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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Report

*The Sino-Soviet Struggle*
*in the World Communist Movement*
*Since Khrushchev's Fall (Part 3)*

*Reference Title: ESAU XXXVI*

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# WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

# THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

This working paper of the DD/I Research Staff examines in detail the evolving relationship of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties to the world Communist movement from the time of Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 through the end of May 1967. The paper attempts to describe the principal public and private dealings between the CPSU and the CCP throughout this period; the dealings of each of the two antagonists with the most important parties of the world movement; the dealings of many of those other parties with each other, and the effect of their interests on the policies of the Soviet and Chinese parties; the role played by the evolution of Soviet policy toward the United States in the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence over the Communist movement; and the role played by the internal life of the Soviet and Chinese parties on the course the Sino-Soviet struggle has followed since Khrushchev's fall.

The paper is organized in three parts, published separately as ESAU XXXIV, XXXV, and XXXVI. Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev's fall toward a more vigorous appeal to the interests of all those parties--such as the North Vietnamese--hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest in militant struggle against the United States. Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former supporters of the Chinese by advocating "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung's refusal to cooperate and Mao's arrogant attitude toward all who would not obey him completely. Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with Mao's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 and his simultaneous surfacing of the gigantic purge known as the "great cultural revolution," describes the subsequent rapid decay of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage of China's increasing isolation,

and concludes with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the Communist militants, toward the United States, and toward the Chinese Communist regime which the dominant majority in the CPSU leadership may be expected to follow in the future.

A chronological list of secret Sino-Soviet correspondence since Khrushchev's fall precedes Part I. An index follows each of Parts I and II and a cumulative index of all three parts follows Part III.

This paper presents a working thesis against which other analysts may test their own theses and conclusions; it does not, therefore, reflect an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence. It has benefited from the advice and comments of [redacted] of the Office of Current Intelligence, [redacted] of the Office of Economic Research, and officers of the Clandestine Services. The conclusions expressed--some of which are controversial--are solely those of the author, Harry Gelman. Comments on any aspect of the paper are solicited and may be addressed to the author or the Chief and Deputy Chief of the DDI Special Research Staff, [redacted]

# THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

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Summary and Conclusions

Part III

The North Vietnamese Quarrels With Mao

For the North Vietnamese, constrained by their continuing dependence on Chinese support for their war effort, 1966 saw an aggravation of several specific grievances against the CCP.

The first of these was Mao's hostile attitude toward the "unity of action" line. To the unwelcome Chinese action in 1965--the obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam, the refusals to sign a tripartite statement or attend a tripartite or bloc conference on aid to Vietnam--worse actions were now added. These included the Chinese virtual break in party relations with the CPSU and its friends, public and private pressure on Hanoi to do likewise, and repeated threats to the continuation of Sino-Soviet state relations which must have alarmed Hanoi considerably because of the implied menace to the Soviet military aid supply line through China.

A second continuing grievance was the Chinese claim to have furnished precept and model--in Mao's writings and Chinese Communist experience--for the North Vietnamese struggle against the United States. Despite Chinese awareness of North Vietnamese sensitivity on this issue--which goes to the heart of the cherished autonomy of the North Vietnamese party--Mao's arrogance has continued to create friction. The ever-mounting claims made for Mao and the continued expansion of Mao's cult in connection with the "great cultural revolution" in the fall and winter of 1966 brought the Chinese into further conflict with the North Vietnamese, as with virtually everyone else, and a Chinese attempt to export cultural revolution propaganda to North Vietnam appears to have been one of the offenses that evoked a thinly-veiled personal attack on Mao by a North Vietnamese party journal in May 1967.

Furthermore, the Chinese have not hesitated to give the North Vietnamese repeated unwelcome advice on how to run their war, and to change that advice when they felt it necessary. There is evidence that in 1966 there were differences of view between Peking and Hanoi

on several issues of tactics and strategy. The Chinese, whose territory was not being bombed, were less in a hurry than the DRV, and viewed with greater equanimity the prospect of North Vietnam fighting indefinitely on the strategic defensive to "bog down" the United States in South Vietnam for many years. The Chinese wished the Viet Cong main forces to take fewer risks than some North Vietnamese leaders wished to take in accepting large-scale direct encounters with U.S. units under unfavorable circumstances. And the Chinese wished the Viet Cong when confronted with superior force to abandon temporarily strongholds which in some cases the DRV felt it necessary to defend. "

A further major grievance was the Chinese presumption in attempting to dictate to Hanoi what tactical stand to take or not to take on the question of negotiations. The North Vietnamese, increasingly influenced by the damage wrought by U.S. bombing, had become increasingly sympathetic to Soviet efforts through diplomacy and propaganda to secure termination of the bombing by merely holding out the prospect of peace talks. In early 1967, the DRV removed some of its earlier ambiguity to indicate more strongly than ever before that a permanent bombing halt could bring talks. This reduction of ambiguity alarmed and infuriated the Chinese, despite the fact that the central DRV position had not changed nor was likely to change: while by now quite eager, even anxious to obtain a cessation of bombing without significant cost, the North Vietnamese remained completely unwilling to halt their effort to conquer South Vietnam as the price of such a cessation; and they were determined, if they entered talks in exchange for a bombing halt, to continue their war effort simultaneous with long, protracted negotiations, while the United States remained bound to continue to abstain from bombing.

Mao's persisting fears about a North Vietnamese entry into talks with the United States even on these terms appear to be based partly on indications that the North Vietnamese, after fighting while talking for a certain period, might sign an agreement halting the fighting at least temporarily in exchange for something less than immediate total U.S. withdrawal. Mao appears to harbor unwarranted suspicions that Hanoi might then

in fact acquiesce in the presence of Americans and U.S. bases in Vietnam indefinitely.

The "Cultural Revolution" and the Renewed Soviet Offensive

Meanwhile, on 23 March 1966, the CCP released a letter they had just sent to the CPSU refusing to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress, and thus breaking the principal remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations. Since that time, there has been no intelligence evidence whatever of personal contacts between representatives of the two parties (as distinguished from govermental diplomatic contacts) or of letters exchanged between the two parties (as distinguished from the many fiery Foreign Ministry notes soon to fly back and forth). While it is conceivable that secret meetings have been held or letters sent which have gone totally unreported, the picture presented by the evidence to date is one of a total break in party relations since March 1966--the organizational "clear line of demarcation" that Mao had prophesied in November.

At the same time, Mao began in the spring his long-drawn-out purge of the party apparatus. Then, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Chinese party's central committee in early August, Mao cast down as unsatisfactory the two chief managers of the party machine: his heir apparent, the senior vice chairman Liu Shao-chi, and the party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping. In the violent ordeal which has gone on in many waves since then, most other central and provincial leaders have been subjected to unprecedented public pressure from student fanatics organized as Red Guards. Again and again, the apparatus of the party and government has been subjected to public humiliation, has been tested, and purged.

These events offered too good an opportunity for exploitation against the Chinese for the Soviets to pass up, and gradually in the fall of 1966 the CPSU resumed and expanded the direct public attacks on the Chinese regime which the Soviet leadership had muffled ever since Khrushchev was overthrown. The Soviets wept copious crocodile tears for the central figures under attack (naming Liu as one of them in late September), and for

the provincial party organizations beleaguered by the Red Guards, and depicted the resistance to the Red Guards organized by some of the party functionaries as a spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the noble Chinese party against Mao's "hooligans." The Soviets soon began to stress that only naked military force--the PLA--was behind the Red Guards in their conflict with the wisely anti-Maoist Chinese party and people. This line was transparently designed to appeal to the sympathies of foreign party functionaries.

Thus the Soviets had begun once more, after a two-year halt, to attack Mao publicly by name, and within a few weeks added Mao's new heir Lin Piao as well. In addition to the public propaganda attacks, one closely guarded CPSU letter on the cultural revolution was dispatched to bloc parties in December, and another to many non-bloc parties. After a CPSU Central Committee plenum was held in mid-December to discuss the China question, unprecedented briefings of the Soviet party and army were conducted by the entire Soviet leadership in January 1967, and the rank-and-file was warned of the possibility that Chinese provocations might force a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

## The Siege of the Soviet Embassy

These Soviet measures were taken after state relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China had grown steadily worse throughout the fall, with worse yet to come. In August and again in early November the Chinese conducted noisy demonstrations before the Soviet Embassy in Peking, each time rejecting Soviet government protests. Then, in late January 1967, the Chinese initiated the most serious threat they had ever made to the continued existence of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations--and to the Soviet overland supply route to Hanoi. An incident involving Chinese students in Moscow was used as a pretext for the imposition of a violent two-and-a-half week siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking. There is evidence suggesting that the initial incident and the siege and demonstrations that followed were deliberately planned, provoked and coordinated. The Soviet reaction to all this was to resolve to hold on in Peking as long as they could. The Soviets were well aware why the Chinese might wish to force them out, and the Chinese were

well aware why the Soviets were determined to stay. A formal break in diplomatic relations would serve as a legal pretext to sever permanently the Soviet land and air transportation routes across China, and thereby present the USSR with the dilemma of either accepting an end to their military aid to North Vietnam--a political disaster--or of shipping their sensitive military equipment to the DRV by sea and running a serious risk of confrontation with the United States.

There is some evidence to suggest that Chinese obstruction of the passage of Soviet aid to North Vietnam through China may have been temporarily reimposed in January shortly before the siege of the Soviet embassy was begun. It is possible that one purpose of the Chinese pressures against the Soviet presence in China in late January and early February was to suggest forcibly to the Vietnamese that the Chinese might cut off the Soviet supply line permanently if the DRV agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the United States. The siege of the Soviet embassy was halted when a North Vietnamese delegation flew to Peking immediately after receipt of a letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh proposing peace talks on terms which Ho subsequently rejected.

Separate agreements were apparently subsequently reached between the North Vietnamese and Chinese and the Chinese and Soviets on the question of Soviet aid transit; these agreements may have involved renewal of a 30 March 1965 two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on aid to Vietnam. The new agreements evidently ratified the practice of having the North Vietnamese accept the Soviet military aid shipments at the Sino-Soviet border and ride with them through China to North Vietnam; but contrary to some Soviet reports, there is reason to believe that this practice was begun not in 1967 but months before, in the fall of 1966. There is no reason to believe that the new agreements will in themselves prevent Mao from reimposing obstacles to the passage of Soviet aid at any time in the future when he may feel it politically desirable to do so.

The cessation of the siege of the Soviet embassy and the relaxation of pressure on the Soviet supply line to Vietnam removed for the time being the threat of a complete break in Sino-Soviet state relations, but did not halt the continued deterioration of those relations, the build-up of Soviet military defenses along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, or the steady outpouring of mutual vituperation. By now Mao was depicted in Soviet propaganda as a madman, a racist, a Hitler, a militarist, a friend of Chinese capitalists and enemy of Chinese Communists, an ally of American "imperialism," and a would-be conqueror of all neighboring peoples, including the Vietnamese.

A salient feature of the CPSU's anti-Mao propaganda has been the thorough way in which it has been combined with the anti-American theme. Soviet propaganda has depicted two terrible extremes--U.S. "imperialism" and the Chinese renegades--in tacit alliance at the expense of the suffering Vietnamese and in opposition to the forces of peace and freedom the world over led by the Soviet Union.

This Soviet line entailed a remarkable change from the Soviet posture in Khrushchev's time toward forces in the United States desirous of improving U.S. relations with Mao's regime. Whereas in earlier years the Soviets had welcomed statements made by such Americans (because any improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might bring a relaxation of Chinese pressures on Khrushchev's policies), now they cited them as sinister evidence of Sino-U.S. collaboration. And whereas in the Khrushchev era the Soviets had eagerly greeted any U.S. voices urging Chinese Communist admission to the U.N., now some Soviet commentaries actually reacted to such suggestions with heavy suspicion as to the motives with which they were offered.

Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 1966 and early 1967, while the Chinese cultural revolution was proceeding, while Sino-Soviet state relations were deteriorating, while the relations of the Communist neutrals with the CCP were growing increasingly bad and the closest remaining friends of the CCP were becoming increasingly worried, the Chinese presence in the Soviet-run international front organizations,

where so many past battles had taken place, was being gradually thinned out. As a result of a combination of voluntary Chinese withdrawals and Soviet evictions, there was an over-all trend toward Chinese departure from most of the fronts in which they still participated.

The New Soviet Push for a World Conference

Finally, the CPSU in the fall of 1966 took advantage of all the multiple phenomena working toward Chinese isolation to press again for a world Communist conference. The CPSU was again eager for a conference because it considered that the low state of Chinese fortunes--a possible temporary circumstance--might have rendered feasible for the time being the convocation of a meeting with an agenda and participants that would permit an expansion of Soviet authority and influence in the world movement. When the Soviets began to press for a conference once more late in 1966, they were pointing toward an event which they hoped to be able to bring off--or bring a step closer--a year later, at the October Revolution's fiftieth anniversary celebrations in Moscow in November 1967. The Soviets were well aware of the extent of the opposition they had to face, and they intended to use the interval to reduce that opposition, bringing pressure on those parties susceptible to pressure and cajoling the others. And indeed, two key parties that had consistently opposed the Soviet will regarding the conference began finally to retreat under CPSU pressure early in 1967. These were the Italians and the British, the two chief recalcitrants at the March 1965 Moscow meeting.

In contemplating a conference, the Soviets have two extreme alternatives. The "minimal program" for which they might settle is a world Communist conference organized and run by the CPSU in Moscow but pegged and limited to the question of aid to Vietnam alone. This is the lowest common denominator, the kind of meeting the maximum number of parties would attend without the Chinese. This is the only sort of world meeting the British party has endorsed yet, and the only one the North Koreans, Japanese, Cubans, and North Vietnamese might attend (the North Vietnamese

being unlikely even so). This is also the sort of meeting most absentees would be least likely to attack afterward.

At the other extreme is the "maximal program": a world Communist conference to prepare a detailed "general line," to write a 1960-type statement minus the ambiguities and self-contradictions imposed on that statement by Chinese participation, to hand down both generalizations and specific guidelines for Communist parties in every region of the world, to impose on the movement a universal viewpoint conforming in detail to all the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, and to endorse CPSU authority as well.

It seems likely that what the Soviets hope to do is to choose a suitable approach from a point on a spectrum between these two extremes. The CPSU may wish to use the aid-to-Vietnam, anti-American issue as the central theme around which to build the conference and attract participants, while attempting at the same time to preserve the broader features of the conference to which Brezhnev and his friends have publicly referred--the evaluation of the past and the setting of a general line for the future.

If absolutely necessary, the Soviets may settle for using the November 1967 ceremonies merely for some preliminary step to bring about a conference in 1968. At all events, however, the November ceremonies present a fortuitous and unique opportunity to the CPSU: an accidental circumstance providing the CPSU, at just the moment when the Chinese have virtually withdrawn from the movement, with a legitimate occasion for an impressive display of the CPSU's historic credentials to lead the movement and a complete roster of parties obliged to be present. The CPSU may never again have quite such an occasion. It is unlikely that the CPSU will let this opportunity pass without some major organizational move to enhance CPSU influence and authority.

## 1964-1967: The Chinese World Challenge to Moscow

In the period since Khrushchev's fall, the Chinese organizational challenge to the CPSU and its

followers has not been destroyed, but for the time being it has been either held or beaten back in all parts of the world. Over-all, there has been a considerable retreat from the Chinese high tide of 1963-1964--the years when most of the CCP-backed splinter parties now in existence were formed, and when a strong Chinese alliance with the anti-Khrushchev independent radical Communists became overt.

The great change has of course been in Asia, because of the defection (or destruction) of the most important of the independent Asian parties. In Europe, despite the addition of one or two splinter parties to the roster, very small beginnings have remained very small, with no progress made. In the Communist movement of Africa and the Middle East, Chinese assets have from the start been even weaker in comparison with those of the CPSU, and this has not changed. On the other hand, in Latin America the Chinese offensive of 1963-1964 had made considerable progress, but here again the tide has either halted or somewhat receded: the most important pro-CCP parties have either barely held on to what they had originally achieved (as in Peru) or have lost some of their original gains (as in Ecuador and Colombia). In most parts of the world, at the time of Khrushchev's fall Chinese organizational efforts had presented a real danger of further subversion of cadres of many important pro-CPSU parties, and although a potential for this still exists in some cases (three notable cases being Italy, Brazil, and Chile), the over-all trend for the time being is not running in this direction. And throughout the world, wherever pro-Chinese splinter groups exist, the CCP and its agents are plagued by incessant internal bickering among rival leaders of these splinters.

## The New Cuban Challenge

Thus, the most serious threat to the authority and influence of the CPSU in the international movement (authority over some parties, influence over others) today comes not from the Chinese Communist party, but from the independent militant Far Eastern parties with which the CPSU has resumed relations and from disruptive forces within the Soviet-oriented

movement itself: from the Rumanians, from the Yugoslavs, and above all, from Fidel Castro's Cuba.

The November 1964 Havana deal between the CPSU and Castro could not and did not last, if only because of the ultimate incompatibility of two competing centers of authority for the Latin America Communist movement, neither of which was really reconciled to deferring even partially to the other. Today, Castro is presenting a direct organizational challenge to CPSU authority among Latin American Communists, is openly polemicizing with the pro-Soviet leaders of the Venezuelan Communist party, and has openly avowed his intention of splitting all those parties where--as in Venezuela--the party leadership is unwilling to follow his dictates on the question of armed revolution. At the same time, Castro has taken the place of the disappearing Chinese as the chief recalcitrant at meetings of international front organizations, and has continued--in alliance with the Far Eastern parties--to bring pressure on the Soviets to take what the Soviets consider undesirable risks in Vietnam and elsewhere. This was most recently demonstrated by the thinly-veiled Cuban criticism of Soviet caution during the Middle East crisis of June 1967.

Soviet Policy Toward the United States

As the result of that crisis, the Soviet leadership was sharply reminded once more of the real dangers of direct conflict with the United States latent in Soviet demagogic appeals to the interests of radical anti-U.S. forces inside and outside of the Communist movement. There is reason to believe that the CPSU leaders during and after the crisis week were particularly sobered by the implications of the radical Arab attempt (supported by the radical Communists such as Castro) to draw the Soviet Union into a direct clash with the United States by manufacturing a claim of U.S.-British air attacks on the Arab states. Thereafter the Soviets soon showed that they had no intention of abandoning their policy of cultivation of the radical Arabs; but they are probably well aware that the potential risk to themselves has not completely disappeared.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a change in the over-all Soviet public posture of hostility

toward the United States. The Soviet posture of denunciation of the United States serves purposes which the present politburo majority centering around Brezhnev evidently continues to consider deeply grounded in Soviet national interests. A tough, vituperative Soviet anti-American line is still absolutely indispensable for Soviet attempts to deal with the Communist radicals, particularly to offset the adverse effect of any negotiations involving the United States into which the USSR may feel it advantageous to its national interests to enter. Even with this offsetting vituperation the Soviets have been highly defensive about such negotiations in the face of direct attacks on them by such parties as the North Koreans and Cubans. Moreover, the tough Soviet public line toward the United States is an essential part of the continuing CPSU efforts to use the aid-to-Vietnam issue as the focus of attempts to convene some form of world Communist gathering that would strengthen CPSU influence and authority. Without the issue of united action over Vietnam, Soviet chances of enticing such parties as the North Koreans, Japanese, North Vietnamese and Cubans to such a meeting would be much poorer even than they are at present.

Soviet Calculations Regarding the Chinese

Regarding their other great rival, Communist China, the Soviet attitude now appears to be one of satisfaction mingled with slight apprehension. The present over-all military disparity between the two powers is so great that the Soviets are reasonably confident that near-term Chinese aggression against them is quite unlikely. The Soviets are likely, however, to be planning now against the contingency that a real Chinese danger to their security will have been created within the next decade. The Soviets are likely to be at least as well informed about Chinese advanced weapons developments as is the United States, and there are reasons why they may well be considerably better informed.

The Soviets appear to recognize that there is nothing at all that they can do about the Chinese leadership at present, and they are not overly hopeful about the future. Contrary to what Soviet propaganda has sometimes suggested, CPSU and East European confidential documents leave little doubt that the

Soviets and their friends have from the first regarded the "cultural revolution" as a purge instigated and directed by Mao. And contrary to the hopes Soviet propaganda has sometimes held out for Mao's "opposition," the confidential documents have been quite pessimistic about the prospects for Chinese opponents of Mao's policies. Moreover, Soviet representatives have privately admitted that Liu Shao-chi has always been as anti-Soviet as Mao.

The Soviets have always had hopes for Chou En-lai, whom they regard as the chief moderate in the Chinese leadership. If Mao were to die at this moment, Chou might become an important factor working for some moderation in Chinese extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets, however, cannot even be sure that Chou would try to do this, they cannot be sure that he will not fall victim to a purge by Mao, and they cannot be sure that he will survive a possible struggle for power after Mao's death. From the point of view of Soviet calculations, Chou is therefore only an outside possibility as a factor for a future improvement in CCP policy toward the CPSU. And the Soviets probably have little hope that Lin Piao--Mao's heir-apparent who will probably become the single most important leader in China on Mao's death--will then disappoint Mao's hopes and seek such a change in Chinese policy. During the last year the Soviets have frequently attacked Lin publicly.

For the foreseeable future, the CPSU has burnt its bridges with the present Chinese regime and with most of the persons likely to be dominant immediately after Mao's death. The CPSU must calculate, however, that once Mao is gone any successor regime, even if it retains a considerable degree of hostility to the USSR (as is likely, because of fundamental conflicting national interests), is also likely quickly to modify some of Mao's more paranoid tactics toward the Communist world which have been recognized by everyone but Mao to be counterproductive for the Chinese competition with the CPSU: Mao's hostile attitude toward the Japanese Communist Party, to take one example. The present situation of virtually complete CCP isolation even from the radical Communist neutrals is not likely to survive Mao's death,

therefore. This is an additional reason for the CPSU to make every effort to exploit its current fragile advantage while it lasts and take some tangible organizational step in November 1967 which can afterward be used to shore up CPSU influence and authority.

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## Sino-Soviet Secret Correspondence and Conversations Since Khrushchev's Fall

| | Date | Sender and Recipient | Gist |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Late Oct. 1964 | CCP letter to CPSU. | Said CCP would welcome CPSU invitation to send delegation to Moscow for October Revolution anniversary; such delegation would be led by Chou En-lai. |
| 2. | Late Oct. 1964 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Extended the invitation. |
| 3. | November 1964 | (Chou talks with CPSU in Moscow.) | Stalemate because of CCP obstinate insistence on CPSU public rejection of all past positions. |
| 4. | Late Nov. 1964 | CPSU letter to CCP (also sent to many other parties through early December.) | "Proposed" postponement of 15 December Moscow meeting to 1 March; gave rundown on latest stand of 26 prospective participants in meeting. |
| 5. | February 1965 | (Mao-Kosygin talks in Peking.) | Stalemate; Mao supremely arrogant, rejected minor CPSU concessions, demanded CPSU self-humiliation. |
| 6. | 16 Feb. 1965 | CPSU (or possibly Soviet government, or both) letter to Chinese. (Similar letter simultaneously sent to DRV.) | Sent immediately after Kosygin return from Far East; proposed "new international conference" for negotiations on Vietnam. |
| 7. | 27 Feb. 1965 | Chinese reply to Soviets. | Rejected this proposal. (Date and exact nature of DRV reply uncertain.) |

| | Date | Sender and Recipient | Gist |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8. | 22 Feb. 1965 | North Vietnamese letter to CPSU and CCP. | Sent at Kosygin suggestion; proposed tripartite public statement on Vietnam to warn United States, and furnished draft. |
| 9. | Late Feb. 1965 | CPSU reply to North Vietnam. | Accepted this proposal. |
| 10. | Late Feb. 1965 | CCP reply to North Vietnam. | Rejected this proposal. |
| 11. | 25 Feb. 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Requested air corridor across China for military airlift to DRV. |
| 12. | 28 Feb. 1965 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Rejected this request. |
| 13. | March 1965 | CPSU (or Soviet government) message to Chinese. | Requested use of air bases in south China (to assemble MIGs shipped by rail from USSR for DRV). |
| 14. | March 1965 | CCP (or Chinese government) reply to Soviets. | Rejected this request. |
| 15. | 7 March 1965 | Communiqué of 1-5 March Moscow 19-party "consultative meeting" sent to CCP (and many other parties) with short covering note, prior to publication. | Professed desire for unity, took no concrete step toward world Communist conference. CCP privately indicated scorn, later publicly attacked communiqué and meeting. |
| 16. | 30 March 1965 | Two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on Soviet aid to DRV signed. | Chinese nevertheless continue to obstruct shipment of Soviet SAM components and personnel to DRV from March until June 1965. |

| | Date | Sender and Recipient | Gist |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17. | 3 April 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Proposed tripartite Sino-Soviet-North Vietnamese meeting on measures "to defend security" of DRV. |
| 18. | 11 April 1965 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Rejected this proposal as unnecessary; attacked Soviet aid as insignificant. |
| 19. | 17 April 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Renewed demand for tripartite meeting and for tripartite public statement; attacked CCP for obstruction of Soviet aid and for rejection of unity. Draft of this letter probably shown to Le Duan, visiting in Moscow, before being sent. |
| 20. | 14 July 1965 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Denounced Soviet past diplomatic activities regarding Vietnam negotiations; charged USSR with continuing collusion with United States; insisted tripartite meeting therefore could only harm DRV; rejected united action of any kind with Soviets. |
| 21. | July 1965 | (Brezhnev-Teng Hsiao-ping talks at Ninth Rumanian party congress.) | Violent mutual accusations ending in complete disagreement. |
| 22. | 18 Sept. 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Rebuked Chinese for their inflammatory stand on India-Pakistan war and for their ultimatum to India. |
| 23. | 18 Oct. 1965 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Rebuked Soviets in turn for siding with India and for trying to frighten Chinese with threat of U.S. action. Termed CPSU letter's demand for united action against United States hypocritical. |

| | Date | Sender and Recipient | Gist |
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| 24. | 23 Oct. 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Complained of new Chinese obstruction of a Soviet military rail shipment to DRV. |
| 25. | 5 Nov. 1965 | CCP letter to CPSU. | In effect admitted refusal to pass this shipment; blamed it on Soviet delay in signing new documentation CCP considered necessary. |
| 26. | 28 Nov. 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Attacked 11 November Chinese editorial that had publicly ruled out any joint meeting or unity of action with Soviets. |
| 27. | 7 Jan. 1966 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Scornfully reiterated 11 November statements, and added that Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was worthless; USSR would be a "negative factor" in a Sino-U.S. war. |
| 28. | 28 Dec 1965 (received 4 January) | Polish party letter to CCP. (Similar letters sent to all other bloc parties.) | Sent at Soviet instigation; invited CCP to bloc conference on aid to Vietnam; Soviets were hoping to hold conference at conclusion of 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow. |
| 29. | 7 Feb. 1966 | CCP reply to Poles. | Sarcastic rejection of invitation. Conference had already been scuttled because DRV declined. |
| 30. | January-February 1966 | CPSU letter circulated to many parties, one version circulated within CPSU. Portions deliberately leaked to Western press. | Reviewed at length and assailed record of Chinese actions since Khrushchev's fall; attacked Mao by name. |

| | Date | Sender and Recipient | Gist |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31. | 24 Feb. 1966 | CPSU letter to CCP. | Terse invitation to 23rd CPSU Congress opening in late March. |
| 32. | 22 March 1966 | CCP reply to CPSU. | Refused invitation; published by Chinese together with CPSU invitation. |

*NOTE: This is the last item of Sino-Soviet secret party correspondence (or party contacts of any kind) of which we have had any information as of late May 1967. Government correspondence, including many Foreign Ministry protest notes on both sides, has continued; and all such notes of which we have any knowledge have been published by the Soviets or Chinese. However, there have apparently been CPSU and CCP letters distributed to other parties concerning the opponent; versions of one such CPSU letter dealing with the Chinese "cultural revolution" were shown to representatives of bloc and non-bloc parties in December 1966.*

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# THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

## PART III

## VII. The Multiple Chinese Quarrels with North Vietnam

### A. The Dispute Over "Unity of Action"

1966 saw an aggravation of several North Vietnamese specific grievances against the CCP.

