PAF General Staff any Soviet troop movement outside of the designated areas.

In January 1957, Rokossovskiy and his entire staff, except Colonel General Bordzilovskiy, were recalled to USSR. Bordzilovskiy, the chief of the PAF General Staff, a Soviet citizen of Polish origin, remained in his position until 1968.

The departure of the Soviet officers appeared to have

<sup>4</sup> Many elements of the armed forces, particularly the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, Internal Troops, naval and military academies sympathized with the civilian population. Military resolutions demanded establishment of Polish-Soviet relations on "principles of total equality and sovereignty," and the "creation of appropriate conditions for unrestricted development of Polish military thought" was postulated.

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closed a phase of open Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Poland and direct control over matters related to Polish defense. The Poles experienced a sense of freedom with new hopes for the future. Only the national authorities, dependent on Soviet support and conscious of the limitations of the system they represented, failed to see certain vital opportunities to regain national independence.

The climate of thaw with the West of the 1950s (15 May 1955--peace treaty with Austria, 17-23 July 1955--first meeting since Potsdam of the leaders of the four powers in Geneva in which Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure participated), and the internal situation created by Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th CPSU Congress of the so called "errors and distortions" of the Stalin cult era, favored the USSR's granting Poland certain external aspects of sovereignty. There is no doubt, however, that the decisive factor was the establishment a year earlier on 14 May 1955 of the Warsaw Pact, through which as the entire history of Warsaw Pact shows, the USSR achieved its goal of subordinating Poland by more sophisticated methods. However, the process was not automatic and for the Soviet leadership the problems were not simple.

In the beginning, the Warsaw Pact was more of a political retort or a declaration of assertiveness vis-a-vis the Paris Pacts of 1945, rather than an organization of a predetermined structure and closely defined principles of operation giving the Soviet Union some special powers. On the contrary, certain decisions of the Warsaw Pact appeared to suggest that each member state would be treated as a member with full rights under the Pact and simultaneously as a separate entity respected by international law, which in specific situations (according to the provisions of the Pact) would alone decide whether or not it would render assistance to other states and alone would choose the means necessary for that purpose.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Article IV of the Warsaw Pact states: "In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states participating in the Treaty, by any state or group of states participating in the Treaty, each of the states participating in the Treaty will, by virtue of the right to individual or collective self-defense, in conformity with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, offer to the state or states subjected to the attack immediate assistance, individually or in

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The principle of equal rights appeared to be provided in a resolution, which stated that in the Political Consultative Committee (the highest consultative organ in the Pact) each state participating in the Pact would be represented by a member of the government or by a specially designated representative. Unfortunately, in practice, the Soviet Union never intended to take this resolution seriously. The first test of Soviet intentions was the creation of the Combined Command, based on Article V of the Pact. The Command was composed of USSR Marshal Ivan Konev, as Commander-in-Chief (CinC) (1955-1960),<sup>6</sup> and the deputy ministers of national defense of all member states as deputy CinCs. However, the hopes for a joint command evaporated rapidly when it was established that the role played by the deputies of the CinC would be mostly titular and their authority limited exclusively to their own national armies. The CAF Staff was formed on the same principles with regard to the positions of chief of staff and other responsible CAF positions. Soviet generals and officers were appointed. The authority of the national representatives and their staff officers assigned to CAF headquarters was also limited to their own armies. Nevertheless, at that time these matters provoked no objections. The WP member states were accustomed to the idea that overall command should rest in Soviet hands. In addition, the problem did not appear to be important because the 1955 Pact founding resolution did not deal at all with the authority of the Combined Command, its relationship to national commands, and under what conditions and on what principles what national forces would be placed at its disposal.

Gaps in the agreement on the Combined Command are particularly apparent when compared with the Soviets' concepts of their own strategic control of the coalition of WP member states. According to these concepts, the national systems of the member states should constitute integral components of the Soviet defense system directed by the Stavka. However, because it was difficult to insert the role of the Stavka into the

agreement with other states participating in the Treaty, with all the means which it considers necessary, including the use of armed forces."

<sup>6</sup> Subsequent CinCs were Soviet marshals: A. A. Grechko (1966-67), I. A. Yakubovskiy (1967-76) and since 1977 V. P. Kulikov.

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newly signed Pact, the Soviet concepts were implemented gradually and systematically without paying any attention to establishing a legal basis. In general, creation in 1955 of the Warsaw Pact in no way affected the authority of the Soviet Stavka. Using bilateral channels, the Soviet General Staff unofficially continued to assign, correct and update for each member state its wartime tasks and determine the national forces and means necessary to fulfill those tasks. War planning was left outside the authority of the WP organs. From the very beginning, the Combined Command unofficially assumed the functions of an executive command of Stavka, conveying to the forum of the PCC or directly to the party-state leadership of the individual member states, the wishes of the Soviet General Staff pertaining to expansion and troop assignments of the Combined Armed Forces, arms production and other services and obligations on behalf of the common defense.

The ambiguity of authority which the Soviets initially intended to use to their own advantage, in time began to have the opposite effect. Without official regulations and obligations and without the establishment of a system of control and reporting, it became progressively more difficult for the Soviets to exact higher outlays for arms and to control orderly expansion of the various national armed forces. Against this background, after persistent solicitations and pressures by the Soviets on 17 March 1969 (14 years after signing the WP Treaty) the PCC passed four important resolutions pertaining to the:

- Combined Armed Forces and their command organs in peacetime.
- Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) of the WP member states.
- Military Council (MC) of the CAF.
- Unified Air Defense System of the WP member states.


These resolutions, creating the impression of broader participation by all member states in decisionmaking processes, in reality were further steps towards subordinating the WP military structure to the exclusive control of the USSR. As a result of firm objections by the Romanians, indirectly supported by Poland and Hungary, official recognition of the

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superior authority of the Soviet Stavka over the Warsaw Pact did not take place; however, absolute domination of the Soviets in the existing and newly activated military command organs was legalized. In this respect, of great importance was the approval of the structure of the Combined Command, the Staff and the newly activated Technical Committee without provisions ensuring individual states their proportional share of assignments to positions of responsibility. Taking advantage of this gap, the Soviets, "upon obtaining the views of the allied states" in bilateral agreements, immediately began staffing all new command positions down to the lowest organizational element with Soviet officers, and all civilian positions with Soviet civilian personnel. The role of the representatives of the other armies continued to be limited to carrying out the orders of the Soviet supervisors pertaining only to their own armies.

Creation of the CAF Technical Committee had a great impact on armaments matters. The Committee had authority for matters pertaining to the coordination of research and production of arms, establishment of standard tactical-technical requirements for weapons and equipment, organization of maintenance and standardization of pay scales for all the national forces. However, of crucial importance was granting the CinC the authority to recommend to the individual states and to establish with them in bilateral protocols tasks for developing their own national forces during consecutive five-year periods. The CinC was also granted general authority to issue directives pertaining to combat readiness, training and other matters.

As a result of the resolutions passed in 1969, a new mechanism for escalating outlays for armaments began to operate in the 1970s. At meetings of the collegial organs of the Warsaw Pact--the Political Consultative Committee, the Council of Defense Ministers, and the Military Council--discussions


<sup>7</sup> On working levels of the Staff and the Technical Committee of CAF, the principle that representatives of the national armies have no "right to know the defense solutions of the other states or the specific axis of operations or the overall plan of operations of the Combined Armed Forces" to this day is strictly adhered to.

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were conducted about the alleged threat based on generalized and biased intelligence evaluations. Resolutions were taken which served as the basis for imposing very high demands on the individual states through bilateral agreements, and for seeing to it that those agreements were fulfilled.

On the basis of the "Peacetime Statute for the Combined Armed Forces and Their Command Organs," the institution of CAF CinC representatives stationed with the national armies was created in 1970. The representatives were granted rather broad supervisory powers.

Subsequently, during 1971-72, on the basis of the 1969 resolution on the Unified Air Defense Systems of the WP member states, the Soviets signed bilateral agreements with all WP members (except Romania, which refused to sign) on plans for common air defense. These agreements gave the Soviets full legal control over national air defense means and forces, including national air space, in peacetime as well as in wartime.

In the mid-1970s the Combined Command initiated joint civil defense training of the member states, and then without asking their approval, took over coordination of all civil defense activities of the WP member states.

In December 1977, on the proposal of the Combined Command the Council of Defense Ministers passed a resolution concerning further improvement of the CAF command and control system by creating new positions--those of CinC deputies for aviation and naval matters, assistant for rear echelon matters, and deputy chief of staff for communications matters as well as appropriate working staffs (directorates). While expressing support for the Soviet proposal, the Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian defense ministers requested the staffing of some of these positions with their own fully qualified generals and officers. The Soviets ignored these requests (they were not even recorded in the minutes of the sessions) and soon after,


8 The powers of CinC representatives were not the subject of an agreement with the member states but were rather the results of a onesided order of the CinC.

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in bilateral procedure, the CinC submitted a "request" for confirmation of two Soviet candidates for two of the positions, those of deputy chief of the CAF for aviation matters and for naval matters. The other positions were staffed by the Soviets without asking anybody's approval.

A reorganization in 1977-78, as it later became evident, was an attempt at final subordination of the WP allies to the USSR, officially erasing the last (purely ornamental) role of the member states in "making decisions" pertaining to "common defense." As always, the whole undertaking was carefully prepared and staged by the Soviet leadership.

In the first phase of the reorganization, a large scale strategic exercise Zapad-77 (West-77) of the Combined Armed Forces was conducted in May 1977, under the direction of the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov. On the basis of the "conclusions and experiences" of this exercise, the Soviets presented proposals at the December 1977 CDM meeting for creating a new wartime command and control system for the theater of military operations (TVO).

In the second phase, upon receiving the support of the CDM for these inexplicable proposals, the USSR, during a routine session of the PCC held on 23 November 1978, submitted through the CAF CinC a plan for establishing for wartime the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and of CinCs for Western and Southwestern TOS, based on the Soviet Stavka. The Soviets argued that "conclusions drawn from the exercise" and the fact that NATO already had "for some time an integrated command and control system for peacetime and wartime" made the plan necessary.

The concept of establishing a wartime command and control system met no objections, particularly since the plan did not officially exclude participation of allied representatives. Under these circumstances a resolution was passed without


<sup>9</sup> The WP term TVO (Theater of Military Operations) is roughly analogous to the NATO term TO. The WP term differs from its NATO counterpart in numerically different subdivisions of Europe and in assignment of different range to these subdivisions.

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objections, thus committing the ministers of defense and the CAF CinC to prepare a comprehensive course of action to be expressed in the form of a "Wartime Statute for the CAF and Their Command Organs." Only the Romanian delegation did not sign the resolution, also strongly opposing other military provisions in the resolution (e.g. it refused to increase its outlays for armaments).

In the third phase, CAF CinC Marshal Kulikov took upon himself the main task of imposing upon the allies a comprehensive course of action which was unfavorable for them. In spring 1979, he presented in bilateral conferences with each member state, including Romania, a ready draft of the Statute prepared by the Soviets. The contents of the document left no doubt that as a result of a conceivable confrontation with NATO countries, the Soviet Union would demand the wartime unification under one command not only of all armed forces but also of the political, economic and scientific-technical capabilities remaining at the disposal of the individual states. Similarly, without ambiguity or camouflage, the draft of the Statute clearly stated that exclusively Soviet command and control staffs would constitute the unified command. This meant, on the strategic plane, the Supreme CinC and his working element, the Soviet General Staff, and in the Western and Southwestern TVDs, the appropriate CinCs. No provisions were made in the Statute for representatives of the authorities of the other member states at the Supreme CinC or at the headquarters of the CinCs of the TVDs. Under the draft Statute, the role of the national representatives was reduced to support of operations of their own armies and such services as requested by the theater CinC on behalf of the CAF (read: Soviet Armed Forces).

Important changes were made in classification of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. Until then, the national armed forces envisaged for assignment to the CAF were classified as a strategic grouping of the CAF in the TVD, while the remainder of the national forces, hitherto considered national territorial defense troops, were classified as the reserve of the Supreme CinC. In effect, the new classification meant the subordination of all national forces to a Soviet command. In general, the Soviet proposals went so far as to deny individual member states national jurisdiction over the military personnel subordinate to the Combined Command, thus creating a legal basis for future adjudication of national armed forces

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personnel in Soviet military courts. The Statute also imposed certain financial burdens because it envisaged joint financing of outlays related to the operation of the new command and control elements, even in peacetime (Poland's share of the CAF budget for the Western TVD was 21 percent).

Overall, the Soviet demands on the WP member states were very difficult to accept. There were even official and legal obstacles since many of the Statute postulates called for violation of national constitutions or national legislation.<sup>10</sup> The party leaders of the member states were rather inclined to honor the existing unwritten "Mafia" methods of subordination to the USSR, but they feared giving those methods the status of a legal document. They lamely tried to negotiate but to no avail. The USSR yielded only in marginal and cosmetic matters: in matters of importance it yielded not a single inch. As a result of almost six months of negotiations and of continuous and direct pressures exerted by Kulikov and reinforced by the authority of Ustinov and Yepishev, at their 12th Session on 4 December 1979 the CDM accepted the Wartime Statute for the CAF and Their Control Organs, as prepared by the USSR, with minor, meaningless change. The Romanians were the only party which refused to sign the CDM resolutions.

Subsequently, at the beginning of 1980, the Statute was bilaterally approved by all WP member states (except Romania) without an official session of the PCC. The document was signed in the name of each state by both the head of the government and by the party first or general secretary. Since the document was signed on different dates, on Soviet proposal, it was agreed that the document would carry the date on which the Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, signed it as the last signatory.

Approving the Soviet solutions, the Polish authorities took satisfaction in the fact that the Statute contained

<sup>10</sup> In the case of Poland, Article 33, Item 1 of the Polish Constitution concerning the right of the State to institute mobilization and to declare a state of war and Article 98 of the law on Universal Obligation to Defend the Polish People's Republic which gives the Polish Minister of National Defense control over the Polish Armed Forces.

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provisions for wartime only, and most likely would never have to be implemented. However, the Soviet leadership had different ideas. Marshal Kulikov arrived in Warsaw in order to present the Polish partners a copy of the Statute which by now was signed by six WP member states. At the same time he also presented for the signature of the highest Polish authorities a draft resolution of the WP member states which would designate as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the WP CAF, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. The Polish authorities were surprised by the draft resolution but signed it because it would have been embarrassing to them to admit that they had misunderstood provisions of the Statute, and that they had entertained illusions that the unified command and control organs would be designated only in case of a threat of war.

In 1981, the Soviet Union took further steps leading to implementation of the provisions envisaged for wartime. Specifically, they created CinCs of the TVDs, formed units which already in peacetime were supposed to support operations of the unified CAF command and control system, and within the framework of Warsaw Pact, they integrated the national system for changing the status of the armed forces from peacetime to wartime readiness.

In January 1981, a delegation of the PAF General Staff visited Moscow for the purpose of coordinating development of the PAF for 1981-85. During the talks, PAF Chief of Staff General Siwicki was informed that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was "concerned about the inadequate state of armaments and equipment in the PAF" and requested a "comprehensive report on the progress of talks," implying that the USSR considered directing the defensive potential of the WP member states its legal and inalienable right, in peacetime as well as in wartime, from the moment the document was signed.

In summary, it can be concluded that the decision made at the end of 1970s, although alarming, in reality introduced nothing new. There was no doubt about the intentions of the Soviet leadership to exploit the defense capabilities of the WP member states. Sanctioning those intentions in official and legal documents simply ended a long period of ambiguity and insinuation--or possibly just illusions.

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PART ONE

ARMAMENTS PLANNING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW PACT

ARMAMENTS AND DEFENSE PLANNING

In Soviet and Warsaw Pact terminology, all political, economic and social phenomena leading to preparation of the state or the coalition for war are called armaments or war preparations. Related planning processes are called armaments planning or war preparation planning. Because these terms are perceived by the population as negative in domestic context they are used basically only with reference to activities of the opponent, primarily the United States and the other NATO states. Planning of the WP's own armaments, regardless of the nature of these arms, is identified exclusively by the broadly understood term "defense planning." In military terminology, defense planning at the global level and in the theaters of military operations is called "strategic planning." Some WP states use the term strategic planning to refer to their own military planning for their national territory. Defense planning which directly depends on financial outlays or material contributions is called "defense economic planning."

THE ESSENCE AND SCOPE OF THE INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEM

Defense planning in the WP is fully integrated and is directed by a coalition based on "decisions coordinated by the alliance" through application of military scientific-technical and economic-administrative processes. The purpose of this integrated planning is to prepare the WP member states for war within a single defense system.

The integrated defense system encompasses particularly the following fields:


- Operational (war) planning, which influences the entire economic strategy; defines level of strength and structure of the armed forces; designates trends for industrial development, military production, scientific research, and the expansion of defense economic infrastructure; and determines special

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utilization of the territories of the WP member states.

- Planning of the development of the national armed forces, which includes determination of their qualitative and quantitative strengths and comprehensive designation of trends for improving organizational structures for peacetime and wartime, weapons and equipment, building up of war stockpiles, introduction of new weapons systems and equipment, and other undertakings leading to general improvement of combat capabilities of the armed forces.
- Operational preparation of WP national territories as part of the TVD, which includes expansion and special preparation of the national land, air and water transportation systems, communication systems, logistic supply network, medical support as well as recovery systems and maintenance of ordnance and military equipment.
- Joint defense investments, e.g. military command and control installations, permanent communications systems and more important outlays for defense of national forces, such as military command and control installations, air defense, shelter construction for aircraft and others.
- Military and civilian research and development work, in particular that which serves development of new technologies as well as the planning and designing of new types of armaments and military equipment.
- Production of weapons and military equipment and establishment of unified tactical-technical standards for this production.
- Military production within the framework of the so called "Wartime Annual Plan."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Starts at the outbreak of hostilities, supersedes the five-year peacetime plan.

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- Civil defense arrangements, particularly service on behalf of the Combined Armed Forces.
- Training of commands, staffs and troops.

The above listed fields illustrate the degree of integration the Soviets are attempting to impose. The experience of recent years indicates that the Soviet Union is systematically expanding the field of integration and adding more and more new issues into the realm of joint planning without asking the member states for their consent.

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CHAPTER I

COALITION DEFENSE PLANNING CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE  
WARSAW PACT STATES

Coalition direction of defense planning of the WP states (see Attachment) is conducted by two channels of authority:

- (1) One common, exclusively Soviet military command, sometimes called the "unified command," directing, on the principle of one-man command, strategic planning in peacetime and war operations in wartime.
- (2) Political and military collegial, or collective, organs of the WP, studying the requirements of the unified military command pertaining to member state obligations toward the common defense, and passing general resolutions and recommendations bearing on defense.

An important role in the WP defense planning system is played by various formally non-Pact structures actively exploited by the Pact. The foremost of these are the special bonds of the communist parties, CEMA organizations, and the military-defense structures in the apparatus of the authorities and governments of the states representing the so-called "real socialism."

A. THE ONE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND

1. THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND OF THE WARSAW PACT COMBINED ARMED FORCES

The Supreme High Command of the WP Combined Armed Forces is exercised exclusively by the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Union arrogated to itself this singular role of directing the defense of other states through bilateral agreements on common defense, concluded in the first post-WWII years with countries in its sphere of influence and subsequently ratified at a multilateral level through the "Statute of the CAF and Organs of CAF Control in Wartime," accepted by all WP states except for Romania.

The Supreme CinC of the Soviet Armed Forces, who is at the same time the Supreme CinC of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF),

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is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Soviet Defense Council.

Composition of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces (and the WP CAF) is unknown; the Soviets have never made it known. Just the same, the defense planning mechanism shows that in peacetime this organ is probably the Soviet Defense Council and that it probably consists of the:

- Soviet Prime Minister with the rank of First Deputy Supreme CinC, who conveys Supreme CinC will and decisions to the machinery of the Soviet government.
- Soviet Minister of Defense, as a Supreme CinC deputy for strategic defense planning.
- Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) of the Soviet Council of Ministers, as a probable Supreme CinC deputy responsible for defense planning matters in the national economy.
- KGB Chief, as a chief of intelligence and an official responsible for internal security matters.
- Politburo member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat responsible for political-propaganda activity.
- USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Chief of the Soviet General Staff.
- CinCs of the main branches of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Executive organs of the Supreme High Command are the Soviet General Staff and the CAF Combined Command.


## 2. THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces is the chief strategic planning organ of the Soviet Supreme High Command and of the Warsaw Pact. As such it controls directly the operational (war) planning conducted by the national commands and their general (main) staffs. It controls the activity of

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the military intelligence services of all the WP states, concludes bilateral agreements on joint defense investments and on stockpiling strategic material and technical reserves within the territories of the allied states.

Through the Combined Command (CinC, Staff and Technical Committee of the CAF), the Soviet General Staff determines for individual member states the strength of their armed forces for peacetime and wartime, their organizational structure, armament, equipment, combat readiness and mobilization requirements, as well as tasks in the field of operational preparation of their national territories as part of the TO.

In addition, the Soviet General Staff organizes civilian and military research and development programs to construct weapons systems and military equipment. In collaboration with the Main Armaments Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces<sup>12</sup> and the Soviet Gosplan, it initiates production in peacetime and wartime within the framework of CEMA armament production according to the "Wartime Annual Plan."

3. THE COMBINED COMMAND

The Combined Command has three command and control organs - the CAF Military Council, the CAF Staff and the CAF Technical Committee, and is headed by the following individuals:


- The CAF CinC
- The CAF Chief of Staff, who is also the first deputy to the CAF CinC.
- The CAF CinC deputies assigned by each WP state, who are either deputy defense ministers of these countries or chiefs of general (main) staffs.
- The CAF CinC deputy, who is commander of the WP Air Defense Forces.

12 The existence and or exact title of this directorate is not certain but rather postulated on the basis of other information.

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- The CAF CinC deputy for armaments, who is chief of the Technical Committee.
- The CAF CinC deputy for aviation.
- The CAF CinC deputy for the navy.

The lowest links in the command structure are the CAF CinC representatives assigned to the national armies.

In practice the CAF CinC deputies assigned by individual WP states colloquially known as CAF CinC "deputies for the national armed forces" always stay in their own countries and, except for the routine meetings of the CAF Military Council, do not participate in any Combined Command work or decisions. Although the command organ is supposed to be "coalitional," the real Combined Command consists only of the CAF CinC, CAF Chief of Staff and other Soviet CinC deputies.

The Combined Command, seen in this light, transmits demands of the Soviet General Staff to the forum of WP collegial organs, calling for contributions to the common defense and urging these organs to draft resolutions and authoritative recommendations pertaining to them. Based on the guidelines of the Soviet General Staff and on the authoritative resolutions and recommendations accepted by the WP collegial organs, the Combined Command transmits detailed recommendations to the individual national armed forces (except the Soviet Armed Forces) pertaining to the development of troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF during each five-year period. It conducts direct negotiations with each individual WP state (except the USSR) and concludes bilateral agreements (the so-called "protocols") concerning assignment of their troops and naval forces to the CAF, their development during the next five-year period, and also concerning the preparation of allied state territories as part of the TOs.

#### 4. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

In accordance with the CAF Wartime Statute, in peacetime the CAF CinC is appointed for 4-6 years by decision of WP states. He is guided in his activities by the decisions of the governments of these states and by the PCC resolutions. Actually, however, he is a Soviet first deputy minister of


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defense and is directly responsible to the Soviet Minister of Defense. He has offices in two equally important places: one in the Soviet General Staff headquarters and the second in the CAF Staff building.

Acting within the statutory framework of his authority he:

- Coordinates the operational utilization of troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF.
- Makes recommendations pertaining to improvement of the armament systems, TVD preparation, and material reserves stockpiling.
- Issues directives on CAF combat readiness, their operational and combat training and determines the joint annual CAF activities (exercises, war games, briefings, conferences, consultations, meetings, etc).

He also has the right (theoretically, as an executor of WP states or PCC decisions) to issue orders or recommendations regarding raising the CAF to higher combat readiness status. Within the framework of plans coordinated with the national ministries of defense he may also participate in inspections of the national armed forces assigned to the CAF (in practice he makes these inspections at his own pleasure).

5. MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

The CAF Military Council is, in accordance with Articles 7 and 15 of the CAF Peacetime statute, a control organ of the CAF CinC. At the same time, however, it acts as a consultant and makes recommendations particularly regarding the obligations of individual WP states to contribute to the common defense. The Military Council holds two annual sessions (in the spring and autumn). In 1981 the CAF suggested that Military Council sessions be limited to one a year.


The CAF CinC presides over the Military Council sessions. In addition to the CAF CinC, the Council is composed of the CAF Chief of Staff and the CinC deputies for National Air Defense, Air Force, Navy and armaments as well as CinC

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deputies for the national armies.<sup>13</sup> In all, it has 14 voting members of which eight are from the USSR and one each from the other member states.

Hypothetically, if in some controversial matter the member states desired to present their objections to the Soviet concepts as a block, their total votes would constitute a minority at a ratio of six to eight. Of course, so extreme a situation will most likely never come to pass because the system for preparing and conducting the MC sessions in no way differs from the procedures practiced in the operation of the CDM. The fact that the chairmen of the individual delegations are at the same time CinC deputies, and therefore CinC subordinates, only enhances the efficiency of the MC sessions and the discipline of the presentation of its participants.