The first of these has already been indicated: it was the entire Chinese hostile attitude toward the "unity of action" line, a line which had been dear to Ho Chi Minh's heart in past years, before the massive confrontation with United States forces, and which was doubly so now. To the unwelcome Chinese actions in 1965--the obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam, the refusals to sign a tripartite statement or attend a tripartite or bloc conference on aid to Vietnam--worse actions were now added: the Chinese virtual break in party relations with the CPSU and its friends, public and private pressure on Hanoi to do likewise, the surfacing of "Polish Marxist-Leninist" and "Soviet Marxist-Leninist" paper organizations, and so on. To all this, there were added in the fall of 1966 and early 1967, in the course of Mao's "cultural revolution," repeated threats to the continuation of Sino-Soviet state relations which must have alarmed Hanoi considerably because of the implied menace to the Soviet military aid supply line through China.

### B. The Dispute Over the Authority of Mao's Dicta

A second continuing grievance was the Chinese claim to have furnished precept and model--in Mao's writings and Chinese Communist experience--for the North Vietnamese struggle against the United States. As noted previously (Part I, page 28), there is evidence that as early as August 1964 the North Vietnamese had begun to rebut Mao's pretensions to have

already provided all the necessary guidelines for the Lao Dong party's conduct of the war, and a thinly-disguised polemical dispute on this subject has gone on ever since, with more and more emphatic North Vietnamese assertions of their own originality.*

In late July 1966, for example, Hanoi published a speech Le Duan had given on 18 May to a youth conference in which he repeatedly emphasized the uniqueness, creativity, newness, independence and autonomy of the Lao Dong party's line and its revolutionary practice, and insisted that "we cannot automatically apply the revolutionary experiences of other countries in our country." (It was the Chinese, not the Soviets, who had been trying to impose their model on Hanoi.) A few days later, the newspaper of the Chinese community in Hanoi apparently controlled by the Chinese embassy used the occasion of the Chinese army anniversary to publish an article attributed to a "Vietnamese comrade" containing extreme and nauseating tributes to Mao (along standard Chinese lines never followed by the North Vietnamese) and emphasizing that Mao's works provide the "solution" for the "new problems which have arisen from contemporary revolutionary practice"--in other words, the Vietnamese war. This rebuttal to Le Duan was picked up by NCNA and treated as if it were a North Vietnamese statement.

The CCP has employed this trick with its organ in Hanoi on other occasions, in apparent disregard for the fury this must evoke among the North Vietnamese leaders. The ever-mounting claims made for Mao and the continued expansion of Mao's cult in connection with the "great cultural revolution" in the fall and winter of 1966 were bound to provoke further conflict with the North Vietnamese, as with virtually everyone else, and we have seen that the DRV leadership in the fall of 1966 called for an expansion of theoretical work by its own cadres to fill a gap

**See DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Peking-Hanoi Differences over Doctrine and Strategy for the Viet Cong," RSS No. 0006/65, 2 April 1965.*

left by inapplicable foreign teachings. The Lao Dong party cannot compromise with the CCP on this issue, which goes to the heart of cherished North Vietnamese autonomy.

Although Mao Tse-tung is undoubtedly well aware of North Vietnamese sensitivity on this question, there is evidence to suggest that he nevertheless has continued to take actions--apparently grave actions--infringing on Lao Dong autonomy, and in consequence pushed matters to the brink of a public quarrel with North Vietnam in the first few months of 1967. That some very serious conflict took place in this period became obvious when the May issue of the North Vietnamese party journal Hoc Tap appeared with a transparently veiled personal attack on Mao.

An article in this issue ostensibly devoted to the birthday of Ho Chi Minh made repeated hostile allusions to the errors of an unnamed "certain leader" who did not share Ho's virtues of clear-sightedness, modesty, and reliance upon collective leadership. Hoc Tap insisted that "only by exerting collective leadership can one-sided and erroneous decisions be prevented," and that a Marxist-Leninist leader must "associate himself with the group of the party's leadership organ, obey this group, fully implement the party's platform and rules, and strictly comply with the party's principles governing its activities"--all of which Mao, of course, has not done. Hoc Tap declared that "if a leader commits errors, yet refuses to correct them and insistently maintains them, he cannot keep his leadership role forever."

In a clear allusion to the assaults upon the CCP apparatus by Mao's student Red Guards and worker Red Rebels, the article asserted that "a leader of the working class does not separate the working class from its vanguard, the Communist party." And to render the identification of the target unmistakable to all, the Lao Dong party journal noted that "we respect and love our leader, but we do not deify him," since "deification of a leader will lower the position of the masses of people and even the leader himself." Inserted in the midst of these attacks on Mao's cult, Mao's purge, and Mao's policies was a passage recalling the Vietnamese struggle dating back to the 10th century "against the yoke of domination by foreign countries"--chiefly, in fact, against Chinese domination.

It seems clear that this unprecedented North Vietnamese denunciation of Mao and his role in China must have followed some new and sharp Sino-Vietnamese conflict behind the scenes. To judge from Hoc Tap's allusions to past struggles against Chinese domination, Mao must have committed some serious offense against the autonomy of North Vietnamese leadership, perhaps as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese policy disagreement on the negotiations question, to be discussed later.

In January and February 1967, there had already been evidence of Mao's growing arrogance in dealings with the DRV. As will be seen later in another context, during the siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Chinese representatives in Hanoi did not hesitate to insult Soviet representatives publicly in Hanoi, in the presence of DRV officials. The CCP thereby displayed contempt for Hanoi's insistence on neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and for North Vietnamese desire that decorum be maintained by the warring parties at least on DRV territory.

It is also conceivable, in view of the eventual violent DRV reaction, that the Chinese in the spring of 1967 made some particularly crude attempt with Maoist propaganda to intervene in the internal affairs of the Lao Dong party--as they had recently done in the case of both the North Koreans and the Japanese. There is only fragmentary evidence on this question, some of which, however, is suggestive. [redacted] has claimed that cultural revolution propaganda was initiated among Chinese residents in the DRV late in 1966, that by March the DRV had come to suspect the Chinese of attempting to proselytize for Mao's thought and Mao's policies among the Vietnamese themselves, and that North Vietnam had protested against the dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda in the DRV. This report is given some credibility by the testimony of [redacted] and later reported that all debarking passengers were searched for Chinese propaganda leaflets by DRV customs officials; all such leaflets were confiscated when found. It seems likely that the North Vietnamese regime gave the order to have this fairly drastic action taken only after some unpleasant experience had already occurred regarding the dissemination of Chinese propaganda. It also seems apparent that as of 31 March, despite any protests

the DRV may have previously made, the North Vietnamese felt that they could not rely upon the Chinese to prevent the importation of unwanted Maoist propaganda into the DRV.

In early April, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong, returning from a secret trip to the Soviet Union, had conversations with the Chinese in Peking, and is likely to have talked to Mao himself. Dong may have discussed with Mao not only the question of the DRV position on negotiations, but also the question of Chinese propaganda activities in North Vietnam. Although there is no evidence of what was said in these secret talks, it would have been characteristic of Mao to have vented his anger at the North Vietnamese over the negotiations issue and to have taken an arrogant position over the propaganda issue. Such an outburst by Mao personally seems the most likely explanation for the subsequent North Vietnamese reaction.

On 30 April, two or three weeks after Pham Van Dong had returned home and when the report he presumably made to the Lao Dong Politburo had been digested, the North Vietnamese broadcast over their domestic radio the text of a previously unpublished Le Duan talk given on 28 December 1966 at a North Vietnamese trade union conference. This speech had been delivered soon after the disclosure in Red Guard posters of a drastic purge in the Chinese trade union structure in conjunction with Mao's decision to unleash his "cultural revolution" in industrial enterprises. Le Duan was concerned at the time he spoke with assuring his audience of trade union cadres that the Lao Dong party dissociated itself from what was being done in China, disapproved of it, and had no intention of copying it. Such reasseration of the party line was probably considered all the more necessary if, as has been reported, the Chinese were at that moment attempting to disseminate their propaganda in North Vietnam.

Le Duan insisted over and over again that "the working class alone is truly revolutionary," and declared that "not everyone among our comrades has a complete understanding of this," since "some have

talked about class and class struggle, but have failed to base themselves adequately on the economic basis of society." Engels was quoted on the need to find the source of social transformation not in people's minds (as in fact Mao's propaganda was insisting), but in the economy of the era. Repeating a point the Soviets had used many times in attacking Mao, both before and since the "cultural revolution", Le Duan said that "socialism is not a product of the peasant movement, even in countries where peasants constitute the majority of the population, nor is socialism a product of the intellectural circles' movement." It was the workers who must lead, said Le Duan again and again, and "only the working class' leadership can insure the development of the national economy and culture." The tasks and powers of the trade unions, said Le Duan, "have been codified and guaranteed by our country's constitution"--that is, there was no intention of changing them, no matter what was being done to them in China. In his closest approach to direct criticism of the pretensions of the Chinese "cultural revolution" as a whole, Le Duan declared:

> Of the three revolutions--production relations, technical revolution, and ideological and cultural revolution--...the first is the main content of all socialist revolutions... and the technical revolution is the key revolution at present.

While the delivery of this speech at the end of December 1966 was evidently regarded primarily as an action necessary for DRV internal life, its public release at the end of April 1967 was an action much more hostile to the Chinese, in apparent response to Pham Van Dong's recent interview in Peking. The preparation and publication of the scarcely veiled attack on Mao immediately thereafter in the May issue of Hoc Tap was a second and stronger North Vietnamese response to Mao's arrogance.

Thus far, the Chinese have made no public reply to the North Vietnamese devastating criticism of Mao. In late May, however, a Latin American journalist reportedly was told by Chinese officials in Peking that Ho Chi Minh was a captive of the revisionists in North Vietnam, and that a "small cultural revolution" was going on in North Vietnam "since the present leaders are not peasants or workers but bourgeois elements." If accurately reported, this was the strongest attack on the North Vietnamese party leadership ever made, even in private conversation, and probably was a reaction to the equally unprecedented Hoc Tap attack on Mao. The claim that a "small cultural revolution" was going on in the DRV may conceivably have been an allusion to a Chinese attempt to disseminate propaganda there directly or indirectly critical of some North Vietnamese policies. Both sides in this quarrel created by Mao's insults to North Vietnamese independence have good objective reasons to wish to keep matters from going further (because of the North Vietnamese need for continued Chinese aid to their war effort, and the Chinese desire that the DRV keep fighting). Nevertheless, it is likely that the last word has not been said in the quarrel.

C. The Dispute on Strategy and Tactics in the War

1. The Change in the Chinese Position

Furthermore, the Chinese have not hesitated to give the North Vietnamese repeated unwelcome advice on how to run their war, and to change that advice when they felt it necessary--each time investing their pronouncements with the magical authority of Maoist dicta.

In late 1964 and early 1965, at a time when the South Vietnamese position versus the Viet Cong was growing steadily more grave and the large-scale entry of U.S. forces into South Vietnam had not yet begun, the Chinese seemed concerned to urge the DRV to seize the opportunity to win final victory quickly. That is, the CCP seemed to wish the Lao Dong party to switch the emphasis more and more from

guerrilla warfare to large-unit "mobile warfare" in response to the apparent "change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves," and thus deal the South Vietnamese larger and larger defeats in "battles of annihilation," as the Chinese had done in the final stage of the civil war with Chiang Kai-shek. The North Vietnamese at the time, while inclining in this direction, were apparently reluctant to go as far as the Chinese wished, and intended to keep something of a balance between guerrilla forces and large-unit forces while expanding the latter.*

By the summer of 1965, with the entry and rapid buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, the Chinese changed their position radically, and began to emphasize, like the North Vietnamese, the continuing long-term importance of guerrilla warfare along with large-unit action. (This was not the only modification of the Chinese stance to result from the increased U.S. presence in Southeast Asia: most notably, as the input of U.S. troops into South Vietnam increased, and the bombing of the north expanded, Chinese statements regarding the conditions under which they might enter the war grew progressively more vague and less concrete, if still noisy.

2. The Issue of Duration of the Struggle

Along with this influx of Chinese caution came new issues of contention with the North Vietnamese. The first of these was related to the question of negotiation (to be discussed later) as well as to that of military tactics: it concerned how long the war should now be envisaged as enduring before victory could be attained.

*See DD/I Intelligence Memorandum RSS No. 0006/65, cited above, and DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Peking-Hanoi Differences on 'People's War'", RSS No. 0011/65, 7 October 1965, which contain detailed discussions of the evolution of the dispute on this question.*

The most authoritative and explicit statement of the differences on this issue was made by an evidently important DRV official named Vinh (possibly Nguyen Van Vinh, deputy chief of staff of the PAVN) in a secret April 1966 speech to Viet Cong leaders reporting on policy decisions of a Lao Dong central committee conference in March. According to a captured document giving the text of Vinh's speech, he declared:

> China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. [Emphasis added.] In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try to restrain the enemy and make him get bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive.

This Chinese vague promise of concrete help in the distant future was transparently intended primarily to rationalize Chinese unwillingness (in fact, inability) to act now, while encouraging North Vietnam to persevere indefinitely.* (It is barely conceivable, however,

**This is not to imply that the North Vietnamese have wanted Chinese forces to enter into direct fighting with the United States in South Vietnam. From the DRV's point of view, in addition to other objections this might only enlarge the central problem--how to cause the U.S. to become discouraged and leave South Vietnam as soon as possible--rather than solve it. Such Chinese action might be expected*

*(continued on the next page)*

that Mao envisaged some change in the balance of power within seven years as the result of Chinese advanced weapons developments which might affect the Vietnamese war; it will be recalled that in February 1965 Mao told Kosygin (Part I, page 118) that in ten years the USSR and the United States would no longer alone "decide the destiny of peace.")

Vinh made it clear that the Lao Dong party was not happy at the prospect of merely "restraining" a "bogged-down" enemy indefinitely, while North Vietnam was devastated, until in the fullness of time the Chinese supposedly might be willing and able to take action for which the DRV had no desire anyway. He said:

> Our policy is to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time. This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and achieving decisive success.

While this and other Lao Dong secret documents--and DRV public statements--kept referring to the necessity of being prepared to fight a protracted war for many years, Vinh emphasized over and over again that "it is erroneous to understand protracted as unlimited" and that "it is a great

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*to cause a multiplication rather than reduction of the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia; and if a major Sino-U.S. war resulted, with all its possible consequences, the Vietnamese struggle would soon be dwarfed in importance, and its outcome made contingent upon a much larger struggle over which the DRV would have no control.*

*The DRV probably feels, however, that an invasion of North Vietnam by United States ground forces--particularly if this should lead to a threat to the Red River delta area--would leave them no choice. It is likely that North Vietnam would ask for and expect Chinese direct participation under those conditions, and possibly Soviet participation as well.*

error not to speak of achieving decisive success in a relatively short period of time." Vinh kept reiterating this need to achieve "decisive victory;" he said it could be done by "wiping out the majority of puppet troops" and "an important part of U.S. troops;" he said that this could be done "if the war is pursued for two or three years"; and he intimated that the United States would then be ready to negotiate on DRV terms.

In another speech at the same meeting, a leader using the pseudonym of Anh Sau (quite possibly Lao Dong politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh) insisted that

> we must win over them militarily, politically, and diplomatically. At that time, the enemy will have no other alternative. It is expected that, in the coming two years, the U.S. aggressive intention will be heavily crushed and direct conditions will then have arisen for final victory.*

In a secret letter distributed widely the previous month, Lao Dong first secretary Le Duan said, as Vinh was to do, that even though the party

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* [redacted] *reported that the Czech Ambassador there had stated, citing conversations with DRV officials, that North Vietnam was planning on the assumption that a combination of military action and political warfare would lead to an American agreement to a negotiated settlement favorable to the DRV in about two years. The Czech though that the DRV was not seriously thinking in terms of "5,10, or 15 years," although for propaganda purposes they would continue to say so.*

*These conclusions as to DRV views fit quite well with the statements made in the spring of 1966 in secret channels by Le Duan, Vinh, and Anh Sau. (See also the discussion below on the dispute over negotiations.)*

was waging a protracted war, it was also "racing against time in an effort to achieve the ultimate victory in a relatively short period of time." Le Duan insisted that the Communists were strategically "on the offensive, not the defensive." and argued--obviously in answer to someone--that this attitude was not hazardous."

3. The Issue of the Ratio of Strength in Battles

This impatient Lao Dong viewpoint, in contrast to the Chinese desire (after mid-1965) to have the North Vietnamese content themselves with fighting indefinitely on the strategic defensive* "to bog down" the United States in South Vietnam for many years, had direct consequences for the view each party took on appropriate tactics in fighting "battles of annihilation." Le Duan in his secret letter of March 1966 asserted that Viet Cong forces "can stand firm on the important strongholds which they have secured...and can fight forever with enemy troops who outnumber them five or ten times, thereby putting the enemy on the constant defensive." (Emphasis added.) Again, he declared that "the southern liberation army is fully capable of defeating U.S. troops under any circumstances, even though they have absolute superiority of their fire power compared with that of the liberation army."** In his 18 May speech released by Hanoi in July, Le Duan made the same point even more explicitly, and in polemical terms:

**On 11 April 1967, a Liberation Army Daily article on the Vietnam fighting quoted Mao regarding "the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong enemy."*

***On 3 November 1966 a People's Daily article commenting on the South Vietnam guerrilla war qucted Mao on the prescription that must be followed for a "people's army" to prosper: "We fight when we can win and move away when we cannot." Lin Piao in September 1965 had also cited this familiar Maoist dictum, whose applicability to Vietnam Le Duan in the spring of 1966 seemed concerned to deny.*

> Our party has paid special attention to studying the experiences of the fraternal parties, but it has not studied them mechanically. We must have the requirements of the Vietnamese revolution in mind while studying these experiences... An aggressive mental outlook is the foundation of our revolutionary and military strategies. ...Our troops and people have invented unique tactical methods which enable a lesser force to attack a larger force... In combat, there are times when we concentrate quite a strong force and firepower to outnumber the enemy by two or three to one, but there are also times when our ratios are one to one, one to ten, or even more and we still won. Thus, our army and people have the methods, tactics and techniques which are suitable to the Vietnamese battlefields and to the Vietnamese themselves.

This was in direct contradiction to Mao's thesis, constantly reiterated by the Chinese (including Lin Piao in his 2 September 1965 article on "People's War") that an "absolutely superior force" must be concentrated before engaging the enemy in any battle.

It is possible that Le Duan's thesis about fighting battles while outnumbered has been a matter of some controversy within the Lao Dong leadership, and not only necessarily among persons sympathetic to the Chinese. In Vinh's April 1966 speech, he acknowledged frankly that U.S. forces had not been compelled sufficiently to disperse because of an inadequate development of guerrilla warfare, and even admitted that some Viet Cong main force units had been defeated on occasion because of this, since their enemy "could replace and supplement his forces." Vinh seemed to place a somewhat higher premium on forcing the United States to disperse its troops as a prerequisite to main force victory--implicitly, by devoting a greater share of Communist resources to guerrilla warfare--than did Le Duan. All North Vietnamese spokesmen, including Le Duan, have endorsed the expansion of guerrilla activity side by side with main force activity, but Le Duan's

statements have appeared particularly hostile to the conclusion that the main force units might lose battles of annihilation if the United States were not placed under greater pressure to disperse.

It is not clear to what extent the 1966 disagreement on this subject persists, either between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese or among the North Vietnamese themselves. In actual practice, in the face of heavy casualties suffered in some 1966 large-scale direct engagements entered into without Mao's highly favorable odds, Communists have shown a varied pattern this year. Since February 1967, for example, Communist forces in the western highlands of South Vietnam have spread their units, multiplying small-scale attacks, avoiding frontal engagements and the risk of heavy casualties, and seeking to compel American forces to disperse and expose smaller units to superior attack. At the same time, however, there was an accumulation of evidence in the spring of 1967 suggesting a North Vietnamese intention--or at least desire--to initiate large-scale operations of increasing size in 1967 in the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam despite an unfavorable ratio of opposing forces in the area. It is possible that North Vietnam proponents of such operations have argued that the improved firepower available to their forces in the south has rendered the risk involved again acceptable.

4. The Issue of Holding Territory

Finally, as a corollary to the other North Vietnamese military differences with the Chinese (on the need for haste, and on the need in some cases to stand and fight large battles even if outnumbered), there was a third closely related issue--the North Vietnamese reluctance to yield territory to the degree the Chinese wished them to do, in order to avoid battle on unfavorable terms. The Le Duan secret letter of March 1966 to the party in the south (already cited) made it clear that a major reason why it was necessary sometimes for the Viet Cong to accept battle even if outnumbered was in order to

"stand firm on the important strongholds which they have secured."

The speech by Vinh in April 1966 tied this issue explicitly to the difference between the Vietnamese situation and that in China during the final stages of the Chinese civil war. "In China," said Vinh, "the annihilation of enemy vitality" had sufficed to bring victory, while "in our country" it was, in addition, necessary to maintain and keep expanding the territory under firm Communist control, since the Americans might otherwise "still be capable of reoccupying liberated areas" with fresh reinforcements--even if the original U.S. unit in question had been successfully "annihilated," according to Maoist prescript. In contrast to Chiang Kai-shek, whose army toward the end had grown that much weaker with each unit destroyed, the United States was an opponent with infinitely greater military manpower resources whose army in Vietnam would certainly not decrease in size no matter how many units the Viet Cong manage to "annihilate" by yielding territory. The North Vietnamese evidently felt that control of some key areas had to be maintained continuously at all cost if victory "in a relatively short period of time" was to be kept in sight; and as already noted, despite all their brave words about a "protracted war" they felt a much greater urgency than did the Chinese about making measurable progress rapidly.

The difference between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese on this issue was obviously only a matter of degree: Lin Piao's September 1965 article had itself praised the tenacity with which some "liberated areas" behind Japanese lines were preserved despite intense Japanese pressure; and on the other hand, the Vietnamese themselves have certainly retreated before superior U.S. forces innumerable times.

The Chinese, however, apparently continue to be dissatisfied with some North Vietnamese practice. The Liberation Army Daily article on Vietnam on 11 April 1967 which contradicted Le Duan's 1966 private claim to be on the strategic offensive also read the DRV a thinly-disguised lecture on the necessity of

"luring the enemy in deep" in order to avoid annihilation by the enemy and to annihilate him.* Lin Piao in September 1965 had insisted, in this connection:

> To annihilate the enemy, we must adopt the policy of luring him in deep and abandon some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way to let him in. ...We are firmly against dividing up our forces to defend all positions and putting up resistance at every place for fear that our territory might be lost and our pots and pans smashed...

To sum up: Since the summer of 1965 and the arrival of U.S. troops in South Vietnam in force, important differences have existed between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese on strategy and tactics to cope with the new problem created by the U.S. presence. The Chinese, whose territory is not being bombed, are less in a hurry than the DRV; they wish the Viet Cong main forces to take fewer risks in direct encounters with U.S. units under unfavorable circumstances than the DRV has sometimes felt it necessary to accept; and they wish the DRV when confronted with superior force to abandon temporarily some stronghold which the DRV feels it necessary to defend.

D. The Dispute Over Negotiations

A further major grievance was the Chinese presumption in attempting to dictate to Hanoi what

*In an early June conversation between a DRV correspondent in Cambodia and [redacted] the North Vietnamese at first denied that this Liberation Army Daily article was intended to be critical of DRV tactics, and then implicitly admitted it, saying that it may have been a bit of "friendly advice," but that it was unimportant and showed purely "subjective" thinking. He added that every war of liberation is different and requires different tactics, and that one cannot blindly follow the example of a previous liberation war.

tactical stand to take or not to take on the question of negotiations. In brief, the North Vietnamese, increasingly influenced by the damage wrought by U.S. bombing, had become increasingly sympathetic to Soviet efforts through diplomacy and propaganda to secure termination of the bombing by holding out the prospect of peace talks. Typically, in periods immediately preceding anticipated temporary bombing halts in 1965 and 1966, Soviet and East European representatives have asserted or strongly implied to all who would listen that a permanent bombing halt would suffice to bring peace negotiations while the North Vietnamese maintained a carefully cultivated ambiguity as to whether this alone would suffice. In early 1967, however, under the pressure created by the bombing damage, the DRV removed some of this ambiguity to indicate more strongly than ever before that a permanent bombing halt alone could bring talks. This reduction of ambiguity alarmed and infuriated the Chinese, despite the fact that the central DRV position had not changed nor was likely to change: while by now quite eager, even anxious to obtain a cessation of bombing without significant cost, the North Vietnamese remained completely unwilling to halt their effort to conquer South Vietnam as the price of such a cessation; and they were determined, if they entered talks in exchange for a bombing halt, to continue their war effort simultaneous with long, protracted negotiations, while the United States remained bound to continue to abstain from bombing.

That the North Vietnamese viewed any hypothetical negotiations in this way--as an occasion to "continue fighting the enemy more vigorously" to create conditions in which defeat could finally be imposed on the United States in a negotiated agreement--was explicitly attested to at great length by the authoritative DRV official "Vinh" previously cited, in the April 1966 speech reported in a captured document. It was also asserted quite frankly by Le Duan in his circular letter written in mid-March 1966, which was based on the decisions taken at that time by the 12th conference of the Lao Dong party central committee.*

*Both Le Duan in mid-March and Vinh in April stated that the party central committee--evidently, in an*

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Thus there was no apparent good reason for the Chinese to object to the North Vietnamese attempting to obtain a cessation of bombing in exchange for such negotiations. Le Duan in fact went so far as to point out that "our comrades in China had also adopted the 'fight-and-negotiation' policy in their struggle against the U.S. and Chiang."

Yet the CCP has objected vehemently, publicly and privately. Chinese propaganda in 1966 became so exercised at the thought of DRV entry into negotiations with the United States on any terms prior to a total withdrawal of American forces that the Chinese actually belittled the suffering caused by the bombing and denounced attempts to get the U.S. to stop bombing as playing into American hands. This line was hardly calculated to appeal to the North Vietnamese, and was eagerly exploited at Chinese expense by the CPSU.

In the last half of 1966, there were several indications of CCP pressure on the North Vietnamese over this question. After visiting China and talking with Mao and other Chinese leaders, the told cronies upon his return that the Chinese leadership was worried about the Vietnamese war and had warned the Vietnamese against the revisionists and the "tendency towards peace." In October, the North Vietnamese chargé in Pyongyang remarked that the Chinese were always pressing the DRV not to "commit any appeasement" with the revisionists, and commented that the North Vietnamese did not like this kind of pressure--they knew what to do and could handle matters themselves and did not want to be dictated to by anyone else.