In addition to studying general problems related to armaments, the MC is also concerned at its fall session with matters pertaining to the budget of the CAF Combined Command. However, these matters are not discussed within the framework of the forum but in a separate meeting of the chiefs of finance departments of the Ministers of Defense. The MC sessions are administratively supported by the same Soviet secretariat which supports the PCC and the CDM.

6. THE STAFF OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

As an organ of the CAF CinC, the CAF Staff studies recommendations regarding combat and mobilization readiness of troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF, their operational and combat training, improvement of the organizational structure of troops and armaments systems, the arming and equipping of troops and naval forces, TVD preparation, and stockpiling of reserves. The WP general (main) staffs are obligated to coordinate with the CAF Staff the deployment of troops and naval forces and of staffs assigned to the CAF and


<sup>13</sup> The delegations of the national armies participating in CAF Military Council sessions usually include commanders of the branches of the armed forces (National Air Defense, Air Force, Navy) and designated specialists, a total of seven to 11 persons. In the fall sessions chiefs of financial departments of the individual ministries of defense also participate.

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the location of their decentralized reserves, and to keep the CAF Staff currently informed about the state of their troops' combat and mobilization readiness, training, armament, equipment, reserves, etc.

7. THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNED TO THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

The CAF Technical Committee assigned to the CAF CinC is a type of CAF technical staff. Its chief is the CAF Deputy CinC for Armaments.

The CAF Technical Committee studies and drafts recommendations bearing on WP forces armaments and military equipment; it conducts studies on the future technical development of these armies and coordinates in the WP framework scientific, research, experimental and engineering work connected with equipping the WP armies with the most modern armaments and equipment. It conducts its work in close association with the CEMA Defense Industry Commission. The entire Committee is composed of no more than 80 to 100 officers and a small civilian support staff.

Attached to the CAF Deputy CinC for Armaments is the Military Scientific-Technical Council. It is composed of deputy ministers of defense or deputy chiefs of general (main staffs for armaments or chairmen of R&D committees of the ministries of defense (general staffs) of the WP states. The chief task of this Council is to study the most important recommendations prepared by the Technical Committee.

In addition the Council studies the scientific and research work as well as the so-called "uniform tactical-technical requirements" which serve in designing new models of armaments and military equipment. It also scrutinizes recommendations made by individual WP countries regarding putting their own designs on the list of standard armaments of the WP armed forces.


The proposals (recommendations) of the Military Scientific-Technical Council must first be approved by the CAF CinC and only then are they permitted to be transmitted to the individual national armies.

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8. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES -  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WITH THE NATIONAL ARMIES

Representatives of the CAF CinC are stationed with the national armies. Their role in directing the defense measures of WP member states varies depending on the attitude toward these matters of the party and governmental authorities of individual countries. The "Statute of the CAF and their Peacetime Control Organs" defines precisely neither the representatives' organizational placement nor their authority and tasks. The function of the CinC representatives with the national armies is performed by Soviet officers with the rank of four-star generals (general armii) appointed by the CAF CinC.<sup>14</sup>

Assigned to the CinC representatives as assistants are generals and officers of various specialties (combined arms, national air defense, aviation, navy, ordnance, political, counterintelligence, rear echelon and others, depending on requirements) and auxiliary personnel (translators, typists, draftsmen, clerks, etc.).

The CinC representatives "represent" the CAF CinC in daily working contacts with the national armies:

- They "render assistance" to the leaders of the ministries of defense, commanders of the branches of the armed forces and commanders of military districts of the national armies in resolving problems of combat readiness, schooling, procuring arms, material-technical support and other matters of bilateral interest.
- They "participate" in the more important undertakings of national armies, particularly in inspections, field exercises, conferences, councils, briefings and other activities.

<sup>14</sup> In reality, the CAF CinC representatives and their entire staffs are assigned from the Soviet Armed Forces by personal order of the Soviet Minister of Defense rather than from the Combined Command and CAF HQ by order of the CAF CinC.

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In reality, in addition to "representing," "rendering assistance," and "participating," the CinC representatives influence the most important decisions pertaining to the national forces and to the defense potential of the host state and have full, far-reaching control over all the activities of the national armies. They intervene directly and make corrections on the spot or through the CAF CinC.

Despite their limited numbers, the CinC representatives back up the entire reporting system established between the individual ministries of defense and the Combined Command.

Some member states attempt to restrict the authority of the CinC representatives. Poland limited the number of CinC representatives and refused to situate their offices at the headquarters of the PAF, General Staff, branches of the armed forces and military districts. In addition, the PAF General Staff was determined to share with the CinC representatives only carefully selected information regardless of whether it originated at the central level or at operational elements. Romania went so far as to eliminate their role. On the other hand, member states like Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic gave the CinC representatives full access to their armed forces, down to the lowest elements, and elevated their authority to almost the rank of a military governor.

As a result of this inconsistency, the CAF CinC intended to introduce in 1982-83 measures to standardize the positions of his representatives with regional armies and legalize their privileges on the level they enjoy in Bulgaria and the GDR, by passing a special resolution of the WP member states. One of the more important decisions to be made in these matters is whether to situate the CinC representatives at the headquarters of general staffs, branches of the armed forces and military districts and whether they should routinely participate in meetings of the collegial organs on the central and operational levels (e.g., policy board of the Minister of National Defense, MND Military Council, Collegium of the General Staff and War Councils of the branches of the armed forces at military districts).


9. CONSULTATIONS AND CONFERENCES

In the allied system of controlling defense planning, so-

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called consultations and conferences also play a specific role. The consultations and conferences conducted by CinC representatives, the Staff, and the Technical Committee take the form of official briefings for selected functionaries of the national armies. These events are conducted every year, or every two or three years, in accordance with "Plans for Common Training Activities" published by the Combined Command for specialist groups. During the late 1970s and early 1980s consultations were held between the chiefs of general (main) staffs of the allied armies, and conferences took place among the leadership cadre of the:

- National air defense forces of WP member states.
- Air forces of allied armies.
- Allied fleets.
- Allied rocket troops and artillery.
- Allied AA defense troops.
- Allied signal troops.
- Allied chemical troops.
- Allied rear echelons.
- Railroad and road troops.


Participants in the consultations include commanders or chiefs of the above-mentioned commands and institutions of the national armies. The Soviet Armed Forces are represented by functionaries of two or three grade levels lower than their allied counterparts.

The Combined Command, which organizes the consultations and conferences, uses these events for expanding its influence or even direct control (meaning going over the heads of the national ministers of defense) over activities of the national armed forces, including operation of the general (main) staffs.

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B. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COLLEGIAL ORGANS OF THE WARSAW PACT.

Civilian and military collegial organs of the WP include the Political Consultative Committee, Committee of Defense Ministers and Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces discussed above.

1. THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was initially appointed for the purpose of conducting consultations with the WP member states. However, with the establishment of the integrated defense structure, the PCC was transformed into a supranational collegial organ with political-military authority. Routinely represented at PCC sessions are the party general secretaries (first secretaries), prime ministers, ministers of defense and ministers of foreign affairs of the member states, which suggests this organ enjoys high authority and unrestrained power. In practice, however, the authority of the PCC does not extend to matters concerned with overall direction of common defense. In this field, the role of the PCC is reduced to only periodic study of postulates of the Combined Command pertaining to obligations of the member states on behalf of common defense and to passing related general resolutions.


The PCC is not a permanent organ, and has neither a permanent nor temporary chairman (nor secretariat between sessions). Sessions, held twice in a five-year period, as a rule, are convened consecutively in the capitals of the member states according to Cyrillic alphabetical order. The sessions are chaired by a representative appointed by the host country. The host country also appoints a general secretariat to serve the needs of the particular session.

At each session (except anniversary sessions), general political problems are deliberated as the first items of the agenda, results of which are published in official unclassified "declarations," "appeals" and the like. As the second item of the agenda, military matters (primarily defense matters) are studied in top secret sessions, results of which are never published.

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For example, at the PCC session held on 17 March 1969 in Budapest, the result of deliberations of the first item on the agenda was an "appeal" for preparing and holding an all-European conference on security and cooperation, while the results of declarations of the second item, military matters, were the four secret resolutions described in Chapter I above.

At the PCC session held on 26 January 1972 in Prague, the result of deliberations of the first item on the agenda was publication of the "Declaration of Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe," whereas the result of the second item was a resolution calling for the acceleration of improvements in the quality of CAF weapon systems.

In distinction from the general political agenda which is prepared with the participation of the Central Committees and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all the member states, military matters, including drafts of resolutions, are prepared and presented at a PCC session exclusively by the Soviets. The right to render administrative support to this item of the agenda is also reserved for a completely Soviet-staffed secretariat.<sup>15</sup>

The subject matter of the military problems studied is not coordinated in advance with the involved member states but is imposed by the USSR. However, about a month or two before a PCC session, the CAF CinC sends the minister of defense of each member state a list of topics of the agenda (a 3 to 4 page document) and a draft of a PCC resolution on military matters with a request for coordination with party-state authorities before the next PCC session. There is a mutual agreement that any comments to the draft resolutions on military matters will be submitted by the individual member states two or three weeks before the PCC session. This permits the Soviets not so much to include the comments in the resolution, as time for "explaining and reasoning things out" in bilateral talks, thus obtaining "full agreement of views" ahead of the actual study


<sup>15</sup> The temporary chief of the secretariat is always a Soviet general who is the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, CAF for operational matters, and assisted exclusively by Soviet military and civilian personnel from the CAF headquarters, a total of 30 to 40 persons.

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of the problem. In the event of difficulties in achieving agreement on the contents of the resolution with any of the states (as mostly occurs with Romania), the Soviets coordinate with the rest of the member states the tactics for overcoming the obstruction.

2. THE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS

The Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) was appointed in compliance with the 17 March 1969 PCC resolution for the purpose of directing the defense of the member states. However, as a result of limitations imposed on the Soviets, from its conception the CDM has not performed the role envisaged by the Statute. The role of this organ has been reduced primarily to that of holding regular annual sessions at which problems related to the services and obligations of member states rendered on behalf of common defense are studied in greater detail than the PCC session, and of passing appropriate related resolutions. The activities of the PCC and CDM tightly interrelate and complement each other, primarily as a result of the Soviet tactic of forcing their concepts through these organs.

Frequently the resolutions of the CDM further develop and elaborate more comprehensively the resolutions of the PCC. For example, in armaments, the PCC may decide to increase defense spending without clearly specifying the rate of the increase and for what purpose the increase would be used. It is the CDM, on the proposal and recommendation of the Combined Command, which determines in its own resolution the main trends of expanding and rearming the armed forces of the CAF.

The reverse can also occur. Occasionally the Soviets determine that in order to push through some of their concepts, it would be better to first obtain the support of the CDM and only later present them (already in the form of CDM proposals) at the session of the PCC. This was the case when the "unified command" concept was legalized.


The CDM functions on the basis of different principles than the PCC. Its composition also differs. In the PCC, each member state is represented by one delegate, whereas in the CDM, in addition to the ministers of defense representing

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individual member states,<sup>16</sup> the CAF CinC and the Chief of Staff participate on an equal footing with the ministers of defense, in effect giving the Soviets not one, but three votes.

CDM sessions are held regularly every year at the end of November or beginning of December (most frequently in the first days of December) with the agenda and subject matter for the session having been prepared in advance. On the proposal of the Combined Command, this agenda is accepted by the CDM a year before the session. The CDM, like the PCC, does not work between sessions and thus has no permanent or rotating acting chairman. Preparation of the important items of the agenda for the CDM session is customarily the exclusive prerogative of the CAF CinC, Chief of Staff and the temporary secretariat subordinate to them.<sup>17</sup>

CDM sessions are chaired by the minister of defense of the host country (rotated in the same order as PCC sessions). Traditionally, the chairman conducts the session according to a scenario prepared in advance with collaboration of the chief of the temporary secretariat of the CDM.

A session lasts three to four days. During this time the CDM studies three to five different problems on the agenda, pertaining to armaments and improvement of the WP defense system. The most important problems are presented by the Soviets (CinC representative or the Soviet Minister of Defense) in the form of a briefing. The less important problems are presented by representatives of the member states as designated by the Combined Command. In the latter case, the Ministry of Defense of the member state submits all materials pertaining to the subject to the Combined Command for coordination at least six months before the CDM session. Four to six weeks before the session, the Combined Command informs the ministers of defense of the main topics to be presented at the session and sends them coordination drafts of the resolution and a draft of the press release.


<sup>16</sup> Included in the composition of each delegation are deputy ministers of defense and specialists, a total of seven to 11 persons.

<sup>17</sup> The same Soviet-staffed secretariat which supports the needs of the PCC

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The ministers of defense are obliged to answer the CAF CinC in writing within two or three weeks before the session, stating their views. In the event the comments contain disagreements, the Combined Command makes every effort to clear them up before the session. Disagreements are usually settled by personal intervention of the CAF CinC or Chief of Staff. If these efforts appear to be unsuccessful (usually dealing with Romania) the Combined Command prepares an appropriate tactic of collective "argumentation," for the session, asking individual ministers of defense for assistance in convincing the potential dissenter. In this manner, "full consensus of opinions" and imposition of Soviet concepts upon all the members is achieved. Sometimes the separate position of Romania is barely noted in the watered down form of protocol of the session prepared by the Soviet secretaries.

C. NONPACT STRUCTURES FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

The relations of the communist parties, CEMA organizations and the military/defense apparatus of the national governments of all the WP states play a specific role in Soviet control of the armaments acquisition of the WP member states.

1. COMMUNIST PARTIES

The communist parties (CPs) of the WP states are not formally engaged in defense planning. Nevertheless, within their constitutional rights, they prepare guidelines at their regular congresses for long range political-social programs which serve as the basis for preparing and accepting national five-year social-economic plans. Resolutions of the CP congresses are coordinated with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which has influence on the contents of the programs pertaining to development of defense potential.


In order to create favorable conditions for the decisionmaking of the individual WP states, the Soviets present defense problems as a routine matter at meetings held on Soviet territory between the first (general) secretaries of the CPs and the general secretary of the CPSU. For the same reason, the Soviets established the practice that when the CAF CinC visits a WP state (usually to attend meetings of the WP military organs), he is always received by the head of the party. In the course of their talks, the most important

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armaments problems are discussed, and the talks conclude with declarations by the national party leaders that obligations and services on behalf of the WP will be fulfilled.

2. THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), as an international economic organization of the states of the Soviet bloc, is not officially related to the WP. Its members, in addition to the WP states, are Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. Since 1964, Yugoslavia has participated in the work of some of the CEMA organs. China and North Korea have representatives at CEMA as observers, and Albania, which left the WP and since 1961 has not participated in CEMA work, officially continues to be a member.

The statute of CEMA was adopted at the 12th Session of the Council, and is currently in force as amended in 1972 and 1974.


The organs of CEMA are the:

- Council Session, the highest organ of the Council, which meets once a year; it is composed of delegations of the member states.
- Executive Committee of the Council, the main executive organ of the Council, which is composed of permanent representatives who are deputy prime ministers of the member states. It holds quarterly meetings.
- Secretariat of the Council with a permanent seat in Moscow.
- Committee for Cooperation for Material-Technical Matters, which meets according to a separate schedule.
- Permanent Branch Commissions, which are called to meetings by the Council Session.

The main organ of the Council through which the Soviets assign the international members production tasks and mutual deliveries of armaments and military equipment is the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, which operates under direct control of the Soviet state. The chairman of this commission

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was always a Soviet deputy Gosplan chairman. NSWP Commission members are usually either the chairman or deputy chairman of the respective state planning organization. The Commission's permanent staff is the Defense Industries Department of the CEMA Secretariat, which is staffed completely by Soviets, except perhaps for a few NSWP clerical workers.

Other organs of this international economic organization, despite the fact that it is totally dominated by the Soviets, are excluded from defense planning. The only exception could be their involvement in the coordination of overall production plans and exchanges of products for wartime, spelled out in the Wartime Annual Plan (which most likely would be of interest to the Council Committee for Coordination of Plans) and a very limited number of R&D projects related to development of armament and military equipment, which are coordinated by the Council Committee for Scientific-Technical Cooperation.

The reason for concentrating almost all defense planning in the Defense Industry Commission is, most likely, the Soviet desire to maintain secrecy (the need to know rule is applied). Also of importance is the fact that the armament production of the WP states is at Soviet disposal, and that in CEMA, under commercial trade agreements the Soviets would have to pay for any services rendered on their behalf by WP states. Similar tasks forced instead through military channels or through bilateral allied agreements cost the Soviets nothing.

3. MILITARY DEFENSE STRUCTURES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF WARSAW PACT STATES

An important role in controlling defense planning in the WP states is played by the military defense structures established on the Soviet model at all levels of the national governments of the member states.

In all WP states, on the basis of the constitutional obligation to defend the state, central organs responsible for national defense (in the Soviet Union--the Defense Council, in Poland--the National Defense Committee) issue various orders charging the ministers, chiefs of central offices and of local administrations, down to the most basic level, with responsibility for defense matters.

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Furthermore, in all central planning organs, ministries, and central offices, functionaries are appointed for direct control of defense activities. As a rule, they are deputy chiefs of central planning organs, and deputy ministers.


In addition, there are special military elements in the above mentioned organs with the rank of departments, directorates or main directorates. For example, within the framework of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers in Poland, there is a Military Board composed of two departments, totaling approximately 200 military and civilian personnel. Officially, the chiefs of these military elements are subordinate to the ministers and chiefs of offices where they work, however, in relevant matters, they represent the interests of the Minister of Defense and to him they are subordinate.

In all industrial plants producing armament and military equipment, or being prepared for startup of such production in time of war, as well as in industrial and repair plants envisaged for militarization or fulfilling mobilization tasks on behalf of the armed forces, there are established variously called military sections or military representatives. All these elements, whether governmental, administrative, military or industrial, within the field of their defense activities, are directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense.

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CHAPTER II

MAIN DEFENSE (ARMAMENTS) PLANNING SYSTEMS  
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW PACT

Defense (armaments) planning within the Warsaw Pact is a continuous process and is fulfilled in three closely related and mutually reinforcing areas:

- Military operational planning.
- Military development planning.
- Military-civilian defense planning within the national economy and administration.

A. MILITARY OPERATIONAL PLANNING (WAR PLANNING)

1. ROLE AND PLACE OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN SHAPING SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT DEFENSE POLICY

The WP state military operational system is a continuation or a natural extension of the centrally-based military operations planning system set up in the USSR during WWII. Even after the conclusion of the war the Soviets didn't scrap this system. The only modification made was in connection with the organization during the first postwar years of the so-called "people's democratic states" (present WP members) where operational planning subsystems were set up which were connected with and subordinated to the central Soviet system. Numerous crises and constant East-West tension coupled with brink-of-war balancing not only kept this system from losing its significance but allowed it to become a chief factor shaping Soviet and Warsaw Pact defense policy--if in fact it did not completely subsume this policy.

The formal objective of operational planning is the preparation for "defensive war against a potential aggressor," who for ideological reasons is held to be the United States and the other chief NATO states. The direct results of this planning are detailed and precise operational plans for the conduct of war against NATO countries which may be put into operation at any moment both offensively and defensively.

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Indirect results are, however, demands and recommendations based on these operational plans. They pertain to the development and improvement of the war potential of the individual WP states, chiefly of the armed forces--their numerical strength, organizational structure, armament, equipment, combat and mobilization readiness, war reserves, training--as well as preparation of the entire infrastructure of the TVD for the conduct of war. In conjunction with this, operational planning formulates demands concerning the development of industry, war production, stockpiling of strategic reserves, civil defense and related matters.

Thus, we may safely state that operational planning is the main driving force behind Soviet and WP armaments. The planning process, planning methods, and substantive assumptions of the operational plans are all comprehensive and contain initiatives for action.

2. PRIMARY OPERATIONAL PLANNING: PROCEDURES AND METHODS

Warsaw Pact strategic level operational planning lies within the exclusive authority of the Soviet Armed Forces Supreme High Command. In practice these plans are drafted by the Soviet General Staff and probably only confirmed by the Supreme CinC. Within the framework of this planning the individual WP states and their armed forces are assigned wartime operational tasks and the predetermined national forces and means necessary to carry out these tasks. In its planning of operational tasks for the WP states the Soviet General Staff is assisted only by the most important functionaries from the Combined Command, i.e., the CAF CinC, the CAF Chief of Staff and probably the Soviet CinC deputies. Other than these individuals, no other WP military personnel or organs, including the CAF Staff, participate in the planning. Wartime tasks of individual WP states and decisions regarding their war potential are subject to discussion neither in a WP forum nor in direct contacts with the interested parties: they are simply transmitted in the form of a Supreme CinC directive.

Demands and recommendations based on operational planning pertain to the development and improvement of the WP state war potential. This potential includes mainly the numerical strength of the national armed forces, their organizational structure, armament and equipment in peacetime and wartime as

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well as the combat and mobilization readiness, war reserves and operational preparation of the TVD (all decisions on this potential alone are transmitted by the Soviet General Staff to the Combined Command, which then transmits the decision in the forum of the collegial WP organs). Once the desired general resolutions are passed, problems are taken up and resolved by the Combined Command in direct contact with the individual states.

Demands pertaining to policy on the development of industry, armament production and the war production of the so-called "Wartime Annual Plan" are pushed simultaneously through two channels: (1) CEMA and (2) WP military organs.

Individual WP states conduct operational planning based on the transmitted Supreme CinC directives and only within their scope. Because these directives are very precise and detailed, the national plans are by nature strictly executory and technical (e.g., drafting plans for the troops for their operations in wartime). Just the same, in the whole national planning system operational planning constitutes the highest echelon. Within the individual states the operational plans are drafted by the general (main) staffs and are confirmed by the highest state elements responsible for national defense. The operational plans in Poland are confirmed by the chairman of the National Defense Committee and approved by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party. When a new Prime Minister or a new PUWP First Secretary is installed in office one of his first duties is to get acquainted with the operational plans and to confirm them.

Formally, operational plans drafted in individual WP states are not subject to confirmation by the Soviets. Just the same, specialists from the Soviet General Staff give the national general staffs "help" and before the plans are formally confirmed they are subjected to a thorough verification by a special commission of the Soviet General Staff.


All operational plans are kept up-to-date by constant revision but they are completely re-drafted only if that becomes necessary. In the postwar period they have been redrafted several times, probably chiefly because of important changes in the war potential of NATO and WP forces and means

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and also because of doctrinal changes. The latest general updating was in 1972. In 1980 the Soviet General Staff informed the Poles of its intention to re-draft the plans in 1981. But by the end of 1981 this was not carried out.

Operational planning involves the most important data on national and coalition security and is the most secret and protected area of activities of the USSR and the other WP states. This planning is conducted by a select narrow group protected in depth by military security cadres. Only persons directly participating in this type of planning are authorized to know about its existence and about the nature of the work.

Operational plans are drafted for the Soviet Armed Forces only at three levels: central, front and army (separate corps). For lower levels such plans are prepared by the armies (separate corps). A similar principle is applied in the other WP armed forces with the difference that the operational plans of the highest national operational large units (fronts in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria; but corps in Hungary and East Germany) are not drafted in the fronts or corps but in the general (main) staff.

Operational planning is conducted personally by the commanding officers of the given forces and their chiefs or deputy chiefs of staffs for operational matters in special places--vaults--designed for that purpose and placed under special security protection. The specialized permanent working organs engaged in operational planning are:

- In the Soviet General Staff--Directorate I of the Main Operations Directorate (GOU). Its chief since at least 1973 has been Colonel General Ivanov. This directorate is broken down into elements related to the strategic axes. Planning for the European theater consists of separate elements for the Western and Southwestern TVDs.
- In the general (main) staffs of the WP states--usually by section I of the operations directorates (by section II in the Polish case).

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3. PREMISES OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON WARSAW PACT ARMAMENTS PLANNING

At the base of Soviet and WP allied strategic thinking lies the constantly repeated programmatic slogan that "socialist states because of the humanitarian nature of their system reject war as a means toward political objectives and will themselves not start an aggressive war; however, should they themselves be attacked they will not only repulse the invasion but will achieve victory; the victory may be achieved only through the total destruction of the enemy armed forces and seizure of their territory."

The essence of this premise of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic thinking may be properly appreciated and comprehended by examining the war tasks assigned to Poland in a directive from the USSR Supreme High Command. Since the early 1970s among other things this document has contained the following:

- In item one, estimates of the NATO forces and the threat which can affect the Polish territory and the axes of operations.
- In item two, a statement that in the event of NATO aggression, the strategic groupings of the CAF in the TVD will repulse the invasion and immediately change over to strategic offensive operations. Also included in this item are general provisions pertaining to the conduct of air and antiair operations and use of nuclear and chemical weapons by the CAF.
- In item three, specification of tasks for the Polish Armed Forces assigned to the CAF. Accordingly the PAF, composed of three combined arms armies, one air army, one operational-tactical missiles brigade, and other organic front units, in the sixth to eighth hours of D+3 will be committed to offensive operations from western areas of the GDR along the strategic northern coastal axis, striking in two divergent operational axes: the main effort, using forces of two combined arms armies, will be along the axis. As an immediate objective, the PAF front destroys forces of the 1st Corps (Netherlands), 1st Corps (Belgium) and one to two FRG divisions, and on D+7 to D+8 occupies FRG territories up to the Ems River.