On 4 December, an official of the Chinese embassy in Baghdad stated that his government had

*unpublished decision of the 12th Conference--had entrusted the Politburo with the task of deciding when the time was ripe to seek to enter negotiations with the U.S. on this basis.*

warned Ho Chi Minh about the readiness of the Soviets to bargain with the Americans for peace in Vietnam, and some ten days later, an important CCP official in Peking indicated that the Chinese were uneasy about DRV steadfastness. [redacted] CCP international liaison department chief Wu Hsiu-chuan first claimed to be confident that the Vietnamese agreed with the Chinese that victory must be obtained on the battlefield, but then went on to talk about the possibility that Ho might, in fact, negotiate a settlement. Wu said that the CCP would explain such a development as an abandonment of the correct path by Hanoi under Soviet pressure, and that the Chinese would oppose this as deviationist, as they had opposed the present course taken by Kim Il-sung. And on 8 February 1967 in New Delhi, when a new U.S. bombing pause was in effect, there occurred an unusual demonstration of conflicting Chinese and Vietnamese views in the presence of an outsider. The local DRV Consul General, [redacted] said that if the United States "indefinitely" discontinued the bombing and "invited" the DRV to peace talks, he was "certain" that such talks would be held, and that the DRV's Four Points would not be a stumbling block to the talks. The first secretary of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, who was present during this conversation, appeared very displeased at these statements and began a discourse to the effect that "the Americans were not be trusted."

At the moment this conversation took place, an exchange of letters between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh was already under way, in which the President asked--in exchange for a bombing halt--for a reciprocal halt in North Vietnamese infiltration of the south. Ho refused, but nevertheless reiterated in the most authoritative form to date the DRV position that a permanent--but unilateral--bombing cessation could suffice to bring about talks. The Chinese may have been shown copies of the President's letter and Ho's 15 February letter of refusal, for on 20 February a People's Daily Observer article

attacked, in a fashion reflecting considerable alarm, the notion that "U.S. cessation of bombing of the north should be the solution for the Vietnam question."* The Chinese article concentrated its fire on the American demand for reciprocal DRV de-escalation in the south, and went to extraordinary lengths in warning the North Vietnamese, over and over again, against agreeing to any halt in the fighting in the south while U.S. troops remained. (For example, it explicitly insisted that North Vietnam would be invaded by the United States if the DRV halted the war and allowed the U.S. to remain in the south.) People's Daily also assailed Kosygin for having said in London that a mere cessation of bombing would bring talks, despite the fact that the Vietnamese had themselves already indicated this a number of times most recently and most authoritatively in Ho's 15 February secret letter.

**Ho's letter said that the President's letter had been received on 10 February. Press reports from Peking, Paris, and London subsequently suggested that Vietnamese representatives immediately thereafter had been conferring with important Chinese officials in Peking. These discussions may have concerned both the exchange of letters and the Chinese blockade of the Soviet embassy in Peking which was then going on, with associated delays to Soviet liaison flights to Hanoi and threats to the Soviets rail supply line to Vietnam. It is conceivable that the North Vietnamese linked the two matters in some fashion in their talks with the Chinese. (The Soviet Foreign Ministry had protested again to the Chinese on 9 February, and may have conveyed to Hanoi some dire warning about the supply line.) After the impression had been widely created that this time the Chinese really meant to force a break in diplomatic relations with the USSR, a decision to call off the Chinese harassment was apparently made on 11 February and put into effect in the next two days. Ho's answer to the President was then dispatched on 15 February. The People's Daily reproof to Hanoi was published five days after that.*

A month later, the DRV released the texts of the Johnson and Ho letters; North Vietnam thus placed on the public record both its refusal to halt infiltration of the south in exchange for talks, and its newly-formalized proposal to grant talks if bombing were halted. The Chinese were thereby served notice publicly that the Lao Dong party had no intention of halting its effort to conquer the south--contrary to the loudly-expressed Chinese fears--but that it would nevertheless enter talks with the United States, regardless of Chinese wishes, in exchange for an end to bombing if the United States ever decided to accept this one-sided bargain. By releasing the letters Hanoi answered Chinese objections on one point and presented Peking with a fait accompli on the other.*

E. Possible Causes of CCP Fears About DRV Negotiations

The persisting Chinese fears about a North Vietnamese entry into negotiations with the United States--even if the DRV gave nothing away in exchange for talks and continued to fight during the protracted conversations--appear to be based partly on Mao's overall paranoid distrustfulness; partly perhaps, on Chinese suspicions or information about differences of view within the Lao Dong party leadership; and also, quite possibly, partly on indications that the North Vietnamese, after fighting while talking for a certain period, might sign an agreement halting the fighting at least temporarily in exchange for something less than immediate total U.S. withdrawal.

*In this respect the release of the letters was analogous to the inclusion in the Soviet-Vietnamese joint communique of January 1966 of the unusual statement that North Vietnam would attend the 23rd CPSU Congress--which similarly presented the CCP with a fait accompli.

There is some evidence to support the latter suggestion, contained in the April 1966 secret speech by the "Vinh" previously mentioned. This DRV official stated that after the stage of "fighting while negotiating" would come the stage of "negotiations and signing of agreements," and that "whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements" would depend "upon the comparative balance of forces," since "if we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again, and conversely." Elsewhere, he declared that "after defeating the bulk of the puppet army and an important part of the American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy." Later, he said that "when negotiations are held, the American troops may agree to withdraw from...areas [where they are encircled], under definite conditions. We then proceed to solve the problems of the remaining areas." Still later in his speech, he said:

> Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions. For example, the puppet forces [the ARVN] must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers; the American troops must be stationed at the wharfs.

The net effect of all these somewhat disparate remarks is to suggest a vague DRV intention of forcing on the United States, after a period of negotiating while fighting, an agreement which would halt hostilities while U.S. forces withdrew to small enclaves and the Communist forces greatly expanded and consolidated their areas of control without opposition, in preparation for seizure of the remaining areas when the United States subsequently left South Vietnam. Some such procedure is in fact implicit in the very notion of imposing "signed agreements" on the United States by fighting while negotiating; North Vietnam could hardly expect the U.S. forces to vanish instantaneously with the signing of an agreement. Such a

program, however, if known to the Chinese, would be likely to stimulate unwarranted fears that Hanoi might in fact acquiesce in the presence of Americans and U.S. bases in Vietnam indefinitely.* This may be the fundamental reason why Mao does not trust the Lao Dong party to negotiate with the United States at all.

This Chinese attitude has in the past engendered obvious North Vietnamese resentment, and is likely to continue to do so.** Hanoi, moreover, has

*There is evidence that Ho Chi Minh made a clandestine trip to Peking in mid or late May 1966, a few weeks after the DRV official in question delivered his speech. It is probable that Ho saw Mao while in China, and it is also likely that they would have discussed, among other things, the DRV attitude on "fighting while talking" when the politburo found the time ripe and on eventually imposing "signed agreements" on the United States--particularly since some decision on North Vietnam policy on this subject had apparently been made at the March conference of the Lao Dong central committee.*

**It should be said, however, that this North Vietnamese resentment of Chinese pressures on the negotiation issue, while certainly real, is partially counterbalanced by continuing Lao Dong suspicions that the Soviets and their friends (particularly the Czechs) are "more interested in negotiating peace than in waging the war"--sentiments expressed to the Italian party by some Vietnamese Communists in April 1965 and attributed to Le Duan in 1966. Both the April 1966 Vinh speech and the March 1966 Le Duan innerparty letter made it clear that the East Europeans were more sanguine about the immediate prospects for negotiations than was Hanoi.*

not hesitated to overrule Chinese wishes, and has determined its policy on tactics regarding negotiations from the view of its own national interest held at any given time by a consensus of the Lao Dong politburo.* However, because a majority of the Lao Dong leaders are not likely to give up the intention of conquering South Vietnam for a long time, their differences with the CCP on the negotiation question would not become really acute unless and until the United States were to accept the one-sided North Vietnamese terms for beginning negotiations.

*Differences within the polituburo, however, are believed to have existed in the past as to what policy best suited the national interest, and may well persist today. It is entirely possible that the Chinese have lobbied privately for their own views on this issue (as on other issues) in the past two years with Lao Dong politburo members who have parallel inclinations; but good evidence on this point is lacking.

## VIII. The New Soviet Offensive

### A. The "Great Cultural Revolution:" Soviets Leave The High Road

#### 1. The 23rd CPSU Congress

On 23 March 1966, the CCP released a letter dated the day before to the CPSU refusing to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress, and thus breaking the principal remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations. Since that time, there has been no intelligence evidence whatever of personal contacts between representatives of the two parties (as distinguished from governmental diplomatic contacts) or of letters exchanged between the two parties (as distinguished from the many fiery Foreign Ministry notes soon to fly back and forth). While it is conceivable that secret meetings have been held or letters sent which have gone totally unreported, the picture presented by the evidence to date is one of a total break in party relations since March 1966--the organizational "clear line of demarcation" that Mao had prophesied in November.

The CPSU up until the moment the Chinese sent their letter of refusal had evidently been uncertain as to what the Chinese would do (judging from the contradictory private predictions made by different Soviet spokesmen beforehand).* The Soviets may have

**The Soviets had announced on 1 October 1965 that the 23rd CPSU Congress would convene in late March. In 1967, some Red Guard wall posters were to claim that Liu Shao-chi had sought to send Peng Chen to the congress in order to conspire with the Soviets. This was a transparent and far-fetched effort to blacken Liu and Peng as revisionist traitors and friends of the CPSU, despite all their years of well-documented public and private struggle against the Soviet party. It is conceivable, however, that this*

*(continued on next page)*

been aware of the "pressures" the CCP had been exerting on the Koreans (according to the July 1966 North Korean directive) to prevent them from attending; it is by no means impossible that similar pressure was brought on the North Vietnamese in February despite the fact that Hanoi had already announced it was coming. Although Miyamoto and the JCP, as we have seen, gave in to these pressures on 24 March (the day after the Chinese letter of refusal was published), this was a disastrous victory for the CCP, creating resentments which contributed greatly to Miyamoto's subsequent hostile course. Meanwhile, the fact that the North Koreans and North Vietnamese did attend the Congress--despite all previous Chinese pressures and the eventual Chinese boycott--represented a considerable victory for the CPSU over the CCP, and one which would have been hard to imagine only two

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*Red Guard charge built upon and distorted some suggestion originally made by Liu in leadership discussions (perhaps in early October) before Mao had made his decision to refuse to attend the congress--a suggestion to the effect that Peng would be a suitable choice to head a CCP delegation to the congress. As previously noted, after the publication of the 11 November People's Daily-Red Flag editorial, Mao seemed to be leaning strongly toward a boycott of the CPSU Congress. He did boycott the Italian party congress in January, and he put pressure on the North Korean party in February and the Japanese party in March not to go to Moscow. It is conceivable (although not probable) that Mao delayed his refusal of the CPSU invitation until late March bacause (in view of the fact that the North Koreans and North Vietnamese were insisting on attending the congress) he was vacillating himself on the tactical desirability of attending after all. But it is not credible that the delay was caused by active opposition by other Chinese leaders to Mao's expressed decision to boycott the congress.*

years before. The Soviets had further reason to be gratified because of the public endorsements of unity made at the congress by both the North Vietnamese and North Koreans, in the face of the thunderous Chinese denials that unity with the CPSU leadership was possible.

As part of the price for all this, as already noted, the CPSU had had to give up the scheme floated through the Poles for a bloc-wide meeting at the congress on aid to Vietnam. In addition, the Soviets felt it prudent to soft-pedal the Chinese question in public speeches at the congress: Brezhnev referred to the CCP in only one paragraph of his long report, said that the CPSU wanted to improve relations with them, refrained from blaming them as he and other Soviets had done only a few months before, and said that the CPSU was still ready for a meeting "at the highest level" with the CCP. It has been reported, however, that the CPSU did circulate a document privately at the congress which among other things listed Soviet figures on their aid to Vietnam and accused the Chinese (as Soviet letters had done before) of trying to provoke a military clash between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Meanwhile, the Soviets kept the world conference issue quietly alive. Brezhnev said briefly that the CPSU was in favor of holding it when the time was "ripe;" and CPSU representatives held private meetings with congress foreign delegates in which they continued to lobby for the conference. The CPSU is said to have used a "soft-sell" approach in these talks, and told some delegates that such a conference would not be used "exclusively" to consider the Sino-Soviet dispute, but would primarily

be used as an occasion for dealing with "the global status of the Communist movement." It would appear from this that the Soviets were again thinking in terms of a 1957 or 1960-type conference that would lay down broad CPSU-written generalizations--a "general line"--for the world movement. They were as far as ever, however, from being able to summon such a conference yet.

Pressure brought on Rumania by the CPSU during and after the congress seems eventually to have brought limited concessions on the Vietnam question by the Rumanian party: Rumanian propaganda began to take a somewhat harsher tone toward the United States beginning in May, the Rumanians reacted sharply when the U.S. extended bombing to the Hanoi area in the summer, and the Rumanians consented reluctantly in July to attend a Warsaw Pact meeting which issued a public statement reaffirming determination to aid Vietnam. Thus the Soviets secured a limited consolation prize in July for their inability to hold their bloc aid-to-Vietnam meeting in April.

During and shortly after the 23rd Congress, Ponomarev and Andropov and their specialists appear to have become seriously concerned that the Chinese would soon take drastic organizational action of their own. In April, the CPSU warned some friendly parties that the Chinese were thought to be planning to stage an international Communist conference of their own in the near future, to which the CCP would try to gather all of its "friends" from as many countries as possible, recognizing each national delegation as a Communist party.

In fact, at about the same time in April that the Soviets were receiving and disseminating to their friends this mistaken appraisal of Chinese intentions, [redacted] New Zealand Communist [redacted] party secretary general Wilcox at the end of March reported to his colleagues on talks he had had with the Chinese leaders during a visit to Peking in the first two weeks of March. Wilcox's statements suggested that he, for one, would like to have a pro-Chinese world conference (as the Albanians and many of the pro-Chinese splinter groups probably also did) but made it clear that the Chinese felt this to be out of the question. Wilcox related that he had told Chinese leaders that he realized that a "Marxist-Leninist" world meeting was not possible at present, but suggested that at least there be more coordination in Peking with parties from other areas apart from bilateral meetings. The CCP, however, was dubious even about this; the Chinese held out hope for little more than bilateral meetings (i.e., with them) in the near future, although it was possible that some informal discussion might be arranged in Peking later in the year with Marxist-Leninist representatives from Latin America and Europe.

The Chinese were in fact well aware of their organizational weakness around the world and were not yet prepared to make a humiliating spectacle of that weakness by holding a formal international party conference which the Communist neutrals--the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Japanese, Cubans, and Rumanians--would probably not attend and which would probably include only small splinter groups. Despite all the Chinese talk about drawing organizational lines of demarcation, and despite their breaking of party ties with the CPSU, they had enough

prudence left at this point to refrain from formalizing a world Communist organization of their own, an act which would in effect freeze their total of political assets at its present low level.* In addition, Mao was probably all the more unwilling to plan such a world gathering at a moment when he was about to unleash havoc within the Chinese Communist party.

The CPSU is [redacted] reported to have thought at first that the Chinese would try to use the New Zealand party conference of 9-10 April, immediately after the close of the CPSU Congress, either as their world meeting or to prepare for such a meeting. In fact, the Chinese clearly never had any such intention; they sent to New Zealand only a small delegation led by a second-rank leader, Liu Ning-i, and only a few other parties attended. (The CCP had learned from the Japanese Communists during Miyamoto's talks in Peking in early March that the JCP was unwilling to go to New Zealand.**) When the CPSU found that only a small, ineffectual group of four parties had gone to New Zealand, the Soviets congratulated themselves, but still felt for some time that the Chinese might produce a world conference and a world organization at any moment. By the end of April or early May, however, the Soviets probably changed their minds. Around that time Chen Yi told Scandinavian newsmen that there was no need now for a new--Chinese-led--Communist International, since the (official) reasons the Comintern had been dissolved in 1943--because the Communist parties had

**As already seen, this residual modicum of prudence was also demonstrated by the CCP decision in mid-March to refrain from a response to Castro's 13 March direct attack on Mao.*

***Miyamoto felt that attendance at the New Zealand national conference might create the public impression that the JCP was under Chinese domination. He also though it would be tactically foolish for his party to attend a meeting attended by Grippa's pro-Chinese Belgium splinter party, since this would undermine his arguments against CPSU support of right-wing Japanese dissidents.*

matured and the situation in the international movement had made such centralized leadership as that of the Communist International unnecessary--"remain valid at present." The CCP thus took the occasion to make public its earlier private decision to hold back for the time being.

2. The "Great Cultural Revolution"

Meanwhile, Mao at the end of March finally took action against Peng Chen, and began his long-drawn-out purge of the party apparatus. At first, in the spring and early summer, this purge was concentrated primarily on Peng's Peking party committee, the Propaganda Department of the central committee, and propaganda officials throughout the provincial party organizations. As the purge spread through the party's central and provincial cultural apparatus in May, June, and July 1966, every sector of cultural activity supervised by the apparatus was terrorized in turn--particularly the universities and the teaching profession, but also the press and television, the novelists, musicians, and movie-makers.

At the same time, Mao's cult was exaggerated to an unprecedented extent, reaching fantastic and ridiculous heights never attained even by Stalin's cult. Mao's thought was depicted as being capable of solving every human problem and his image and writings were reproduced on a scale never seen before and made compulsory objects of veneration for all Chinese. At the same time, claims were pushed far more aggressively than ever before that Mao was the supreme leader of the world revolution, the Lenin of today; and simultaneously, in the late spring the Chinese press began a continuous running account of alleged world reaction intended to demonstrate that the vast majority of the world's people's (including the Soviet population and the East Europeans) adored Mao and were his ardent followers. This campaign has gone on unceasingly ever since.

Next, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Chinese party's central committee in early August 1966, Mao

cast down as unsatisfactory the two chief managers of his party machine: his heir-apparent, the senior vice-chairman Liu Shao-chi, and the party secretary general, Teng Hsiao-ping.* These two men were thereafter political ghosts, with final disposition of their cases deferred until the fate of all their provincial subordinates had been decided. Although they were brought out periodically for public rallies, they were evidently under house arrest, and unable to communicate with others or to offer more than passive resistance themselves. Meanwhile, at the plenum Mao provisionally reorganized both the politburo and the central committee apparatus, and proclaimed a new heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao, who warned the party leaders assembled at the plenum that the reorganization would be general and would embrace all of them, with the individual fate of each provincial or central official depending largely on his conduct during the test to come in the next few months.

In the violent ordeal that followed in several waves from late August on, the provincial leaders were subjected to unprecedented public pressure from student fanatics organized as the Red Guards. One purpose of this exercise was to provide for the youth of China--the "revolutionary successors"--an "ersatz revolution," to give them the illusion that they were independently "overthrowing" revisionists within the party, when in fact the power to decide whom to purge and the power to carry out removal of any leader was never relinquished by Mao. A major purpose of the entire charade, however, was to terrorize and humiliate the provincial party apparatus which Liu and Teng had staffed and to induce suspect provincial leaders to confess

**A POLO study to be published shortly will treat the origin and development of the "cultural revolution" up to the present; and another POLO soon to be published will examine the purge of the PLA.*

their own sins and in particular to demonstrate the breaking of all previous allegiance to Liu and Teng by attacking them.

Although this worked with some leaders (e.g., Li Hsueh-feng), many others did not perform as demanded because most of them were well aware that they would not be retained no matter how they betrayed Liu or abased themselves. Resistance by such provincial leaders was either passive (by rendering unsatisfactory self-criticisms) or active (by organizing Red Guards of their own to resist their tormenters) or both, but there is no evidence of coordination among them such as to constitute an organized nationwide "opposition" to Mao.

In February, the Red Guards (and their worker colleagues, the Red Rebels from the factories) had to be dispersed and sent home for the time being because of the disruption they were creating in the economy and because of widespread attempts by their many quarreling anarchical factions to upsurp Mao's prerogative to decide whom in the party apparatus to remove and whom to keep. At the same time, early in 1967 the axe was finally dropped on most of the provincial party first secretaries (confirming their original fears); they were now in fact purged with ridiculous ease with the aid of the PLA, thus consummating the first stage of the reorganization announced by Lin Piao in August. There is no evidence that any troop commanders as of May 1967 had acted in deliberate opposition to Mao's will when given clearcut instructions as to what Mao wanted done.

Pending the reestablishment of new provincial party committees, local army leaders were now placed by Mao in temporary de facto charge of the administration of many of the provinces of China, in "alliance" with, but often in fact superior to, those local veteran party cadres selected by Mao to be saved from the purge. Exceptions to this practice were made in some special cases, such as the Northeast party bureau (whose head, Sung Jen-chiung, had apparently satisfactorily betrayed Liu and Teng during the summer of 1966 and was in Mao's good

favor by September) and its subordinate Heilungkiang province (whose first secretary, Pan Fu-sheng, was apparently an old victim and enemy of Liu's). There, the top party men in place were left in charge; and in Shanghai, not primarily the PLA but rather two reliable former Shanghai party cadres were returned to the city from Peking to take charge when the Shanghai party committee as a whole was removed.

Meanwhile, there was a simultaneous testing and purging of the central apparatus of the army and the government. Those leaders in Peking who failed to implement the pressure on central officials or provincial leaders to Mao's satisfaction, or who aroused Mao's ire (and Madame Mao's ire) by attempting surreptitiously to moderate that pressure--whether old politburo members (e.g., Ho Lung) or newly-elevated ones (Tao Chu) or army officials (Liu Chih-chien)--were similarly "selected out" by fits and starts while the purge throughout the country was being prepared and executed. (Figure G.) Central leaders who had committed only venial sins of this nature were merely criticized and humiliated.

3. The CPSU Opens Fire

The Soviets apparently found it hard to believe their good fortune. After a decade of CPSU-CCP struggle for predominant influence in the world Communist movement Mao was, in effect, ruling himself out of the contest by declaring all the other participants disqualified. And at the same time, Mao was staging a spectacle within China the like of which had never been seen in the history of the Communist world, and which was guaranteed to estrange him still further from everyone not actually in his employ. The CPSU eventually took full advantage of both facts.

In April and May 1966, in the weeks after the 23rd CPSU Congress, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi, and Teng Hsiao-ping each delivered speeches in connection with the Albanian party visit to China containing the most ferocious attack each man had

Figure G

## A CARTOON PARADE OF MAO'S VICTIMS

This cartoon, published in a Red Guard newspaper and placed on sale in Peking post offices in February 1967, provided an authoritative although not necessarily exhaustive compilation of those Chinese Communist leaders who had been definitely purged by Mao as of that date. The size of the figures drawn is roughly proportional to the importance of the persons depicted. Among the fallen leaders shown are Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Tao Chu, Lu Ting-yi, and Yang Shang-kun.

ever made on the CPSU leadership. All three leaders were obviously obediently toeing a line dictated from above which required a still further tightening of screws in relations with the Soviets. During Liu's speech--at a 28 April banquet in Peking in honor of Shehu--East European diplomats walked out for the first time on an address by a Chinese leader, in protest against the insults to the CPSU by the Chairman of the CPR. (Soviet diplomats had not been invited.) The Soviets around this time were understandably not claiming either publicly or privately--as their propaganda was to claim eight months later--that Liu and Teng were moderates who were secretly striving for a reconciliation with the CPSU (a remarkable proposition in any case, in view of the past private encounters between those two and the Soviets).

- Adhering to their usual post-Khrushchev practice, the Soviets did not respond to these attacks, nor to a Chinese refusal to attend a Komsomol Congress in May (an expected sequel to the CCP refusal to attend the party congress in March-April.) But in late May, the CPSU began cautiously to exploit the cultural revolution: at first (as so often in the past) in Literaturnaya Gazeta,* then in Pravda and other Soviet publications. The Soviet practice from May through July was to summarize or quote in deadpan fashion the most egregious and ridiculous examples from the Chinese press of claims regarding the magical powers of Mao's thought: for instance, the celebrated article recounting how Mao's writings had helped the selling of watermelons in Shanghai. Meanwhile, on the occasion of the 1 July Chinese party anniversary, the CPSU sent the Chinese party public greetings recalling how "the Chinese Communists-internationalists" had constantly emphasized the importance of unity with the CPSU, and a Pravda article elaborated on this point.

**This Writers Union organ had similarly been used, for example, as the vehicle for the first public Soviet reaction to the Chinese communes in the fall of 1958.*

The events in China in August changed all this. Three August developments convinced the CPSU leadership that Mao had now made it profitable for the CPSU to switch from pious professions of a desire for unity and low-keyed ridicule of the Mao cult to direct attack on Mao and the Chinese leadership.

The first was the communique issued by the eleventh plenum of the CCP central committee, which was not only formally ratified all the actions taken by Mao in the Sino-Soviet struggle since 1962, but also engraved on stone the dictum that unity was impossible with the CPSU leadership and that an organizational line of demarcation must be drawn.

The second was the revelation, shortly thereafter, that there had been a further drastic shakeup in the Chinese leadership, that Liu and Teng had been demoted, with the prospect of more to follow. (The downgrading of Mao's long-time heir and of the party secretary general--both of whom had led the CCP struggle against the CPSU in dealings with innumerable foreign party delegations over the last decade--was bound to create a profound shock in many parties, including some of the closest Chinese adherents.)

The third and most important was the emergence of the Red Guards. The violence they unleashed in the streets of Peking from the very beginning, the public beatings, destruction of works of art, waylaying of foreign diplomats, demonstrations outside the Soviet embassy--and above all, the enormous publicity these activities received in the world press--all this created an opportunity too good to miss.

In the last week of August, Soviet propaganda began to report the Red Guard violence, using at first a calm, matter-of-fact tone and citing Western and Japanese sources whenever possible. On 31 August, the CPSU central committee issued a belated public statement attacking the communique of the CCP eleventh plenum; and this statement linked

the anti-CPSU assertions made in the communique with the "anti-Soviet campaign" in China since the plenum. It seemed likely that Andropov and Ponomarev had been put to work to draft the CPSU statement on the Chinese plenum only after the actions of the Red Guards had triggered a final decision by the Soviet leadership to set the whole propaganda machinery of the CPSU and its friends in motion. East European and non-bloc pro-Soviet parties in fact now began to pass similar resolutions and issue statements criticizing the Chinese plenum and the Red Guard actions, and discussions of the latest Chinese developments and Chinese perfidy were once again begun throughout lower party organizations in East Europe. In September, as the world also began to hear reports of the violence created by Red Guard attacks on provincial party organizations, the Soviets picked up these reports regularly and in increasing volume. Their propaganda was aided by the fact that their Peking embassy (in accordance with an exchange agreement with the Chinese) still received the Chinese provincial press, generally unobtainable in the West.

On 9 September, in private conversation with a Western ambassador, politburo member Polyanskiy "quite spontaneously" unleashed a tirade about what was going on in China, describing the Red Guards movement as reactionary and as an infantile phase of the revolution which was "dangerous". He added that the Chinese leaders bewildered him, that they seemed to be frustrated and angry men who were now intent on going their own way.

Beginning in mid-September, Soviet correspondents reporting on events in China began increasingly to editorialize in their dispatches from Peking. While continuing to emphasize the Red Guard attacks on Chinese and foreign culture and to decry the "cultural revolution" as tending to discredit Marxism-Leninism in the eyes of the world, the Soviet press and radio now began also to hammer at the theme that Mao was using the Red Guards to attack the Chinese Communist party. The Soviets wept copious crocodile tears for the central figures under attack (naming Liu as one of them in late September), and for the provincial party organizations beleaguered by the Red Guards, and depicted the resistance to the Red Guards organized by some of the party functionaries as a spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the noble Chinese party against Mao's "hooligans." (See Figure H.) The Soviets soon began to stress that only naked military force--the PLA--was behind the Red Guards in their conflict with the wisely-anti-Maoist Chinese party and people. This line was transparently designed to appeal to the sympathies of foreign party functionaries. Pravda ran a daily column of hostile comments on events in China from different parties, and Komsomol'skaya Pravda derisively cited the "pathetic" Chinese newspaper headlines claiming praise and adulation for Mao from countries throughout the world.

Thus the Soviets had begun once more, after a two-year halt, to attack Mao publicly by name, and within a few weeks added Lin Piao as well. Soviet leaders started to refer privately to Mao and his actions as "fascist," and public hints and allusions to the same effect were gradually transformed into direct statements before the year was over. This line about Mao's "fascism" was probably adopted deliberately, as one means of emphasizing that "Mao Tse-tung and his group" had now changed into an

Figure H

# PUBLIC HUMILIATION OF FALLEN CHINESE LEADERS

These photographs depict the manhandling of purged CCP leaders at Red Guard rallies or kangaroo courts late in 1966. The photographs were published in Red Guard newspapers and widely reproduced, both in the West and in the Soviet Union.

Lo Jui-ching, former PLA Chief of Staff.

Yang Shang-kun, former alternate member of the party secretariat.

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(Left to right) Yang Shang-Kun, Lo Jui-ching, former propaganda chief Lu Ting-yi, former Politburo member Peng Chen. Each bears a sign with his name written and crossed out, and each is forced to bow his head.



Li Pao-hua, former first secretary of the Anhwei provincial party committee. In publishing this photograph on 8 February 1967, *Pravda* pointed out that Li was a son of one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party.

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entirely different political breed with nothing in common with the world Communist movement or its leaders--and as thus, in turn, justifying a world Communist conference without Mao (for which, as will be seen, the CPSU was again pressing).*

In late September, Brezhnev during a brief visit to Yugoslavia is reported to have held forth on China at some length in private talks with Tito. Brezhnev is said to have declared (as Soviet propaganda was beginning to do) that the issue was no longer one of relations with another Communist party, but rather of dealing with a personal military regime whose objective appeared to be destruction of the CCP as presently organized. Brezhnev's purpose was apparently to talk Tito into joining in some spectacular political move against the CCP--most likely, as ever, the old question of the world conference without Mao. (It has been reported that Brezhnev also wanted Tito to join in a coordinated break in state relations with the Chinese; but this seems most unlikely, since it has clearly been Soviet policy, on the contrary, to hang on to their embassy in Peking as long as possible.) Brezhnev failed in his purpose, despite Tito's continuing antipathy to Mao, because the Yugoslavs remain opposed to any proposal which might have the effect

*A 13 November broadcast by the Czechs--still the most eager of all for such a conference--said that the anti-Soviet Red Guard actions had merely confirmed what had already been indicated for years: that Mao, while using the terms socialism, Communism, and internationalism, had always hidden behind those terms "an entirely peculiar and divergent content." The broadcast noted that "it is sometimes very hard to bid farewell to the idea of a united socialist camp from Sumava to Shanghai," but that it was now necessary to face up to this. (Emphasis added.) Chinese conduct toward the bloc, not only now but "for years," said Prague radio, had been incompatible even "with normal relations between states which maintain reciprocal diplomatic relations," let alone intra-bloc relations.*

of increasing CPSU authority in the movement, and also because of Tito's anger at suspected previous Soviet intrigues with Rankovic, his own recently ousted heir.

In mid-October, in private talks in Moscow with secretary general Rayamajhi of the pro-Soviet Nepalese Communist party, Brezhnev again assailed the Chinese cultural revolution, citing gory details, some accurate, some not; spoke of the possibility of a Chinese military attack on the Soviet Union; denounced the Chinese in familar terms over the whole range of Vietnamese issues; sneered at Mao as a man allegedly unable to talk coherently for more than a couple of hours;* and predicted that Chou En-lai would soon be purged and that Lin Piao's position would only be temporary. It is doubtful that Brezhnev believed all this; he was probably deliberately exaggerating, consciously wielding a very thick brush to deface the image of the Chinese leaders. As in Belgrade, so with Rayamajhi, Brezhnev made it clear that he was doing this to promote the project of a world conference without the CCP. Of particular interest for the organizational line the CPSU was now taking were Brezhnev's reported instructions to Rayamajhi to cease all efforts to bring the leaders of the pro-Chinese counterpart Nepalese Communist party back into his organization, since it would be impossible to control them. In early 1965, CPSU instructions to Rayamajhi had been just the opposite, and had been designed to promote a merger of the two Nepalese parties. In addition, Brezhnev reportedly expressed his displeasure with King Mahendra's overly pro-Chinese attitude, and remarked that the USSR would make no financial grants to Nepal as long as the King continued to be a "pawn" of the Chinese.

**Students of Soviet affairs are painfully aware that Brezhnev can talk for much longer than this.*

4. The Extended CPSU Briefings

By late November, material from Moscow on Sino-Soviet relations and the situation in China was reportedly being discussed by primary party organizations throughout the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on the alleged worsening of the border situation. On 27 November, a Pravda editorial article appeared with the most authoritative pronouncement of the fall on the struggle with China. Reviewing all the old charges regarding the events of the past two years, Pravda triumphantly pointed to Chinese isolation, asserting that "they have no one in the Communist movement with whom to form a bloc." The Pravda article denounced Mao and his "group" as allegedly waging a campaign against the cadres of the Chinese party in order to impose his anti-Soviet line on an unwilling CCP.

In mid-December, a CPSU central committee plenum was held to discuss the China question (and the question of a world Communist conference). A 14 December communique issued by the plenum declared that the "great power anti-Soviet policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group had entered a new and dangerous stage," that it was necessary therefore "to step up the struggle in defense of Marxism-Leninism," and that "favorable conditions are now being established for a new international meeting"--pressure for such a meeting being of course the perennial Soviet method of "stepping up the struggle." Throughout January, virtually the entire CPSU politburo fanned out across the country to transmit the decision of the plenum to party meetings, beginning with all-day massive assemblies of the Moscow and Leningrad party aktivs, addressed on 4 January by Brezhnev and Suslov respectively. The engagement of the entire leadership in this briefing activity regarding China was the first time this had been done on such a scale since the adoption of the Suslov Report in early 1964, and far exceeded the anti-China briefing carried out in January 1966. Ranking military officers participated in spreading the central committee's decision throughout the army, even among Soviet forces abroad. Additional documents on the China question were simultaneously disseminated to CPSU organizations everywhere,

and a salient feature of their content was reported to be the officially-inspired Chinese provocations against the Soviet Union, the increased tension on the Sino-Soviet border, and the possibility of a rupture of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations. Soviet embassies around the world were warned that further provocations were to be expected. This was correct.

5. The Decay of State Relations

These CPSU measures were taken after state relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China had grown steadily worse throughout the fall, with worse yet to come.

On 26 August the Soviet Foreign Ministry had protested to the CPR, to no avail, against the initial Red Guard rampages in "Anti-Revisionism Street" outside the Soviet embassy in Peking, and the accompanying harassment of the cars of embassy officials. On 20 September, the Chinese decreed the departure of all foreign students in China, including the Soviet students; on 7 October with a great show of indignation, the Soviets retaliated by ordering the expulsion of all Chinese students (other East European states following suit). On 22 October, the CPR protested to the Soviet government against this "unjustifiable decision" which "further worsened relations between the two countries." People's Daily on the 24th attributed the Soviet decision to a "fear that Chinese students would spread the thought of Mao" in the Soviet Union, and alluded to past Soviet "atrocities" against the noble Chinese students, such as the repression of the March 1965 student demonstrators in front of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. (See Part II, pages 1-3.) The Chinese also laid on massive Red Guard demonstrations in front of the Soviet embassy on 23 and 24 October in protest against the student expulsion. The Soviet Foreign Ministry duly protested this on 27 October in terms somewhat stronger than those of the 26 August Soviet note, citing details of the provocations by the demonstrators ("obscene language, indecent gestures and poses, spitting, etc."), and noting that flagrant violations of international law

and diplomatic immunity were becoming "a standard practice in the CPR".*

The Chinese Foreign Ministry replied on 1 November in a predictably tough and scornful tone, taking the interesting position that the obstruction of "Anti-Revisionism" Street in front of the Soviet embassy and the preventing of diplomatic cars from passing on that street was a perfectly normal phenomenon, and that the Soviets and those foreign diplomats foolish enough to want to visit them could enter and leave through side exits and streets. Meanwhile, Chinese students about to depart from Moscow attempted on 26 October to lay wreaths at the mausoleum of Lenin and the tomb of Stalin, had a lengthy argument with the Soviet police, and were not allowed to enter the mausoleum.** The Chinese press published numerous pictures and indignant stories about this "vicious" incident and about the departure and arrival in China of the heroic students.

The Chinese attitude up to now was plain enough: while unwilling to accept the onus for a break in diplomatic relations, they had no particular interest in the maintenance of such relations, as the Soviets apparently did (because of the need to maintain communication lines with Vietnam, among other reasons), and they therefore felt free to harass the Soviet embassy, within certain limits, whenever the spirit moved them. As already noted, the Soviets by the end of the year estimated that the Chinese might take more serious steps, and were prepared for the possiblity that a diplomatic break would be forced on them.

In December, the Chinese reduced the number of Soviet press correspondents allowed to remain in

**This Soviet note was reported on television in the Soviet Union; and henceforth, this most powerful means of propaganda in urban areas, which had hitherto not been used for anti-Chinese items at all, joined the other propaganda vehicles in the dissemination of anti-CCP materials.*

***Quite possibly the Soviets feared some Chinese "provocation" with regard to Lenin.*

China to the number of Chinese journalists accredited in the Soviet Union, expelling the surplus Soviets. Simultaneously, the Chinese detained in Port Arthur for several weeks a Soviet ship whose captain had overruled instructions of a Chinese harbor pilot which he though might endanger his ship. This incident was made public by both sides in another angry exchange the following month.

6. The Siege of the Soviet Embassy

In the latter part of January 1967, the Chinese initiated the most serious threat they had ever made to the continued existence of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations--and to the Soviet overland supply route to Hanoi. On 25 January, Chinese students from Europe returning home through Moscow again attempted to visit the Lenin mausoleum; and when the Soviets this time foolishly acquiesced, seized the occasion to stage a demonstration there involving mass readings of quotations from Mao Tse-tung. When they refused to stop at the behest of the Soviet police, they were dragged away violently resisting.* NCNA reporters and photographers conveniently on hand recorded the occasion for lurid front-page stories published the next day in the Chinese press; the Chinese embassy in Moscow violently protested and staged a press conference; and gigantic demonstrations were promptly begun before the Soviet embassy in Peking which soon became a siege of the embassy. (See Figure I.) Other demonstrations were meanwhile conducted in front of Soviet embassies in other countries around the world. [redacted] revealed privately that instructions for the demonstration held at the Soviet embassy in Baghdad on 29 January had come from Peking and were received about a week before the demonstration--well before the incident in

*This is the essence of the Chinese account itself, stripped of accompanying vituperation. The Soviet account--that the Chinese not only obstructed the way and broke the rules but began hitting people of their own initiative--is less credible; and the Chinese account is sufficient to demonstrate Chinese deliberate provocation.*

Figure I

# A. THE INCIDENT AT THE LENIN MAUSOLEUM 25 JANUARY 1967

Chinese students in Red Square chant Mao's sayings in unison as Soviet officer beckons for help to break up the demonstration.

Soviet police scuffle with the Chinese students.

Figure I (Continued)

## B. THE SIEGE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING, FEBRUARY 1967

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Figure I (Continued)

## C. THE SOVIET REACTION

Evacuated dependents of personnel of the Soviet embassy in Peking hold an emotional press conference at Moscow airport.

Protest demonstration before the Chinese embassy in Moscow. The signs read "Shame to the Mao Tse-tung Clique" and "We Brand the Chinese Splitters with Shame."

Figure I (Continued)

The students lead away an injured comrade.



The injured students return to Peking, welcomed as heroes.

Moscow--which again suggested that the entire campaign was deliberately planned, provoked, and coordinated.

For the ensuing two and a half weeks--from 26 January through 11 February--the Chinese steadily intensified their siege of the Soviet embassy in Peking: surrounding first the main entrance to the embassy, then all entrances; plastering the walls with posters; booming epithets against Brezhnev and Kosygin at the embassy through loudspeakers day and night; burning and hanging their effigies; and attacking cars carrying Soviet personnel which ventured out into the city. Other East European embassies and personnel (and even a French diplomat, because of an incident in France) were harassed as secondary targets. Chinese employees of the Soviet embassy were pulled out on strike; the heat ceased to function in the embassy; the embassy school was closed, and embassy dependents evacuated home by plane, after having been surrounded at the airport before leaving by a howling mob. Some Soviets and East Europeans who saw the dependents off were isolated by the mob and could not regain their embassies until the next day. It became impossible for Soviet newsmen to move through the city, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 7 February is reported to have phoned the Soviet chargé to tell him that it would henceforth be impossible to guarantee the safety of Soviet officials. Much of all this was openly described and hailed by Chinese editorials; the siege of the Soviet embassy was made into a holy act to be participated in by as many of the "little revolutionaries" as possible; rallies were held to denounce the Soviets in many Chinese cities and military units; and this concrete struggle against foreign revisionism on Chinese soil was merged in hortatory propaganda with the ongoing vast struggle against domestic revisionism. The campaign against the foreign devil was used to whip up enthusiasm further for the eradication of the domestic devil, and the term "swine" was now introduced simultaneously everywhere for both.

The Soviet reaction to all this was to resolve to hold on in Peking as long as they could. In

conversations [redacted] an important Soviet Foreign Ministry official told the [redacted] that the USSR would persevere regardless of Chinese provocations, and would not sever diplomatic relations no matter what the Chinese did. He noted that the Soviets probably would be forced sooner or later to reduce drastically their diplomatic representation in Peking, but would keep several diplomats there even if the Chinese attempted to force them out. On 4 February, Brezhnev and Andropov arrived in Prague, reportedly on very short notice; [redacted] alleged that the major purpose of this visit was to discuss the events in Peking and the question of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations with Novotny and to exert pressure on the over-eager Czechs to avoid precipitate action on this matter. The Soviet embassy in Peking meanwhile filled its swimming pool with drinking water and brought in several tons of food by plane; also imported by plane from Moscow were a good number of young KGB goons to defend the embassy grounds against the Red Guards. It was apparently the Soviet intention to force the Chinese to level the embassy building and kill the last Soviet diplomat before a break in relations could be consummated.

The Soviets were well aware why the Chinese might wish to force them out, and the Chinese were well aware why the Soviets were determined to stay. A formal break in diplomatic relations would serve as a legal pretext* to sever permanently the Soviet land and air transportation routes across China, and thereby present the USSR with the unpleasant dilemma of either accepting an end to their military aid to North Vietnam--an unthinkable political disaster--or shipping their sensitive military equipment to the

**The Chinese have placed great store on such legal pretexts. They used the pretext of the alleged lack of a proper contract to block a Soviet military aid rail shipment to Vietnam for several months in the fall of 1965. (See Part II, pages 59-60.)*

DRV by sea and running the terrible risk of a renewal of their 1962 confrontation with the United States Navy. Any amount of inconvenience or hardship for their diplomats in Peking was well worth accepting in order to avoid this dilemma--all the more so since the Chinese siege of the Soviet embassy was meanwhile bringing the CPSU further political gains against the CCP around the world.

7. The Transit of Aid to Vietnam

There is some fragmentary evidence suggesting that the Chinese may have reimposed some restrictions on the movement of Soviet military aid to Vietnam in January, shortly before the siege began.

For a number of months before January 1967 the Chinese had apparently not seriously interfered with the movement of Soviet military aid, despite frequent Soviet public insinuations to the contrary. A DRV diplomat in Pyongyang stated in October 1966 that "before," there had been some "irregularities," but that they had now been taken care of.* He said that the Chinese were not putting barriers in the way as the Soviets were suggesting in their press (a point reaffirmed by the DRV publicly in December). And he stated that "presently" the transportation of such materials was being "safeguarded by the Vietnamese themselves."

This information was new; but what he meant was not explained by any source until four months later, when the Soviet Union for reasons of its own decided to make sure that the point was brought to

*At about the same time, a Moscow public lecturer also said that after "temporary complications," rail shipments were now proceeding "normally." He admitted that the story "has been somewhat distorted in the telling"--in fact, by the Soviets.

the attention of the American State Department. In the third week of February, [redacted] Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin made statements which confirmed and clarified what the North Vietnamese diplomat had said in October. Dobrynin stated that, following an alleged Chinese rebuff to a final Soviet effort initiated in August 1966 to work out a Sino-Soviet accord on transshipment (possibly, another supplementary contract for rail shipment),* the Soviets had worked out an arrangement with the DRV whereby the North Vietnamese were to accept Soviet military assistance shipments at rail crossings on the Sino-Soviet border and thereafter be responsible for getting the shipments through to North Vietnam. In other words, the Soviets, after having apparently previously insisted on having their own personnel accompany (and guard) the equipment passing through China, had agreed to pass on this responsibility to the DRV. This change evidently took place between August and October 1966, and brought relative tranquility for a time.

In mid-January, however, one DRV official abroad commented privately that the "Chinese situation" constituted a great handicap to the DRV, especially in matters concerning military aid; and a week or so later--at about the time the Chinese were beginning their siege in Peking--another DRV representative stated that the Chinese were delaying Soviet aid deliveries to North Vietnam. A more tenuous circumstance also pointed in this direction. On 21 January, NCNA and People's Daily published a violent denial of rumors which the Chinese correctly said were being placed into circulation in the Western press by the Soviets, to the effect that the Chinese had both "hijacked" some Soviet missiles in transit

**See page 51 below.*

and delayed or banned the transit of others. On 26 January--the same day the siege of the Soviet embassy was begun, and about the time a DRV official privately alleged the Chinese were indeed delaying the transit of supplies--Nhan Dan published a brief denunciation of the "odious slander" (by the imperialists) about Chinese theft of Soviet missiles, but conspicuously failed to repeat the public assurance the DRV had given in December that the Chinese were not delaying the transit of those missiles. Finally, a month later, a Soviet bloc official in a position to know claimed that Soviet military shipments had been blocked in China; specifically, (and more doubtfully) that for several weeks a group of over 300 railroad cars carrying military supplies had been held up in China; and further, that an official DRV delegation had been in Peking for the past few days (in late February) to discuss this.

This is far from conclusive evidence, particularly in view of the Soviet habit of embroidering on this subject; but it is sufficient to present a possibility that the Chinese in January had indeed again interfered with the flow of Soviet military equipment to Vietnam, despite the fact that the North Vietnamese had already taken responsibility for overseeing that flow.* Further, it suggests that this

*It is of course also conceivable that rail disruption caused by the events of the "great cultural revolution" in January was responsible for prolonged delays then to Soviet military shipments. There is insufficient evidence to tell whether the brief disruption known to have existed on a few rail lines in early January also occurred on the line used for these shipments, or how long it persisted if it did occur. On balance, this explanation seems thus far to be slightly less probable than an explanation based on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

interference may have been resumed not long before the Chinese provoked an incident in Moscow and used this as justification for both besieging the Soviet embassy in Peking and blatantly interfering with Soviet rail communications to Peking and air liaison with Hanoi.

In early February, Soviet-manned passenger trains on the Peking-Moscow run were extensively harassed and in some cases delayed by the Red Guards, who among other things held anti-Soviet rallies on the trains. The Soviets publicized both this and the harassment and delay of Soviet planes at Peking airport on 31 January while on route to Hanoi carrying Soviet military experts.

The Soviets made extensive political capital of all this. Whereas in January they had merely planted in the Western press allegations that the Chinese had delayed, stolen, or copied Soviet military equipment going to Hanoi, in February, with the coming of the Chinese siege in Peking, they shouted these and other allegations in their own propaganda. The Soviets told tales of weapons being held up "for weeks," of trains never arriving in the DRV, and of spare parts being stolen. They referred back to the Chinese refusal of an air corridor (actually, in February-March 1965), and they quoted a U.S. newspaper as saying that the Americans "expect China to cut off Soviet assistance to Hanoi via ground routes" to such an extent that the USSR "will be compelled to rely on the vulnerable sea route via Haiphong." One of their Foreign Ministry protest notes to China, on 9 February, made the point that the Chinese warning to the embassy staff not to leave the embassy was preventing them from fulfilling their duties

"including those connected with...military and economic aid deliveries via China" to Vietnam.*

The Chinese seemed to brush off the various Soviet protests, and seized every pretext to lodge violent official protests themselves alleging a Soviet desire to force a break in relations (e.g., in reaction to Soviet actions in breaking up an anti-Soviet demonstration at the Soviet embassy in Baghdad, and in tearing down an offensive display in front of the Chinese embassy in Moscow). On 5 February, a People's Daily editorial warned of

**It appears from a secret CCP letter to the CPSU of 5 November 1965 and other evidence that one of the functions of the embassy is the negotiation from time to time of what have apparently been repeated supplements to the 30 March 1965 two-year Sino-Soviet transport agreement for Soviet military aid to the DRV. These supplements have evidently been insisted upon by the Chinese in order to give them advance information about (and veto over) all the new military aid--not specified in the original March 1965 agreement--that the USSR has sought to ship to Vietnam through China as the result of additional Soviet-DRV negotiations in 1965 and 1966. Without Sino-Soviet formal diplomatic relations, such supplementary rail agreements would not be negotiated, and the Soviets can have little doubt that the Chinese would then use the absence of such agreements as legalistic justification for further obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam.*

"grave consequences" unless an official Soviet apology were forthcoming, and dropped a broad hint by wondering aloud whether the Soviets were fit to have diplomatic relations with others.

In short, the Chinese seemed to all observers--including the Soviets, the Americans, and the North Vietnamese--to be trying to force a break in Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations. This may indeed have been Mao's primary intention to start with, but when the Soviets demonstrated more and more clearly that they would not take the onus of precipitating a break no matter what the Chinese did, and would attempt to ride out the storm indefinitely, the Chinese seem to have drawn back from the still more extreme measures--such as a physical attack on the embassy--which might be necessary to remove the Soviet presence from China. On 10 February, a number of Chinese diplomats were reported [redacted] arriving back in Moscow from indoctrination stints at home; it does not seem likely that they would have been sent back if the CPR expected to be able to force a break soon.

It is barely conceivable--although there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis--that the operation against the Soviet embassy, and the attendant threats to and possibly actual delay of Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam, were also designed to bring pressure on the DRV over the issue of negotiations. It will be recalled that the CCP official Wu Hsiu-chuan in mid-December had expressed fear that Ho might indeed negotiate with the United States. During the next month, the Chinese may well have become privately aware that the DRV intended to indicate more clearly that a bombing cessation could bring talks (as the DRV Foreign Minister was to do in late January). It is conceivable that the Chinese--who, as we have seen, did not trust the DRV to enter into negotiations with the United States on any terms--then became particularly afraid that the U.S. might be persuaded by its allies and by the Soviets to accept the less ambiguous DRV terms

for beginning negotiations, and that the DRV consequently might actually agree to begin talks.*

It is therefore possible that a subsidiary purpose of the Chinese pressures against the Soviet presence in China in late January and early February--which were really in essence intensified threats to the continued existence of the Soviet supply line to Vietnam--was to suggest forcibly to the Vietnamese that the Chinese might cut off that supply line permanently if the DRV, faced with a concrete U.S. proposal to take North Vietnam up on its one-sided offer, were to follow through on the offer. As previously stated, on 11 February, the day after President Johnson's letter refusing that proposal was received in Hanoi, there were good indications of a hasty, last-minute Chinese decision to dismantle the siege and stop harassing Soviet passenger trains--which was done during the next two days. It has been suggested in press reports at the time and subsequently that a DRV delegation which came to Peking in the second week of February (led by politburo member Huang Van Huong, according to one possibly informed version) was able to negotiate a relaxation of Chinese restrictions on the transit of Soviet supplies. It is conceivable that the North Vietnamese were indeed successful in doing this in February, and that this became possible because the DRV could show Mao that

*On 10 February NCNA remarked that Kosygin, during his visit to Britain, was "begging Johnson to implement the scheme of inducing 'peace talks' through a bombing pause." This formulation, suggesting a U.S.-USSR difference of view on talks, and indicating that the Soviets were trying to get an unwilling United States to do something which would consummate Soviet betrayal of the DRV, was quite unusual for the Chinese, who usually only refer vaguely to complete Soviet-U.S. cooperation and collaboration in this matter.

President Johnson had refused the one-sided DRV proposal, and that consequently, although Ho intended to keep the proposal open (to Chinese displeasure), the issue was moot--the Chinese had nothing to fear for the time being.

Regardless of whether the negotiation issue was a factor, the hypothesis that the Chinese relaxation of pressure against the Soviet embassy was followed by relaxation of restrictions on the passage of Soviet arms would suggest why the DRV was willing, on 28 February, to issue a statement reaffirming a point--that the Chinese were not obstructing the passage of Soviet arms--which it had been unwilling to reaffirm a month before. About this time Soviet propaganda charges about Chinese obstruction of transit began to die down, and eventually to disappear. About this time, too, the Soviets and their friends began to disseminate privately vague reports that an agreement had been reached on this subject, beginning with Ambassador Dobrynin's statement shortly before 21 February.

Dobrynin alluded to an agreement to allow DRV representatives to take charge of the transit of Soviet goods, but specified only that this had been agreed at some time since the previous August; other Soviet-inspired rumors sought to imply that this had just been decided on, and even contradicted Dobrynin by suggesting that it had happened in March. In fact, as has been noted, the DRV role in the transit of supplies had apparently been specified months before, between August and October; but the Chinese may have agreed to reaffirm this arrangement in February. It is possible, as some press reports have suggested, that some Sino-Soviet agreement on aid transit (perhaps involving renewal of the 30 March 1965 two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on aid to Vietnam) was reached in March in the wake of a Sino-Vietnamese agreement in February. This sort of separate bilateral negotiation has evidently been the pattern in the past.

The Soviets in disseminating rumors on all this have attempted to convey the impression that eternal harmony has now been reached on this question, a highly dubious proposition. Their central purpose has apparently been to convey to the United States the impression that past obstacles to mightier Soviet help to the DRV have now been removed, in the hope of deterring the U.S. from further steps against North Vietnam and of encouraging pressures on the U.S. government for unilateral U.S. concessions on the bombing issue to bring talks with the DRV. The Soviets appear to have been dismayed to discover that the exaggerated information they have circulated has largely had the opposite effect, and is being used to buttress arguments for expanded U.S. measures in Vietnam.