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In its next objective, the front destroys reserves of the Northern Group approaching from the rear, and on D+12 to D+14, acting in coordination with forces of a tank army of the Soviet front, occupies territories of the Netherlands and Belgium and maintains readiness to deploy for subsequent operation. As the situation develops, it organizes defense in the main harbors and the North Sea coast from the mouth of Elbe River to the French border.

In the second effort, the Polish front, in coordination with the Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea, using one army, attacks on the axis Schwerin-Flensburg Skagen and on D+7 to D-3 attacks on the Frederoca- (southern part of the Jutland Peninsula)-Odensee (Danish Fyn Island)-Copenhagen axis. As an immediate objective, it defeats the combined forces of the Jutland Army Corps and on D+7 to D+8 occupies Schleswig-Holstein and Danish border areas. As a subsequent objective, it executes air and sea landings on Zeland Island, defeats the Zeland mechanized division, the remaining forces of the regular army and Danish territorial defense units, and by D+12 to D+24 occupies the entire Jutland Peninsula, the main Danish islands (Zeland, Falster, Fyn and Langeland) and secures for the Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea passage through the Danish Straits to the North Sea.

In addition to purely military tasks, the Polish front organizes Danish civilian administration on the basis of the cadre of the Danish Communist Party and "progressive forces."

- In item four, designation of NATO targets on the axis of operations of the PAF to be destroyed or neutralized by strategic forces and means, and what limits of nuclear and chemical weapons are allocated for the operation of the PAF (in the plans of the mid-1970s, issue of 170 nuclear and chemical warheads for surface-to-surface missiles was envisaged.)<sup>19</sup>
- In item five, notification that commitment to battle of the Polish front will be supported by a combined Soviet-East German screening force composed of one

19 The ratio of nuclear to chemical warheads is unknown.

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East German border police division and one Soviet division; provision of information on units adjacent to the Polish front (on the right flank, the Allied Fleet on the Baltic Sea and the Soviet Northern Fleet. On the left flank, one Guards Tank Army which makes the main effort on the Berlin-Hannover Muenster axis).

In one of the subsequent items, tasks for the Polish Navy are formulated. During peacetime, the Navy performs combat duty service in a designated zone of responsibility (a zone of the Baltic Sea approximately 50 miles deep along the Polish coast). During wartime within the integrated operations system of the Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea it fights for naval supremacy in the Baltic Sea, supports operations on the coastal flank of the Polish front in the Danish Straits and western Baltic Sea, and on D+6 to D+8 executes landing operations in the Kege and Takse Gulfs and the Zealand Island.

In other items, the directive designates Poland as a transit state for regrouping and redeploying the Soviet Armed Forces into areas of future operations, and as a home front for strategic deployment of troops in the TVD.

According to the directive, Poland is obliged during peacetime to maintain the National Air Defense Forces in a high state of combat readiness. The Air Defense Forces are to be organized into three corps, having a total of 36 ground-to-air missile battalions, eight fighter aviation regiments, an appropriate number of reconnaissance units, rear radiotechnical troops and other units.

In addition, using national forces and means, Poland is obliged to organize coastal defense, antilanding, antisubversion and sabotage defense of the territory and prepare among other things on behalf of the regrouping Soviet forces:

- 20 routes for regrouping troops (approximately 20,000 kilometers of first-class roads with appropriate permanent bridges, overpasses, major city bypasses, approaches to alternate river crossing providing forces and means to construct them, such as engineer units with bridging equipment and ferries).

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- Several thousand kilometers of lateral roads facilitating maneuver for the forces.
- Nine rail transit lines with appropriate permanent and temporary transloading areas; thousands of flat cars, box cars, locomotives, both steam and diesel, for transporting Soviet troops.
- A network of first-class airfields for utilization by Soviet aviation.
- Sea and inland navigation for mass transport of material-technical reserves to areas of operations to include appropriate craft and loading points in addition to ports and landing places.
- Hundreds of telephone-telegraph switchboards within the permanent national and international communications systems.
- A network of technical-maintenance stations along the routes of the regrouping forces for maintenance and repair of equipment.
- A hospital base with reserves of drugs and medical means for treatment of casualties.

In order to insure the planned regrouping of the Soviet Armed Forces through Polish territory, the directive mandates creation for wartime of a mixed Polish-Soviet troop traffic directing and controlling system and schedules for placing at the disposal of the Soviet Armed Forces all of the above mentioned installations of the TVD infrastructure. Also, Poland is responsible for the preparation of war stockpiles in support of its own armed forces, and for the organization of a replacement system for combat losses.

Services and obligations on behalf of the CAF (read Soviet Armed Forces) and stockpiles for the PAF are subject to comprehensive agreements signed by the Polish government and the CAF CinC, in bilateral protocols for each five-year period.

In one of the last items, provisions are listed pertaining to preparation of the armament industry for conversion to

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wartime production, and production of weapons and equipment within the so-called "Wartime Annual Plan." It stipulates that Poland will undertake appropriate efforts to secure increased production, coproduction and deliveries in time or in threat of war in accordance with appropriate agreements between the WP member states.

The comprehensive war tasks of the other WP member states are not known. However, sufficient data<sup>20</sup> exist to serve as basis for drawing the conclusion that the war tasks of the other states differ from the tasks of Poland only in details. All the tasks are offensive by nature, and all of them include services and obligations rendered on behalf of the Soviet Armed Forces. The offensive precepts of the operational plans create a vicious circle of constantly growing arms demands on all the WP member states.

The offensive nature of operational plans directly affects the tempo and scope of armaments since it is precisely these plans which define the actual projected needs in the field of armaments, equipment of the armed forces, wartime resources and other areas. In this sense operational planning should be recognized as the original source and the main driving force for armament planning.

This is definitely the case with the USSR and with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. However, in Poland and in other WP member states, the influence of this planning upon armaments decisions, even though strong, is not decisive. Proof of this is the fact that the Polish leadership, which in speeches always supported offensive plans directed against NATO, and without reservations accepted the tasks assigned Poland, in practice during the 1970s and early 1980s dodged armaments efforts in order to prevent the burden of armaments from crushing the national economy. For example, analysis of


<sup>20</sup> Crucial elements of plans for employing the armed forces of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and East Germany; certain tasks of Czechoslovakia and East Germany pertaining to preparation of their territories as part of the TVD; experiences gained from participation in major CAF exercises, such as Soyuz, Zapad ("West"), Shchit ("Shield"), Granit, Fala ("Wave"), Tranzyt, Vesna ("Spring") and Leto ("Summer").

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Poland's war tasks and Poland's capability of fulfilling them showed incontrovertibly that fulfillment of those tasks was beyond the capability of the PAF. Conclusions of this analysis served as the basis for preparing a memorandum dealing with a long list of requirements for developing the armed forces. According to the document, in order to fulfill operational tasks successfully, it would have been necessary to satisfy many needs, including the needs to:

- Modernize aviation by introducing supersonic fighter-bomber aircraft and modern reconnaissance and assault aircraft.
- Substantially strengthen ground forces by improving their organizational structure, expanding their antiaircraft missile defense, ground support aviation, radioelectronic warfare and reconnaissance and by tripling the number of field artillery troops.
- Thoroughly modernize the navy, including replacement of all submarines, and most of the surface ships, and fulfill many other needs.

This document never left the files of the operational planning organ primarily in order to prevent it from falling into Soviet hands and increasing the already substantial pressure on Poland from the Combined Command to accelerate rearming. The contents of the memorandum were known only to a very limited circle of leading personalities of the Ministry of National Defense, and to the Party First Secretary and the Prime Minister. Except for some weak and unsuccessful attempts to modernize the navy, the memorandum precipitated practically no serious, spontaneous initiatives regarding rearming.

In this respect, since the time of Gomulka, there has been an unwritten rule among the leadership circles that Poland as WP partner would fulfill only those armaments obligations agreed upon in collegial resolutions of the WP or in bilateral agreements with the USSR. Nevertheless, it has been increasingly difficult to reconcile these obligations with the enormous social and economic needs of Poland.

At the same time, the Soviet appetite for arms constantly grew larger as did the pressures for introducing new armament

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programs, particularly since Marshal Kulikov assumed command over the CAF. Related bilateral negotiations were becoming progressively more difficult. The Soviets never agreed to make the increase in armaments spending conditional on proportionate growth of national revenues. The Soviets considered this an internal matter of the individual member state.

According to the interpretation of the Combined Command planning by Kulikov and Gribkov, the only determinants of each member state's national defense effort should be the needs created by war requirements and the capability of the domestic arms industry to meet those needs. During the negotiations of armaments plans for 1981-85, conducted from November 1978 to January 1981, the Combined Command refused to take into consideration the exceptional situation in Poland related to the failing economy and open crisis. In private, the Soviets accused the Poles outright of violating agreements on common defense tasks when the Poles showed hesitation in accepting armaments obligations. In this case, the Poles accepted most of the Combined Command demands. However, the deepening crisis and economic collapse forced the Polish political-military leadership (Jaruzelski and Siwicki) to review the war tasks of the PAF. During the summer of 1981, with the tacit approval of Jaruzelski and Siwicki, a small group of officers of the PAF General Staff, assisted by staffs of the front, combined arms armies, air army and the Navy, began a comprehensive reevaluation of operational plans. Updating of the operational plans, called for by the Soviet General Staff, served as the pretext. In reality, the purpose was to prepare a well grounded proposal for introducing changes in operational tasks which in the future would lessen Soviet pressures.


At the end of October 1981, appropriate proposals were prepared on the working level of the PAF General Staff (by the Deputy Chief of the PAF General Staff for Operational Matters and by Directorate I). On 9 November 1983, these proposals were discussed at a meeting of the Collegium of the Chief of the General Staff of the PAF.

The prepared options contained a proposal to relieve the PAF of some of the operational tasks related to offensive operations against Denmark, or limit the first operation of the PAF front to Danish territory and the northern FRG (excluding the Netherlands and Belgium).

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In the event that one of the options was accepted by the Soviet General Staff, one of the following was envisaged:

- in the minimum program -- more favorable conditions for the PAF to fulfill the war tasks while maintaining a more moderate rate of force expansion.
- in the maximum program -- maintaining the PAF on a level at which in time of peace there would exist vis-a-vis the potential opponent approximate or even slight advantage (1.2 to 1) in the balance of forces, while in time of war (after mobilization) there would be a 2.5 or 3 to 1 advantage, if US forces are not counted.

As mentioned above these were proposals of the working level of PAF General Staff, and their fate is not known. Most likely, even if the proposals were approved by the Collegium of the Chief of General Staff and subsequently by Jaruzelski, further action on the matter would have been postponed until more opportune times. In the complicated Polish situation, the most that could have happened would have been an agreement, justified by the operational axis and envisaged reinforcement by NATO of the north-coastal axis (by a US Marine division or even by the US 3rd Corps) to limit the first operation of the PAF front to the Danish territory and to the northwestern part of West Germany only.

Viewed in light of past experiences, it is not likely then that the Soviet Stavka will consider any suggestions limiting the war tasks of the PAF. Recent experience indicates that those tasks constitute a crucial Soviet demand in bilateral negotiations on development plans for the national armed forces comprising the CAF, and for rendering services and obligations on behalf of the common defense.

8. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING SYSTEM

1. OBJECTIVES AND TASKS

The planning of military development is the broadest field in the integrated system of WP defense planning. In military developmental planning the conclusions and postulates derived from operational planning are converted into concrete plans for

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fulfillment. Its main purpose is the unceasing adjustment of the capabilities of the armed forces and the infrastructure of the TVD to constantly changing requirements for conducting offensive operations against NATO states.

The military developmental planning system that holds all Warsaw Pact states together was established in the early 1970s, primarily on the basis of the PCC resolution of 17 March 1969. The system is highly centralized and is a natural extension of Soviet military developmental planning. All undertakings concerned with military development, on the scale of the WP as a whole and as individual WP states (except the USSR), are officially initiated and coordinated by the CAF Combined Command, based on authority granted in the Peacetime Statute of the CAF. The Soviet General Staff, whose role was not clearly defined until about the end of 1969 when the Peacetime Statute was accepted, remains in the shadows. Nevertheless, judging by the routine of work of the Combined Command Staff and the CAF Technical Committee, and indirectly by documents on CAF operational planning, as well as by informal statements of the CinC and the CAF Chief of Staff, it is irrefutably clear that at the very summit of this system stands not the Combined Command, but the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

2. TYPES OF PLANS

The broad system of military developmental planning is based mainly on five-year plans, which ensure the close coordination of military undertakings with production and delivery of new weapons and military equipment. However, since the beginning of the 1970s within the framework of developmental planning, additional plans contributing to or working alongside of the five-year plans have been accepted, including:

- Long-range programs for developing selected fields of defensive potential of the WP states.
- Plans for joint defense investments.
- Supplemental plans.
- Joint R&D plans.

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Also plans for joint training undertaking and the CAF budget have been adopted annually since that time.

To streamline military developmental planning, the Combined Command planned to accept a Polish proposal supported by other WP states, to introduce 15 to 25-year forecasts beginning in 1982-83. Also, annual joint training was to be supplemented by outlines of five-year plans.

C. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEM WITHIN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES AND GOVERNMENTS

The military-civilian planning system, integrated within the national economies and governments of the Warsaw Pact member states, encompasses primarily:

- Operational preparation of territories of the WP member states as components of the TVD.
- Production of armaments and military equipment necessary for development of the armed forces and for export.
- Preparation for war production, mutual deliveries and industrial coproduction within the framework of the so-called "Wartime Annual Plan."
- Military-civilian research and development (R&D) programs specifically serving the development of new technology and new types of weapons and military equipment.
- The latest civil defense problems.
- Weapons trade within the framework of "foreign aid."

All the above mentioned fields of planning of the individual member states are "coordinated," that is, controlled by appropriate military and civilian organs of the Soviet Union and its representatives either at the Combined Command or CEMA.


1. OPERATIONAL PLANNING PREPARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT TERRITORY AS PART OF THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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Planning operational preparation of the territories of the WP states as part of the TVD is directed by the Soviet General Staff through the Combined Command, which in these matters issues appropriate recommendations to the individual WP states and concludes agreements with them in the form of bilateral protocols, then checks and enforces the fulfillment of these protocols.

2. ARMAMENT PRODUCTION PLANNING

Planning of production, delivery, and repair of armament and military equipment within the WP framework is coordinated within two channels--military and civilian--which cooperate closely and often duplicate the same effort.

The military organs demand, often organize, supervise and enforce the production of armaments and military equipment as well as their repair for own need and in the interest of other WP armies.

The civilian organs, on the other hand, make decisions regarding inclusion of armament production plans specified by the military organs into the national socio-economic plans, and into the ministry, branch and plant production plans. They plan coproduction links, conclude intergovernmental agreements on sale of licenses, and agreements on special mutual turnovers.

The chief military organ determining the production, mutual deliveries and repairs of armament and military equipment for the WP is the Soviet Ministry of Defense, especially the Soviet General Staff and the Main Directorate for Armaments. The Soviet Ministry of Defense presents its initiatives chiefly through the CEMA Defense Industry Commission and the Combined Command and its specialized organ for armaments, the CAF Technical Committee.

The chief civilian organ coordinating production planning, mutual deliveries and repairs of armament for the WP is Gosplan. Its coordination function is performed chiefly through commercial methods (offers to initiate production based on licenses, market proposals, etc.) by the CEMA Defense Industry Commission. The procedures and methods for production planning, mutual deliveries and repairs of armaments and

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military equipment are presented, based on the example of plans for 1981-85, in Chapter IV of this study.

3. PRODUCTION PLANNING OF THE WARTIME ANNUAL PLAN

Production plans of the Wartime Annual Plan are prepared for the event of the threat of war or war, in order to determine fulfillment of national social-economic plans and to be prepared to switch over the entire production potential of the WP states to war purposes at any time. The plan encompasses a 12-month time span that can start on any given day of the calendar year.

Preparation of wartime production plans of the Wartime Annual Plan is the responsibility of each member state, and is based on requirements stemming from operational plans. On a WP scale, national production plans of the Wartime Annual Plan are coordinated in the field of:

- Armament production and delivery of materials and strategic raw materials by the CEMA Defense Industry Commission.
- General military deliveries probably by CEMA Committee for Coordination of Planning.

The Wartime Annual Plan production plans are verified every five years on national and allied level.

4. MILITARY-CIVILIAN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PLANNING

Military-civilian scientific research is one of few areas in which the control of USSR and its representatives in the WP and CEMA is not felt to be so overbearing. Despite the fact that scientific research in the field of defense on the WP level is formally coordinated both by the military organs (the Combined Command) and the civilian organs (CEMA), the WP states have large freedom of movement in this area and the extent of their participation in research and development work depends not only on the USSR but on their own creativity.

The reason for this appears to be the fact that in the field of research and development the USSR depends chiefly on its own potential. This can be understood when we note that in

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designing new weapons the USSR to a large degree utilizes secretly the scientific and technological gains of the West, particularly of those states which the USSR holds to be its main enemies. This situation is reflected in the equipment introduced into the WP armed forces after 1980, the decided majority of which (over 80%) is produced on Soviet licenses.

In general, however, scientific advances registered by the WP states are substantial and greater from one year to the next. At the end of the 1970s in the framework of the plan for scientific-research and experimental-engineering work coordinated by the Combined Command the WP states devised about 200 new models of weapons and military equipment. In the 1970s the CAF Technical Committee received from Poland alone about 60 new models of weapons and military equipment.

5. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING

In the past, the planning of civil defense (CD) belonged to the authority of national governments and administrations of the WP states. However, in 1976, the Combined Command initiated coordination of CD exercises in border zones of the WP states, and then in 1977--faced with no resistance from the member states (except Romania)--submitted official requirements for drawing up an organizational framework for CD obligations on behalf of the CAF (support of Soviet Armed Forces transit, and assistance in eliminating the results of strikes delivered by mass destruction weapons to Soviet forces and installations). Since 1978, problems in developing certain fields of CD (e.g. creation of an integrated automated nuclear burst and contamination detection in the European theater) were included in the CAF development plans. It appears to be only a matter of time until the Combined Command assumes total control over the planning of WP states' civil defense.


6. WEAPONS TRADE COORDINATION WITHIN THE FOREIGN AID FRAMEWORK

Before 1980, weapons trade within the framework of foreign aid belonged to the authority of the national party-government organs of the WP states. Against the background of competition for the hard currency markets of the Arab nations, as well as certain conflicts of interests among the WP states in dealing with the developing countries, the Soviets in 1979 attempted to

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initiate coordination of the activities of all the WP states in the field of so called "aid to developing countries" by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, making it the sole, principal coordinator. However, the WP states rejected the Soviet draft of the statute pertaining to this matter on the assumption that "aid to developing countries" does not consist strictly of military matters but frequently is related to economic, technical, food, medical, and other aid.

At the beginning of 1980, the Soviets changed the context of the proposed statute, limiting its resolutions to military matters. As a result, the WP states reluctantly accepted the new version. Since 1980, armaments trade within the framework of "foreign aid" on a Warsaw Pact scale has been coordinated by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and on a national scale, by the ministries of defense of the individual states.

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Chapter III

FIVE YEAR PLANS FOR DEVELOPING THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

The five year plans for developing the CAF of the WP states comprehensively formulate the tasks for the organizational-technical development of all the branches of the armed forces of all the national armies assigned to the CAF, and for development and special preparation of the infrastructure of the TVD.

Although only general and rather overall guidelines to plans are studied, recommended, and accepted for the WP as a whole, detailed five-year plans are prepared separately for each WP state (except the USSR), in which process the Combined Command unquestionably plays the decisive role. The role of national authorities is limited to:

- first, accommodation of themselves to the draft of the military development plan prepared by the Combined Command;
- second, negotiation of a more acceptable variant of the plan, and signing appropriate agreements with the Combined Command;
- third, implementation of the accepted variant in the national five-year plan.

The process of planning the five-year development of the armed forces precedes national economic planning by approximately two years in the USSR, and by at least a year in the other WP states. Adaptation of this principle on the WP scale facilitates:


- placing military orders with the WP states' defense industry on a priority basis;
- earlier balancing of investments required by the defense industry and their inclusion in the national economic plans;
- appropriate early balancing of the capabilities of meeting armed forces needs from national production and

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import; which in turn facilitates defining the final size of defense investments (budgets of the ministries of defense), and secures the funds at the time the national gross income is allocated for the five-year period.

Work on five-year plans for developing the CAF is conducted simultaneously on the military and defense economic planes in the sphere of arms production. On the military plane, the principal actors are the Soviet General Staff, the Combined Command, the collegial organs of the WP, and the national commands. On the economic/defense plane, the participants are the Soviet General Staff, central institutions of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, service commands, the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, and the central planning organs of the WP member states.

Frequently, the various organs involved in planning Soviet armament production, including the Combined Command, contract directly with individual member states and offer production licenses or maintenance services for specific types of armament and military equipment, bypassing the CEMA Defense Industry Commission.

On the military plane, five phases can be distinguished in the process of preparing plans for military development.

The first phase takes place (almost unnoticeably to the WP member states) in the Soviet General Staff, the central institutions of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, including those responsible for supply, and the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces.


In this phase, the main and comprehensive goals of the five-year period are determined, and based on the analyses of operational plans and initially balanced capabilities of armament production--a number of concrete developmental tasks is established. Judging by the routine work of certain key functionaries of the Combined Command, the Staff, and the Technical Committee of the CAF involved in some of this work, it was apparent that this phase begins in the first and at the latest in the second year of the current five-year period, that is, at least four years before implementation of the plan in preparation, and ends at the latest in the first half of the third year of the current five-year period. At this time

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the Soviet General Staff issues to the Combined Command guiding rules for preparation of the WP five-year plans.

These guiding rules definitely contain among other things: (1) a final definition of the main trends for developing the CAF during the five-year period and determination of peacetime and wartime strengths, organization, armament and equipment, level of combat readiness, mobilization, and stockpiles for each national army for the same period. (2) allocation limits of weapons from planned Soviet production and partly from the stocks of the Soviet armed forces for the needs of the CAF (less Soviet armed forces), and general conceptions about meeting the rearming needs of the CAF production of the WP states. (3) comprehensive tasks for all the WP member states (except the USSR) in the field of preparation of their territories as part of the TVD.

In the second phase, planning processes officially begin within the framework of the WP through study and acceptance by the collegial organs (PCC, CDM, and MC of the CAF) of general resolutions appropriate for each of these organs, prepared by the Combined Command and pertaining to development of the CAF during the subsequent five-year period.

According to the accepted procedure, the collegial organs pass resolutions no later than the end of the third year of the current five-year period, or two years before passing resolutions on the national five-year plan, containing:

- recommendations of the Combined Command for developing national armies during the five-year period.
- tactical-technical information on armament and equipment recommended for introduction into service during the subsequent five-year period.

In addition, in this phase the CAF Technical Committee, jointly with the Defense Industry Commission of CEMA, organized exhibitions of new weapons and equipment where initial commercial offers are provided by the exhibiting states (prices, delivery dates, and the like).

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The recommendations of the CinC mentioned above and information pertaining to equipment are forwarded to the national armies barely three or four months after the PCC and CDM have passed appropriated resolutions, that is, in the first quarter of the third year of the current five-year period: exhibitions are organized during the first six months of the same year.

The fourth phase begins when the recommendations of the Combined Command reach the national armies. This is the phase where the real effort takes place in finalizing the five-year plans for development of the individual national armies. This work is carried out simultaneously at:

- the Combined Command and is referred to as "Preparation of the Bilateral Protocol on Assignment of Armies and Fleets from the National Armed Forces to the CAF, and their Development During the Five-Year Period," and
- the national armed forces, where recommendations of the CinC are reconciled with the national concepts for developing their own armed forces and their own national economic capabilities.

In the fifth phase, the Combined Command coordinates its drafts of the "Bilateral Protocols on Assigned Armies and Fleets from the National Armed Forces to the CAF, and their Development During the Five-Year Period" with the national commands. At the same time, on the economic plane, agreements of the "Protocol on Mutual Deliveries of Armament and Equipment for the Subsequent Five-Year Period" are coordinated.

This is the longest and most sensitive phase of planning work, extending from about the middle of the fourth year to the end of the fifth year of the current five-year period. The signing of the "Bilateral Protocols" and the interstate agreements on mutual deliveries, which takes place toward the end of last year of the current five-year period, is the final act of five-year planning on a WP scale.


On the economic-defense plane (in the sphere of armament production) work is carried out in close cooperation with military planning in two phases.

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The first phase closely follows the first phase of military planning and consists of initial balancing of armament production and delivery capabilities of the USSR and WP member states industry. In this phase, the planning organs of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and Gosplan determine the general specialization concepts, co-production, maintenance, and mutual deliveries of armaments and military equipment in coordination with CEMA Defense Industry Commission or using already existing contracts with the industry of the WP states.

The second phase, which starts when the planning process within the framework of WP begins and ends when the protocol on mutual deliveries of armament and equipment for the subsequent five-year period is signed, is primarily concerned with the Soviet presentation of comprehensive offers to sell production licenses to the individual member states and starting production of armament by their industry. Production plans are constantly adjusted to conform with successively improved military plans.