8. The Anti-Chinese, Anti-American Line

The cessation of the siege of the Soviet embassy and the relaxation of pressure on the Soviet supply line to Vietnam removed for the time being the threat of a complete break in Sino-Soviet state relations, but did not halt the continued deterioration of those relations. One permanent legacy of the siege was abrogation of a bilateral convention which had waived visa requirements for mutual business trips across the Sino-Soviet border. The propaganda battle continued on a higher level of intensity than before the siege, with the Chinese harping on Soviet crimes of the recent past, such as the Soviet refusal to take back the Chinese employees of the Soviet embassy who had walked out in late January. On 11 March, the Chinese government made this the pretext for the formal expulsion of two Soviet Embassy officials; and a week later, the Soviet

government retaliated in kind, and took the occasion to summarize publicly all the misdeeds of the Chinese embassy in Moscow over the last few months. On 26 March, when a car driven by Soviet diplomats in Peking was involved in a minor traffic accident, Red Guards and Chinese police surrounded and detained them for six hours insisting that they apologize; People's Daily duly defended and endorsed this action a few days later.

The Soviets had begun in January to jam Chinese broadcasts; their own broadcasts had by now become, and remained, even more incendiary than anything Khrushchev had ordained, calling openly for Mao's overthrow and commiserating with the minority peoples of Sinkiang over their persecution by Mao. Mao was depicted, often in the same breath, as a madman, a racist, a Hitler, a militarist, a friend of Chinese capitalists and enemy of Chinese Communists, an ally of American imperialism, and a would-be conqueror of all neighboring peoples, including the Vietnamese. Soviet coverage of the "great cultural revolution" had by now evolved very far from the cautious, relatively objective reporting in August, and was reporting at face value even the most extravagant fabrications planted by the Chinese Nationalists in Hong Kong. During periods of apparent quiet in the cultural revolution--such as February and March 1967--Soviet propaganda filled in the intermission by describing the most lurid past events again as if they had recently occurred.

A salient feature of the CPSU's anti-Mao propaganda has been the thorough way in which it has been combined with the anti-American theme. Although some Soviet KGB or military representatives abroad now occasionally privately alluded, as they had in some past years, to the notion that

the Chinese danger might require a better Soviet relationship with the United States, there was no hint of this in the Soviet press or radio. The Soviets turned the tables on the CCP and its claims of U.S.-Soviet collaboration, and insisted incessantly that it was the Chinese who had entered into a tacit agreement with the American imperialists to allow them a free hand in Vietnam. Dark hints were repeatedly dropped about what went on in the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw. When Chen Yi in September 1966 made an overenthusiastic effort to improve the worsening Chinese Communist image in Japan by strenuously affirming a Chinese desire for peace and pooh-poohing the likelihood of a Chinese war with the United States, the Soviets eagerly seized upon the first exaggerated accounts of this from Tokyo as evidence of Sino-U.S. plotting, ignoring the quick Chinese efforts to correct the record of what had been said. The Soviets similarly exploited--and perhaps planted in the first place--reports of Chinese indirect trade with the United States through third parties and reports of Chinese industrial products turning up in Saigon. All in all, Soviet propaganda depicted two terrible extremes--U.S. imperialism and the Chinese renegades--in tacit alliance at the expense of the suffering Vietnamese and in opposition to the forces of peace, freedom, and light the world over led by the Soviet Union.

This Soviet line entailed a remarkable change from the Soviet posture in Khrushchev's time toward forces in the United States desirous of improving U.S. relations with Mao's regime. Whereas in earlier years the Soviets had welcomed statements made by such Americans (because any improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might bring a relaxation

of Chinese pressures on Khrushchev's policies), now they cited them as sinister evidence of Sino-U.S. collaboration. And whereas in the Khrushchev era the Soviets had eagerly greeted any U.S. voices urging Chinese Communist admission to the U.N., now some Soviet commentaries actually reacted to such suggestions with heavy suspicion as to the motives with which they were offered.

While the fundamental Soviet reason for taking this public line about tacit Sino-U.S. collaboration against the USSR was undoubtedly a merely opportunistic desire to discredit both the USSR's major opponents at once, it is barely conceivable that some of the Soviet leaders also actually feel some small degree of genuine apprehension that this might some day come to pass. It was reported in the fall of 1965 that Soviet intelligence had been ordered to watch for any indication of secret Sino-U.S. contacts; and a year later there was a curious incident in Burma when Soviet representatives there kept badgering the local U.S. ambassador with private attempts to elicit from him an admission that he had recently held conversations with the Chinese. In 1967 when some speakers at a U.S. academic meeting made statements reported in the U.S. press to the effect that Mao was an asset to the United States because he kept the USSR and Communist China at loggerheads, this was duly exploited by Soviet propaganda; but more significantly, Soviet representatives in the

United States were soon asking various U.S. officials for their reaction to this statement and to the notion that a Sino-Soviet war would be a good thing for the United States. While the leaders of the CPSU are undoubtedly well aware of the present realities of Sino-U.S. relations, some of them--for example, Brezhnev--may be nevertheless troubled by the possibility that Sino-U.S. relations might some day improve before Sino-Soviet relations do.

At present, Sino-Soviet state relations remain at a fairly high and constant level of tension. During Kosygin's visit to London he was apparently preoccupied with China, talked with intense passion about Chinese behavior, told the British he was convinced Mao was mad, and chided the British in private for providing the Chinese with strategic goods. The Soviets had foreseen the possibility that Mao might attempt to destroy mutual diplomatic relations before Mao began the siege of the Soviet embassy in late January, and they can have no confidence that he will not try again.

The Soviets for years have apparently viewed the Chinese attitude toward the Sino-Soviet border as a long-term danger against which intensified preparations are necessary, and a number of further steps have been taken in this direction since Khrushchev's fall, particularly in the last six months. Soviet railway and construction troops and a military advisory group have been sent to Mongolia in increasing numbers, particularly since Brezhnev's visit to Ulan Bator in January 1966 to sign a new Soviet-Mongolian treaty--which the Chinese have openly described as being aimed at them. There is good evidence that it is also planned to station considerable Soviet combat forces in Mongolia when facilities now being prepared are ready for them, and it has been reported that some such forces and equipment have already arrived.

In addition, the events of the last few months have evidently persuaded the Soviet leaders that despite the great present disparity between Soviet and Chinese military strength, there is even a short-term danger that Mao in his present state of mind might right now provoke some serious incident on the border. The briefings of the CPSU leadership to the party membership in early January 1967 apparently stressed this point, and numerous Soviet public statements and articles have evidently been designed both to strengthen vigilance and solidarity among the Soviet population against the Chinese danger, on the one hand, and to warn the Chinese indirectly, on the other.

Finally, the Soviets have probably not overlooked the possibilities for both intelligence collection and subversion in China, particularly in Sinkiang, where the confusion created by Mao's cultural revolution has been considerable, where the Soviets had past ties with and influence over the minority population, and where a revolt in the Altai area was reported by one source as going on as recently as early 1965. Soviet military intelligence requirements regarding China formulated in early 1966 are [redacted] reported to have called for an expansion of operations within the CPR. In early February 1967, CPSU secretary Ponomarev, addressing the secret CPSU school for non-bloc Communists, responded to a question as to what the USSR would do in the event of real civil war in China by asserting that "the possibility exists" that the Soviet Union would help anti-Mao forces "with arms." The Soviets are probably under no illusions, however,

that the time when this can be done is close at hand.*

9. Dissension in the Remaining Chinese Camp

Meanwhile, the Soviets had taken advantage of the widespread revulsion evoked by Mao's "cultural revolution" to seek the further alienation from Peking of those parties still on speaking terms with the CCP, to accelerate the withdrawal of the Chinese from Soviet-controlled international fronts, and to revive pressure for an international Communist meeting.

The position to which Mao's domestic and foreign policies had brought his relations with some of his erstwhile friends was dramatized by an incident during the fall of 1966 which was never made public but about which the CPSU and CCP were undoubtedly both informed. In early November, a fulsome message from Mao to the Fifth Albanian party congress informed the Albanians that "we are not afraid of being isolated and we shall never be isolated," but certain incidents at the congress itself furnished an ironical commentary on Mao's claim. The Rumanian and Japanese party delegates reportedly refused to have any contact with Grippa's pro-Chinese Belgian delegation; the Rumanians, Japanese, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, and Burmese delegations refused to applaud Hoxha's lengthy attacks on "Khrushchevite revisionism," the Rumanians and Japanese walked out when Grippa read to the congress a message--denouncing Gomulka, the Polish party and the CPSU--from the

*The Soviets are thinking about the matter, however, and may have begun contingency planning against the possibility that the happy day may eventually come--perhaps during a succession struggle after Mao's death, or perhaps under circumstances arising from a Sino-U.S. war. A Soviet diplomat in April asked a U.S. State Department official what the United States government thought about someone's thesis that in the event of a Sino-U.S. war the Soviet Union would seize the occasion to occupy north China.

"Polish Marxist-Leninist party" (a paper organization sponsored by the Albanians); and after this, the Rumanians, Japanese, North Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Burmese all reportedly absented themselves from most of the remaining sessions of the congress.

The vigorous stand taken by the Rumanians, Japanese, and North Koreans at the Albanian party congress was not surprising; that the North Vietnamese were reportedly willing to join them was an interesting new development. The North Vietnamese decision to demonstrate Hanoi's displeasure at having the "Polish-Marxist-Leninist party" paraded before the visiting delegations was a concrete act of defiance of the Chinese in the same spirit as the Lao Dong party's January 1966 public announcement that it would go to the CPSU 23rd Congress. A similar subsequent action was to be North Vietnamese participation in the January 1967 AAPSO meeting in Nicosia boycotted by the Chinese and acquiescence in the successful Soviet effort to remove the site of the next scheduled AAPSO Congress from Peking.

North Vietnamese unhappiness and fear at the events unfolding in China was expressed privately by several DRV representatives abroad in late 1966 and early 1967. These emotions were certainly redoubled when the Chinese during their crisis with the Soviets in January-February 1967 proceeded to stage demonstrations before the Soviet embassy in Hanoi and otherwise insulted Soviet representatives there in the presence of the Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese head of protocol is known to have intervened to halt one incident being created by the Chinese military attaché in Hanoi; and it has been reported that the DRV delayed distribution of the Chinese-language newspaper Bao Tan Viet Hao (which the CPR embassy evidently controlled, and which the CCP, as we have seen, had previously used to provoke the DRV) on the day when the Chinese held a demonstration at the USSR's Hanoi embassy. In short, the Lao Dong party showed an unusual willingness in late 1966 and 1967 to react to Chinese provocatory actions infringing on Lao Dong neutrality in the Sino-Soviet struggle. As discussed earlier (pages 1-7.)

the North Vietnamese seem to have reacted particularly strongly to Chinese attempts to export "cultural revolution" propaganda to the DRV in violation of the autonomous rights of the Lao Dong leadership. As noted, Mao's arrogance in all these and other matters eventually led the North Vietnamese to make a thinly-veiled attack on him in the May 1967 Hoc Tap.

The baleful effects of the cultural revolution were also being felt in the very heart of what was left of the Chinese camp.

The Burmese party, as noted above, was one of those reported to have joined a boycott of some of the sessions of the Albanian congress. Why this party*--which had long been in the Chinese orbit and hostile to the CPSU--should take this stand became clearer in early February 1967, when party chairman Thakim Soe reportedly voiced his disapproval of aspects of the CCP's cultural revolution in a handbill clandestinely circulated in Rangoon. Thakin Soe, an old foe of Khrushchev's "revisionism," said that the Red Guards had gone far beyond mere opposition to "revisionism," that the cultural revolution was "left opportunist," and that Mao was at fault for allowing this to go on unchecked. Some members of Thakim Soe's politburo reportedly disagreed with him and were still completely loyal to the CCP.

In India--in the Communist Party of India/Left--a similar situation obtained. Party general secretary Sundarayya, who continued to be somewhat critical of Soviet revisionism, privately remarked in late January 1967 that he was becoming increasingly disturbed at the course taken by the Chinese cultural revolution and at the glorification of Mao. Members of the moderate wing of his party (such as Namboodiripad) probably agreed with him, while the

*There are two Communist organizations in Burma, the CP of Burma (Red Flag) and the larger CP of Burma (White Flag). The party which took this anti-Chinese action in Tirana was presumably the Red Flag--Thakin Soe's group--since the White Flag party has since remained on excellent terms with Peking.

large, militant wing of the party centering on West Bengal continued to be loyal to the CCP.

In New Zealand, party secretary Wilcox in early January was saying privately that something was wrong if comrades with whom he had fought revisionism from 1960 onward--notably Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--were now being attacked; that Mao might have made a mistake in handling the cultural revolution; that the Chinese were not going about things in the right way; that the CCP had not informed the New Zealand party about what was going on; and that if the stories coming out of China were true, his party was "in a fix," since he could never explain to other party leaders that Mao could be making a mistake. (After a subsequent trip to China, however, he made a valiant try to rationalize Chinese events to his party.)

In Indonesia, among the underground remnants of the PKI, hostile remarks were reported being passed in some PKI units regarding Mao's cult and the Chinese cultural revolution. It is certain that the Soviet embassy and the East Europeans in Djakarta must now be working hard to encourage this attitude within the covert PKI.

Even Albania--the CCP's closest remaining ally--was conspicuously close-mouthed about the Red Guards and the cultural revolution all through the fall of 1966, a circumstance widely commented on at the time. During the fall the Albanian central committee is reported to have sent a letter to Peking expressing its concern about the "cultural revolution" and requesting an explanation. It is likely that Hoxha was particularly concerned about the fall of Liu and Teng and what this might mean for the ultimate Chinese attitude toward him.* (See

*As previously noted, the Albanians had several times in past years displayed uneasiness about Chinese steadfastness, and on various occasions had sought to get the Chinese to take organizational steps (both in regard to breaking with the Soviets

(continued on next page)

# THE LAST ALBANIAN MEETING WITH SOME OLD CHINESE FRIENDS

Figure J



This is part of a group picture taken at the conclusion of the May 1966 visit to China of an Albanian delegation led by Premier Shehu (fifth from left) and Politburo member Kapo (third from left). The Chinese politburo members whose arms are linked with the Albanians in this picture are (from left to right) Teng Hsiao-ping, Chu Te, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Ho Lung, and Ulanfu. All except Chou have since been purged.

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Figure J.) The warmth of Mao's personal message to the Albanian party congress in early November was probably intended to reassure Hoxha and bring him into line; but only beginning in late December 1966 did the Albanians display reassurance and resume the wholehearted endorsement of the cultural revolution--and of Mao's cult--which the Chinese craved and expected.

10. The Chinese Departure From the Fronts

Throughout the fall of 1966 and early 1967, while the cultural revolution was proceeding, while Sino-Soviet state relations were deteriorating, while the relations of the Communist neutrals with the CCP were growing increasingly bad and the closest friends of the CCP were becoming increasingly worried, the Chinese presence in the Soviet-run international fronts, where so many past battles had taken place, was gradually being thinned out. This happened as a result of a combination of voluntary Chinese withdrawals and Soviet evictions.

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*and the East Europeans and in regard to setting up their own formal organization) which the Chinese at the given moment were not prepared to take. Even at this late date, the Albanians are still at it: a 13 December 1966 Zeri i Popullit editorial insisted that "there is no longer any hope that one day the revisonist traitors may return to the right road; now everything divides and nothing unites the Marxist-Leninists and the Khrushchevite revisionists." (Emphasis added.) This was a clear allusion to the formula used in the 11 November 1965 Red Flag-People's Daily editorial to the effect that "there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us," and to the editorial's assertion that there could be no unity unless the Soviets completely repented, confessed, and reformed. The Chinese have still not gone beyond this formula, despite all that has happened since. The Albanians would like them to do so, and to call a formal meeting of all the pro-Chinese groups, something the CCP has up to now been unwilling to do.*

In the early fall of 1966, the Chinese representatives were withdrawn from the Prague secretariat of the International Union of Students. Although the Soviets in the winter were expecting the Chinese to attend the congress of the IUS to be held in Mongolia in late March, when the congress materialized the Chinese were not there. The Chinese also boycotted a January meeting of the international preparatory committee for the Ninth World Youth Festival, and it was there conjectured that the Chinese might be intending to split with the youth organizations that remained loyal to Moscow and launch competing organizations.

Meanwhile, in the Secretariat of the World Peace Council in Vienna, the Chinese members had been kept increasingly out of discussions of WPC plans and policy, and in early January were forced to leave the Secretariat when--according to credible Chinese charges--the secretariat leaders through a legal maneuver made it impossible for the Chinese to get their Austrian visas renewed. The Chinese protested loudly at this, and the WPC protested its innocence.

With regard to the World Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese trade union leader Liu Ning-i stated privately in early October that the Chinese attached considerable importance to WFTU and planned to remain in it. The Chinese did indeed attend a metal-workers trade union meeting in Sofia later in October, and in their customary fashion did their best to disrupt the functioning of the Soviet machinery. When they attempted to repeat this performance at a meeting of the WFTU General Council in Sofia in early December, however, the Soviets took advantage of the fact that the Chinese delegates were mostly not Council members but replacements for recent victims of the "cultural revolution," and used this fact as legal justification to expel the Chinese from this Council meeting. The Albanians then walked out, but the Vietnamese, Koreans, Cubans, and Rumanians, who had voted against expulsion, remained. After this unprecedented Soviet action, the Chinese attended another international trade union meeting held in

Damascus in January (about the Aden question), but walked out with the Albanians when the Soviets would not let them speak. The DRV representative reportedly issued a statement regretting the decision to muzzle the Chinese, but remained. The Chinese have since claimed that they were not invited to an April meeting of WFTU's executive bureau, and themselves refused to attend a WFTU conference of petrochemical unions in May.

With regard to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, as already noted, the Chinese boycotted the AAPSO Council held in Nicosia in February when it became apparent that the Soviets intended--and would be able--to use the Council meeting to remove the venue of the next AAPSO Conference in 1967 from Peking. The Chinese then announced that they would hold the AAPSO conference themselves anyway, presumably with whatever foreign delegates they could muster.* A long-existing schism in the Afro-Asian Writers Organization was similarly formalized in March.

In short, there was an overall trend toward Chinese departure, willingly or unwillingly, from many of the fronts, although the situation regarding

*In early May, however, there was one report that the Chinese had informed the Pakistanis that the Peking AAPSO conference was being indefinitely postponed. It is possible that this is true, and that the Chinese are backing out of this project because of difficulty in rounding up enough participants to make a respectable showing; but it is extraordinary that Peking should not have foreseen this in February when it went on record about holding its own conference. One may speculate that resistance to attending Peking's AAPSO conference may have developed from key parties that the Chinese originally had hoped would attend: North Vietnam and North Korea, for example.

the WPC was not yet clear. In cases where the Chinese had the capability or the organizational machinery in being (the Afro-Asian organizations), they were already running counterpart fronts of their own; in the older, Europe-based fronts such as the IUS, WFDY, WFTU, and WPC, the Soviets were left in possession, and it would be some time before the Chinese could organize meaningful counterparts, if that was their intention.

B. The World Conference Revisited

1. Resumption of Soviet Pressure

Finally, as already noted, the CPSU in the fall of 1966 took advantage of all the multiple phenomena working toward Chinese isolation to press again for a world Communist conference, preferably of the 1957 type.

It will be seen from the events described below and from some rather drastic actions taken by the CPSU that the Soviet leadership did desire such a conference very much indeed and was once more struggling almost desperately against various obstacles to get it. The CPSU was again eager for a conference because it considered that the low state of Chinese fortunes--a possibly temporary circumstance--might have rendered feasible for the time being the convocation of a conference with an agenda and participants that would permit an expansion of Soviet authority and influence in the world movement.

The view that the CPSU was merely going through the motions of advocating a conference because of the supposed belief that this in itself would help the CPSU in some way is contradicted not only by the details of what the Soviets did but also by the obvious fact that a campaign for a conference which did not produce a conference would leave the CPSU worse off, not better off than before. For the CPSU leaders were surely well aware (a) that the pressures they were using to help advance a conference created intense resentment in some quarters (e.g., in North Korea),

so that only the actual convocation of a conference could compensate the CPSU for the problems evoked by the campaign for a conference; and (b) that each time the CPSU began a drive for a conference and failed to get it (as in 1963-1964), there was a net loss to Soviet authority and influence throughout the world movement which the CPSU thereafter could never quite recapture. There is no assurance that the Soviet drive for a conference begun in the fall of 1966 and continued through the spring of 1967 will succeed, but it is quite clear that the CPSU has been in earnest about it.

As early as July 1966, at about the time of the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations, it was reliably reported that the Soviet party was already actively seeking to revive the issue of an international Communist meeting (at the time, one centering on Vietnam). [redacted] stated that the CPSU had already begun once more to canvass among a few non-bloc parties and intended next to sound out the North Vietnamese again--expecting, however, that they might prove evasive.

At the same time, the CPSU was vigorously pressing the two parties it had charged with organizing an all-European party conference on European security--the French, for West Europe, and the Poles, for East Europe--to "go ahead resolutely."* One of the important unstated purposes of this projected regional conference, from the CPSU point of view, was to pave the way for and break down some of the resistance to a world meeting. Although the CPSU wanted the European party conference to be held sooner rather than later--preferably in the fall of 1966--the Soviets eventually deferred to Polish

*Ostensibly, of course, these two parties were given this responsibility by an acrimonious European party gathering in Vienna in May 1966. In fact, they were chosen for the task by the CPSU, because of their size, influence, and relative amenability to Soviet wishes.*

wishes and agreed to have this meeting put off until the spring of 1967.

The next important move occurred in mid-September, when Brezhnev during a tour of Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia is reported by several sources to have discussed at length the implications of Chinese developments with leaders of those countries and to have used those events as an argument for some sort of joint action against the Chinese. According to one account of his talks [redacted] Brezhnev argued, among other things, that such forceful joint action would help healthy forces in the CCP in their supposedly titanic struggle with Mao: a transparently specious and hypocritical argument which made no impression [redacted] but which the Soviets were to repeat later privately to others. Simultaneously--at about mid-September--Ponomarev's and Andropov's central committee people were apparently being put to work drafting a documented history and analysis of Mao's "cultural revolution" for subsequent private dissemination inside and outside the CPSU.

Next, in early October, the Soviets began to reprint statements from some of their tame parties--first the Sudanese party, then the Ecuadorean one--once more calling for a world conference, after months of silence on this question. These statements had obviously been commissioned by the CPSU. Two weeks later, Brezhnev talked with [redacted] who later said Brezhnev had told him that the Soviets had already "sent representatives to every country" to round up support once more in the world movement for a world conference. This was an obvious garble or exaggeration of what Brezhnev had said; he may have merely indicated a CPSU intention to communicate privately with most parties on this issue.

Meanwhile, on 10 October Gomulka came to Moscow for talks with Brezhnev, on the China question among other things. In response to evident Soviet prodding, the Poles on 29 September had published an editorial condemnation of recent Chinese internal and external policies which closed part of the gap between the restrained Polish treatment of Chinese

events and the position already taken by the Soviets and their most vociferous supporters. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that Gomulka was still reluctant to go as far as the Soviets wished, and that Brezhnev was continuing to apply pressure on him. It was in mid-October, immediately after the talks with Gomulka, that Brezhnev told [redacted] that the CPSU definitely wanted a world conference, that the Soviets had not convened one up to now because of fear that not all the parties would support them, and that [redacted] should work diligently to line up his party for a conference.

These words were hardly out of Brezhnev's mouth when on 17 October he began a five-day meeting in Moscow with the leaders of the pro-Soviet bloc parties (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Mongolia, and Cuba).* Although several subjects were undoubtedly discussed, including the issues of aid to Vietnam and Vietnam negotiations (several of the participants made publicized or unpublicized journeys to the DRV immediately thereafter), there seems little doubt that the CPSU brought up the subject of a joint condemnation of Chinese actions and of the world Communist conference, as has been reported. The CPSU evidently was blocked at this time by the opposition of the Rumanians and Cubans, and there was apparently insufficient agreement to allow even the publication of a joint communiqué on the issues discussed.**

*A Yugoslav "parliamentary" delegation led by Kardelj arrived in the USSR just as this meeting closed, and Kardelj duly met with Kirilenko and Andropov, no doubt to be briefed on what had been discussed.*

**Ten days later, speaking in Tbilisi, Brezhnev stated in exasperated fashion that it was "impossible not to express decisive condemnation" of the CCP for its rejection of unity of action.*

Shortly after this, however, it became apparent that the Soviets had made at least some limited progress during their bilateral talks with Gomulka. On 3 November, the editor of Warsaw's Polityka stated during a lecture that CPSU had gained a more favorable position in the international movement as a result of Chinese losses, and that "probably next year we can observe successful efforts to organize an international Communist conference." The following day, Trybuna Ludu quoted Gomulka as having told a Polish party plenum the week before (reporting on his talks in Moscow) that "further efforts" were required "to unite the ranks of the Communist...movement around concrete goals of anti-imperialist struggle," and that "new initiatives in this field are necessary." (Emphasis added) The Poles on 29 September and the Soviets on 27 November alluded directly and publicly (for the first time) to the Polish "initiative" of a year before--the November 1965 proposal for a bloc-wide meeting on aid to Vietnam (see Part II, pages 73-78.) This sequence of events raises the possibility that Brezhnev and Gomulka may have agreed in October to have Poland renew this proposal or something like it on an informal basis.* There is no direct evidence at all to support this hypothesis, but it would tend to explain why some Polish journalists subsequently began spreading rumors about a possible international meeting in Warsaw in the next few "weeks or months." It would serve Soviet purposes to have a limited aid-to-Vietnam meeting take place in Warsaw if the Poles were to be the ostensible sponsors, whereas the CPSU would of course want any more general international conference of the parties to take place in Moscow.

**A formal Polish proposal--a document on paper, like the circular invitation sent out in November-December 1965--would have to be sent to the Albanians also, for form's sake; and the Albanians would certainly have published and denounced it, as they did a year before.*

If an aid-to-Vietnam meeting proposal was in fact renewed in some form in October, this could have something to do with the parade of bloc representatives to Hanoi after their Moscow consultations. It also might be related to a rumored secret visit by Le Duan to Peking in early November immediately after the arrival of the Cuban delegation in Hanoi which [redacted] reported and considered credible. It also could have something to do with the visit of Le Duc Tho to Moscow in December.

Whether or not this idea was floated again, the CPSU meanwhile pressed vigorously ahead with the issue of a more general world Communist conference. A French party resolution denouncing the CCP published on 21 October pledged to continue to work "to create conditions" favoring an international conference. Several European parties held joint talks in Prague in early November in which they discussed what they wanted in the way of changes from the dogmas of the 1957 and 1960 documents to be introduced into any document written by a new conference. A CPSU delegation led by Suslov visited Helsinki 31 October - 4 November, told the Finnish party the CPSU wanted an international conference, and put pressure on the Finns for support. (While generally agreeable to the idea, the Finns were not immediately as enthusiastic as the Soviets would have wished, and the joint communique published after the visit endorsed only the general utility of international Communist conferences.* A few weeks later, the CPSU took effective steps to straighten out the Finns, who fell completely into line.)

*These unwonted (and abortive) faint stirrings of resistance in the traditionally obedient Finnish party on a matter of great importance to the CPSU were interesting in that they were the direct result of a change in the balance of power in the*

*(continued on next page)*

At congresses of the Bulgarian and Hungarian parties in November, Brezhnev gave the conference issue a strong additional push by telling the world at large that many parties felt that conditions were growing more and more ripe for a conference. Although a great many delegates at the Bulgarian congress were either unwilling to echo this line or uninstructed by their parties or both, the CPSU took steps to remedy this: it reportedly asked delegates to the following Hungarian congress to come early for private meetings, organized preliminary closed-door regional party discussions, and evidently systematically applied pressure upon the many waverers.* Pravda meanwhile on 22 November reiterated the central message for any who had not heard, and the next day published a Portuguese party article chiding (like Gus Hall in September 1964) those parties that "on the one hand call for unity and on the other, out of fear of offending the splitters, avoid any initiative to solve this problem."

*central Finnish party organs, an increase in the relative weight of party "liberals" at the expense of the Stalinist old guard. Ironically, the CPSU itself had approved and faciliated this change in order to improve the Finnish party's ability to expand its influence in Finland. In this respect, the change has been quite successful; the party now participates in the Finnish government, the first time this has happened in Western Europe in many years. Yet the same changes in the party leadership which have helped to bring this about have made the party begin to be susceptible to the influence of such recalcitrants as the Italian and Swedish CPs on international matters. This process has barely started; the CPSU may have much more trouble with the Finns in a few years.*

**The turnout of foreign delegations for the Hungarian congress was much smaller than that for the Bulgarian congress; it is possible that one of the reasons for this was the desire of some parties to avoid this arm-twisting.*

At the Hungarian congress itself, Brezhnev, Kadar, and others guffawed (as Khrushchev had done, two and a half years before) at the malicious, ridiculous suggestion that they wanted to read the Chinese out of the movement; and almost in the same breath, Brezhnev insisted that a new conference must reaffirm a "general line" for the movement--that is, reaffirm Soviet authority in a movement without the Chinese. Kadar carried the ball on behalf of the CPSU at his congress: both in his opening and closing speeches he made the point that the conference should be held whether or not all parties were willing to come (the same thing that he had said at the March 1965 Moscow meeting).* The Belgian party representative reiterated this; and the lineup of the public speeches at the Hungarian congress on the conference issue, while still far from satisfactory for the CPSU was much better than it had been at Sofia.

Next, in early December, a regional meeting of Scandinavian parties was held in which two parties responsive to CPSU wishes--the Danes and Finns--lobbied on the conference question (to no avail) with two that were not--the Swedes and Norwegians. Then, in mid-December, the CPSU central committee plenum was held, announced the Soviet intention to "step up the struggle," and reaffirmed Soviet agreement with the view allegedly held by many other parties that favorable conditions "are now being created" for a "well-prepared" international conference. As already noted, the CPSU now accelerated the dissemination of anti-Chinese briefing materials throughout the Soviet party. There is good reason to believe that the CPSU also disseminated to the world movement at some time in December, two secret circular letters on the Chinese

*Kadar took this stand despite several apparently well-founded reports from authoritative sources that he was privately not enthusiastic about the conference at all. This was evidently a case in which the efficacy of CPSU muscle was demonstrated.*

(and thus quite possibly also on the world conference); one was addressed to bloc parties, the other to parties outside the bloc. These letters apparently were so tightly controlled by the CPSU that no version of their contents is yet available. The Soviets have publicly revealed that North Vietnamese politburo member Le Duc Tho was present in Moscow shortly after the CPSU plenum. He is likely to have discussed the CPSU circular letter, among other things.

The Soviets now intensified their pressure. Both the French party congress in January and the East German congress in April heard repeated demands for the holding of a conference whether all would attend or not. Brezhnev in a speech at Gorkiy on 13 January said that "many parties" had been demanding this "with growing insistence." Most significant of all, on 5 January Pravda had been able to publish a statement by a Polish Politburo member acknowledging that the holding of a conference "cannot be made dependent on whether or not the CCP or any other party takes part in it." The Poles had now come round.

2. The Time and Place of the Conference

On 13 December, the Albanian Zeri i Popullit had declared that "the Khrushchevites need the 'large Communist meeting' to present it as a 'great success' at the jubilee of the 50th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution." There is good reason to think that the Albanians were right, and moreover, that it had been the CPSU desire from the very beginning--that is, from the moment when the current campaign for a conference began in September 1966--to point toward a world meeting of some kind at the 50th anniversary celebrations in November 1967. When Brezhnev visited Tito in September and argued unsuccessfully for joint action to isolate the Chinese, he reportedly dwelt at considerable length on Soviet plans for the November 1967 anniversary. After he

had gone, the Yugoslavs privately commented that both they and the various Communist neutrals opposed to a conference could not avoid going to the Moscow jubilee ceremonies the following year. In mid-November, the Yugoslav ambassador in Prague, remarking that a conference in the near future was out of the question, added that the CPSU "under proper conditions" could manage to hold the conference in November 1967. On 30 November, a ranking Polish Foreign Ministry official told the U.S. ambassador that the world-wide conference definitely would be held in Moscow in connection with the anniversary celebrations in the fall of 1967. And on 13 January, Brezhnev in his Gorkiy speech let the cat out of the bag:

> For 50 years the Communist movement has been developing under the invincible banner of the ideas of October. It is quite understandable, therefore, that while marking this momentous anniversary, the fraternal parties sum up the results of the path they have covered, summarize the gigantic experience they have accumulated in the revolutionary struggle.

When the Soviets began to press for the conference in the fall of 1966, therefore, they were pointing toward an event which they hoped from the beginning to be able to bring off a year later. They were well aware of the extent of the opposition they had to face, and they intended to try to use the interval to reduce that opposition, bringing pressure on those parties susceptible to pressure and cajoling the others. If the suggestion for a limited aid-to-Vietnam bloc meeting was indeed privately revived in October 1966, this would have been calculated to break down some of the resistance to a world conference without the Chinese by demonstrating anew that Chinese attendance at even the most restricted and necessary anti-imperialist meeting could not be obtained. Meanwhile, the all-European party meeting in the spring of 1967 would be used to provide impetus for the coming world conference, and at least two other meetings were being planned by the CPSU

to point toward the same end: a Prague meeting of all the African parties scheduled for March 1967, and a gathering of the youth auxiliaries of all the parties planned to be held under Komsomol auspices in July 1967.

3. The Remaining Opposition

Two parties that had consistently opposed the Soviet will regarding the conference began finally to retreat under CPSU pressure early in 1967. These were the Italians and the British, the two chief recalcitrants at the March 1965 Moscow meeting.

The Italian party leadership was hotly debating what to do in December 1966, in the wake of the Soviet initiatives at the Bulgarian and Hungarian party congresses.

During one of these inner-party discussions, the leadership wrestled with a problem which had always been present beneath the surface: the effect within the PCI of a strong anti-Chinese stand by the party at an international conference. One leader noted that the so-called "Chinese fringes" had been gaining ground within the PCI, that the party wanted to keep these radicals within the PCI if it possibly could, and that if the PCI adopted a violent anti-Chinese position in response to Soviet pressure, these fringes would have to be expelled from the party and would therefore be lost for good. On the other hand, the PCI seemed unusually vulnerable to Soviet pressures at around this time, in large part because of well-documented increasing financial difficulties. There were [redacted] reports earlier that PCI leaders Longo and Alicata had both sought in August to get more money from the CPSU, and the Soviets may well have made an increase in their subsidy to the PCI conditional on a change in the Italian line toward the world conference.

Whether or not it was for this reason, between December 1966 and April 1967 there was indeed a gradual shift in the PCI stand on this issue, until by April PCI secretary general Longo was saying publicly that his party had never opposed a world

meeting "in principle," that its opposition in the past was based purely on the question of timing, and that since then the situation "has profoundly changed." Although Longo was still trying, as a last resort, to hold off the world conference "at least" a year for preliminary discussions, he now affirmed the right of the movement to meet if necessary without the Chinese, to restore unity. Hypocritical to the last, the PCI thus abandoned this feature of the Togliatti Memorandum.* At the same time, Italian party statements continued to uphold the vigorous anti-American line set forth in the Togliatti memorandum, and even when attacking Mao seldom failed to blame United States policy toward China as bearing ultimate responsibility for his erroneous course.

The British party, meanwhile, in mid-January issued a statement which for the first time endorsed "a world conference of Communist parties to assist the Vietnamese people, convened with the agreement of the Vietnamese Communists." While this statement stopped short of what the Soviets wanted most--approval of a broader world conference to write a "general line"--it was a considerable shift for the British, who had hitherto steadfastly opposed any world conference at which the Chinese were not present. This decision was taken simultaneously with disciplinary action against Reginald Birch and three other members of a pro-Chinese faction inside the British party; and the two actions may well have been related. The Soviets may well now hope that the British can be induced to shift still further.

The radical neutral Communist parties, on the other hand, remained strongly opposed to a general 1960-type conference without the Chinese. By the end of the year, the North Koreans and

**There was some evidence to suggest differences among the PCI leaders about how far to yield to CPSU pressure on this question, with Ingrao, the leader of the PCI left wing, holding out unsuccessfully for continued resistance.*

Japanese had said so openly, and North Vietnamese and Cubans had strongly indicated as much by refusing to endorse a conference and by refusing to applaud demands for the conference at the Bulgarian and Hungarian party congresses. From the CPSU point of view, however, it was likely that all four of the radicals would in any case attend the anniversary celebrations in Moscow, and that, if worst came to worst most or all of them would at least agree to participate in a world conference strictly limited to the Vietnamese question. Finally, if the CPSU decided to hold a more general 1960-type conference despite the opposition of these parties, there was a good chance that if they decided not to attend they would at least not attack it strongly (because of their own differences with the Chinese).

Lastly, there was the continuing European opposition: chiefly the Swedes, Norwegians, Icelanders, and Dutch, in West Europe, and the Rumanians and Yugoslavs, in East Europe. All of these parties had refused to participate either in a world conference or in the all-European party conference scheduled for April.*

Of these recalcitrants, the one which offered the CPSU the most serious problem and which entered into a direct quarrel with the CPSU over Soviet intentions was the Yugoslav party. First, the Yugoslavs remained unalterably opposed--and said so loudly--to any conference which could be used to strengthen Soviet authority within the movement, and by October they had become convinced that this was precisely what Brezhnev wanted. The Yugoslavs were opposed, and said so, to any attempt to reimpose a "general line" on the movement; and Soviet propaganda was loud in its defense of the "general line" arrived at in the 1957 and 1960 conference and in its insistence that a "general line" must be reaffirmed at a new conference. As one Yugoslav official noted, the conference the Soviets had in mind had nothing to do with China

**The Swedes, however, eventually sent an observer to the European conferenece at Karlovy Vary.*

or events in China (except as an excuse to get the conference), and everything to do with Soviet hegemony.

Secondly, the Yugoslavs would not even consider attending a world conference unless the CPSU would promise in advance to withdraw, in any document drawn up by the conference, what Belgrade considered the dogmatic provisions of the 1957 and 1960 documents--and particularly the attacks on "revisionism" and Yugoslavia contained in those documents. Both public and private Soviet statements have made it clear that the CPSU is up to now unwilling to do this. (A Pravda editorial article on 7 December, for example, said that the 1957 and 1960 conferences "armed the Communists with new theoretical conclusions which must be recognized and must not be revised; otherwise it is impossible to wage a successful struggle against imperialism.") As a practical matter, even if Brezhnev wanted to make such concessions to the Yugoslavs--and he apparently does not--he could not do so without seriously offending the Communist radicals (North Vietnam, North Korea, Japan, and Cuba) whose good will is evidently much more important to him.*

**It is too soon to tell yet whether the attitude of any of these parties toward Yugoslavia will be appreciably altered by the position taken by Belgrade regarding the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Largely because of Tito's past close relationship with Nasser and Tito's desire to maintain good relations with the radical Arab states, Yugoslavia strongly backed the Arab side of the conflict and went so far as to sign a joint statement on the subject with the USSR and most of the other East European states.* [redacted] *then reported an intention by Tito to attempt to improve relations with the USSR and to adopt a cooler attitude toward the United States. While the Yugoslav public posture toward the United States could indeed become considerably tougher if Belgrade's present line of policy were extended further, this has not yet happened. It is unlikely that such anti-U.S. radicals as Castro or Ho Chi Minh are pleased by the relatively cautious tone Yugoslavia has thus far adopted in criticizing United States policy in the Middle East.*

Thirdly, the Soviets also do not want to make such concessions because they are at this moment fighting a new revisionist threat from Yugoslavia. The CPSU is reported to have become seriously alarmed at the potential influence elsewhere in Eastern Europe of new reforms somewhat diluting the party's role which have begun to be introduced in Yugoslavia since Rankovic's fall in the summer of 1966. A CPSU letter criticizing Yugoslavia was reportedly circulated in Eastern Europe during the autumn, and may have touched on this question. After Tito had an angry exchange with the CPSU leaders in Moscow in January 1967 over his party reorganization, relations between the two parties became much colder for the time being, and Pravda articles in February and March made thinly-veiled attacks on the projected Yugoslav party and state reforms. Two Yugoslav private party documents reportedly containing extremely revisionist ideas relating to party reforms have apparently particularly agitated the CPSU, which is said to have warned Tito during his acrimonious visit to Moscow in January not to publish them. This situation apparently resembled in some respects the controversy with the Soviets in 1957-1958 over the Yugoslav party program.* Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs for their part apparently suspect the Soviets at the least of having sympathized with and encouraged Rankovic's opposition to economic and party reform.

The net result of all this is that the Yugoslavs have in the last few months been conducting a running polemic with the Soviets, including subdued but explicit criticism of CPSU intentions regarding a world conference, steady sniping at the Karlovy Vary European party conference before and during its

**One of the documents in question--the draft theses on party reorganization--was finally published by Belgrade on 27 April, in a form which suggested that Tito had made a partial retreat from support of the liberal wing of the Yugoslav party (although probably not enough of a retreat to placate Suslov and Brezhnev).*

convocation, and outspoken defense of their own internal reforms against attacks from abroad. Something of a gap has now opened between the position of the Yugoslavs and that of the Italians, Poles, and Hungarians, three European parties long sympathetic to them but now more amenable than they to CPSU pressure.*

4. The Nature of the Conference

Around the end of 1966, [redacted] remarked privately that he thought the Soviets would persist in convening a world conference sometime late in 1967 even if some parties did not attend. He added that the CPSU was prepared to accept a "minimal program" if a "maximal one" was not attainable.

The nature of these two alternatives is by now quite clear. The "minimal program" is a world Communist conference organized and run by the CPSU in Moscow but pegged and limited to the question of aid to Vietnam alone.** This is the least common denominator, the kind of meeting the maximum number of parties would attend without the Chinese. This is the only sort of world meeting the British party has endorsed yet, and the only one the North Koreans, Japanese, Cubans, and North Vietnamese might attend (the North Vietnamese being unlikely

*On the other hand, the Rumanians, who are with the Yugoslavs in resisting Soviet pressures for a conference, have little regard for the Yugoslav economic or party reforms. The greatest sympathy in the Communist movement today for the overall Yugoslav position is probably to be found in Scandinavia, among the Swedes and to a lesser extent the Norwegians.

**A proposal for a world party conference of this type was first aired privately by the pro-Soviet Belgium party in the spring of 1965.

even so). This is also the sort of meeting most absentees would be least likely to attack afterward.

At the other extreme is the "maximal program": a world Communist conference to prepare a detailed "general line," to write a 1960-type statement minus the ambiguities and self-contradictions imposed on that statement by Chinese participation, to hand down both generalizations and specific guidelines for Communist parties in every region of the world, to impose on the movement a universal viewpoint conforming in detail to all the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, and to endorse CPSU authority as well.

The Soviets know perfectly well that they cannot get all of this, but they have given frequent notice that this is what they are yearning for, and they will strive for as much of it as they can possibly get. Brezhnev said at the Hungarian congress in November that the purpose of a conference, "as always," would be "to jointly analyze the great changes that have taken place in the world in recent years, to collectively map out our general line for the future, and thereby to consolidate the unity of our ranks still further." The same three points (appraisal of the past, establishment of a line on future "tactics and strategy" for the movement, and "coordination of measures" for strengthening unity) were set forth by Tsendenbal in a January interview published by the Hungarians. This litany has been repeated on other occasions.

In their Zeri i Popullit appraisal of Soviet tactics on 13 December, the Albanians claimed that the question of "solidarity with Vietnam" was being presented by the Soviets as the basis for the world meeting because this is "the only question by means of which the Khrushchevites [the CPSU] can rally round themselves the various revisionist groups and tendencies." At the same time, the Albanians stressed that the Soviets needed the meeting to try "to reestablish their hegemony over the various revisionist groups," and said that "the revisionists are considering taking a joint decision purporting to be a 'historical and ideological document.' Thus the Albanians recognized the Soviet hope to widen

the scope of the conference beyond the subject of Vietnam. Zeri i Popullit went on to claim that the Soviets could hold the meeting "even with only those who will be willing to attend" because the threatened nonparticipation of some parties was in fact "an in-between position" which was "very satisfactory and acceptable" to the CPSU. This was clearly an allusion to such parties as the North Koreans and North Vietnamese and their refusal to attack the March 1965 meeting which they had declined to attend.

In actual fact, the CPSU has a considerable range of options, and which one it will choose will depend on the Soviet evaluation of the relative weight of the gains and losses involved in each case. The CPSU today still has it in its power to convene a conference in Moscow which a majority of the world's parties would attend and swear absolute loyalty and obedience to the CPSU and all its specific views in the crudest possible fashion, including denunciation of the Chinese in any terms desired. But this would clearly lose more than it would gain in terms of a major purpose in holding a conference: that is, in the effect upon the neutral radicals (over whom the Soviets wish to maintain or increase their influence) and all the various pro-Soviet parties of autonomous tendencies (over whom the Soviets wish to augment or restore a measure of authority). These parties would simply not cooperate. At the other extreme, a conference keyed only to aid to Vietnam, ignoring the Chinese, making no attempt to write a more general document, to set a "general line" or to praise the CPSU in any way would attract a maximum turnout of marginal parties, but could at best make only rather modest gains in advancing the cause of Soviet hegemony, and would invite invidious comparisons with the 1957 or even the 1960 conference.

It seems likely that what the Soviets hope to do is to choose a suitable approach from a point on a spectrum between these two extremes. The CPSU may wish to use the aid-to-Vietnam issue as the central theme around which to build the conference and attract participants, while attempting at the

same time to preserve the broader features of the conference to which Brezhnev and his friends have referred--the evaluation of the past and the setting of a general line for the future.*

To accomplish this, the CPSU could well afford to make some concessions to waverers. Denunciation of the Chinese in conference documents could be muffled or if absolutely necessary even dispensed with entirely, as inessential to the Soviet purpose, since the purpose of the conference for the CPSU would not be to read the Chinese out of the world movement (they have long since read themselves out, to all practical purposes) but to enhance the CPSU position in the movement which the Chinese have already left. Instead, there would probably be full-blown denunciations of the United States in all documents adopted, repeating or even expanding on the line taken in 1957 and 1960; this would serve to appeal to the interests of the radical neutral Communists, whether present or absent. Under such circumstances, the Soviets might well feel, as the Albanians suggest, that they could afford to go ahead without the participation of some of the radical neutrals.

Moreover, in the conference documents, any policy prescriptions set down for Communist parties

**On 14 April, the TASS international service summarized a report made by Canadian party chairman Tim Buck at a conference on "Leninism and problems of the international working class movement" being held in Moscow. TASS said that Buck "believes it necessary to hold an international meeting to organize extensive aid to the people of Vietnam," and also said that Buck related this to the need to unify the world Communist movement in view of Chinese actions. These Buck statements were not reported in the Soviet press or radio, however; the Soviets may be unwilling to commit themselves publicly to this gambit yet.*

in different areas of the world would have to be somewhat more self-contradictory or ambiguous than the CPSU would otherwise wish (even without the presence of the Chinese), because of the need first to placate parties such as the Italians who want no line dictated to them at all, and secondly to reconcile or obscure such differences of view as those between Castro and the Latin American Communist parties.

On the other hand, the Soviets would try very hard to get into a general conference document some form of tribute, however, attenuated, to the unique role of the CPSU and of CPSU congresses. They might well also attempt to have brought into being some form of permanent international party machinery, however innocuous-appearing, which might later be made to serve as a vehicle for imposing the CPSU will on other parties. The question of uniting everybody's efforts to aid Vietnam could conceivably serve as a pretext for the creation of such machinery, a pretext which parties such as the Italians and Poles would have some difficulty in denouncing.

The question remains whether or not the Soviets now feel that they can bring off such a conference at the November celebrations of their 50th anniversary, or whether they must content themselves with using the Moscow November ceremonies and the captive audience there--the almost compulsory presence of any party still on speaking terms with the CPSU--to try to organize a subsequent conference.

The evidence of current Soviet intentions is ambiguous and partly contradictory. On the one hand, as already mentioned, there was an important Polish Foreign Ministry official's private statement in late November that the conference would be held in late 1967, and Brezhnev's public remark in mid-January that the "fraternal parties" when celebrating the anniversary would "sum up" their experiences. On the other hand, the CPSU is reliably reported to have told at least one party around the turn of the year that the CPSU would discuss the conference

with the other parties in November, and that these discussions would lead to a subsequent public announcement about a conference. This would suggest that at most the CPSU may now plan only to have a preliminary meeting of all the parties in November to decide time, place, agenda, and invitees for a later conference proper--a procedure more consistent in fact, with the recommendations of the March 1965 meeting. In early March 1967, an official of the Soviet embassy in Washington would comment only that whether there will be a world conference this year would depend on "political developments." Yugoslav representatives commenting in different parts of the world in February and April 1967 were now optimistic that the CPSU, while still avidly desiring a conference, would not be able to bring it off until 1968. And when the Italian party finally came out for a conference, PCI leaders Berlinguer in February 1967 and Longo in April publicly insisted that preparations for the conference would take "at least" a year--in other words, that it could not be held in November.

The Soviets, however, while speaking of "big preparations" have not publicly committed themselves to settle for this more time-consuming procedure that the Italians are demanding. On the contrary, the statements regarding the conference issued by the Soviets and their most reliable friends tended to become more urgent and pressing before, during, and particularly after the April Karlovy Vary European party meeting, which authoritative private Soviet, Polish, and Czech statements had earlier depicted as an important step toward a world conference. Although the world conference was not formally on the agenda at Karlovy Vary and there is no evidence available yet that it was discussed there, Pravda has since cited it as an "example" showing that unity of opinions is possible and that "there exists a way toward further strengthening of the international Communist movement"--i.e., through conferences.

Before this, while attending the East German party congress in mid-April, Brezhnev had said that

"it is now time to consider concrete questions of preparations of this conference," claimed that more than 70 parties had officially come out for it, and added that it was "our common task to make a maximum effort to bring about this conference." Late in April, in close sequence, a Bulgarian Politburo member speaking on Lenin's birthday revealed that now "conditions have already ripened" for calling a conference; Moscow quoted a Ceylonese party leader as announcing that "conditions have become fully ripe;" and the Soviets quoted Bulgarian first secretary Todor Zhivkov as saying that the Karlovy Vary meeting "has proved again that conditions have ripened," and furthermore, that "in the not too distant future such a conference will take place." In the fall of 1966, the measured formula the Soviets had finally settled on was that conditions were getting "more and more ripe;" now the CPSU gave the screw another turn. An SED official writing in Neues Deutschland on 11 May thought that Karlovy Vary had brought about "new conditions and a favorable atmosphere" for the world conference--which, he asserted, was already being called for by the "overwhelming majority of Communist parties." And an article in the Danish party organ on 15 May also announced that more and more parties were expressing their conviction "that the time is ripe" for an international conference in order to "give the unity of the Communist movement a good shove forward."

A Hungarian Politburo member on 4 May, however, indicated that what conditions may have ripened for is a world preparatory conference--presumably, in November--with the world conference per se to follow later. He said that the conference should be held "with universal attendance in the preparatory stages," and that if thereafter some parties do not "find themselves in a position to join," the final conference should nevertheless be called. (Emphasis added) This may be the closest approximation of CPSU thinking as of the late spring of 1967. The Soviets are still carefully refraining from committing themselves, however, and they may not make a final decision on what to settle for in November for some time.

The November ceremonies, however, present a fortuitous and unique opportunity to the CPSU: an accidental circumstance providing the CPSU, at just the moment when the Chinese have virtually withdrawn from the movement, with a legitimate occasion for an impressive display of the CPSU's historic credentials to lead the movement and a complete roster of parties obliged to be present. The CPSU may never again have quite such an occasion. It is unlikely that the CPSU will let this opportunity pass without some major organizational move to enhance CPSU influence and authority.

## IX. Current Status and Prospects

### A. A Tour of the World Movement

After all that has occurred, what is now the relative strength of the CPSU and the CCP in the world Movement? The following rapid survey is a comparison in the broadest possible terms of Soviet and Chinese influence and authority among the world's Communists as of May 1967, two and a half years after Khrushchev's fall.

#### 1. Eastern Europe

Here the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a completely hostile adversary in Albania; an almost completely subordinate satellite in Bulgaria; an old close acquaintance in Yugoslavia with whom relations on most questions are now rather cool; an ally in name only (Rumania) from whom only stubborn resistance and fresh obstruction are to be expected on most subjects; and four allies (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany) each capable in one degree or another of recalcitrant behavior on matters of greatest importance to itself, yet each likely sooner or later to retreat before Soviet pressure on most matters of greatest importance to the CPSU.

The Communist Party of China has its Albanian ally, bound to it by mutually shared hatreds, yet frequently distrustful of Chinese intentions; and four paper organizations, "Marxist-Leninist" parties of Poland, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Yugoslavia.

#### 2. Western Europe

Here the CPSU has going parties on reasonably good terms with it in all countries except the Netherlands, where the Dutch party leadership remains quite hostile, intransigent, and largely self-isolated from the entire movement. The Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic parties, while oriented toward the Soviet Union and maintaining ties with the CPSU, are intransigent regarding all CPSU attempts to

convene international meetings in order to enlarge its authority in the movement. The Italian and British parties also offer a great deal of resistance to such Soviet attempts, but are somewhat more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. The Soviets can get what they want from nearly all other West European parties most of the time with less exertion, although many will make statements unwelcome to the CPSU on occasion when given sufficient provocation (as in the case of the ouster of a Khrushchev). Most parties are subsidized to some extent by the CPSU, and many need the money badly. The parties of France and Italy are large and quite important; those of Finland and Greece have some importance in their countries; all others are small and usually insignificant.

The CCP has a minority offshoot from one of these small parties (Belgium) as its chief bulwark in Western Europe. In addition, there are now tiny Chinese-subsidized splinters (sometimes more than one in a country, and sometimes not formally recognized by Peking) in Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece, and Sweden. There is apparently also a leftist fringe within the large Communist Party of Italy which has some sympathy for the CCP and which the CPI is reluctant to lose.

3. North America

The CPSU has the small "Communist royalist" parties of the United States and Canada, both aggressively loyal and outspoken in the fashion of trusted old family retainers.

The CCP has several tiny, mutually competing splinter groups in both countries. The degree of subsidization is unknown, although at least one case of a promised subsidy has been reported.