The CEMA Defense Industry Commission is only a nominal coordinator of work in this field. Its function is limited exclusively to exchange of information on technical production and organization of multilateral consultations on mutual deliveries.

The real power behind all initiatives, the most important being commencement of armament production in the individual WP member states, is the Combined Command and its highly qualified organ, the Technical Committee of the CAF. Together they clear the way for the Soviet economic planning organs, including Gosplan, the industrial ministries, and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

A. PRINCIPLE PROCEDURES AND WORK METHODS IN PREPARING THE FIVE YEAR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN (USING 1981-85 AS AN EXAMPLE)

1. STUDY AND ACCEPTANCE BY WARSAW PACT COLLEGIAL ORGANS OF RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE GENERAL PROGRAM FOR THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

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a. SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE WARSAW PACT FORUM:

In accordance with the established routine, at the beginning of November 1978, i.e., about three weeks before the PCC session, the WP Defense Ministers received materials for this session from CAF Marshal Kulikov along with the request that these be presented to the party-political leadership for coordination. These materials contained:

- points taken up in the report presented by the CAF entitled "State of Developing Military Cooperation of the CAF of the WP States."
- a draft PCC resolution bearing on the CAF CinC report.

These points took 11 typewritten Russian-language pages and consisted of three chapters successively dealing with:

- direction and scale of NATO military preparations.
- evaluation of the present state of CAF armament and equipment and chief directions of their expansion in the period 1981-85.
- the problem of improving CAF command and control including the Statute and the organs which control these forces in wartime.

In regard to armaments the draft PCC resolution concluded that:

(1) CAF expansion plans for 1981-85 should take note that:

- the combat strength and total number of the CAF will be maintained at a level not lower than that given in the "protocols" at the end of the 1976-80 five-year plan.
- each national army should have additional formations for time of war, large reserve tactical units and other units necessary to increase the efforts or to replace the battle losses suffered in the first months of war and during the course of further action.

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- there should be a significant increase in comparison with the 1976-80 five-year plan of efforts to rearm the troops with new and unified armaments and military equipment.
- each WP army should be certain to have up to 90-100 percent of unified armament and equipment, including rockets and artillery, tanks, aviation equipment, AA missiles, rocket and torpedo cutters, and antisubmarine and communications craft.
- each WP army should organize advanced subunits (yacheyka in Russian) equipped with the most modern armament and military equipment to serve as the basis for further rearming of troops to be completed by 1990.

This point resolved that the development plans of troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF should be drafted during 1979 and 1980 and should be legalized by the end of 1980 in the form of bilateral protocols.

(2) The WP states should take into account an increase in outlays for armaments and military equipment "giving consideration for the tempo of rearmament."

(3) The WP states should make an effort to intensify the production of modern models of armament and military equipment as well as the timely implementation of production plans and military delivery plans.

Almost at the same time that the ministers of defense of the WP states received the materials for the PCC session, they also received documents from the Combined Command for the 11th CDM session scheduled to take place on 4-7 December 1979 in Berlin.

In regard to armaments planning for 1981-85 the CDM documents contained the following:

- main points of the presentation of Soviet Ministry of Defense representative Army General P. Ivashutin as the initial matter for consideration on the agenda of the CDM session. Ivashutin's report was entitled "The Status and Prospects of Development of the NATO Forces"

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and included a draft CDM resolution on this matter. (This subject was to serve as introduction for the study of the actual theme, namely the planning of WP armament for 1981-85).

- points taken up in the report presented by CAF CinC Marshal Kulikov as the next point of the CDM session agenda entitled "General Direction of the CAF of the WP States During the Period 1981-85" and a draft CDM resolution in this matter.
- points taken up in the report presented by Deputy CAF CinC for Armaments, Lt. General-Engineer I. A. Fabrikov as the third point of the CDM session agenda. Fabrikov's report was entitled "Providing Armaments and Military Equipment During the Period 1981-85 to the Troops and Naval Forces Assigned to the CAF," and included drafts of the CDM resolutions pertaining to this matter.

The documents referring to the first agenda point revealed nothing new besides the generally known Soviet evaluation of NATO military potential as a factor threatening the WP states' security and peace in Europe. These shallow and prejudiced assessments were, however, necessary to provide a strong and substantial underpinning for the unusually rigid WP armaments programs taken up in the second and third agenda points.

The documents pertaining to the second and third points of the CDM session agenda developed and detailed the PCC resolutions on WP armaments during the years 1981-85.

Marshal Kulikov's report laid down the general policies for all WP armies pertaining to the development of the troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF. The report clearly revealed a precise picture of that which Moscow wanted to attain in each WP army by 1985 at the expense of its allies. The aim of the five-year plan--according to the requirements presented in Kulikov's report--was to further strengthen the combat capability of the troops and naval forces chiefly through introduction of new and modernized models of armaments and equipment, to raise their combat and mobilization readiness, update their organizational structures, command systems, and material and technical support as well as to

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improve the terrain preparation of allied areas as part of the TVD.

Among the most significant requirements of Marshal Kulikov in regard to the WP armies we should list the following:

In the ground forces,


- approximation of the effective strength and organizational structure of the operational and tactical large units of the typical models in the Soviet army.
- raising the number of reserve staffs, tactical large units, and other units organized for time of war.
- significant increase of the combat capabilities of the missile troops through the expansion of the number of missiles launchers in the operational tactical missile brigades and in the tactical missile battalions.
- introduction of a unified organizational structure for an armored and motorized (mechanized) division consisting of one BMP-1 motorized regiment, a 54-gun artillery regiment, an AA missile regiment (with 20 K98 or OSA-AK launchers) a separate missile artillery battalion (13 artillery launchers), a separate combined arms antitank battalion (12 antitank guns and nine self-propelled antitank guided missile launchers).
- rearming parts of tank divisions with T-72 tanks and having in these divisions: one BMP-1 mechanized regiment, one artillery regiment equipped with self-propelled howitzers, one AA missile regiment, and one separate missile artillery battalion.
- reinforcing the field and antitank artillery through formation of:
  - at the front level: an artillery division with 360 guns and antitank artillery brigade consisting of four battalions.
  - at the combined arms army level: an artillery brigade (96 guns), missile artillery regiment (54 artillery

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launchers) and an antitank regiment consisting of three battalions (each unit with 12 antitank guns and nine antitank guided missiles systems).

- continued formation of KRUG and KUB AA missile brigades and regiments within fronts and armies.
- equipping the army ground forces aviation regiments with MI-24D helicopters.
- inclusion in each front of no less than two radioelectronic warfare regiments and in each combined arms army, two radioelectronic warfare battalions.

Marshal Kulikov's requirement in regard to the National Air Defense Forces merely confirmed the decision to continue the long-term program for development of these forces accepted at the 10th PCC Session (held in Budapest in 1977).

In regard to the Air Force Kulikov demanded chiefly:

- initiation of rearming the fighter aviation with MIG-23MF aircraft.
- replacement in fighter-bomber aviation of the old aircraft park with new MIG-23BNs and SU-22Ns and with the SU-25 assault aircraft.
- introduction in reconnaissance aviation of new SU-26M and MIG-25RB aircraft.

He recommended at the same time that all aviation regiments accept a unified organization consisting of 4) combat aircraft and that the formation of the new aviation command and control system based on the Combat Aviation Army Command Center be completed.

Requirements pertaining to the naval forces were very general and only pointed to the need for finding how to increase the number of missile ships and cutters, submarines, and naval aviation of individual fleets.


In the field of operational preparation of the WP state territories as part of the TVO, Marshal Kulikov requested that

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the airfield network be broadened, the shelters for aircraft as well as those of the missile and radiotechnical air defense troops positions be expanded, the naval forces bases be improved and the communications systems be expanded and perfected.

The main points in the report presented by CAF Deputy Cinc for Armaments Fabrikov were actually but a repetition of Kulikov's main points, with the difference that Fabrikov listed in detail the types of armaments and equipment which the Combined Command recommended to be introduced into the armament of the WP armies during 1981-85.

Both reports (Kulikov's and Fabrikov's) were very significant because as CDM drafts that were to be coordinated and approved, their recommendations were to serve as guidelines for drafting the specific plans for each allied army.

The draft resolution dealing with the main policies of CAF development during the years 1981-85 also presented the following recommendations for the Combined Command and the national commands:


- to have by the end of 1985 no less than 75% of modern and modernized armaments and equipment in the ground forces, up to 85% in the aviation forces and the National Air Defense Forces as well as up to 70% in the naval forces.
- to improve the organizational and organic structure of the operational and tactical large units and in the units of all branches of the armed forces in order to increase their combat capability, self-sufficiency, and the efficiency of commanding and controlling them within the framework of the coalitional grouping, considering the specific features of the TVD.
- to increase the fire and assault power of the ground forces as well as their capabilities to maneuver and to engage in self-sufficient operations against tanks and against an air opponent; to introduce a new motorized (mechanized) and tank division organization (now operative) in the Western and Southwestern TVDs; to anticipate the expansion of ground force aviation.

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- to increase in the air forces combat capabilities of frontal aviation in gaining air control, air support of ground force operations, destruction of enemy missile and nuclear means and conduct of reconnaissance; to increase the number of strike aircraft.
- to implement the expansion of National Air Defense in accordance with the 10th CDM Session of December 1977.
- to anticipate for the naval forces an increase in the power of combat vessels and missile cutters, power of mine sweepers and helicopters, further expansion of the naval air forces, restoration of power of submarines and antisubmarine means, introduction into the fleet armaments of new and mobile missile coastal defense systems.
- to continue increasing combat reserves; to stockpile reserves of ammunition and missiles to last two months and of other reserves for three months of war; to pay special attention to stockpiling the appropriate amount of missiles and ammunition needed for the given types of armaments and technology.
- to ensure in the operational preparation of the allied state territories that regrouping and deployment could be supported and defended, that the airport network be increased, fleet bases improved, command and control efficiency facilitated, and the communications net expanded; to continue building up hardened command posts as well as reinforced concrete aircraft shelters.

The draft resolution "Providing the Troops and Naval Forces Assigned to the CAF with Armaments and Military Equipment" contained recommendations for introduction (without indication of quantities) of the following armaments and equipment:

- In the ground forces R-17 operational-tactical and "LUNA-M" tactical missile launchers, BMP-1 infantry combat vehicles, "GOZDIKA," AKATSIYA," and "DANA" self-propelled howitzers, artillery rocket launchers (types not specified), antitank guided missile launchers (also types not given), "FROG" rocket and "STRELA" AA missile

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systems, MI-24D fire support helicopters, new reconnaissance equipment (type not specified), radioelectronic and communications warfare equipment, and new models of equipment for the engineering and technical troops.

- In the air forces the draft resolution recommended priority rearming of fighter-bomber and reconnaissance aviation with the MIG-23BN, SU-25, SU-22M, and MIG-25RB, while the MIG-23MF was to be introduced into fighter aviation.
- In the National Air Defense Forces of the WP states the draft resolution recommended introduction of the MIG-23 and MIG-25 as well as the NEVA short-range missile system, the VOLKHOV intermediate-range and the VEGA-E long-range missile systems together with appropriate modern radar means. In addition, this point demanded the formation of a unified automated system with which to command and control these branches of the armed forces.
- In the naval forces the draft resolution recommended rearmament of the strike forces with PR-877E submarines, PR-1234 and 1341RE missile ships and cutters, MIG-23BN and SU-22M aircraft, PR-1159E, PR-1241PE, PR-133.I ships and MI-14 helicopters for antisubmarine operations, PR-1258, PR-1259, PR-1256, PR-207 minesweepers and MI-148T helicopters for antimine operations, and RUBYEZH mobile missile systems for coastal defense operations.

The draft resolution obligated the national commands and the Combined Command to pay particular attention to working out a plan for starting allied states' production by specific deadlines of new models of armament and military equipment, in accordance with specifications already agreed upon.

A separate point of the CDM draft resolution pertaining to organizational matters obligated the CAF staff "to work out, together with the allied armies general (main) staffs, concrete and specific recommendations regarding the development of naval forces assigned by the individual WP states to the CAF during the years 1981-85" and to transmit these recommendations to the individual armies during January-February 1979.

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## B. WARSAW PACT STATE REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET ARMAMENT PROPOSALS FOR 1981-85

The Soviet initiatives on armament during the five-year period of 1981-85 which, according to initial estimates, required outlays for defense to increase almost threefold, probably overwhelmed all WP states with their intensity. Unofficial contacts between the general (main) staffs of the Polish Armed Forces, the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Army revealed that despite the anguish caused, no WP state except for Romania dared to turn down the Soviet proposals as a whole, but neither did any state have the intention of implementing them fully. The only important problem on which they intended to take a common stand was the need for a more precise statement in the PCC resolution regarding the level of increase of defense outlays; timid thought was given to a formula similar to that accepted by the NATO states for their armaments programs for the 1980s, which devoted about a 3 percent annual increase in defense outlays. Also, a common position was to be taken concerning reduction of the Combined Command proposed indicators of unification of armaments and equipment which the WP armies were to attain by the end of 1985.

CAF CinC representatives tried almost from the very beginning to obtain the opinions of national commands vis-a-vis proposals made in the PCC and CDM resolutions. It may be assumed that their impressions from the national defense ministries and the subsequent reports they transmitted on this matter to Moscow were worrisome, because CAF CinC Kulikov and CAF Chief of Staff Gribkov decided to hold at least one other special round of "clarifying talks" with all defense ministers and chiefs of general (main) staffs of the WP armies prior to the PCC and CDM Sessions. In mid-November 1978 they visited successively Sofia, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, and Strausberg (GDR).

During these talks--which, like those in Poland, were at times highly undiplomatic in language--the Soviets backed down only in regard to the PCC resolution note obligating the WP armies to have by the end of 1985 at least 90 percent unified armaments and equipment: they revised this to at least 70 percent. But they firmly rejected suggestions put forward by many WP states that the PCC resolution specify a precise

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defense outlay growth indicator. Here the Russians took a hard line saying that "we are communists and not some small-time wily merchandisers haggling about percentages; no price can be put on the defense of a socialist state." In regard to other developmental demands presented in the PCC and CDM resolutions, they gave the WP states the impression that these resolutions were in the nature of general guidelines for all WP armies, and that in the process of drafting specific plans it would be possible to take into consideration the specific situation and condition of each national army.

At the 23 November 1978 PCC session in Moscow only Romania rejected the resolutions proposed by the Combined Command concerning military matters. Chiefs of the other states not only accepted the Moscow postulates but most of them also condemned the position of Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu. At that the Romanian delegation left the PCC meeting hall. In the absence of Romania the other WP states accepted the resolution without any objection whatsoever.

The 11th CDM Session which took place two weeks later (4-7 December 1978 in Berlin), although accompanied by sharp polemics with the Romanian delegation, was less dramatic. The Romanian delegation did not reject the CDM resolution on armaments initiated by the Combined Command, but it affirmed categorically that the 23 November 1978 PCC resolutions on military matters were not binding for Romania. In the matter of armaments Romania would be guided by the resolutions of the Romanian Communist Party as well as by the political declaration accepted by all WP states, including Romania, on 23 November 1978.

During the discussion the defense ministers of the other WP states abjectly expressed their servile homage to the Combined Command armaments concept and asserted full backing for the proposed CDM resolutions. We must, however, make it clear that most of the defense ministers' presentations had less to do with the Soviet armaments concepts than with their own past achievements in this field, and that these presentations at such a forum laid the groundwork to eventually avoid the fulfillment of many of the developmental undertakings demanded by the Combined Command. As an illustration we may take the presentation of Army General Jaruzelski, Polish Minister of National Defense.

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Jaruzelski knew well (because the Polish Armed Forces General Staff had appraised him in great detail) that Poland, even with enormous outlays that would increase its capabilities several times, would not be able to implement even half of the Soviet armaments proposals. Despite this, he, as an idealistic communist and basically loyal friend of the USSR, could not see how it was possible to reject the Soviet demands.

But, because he also could not see any chance of implementing these demands, he selected a typical communist operational method of loyal pro-USSR dodging. On the one hand he declared "full support for the CDM resolutions" but on the other hand he asserted something along the following lines: "the whole matter of the Combined Command recommendations in the field of strengthening CAF defense we treat as a goal which we will try to achieve and which establishes the framework and priority tasks of our activities." The words "we will try" were pictured by Jaruzelski as an attempt to weaken the significance of Polish obligations, which Poland had accepted with the signature of its minister of national defense below the CDM resolutions.

Other examples of such dodging were the following statements:

We will try to maintain the recommended tempo of rearmament. But in certain types of equipment we must retain present generations while at the same time paying particular attention to increasing efficiency, effectiveness and tactical-technical parameters through modernization.

This was to introduce the thought that the Polish Armed Forces would not attain the level of unification in armaments and equipment specified in the CDM draft resolution.

We cannot be equally strong in all fields; for that reason we are establishing appropriate priorities taking care at the same time that the expansion of the armed forces be harmonious and systematic. Our greatest care will be given to the forces assigned to the CAF, although we know that even here there will be weak spots.


This thought was to indicate that the Polish Armed Forces were

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going to opt for selective not general implementation of the armaments programs.

The phrase "We consider the most realistic approach to strengthening our frontal aviation to be starting production on Soviet license of the SU-25 aircraft and introducing it into the armament of the air army," accompanied by simultaneous omission in that portion of the presentation of all other aircraft types recommended by the Combined Command (such as the SU-22M, MIG-23, and MIG-25), was formulated to indicate that the Polish Armed Forces did not intend to introduce new types of aircraft other than the SU-25.

Successive enumerations of improvements in the Polish Armed Forces during the current five-year plan in tank equipment and through increases in the capabilities of engineer, chemical, and communications troops were considered by Jaruzelski to be not so much the result of rough implementation of past CDM resolutions as a device for arresting the tempo of development in the Polish Armed Forces of this portion of defense during the 1980s.

The statement that all combat air regiments have a permanent base and one reserve airport each, the announcement that Poland had implemented up to 80 percent of the planned regiment road-airfield segments, and a later assertion that "all projects bearing on operational preparation of the national area as part of the TVD will be further developed in accordance with the economic capabilities of the country," were intended to indicate not the intent to implement demands to further expand the airfield network in Poland but rather the decision to reject this task. But who was and is now on the receiving end of this rhetoric?

When Jaruzelski left the CDM podium he did not attempt to hide from the Polish Armed Forces delegation he headed how proud he was that he managed with a single stroke to fulfill his international obligation. He had done this by fully supporting the CDM resolutions introduced by Moscow while saving a hundred billion zlotys previously marked for investment in armaments.

Noting the presentations of the other WP defense ministers it was easily seen that they had selected a similar method of

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equivocation and dodging. But who in this yawning bunch of marshals impatiently waiting for approval of the Soviet-initiated CDM resolutions could or wanted to understand this obstruse language? Although the contents of the presentation were filed, they never constituted official documents of the CDM sessions. If a Committee member did not declare his comments on the CDM resolutions as formal then the content of his presentation was not reflected in even a single sentence of the protocol. It sufficed that he had been present and had signed the resolution. The ineffectiveness of these methods quickly came to light during the successive phases of work on the five-year CAF development plans.

2. ISSUANCE BY THE COMBINED COMMAND OF A DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR PLANNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL ARMIES

b. COMBINED COMMAND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the CDM acceptance on 7 December 1978 of a resolution that included a statement obligating the CAF Staff to "work out jointly with the general (main) staffs detailed recommendations for individual armies regarding their development during 1981-1985," the CAF Staff did the work without any assistance under overall supervision of the Soviet General Staff and other central institutions and branches of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

At the beginning of March 1979 the general (main) staffs of the WP armies received ready-made recommendations concerning the development of troops and naval forces assigned from their countries to the CAF.

The recommendations, transmitted to Poland (addressed to the Chief, General Staff, Polish Armed Forces) consisted of the text and five attachments in the form of tabulated figures.

The text contained a preamble and 27 pages of specific recommendations. The preamble contained a statement, which was contrary to the CDM resolution, that the:

CinC and the CAF Staff, basing themselves on the resolutions of the Congresses of CPSU and the PUWP, the PCC and the CDM of the WP states, taking into consideration the

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aggressive behavior of the NATO bloc which continues the armament race and feverishly develops missile-nuclear means and conventional means of mass destruction in all branches of the armed forces, aiming to ensure the collective readiness and combat capability of the CAF for an effective defense of the interest of the socialist coalition, recognizing the indispensability of further improvement of the organizational structure of troops and naval forces of the PPR and of their equipment with modern gear and combat equipment, see the necessity of working out the plan for the development of troops and naval forces in the PPR assigned to the CAF during the years 1981-85 as being guided by the following...

This introduction was followed by a detailed six chapter enumeration of all developmental projects which the Polish Armed Forces should implement by the year 1985.

Chapter I, the most extensive, contained concrete regulations pertaining to the numerical strength of troops assigned from Poland to the CAF as well as the combat composition, organizational structures, armaments and equipment of all component parts of the PPR armed forces from the front level down to the individual units. As an example, we have the regulation that "the total strength of troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF should consist in peacetime of 243-245 thousand men and in wartime 650 thousand men..." and that the "front operational-tactical missile brigade would consist of three battalions (12 missile launchers), the army brigade--two battalions (eight missile launchers); each brigade should have two batteries with two R-17 missile launchers each." The missile battalions in full-strength divisions should have four missile launchers each, while those in the skeletonized divisions should have three LUNA-M missile launchers (with each battalion consisting of two batteries). The missile units are to be equipped with the YASKER-5374 command points, etc.

Chapter II formulated rather generalized tasks in the field of combat and mobilization readiness. For instance:

"To introduce a new system of shifting the troops and naval forces from peacetime to wartime status and to ensure full and standardized implementation of the CAF Combined Command Directive on Combat Readiness..." etc.

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Chapter III presented specific tasks in regard to the improvement of the troops and naval forces command systems. For instance:

"Commands of the front and of the combined arms armies should be reorganized in accordance with the attached organizational diagram....," "Introduction of the MI-8 'Volga' air command points....," etc.

Chapter IV presented tasks pertaining to improving rear support for the troops and naval forces and stockpiling material and technical reserves. For instance:

"To stockpile by the end of 1985 material reserves for 90 days of war, including ground forces ammunition for 50 days, air force and National Air Defense for 60-90 days, and the navy for 90 days..." "For CAF use retain for a specified period in the Combined Command a reserve of 60,000 tons of liquid fuel, including:

- from PPR resources - 30,000 tons (10,000 tons each of gasoline, diesel oil, and aircraft fuel)
- from Soviet resources - 30,000 tons (11,000 tons of gasoline and 19,000 tons of diesel fuel), etc.

Chapter V presented tasks in the field of operational preparation of the PPR territory as a part of the TVD. For instance:

"....for maneuvering of frontal aviation construct within the existing grass airfields, class I airfields with reinforced concrete starting runways, taxiing roadways, aircraft parking areas and necessary depots in the vicinity of ....Debica, Przylep, Wschowa, Gostyn and Michajlow" etc.

Chapter VI presented tasks in the field of geodetic and topographic support within the national territory. For instance:

"to work on the standardization of the content and form of maps used during the conduct of joint operations of allied armies..." (This formulation contained the hidden

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requirement for printing Polish maps with names and notes in the Russian language.)

The attachments with the tabulated recommendations of the CAF CINC and Staff contained:

In Attachment I--a list of armaments and combat equipment necessary to cover the development projects recommended for Polish Armed Forces during 1981-85. This document listed all the types of armaments and equipment which were to be introduced into the Polish Armed Forces, their number and the WP states from which they were to be procured. For instance:

- R-17 launchers -- 12, 12 to be bought in the USSR.
- T-72 tanks -- 517, 517 to be bought in Poland.
- PASUV Command Staff cars -- 39, 12 to be bought in Hungary, eight in Poland, 16 in Czechoslovakia, and three in the USSR.

In Attachment II--a list of large units and other units of PAF engineer troops required during 1981-85 by the Combined Command in peacetime and in wartime together with details as to their combat composition as well as detailed enumeration of their authorized technical equipment.

In Attachment III--a list of large units and other units of PAF chemical troops required during 1981-85 by the Combined Command in peacetime and in wartime together with details on their combat composition as well as detailed enumeration of their authorized technical equipment.

In Attachment IV--a list of large units and other units of PAF communications troops required during 1981-85 by the Combined Command in peacetime and in wartime, together with details as to their combat composition and a detailed enumeration of their authorized technical equipment.

In Attachment V--a list of PAF radioelectronic warfare units required during 1981-85 by the Combined Command in peacetime and in wartime together with details as to their combat composition and a detailed enumeration of their authorized equipment.

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Since the beginning of 1979, these recommendations formally referred only to the troops and naval forces assigned to the CAF. In practice, however, they went further because they contained developmental tasks also for the National Air Defense Forces and requirements pertaining to rear support for military operations and for operational preparations of the national territory as part of the TVD. Thus, we must recognize that their actual scope covered the entire armed forces of the country and that additionally they actually impinged upon the sphere of the national economic infrastructure.

In substance, the recommendations presented a list of Moscow's maximum armaments requirements for the WP states without any regard for their economic situation or capabilities.

b. TACTICAL-TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON RECOMMENDED ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

In accordance with the routine going back to the early 1970s, about the time when the CAF CinC and Staff published their recommendations, the CAF Technical Committee transmitted to the individual defense ministries of the WP states tactical-technical information concerning the recommended armaments and military equipment. Then, in cooperation with the national commands, the Technical Committee organized exhibits in individual countries of equipment which was in production and being offered for sale.

The tactical-technical information about equipment planned to be introduced during the years 1976-80 contained about 500 nomenklatura items, while similar data about equipment to be introduced in the years 1981-85 contained about 600 such items.

In both cases the information was sketchy, describing a single model of equipment, e.g., missile launcher, aircraft, tank, ship, or mine, using less than one double-spaced typewritten page. Colloquially this information on a single type of armament or equipment was known as a "birth certificate" (metryka). It contained the name and symbol of the equipment, its combat application, its most important tactical-technical data, and the country expected to produce it. Prices and delivery data on the specific weapon or equipment, the interested ministries had to turn to the

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producer country or to the license holder (most frequently to the Soviet General Staff) and arrange a consultation. In most cases these data were obtained semiofficially through personal contacts of functionaries from the Ministry of National Defense, commanders of branches of the armed forces and chiefs of arms of troops and services with appropriate Soviet, Cinc Representatives of the CAF with national armies, or even Northern Group of Forces, Soviet Army.

As a rule, all items of the weapons and equipment nomenklatura are demonstrated during special exhibitions in the countries which produce them. These matters are coordinated for the Warsaw Pact by the CAF Technical Committee. But the organization itself of the exhibits was done by the individual defense ministries. Depending on the number and types of equipment demonstrated, the exhibits could be in one or several locations. Invitations to visit the exhibits were sent out to individual army delegations by the ministries of defense or chiefs of general (main) staffs of the countries holding the exhibits. Composition of national army delegations to visit the exhibits were determined by the ministers of defense or chiefs of general (main) staffs of states sending the delegations. Generally delegations consisted of about 30-40 persons representing planning units, specialists and technicians at the level of the defense ministry, commands of branches of the armed forces as well as of the arms of troops and services.

Invitations to visit the exhibit were accompanied by a list of the equipment being demonstrated and by their tactical-technical characteristics, which essentially did not differ from the tactical-technical information distributed by the CAF Technical Committee. In some cases the exhibit organizers also transmitted the delivery terms to the individual ministries.

The exhibits were serviced by military specialists who explained in sufficient detail the purpose and the technical combat virtues of each item displayed, gave explanations and when possible, demonstrated the equipment in actual operation. Upon request the visitor could also receive the necessary commercial information (prices, delivery terms, repairs, coproduction possibilities, etc.).

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3. PREPARATION OF BILATERAL PROTOCOLS ON ASSIGNMENT OF TROOPS AND NAVAL FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL WP MEMBER STATES TO THE CAF AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT DURING A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD

a. ESSENCE OF THE PROTOCOLS

The most important documents detailing WP state armaments obligations toward the Soviet Union every five years are the so-called "Protocols on Assignment of Troops and Naval Forces of Individual WP Member States to the CAF and Their Development During the Five-Year Period."

After 1969 these matters were regulated exclusively by the CAF peacetime statute, which in Article 2 stated that:

The total number of national troops assigned to the CAF in peacetime and in wartime, the composition of large units, other units, rear units and their command organs, their organization, armaments and equipment, size of their material reserves and scope of projects in the field of operational preparation of the national territory are established by each WP member state, taking into consideration recommendations of the CAF CinC and by the defense ministers of each state, and are ratified by the governments of the WP member states.

Provisions of the above-mentioned article, which clearly specified the role of WP governments in determining the level of armaments of their countries, in practice during the 1970s were not fully implemented because:

- the Combined Command and not the governments of the individual WP states (as specified by Article 2) determined the protocols' content. The Combined Command tried to limit the role of the individual member states only to bargaining over the final text of the CAF protocol draft.
- in determining the protocol text the CAF never took into consideration the "available means and economic capabilities" of individual WP members as is firmly asserted in Article 2.


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- Chapter III assigns principal tasks in the field of outfitting ground and naval forces with armaments and equipment.
- Chapter IV deals with crucial tasks in the field of improving rear support and stockpiling for the states' own and allied (actually Soviet) forces.
- Chapter V designates general tasks pertaining to preparation of the territory of the member state as part of the TVD.
- Chapter VI describes final decisions and procedures, stating that all undertakings enumerated in the protocol should be fulfilled by the end of the five-year period, and that any adjustment of provisions of the protocol can be made in an emergency only with the consent of both signatories of the protocol.

All chapters, except the sixth, refer to comprehensive agreements written in the appropriate attachment.

Attachment 1 to the protocol contains a roster of the principal command and control organs, large tactical units and units of the national armies assigned to the CAF for the five-year period. It is in the form of tables organized according to branches of the armed forces, showing successively their peacetime and wartime strengths, deadlines for combat and mobilization readiness of the individual types of operational and tactical large units and other units.

Attachment 2 contains personnel strength and equipment of the basic large tactical units and other units of the national army assigned to the CAF. Within the framework of the branches of the armed forces, large tactical units and other units are listed according to their numerical unit designations, and their peacetime and wartime personnel and equipment strengths are given.

Attachment 3 contains a listing of major items of equipment which should be in the armament of the national army assigned to the CAF. It is in the form of tables listing equipment and is organized according to branch of the armed forces (ground forces, air defense, air force and navy). Types

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of weapons and equipment, their numbers at the end of the five-year period, and their positions in unit classification according to their state of constant combat readiness and according to the mobilization expansion plan are listed in individual columns.

Attachment 4 defines the level of supply stockpiles of the national army assigned to the CAF. Reserves of ammunition, fuels and rations are designated for each individual branch of service first generally in terms of days of war and then specifically giving types of missile and ammunition and units (units of fire, units of replenishment, and rations per day).

Attachment 5 specifies undertakings related to preparation of the national territory as part of the TVD. It is in narrative form and is organized according to the following numbered paragraphs:

- (I) command posts;
- (II) signal communications;
- (III) rail lines;
- (IV) highways;
- (V) inland waterways;
- (VI) sea lanes;
- (VII) air axes, preparation of airfields and combat positions for the means and forces of the National Air Defense;
- (VIII) liquid fuel pipelines;
- (IX) rear support;
- (X) geodetic and topographic support.

The protocol itself (without attachments) is signed by the CAF CinC and the defense minister of the given state and is ratified by the premier of the interested country, and the attachments are signed by the CAF Chief of Staff as well as the

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chiefs of the general (main) staffs of the given armed forces.

b. METHOD OF DRAFTING THE PROTOCOLS

As has been mentioned above, the drafts of the bilateral protocols for individual national armies (except, of course, the Soviet Army) are compiled by the CAF Staff. The general (main) staffs receive them in final form several days (frequently as late as a day or two) before the scheduled coordination session for this document.

The Operations Directorate of the Combined Command Staff prepares the protocol in collaboration with other sections of the CAF Staff and Technical Committee. All phases of its preparation (from first draft to signing) are the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Operations Directorate, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Matters of the CAF, a Soviet general. He answers directly to the CinC and the CAF Chief of Staff. The protocols for Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany are personally prepared by the chief of the Western axis of the Operations Directorate, and for Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary--the chief of the Southwestern axis of the Operations Directorate, both Soviet generals.

The representatives of the national armies are used for explaining specific questions on their armies, and or assisting in routine office matters (typing, proofreading texts). However, they have absolutely no influence on preparation of the substance of the text of the protocol, and are not even allowed to know the contents of the protocol for armies other than their own.

The general and combined arms texts of the protocol are prepared by the axis chiefs of the Operations Directorate of the CAF Staff, while provisions pertaining to the branches of the armed forces and arms of troops and services are prepared by the appropriate chiefs of the specialist sections of the CAF Staff and Technical Committee (e.g., air defense, air force, navy, artillery, antiaircraft defense troops, engineers, chemical, signal, rear, ordnance and other).


The work of the CAF Staff on the protocol for the years 1981-85 was totally uninhibited. In planning the development tasks, no one was the least concerned with economic costs.

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Also totally disregarded were the economic and demographic capabilities of the states concerned. The work was "hand made" without the benefit of computers.

Work on the first drafts of the protocols in the CAF Staff took approximately five months, that is, from January to May 1979. According to statements of persons who participated in this work, the contents of all the protocols were coordinated with the Soviet General Staff before they were coordinated with the national armies.

4. COORDINATION OF BILATERAL PROTOCOLS BETWEEN THE COMBINED COMMAND AND NATIONAL COMMANDS

a. COORDINATION METHODS

Warsaw Pact planning practice over time adopted a three-stage method of arriving at coordination of the "Bilateral Protocols on Assignment of Troops and Naval Forces from Individual States in the CAF and their Five-Year Development."

This method was used in the first part of the 1970s during the work of drafting five-year plans for the period 1975-80 and it was planned to use it at the end of the 1970s in drafting the plans for 1981-85.

The method calls for the following coordination procedures:


- at Stage I, coordination efforts were made at the level of Operations Directorate chiefs, CAF Staff and general (main) staffs of the WP armed forces (about 13 months before the signing of the protocol);
- at Stage II, coordination was performed at the level of CAF chiefs of staff and general (main) staffs of the WP armed forces (about 12 months before the signing of the protocol);
- at Stage III, coordination was done at the level of the CAF CinC and the defense ministers of the WP states (actually as the final formality just before the signing of the document).

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In the process of drafting the 1981-85 plans, as a result of differences between the Combined Command and the national commands that came to light during the first stage of the bilateral coordination of the protocol, in most WP states the coordination as a rule extended over four stages:

- Stage I, in accordance with plan, was at the level of the Operations Directorate chiefs, CAF Staff and the general (main) staffs of the WP armed forces; it took place in May-June 1979.
- Stage II, not preplanned, took place in October 1979 at the level of the CAF deputy chiefs of staff and the general (main) staffs of the WP armed forces.
- Stage III was at the level of the CAF Chief of Staff and the general (main) staffs of the WP armed forces; for most countries, this took place in autumn 1980 but coordination in Poland was delayed with the beginning of January 1981 because of the hectic internal situation.
- Stage IV was at the level of the CAF CinC and the defense ministers just before the bilateral protocols were signed and ratified; this occurred as planned at the end of 1980, except for Poland where coordination was completed on 12 January 1981, shortly after Stage III.

Combined Command delegations during Stages I and II were led by the Operations Directorate chief, who was at the same time CAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The delegations were composed of the appropriate Operations Directorate policy chiefs and included representatives (usually deputy chiefs) of the following organizational units within the Staff and the CAF Technical Committee:


- air and aircraft defense,
- air force,
- navy,
- rear support,

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- armaments and technology,
- artillery,
- communications,
- engineers, and
- chemical troops.

In addition the Combined Command delegations would include--during talks taking place in their own countries--CAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff for the given national armed forces and, when necessary, other officers of the national armed forces serving in the CAF headquarters.

The delegations of the national armies were composed so as to provide the Combined Command representative a counterpart specialist of equal or higher rank. In the Polish case, in view of the difficulties foreseen in reaching agreements, all deputy chiefs of the General Staff, and the chiefs of the Operations, Organization, Material-Technical, and Mobilization Directorates of the General Staff and--as needed--appropriate chiefs and commanders of the branches of the armed forces and services were included in the talks.

During the third state of coordination, the Combined Command was represented by the CAF Chief of Staff, all Cinc deputies and assistants, as well as by the more important deputies of the CAF Chief of Staff, including the deputies for national army matters. The delegations of national armies were headed by their chiefs of staff and their composition varied. For example, in the Polish delegation, in addition to the Chief of Staff, there were only his deputies for Operations and Organization-Mobilization matters and the chief of General Staff Department I for Strategic-Defense Planning.

Deliberations at the first and second stage lasted an average of three days without time limits for day sessions (12 to 16 hours), whereas at the third stage--where only some controversial questions were decided--one day.

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Coordination at the second and third stage was conducted in all national armies according to the same routine. One or two days before the meetings, the CAF CinC, using a special team of officers, sent his own draft of the protocol to serve as the basis for deliberations. Agreements were reached in plenary sessions with all members of both delegations participating. The coordination process consisted of reading the Combined Command version of the protocol and either approval of it or submission by the chairman of the national delegation of his own counterproposals. On controversial matters, both sides presented their arguments. Some problems were discussed within the circle of specialists outside the plenary session.

The results of the negotiations were reported to the superiors of both parties in special reports. In the case of the Combined Command, special reports were addressed to the CAF CinC, who in turn sent them to Ustinov, the Soviet Minister of Defense. The reports of the national general (main) staffs were frequently sent to their own prime ministers, in consideration of the necessity of increasing the defense budget.

In theory, the method of prolonged, multi-stage negotiations could have served the purpose of reaching compromise solutions acceptable to both sides. Regrettably, as practiced in the Warsaw Pact, the method served the on-sided purpose of "softening" the positions of the individual member states and forcefully imposing Soviet plans which were in sharp conflict not only with the interests, but also with the economic capabilities, of the individual member states. However, the experience of 1979-81 indicates that in hard and unyielding negotiations, certain extreme demands of the Soviets can be considerably mitigated, even rejected, as described above in the example of Poland.

b. GENERAL NATURE OF COORDINATING THE BILATERAL PROTOCOLS FOR 1981-85


The course of events in coordinating the protocol with all the WP member states is not a matter of common knowledge. However, from the informal statements of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the CAF for Operational Matters, Lieutenant General Titov, and certain other members of the Combined Command

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delegation, it was apparent that although all member states had serious difficulties accepting the protocol, the difficulties were not so great elsewhere as in Poland.

The least difficult negotiations were with the GDR, whose party, political and military leadership were interested in quantitative as well as qualitative expansion of their own armed forces. The only problems encountered were on organizational structure questions of their armed forces and matters pertaining to the operational preparation of East German territory as a theater of operations, in which matters the Germans at times held different views. Most likely in the case of the GDR, the imposition of excessively difficult and overly expensive services and obligations to be rendered on behalf of the Soviet Armed Forces was involved (i.e., considering territorial limitations and cost of outlays for airfields, bases, stockpiles, fuel pipelines, permanent maintenance and repair facilities).

Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in general approved Soviet proposals, striving to prepare programs for development of their armed forces which could be contained within the limits of a 50 to 60 percent maximum increase in defense outlays for the years 1981-85. However, it can be safely assumed that they, too, resisted acceptance of some of the tasks in the field of operational preparation of their territories as part of the TVD.

Hungary very likely represented its own concepts on how to develop its armed forces, distinctly deviating from the proposal of the Combined Command. Based on various pieces of unconfirmed, fragmentary information available to high military circles of the PAF, it was believed that the Hungarians planned at most a 30 percent increase in their military budget over the 1981-85 period.

Romania, in keeping with President Ceausescu's position at the 1978 session of the PCC in Moscow, most likely totally rejected Combined Command proposals and in counterproposal set its military expenditures for 1981-85 above the level of expenditures of the past five-year period. The Romanians also declared a desire to develop and train their armed forces primarily on the basis of the capabilities of their own armaments industry, and to supplement this with deliveries from


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any source freely selected by the Romanians. According to the Soviets, contrary to these declarations, the Romanians asked for a substantial amount of the latest models of Soviet equipment, but the Soviets allegedly turned down the request.

In Poland there was a strong clash of two different concepts for the development of the PAF.

A draft of the protocol prepared by the Combined Command expressed the extreme measures concept to be fully implemented in the PAF, regardless of costs. Fulfillment of the provisions of the protocol would require for 1981-85 a military budget reaching the sum of 1.025 billion zlotys (in 1975 prices), which in relation to expenditures for 1976-80, would represent almost a three-fold increase (283 percent). In addition, the Combined Command draft in many instances exceeded the provisions of the resolutions passed by the collegial organs of the WP, and contained many new obligations and services on behalf of the Soviet Armed Forces which stood in conflict with previous agreements with the USSR.

The concept proposed by the PAF General Staff took into consideration Polish obligations stemming from the 1978 resolutions of the PCC and CDM, and went far toward meeting the recommendations of the Combined Command. However, allowing for worsening of the Polish economic situation (during the 1981-85 period, growth of the gross national revenue was expected to be only 17 percent, and net national revenue for distribution only 10 to 11 percent), the concepts were based on the assumption that the military budget for the period could not exceed 553.3 billion zlotys, allowing it to be higher than the budget of 1976-80 by 51.8 percent, including 231.8 million zlotys for purchase of armaments and military equipment (an increase of 81.4 percent.)


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Coordination of the protocol's text concerning assignment of Polish troops and naval forces and their development during 1981-85 went on for one and one half years. During the four-stage, rather difficult negotiations, the two sides significantly altered their positions. Because of the rapidly worsening economic situation in Poland, the USSR was forced to make several concessions, but it had enough power to force Poland to accept more than it could fulfill and more than what the Poles themselves had decided to do in regard to armaments.

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B. POLISH-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS OF THE BILATERAL PROTOCOL FOR 1981-85

1. POLISH-SOVIET CONTROVERSIES OCCASIONED BY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR 1981-85

Because of the general premise initially adopted by Poland that outlays for the armed forces during 1981-85 could not rise by more than 51.8%, the first version of the draft of the development plan put out by the Polish General Staff ignored many of the development demands made by the Combined Command. Specifically, in the ground forces the Poles rejected the following programs:


- formation of an additional two or three reserve mechanized divisions and three reserve mechanized regiments (rejected because of Poland's shortage of reserve weapons, equipment and essential reserves of supplies and material).
- reorganization of all armored, mechanized and reserve divisions into a new, standard organizational structure (it was envisaged that only one armored division could be partially reorganized).
- rearming one armored and one mechanized division with T-72 tanks (planned national production of the T-72 could ensure introduction of these tanks only into one armored division).
- increase of the number of infantry combat vehicles in an armored division from 109 to 150, and in the first echelon mechanized divisions, from 109 to 120.
- increase of the number of operational-tactical rocket launchers on front and army level from a total of 24 launchers to 36 launchers (the PAF General Staff proposed an increase from 24 to 28 launchers), and introduction into tactical large units of a total of 22 LUNA-M tactical rocket launchers (the PAF General Staff proposed a total of 15 launchers).

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- saturation of ground forces with indirect fire artillery pieces: tactical large units with self-propelled GOZDIKA howitzers, and operational level units, with self-propelled AKATSIYA and DANA howitzers, 130mm guns, and GRAD launchers for delivering salvo fires (the PAF Ground Staff proposed approximately 30 percent less artillery in mechanical divisions, and up to 50 percent less in armored divisions than the Combined Command draft of the protocol recommended).
- introduction of the proposed number of KUB antiaircraft systems and STRELA-2 shoulder-fired missiles.

In the National Air Defense Forces, the PAF General Staff refused:

- withdrawal from national defense of 14 AA battalions of old DVINA and VOLKHOV models and replacement with new VOLKHOV and NEVA models.
- formation of five battalions of VEGA long range AA missiles (the PAF General Staff proposed three battalions).
- rearming of two fighter aviation regiments of the National Air Defense Forces with MiG-23 aircraft (the PAF General Staff proposed one regiment) and the initiation of the introduction of the newest models of MiG-25P aircraft (eight aircraft).

In the Air Force the PAF General Staff refused to:


- have in all fighter and fighter-bomber aviation regiments 40 combat aircraft each (the PAF General Staff proposed to maintain the current number of 36 combat aircraft in each).
- rearm three fighter-assault aviation regiments with SU-22M fighter-bomber aircraft and initiate introduction of the newest models of MiG-25RB aircraft (four aircraft).

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- introduce into the ground forces aviation 42 MI-24D helicopters (the PAF General Staff proposed only eight helicopters).

The Navy refused to introduce a battalion of RUBY EZH coastal rocket artillery launchers (four launchers).

In addition, the Polish partners could not accept that part of the protocol which pertained to reaching and maintaining the reserve level of all types of missiles and ammunition necessary for a three-month period of combat operations (the Polish General Staff proposed differentiated levels of reserves for periods from 30 to 90 days).

There were substantial differences in the approaches to planning the peacetime and wartime strengths and TOE of the PAF.

The Combined Command, disregarding resolutions of the WP collegial organs which favored qualitative developments of the CAF without further numerical buildup,<sup>21</sup> called for increasing PAF peacetime personnel strength from 6,000 to 8,000 troops, and for wartime to approximately 60,000.

In the organizational-TOE field, the Combined Command, regardless of organizational changes related to the introduction of new weapons and equipment, included in the protocol draft other undertakings:

- a) transformation of the 6th Airborne Brigade into an Airborne division, and of the 7th Sea Landing Brigade into a Sea Landing Division.


<sup>21</sup> The PCC resolution of 23 November 1978 required maintaining the combat composition and strength of forces assigned to the CAF "on a level not lower than that stated in the "Protocols for the End of 1976-80 Period," whereas the recommendation of the XVIII Session of the MC of the CAF (Berlin, 16 to 19 October 1978) stated that the WP states should "continue improving the combat capabilities of troops and naval forces comprising the CAF of the WP member states by further rearming them with modern armaments and military equipment, perfecting the organizational-TOE structure and the command and control system without substantial change of the overall strength."

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- b) forming on the front level:
  - an artillery division of five brigades;
  - two artillery reconnaissance regiments;
  - a road-bridge engineer brigade;
  - four pontoon regiments (for wartime); and
  - an engineer-technical regiment.
- c) forming in combined arms armies:
  - a reduced strength road-bridge engineer regiment;
  - an engineer-technical regiment; and
  - smoke generator battalions.
- d) reorganizing in tactical large units:
  - artillery batteries of tank regiments into artillery battalions;
  - chemical companies of all mechanized and armored divisions into chemical battalions; and
  - chemical platoons of all mechanized regiments, tank regiments and artillery regiments into chemical companies.

In general, in their own plans the Poles rejected all these demands on the grounds that the numerical strength of the PAF could not be increased. Accordingly, the plans of the PAF General Staff proposed necessary reorganizations (by way of so-called "internal management") only in units where new armaments and equipment were to be introduced.


Also disturbing and unacceptable to the Poles was the part of the bilateral protocol which dealt with operational preparation of national territory as part of the TVD. Already in the past, outlays for this purpose for the five-year period had reached 20-30 billion zlotys, not counting expenditures of the administrative and economic ministries and administrative local units (voivodships) within the framework of so-called

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"defense tasks tied to national social-economic interests" of the country region, or voivodship.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the enormous packet of tasks already fulfilled, the Combined Command included in the Polish 1981-85 protocol new tasks requiring not only billions of zlotys in outlays but also formation of additional units and material-ordnance stockpiles. Particularly controversial were entries obliging Poland to fulfill such undertakings as:

- 1) Rebuilding five existing grass landing strips as first class airfields, allegedly for supporting maneuvers of the Polish air force. However, the PAF already had at their disposal a sufficient network of airfields. Each aviation regiment having 36 to 40 aircraft had assigned to it a permanent basing airfield, an alternate airfield and a road segment which ensured conditions for dispersal. In this situation it was obvious that the Soviets were not concerned with the needs of the PAF but with the needs of Soviet military aviation. The positioning of these airfields (Debica, Przylep, Wschowa, Gostyn and Michajlow) designated by the Combined Command only strengthened the Poles in their conviction, since most of these localities were situated beyond the axis of operational tasks planned for the front of the PAF. The cost of construction of these airfields was estimated at five billion zlotys. An additional problem was related to expropriation of cultivated land from farmers and obtaining materials and processing power from the national economy for the special construction.

22 Construction of a wide-gauge railroad between Hrubieszow and Katowice according to Combined Command TVD demands, for example, could also have been considered useful from the point of view of national economic interests, and the costs of this undertaking be paid totally from the budget of the Ministry of Transportation, because along this axis--within economic cooperation with the USSR--mass cargo transports were moved (iron ore from the USSR to Silesia, coal and phosphorus from Silesia to USSR). Elimination of transloading cargo on the eastern border of Poland from the Soviet to the Polish railroad increased capacity of the transport and in the long run lowered costs.

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- 2) Polish takeover of the task of transloading at alternate sidings and ramps 80 percent of trains arriving from USSR into Polish railroads. During 1976-80, Poland was obliged to transload 50 percent of the trains. This task required construction of additional 25 loading points and assignment of additional forces and means of transloading 100 trains in 24 hours on the eastern border of Poland.
- 3) Assignment of forces and means to three temporary transloading areas on the banks of Vistula River which according to previous agreements were supposed to be organized by the Soviet Armed Forces. Assigning this task to the PAF required tasking approximately 2500 men, 645 trucks, 250 trailers, more than 170 items of various mechanized transloading equipment and 45 km of field pipeline for fuel.
- 4) Assignment of forces and means for maintenance and repair of border transloading areas. According to the 1963 agreement between the USSR and Poland, this task was supposed to be performed by the Soviets. Its transfer to the PAF required assignment of an additional 450 units of various technical equipment.
- 5) Change of three crossing points for the Soviet Armed Forces and their related vehicle transit routes. According to previous agreements with the Soviet General Staff, the PAF had prepared 20 border crossing points and brought up to technical parameters 20 vehicle transit roads according to the specifications of the Soviet General Staff plan. The changes proposed by the Combined Command conflicted with previous agreements and required considerable investment.