4. Latin America

Here the CPSU has Cuba, a very expensive, aggressively uncooperative ally, currently waging polemical and in some cases organizational battle

with the CPSU, with the Soviet-controlled international fronts, and especially with the Latin American Communist parties oriented toward the CPSU and more or less responsive to its wishes. Every one of these parties is subsidized by the CPSU to one degree or another, and all of the weaker ones (e.g., those in Central America) are basically dependent on such subsidies. Since early Comintern days, the Argentine party has traditionally been the one most trusted by the CPSU to support it and pass the line on to Latin America. At the other extreme, for the past three years the CPSU has been engaged in an indecisive struggle to purge Oscar Creydt, secretary general of the small, exiled Paraguayan party--possibly partly because of suspicions about his contacts with the Chinese--and the Soviets have used obedient neighboring Latin American parties for this purpose. Creydt is still resisting, protesting his innocence of dealings with Mao, the party is divided, and the matter could become embarrassing for the CPSU. There are indications that the Soviets are also displeased with the party in Panama, which has in the past been weakened in its support of the CPSU against the Chinese because of a large pro-Chinese minority in its ranks. The Soviets also have some reason to be dissatisfied with the past and present unauthorized dealings with Castro carried out by Marie Monje, head of the pro-Soviet Bolivian party, although there is no evidence yet that they intend to try to purge him. The other Latin American parties are at the moment under a fair degree of CPSU control, including even the leadership of the Venezuelan party, whose allegiance the CPSU had in effect temporarily lost for several years to Castro.

The CCP has what can be considered going parties (as distinguished from splinter groups) in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia; except in Peru, all of these are smaller than their pro-CPSU counterparts, sometimes much smaller. Subsidized splinter groups exist almost everywhere else. There is incessant internal dissension and splitting within both the parties and the splinter groups as well as squabbles among them. Some of

the more important pro-Chinese parties met in 1966 to attempt to establish better coordination among themselves. There is some latent highly militant feeling within the important pro-Soviet Brazilian party which under some circumstances might eventually be forced to split off and then might be assimilated by the pro-Chinese Brazilian party.

A great many organizations primarily responsible to Fidel Castro also exist in Latin America, the most important being Douglas Bravo's FALN in Venezuela. In general, Castro today is much more of a threat to the pro-Soviet parties than are the pro-Chinese parties, both because of the pro-Cuban organizations already in being and because of Cuban factional strength within the pro-CPSU parties through which Castro is now exerting intense pressure on the leaderships of most of the pro-Soviet parties.

5. Asia and the Far East

Here the CPSU has Mongolia, a firm, well-paid ally; the Communist party of India (Rightist), a subsidized, reasonably loyal party, the most important such non-bloc CPSU follower in Asia; the right-wing version of the split Communist party of Nepal, firmly controlled; ditto for one of the two Communist parties of Ceylon; apparently, only part of the underground party of Pakistan; and the small Communist Party of Australia. With the possible exception of the Pakistani party, all of the foregoing will do what they are told by the CPSU on most matters.

In addition, the CPSU has neutralized and is now on speaking terms with North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Japanese parties--all of which bitterly oppose, however, any attempt by the CPSU to expand its authority, and otherwise exert pressure on Soviet policies.

The CCP has the very small New Zealand party; the tiny splinter Communist party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist); the small underground or exiled

Communist Party of Malaya, and associated Communist organizations elsewhere in Malaysia, all composed of ethnic Chinese; the China-based Communist Party of Thailand; the small Chinese version of the Communist Party of Ceylon, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Leftist), which is much smaller than the Soviet-controlled Nepal party, and which is itself weakened by the internal power struggle between two of its leaders, one of whom the CCP has backed against the other. These six subsidized organizations appear to be the only parties of the Far East now solidly controlled by the Chinese. Some Communists in Cambodia, who do not appear to be organized into a party, are also strongly pro-Chinese.

In addition, the Chinese have had strong sympathy in much of the important Communist Party of India (Leftist); but only a minority of this party has wished to follow the CCP in attacking the CPSU, and the party as a whole has not done so. Moreover, the CCP disapproves of the CPI/L's participation in provincial governments, and has greatly embarrassed the CPI/L leadership by publicly backing party rebels favoring immediate armed struggle. The party's right wing around Namboodiripad is fairly friendly now to the CPSU, which would dearly like to entice it away. The Communist Party of Burma (White Flag) is strongly oriented toward the CCP; the counterpart Communist Party (Red Flag) is divided over the Chinese cultural revolution. Considerable support for the Chinese apparently continues in the underground Communist Party of Pakistan. The Chinese have in Peking one of the few surviving members (Adjitorop) of the politburo of the Communist Party of Indonesia, plus some other pro-Chinese PKI veterans who have been expelled from the Soviet Union; but the relative proportion of the pro-CCP and pro-CPSU feeling within the present underground PKI organizations in Indonesia is unknown, although some anti-Chinese feeling is known to exist. There is fragmentary evidence to suggest some pro-CCP, anti-CPSU sentiment in the Communist Party of Laos, although this is difficult to gauge; it is conceivable that this party may be pulled in two directions in its attitude toward the Soviets by the Chinese and the North Vietnamese.

There is insufficient information on the situation in the Communist Party of the Philippines, but [redacted] has reported that the party in the recent past was trying to steer a neutral course and had rejected a Chinese offer of financial aid to its youth affiliate because of "strings" attached (presumably of an anti-CPSU nature). One member of the party leadership, however, was reported in the spring of 1967 to be in direct contact with the Chinese, to be receiving money from them, and to be pressing a challenge to the other leaders which could soon lead to a split in the party. This may have happened by May, when the Chinese publicized a statement attributed to the Philippine party politburo apparently issued by the schismatic forces loyal to them. This statement followed a rigid Chinese line in praising Mao and denouncing the Soviets. The statement and subsequent Chinese propaganda have loudly trumpeted a revived guerrilla struggle in the Philippines, a subject which the Soviets have thus far ignored.

The Chinese are on speaking terms with the North Vietnamese, with whom, however, they have a great many quarrels and running debates. The CCP relationship with North Korea and the Japanese Communists is quite hostile, and an open Chinese polemic and organizational battle exists with the latter.

6. Africa and the Middle East

Here the CPSU has fairly firm control of five small Communist parties of Arab North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, UAR, and Sudan), two of which (in Algeria and in the UAR) in accordance with Soviet agreements with the regimes in their countries are supposed to have dissolved themselves and merged into regime-controlled organizations, but in fact have apparently continued to exist on a clandestine basis. The CPSU also has reasonably good control over six neighboring parties in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey), four of which are deep underground, and most of whose leaderships have operated or do operate out of Eastern Europe.

A seventh party in the area, the Communist Party of Israel, in 1966 split along Arab-Jewish lines into two independent organizations, despite all the CPSU could do to prevent this. Both of the splitting halves were pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese, and the CPSU maintained relations with both. But before the coming of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 the Jewish Communists of Israel broke with Soviet policy to support the Israeli point of view, while the local Arab Communists did not, were arrested later by the Israeli government, and were subsequently hailed by Pravda as martyrs--and as the "Communist Party of Israel." It is not clear what future CPSU policy will be toward the Jewish Communists of Israel.

The CPSU appears to have the allegiance of the five parties known to exist in black Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Reunion, Lethoso, and South Africa). The underground South African party, in particular, is largely run by whites, and with the increasing channeling of Chinese political and financial support to a nonwhite organization hostile to the party (the Pan-African Congress), the party has reacted with increasing hostility to the CCP and with much more outspoken support for Soviet anti-Chinese projects such as an international conference than was furnished in Khrushchev's time.

Although the Chinese still retain influence (as of course do the Soviets) in several African states--strong Chinese influence in the case of Tanzania and the Congo (Brazzaville)--as well as in some radical African nationalist movements such as the South African Pan-African Congress, yet there is no organization on the continent of Africa calling itself a Communist party (Marxist-Leninist or otherwise) that is controlled by the CCP. A faction leaning toward the Chinese was purged from the Sudanese party three years ago. There is some fragmentary evidence of Chinese clandestine organizational activity on a small scale in the UAR. In the Middle East, there has been some pro-Chinese activity within the parties of Iraq and Iran, and a purge

was carried out in the Iranian party over a year ago. "Socialist Revolution parties" were organized in 1964 in Syria and Lebanon by dissident members of the Communist parties of those countries, pledging allegiance to the CCP, but have since remained little more than paper organizations.*

7. The Overall Trend

The Chinese organizational challenge to the CPSU and its followers has not been destroyed, but for the time being it has been either held or beaten back in all parts of the world. Overall, there has been a considerable retreat from the Chinese high tide of 1963-1964--the years when most of the CCP-backed splinter parties now in existence were formed, and when a strong Chinese alliance with the anti-Khrushchev independent radical Communists became overt. The great change has of course been in Asia, because of the defection (or destruction) of the most important of the independent Asian parties. In Europe, despite the addition of one or two splinter parties to the roster, very small beginnings have remained very small, with no progress made. In Africa and the Middle East, Chinese assets among the few Communist parties have from the start been even weaker in comparison with those of the CPSU, and this has not changed. On the other hand, in Latin America the Chinese offensive of 1963-1964 had made considerable progress, but here again the tide of Chinese advance has either halted or somewhat receded: the most important pro-CCP parties have either barely held on to what they had originally achieved (as in Peru) or have lost some of their original gains (as in Ecuador and Colombia).

*It should be noted again that the foregoing discussion was limited to Soviet and Chinese influence among Communists per se. In the case of Syria, both the Soviets and the Chinese have excellent relations with the militant left-Baathist regime, with the Soviets having the stronger ties with and influence over the regime.*

In most parts of the world, at the time of Khrushchev's fall Chinese organizational efforts had presented a real danger of further subversion of cadres of many important pro-CPSU parties, and although some potential for this still exists in some cases (three notable cases being Italy, Brazil, and Chile), the overall trend for the time being is not running in this direction. And throughout the world, wherever pro-Chinese splinter groups exist, the CCP and its agents are plagued by incessant internal bickering among rival leaders of these splinters.

B. The Castro Question

1. The Challenge in Latin America

The most serious threat to the degree of authority and influence retained by the CPSU in the international movement (authority over some parties, influence over others) today comes not from the Chinese Communist party, but from disruptive forces within the Soviet-oriented movement itself: from the Rumanians, from the Yugoslavs, and above all, from Fidel Castro's Cuba.*

The November 1964 Havana deal between the CPSU and Castro could not and did not last, if only because of the ultimate incompatibility of two competing centers of authority for the Latin American Communist movement, neither of which was really reconciled to deferring even partially to the other. While matters of policy may be blurred or avoided in ambiguous resolutions or agreements, the question of rivalry for authority in the Communist movement is not capable of being compromised, as had previously been demonstrated in the Sino-Soviet conflict

**See DD/I Intelligence Study "The Sino-Soviet Dispute Within the Communist Movement in Latin America," 15 June 1967, ESAU XXVIII, TS No. 196753, for a more detailed and more authoritative examination of the developments in the Sino-Soviet-Cuban triangle in Latin America over the last three years.*

and the fate of the November 1960 Moscow Statement. And as in the case of the Sino-Soviet struggle, Castro's personal and national interests were in many aspects incompatible with those of the CPSU.

Castro saw himself as the supreme Marxist-Leninist in Latin America, saw it his mission to bring revolution to Latin America, and saw the viability of his regime as in doubt unless revolutionary struggle were vigorously accelerated against the Latin American bourgeoisie to bring victory in at least one other country. As against this, the Soviets had both their desire to do business with Latin American bourgeois governments (with the hope of thereby encouraging bourgeois resistance to U.S. domination of the area) and the agonized protests of pro-Soviet Latin American Communist leaderships under attack by Castro for their unwillingness to follow his dictates in conducting militant struggle against those governments. The CPSU has however been unwilling to break with Castro or even threaten him directly at this juncture of the Sino-Soviet struggle, and has been unable either to coerce him or to cajole him into obedience.

While both sides, as earlier noted, took some steps in the first few months after the Havana agreement to conciliate the other, both also from the first took some actions in violation of the agreement.

For example, on Castro's side, he apparently supplied money to the exiled Brazilian leftist leader Brizola during 1965 without clearing this with the Brazilian Communist Party (much to the indignation of that party). For the Soviet part, the CPSU began again as early as December 1964 to work behind the scenes to try to strengthen the position within the Venezuelan party of persons who were more amenable to CPSU discipline and who were therefore somewhat less fanatical on the subject of armed struggle. As already mentioned, these two aspects of the Venezuelan party had seemed to go hand in hand: those younger party leaders most insistent on continuing armed struggle without

qualification were Castroites who had also followed Castro in committing the Venezuelan party to neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, while those older leaders more receptive to CPSU wishes on one issue were also more receptive on the other. In the last analysis, it appears that if the CPSU wishes above all to retain organizational control of the Latin American Communists, the Soviets cannot endorse armed struggle as fully as Castro would like even if they wanted to (which they do not); for in Latin America the participation of Communist parties in armed struggle has itself sometimes apparently tended to bring leaders to the fore more responsive to Castro than to the CPSU.

This phenomenon was evident also in the temporary effects of the Dominican Republic events of 1965 upon the pro-Soviet Dominican Communists (the PCD). As a direct result of the emotions generated by the armed struggle against the "Yankee invader," a coup took place within the PCD which downgraded older pro-CPSU leaders and brought young Castroites to temporary control of the party. Representatives of this "new Communist Party" who attended a gathering of hemisphere parties at the Chilean party congress in the fall of 1965 made frequent disparaging remarks about the Soviets, showed pro-Cuban sympathies, and joined with the Cubans and Venezuelans in opposing the more moderate line which the Soviets seem to have attempted to advance at the congress. (During the following year, however, with the termination of the leftist armed confrontation with the United States, the CPSU appears to have regained control of the PCD.)

Reporting is incomplete on the events at this Chilean congress in October, which was attended by a powerful CPSU delegation led by politburo member Kirilenko and Ponomarev's deputy, Korionov. It would appear, however, that this congress was a turning point, for it was after this that matters began to get worse between Castro and the CPSU.

In December 1965, the leader of the most militant faction in the Venezuelan party leadership,

Douglas Bravo, made a first abortive attempt to seize control of the party from the centrist faction of the party which the CPSU had recently been covertly encouraging to hedge and retreat on the policy of armed violence.

In January 1966, the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana saw Castro--with the aid of the radical Asian Communists and even of the Chinese--force the Soviets to yield to him all along the line. The CPSU's representative was compelled to acquiesce in (and even to echo) violent public calls for revolution in Latin America which soon greatly embarrassed Soviet diplomatic representatives everywhere in the hemisphere and evoked numerous private acid comments from pro-CPSU Latin American Communists.* The CPSU was also forced after long, behind-the-scenes struggle both to accept Havana as at least the temporary seat for a new tri-continental organization (AALAPSO) set up on paper by the conference, and to acquiesce in the establishment of a new Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) nakedly controlled by the Cubans and avowedly intended to promote guerrilla warfare in the hemisphere.

After this, in March, Fidel Castro began (at the same time that he was intensifying his dispute with Mao) a series of public attacks on the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei in Chile, toward which both the Soviet government and the Chilean Communist party had been taking a notably soft line. The Chilean party was privately infuriated at this. At the 23rd CPSU Congress in March and April there was reported friction between Latin American party representatives and the Cubans, and more

*It was however this same anti-United States and anti-imperialist militant language of the conference which so encouraged the Japanese Communists (a Castro ally at the conference) about the progress they were making in pushing the CPSU on to the proper path. As noted, the JCP recorded its satisfaction in Akahata on 10 February 1966. (See Part II, page 88.)

complaints by the Latin Americans to the CPSU. Suslov is reported to have told the Colombian leader Vieira in March that the Latin American parties would simply "have to have patience with Castro." Suslov declared that the CPSU had experienced "very trying times" because of Castro but that by being patient the CPSU was able to exert some influence over him.

Subsequent events provided an ironical commentary on this hopeful estimate. In April the Venezuelan party militant Bravo made a new attempt to "restructure" the party's armed forces (the FALN) and its allies (the FLN) along lines more congenial to himself. The PCV leadership responded in May by suspending Bravo from the party politburo and began a purge of his personal followers. In June Havana published a letter to Castro from Bravo and his friends denouncing Bravo's enemies as cowards "who would abandon the armed struggle" and announcing formation of a new organization; in late July the PCV sent Castro a secret letter of protest to which Castro made a hostile reply full of accusations against the PCV; and about the same time there was an angry confrontation in Havana between representatives of some Communist parties and the Cubans. Castro made public speeches in July and August assailing Latin American Communists as "pseudo-revolutionaries" and "defeatists" and implying that he would support other leftist groups willing to wage armed struggle if the Communists refused to do so. Castro thereby came close to explicit repudiation of the November 1964 Havana agreement, which was by now dead for all practical purposes.

A 7 November editorial in the Cuban party newspaper Granma renewed this threat to back "real Communists" who were willing to fight, adding that "those who remain on the sidelines will cease to be Communists." These Cuban pronouncements bore a striking resemblance to the repeated Chinese statements (first made in June 1963) of their intention to annoint as honorary "Marxist-Leninists" all who would revolt against the CPSU and follow their

banner. Although the Cubans did not yet mention the CPSU directly in this context, the organizational threat to the CPSU implicit in the announced intention to supplant Latin American parties loyal to the CPSU and unwilling to wage armed struggle was now clear, and may well have been partially modelled on previous Chinese conduct.*

Moreover, the Cubans were in the process of trying to carry out this threat, particularly regarding Venezuela, where the CPSU had in effect stolen control of the party back from Castro. By the fall of 1966 relations between the PCV and Cuba were broken; Bravo's organization installed representatives in Havana in place of the PCV and was given elaborate publicity, as well as the opportunity to attack Bravo's enemies in Cuban propaganda. Castro publicly lauded Bravo in a speech on 2 January 1967; Castroites in Mexico and elsewhere began to attack the PCV directly in January (and were attacked in their turn by pro-Soviet Latin Americans); the PCV sent private messages to parties everywhere asking support against Castro; and Castro himself finally attacked the Venezuelan party by name at vituperative length on 13 March.

This brought the issue to a head. The PCV issued an angry communiqué denouncing Castro for interfering in its internal affairs, and the Brazilian party approved a strongly worded attack on Castro for

*Action was simultaneously being taken against some pro-Soviet Cubans who disapproved of this line. In October 1966 five staff members of the editorial board of Granma were purged for objecting to Castro's Latin American policy, and in February 1967 the party theoretical journal Cuba Socialista--published since 1961--was discontinued "until the first congress of the party /in October 1967/ adopts decisions concerning some of those theoretical, strategic, and tactical problems of the revolutionary movements of the world...." Old pro-CPSU Communists up to now on the editorial board of the party journal may well be dropped after the party congress; in the meantime, they are muzzled.*

harming the work of seven parties. In fact, the leaderships of nearly all the Latin American Communist parties had important grievances against Castro, the most serious such case after Venezuela being that of Guatemala, where Castro had similarly been using his supporters in the Guatemalan Communist party's military arm to try to force the ouster of the old-guard pro-CPSU leadership of the party.

Castro's 13 March 1967 speech, besides attacking the PCV, had carried further his announced intention to split all Latin American revolutionary forces--including all the Communist parties--separating those who would follow his line from those who would not. Like the Chinese so many times before him, he said that "this will be a point of differentiation, for we are reaching a time when they will have to be differentiated."* He attacked the Soviets directly (not for the first time) for their official dealings with governments with whom he was on bad terms, and in effect dared the Soviets to try to do anything to meet his challenge.

In the meantime, since the beginning of 1967 there had been a strong resurgence of Cuban public allusions to and praise for Che Guevara, who had disappeared from Cuba in March 1965 after voicing open criticism of both Soviet economic practice and the Soviet attitude toward Latin American revolution. Both the Chinese and the Trotskyites had ever since cited Guevara's vanishing as evidence of Castro's capitulation to the CPSU. Castro, however, had claimed that Guevara would now be occupied with making revolution abroad and would be heard from in the future. It is conceivable that there were differences between Guevara and Castro in 1965 on the application of Soviet economic

*Also reminiscent of the Chinese challenge to the CPSU was an authoritative Granma article the previous November which had defended the usefulness and necessity of an open polemic now between the "real revolutionaries" of Latin America and the "ostriches" who cling to the "comforting and deceiving peaceful way."

precept to Cuba, and also that Castro in the spring of 1965, a few months after the Havana agreement, was not yet ready to identify his regime with the anti-CPSU all-out push for Latin American armed revolution which Guevara wished to promote. Guevara may therefore have been allowed to depart quietly for Latin America with only Castro's unofficial blessing. The return of Guevara's name to prominence in Cuban propaganda in 1967--including even the publication of a purported letter from him--was therefore a natural concomitant of the new Castro organizational challenge to the Latin American Communist parties and to the CPSU.*

Castro has seemed intent on forcing the issue, and while there have been recent reports testifying to CPSU anger, there is no indication as yet that the CPSU is willing to take up the challenge. During 1966 the Soviets had hedged on the PCV issue, supporting the orthodox party leadership while striving to keep their lines open to Bravo. This may not be possible much longer, in view of recent developments, but there is no evidence yet that the CPSU has chosen to back the Latin American parties under attack in terms at all commensurate with the way they are being assailed by Castro.

On 10 March, a Pravda article by the central committee apparatchik Korionov restated in more categorical terms the Soviet line for Latin America set forth by Kirilenko in Chile in October 1965: the Communist parties were to try to construct the broadest possible alliances of "all patriotic forces"--led by themselves--to work to reduce and eliminate United States influence from their countries. Special emphasis was to be placed on winning over elements of the Latin American military establishment to the anti-U.S. cause, and all bourgeois

**The attitude of many of the Latin American Communist leaders toward Guevara (and Castro) was exemplified by the statement to the New York Times in early May by Jorge Kolle, second-ranking man in the pro-Soviet Bolivian party, that if he knew where Guevara was he would turn him in to the authorities for the reward offered.*

movements that "to one degree or another" were hostile to the "dictate of foreign monopolies" and wanted to restore "respect for the norms of international law" were to be courted by the Communists. This line was virtually incompatible in most Latin American states with the demand the Cubans had been making more and more vociferously: that the true revolutionaries in "most" countries of Latin America must start preparing right now to get out of the cities entirely and begin armed struggle in the mountains and countryside in order to try to seize power--a program which, if actually followed by the Communist parties, would preclude their cultivation of the broad nationalist bourgeois and military circles the USSR wanted them to attract.*

**Although the Cuban line for Latin America obviously has much more in common with the Chinese line, there are also some differences, principally in the much greater urgency attached by the CCP to the prerequisite of prior mobilization of the peasants to create a mass base for armed struggle and the much more rigorous Chinese insistence upon the prior existence of a well-organized "Marxist-Leninist" party to control and lead the revolutionary armed forces. On 29 December 1966 NCNA summarized succintly the Chinese view of the difference between the Guevara and Mao doctrines:*

> *...A number of revolutionary vanguards /in Latin America/ have begun to accept Chairman Mao's great theory of people's war. They have criticized and repudiated the line of not relying on the masses but attempting to win an easy victory by the roving guerrilla actions of a handful of people. They have emphatically pointed out that in carrying out a genuine armed struggle, it is necessary to establish the leadership of the proletarian party, fully mobilize the masses, rely on the peasants, set up rural bases, use the countryside to encircle the cities, and eventually capture the cities.*

*(continued on next page)*

Korionov also alluded briefly to the Cuban problem in very gingerly fashion: without naming Cuba, he deplored any "underestimation" of the role of Communist parties, any "weakening" or "splitting" of them, "no matter by whom." Castro in his 13 March speech scornfully alluded to and dismissed such criticism of his activities, and there is no indication that the Soviets have thought of a more efficacious way to curb him.

On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that the CPSU has yet again told its Latin American followers to try their best to compromise with Castro and mollify him. The Uruguayan party leader Arismendi--who is now virtually the only Latin American Communist leader still on speaking terms with Castro--returned from an April 1967 trip to Cuba and the Soviet Union to announce publicly that he had been attempting to promote unity, alluding to "a difference of opinion... between the Soviet Union and Cuba." Arismendi in his speech--which the Cubans published--made a strong effort to flatter and appease Castro, and in effect pleaded with Castro to go no further in his efforts at "differentiation" by rebuking the Chinese for their "theory of drawing the line and causing division." Arismendi insisted that "this is not the time to draw the line; it is the hour for unity"--thus reminding Castro that he was committing the same breach of unity for which he himself had been blaming the Chinese.

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*In short, Castro and Guevara felt that the guerrilla vanguard comes first, mass peasant support will come along eventually, and a strong party structure can be left for last. The Chinese feel that the party organization must exist first, mass support and self-sustaining bases be created second, and the armed struggle waged only on that foundation. In view of the repeated failures of guerrilla warfare in Latin America in the last few years, the Cubans have lately been paying considerably more attention to the question of peasant support, but not enough to alter their doctrine fundamentally.*

There is some evidence that the Soviets are now trying to promote another meeting of the Latin American parties with Castro, and it is not impossible that the CPSU may again make a partial tactical retreat on the question of guerrilla warfare, although it is inconceivable that the Soviets can afford to retreat sufficiently to satisfy Castro. And although the Soviets have it in their power to injure Cuba greatly through the use of economic sanctions (a fact to which Arismendi indirectly alluded), they are unlikely to risk the enormous possible counter-productive effects of such action and are more likely to attempt to bribe Castro with further economic aid.

Finally, although Arismendi professed to be working for the eventual return of the Chinese to the "world family of Communism" in connection with a world Communist conference, he was obviously concerned rather with trying to get the Cubans to come to such a conference, and declared that "we are trying, patiently and effectively, to overlook no one" in preparing the conference. The Soviets are obviously now looking toward the scheduled October congress of the Cuban Communist party--which will come immediately before the November Moscow celebrations for which the CPSU has so many hopes--and are fearful of further overt acts by Castro against CPSU interests.*

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**In late April, the French party's Latin American specialist Georges Fournial stated privately that the party had information from a variety of sources, some in Cuba, that Castro was preparing another attack on the USSR to be delivered at a meeting in Cuba in July and August. The reference was presumably to the first Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference scheduled to be held in Havana 28 July - 5 August 1967.*

*Fournial asserted that Castro was aware that the USSR would not drop him of its own initiative; that there would be no Soviet reaction to the new attack Castro was planning; and that Castro, in Fournial's opinion, had succeeded in blackmailing the Soviet Union.*

2. The Challenge in the Fronts

The CPSU problem is all the greater because the struggle in Latin America is not the whole of the Soviet troubles with Castro. Cuban actions have also been creating steadily increasing difficulties for the CPSU in the international fronts, and with the gradual disappearance of the Chinese from these organizations, the Cubans have become the worst Soviet problem there.

In contrast to the Cuban attitude in 1965, when they had generally cooperated with the Soviet pose of upholding "unity" in the fronts against Chinese obstruction, in 1966 the Cubans began to make difficulty. At a Geneva plenary session of the World Peace Council in June, they publicly condemned "unjust" and "retrograde" rulings by the "self-perpetuating hierarchy" of the WPC, urged that "sterile declarations" on Vietnam be abandoned for practical aid, and announced that they would never accept "a fraudulent coexistence fraught with formalities and double-dealing" with the enemy. They took a similar stand at the Seventh World Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth held in Sofia the same month, denouncing the WFDY for not admitting some pro-Castro delegations and demanding that the WFDY be radically decentralized on a tri-continental basis--in effect, that one-third of the WFDY be handed over to Castro's total control. In the same direction, the Cubans manipulated the Fourth Latin American Student Congress held in Havana in August to produce endorsements of Cuban policies and had a Continental Latin American Organization of Students set up in Havana to coordinate hemisphere student affairs along Castroite lines.

In December, the Cubans voted with the DRV, Koreans, Rumanians, and a Castroite Venezuelan delegation in opposing the successful Soviet move to expel the Chinese delegation from a WFTU General Council meeting in Sofia.