2. STAGE I IN PROTOCOL COORDINATION NEGOTIATIONS

Due to the serious differences of opinion, Stage I negotiations in June 1979 did not proceed smoothly. Not helping the situation was the attitude of the Combined Command representative, who insisted on compliance with the provisions of the protocol draft (which the Combined Command authored),

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and who refused to be drawn into any deliberations related to costs or the economic capabilities of Poland. Negotiation under those conditions was tantamount to an official confrontation of two different conceptions for developing the PAF, and presentation of arguments of a doctrinal and operational nature.

The Combined Command representatives pointed out at the very beginning of the deliberations that the PAF had unsatisfactorily fulfilled provisions of the protocol for 1976-80 which called for rearming troops, stockpiling material-technical reserves and starting production of new Soviet models of weapons and equipment. They were particularly critical of the failure of the PAF to fulfill the plan requiring introduction into service of 100 T-55 tanks, approximately 40 "GOZDIKA" self-propelled howitzers and over 50 "STRELA-IM" systems before the end of 1980. The Combined Command considered this a violation of allied agreements which not only seriously lowered the combat capability of the PAF but also backlogged fulfillment of tasks for 1981-85.

With references to increasing the numerical strength of the PAF, the representatives expressed the view that all new formations and necessary organizational structure could not be created by "internal administration" because "the PAF cannot spare any units for elimination." On the other hand, they reasoned, if the Poles desired to accomplish it by reducing the strength of other units to cadre levels, such a measure would lengthen the time necessary for mobilization and consequently lower combat readiness of the PAF, which was not permissible.

In discussing ground forces, the Combined Command representatives evaluated the combat fitness of Polish armored and mechanized divisions rather unfavorably. They stated that those divisions were in reality the weakest WP divisions in the Western TVD. They considered the Polish concept of maintaining the company structure of tank regiments during 1981-85 a serious mistake, which in their opinion not only hampered command and control of troops, but also left the units insufficient striking power and maneuverability.

The Poles argued that restructuring the tank regiment could be realistically accomplished only when a sufficient number of tanks became available from the production line. In

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the meantime, according to allied agreements, Poland could produce for its own needs during 1981-85 only approximately 300 tanks (100 T-72 and 200 T-55) which, at present TOE shortages of this equipment, would allow reorganization of, at best, one division of three regiments of three different divisions.

Since the arguments of the PAF General Staff were indisputable, the Combined Command representatives resorted to a test trick by proposing an amendment to the protocol requiring that all tank regiments change to battalion structure and that the new TOE strength be attained gradually by 1985.

The Poles rejected this proposal, knowing that following acceptance of this amendment, the Soviets would exert even greater pressure for attaining full TOE strength in tanks in the divisions.

Serious controversies developed in approaches to the concept of expanding artillery. The Combined Command representatives considered the current number of artillery pieces in tactical large units and operational units of the PAF as seriously inadequate for direct fire, having in mind primarily GOZDIKA and AKATSIYA self-propelled howitzers and GRAD artillery rocket launchers. The Soviets argued that at current levels of density of artillery, breakthrough of deliberately prepared defenses of the enemy would not be feasible without resorting to nuclear weapons. They strongly insisted also on introduction into service of M-46 130 mm gun and MT-12 mm AT gun and in addition, on the formation of an artillery division on the front level, composed of 350 heavy guns and artillery rocket launchers.


In this case, the Poles told the Soviets directly that in the opinion of the PAF General Staff, the equipment was obsolescent:

- GRAD launchers did not ensure continuity of fire support rendered to attacking armor. Compared with the BM-21, the GRAD was in no way superior and in some respects was even inferior (range of GRAD - 15 km, range of BM-21 - 20 km; GRAD salvo - 36 rounds, BM-21 salvo - 40 rounds). In addition, the new GRAD ammunition could not be used by the BM-21 launchers with which the PAF were armed.

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opinion of Polish technicians, those systems could serve very satisfactorily until at least 1986.

Yielding to the never ending pressures and insistence of the Combined Command delegation, the Poles, upon consent of the Chief of PAF General Staff, agreed to consider future introduction of four battalions of NEVA-M systems in partial exchange for the oldest weapons.

With regard to National Air Defense Forces aviation, the Combined Command representatives insisted on rearming two regiments of the air defense II Corps (coastal defense zone) with "MiG-23MF" aircraft, justifying this by saying that only this aircraft was suitable for combatting NATO aircraft at distant approaches to Polish coastal borders, and for destroying enemy aircraft before they launch their air-to-ground missiles.

The Poles, in support of their own argument, pointed out the matter of the shortage of pilots. Despite major efforts, the Poles could not reach the recommended 1.5 pilot/aircraft indicator (the average was 1.3, which already had made difficult full utilization of aircraft on hand). They informed the Combined Command representatives that the Ministry of National Defense, appreciating the shortage, planned to activate another aviation officers higher school and to modernize the entire pilot training system in terms of training crews to fly supersonic aircraft. However, improvements would not be visible before the second half of the 1980s (1988-89).


In discussing the air forces, the Combined Command representatives strongly opposed the Polish concept of developing strike aviation based on the envisaged national production of SU-25 aircraft--and the consequent abandonment of introducing 120 SU-22M aircraft into service. They maintained that SU-25 assault aircraft could not replace fighter-bomber aircraft such as the SU-22M. They repeatedly questioned quantity-quality aspects, arguing that aviation of the Polish front would have instead of the recommended 230 modern assault aircraft only 178 old model fighter-bombers and assault aircraft of lesser combat capabilities. According to Soviet views, acceptance of the Polish concept would violate PCC resolutions of November 1978 and the CDM resolution of December 1978, since it lowered the combat effectiveness of strike aviation.

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Polish refusal to purchase from the USSR and to introduce into service 12 of the latest generation MiG-25P and MiG-25RB aircraft made the Soviets very unhappy. They complained that the resulting losses would not be possible to make up in the subsequent 5-year period.

The Combined Command representatives also disagreed with the Polish plan to introduce a limited number of MI-24D assault helicopters into service in the PAF and to later replace them with MI-2 gunships and W-3 helicopters from domestic production. They had no problem convincing the Polish partners that there was no comparison between the types of equipment. The Poles agreed with some of the proposals of the Combined Command representatives and, in coordination with the Chief of the PAF General Staff, promised to consider purchasing 40 MiG-23BN or SU-22M fighter-bomber aircraft from the USSR and rearming one aviation regiment with them.

In the Navy, the controversies were not so severe because the PAF General Staff intended to accelerate development of this branch of the armed forces anyway. The discussions revolved around deliveries of essential craft. The Combined Command delegation was of the opinion that the USSR should deliver two (Project 877E) submarines and two (Project 1241E) large missile cutters, and that other naval requirements should be met from Polish production.

This was, of course, well received by the Poles, except that coproduction imports from the USSR (particularly of weapons) were necessary for domestic shipbuilding and the Soviets could not or desired not to confirm guarantee of deliveries. Later, the Soviets backed out of delivery of one submarine and one missile cutter proving that the problem was, indeed, production and delivery of the craft, problems which could not have been discussed at this level of talks.

The Combined Command representatives were more disturbed by Polish objections to introduction of the RUBYEZH missile into the coastal defense system (the Poles considered the missile obsolete) and the intention to limit the rearming program of the naval aviation regiment with SU-22M aircraft (the Poles expected to receive strong air support from the naval aviation of the Soviet Baltic Fleet).

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The Combined Command representatives attempted to prove that Polish comments about weaknesses of the RUBYEZH system were unfounded because the equipment in fact was excellent and was standard for all Soviet fleets.

With reference to rearming the naval aviation regiment with SU-24M aircraft, the Soviets stated that it was essential for the regiment to have the capability, within the framework of operations of the Combined Baltic Fleet, of acting in coordination with the units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Peoples' Navy of the GDR.

With regard to the controversial projects pertaining to operational preparations of Polish territory as part of the TO, the reasoning of the Combined Command representatives was a combination of chicanery and primitive swindle. At first they stated that the network of airfields was too limited for PAF aviation maneuvers. When the Poles proved that they had a sufficient airfield base for the needs of their own aircraft (each regiment had one main, one alternate and one road segment airfield) and that the base was equal to or better than airfield bases of some of the rich NATO states, the Soviets argued that under war conditions those airfields would become principal targets of NATO air strikes. The Poles answered that at the moment hostilities begin, all PAF aviation regiments and part of the air defense aviation would redeploy to airfields in the GDR because of the limited radius of operations of these aircraft, whereas, in operational assembly areas in GDR, one airfield is designated for two and even three PAF aviation regiments.

The Combined Command representatives dismissed even this argument as inadequate, stating that: "You see?" You want the GDR to build for you more airfields. In time the Germans will undertake this effort and help you, but you refuse to do something for your own needs."

Since the position of the Combined Command representatives on the subject of airfields was unyielding, the Poles pointed out that since utilization of the airfields postulated for construction meant meeting CAF needs rather than those of the PAF, the matter should be submitted for deliberation at the CDM session and resolved comprehensively with proportional sharing of costs by all involved parties. The representatives rejected

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commands of branches of the armed forces, and headquarters of arms of troops and services who often, to the detriment of their own positions, cast "no" votes, and then during difficult negotiations with the Russians, not only defended themselves but also attacked.

The mainstay of this "rejection front" proved to be without doubt PAF General Staff Chief, Army General Florian Siwicki; he not only created an appropriate climate for a sober evaluation of Soviet armament demands, but demonstrated courage rarely seen at that level of authority, and took upon himself the greatest burden for all negative responses.

The person who most influenced the final shape of the Polish concept for PAF development in the first part of the 1980s was the Deputy Chief of PAF General Staff for Operational Matters, Major General Jerzy Skalski. Skalski was an unusually dynamic man who was frequently inclined to challenge Soviet concepts. Spurning diplomacy and double-talk, he took upon himself the most difficult task of open confrontation with the Russians.

Helpful to this line of action was the position of the PAF General Staff Directorate VII for Material-Technical Planning, and its chief, Brigadier General Stanislaw Rogowski, whose authority extended over the defense budget.

The center of strongest resistance to Soviet demands and simultaneously the driving force behind all armaments slashes were the PAF General Staff Department I for Strategic-Defense Planning and the Operations Directorate. Positive roles were also played by the PAF Main Quartermaster Staff, especially its Chief Specialist (adviser), Colonel Stanislaw Wozniak, Rocket Troops and Artillery headquarters, with its chief, Brigadier General Xubiczek, and Air Defense Forces headquarters with its chief, Major General Obroniecki.

Persons and institutions mentioned above constituted but the top level of a long list of those in the Polish Armed Forces who began to look at armaments from the vantage point of the interests and capabilities of their own country.

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2a. SOVIET REACTION TO THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST STAGE OF PROTOCOL COORDINATION

The results of Stage I coordination attempts alarmed CAF CinC Marshal Kulikov to the point that he decided to intervene at once. Scarcely several days after the end of Stage I, around 20 June 1979, he came with all his Soviet deputies and with Soviet Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Matters, General Merezhko, to the Soviet air base at Chojna in Poland. He invited General Jaruzelski and several of his deputy ministers together with all the CinCS of the branches of the Polish Armed Forces to come and see him at the base.

Although Kulikov did not give a reason for his visit to Poland and for the invitation to meet the leading commanders of the PAF, the Poles well understood what was afoot, that these would be difficult discussions regarding the plans for development of the PAF, and they prepared themselves well for it. The Soviets remembered the representational setting of the meeting: an honor guard and Soviet children greeting the Polish delegation with flowers, followed by a visit to the base and a magnificent reception ending with friendly contacts: boat rides on the lake and intimate one-to-one talks between the Soviets and their Polish counterparts.

When everything appeared to be ready, and places were taken at the table of the joint talks in order to take important decisions, it appeared that Marshal Kulikov had at his disposal only hastily prepared materials for his talks with the Poles. The first three charges by Kulikov, which luckily for the Poles were of little consequence and not completely truthfully presented, were easily disproven by Jaruzelski. This so depressed Kulikov that he threw down the documents prepared by General Merezhko, reprimanded their author publicly (subsequently Merezhko was removed from his position), and turned the discussion from details to rather general matters. This tactic was utilized by Jaruzelski in order to get down to economic matters. He stated that the Poles were open to any changes in their armament planning and would gladly take advantage of the technical advice of Soviet specialists but only in the framework of the budgetary means initially granted to the Ministry of National Defense by the Polish government. In his reply Kulikov stated that continuation of the plenary discussion was in his judgment useless and asked Jaruzelski to

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present his point of view to Marshal Ustinov who was awaiting a telephone report on the meeting. This talk over the Soviet secure high frequency line took place almost immediately. Its contents are unknown. It may be assumed, however, that Jaruzelski obligated himself to further consider broadening the PAF development plans.

Because of sharp Soviet military leadership reaction in the summer of 1979, Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz asked Soviet Premier Kosygin on the suggestion of Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski to grant Poland a long-term credit amounting to three billion rubles. This would cover the purchases from the USSR of the amount of arms and military equipment recommended by the Combined Command, the cost of delivery from the USSR of spare parts and repairs, and the expenses connected with starting armaments production in Poland.

The PAF General Staff began at the same time, on orders from Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski, to elaborate ahead of time (counting on the eventual loan) a series of variants of a new five-year plan assuming various levels of purchases on credit from the USSR.


The USSR was not in any hurry to grant Polish authorities binding replies. But just the same, through the Combined Command it let Poland know that the Soviet government might consider granting credit, but only for the purpose of purchasing new weapons and equipment, and that the amount granted as credit would be closely tied to the Polish requirement for purchasing military equipment from the USSR in the quantities and types specified in the Combined Command recommendations. The specific concern here was in regard to the KUB-3M and S-200 VEGA-E missile systems, R-170 operational-tactical and LUNA-M tactical missile systems, M-46 130 mm and M-12 100-mm AT guns, and GRAD-1 launchers--thus, in regard to equipment of older generations which the Soviet General Staff wanted to purge from the Soviet Army. Other information secured from the Combined Command showed that, according to Soviet estimates, deliveries to Poland on credit could go as high as 1.2 billion rubles but only if Polish arms trade with the Soviet Union would have a negative balance approximating the 1.2 billion rubles.

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3. STAGE II IN PROTOCOL COORDINATION NEGOTIATIONS

During Stage II protocol coordination, which took place in Moscow in October 1979, the problem of a possible loan dominated the talks. In the course of negotiations Combined Command representatives showed themselves more to be good traders than military officials who should have cared about the level of modernizing the PAF assigned to the CAF. With genuine conviction they praised the technical combat qualities of the above-mentioned equipment, which was known to be antiquated and which in the Soviet Army was being replaced by new equipment; and they strongly pressed for its introduction into the PAF. But the PAF General Staff representatives, conscious of the fact that purchase of this equipment would have to be paid for, rejected the introduction of the obsolescent gear.

The Poles agreed, based on the variant of the plan which envisaged 600 million rubles of credit from the USSR, to introduce into the PAF inventory in 1981-85 items which in Stage I were not taken into consideration. Among the most important of these were: 80 SU-22M or MIG-23 aircraft and 15 trainers of the same type, 30 MI-24D combat helicopters, 12 MI-14 BT helicopters, 44 OSA-AK AA missile launchers, 20 BM-21 GRAD artillery rocket launchers and a large amount of already-introduced AT, communication and electronic warfare means.

Among the most important items of equipment which were rejected in the quantities recommended by the Soviets were the R-17, LUNA-M, S-200 VEGA-E, KUB-3M, VOLKHOV and NEVA missile systems. Completely rejected were 130-mm M-46 guns, 100-mm MT-12 AT guns and GRAD-1 rocket artillery launchers.

There was categorical opposition to the formation of a new artillery division as well as certain formations in the engineer, chemical and communications troops. Also rejected were the demands pertaining to the recommended amounts of wartime reserves of missiles and ammunition as well as construction of five new airfields on Poland territory.

4. STAGE III IN PROTOCOL COORDINATION NEGOTIATIONS

Stage III protocol coordination, which took place in Moscow in January 1981, was negotiated under the conditions of an open socio-economic crisis in Poland.

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The Polish military leadership was well aware that the PAF armaments program accepted at the end of 1979 during Stage II of the protocol coordination was outrageously excessive and far exceeded Poland's economic potential. For this reason at the end of 1980 the PAF General Staff revised downward certain developmental assumptions about the Polish Armed Forces. But out of fear of Soviet reaction, this revision was not particularly massive and, except for the SU-22M aircraft, did not affect the chief positions which were already coordinated with the Combined Command. Despite this, the talks in Moscow were especially difficult. The Combined Command representatives, particularly CAF Chief of Staff Army General Gribkov, CAF Deputy CinC for Navy Admiral Mikhailin and CAF Deputy CinC for the Air Force Colonel General Katrich either did not know or did not want to know that Poland stood at the edge of an economic precipice; they not only refused to accept any corrections in the plan, but strongly pressed the acceptance of developmental positions that the Poles had rejected in the preceding stages of negotiations. The PAF delegation headed by Army General Siwicki was almost completely exhausted by the talks, which not only failed to narrow the differences, but actually brought about greater and greater bullheadedness among the Soviet negotiators, including open criticism of the Polish leadership for its inability to overcome the crisis. Just when it seemed that nothing and no one could convince the Soviet negotiators, Deputy Chief of the PAF General Staff Major General Skalski stood up at the table and interrupted some moralizing of Admiral Mikhailin, telling him with a sharply raised voice more or less the following:

"Listening to your arguments, Admiral, I immediately see before me my own wife who for years demands from me a mink coat and does not even listen to me when I tell her that I earn only 16,000 zlotys which barely covers our modest life style. We came here in order to present our true position and expected that our arguments would be accepted from the position of an allied state and not from the position of a Baltic Fleet commander and maybe from even a lesser one."


When all indicated that the negotiations were finished and that the Soviets, whether they wanted to or not, had to recognize the decision of the Poles, the CAF CinC representative at the Polish Armed Forces, Colonel General

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Shcheglov, asked for the floor. One would have expected that he, as a man who knew Polish conditions and Polish difficulties, would have given some support for the Polish delegation. But Shcheglov stated that the USSR had no difficulty in selling weaponry, and that for the same equipment which Poland was rejecting, the Arabs would pay hard dollars. He wanted to say more, but then came the ringing voice of the CAF Chief of Staff, General Gribkov, saying: "Shut your mouth. You know nothing." Gribkov then apologized for the improper behavior of Shcheglov and explained that this matter had nothing to do with dollars because the USSR did not trade in weapons. What was involved here (and here Gribkov stressed that this information was only for the Poles) was that the whole pool of arms assigned to the WP armed forces, which was not easy to come by, should be retained in the WP.


The armament and equipment items which Poland did not want at this time would have been readily accepted by either the GDR or Romania, but the Soviet General Staff opposed this. According to Gribkov, it was therefore likely that if Poland turned down these items they would be simply removed from the WP pool. He ended by appealing to Poland to accept in the protocol the largest number possible of aircraft and surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and surface-to-sea missile launchers in order to allow retention of this equipment under Combined Command control. If in the future (say, in the middle of the five-year plan) it should prove that the economic situation would prevent implementation of provisions of this protocol, then the Combined Command would agree to exclude these items from the Polish plan. He expressed the hope, however, that the Polish economic situation would improve and that no changes in the protocol would be necessary.

The PAF delegation was not authorized to accept Gribkov's proposed solution. After the delegation's chief, General Siwicki, phoned Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski, this proposal was accepted partially, i.e. it was agreed that a note be made in the protocol to the effect that the Polish side would restudy in 1983 the possibility of the additional introduction of a larger number of SU-22M aircraft, MI-24 helicopters and RUBYEZH missile systems costing a total of about 200 million rubles--if the economic situation of Poland improved. In regard to the airfields it was only agreed to study the possibility of constructing three airfields. The

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draft final protocol was not coordinated because the Combined Command representatives demanded that the proposed amount of equipment be included in the protocol with a note that the final number of the conditionally accepted equipment would be determined during 1983. They also demanded that an agreement to construct at least three airfields be included in the protocol. After completion of Stage III the chairman of the Polish delegation was received by Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov. In contrast to the Combined Command representatives, Ustinov displayed much greater understanding of the PAF General Staff position and in effect agreed with it. But in regard to the construction of airfields, he maintained the same position as his Combined Command generals.

5. STAGE IV IN PROTOCOL COORDINATION NEGOTIATIONS

Stage IV protocol coordination took place 12 January 1981 in Warsaw, just before the ceremony of signing this document. These were the shortest negotiations in the whole cycle of the coordinaton process. They lasted not quite one hour.

In the conference hall were the Combined Command representatives and the PAF delegation, each side with its own version of the protocol. Marshal Kulikov went with PAF General Staff Chief Siwicki to Jaruzelski's office.


There was a feeling of tenseness in the conference hall. Deputy Chief of the PAF General Staff Skalski stated that the Soviet version of the protocol could not possibly be accepted. In reply CAF Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Titov said that "we should stop our disagreements. Now this is in the hands of our great chiefs; they will decide and all that we will have to do will be to shake hands." "I am not for the handshakes"--said Skalski--"because with you it is like with a bear in a cage. One can go in and try to shake the bear's paw, but it is a rather questionable pleasure and, in addition, dangerous." This was followed by silence. Several minutes later General Siwicki came from Jaruzelski's office and announced that Poland "accepts the Soviet version of the protocol."

6. PROTOCOL SIGNING AND RATIFICATION

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to the CAF and Their Development During the Period 1981-85" was signed on 12 January 1981 and was ratified on 13 January 1981 in Warsaw by Polish Premier Jozef Pinkowski in the ceremonial presence of the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee Stanislaw Kania. In accordance with the accepted WP routine both acts had the character of a solemn ceremony. In the case of signing the protocol, this was understandable because the most important provisions of this document were known to both Jaruzelski and Siwicki, who placed their signatures next to those of Kulikov and Gribkov. This, however, was not the case with the ratification by the Premier.

The Premier had no idea of the protocol's content. Despite the fact that this document obligated Poland to huge outlays involving hundreds of billions of zlotys and hundreds of millions of rubles, it was most certainly not studied even in general by the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the National Defense Commission of the Polish Sejm--that is, by the state constitutional organs which have jurisdiction in these matters. Premier Pinkowski signed the document merely on the strength of verbal information given him on this matter by Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski. The presence of PUWP First Secretary Kania during the ratification ceremony signified the Party's agreement and its decision to implement the provisions which were being accepted.


It is not known how these matters are handled in the other WP states, but most certainly the method does not much differ from that used in Poland.

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CHAPTER IV

PLANNING ARMAMENT PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE FOR 1981-85

1. GENERAL SITUATION IN THE FIELD OF PRODUCTION AND WARTIME DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT AT THE END OF THE 1970s

In the early 1970s the Soviet armament industry began to show signs of stress, and of not being capable of keeping up with the growing demands of the military, particularly in the field of more sophisticated weapons and equipment.

The dynamic development of technology and armament with each year made it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to reconcile the design and introduction into service of even newer generations of weapons on an even level, despite enormous investments in the armaments industry.

It was a matter of common conviction among Soviet Armed Forces officer cadres (confirmed rudely by the experiences of the Arab-Israeli war) that many Soviet conventional weapons systems were inferior to comparable Western systems. In addition, shortages began to occur. During 1976-80, Soviet industry, having difficulty with deliveries to their own armed forces, refused outright to deliver to the WP armies many items covered by military plans.

It was not unusual for the Soviets to fail to honor fulfillment of an entire contract. For example, in accordance with the "Bilateral Protocol on Assignment of the National Forces Armies and Fleets to the CAF and their Development During 1976-80," for 1980 Poland ordered equipment from the USSR worth 321.4 million rubles. The Main Engineering Directorate (GIU) of the Committee for Foreign Economic Cooperation (GKES) of the Council of Ministers confirmed the capability of delivering goods worth only 239.5 million rubles. Analogous data for 1979 were as follows: ordered--415.1 million rubles; confirmed--358.6 million rubles; fulfilled--312.4 million rubles.

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I-8PP helicopters, SPO-8M radioelectronic jamming sets); T-7-2M secure communications transmitters; self-propelled fire reaction equipment; PTS-M amphibious transporters; reconnaissance vehicles, air reconnaissance containers for SU-aircraft; chassis for KUB, KRUG, and LUNA-M missile systems; certain radar sets and other electric equipment. Only approximately 40 percent of Polish requirements for maintenance Soviet plants for 1976-80 were satisfied.

Serious difficulties were also encountered in obtaining spare parts from the USSR for equipment in operation. In addition, in the period of 1976-79, the Soviet Union was not able to deliver 2576 spare parts items requested by Poland.

Against this background, the opinion was formed in Soviet military and civilian leadership circles that these difficulties could be overcome only by further expanding the specialization of defense production within the framework of MA, and by shifting a considerable number of armaments production tasks, including production of more sophisticated weapons systems, to the WP states. This opinion was expressed forcefully in December 1978 at the 11th CDM Session in Berlin, where Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov stated bluntly that a breakthrough in rearmament could not be expected if the Western states did not unburden the Soviet Union of a part of these tasks. According to Ustinov's statement at that time, Soviet R&D centers had at their disposal the latest designs of many types of weapons and equipment, but production of these designs was delayed mainly because Soviet industrial plants had to continue current production. In some cases starting production of new models was totally impossible while the plant was producing old models. For example, when the T-72 tank was introduced into production, Soviet industry, empowered by a special law, suspended production of the old tank (possibly the T-64) for nine months, during which time the work force, operating according to a new plan, prepared the plant for production of the T-72 tank. During that period all employees, regardless of whether they worked or were laid off, received salaries equal to their average salaries of past months.

Marshal Ustinov's comments were further expanded upon by Marshal Kulikov when within the framework of the same session of the CDM, he inspected an East German missile maintenance plant near Berlin. Kulikov stated, among other things, that

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the only line delineating allied distribution of tasks in the field of armaments production was the technological level reached by the individual WP member states. The high degree of Soviet technological achievement predisposes the Soviet armaments industry to produce the most complex and advanced models of weapons and equipment. The best contribution of WP state industry would be to take over ready and fully mastered technologies and maintenance tasks from the Soviet Union.

2. BASIC PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING ARMAMENT PRODUCTION FOR 1981-85

The statements of Marshals Ustinov and Kulikov were an introduction to the most dramatic official initiatives of the Soviet Union for the intensification and expansion of armaments production in the WP states of the postwar era. The main forum in which the Soviet Union had developed those initiatives was the CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense Industry which, although officially independent of the WP, was thoroughly dominated by the Soviets. This organ, on instruction from the Soviet Gosplan, prepared a general plan covering WP armaments production needs for 1981-85, and established a time schedule for coordinating national armaments plans.

The time schedule envisaged providing the individual member states with a comprehensive list of licenses for all production and proposals for starting newly licensed production of armaments by early 1979. It was planned that by the end of the first quarter of 1979, the individual member states would submit initial commercial offers on their own current or expected armaments production.

Two stages of bilateral consultations and agreements on mutual deliveries of manufactured armaments were envisaged. In the first stage, consultations would take place in May 1979 in Hungary. This stage would be coordinated, with regard to content and time, with the first stage of agreements on military matters of the "Bilateral Protocol of Assignment of National Forces to the CAF and their Development." The second stage was envisaged to take place in November 1979 in East Berlin and was to be coordinated with the second stage of the agreements of the same Protocol. Signing of "Protocols on Special Mutual Deliveries" was planned for October 1980.

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In addition, the time schedule envisaged rather numerous sessions of the Defense Industry Commission to study the problems of specialization, coproduction and bilateral contacts and consultations of military-economic delegations related to acquisition of production licenses from the USSR by the individual member states.

In addition to the procedures of the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, the Soviets actively utilized all party-political, military and economic contacts in an effort to force their concepts for shifting a significant part of their armaments production on their WP allies. However, the main pressure was exerted through the WP military organs, specifically through the Combined Command, the Staff and the CAF Technical Committee.

### 3. SOVIET OFFERS OF SALES OF LICENSES AND OF ACTIVATION OF NEW ARMAMENT PRODUCTION STARTUPS

Following the time schedule of the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, in early 1979 the Main Engineering Directorate of the GKES proposed to the individual member states the sale of licenses and the activation of new, licensed production of armaments. The details of these offers for each individual state are not known. However, it was a matter of common knowledge in Polish military circles that in addition to current production of armaments and equipment in those states, the Soviets planned to introduce mass production of:

- SU-25 aircraft for deliveries to the Soviet Armed Forces and to other WP member states (the SU-25 was not a successful model, probably an interim version to be replaced with an improved version);
- T-72 tanks, the entire initial 1981-85 production (1499 units) destined for the WP armies;
- GOZDIKA self-propelled 122mm howitzers for delivery of approximately 1,500 units to the Soviet Armed Forces and at least 1,500 units to WP armies;
- AKATSIYA or the Czechoslovak version DANA self-propelled 152 mm howitzers;


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- GRAD launchers and artillery rockets;
- MALYUTKA, METYS and KONKURS - antitank guided missiles;
- PODNOS 82mm mortars and ammunition;
- SANI 120mm mortar and ammunition;
- STRELA-1M portable antiaircraft missiles and its newest version STRELA 10 SW and missiles;
- STRELA-2 portable antiaircraft missiles and its newest version STRELA-3 and missiles;
- Rockets flame throwers;
- 5.45 caliber AKM carbines;
- a broad group of radioelectronic equipment, including various types of transceivers, radio relays and radars; and
- certain types of naval combat craft.

Along with these offers, the Soviets proposed the transfer of maintenance of various types of armaments and military equipment. Poland, in addition to current production, received proposals for starting production of 78 new types of armaments and military equipment.

Practically all the WP member states, including Poland, were to a certain degree interested in expanding their own armaments production. However, this interest had clearly defined limits. They had in mind primarily balancing their mandatory (as viewed by WP development planners) imports of very expensive Soviet armaments with their own production within the framework of WP military development plan, and at the same time developing lucrative exports of arms to the Third World, particularly to the Arab states rich in hard currency.

It can generally be accepted that the WP member states were ready to invest in the development of the armaments industry without any great pressure from the Soviets, but only

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on levels not much higher than their general industrial investments. Instead, the Soviet proposals of early 1979 exceeded all admissible norms of investment even for a Communist system. Poland can serve as the best example of the scale of investment effort related to initiation of new armaments production.

During the years 1971-75, Poland budgeted for the armaments industry nine billion zlotys above the defense budget of the Ministry of National Defense. For the subsequent five year period (1976-80) Poland budgeted as much as 27 billion zlotys--a 3-fold increase of investments.

Acceptance of the entire Soviet proposal of 1979 would have required investment outlays reaching into hundreds of billions of zlotys for the years 1981-85. Faced with this situation, the Poles seriously considered acceptance of only a part of the proposal involving approximately 20 items:


- SU-25 assault aircraft;
- T-72 tanks;
- STRELA-2 and its newer version STRELA-3 as well as STRELA-1M and its newer version STRELA-10 SW antiaircraft missile system;
- K15MI infrared air-to-air missiles;
- 5.45 caliber AKM carbines and ammunition;
- ST-68 transceivers;
- EKVATOR single band, medium range transceivers;
- VSPYSHKA single band receivers;
- ABZATS-1 and ABZATS-2 tank radios;
- VIKONT company level radio sets;
- AZID-1 and AZID-2 radiorelay sets;
- New models of ships; and

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- Naval guns, radar and sonar equipment for certain types of naval ships built in coproduction with the USSR and East Germany.

To support the new production (less SU-25, however) an outlay of approximately 42 billion zlotys was required. Keeping in mind that the plans also envisaged the fulfillment of investments initiated in 1976-80, for which an additional 29 billion zlotys would have been needed, the total investment outlay for Poland's armaments industry for 1981-85 would have been, according to most conservative official estimates, 70 billion zlotys. A considerable portion of the investment was due to essential imports of machinery and installations from the dollar market requiring hard currency.

It can be safely assumed that Soviet proposals for armaments production for the years 1981-85 had a great impact on all the WP member states. The best proof of this is the fact that none of the states responded to the proposal by the deadline established by the CEMA Defense Industry Commission. The impatient Soviets intervened through the Combined Command. Also, this matter was brought up at the 19th Session of the Military Scientific-Technical Council of the CAF by Deputy CinC for Armaments and Chief of the Technical Committee Colonel General Fabrikov. Against the background of difficulties in defining positions of the member states with regard to Soviet license proposals, the CinC put pressure in writing on the governments of the individual states.

The Soviets (the Main Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) also presented the individual states a complete list of commercial offers. The list, however, contained only price information on Soviet-manufactured equipment, with no information regarding delivery capability.

#### 4. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AND COORDINATION OF MUTUAL DELIVERIES OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR 1981-85

In 1979, in keeping with the time schedule of the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, two stages of bilateral consultations on mutual deliveries of arms and military equipment during 1981-85 were held: the first stage at the end

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of May in Hungary and the second 12 through 16 November in Berlin.

The hosts of both conferences were the CEMA Defense Industry Commission and the CAF Technical Committee. Delegations from all WP member states participated. Heading the individual delegations, which are routinely composed of representatives of the central economic planning organs, industry, foreign trade and ministries of defense, were the chiefs of the military sections of the central planning organs. Heading the Polish delegation was General Director of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, Major General Marian Knast. Heading the Soviet delegation was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Gosplan Titov.

Both conferences proceeded in an identical order:

- opening address (speeches of the chairman of the CEMA Defense Industry Commission and chief of the CAF Technical Committee);
- bilateral consultations according to the agreed upon agenda;
- recapitulation of the conference plenary session (speeches by the heads of the individual delegations) and recapitulation rendered by the representatives of the Defense Industry Commission and the Chief of the CAF Technical Committee.

In formulating agreements on orders and deliveries, the individual delegations were guided by instructions of their governments. The instructions of the Polish delegation were prepared by the Military Board of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers with the cooperation of the PAF General Staff and approved by then Chairman of the Planning Commission, T. Wrzaszczyk.

The details of the negotiations at both stages between the individual WP member states are not known. However, in a fragmentary manner, the Polish example is typical.

At the first stage of agreements, the Polish delegation presented only a limited program of orders and offers of

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deliveries, constrained by the worsening national economic situation and with the "economizing" program for developing the armed forces which was presented during the first phase of military agreements of the "Bilateral Protocol on Assignment of National Forces to the CAF." The total value of Polish imports initially declared at this stage was 1.8 billion rubles or approximately 80 billion zlotys, of which approximately 1.447 million rubles or 64 billion zlotys was from the USSR. The cost of coproduction to Polish industry was 567 million rubles. The value of Polish exports was initially declared at 3100 million rubles.

Despite these figures, the Soviet delegation appraised the Polish contribution to fulfillment of the PCC and CDM resolutions of 1978 very critically and declared that they would file an official protest with the Polish government. Indeed, the intervention came in the form of a letter from Marshal Kulikov to the Polish government and caused correction of the provisions of the plan.

At the second stage (subsequent to the correction of the plan)--despite signs of the further worsening of the Polish economic crisis--military orders for deliveries from the USSR were increased (e.g. SU-22M aircraft from 42 to 96, MI-26D helicopters from 4 to 38, MI-14BT helicopters from 5 to 12, OSA-K anti-aircraft launchers from 8 to 44 - to mention only major items of equipment) while at the same time, certain deliveries from Polish production to other countries, agreed upon in the first stage, were cut back. (Poland refused to produce and deliver SU-25 aircraft, self-propelled GOZDIKA howitzers, anti-aircraft STRELA-1M launchers and missiles, antitank MALYUTKA-P guided missiles and other equipment.)


The purpose of the Polish maneuver was primarily to attain a negative balance in arms trade with the USSR, in order to create a basis for obtaining long-term, low interest loans for the payment for armaments from USSR, and additionally, to facilitate general reduction of outlays for investment in the armaments industry.

Within the framework of special trade established at the second stage of consultations the total value of imports for the Polish Ministry of National Defense was approximately 2.6 billion rubles (approximately 115 billion zlotys--in comparison

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with 1976-80, an increase of 64.5 percent) of which the USSR was to receive approximately 2.3 billion rubles (approximately 102 billion zlotys--in comparison with 1976-80, a 68.5 percent increase). In comparison with the first stage of consultations this value had increased by approximately 800 million rubles (approximately 35 billion zlotys) of which payments to the USSR had increased by approximately 860 million rubles (approximately 38 billion zlotys).

The spirit of the consultations was strictly businesslike although not without an element of Soviet pressure. In bilateral talks, the Soviets were aware of Polish efforts to maintain a deficit balance in special trade in order to use it as a basis for obtaining long term loans, and used every conceivable means to balance the trade by increasing imports from Poland. The Soviets firmly requested another revision of Polish capability to deliver to the USSR the MTS prime movers, MALYUTKA-P guided missiles and self-propelled howitzers GOZDIKA, as well as increased deliveries of AN-2 aircraft, GTD-300 engines and WR-2 clutches for the MI-2 helicopters. On the other hand, the Soviets consistently refused to confirm their own capability to deliver those items which, according to the Soviet position, could be produced in Poland or other WP member states. The Soviets confirmed for delivery only approximately 64 percent of spare parts (requested value 353 million rubles, confirmed deliveries for only 226.8 million rubles). Only 32 percent of requests for maintenance of weapons and military equipment were confirmed (requested value 100 million rubles, confirmed only 31.5 million rubles).

The Czechoslovak delegation, supporting the Soviets, expressed displeasure with the Poles for reducing their exports to Czechoslovakia by 94 million rubles, as well as for reducing their imports from Czechoslovakia of BMP-1 infantry combat vehicles from 500 to 200 vehicles, and of 152 mm DANA howitzers from 75 to 37 units. The Czechoslovak delegation insisted on keeping agreements reached in the first stage of coordination valid, including deliveries of STRELA-1M antiaircraft missiles.

The East German and Hungarian delegations, probably inspired by the Soviets, very strongly demanded from Poland deliveries of STRELA-1M launchers and missiles. The Soviet representative, in his recapitulation of the consultations in the presence of all delegations, expressed dissatisfaction with

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Poland for the reductions of deliveries agreed upon in the first stage. The Czechoslovak representative in his speech expressed a similar, critical attitude.

The chairman of the Polish delegation, Major General Knast, presented the arguments of the Polish side in a vigorous retort. During a break in the deliberations there was an unpleasant incident when Knast approached the Czechoslovak delegate, and in the presence of many other delegates, told him to "keep your snout out of Polish affairs."

This incident was played down, nevertheless, several days later at the session of the CEMA Defense Industry Commission when, on 20 November 1979, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Gosplan Titov, once more in the presence of all delegations, condemned the Poles, and requested that they take into consideration in their plans the postulates of the Soviet Union and the other member states.

In accordance with the time schedule of the Defense Industry Commission, in October 1980 the WP member states signed in Berlin a protocol on mutual deliveries of armaments and military equipment for years 1981-85.<sup>24</sup> During this period, Poland was already sinking into the universally-recognized grave social-economic crisis. Ignoring it, the Soviet Union extorted further concessions from the Polish government.


The "Protocol on Mutual Special Deliveries" signed by the Polish representatives included provisions for further increases of obligations above the agreements reached in November 1979 at the second stage. Specifically, exports to the USSR were to increase from 2,447 million rubles to 2,821 million rubles (by 374 million rubles) and imports from the USSR were to increase from 2,874 million rubles to 3,273 million rubles (by 397 million rubles).

In view of the rapidly developing economic catastrophe in Poland, the import-export decision forced upon the Polish

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government had practically no chance for implementation. Aware of this, the Planning Commission of the Polish Council of Ministers, with the collaboration of the Ministry of National Defense, disregarded the provisions of the signed protocol and in late 1980 reviewed production plans for 1981-85 with the intention of shifting available resources from armaments production tasks to the field of consumer goods, in an effort to rescue the internal market.

However, news of this reached the Soviet leadership circles. On 9 January 1981 Deputy CinC of the CAF for Armaments Fabrikov arrived in Warsaw in order--as he put it-- "to prepare information for the CinC of the CAF, Marshal Kulikov, on the readiness of Polish defense industry to fulfill obligations according to the provisions of the "Protocol on Deliveries of War Material for 1981-85," signed in Berlin in October 1980.

Fabrikov informed the Polish Ministry of National Defense that the Soviet Ministry of Defense and Combined Command headquarters had received information which indicated serious violation by the Poles of the agreed upon export obligations and considerable reduction of new defense production as a result of events in Poland in May 1981. He stated that the complex economic and political situation in Poland could cause certain deviations from the Berlin agreements. However, maintenance of newly started production was essential and all efforts of the Polish Ministry of National Defense should be directed toward this goal. Even though the Ministry of National Defense appeared to have dispelled some of Fabrikov's fears, he requested personal talks with the directors of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Machine Industry.

The newly nominated, frightened Prime Minister of Poland, Jozef Pinkowski, agreed to Fabrikov's request, and ordered the Planning Commission to prepare a briefing for the Soviet general explaining that "changes in the plan are cosmetic rather than substantive and will not represent any serious deviations from the obligations agreed upon at the Berlin consultations."


A variant of the plan, prepared ad hoc (during the night) by the Planning Commission and presented to Fabrikov, contained

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only minimal variations from the protocol. According to this adjusted plan, Polish exports to the USSR would be decreased from 2,821 million rubles to 2,540 million rubles, or by 10 percent. Nevertheless, it was still greater by 28.2 percent than the exports for years 1976-80, whereas imports decreased from the agreed upon 3,273 million rubles to 2,977 million rubles, or by less than 10 percent. But if in the balance of imports from the USSR one included the additional purchases of RUBYEZH systems, a greater number of SU-22M aircraft and MI-24D helicopters for a total sum of 200 million rubles--to which the PAF General Staff at the third phase of agreements of the "Bilateral Protocol on Assignment of National Forces to the CAF" had agreed--under the condition that the Polish economic situation improved--then the value of imports from the USSR was supposed to have reached the limit of 3,177 million rubles, or barely 3 percent less than the balance under the Berlin agreement.


Fabrikov, upon careful study of the Polish plan for production and deliveries and the actual state of readiness of the industry to start new armaments production (T-72 tanks, GOZDIKA howitzers, MTS primemovers, STRELA-1M launchers and missiles), requested that Minister of Machine Industry Gawronski--despite the information provided to Fabrikov--submit a report to Marshal Kulikov, in the presence of Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski, as to whether he could make up the delays created by the Polish industry in starting new production.

In the end, public "presentation" of this idea, so characteristic in internal relations of the Warsaw Pact member states, did not take place. Marshal Kulikov was satisfied with the assurance of Prime Minister Pinkowski and Party First Secretary Kania, given on 13 January 1981 (on the occasion of the signing of the "Bilateral Protocol on Assignment of Forces to the CAF...") that "the authorities will use all means to protect the armaments industry against destruction by "Solidarity"; that "tasks for the plants of the defense industry always will be determined by the top governmental authority in a centralized manner"; and that "Poland will do everything necessary in order to again become the second, after the Soviet Union, economic and military potential of the Warsaw Pact states."

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These were big promises and obligations not taken lightly by the highest Party officials of a country where the most basic articles necessary for the biological survival of the nation were lacking. Throughout 1981, the state authorities systematically continued to lower allocations of food, articles of personal hygiene and clothing for the population, but armaments production plans remained intact.

It is not a simple matter to change the profile of industrial production in any system, but in the Soviet bloc states, where industrial plants do not have at their disposal reserves of production means, the problem is even more complex. Nevertheless, it would not be an impossible task, if planning were realistic and done with some imagination.

It would be difficult to prove that limitation of armaments production, even if substantial, could have saved the Polish economy. But there should also be no doubt that such limitation would have, to a considerable degree, softened the harsh and uncommonly oppressive consequences of the economic crisis on the population. Almost all armaments production plants could have utilized a portion of their potential for internal market or for hard currency export production by producing heavy tractors, agricultural and construction machines, merchant ships, television and radio sets, tape recorders, refrigerators, washing machines, sewing machines, even motor vehicles.

The problems of raw materials and energy were important factors in the Polish situation. The main reason why production dropped off in 1980 and 1981 was the shortage of raw materials and energy. By limiting energy intensive armaments production, production of the most important consumer goods could have been increased. However, this did not happen because the Polish government, fearing a loss of credibility in Moscow, dared not disrupt the armaments production plans agreed upon. Even the rare strikes in armaments plants, (e.g. naval ship yards, the aircraft plant at Mielec), caused by specific working conditions, could not seriously disrupt those plans.


The only real and unavoidable obstacle limiting armaments production, in particular the start of new production, was the shortage of hard currency for importing modern technology-- machines and installations for production of sophisticated

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military equipment--from the West. For example, in 1980 alone, in order to start production of the T-72 tank, Poland imported seven million dollars' worth of machine tools from the West. In addition, Poland had to import for hard currency many installations for technological systems and multi-dimensional matrices for producing hulls and turrets for the T-72 tank.

In view of the above, it can be accepted that only the difficulties of obtaining hard currency and the sanctions of the West would have caused any significant departure from the plans.

5. DIVISION OF 1981-85 ARMAMENT PRODUCTION TASKS

On the basis of working contacts and mutual delivery agreements of the Polish Ministry of National Defense during 1979-80, a picture - albeit incomplete - of allied distribution of tasks in the field of armaments production for 1981-85 can be reconstructed as follows.

The Soviet Union took upon itself the role of principal supplier of the most sophisticated equipment to the WP member states. The deliveries were supposed to include in particular:


- aviation equipment, including all types of the latest models of combat aircraft: MIG-25P, MIG-25RB, MIG-23MF, MIG-23BN, MIG21B15, SU-22M, MI-24D combat helicopters, MI-8 multipurpose helicopters, MI-14PT antisubmarine helicopters, MI-14BT trawler helicopters and MI-14PS rescue helicopters.
- surface-to-surface rockets - R-17 operational-tactical rockets and LUNA-M tactical rockets.
- air defense missile systems - VEGA-S-200, VOLKHOV-M and NEVA.
- basic antiaircraft defense equipment - KRUG, KUB and OSA-AK.
- radioelectronic warfare equipment - R-388 radio navigation jamming sets, UKF PIRAMIDA-1 jamming sets.
- automated command and control equipment and basic

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security devices for radio and wire communications equipment.

- certain artillery weapons, mainly 152mm self-propelled howitzer AKATSIYA and GRAD-1 artillery launchers. The Soviets were also pushing sales of greater numbers of M-46 130mm guns and MT-12 100mm AT guns.
- certain types of ships, primarily Project 877E submarines and large Project 124RE missile cutters.

The USSR licensed to some WP states production of the KONKURS AT guided missile (allegedly the best Soviet weapon in the AT family of weapons), K-611 nuclear detection set, vans for K-611-0 sets, and rocket flame throwers.

Poland was made one of the major suppliers of armored equipment, light aircraft, anti-aircraft defense equipment and radioelectronic equipment. Despite strong opposition from the Polish shipbuilding industry, the Soviets imposed on Poland major tasks in the building of naval vessels.

The level of Polish deliveries for 1981-85 was lowered as a result of the economic crisis, and included:

armor and mechanized equipment:

- T-72 tanks, 700 tanks (300 for the PAF and 400 tanks for export to WP member states); additional 700 coproduction components for T-72 tanks for Czechoslovakia. Annual goal production of the T-72 tank after 1985 was planned to be 250 units.
- T-55A tanks, approximately 300 units (for the PAF).
- self-propelled 122 mm howitzers - 408 units (208 for the PAF, 200 for the SAF). The Soviets counted on delivery of 1500 units, annual goal production after 1985 was planned to be approximately 250 units.
- MTLB universal transporter-primemovers, approximately 4000 units, of which 3000 units were for the USSR.
- MTS primemovers - approximately 750 units (initially

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planned to be approximately 2000 units).

aviation equipment:

- SU-25 assault aircraft (as of the end of 1981 there was no final decision on starting production of this aircraft).
- AN-28 transport aircraft, 65 units, of which 35 units were for the USSR.
- AN-2 aircraft, approximately 2000 units, of which 1500 units were for the USSR.
- engines for AN aircraft, approximately 4000 units, of which 1500 units were for the USSR.
- MI-2 helicopters (number not agreed upon).
- engines for MI-2 helicopters, approximately 3000 units, of which 2250 units were for the USSR.
- W-3 helicopters, approximately 150 units, of which 35 were for the USSR.

light equipment for antiaircraft defense:

- 3500 missiles for the STRELA-IM launcher and as of 1981, an undetermined number of the new generation STRELA-10SW and STRELA-2. In this production category, Poland will most likely be the principal producer of the 23 mm ZSU-23-4M, ZSU-23-2 guns.

radioelectronic equipment:

An undetermined number of various types of radios, including medium power EKVATOR, ABZAC-1 tank radios, VIKONT company radios, AZID-1, AZID-2, R-404M and R-409M radio relay sets, and ST-58 radars.

naval equipment - various types of vessels - for the USSR only, value up to 600 million rubles.

Czechoslovakia, like Poland, was made a principal supplier

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of armor and artillery and probably is an important coproducer with the USSR of aviation equipment.

Czechoslovak deliveries specifically encompass:

- T-72 tanks, 700 units (annual goal production 250 units after 1981).
- BMP-1 infantry combat vehicles.
- DANA 152mm self-propelled howitzers.
- SM-70 launchers (Czech version of BM-21).

Bulgaria specializes in production and delivery of GOZDIKA 122mm self-propelled howitzers, SANI portable and PRAM self-propelled 120mm mortars, RPG-7W (WN) hand grenades, SPG heavy grenades, and probably BRDM-2CH contamination recon vehicles and contamination recon equipment mounted on GAZ-59RS, and drone reconnaissance aircraft. Also, Bulgaria probably coproduces radioelectronic equipment with the USSR.

East Germany occupies a prominent position as coproducer with the USSR and other WP member states of optical and probably laser instruments.

The USSR licensed to unidentified WP states the production of the KONKURS AT guided missile (allegedly the best Soviet AT weapon) and the FAGOT, METYS and FLEJTA AT missiles, K-611-0 nuclear burst detection set, vans for K-611-0 receivers and information processors, rocket flame throwers and R-42 radiorelay sets.

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CHAPTER V

OTHER ARMAMENTS PLANS OF WARSAW PACT STATES AND EXPECTED CHANGES IN DEFENSE PLANNING

The five-year plans--though very broad and detailed--do not completely exhaust the armaments planning of the WP states. The experience of the 1970s and early 1980s shows that in addition to the five-year plans, sessions of the PCC, the CDM and the CAF Military Council are devoted to Combined Command initiatives for studying and systematic (almost annual) acceptance of various armaments plans and programs. Among those plans and programs which are always included in the military planning system and which cause the largest expenditures by the WP states, often beyond any envisaged limits, are:

- supplementary plans,
- long-term developmental programs in selected defense areas,
- joint defense investment plans,
- joint scientific research plans,
- joint CAF enterprise plans, and
- the CAF budget.

1. SUPPLEMENTARY PLANS

The supplementary plans broaden the accepted five-year plans already being implemented. In their substantive scope they cover various defense fields and systems. Because of their connection with fairly substantial and unplanned expenditures made by the WP states, decisions on their acceptance are made by the PCC during its routine meetings. Classic examples were the 1976 PCC decisions on an extra (and unplanned) introduction into CAF armaments of the latest generation of weapons and equipment of the so-called supertechnology (MIG-23 aircraft, T-72 tanks, MI-24D assault helicopters, OSA-AK AA missile launchers, PR-1241 RE missile

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ships, MI-14PT anti-submarine helicopters, and others) as well as formation in the WP armed forces of special innovative (awangardovy) subunits equipped with these armaments. These subunits (yacheyka in Russian) were to serve as an instrument for a broader introduction of this technology in 1981-85.

WP state governments allot extra, unplanned financial means to cover the import of additional recommended weapons from the Soviet Union. In Poland a special resolution on this matter was passed by the government Presidium; it was not, however, submitted to the Sejm or even to the Sejm's National Defense Commission. The allotted means came from the Polish Government reserve, and the expense of organizing the special innovative subunits was covered by the Ministry of National Defense budget.

2. LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS IN SELECTED DEFENSE AREAS

The long-term development programs in selected defense areas were introduced as a partial and very perfidious response to the WP states' wishes that the Combined Command show, along with the five-year plans, the course of CAF development in a longer timeframe of at least 15 years. The states making the request were not interested in accepting WP developmental programs for such a long term, but only in outlining desirable future solutions in order to avoid making such shortsighted mistakes in armament decisions as purchasing hundreds of DVINA and VOLKHOV missile systems in one five-year plan only to have them removed from service in the next five year plan, or making commitments to purchase the SU-20 aircraft which the USSR had practically stopped producing for itself and would soon be unable to maintain and repair.

The USSR could not possibly accept these proposals as envisaged by the WP countries because (1) the Soviet military leadership was afraid to reveal secret data on new systems that might reach NATO, and (2) an honest presentation of future plans to the allies would destroy the whole Soviet arms trade policy. The essence of this policy lies in selling the WP states a large amount of arms, including used or overhauled equipment, from the Soviet combat inventory (KUB-3M, S-200 VEGA-E and NEVA AA missile launchers, RUBYEZH coastal missile systems, 130-mm M-46 guns, 100-mm MT-12 AT guns, and others).


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Under these circumstances the USSR, pretending to go along with the request, during the late 1970s introduced through the Combined Command long-range development programs. Covering only selected defense areas these programs were presented not as informational and auxiliary materials for five-year planning purposes, but rather as formal proposals to be accepted and implemented.

Both the above-mentioned programs were studied and accepted at the 11th session of the CDM in December 1977, i.e., during the second year of implementation of the 1976-80 five-year plan and three years before initiation of the next five-year plan. One, covering the development of the WP state air defense troops, was presented to the CDM by Soviet Marshal Batitskiy, then Deputy CinC of CAF for WP air defense matters and at the same time the Soviet Air Defense Troops commander. The second program dealt with troop command systems and was presented by an authorized representative of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The CDM's acceptance of both these developmental programs meant that the states were obligated to include them in their future five-year plans.

### 3. JOINT DEFENSE INVESTMENT PLANS

In accepted practice the joint defense investment plans usually were accepted outside the five-year CAF developmental plans. In the 1960s and early 1970s, joint defense investments, chiefly in bases and support depots, stemmed from bilateral agreements between the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff and the WP state armed forces general (main) staffs. All documents implemented during this period showed unmistakably that the entire cost of constructing permanent installations (buildings, warehouses, underground fuel tanks, etc.) was to be covered by the country where the installation was located. The Soviet Union covered only the costs of the distribution facilities (cranes, facilities for mass refueling of military vehicles, etc.).


In the mid-1970s the Combined Command took over from the Soviet General Staff all planning of joint defense investments. At Combined Command initiative, the CDM accepted and began to implement in the 1970s two large investments in which all WP states participate. The first investment, covered by the cryptonym ALBATROS, pertains to construction of hardened

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command posts for the CAF CinC in the Western and Southwestern TVDs. The second investment is connected with construction of a European theater-scale permanent tropospheric communications network to serve the strategic needs of commanding the CAF.

The ALBATROS investment, whose total cost for the Western and Southwestern TVDs was originally to be about 100 million rubles, is being implemented by the Combined Command with special contributions designated for this purpose made by the WP states to the CAF budget. The USSR, for whose personnel alone these investments are made, covers only 44.5 percent of the cost; the rest is covered by the other WP states.

Investments connected with construction of the permanent tropospheric communications network according to a Combined Command plan are realized on their own territories and at their own cost by the individual WP states. To implement both investment plans the WP state governments probably initially allotted an additional limited amount of means and then modified the amount in the budgetary outlays of their defense ministries in accordance with the five-year plan.

4. JOINT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PLANS

The joint scientific research plans coordinated with the national commands are drafted and published by the Combined Command. The part pertaining to operational research is published by the CAF Staff, while the part pertaining to the design of new weapons and military equipment is published by the CAF Technical Committee. Some of the themes for scientific research and for design and development are contributed by the individual WP states, reflecting their own capabilities and interests. The joint scientific research plans are put out independently of the five-year CAF developmental plans. There are no set forms for financial settlements on behalf of research work contracted for. The scientific research costs are covered by the states in which the work is done. Outlays made for scientific research and design and development work are subsequently included in the price of a finished model of armament or equipment offered for sale.

Scientific research and design and development projects requiring extra-large outlays and commitment, particularly on the part of the civilian scientific research force, were

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accepted reluctantly or even rejected by WP ministries of defense because such projects went beyond the limit of their capacity. In such cases the matter was handled by the CEMA Defense Industry Commission, which would organize the research along commercial lines. The research costs would be covered by the consumer. Such situations are, however, exceptional. Three examples of this type of scientific research, design and development work are the VAKSS, PASUV, and PASUF.<sup>25</sup> But whenever it is at all possible the USSR pushes the work on to the shoulders of the national commands without any promise of recompense. An example here may be the case of a very broad research program covered by the cryptonym PROSPEKT AN and initiated by the Soviet General Staff, the goal of which was integration for defense purposes of railway, highway, air, inland, and sea transportation systems throughout the WP area. The chief objective was the switchover of East European railway net to the broad gauge used in USSR. At first the Soviet General Staff presented this matter in a bilateral form to the ministries of defense with the request that it should be scientifically elaborated to cover all matters connected with this subject. Some ministries, including the Polish Ministry of National Defense, declared themselves unqualified to take on the work and suggested that it should be directed to CEMA. The USSR did not accept this suggestion and intervened at a higher level. As a result, for example in Poland, there was a government decision (passed by the government Presidium) accepting the Soviet request and ordering the scientific work to be done by several economic ministries (Transportation, Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy, Agriculture) as a priority and financed by Poland. The work was completed in record time (in about one year) and was sent to the Soviet General Staff.

5. JOINT CAF ENTERPRISE PLANS


The joint CAF plans are drafted annually and published by the CAF Staff after they are coordinated with the general (main) staffs. These documents contain bilateral and multilateral training programs organized by the Combined

25 VAKSS -- interconnected, automated, integrated communication system.  
 PASUV -- field automated troop command system.  
 PASUF -- field automated fleet command system.

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Command inspections, checkups and all sorts of consultations, conferences, meetings, etc.

The broadest of the joint CAF activities and those that put the greatest burden on the WP state defense budgets are the training programs initiated by the Combined Command. These include:

- exercises and workouts organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense.
- exercises, workouts and war games organized by the Combined Command.
- exercises and workouts organized and conducted by the national commands with the participation of the staffs and troops of the allied armed forces.
- missile launches for troop training at ranges in the USSR.


Joint exercise plans designate the organizer and the director of a given activity, its participants (staffs, troops and sometimes equipment), and date and location. Drafting of the joint exercise plans follows strict procedures. After the CAF Staff drafts the plan, it is sent to the defense ministries of the WP states for coordination with the CAF CinC's draft on training for the following year and other materials for the autumn session of the CAF Military Council. The national defense ministries analyze the draft plan and send their comments to the CAF Staff well ahead of the autumn MC session. Upon receipt of comments from the defense ministries, the CAF Staff prepares the final version of the plan for study by the CAF MC. When the MC finishes studying the plan, each army receives only that part pertaining to it as an attachment to the CinC directive on training for that army.

Since the 1970s the Soviets have exerted constant and strong pressure to increase the number and types of exercises, to expand their territory and duration, and to add more troops. The Combined Command does take into consideration well-founded comments on the joint enterprise plans from the WP states.

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6. THE BUDGET OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

In accordance with the provision of the CAF Peacetime Statute, expenses of the Combined Command, the Staff and other CAF command organs are covered by a budget composed of WP state contributions, which in percentage are as follows:

- Bulgarian Peoples Republic-7
- Peoples Republic of Hungary-6
- German Democractic Republic-6
- Polish Peoples Republic- 13.5
- Socialist Republic of Romania-10
- USSR - 44.5
- Czechoslovak Socialist Republic-13

The budgetary means should be used, in accordance with the statutory provision, to cover the cost of CAF training enterprises, maintenance of material reserve means assigned as CAF CinC reserves to support the Combined Command and CAF command organs, official operations, the costs of civilian and military communications operations, and transportation.


In practice the expenses connected with the participation of individual WP armed forces in CAF exercises are covered by their own defense ministries, while the CAF budget covers the expenses of the Combined Command and the CAF Staff resulting from their participation in exercises (per diems, transportation means, prizes for exercise participants, propaganda settings, receptions, representational funds, etc.).

Payment of the expenses for maintenance of materiel reserves classified as CAF CinC reserves is actually WP subsidization of the Soviet Army reserve maintenance because, according to the CAF Wartime Statute, the CAF operational system does not envisage transfer of any CinC material reserves to the national armed forces. Rather, the Wartime Statute contains a precise statement that the national commands alone are responsible for the material-technical support of their armed forces.

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Similarly, the expenses connected with the current Combined Command activities and its utilization of communications and transportation means is actually a subsidy by the WP countries of the Combined Command as the overt agency of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff.

Since the mid-1970s the expenses connected with financing "joint" (actually Soviet) investments also began to be covered, on the basis of a CDM resolution, from the WP state contributions to the CAF budget.

In the beginning of the 1980s (1980-81) the annual CAF budget<sup>26</sup> was on the level of 15 to 17 million transferable rubles (about 24 to 27.5 million US dollars). Expenses covering CAF Staff activities and maintenance of special installations (wartime command posts) were 7.5 million rubles, and investment outlays (installation of CAF wartime command system) were 8-10 million rubles. The CAF budget has a constant tendency to grow. Planned 1982 expenses were to reach some 20 million transfer rubles, or more than 32 million US dollars.

According to the CAF Peacetime Statute, CAF budgetary expenditures for each year as well as estimated budgetary expenses for the next year should be ratified in the name of individual governments of the WP state defense ministries as well as in the name of the CAF CinC. In practice the procedure is as follows: in August or September of each year the CAF Staff transmits to the defense ministries a report on budgetary outlays for the current year and a draft budget for the next year. The central military finance organs of the ministries of defense analyze this document (in Poland--the Department of Finance of the Ministry of National Defense)--and the general (main) staffs prepare a special report for the premiers of their governments with the recommendation that the budget be ratified. After coordination of the matter with the premier,


<sup>26</sup> Since 1976 the transferable ruble has been the official accounting unit used in trade relations between CEMA member countries. Theoretically this ruble is based on gold parity. Gold parity of 0.08742 grams is equal to the parity of the Soviet ruble. The official exchange rate in 1976 was 0.72 rubles, while in 1981 it was only 0.62 rubles.

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the ministers of defense authorize the chiefs of their finance organs to participate in the analysis of the budget at the autumn session of the CAF Military Council (most commonly in October); they also authorize the deputy ministers of defense they had delegated to attend the Military Council session and who are members of the Military Council, to formally sign the budget in the name of the governments.

Budgetary matters are analyzed at separate sessions attended by the authorized chiefs of the finance organs of the ministries of defense. Each session is chaired by the finance chief of the CAF Staff, a Soviet general. Formally the budget is ratified during a break in the session of the CAF Military Council by deputy ministers of defense and by the CinC.

In addition to existing provisions on CAF budget, when the CAF Wartime Statute came into force in 1980 it introduced the regulation that WP state contributions would finance the CAF command organs activities in the TVDs as well as their communications, guard and service units. These contributions, given in percentages, are as follows:

- for the Western TVD Supreme Command: GDR--16.2, Poland--23.1, USSR--44.5, Czechoslovakia--- 16.2.
- for the Southwestern TVD Supreme Command: Bulgaria--16.9; Hungary--14.5; Romania--24.1 USSR - 44.5.

By the end of 1981, the Combined Command had not yet presented expenditure plans for the individual TVDs. It may be assumed, however, that after the formation at the beginning of 1982 of supreme commands for the TVDs and after assignment of new communications, guard and service units, probably in the same year, this matter must have been a point on the agenda of the CAF Military Council of autumn 1982.

7. EXPECTED CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN WARSAW PACT DEFENSE PLANNING

The WP defense planning system, which has acquired its shape throughout many years of practice, will doubtlessly be retained in the foreseeable future. There is no indication that in the near future there will be any serious change in the forms, methods and procedures of that planning, particularly

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changes leading to any limitation of Soviet influence on armaments decisions. Only changes resulting from the needs of a concrete situation and modifications for finetuning are probable.

Among the most important changes which have been in preparation for a long time and which may already have been introduced during 1982-83 are:

- changes connected with additional implementation of the CAF statute and of the command organs for wartime.
- extension of the five-year planned prognostication of the CAF development to 15 or 25-year periods.
- stretching the cycles of planning joint CAF enterprises up to five years.

The full implementation of the CAF Wartime Statute that was intended to take place in 1981-83 will have great significance for the further centralization of WP defense planning under Soviet leadership. By mid-1981 the Soviets had not really revealed how they intended to utilize the provisions of these documents which favor their position. The Soviets only made known that plans were being drafted and would be the subject of later arrangements.

One obvious move would be the inclusion of the new CAF command organs for wartime (Supreme Commands for the TVDs) in operational planning. Initial information on this matter coming from the Soviet General Staff indicated that this type of planning will be performed in peacetime by the existing Combined Command. Because the WP command structure for wartime has no intermediate element between the Supreme CinC and the Soviet General Staff as the Supreme CinC's working organ on the one hand, and the commanders-in-chief for the TVDs, on the other, it may be assumed that operational planning in the Combined Command framework will be carried out by assigned teams from the CAF Staff for peacetime, which will be treated as nuclei of the future Supreme command staffs of the TVDs. The CAF CinC and CAF Chief of Staff will perform the function of coordination and operational planning direction for the entire European TVD.


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Possible introduction of an intermediary operational planning element (between the Soviet General Staff and the national armies) basically would not change the situation of the WP states and would bring no substantive changes in the content or method of planning at the national army level.

However, this move would elevate the role and importance of the CAF CinC and Chief of Staff in the whole system of WP state defense planning--a fact they will no doubt want to utilize in the armed forces development planning processes and possibly even in the whole range of allied state preparations for war.

It is, however, difficult to foresee the results that may result from the appointment of the CPSU General Secretary as the Supreme CinC, with the Soviet General Staff as his working organ even in peacetime. Statements by leading personalities of the Soviet General Staff and the Combined Command indicate that this new "authority" feels itself not only competent but obligated to supervise military preparations even in peacetime. It is therefore very likely that this authority will skillfully exploit the less precise statutory provisions and will initiate further probes at broadening their powers in the economic and scientific-technological areas where the WP states have had up to now the greatest freedom of action.

Extension of the five-year planned forecasting of CAF development to 15 or 25-year periods should have been initiated in accordance with Combined Command statements at the end of 1981 or in 1982. Requests in this regard were made by many WP states, particularly insistently by Poland. Despite strong opposition the Combined Command finally accepted proposals which promised that the assessment of the threat to WP state security and assessments of CAF development would be presented for study by the CDM even prior the presentation of the planned CAF development for 1986-90. Initial information on this matter provided by the Combined Command showed that both forecasts and assessments would be drafted and presented by the Soviet General Staff.

The Combined Command did not reveal how it intended to correlate the defense forecasts with CAF development nor did it show what procedures would be used in this matter. However, it seems self-evident that the forecasts will become a permanent

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part of developmental planning and will be studied by the CDM at least once, a year prior to the study of each five-year plan. Because the forecasts will be for a 15 to 25-year timeframe, each consecutive forecast (drafted every five years) will probably revise and elaborate upon the preceding one and will also extend its future validity by an additional five years.

The collegial organs have never studied a problem without adopting appropriate resolutions. It is therefore almost certain that each study of forecasts pertaining to WP state security and to CAF development will be followed by resolutions constituting general guidelines for WP armaments programs during the next 15 to 25 years.

For some time it had been intended to extend the scope of planning of joint CAF enterprises from one year to five years. Initial agreements regarding this matter envisaged five-year plans to cover general decisions pertaining particularly to the most important training programs (massive joint exercises) in specified years, while the annual plans (in their existing form) were to bring them to immediate attention and to detail them. The five-year plans would be helpful not only from the methodological standpoint but also in the planning of financial expenditures and resource consumption. Acceptance of these joint five-year CAF training plans would probably be the responsibility of the CAF Military Council.

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CHAPTER VI

THE SOVIET SYSTEM FOR SUPERVISING AND CONTROLLING THE FULFILLMENT OF ARMAMENTS PLANS

The Soviet leadership attaches great importance to controlling the implementation of the armaments plans forced on its allies. They apply the old Russian proverb "Trust, but check" doveray, no proveray. Accordingly, the Soviet system for supervision and control contains elements of "voluntary" self-accounting by the individual WP states, periodic submission of very detailed reports and verification of these reports through official inspections and checks, and the use of various methods of penetration of allied forces by the Combined Command representatives.

1. SELF-ACCOUNTING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALLIED OBLIGATIONS

The Soviets have managed to subject the political and military leaders of all Warsaw Pact states to a regular self-accounting process. Self-accounting for the implementation of resolutions already taken and for obligations based on them constitutes one of the chief points in the ritualistic speeches by the members of all collegial WP organs, starting with the PCC, through the CDM, down to the CAF Military Council. This is done by the chairmen of the individual state delegations or by the authorized representatives. Good form calls for a statement that all planned assumptions are consistently being implemented, thanks of course to help from the Soviet Union. Everything does not always follow the plan, and the speech dare not ignore various lapses and setbacks because the Soviets already know about them. Therefore, the speech refers to delays in implementing the plan, but this reference must be accompanied by some indication of how and when they will be rectified. Self-accounting does not have any informative value because a 15 or 20 minute-long ritualistic speech, containing many trains of thought, cannot possibly present concrete and detailed reporting. Nevertheless, self-accounting has an enormous disciplinary significance for the party leaders since each of them knows that he must publicly account for his obligations.

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2. REPORTING SYSTEM

A unified reporting system was introduced, based on provisions of CAF Peacetime Statute, which obligates the allied army general (main) staffs to report regularly to the CAF Staff about the combat and mobilization readiness of their armed forces, the level of their training, armament, equipment reserves and other matters.

WP armed forces general (main) staffs, except for the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, must transmit to the CAF Staff by 15 February of each year written reports in a strictly specified form for the preceding year (according to the status as of 1 January of the year following that on which the report is being made).

These reports contain the main text signed by the General Staff chief and a dozen attachments, the whole thing numbering 300-400 typewritten pages, including maps, sketches, lists, etc.

The main text contains a general assessment of combat and mobilization readiness of the troops assigned to the CAF and a general accounting of the implementation of the CinC directives and of the bilateral protocol provisions.

The attachments deal with such information as:


- accounting for peacetime and wartime armed forces personnel strength.
- combat composition of operational and tactical large units and separate units of all branches of the armed forces.
- listing of basic armaments with a breakdown showing specific units.
- disposition and bases of all branches of the armed forces down to the separate unit indicating their alert and mobilization areas.
- state of wartime material reserves showing how they are integrated and where they are located.

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- all data on the air defense system (deployment of missile, air, radio-technical, reconnaissance radioelectronic warfare troops, rear support, command, etc.).
- all data on operational preparation of national territory as part of the TVD (permanent military and civilian airfields, alternate airfields, road airfield segments, highway net, base hospitals, Soviet troops deployment support elements, etc.).
- reports on exercises at divisional level upward and on surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air and air-to-surface missile launchings.
- personnel data pertaining to more important military positions. Part of the reported materials is used by the CAF Staff for its own purposes and part is transmitted to the Soviet General Staff.

The reporting system is constantly being expanded so that more and more reports and more and more different types of information are transmitted to Moscow. In 1981 the CAF Staff sent to the general (main) staffs new report forms for coordination. Rough assessments by the Poles indicated that the number of reports will multiply 5-6 times, and in order to draft them on time, special organizational units engaged only in reporting have to be created in the Ministry of National Defense, in the branches of the armed forces headquarters, in military districts, and in the arms of troops headquarters. Because of this the PAF General Staff turned down many of the Moscow-requested reports. But it is likely that the Russians will manage to exert pressure at the proper Polish decisionmaking levels, and if need be on other WP countries as well, and will accomplish what they had set out to accomplish.


3. WP NATIONAL ARMY REPORTING VERIFICATION BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

One of the main tasks of the CAF CinC representatives attached to the national armies is to gain a thorough familiarity with the armed forces with which they reside. They collect the information legally through participation in all sorts of meetings of the military collegial organs, exercises

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of command, staffs and troops, inspections and checks and also through official and non-official contacts with the higher command and staff cadre.

The CAF CinC representatives receive copies of the more important correspondence and documents directed by the Combined Command to the national ministries of defense. It also has become customary for the correspondence from the ministries of defense to be coordinated with the CAF CinC representatives before they are transmitted to the Combined Command and the Soviet General Staff.

Various functionaries of the CAF CinC representation with the Polish Ministry of National Defense made it clear that the representation was obligated to duplicate the whole Polish Ministry of National Defense reporting system. They frequently approached units of the Polish General Staff asking for help in this matter pertaining to drafting reports to the CAF Staff.

4. INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS

The CAF Peacetime Statute does not provide a legal basis for the Combined Command or the Soviet General Staff to conduct independent inspections or checks. That document only mentions the possibility of participation by the CinC in implementing the inspection plans coordinated with the ministries of defense.

In practice, however, a custom has come into existence, unquestioned by the WP states, that the Combined Command also includes in the plan for joint exercises its own inspections conducted in the national armies. Once these plans are coordinated with the national commands, the Combined Command conducts the inspection in various degrees basically once a year. In addition, the Soviet General Staff conducts checks and inspections in selected fields of operational planning and operational preparation of national territories.

The inspections are always comprehensive, going into details of the troops' moral and political state, the status of combat and mobilizational readiness, the state of training, armament, wartime reserves and other problems which interest the Combined Command.

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In the 1970s, Combined Command inspections included basically only the tactical levels (divisions and separate units) of the various branches of the armed forces, most frequently of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy. Air Defense Forces were inspected in the framework of National Air Defense Corps combat exercises conducted annually in USSR and connected with missile launching or during the course of allied exercises within the combined WP state air defense system.

At the beginning of the 1980s the Combined Command enlarged the number of units which it inspected so as to include so-called representative elements of the armed forces. In practice this called for inspection of:

- In the Ground Forces: the staff of one army, one tank or mechanized division, one operational-tactical missile brigade, one field artillery brigade, one AA missile regiment, and also selected units of arms of troops and services in addition to army level rear support units.
- In the Air Forces: the staff of the air army, one aviation division, and selected rear support units.
- In the Navy: one ship flotilla, naval reconnaissance center, and material and technical support bases.


Formal inspections are conducted by Soviet officers and officers of the given national army assigned to duty at the CAF. At the formal inspection, representatives of the appropriate ministries of defense are usually also present. Results of the formal inspection are given in a special protocol containing the evaluation and short post-inspection recommendations. One copy of the protocol goes to the national minister of defense and another to Moscow.

Soviet General Staff inspections in the national armies are fragmentary. They are conducted according to their own plan without coordination with the defense ministries of the WP states. The checks are rather infrequent and pertain chiefly to selected fields dealing with support of regrouping Soviet forces (fuel reserve depots, reserves of means for alternate bridge construction and ferry crossing points, airfields, maritime bases, troop regrouping routes, etc.).

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By authorization of the Soviet General Staff the checks are conducted by officers from various specialized central institutions of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. In the course of checking the Soviet officers are usually accompanied by representatives of the given ministry of defense who are cleared to handle operational planning. Results of the inspection are contained in a special protocol, one copy of which goes to the interested ministry.

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