In January 1967, the Cubans--who had insisted at the WFDY meeting the previous summer that Havana

must be the site of the next World Youth Festival planned for 1968--boycotted a Vienna meeting of the International Preparatory Committee for the festival and sent a letter to the meeting warning that if Havana were not chosen they would have to reconsider their decision to participate at all. The Soviets told one delegate to the Committee meeting that they were absolutely opposed to Havana being chosen because Castro would turn the festival into a mechanism for exporting his brand of revolution, and the Soviet voting machine succeeded in having reliable Sofia chosen in place of Havana.

In late March and early April, the Cubans and a group of Castroite Latin American delegations led a concentrated attack on the Soviet position at the Ninth Congress of the International Union of Students in Ulan Bator. The Cubans demanded the expulsion from the IUS of a Chilean student organization controlled by Frei's Christian Democratic Party, and the Castroite delegations from other Latin American countries made direct attacks on the USSR and various East European nations for maintaining or seeking diplomatic relations with their own allegedly oppressive governments. These Castroites were clearly taking their cue from Castro's 13 March speech. When the Soviets mustered their strength and had the Cuban demand to oust the Chileans voted down, the Cubans walked out with their band of followers--eight delegations plus members of two others. The Cuban party organ Granma on 11 April published a denunciation of the action of the IUS majority signed by all those who had walked out. While the Soviets had places reserved in the IUS for all the departed comrades, it is uncertain whether the Cubans will choose to participate--and have their satellite organizations participate--in future meetings of the IUS.*

**A German participant in the IUS Congress later said that when the Latin Americans walked out of the Congress they "further threatened to withdraw from the IUS," and a Finnish participant said that Cuba at the time "indicated that it probably would not attend future IUS meetings."*

The Cuban-led walkout from the IUS Congress thus followed the Cuban January boycott of the International Preparatory Committee for the World Youth Festival, and may well presage similar Cuban walkouts from other Soviet international fronts at precisely the time when the Chinese are also disappearing from them. Although the Soviets are delighted to see the Chinese go and are helping them on their way, they are probably unhappy at the further organizational separation from the Cubans despite the simplification of some problems that Cuban absence would produce within the fronts themselves. The CPSU may also fear that such Cuban acts of "differentiation" (as Castro put it) may lead to separation from the Soviets in other fields.*

It is noteworthy in this connection that after the Cuban departure from the IUS Congress, the Cuban party two weeks later failed to send any delegation to the East German party congress (not even their ambassador there on the spot). And while the East Germans claimed that the Cubans had sent brief congratulations during the congress to the SED Central Committee on the East German party anniversary, unlike nearly everyone else the Cubans sent no greetings to the party congress itself; in fact, their press blacked out almost all mention of the very existence of the congress. The Cubans were the only bloc state besides the CPR and Albania to behave this way. Such behavior for them was extraordinary, and strongly suggests that something further had happened behind the scene. We do not know what this was. This Cuban boycott may relate

**As of March 1967 the Cubans reportedly had no representative at the Prague headquarters of the Soviet-controlled international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism. This was another good index of the Cuban attitude toward CPSU leadership: for the Chinese and Albanians also had no representatives there; the Rumanians had only an observer; and all other bloc states had full representatives attached to the journal.*

to the events of the IUS Congress or even to some private reproof addressed to Castro by the SED on CPSU behalf.* It is also possible that Castro was reacting to the fact that the Bulgarian party congress of November 1966 had been used as an occasion for private remonstrances to the Cuban delegation about Cuban policy by most of the Latin American party delegations. This explanation would become more likely if it were known that the subsequent Hungarian party congress had also been used in this way, but this is not known. Information is badly needed on the background to the Cuban party boycott.

3. The Challenge Over Vietnam

Finally, as previously noted, the Cubans had put repeated unwelcome public pressure on the CPSU over the Vietnam issue. In two speeches in March 1965 Castro had rebuked both the Soviets and the Chinese for insufficient audacity in responding to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, and such rebukes have been repeated by Cuban spokesmen at frequent intervals ever since, at least offsetting from the Soviet point of view the good done them by the Cuban criticism of the Chinese for rejecting unity of action over Vietnam.

One of the most offensive statements of the Cuban attitude was made to the Soviet faces at the 23rd CPSU Congress by Armando Hart, a Castroite who has always had near-Trotskyite views whom Castro has made organizational secretary of the Cuban party. While reiterating an implied rebuke to Peking for opposing unity of action, Hart demanded more "decisive" measures to "paralyze" the bombing of North Vietnam and insisted that "the necessary risks" must be taken, and coupled this with a generalized demand that the bloc help "speed up the revolution" everywhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America by supporting

*In Castro's 13 March speech, he went out of his way to allude to the economic sacrifice Cuba had accepted by recognizing East Germany and thereby forfeiting diplomatic relations with West Germany.

"combative, bold, and violent action by the revolutionary vanguards." The Yugoslavs reported that this speech was accompanied by "commotion throughout the congress hall," and [redacted] reports from Latin American Communists in Moscow at the time testify to the anger with which they and the Soviets heard the Hart speech.

The attitude taken toward the Cuban position as expressed by Hart was symptomatic of the main lines of cleavage among the dissimilar forces to which the CPSU was simultaneously trying to appeal. The Soviets and their closest supporters fumed in silence at the temerity of the Cubans--the organizational disrespect--in using the CPSU's own congress as the forum from which to demand both that the assembled Communist movement abandon CPSU guidance and adopt the Cuban line of universal revolutionary violence, and that the Soviet state take greater "risks" for the sake of Vietnam. To the right of the Soviets, the Yugoslavs--long on bad terms with the Cubans--publicly denounced Hart's "pseudo-revolutionary adventurism." But to the left of the Soviets, the radical Asian Communists could only welcome this public Cuban pressure, which dovetailed completely with their own position: Kim Il Sung had already similarly demanded the acceptance of greater risks.

The well-documented alliance of the Cubans with the radical Asians to bring pressure on the CPSU was to be further demonstrated in November 1966, when the Cubans publicly announced that Cuba and North Korea had agreed to the establishment on their soil of schools for the training of cadres to carry out revolutionary violence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Both countries had in fact long been involved in such activities: it was the public flaunting of them that was new, and which further dramatized the vulnerabilities to which Soviet policy had been exposed by the original decision to abandon Khrushchev's line and seek to court and appease the Communist radicals.

As already noted in Part II, the Cubans again took a position critical of Soviet caution in

connection with the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. The Cubans, North Vietnamese and North Koreans during and subsequent to the week of war all repeated Nasser's false charge of U.S. and British armed attack on the Arab states--the charge which Soviet propaganda was attempting to mute or suppress because it carried the implication of a Soviet obligation to meet directly a military challenge created by United States forces. The Cuban government, although not Hanoi or Pyongyang, went much further than this, and on 7 June issued a statement attacking the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution to which the Soviet Union had agreed.

Thereupon, the Cubans took the occasion to reinforce pressures being brought on Soviet policies by the radical Arab states as well as the radical Communist parties. A Prensa Latina commentary on 11 June warned that "active, militant solidarity" was a duty "that cannot be sidestepped without the danger of contributing to aggression by failure to act," and that "force is not checked with watchwords, vacillation, weakness, or hopes that the enemy will of his own accord become an honest ally of his victims." The commentary said that "no lengthy analysis is needed" to realize this--an evident allusion to a Soviet process of reappraisal of policy then going on.

On 12 June, as Boumediene left Algiers on a hasty visit to the Soviet Union, the Algiers newspaper El Moudjahid warned the USSR that "the policy of peaceful coexistence" was an "obstacle to countries seeking to liberate themselves from imperialism," that the Soviets were pursuing a policy of "peace at any price," that "to the extent that peaceful coexistence becomes a general and constant line of policy of the socialist countries, it risks striking a fatal blow to their solidarity with the countries of the third world," that "peaceful coexistence can in no case be a substitute for revolutionary struggle," and that the socialist camp "must supply conclusive and resolute aid to peoples engaged in armed struggle." At one point in this editorial the USSR was explicitly named as the target being criticized.

This outspoken Algerian editorial was broadcast in full by Havana.

Although Boumediene was apparently mollified in Moscow and the Algerian press made no further frontal attacks on the USSR, the Cubans kept up a drumfire of vehement attack. Notable was a Granma editorial of 15 June that among other things reiterated Cuban denunciation of the unconditional Security Council cease-fire demand. Castro has used support for the Algerian position as a new vehicle for generalized condemnation of inadequate Soviet militancy throughout the world--and of the Soviet refusal to accept "risks," in the Middle East as in Vietnam. The Middle Eastern crisis thus saw a further insolent effort by Castro to expand the Cuban propaganda challenge to the CPSU from Latin America to other parts of the world. While this Cuban challenge remains independent of the Chinese world-wide struggle against the CPSU, the Cuban line continues to run parallel to the Chinese line on many points and is even more explicit in its demands for Soviet acceptance of the risk of military confrontation with the United States. As with the narrower issue of the Cuban organizational challenge to the CPSU in Latin America, so also with the Cuban attacks on Soviet policy elsewhere: there is as yet no evidence that the CPSU leadership has thought of any answer to the Castro problem except for sporadic attempts to mollify him and buy him off.

### C. June 1967: The Soviet-Chinese-American Triangle

The Soviet Union today is thus confronted with a most serious, even critical challenge from Fidel Castro which has multiplied the gravity of the policy pressures on the USSR coming from the Far Eastern parties and other militant forces, Communist and otherwise, with whom Castro has allied himself. At the same time, the Soviet party must constantly deal with a number of accumulated headaches, threats, and hindrances to CPSU freedom of action coming from other directions: among them, the persistent

recalcitrance of the Rumanians, the footdragging of the Italians, and the new wave of dangerous revisionist theories now coming out of Yugoslavia.

The central aim of Soviet policy remains the maximum expansion of Soviet influence within both the Communist and non-Communist worlds at the expense of its two principal great power rivals, Communist China and the United States, consistent with the avoidance of serious danger to the Soviet state. The USSR is now on terms of public hostility toward both these rivals, and it has many important reasons to maintain this hostile atmosphere in each case.

1. The Soviet-American Relationship

Regarding the United States, a tough, vituperative Soviet public line is still absolutely indispensible for Soviet attempts to deal with the Communist radicals, particularly to offset the adverse effect of any negotiations involving the United States into which the USSR may feel it advantageous to its national interests to enter. Even with this offsetting vituperation, the Soviets have been highly defensive about such negotiations in the face of direct attacks on them by such parties as the North Koreans and the Cubans. Soviet commentaries have been concerned not only to portray any such negotiations or agreements such as the outer-space treaty as "victories" over the opposition of U.S. imperialism, but also explicitly to deny that the Soviet Union in such negotiations ever makes concessions of any kind to the United States. This is a far cry from Khrushchev's open defense of "mutual concessions" as a principal attribute of peaceful coexistence.

Moreover, with regard to at least one such agreement--the one granting Aeroflot landing rights in the United States--there would appear to be some justification for the Soviet claims about victories and lack of concessions to the U.S. As previously noted, since the United States agreed to sign this document after having held it up for several years, Aeroflot has been enabled to secure landing rights

from a number of other governments that had previously held back because of the United States example. This in turn may enable Aeroflot, among other things, to set up a shorter flight route from the USSR to Cuba. It seems clear from Soviet conduct that the central Soviet purpose in concluding the Aeroflot agreement with the United States was to make possible the elimination of the resistance of these governments on this matter, and that the actual inauguration of Aeroflot flights to New York was a very secondary consideration. Having gotten what they wanted out of the agreement, the Soviets through the KGB soon manufactured an unprecedented incident involving Aeroflot (the Kazan case) which not only created a crisis in Czech-U.S. relations, but could well have provoked the United States into renouncing the agreement and thus accepting responsibility for its termination. Although the United States failed to do so, and the Czechs eventually backed down on the Kazan issue, the Soviets have to date failed to implement the agreement, and its representatives have dropped heavy hints privately that the USSR may continue to do so indefinitely because of the suddenly-discovered evil nature of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Secondly, the tough Soviet public line toward the United States is an essential part of the continuing CPSU efforts to use the aid-to-Vietnam issue as the focus of attempts to convene some form of world Communist gathering that would strengthen CPSU influence and authority. Without the issue of united action over Vietnam, Soviet chances of enticing such parties as the North Koreans, Japanese, North Vietnamese and Cubans to such a meeting would be much poorer even than they are at present. And without the opportunity to denounce the United States over Vietnam and demonstrate Soviet political support for Vietnam (and, within carefully controlled limits, military support), the CPSU would find itself even more exposed to criticism from the radical Communists for failure to take risky actions elsewhere. It is likely, for example, that the North Korean party's reaction to Soviet caution in the Middle Eastern crisis of June 1967 would have been

as strong as was Castro's were it not for the Soviet line regarding aid to Vietnam.*

Thirdly, entirely apart from and in addition to its effect within the Communist movement, the Soviet posture of denunciation of the United States serves purposes which the present Politburo majority has evidently felt to be deeply grounded in direct Soviet national interests. Contrary to the view of those Western observers who have thought that the USSR had a genuine fear of West Germany and desired a U.S. presence in Europe to restrain the Germans, the Soviets have given every indication in the last two years that they would like to eliminate United States presence and influence from Europe entirely and welcome every small step in this direction. Their own propaganda and even more, that of the Communist parties, international fronts, and other forces responsive to them have avidly used the Vietnam issue to discredit the United States and weaken as much as possible the fabric of relationships binding Europe to the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union. In most places this has had at least some effect and in some places (e.g., Sweden), enormous effect. The endless charges of genocide, torture, and atrocities and

*As has been indicated elsewhere in this paper, we do not believe that the North Korean relative restraint over the last two years in criticizing the Soviet Union has been dictated solely by the Soviet restoration of military and economic aid to Pyongyang. Such aid has hardly restrained Castro at all; it did not restrain the North Koreans prior to 1962 (when Soviet aid was cut off in the first place precisely because the North Koreans would not refrain from siding with the Chinese against the CPSU); and the restoration of Soviet aid since 1965 has not prevented Kim Il Sung from continuing to voice some criticism of the USSR. We believe that equally important factors in moderating Kim's attitude have been, on the one hand, the increasing intransigence of the Chinese, and on the other hand, Kim's belief that from his point of view Soviet policy overall really has improved since Khrushchev's time: that is, it has become more hostile toward the United States.*

repeated comparisons of U.S. leaders with Hitler involved in this massive effort are difficult to dismiss as mere "atmospherics" incidental to a fundamental Soviet relationship of "detente" with the United States, if only because the hostile words so obviously serve a hostile purpose and elicit real Soviet gains against the United States.

Even the cause of CPSU cultivation of the North Vietnamese regime has had to defer to the cause of eliminating the United States from Europe: for the Soviets are obviously delighted at all unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, would like much more of the same, and have great difficulty in disguising their satisfaction in the face of the North Vietnamese desire that the United States be compelled to keep its forces in Europe and even to increase them (so that they cannot go to Vietnam).

The same considerations are basic to Soviet policy in other parts of the world. For example, in the contest among the great powers for influence in India, the role of Communist China (through the CPI/L) is relatively small, and the primary struggle is conducted on nearly equal terms between the United States and the Soviet Union. While Soviet-controlled propaganda organs in India (such as the newspaper Patriot) do attack the Chinese daily, the main focus of their work is the steady, long-term effort to defame and discredit the United States.

On the other hand, as noted previously, it seems clear that the Soviet leadership remains determined to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States and to avoid acts which in their judgment run an unacceptable risk of producing such a confrontation.*

**Some slight change may be taking place in the judgment of what is an acceptable risk, however. For example, the Soviet harassment and bumping of U.S. destroyers in the Sea of Japan in May 1967 involved somewhat more risk (than had previously been accepted) that the U.S. might make a forceful response, placing the USSR in an embarrassing and dangerous dilemma. The Soviets appear to have estimated the probable U.S. reaction correctly, however.*

One action which up to now they have ruled out for this reason has been the shipping of certain weapons and ammunition to Vietnam by sea (advanced, sophisticated weapons almost certainly, and quite possibly all weapons). Another action they have avoided has been the provocation of a crisis in Europe (which, aside from the matter of risk, would undermine their entire effort to get the United States out of Europe). In both cases they have accepted vulnerabilities for their efforts to court the North Vietnamese and the Communist radicals generally rather than do what the radicals have wanted them to do. The Soviets have also continued to maintain close personal contact with U.S. military attachés in Moscow and elsewhere, and have taken other steps to keep the general level of U.S.-Soviet tensions under careful control. This task has been facilitated for them by the fact that the U.S. attitude toward the Soviet Union for the past two years has been consistently conciliatory, leaving the temperature of U.S.-Soviet relations at any given moment largely under the control of the USSR. The Soviets have frequently referred both publicly and privately to an alleged Chinese desire to provoke a war between the United States and the Soviet Union from which the Chinese would abstain. There is good reason to think that the Soviets really believe that the Chinese do wish this (whether or not the Chinese actually do), and that this belief tends to reinforce Soviet caution.

As the result of the Middle Eastern crisis of June 1967, the Soviet leadership was sharply reminded once more of the real dangers of direct conflict with the United States latent in Soviet demagogic appeals to the interests of radical anti-U.S. forces inside and outside of the Communist movement. There is reason to believe that the CPSU leaders during and after the crisis week were particularly sobered by the implications of the radical Arab attempt (supported by the radical Communists such as Castro) to draw the Soviet Union into a direct clash with the United States by manufacturing a claim of U.S.-British air attacks on the Arab states. Thereafter the Soviets soon

showed that they had no intention of abandoning their vigorous cultivation of the radical Arabs; but they are probably well aware that the potential risk to themselves has not completely disappeared, and eventually could become acute again, particularly if the irresponsible, highly militant left-Baathist regime in Syria, closely tied to the USSR, should again seek to sponsor guerrilla raids on Israel (a distinct possibility).

The Soviets are also presumably aware that in the absence of any Arab-Israeli settlement the new Soviet military shipments to the radical Arab states necessary to maintain Soviet influence among those states will create a potentially dangerous situation for the USSR precisely to the degree that the new Soviet aid enables the Arabs to restore or exceed parity with Israel in military hardware. On the other hand, the actual conclusion of an Arab-Israeli settlement--and even more, any Soviet pressures on Arab governments to help bring about such a settlement--would tend to reduce the advantage which the Soviet Union has gained over the United States in the Arab world through the exploitation of Arab-Israeli antagonism and encouragement of the radical Arabs. In this matter, as in others, there is a conflict between Soviet security interests and the Soviet interest in scoring political gains over the United States.

Under these circumstances, the CPSU leadership apparently decided to hedge and to reduce the public level of tension with the United States, and therefore authorized Kosygin to meet personally with President Johnson in late June despite the violent reaction this was sure to evoke among the CPSU's various radical anti-U.S. friends around the world. A second purpose in agreeing to the summit meeting is likely to have been a Soviet desire to counter the impression of a hostile and unreasonable Soviet Union recreated among much of the West European public by the Soviet stand in the Middle Eastern crisis, an impression which was undoing much of the USSR's previous work in softening the West European view of the Soviet Union and in weakening the West European desire to maintain close ties with the United States in opposition to the USSR.

On the other hand, to offset at least partly the negative impression created among all the anti-U.S. radicals by the mere fact of Kosygin-Johnson talks, a press conference at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit was used as the occasion for Kosygin to reassert the CPSU hard line on a multitude of topics. While publicizing (or even further hardening) many of the statements made on this occasion, Soviet propaganda has predictably muted coverage of the summit conference itself. There is no evidence of a change in the overall Soviet public posture of hostility toward the United States.

In the last analysis, the Soviet attitude toward the United States will continue to be determined by the balance of the opposing forces in the CPSU Politburo discussed in Part I of this paper. At the end of May 1967, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, Soviet officials abroad were affirming privately that the Soviet stand in support of Nasser's position in the Middle East crisis was part of a general Soviet policy of further "cooling off" toward the United States, a policy which, it was indicated, was intended to improve Soviet ideological credentials with anti-U.S. forces around the world and to bring pressure on the East Europeans for greater conformity with Soviet desires. On 1 June, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister asked [redacted] if he could think of any reason the Americans could give the Soviets why the USSR should work with the United States in the Middle East. It is possible that a few Soviet leaders have now thought of a reason, but the majority of the CPSU leadership apparently still have not.

In Part I arguments were presented for the view that Brezhnev, while by no means the most extreme ideologue in the CPSU politburo, has nevertheless because of his key position been the decisive force behind the affirmation since Khrushchev's fall of a line of appealing more vigorously to the interests of anti-U.S. radical forces throughout the world at the expense of Soviet relations with the United States. Evidence was also presented for the

proposition that Kosygin was the leader of economically-oriented forces in the Soviet leadership (a minority) who were dubious about the value to the Soviet Union of this ideologically-determined order of priorities and who desired for various reasons that a higher priority be given to the improvement of relations with the United States. To the extent that the Soviet policy of supporting and encouraging (or at least failing to discourage) Nasser's provocatory actions in May 1967 flowed from the general trend of policies supported by Brezhnev and disliked by Kosygin, it is likely that the disastrous--and more important, dangerous--events of early June 1967 may have momentarily embarrassed Brezhnev in his rivalry with Kosygin.

This is all the more likely since there is every reason to believe that Brezhnev was no more willing than Kosygin to enter a military confrontation with the United States to rescue the Arab states. As has been noted before in this paper, the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership has consistently shown such caution regarding questions of military risk, and there have been only minimal differences on this life-and-death matter between those leaders who have favored good relations with the United States and those who did not believe such relations necessary or advantageous to the Soviet Union. In other words, there seem to be few if any "hawks" in the Soviet leadership, in the sense of men willing to accept a direct military clash with the United States for interests not absolutely vital to the USSR. While it is barely conceivable that the most extreme ideologue in the leadership--Shelepin--may hold such views and may have been willing to take such risks in June 1967, even this is a conjecture which is completely unsupported.

For reasons of practical safety, therefore, Brezhnev and virtually all of the politburo majority that has favored a hard line toward the United States appears to have united with the more moderate politburo minority in accepting the Arab defeat without intervening, in deciding to accept a humiliating Security Council resolution calling for an unconditional ceasefire, and in deciding to permit Kosygin

to meet President Johnson to reduce the dangerous level of tensions with the United States. At the central committee plenum that immediately followed the crisis one speaker, Moscow city party committee head Yegorychev (possibly but not necessarily reflecting Shelepin's views) is said to have protested against this restraint. This one undisciplined second-level "hawk" was soon purged for his temerity.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Brezhnev's refusal to accept the risk of thermonuclear war has been followed by any change in his views regarding the Soviet public posture toward the United States. The strict limits obviously placed on Kosygin while in the United States and the unbending line maintained by Soviet propaganda make it clear that the multitude of interests enumerated in this paper arguing for a continued Soviet hard line toward the United States still remain persuasive to a majority of the politburo, and to Brezhnev.

Despite the embarrassment the Middle East crisis may have caused Brezhnev, the overall record of the period since Khrushchev's fall has shown a steady expansion of Brezhnev's personal power, and it is reasonable to assume that over the long run this trend will continue. This gradual enlargement of Brezhnev's role has been achieved at the expense of colleagues both to the left of him and to the right of him on policy issues. The most significant loser thus far has been Alexander Shelepin, who appears to have recently suffered the most serious in a series of reversals at Brezhnev's hands with the removal of his close associate Semichastnyy as chairman of the KGB and the substitution (and promotion) of Andropov, who has until now been working directly for Suslov and Brezhnev. There has also long been good evidence of persistent antagonism between Brezhnev and Kosygin, caused by both natural organizational rivalry and the well-established policy differences; this evidence has been supplemented by reports [redacted] in the late spring of 1967 of increased tension between the two. There is evidence that the opportunist Podgornyy,

some of whose views have strongly differed from those of Brezhnev in the past, has nevertheless apparently decided that Brezhnev is a winning horse and has sided with him against Kosygin. Another observer has credibly surmised that Brezhnev would like to hold Kosygin's post (the prestige value of which has again recently been underlined) in addition to his own, although he is probably not yet strong enough to accomplish this.

In sum, it is likely that Brezhnev's personal views--already more important than any other single individual's in the determination of the Soviet foreign policy mix--will grow relatively more important still. It is possible that the position he takes on various issues may change (as indeed did Khrushchev's) if his power becomes more solidified. But this certainly cannot confidently be predicted; and in any case, he is particularly unlikely to sanction a significant moderation in line toward the United States so long as Kosygin remains in office and such a change in line would be interpreted as a victory for Kosygin's views over his own.

2. Soviet Calculations Regarding the Chinese

Regarding their other great rival, Communist China, the Soviet attitude now appears to be one of satisfaction mingled with slight apprehension. The USSR certainly does not want a military clash with the Chinese; but although Moscow is making widespread use of the Chinese threat to Soviet borders as a political weapon against Peking, and although the Russians are somewhat nervous about possible irrational actions by Mao and are watching the border closely for that reason, the present overall military disparity between the two powers is so great that the Soviets are reasonably confident that near-term Chinese aggression against them is quite unlikely. Soviet military men in their private statements in Moscow have consistently derided any Chinese military threat to the USSR. The future is another matter, and it is against this that long-term Soviet

preparations--all along the border and in Mongolia--are going forward. Colonel General Markov told a [redacted] that for the present the Chinese represented no military threat to the USSR, despite their recent missile test, but that perhaps in ten years they would offer such a threat. The Soviets are likely to be at least as well informed about Chinese nuclear weapons and missile development as is the United States, and probably considerably better informed--because of their past role in these programs, because of their much closer proximity to the test areas, and because of the better assets they should have for clandestine reporting, particularly from Sinkiang. They of course also recall Mao's boast to Kosygin in February 1965 that in ten years it would not be the USSR and the United States alone that would decide the destiny of the peace. The Soviets may therefore now be planning against the contingency that a real Chinese danger to their security will have been created within the next decade.

In contemplating their dangerous neighbor, the Soviets appear to recognize that there is nothing at all they can do about the Chinese leadership at present, and they are not overly hopeful about the future. Contrary to what the Soviets have sometimes (although not always) said when belaboring the CCP in their propaganda, CPSU and East European confidential documents leave little doubt that the Soviets and their friends have from the first regarded the "cultural revolution" as a purge instigated and directed by Mao. And contrary to the hopes

pro-Soviet public propaganda holds out for Mao's "opposition," an East German party document in April 1967 was quite pessimistic, almost despondent, about the prospects for Chinese opponents of Mao's policies:

> The tragedy of opponents of the current policy of the Chinese leadership group around Mao Tse-tung is that they obviously tried to achieve a change in the current CCP policy line without waging a principled political-ideological struggle within the party, and that they obviously wanted to solve these problems only internally, within the framework of the question concerning Mao Tse-tung's successor.

In other words, Liu Shao-chi was unwilling and unable to stand up to Mao directly--to try to overthrow him--and is now paying the penalty.* The East German document also noted that "the opposing forces are obviously inadequately organized," that they are a heterogeneous lot ("the most varied motives exist for their current attitude"), and in short, that "as a result of many decades of the Mao personality cult, opposing forces are hardly in a position today to stand up to him." This probably is the current Soviet estimate.

The East German party document names a group consisting of Mao, Lin Piao, Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta, and Mao's wife as primarily responsible for current Chinese policy, which is replacing the dictatorship of the proletariat "with something resembling a sort of military dictatorship of an autocratic character." Chou En-lai is omitted;

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**Moreover, again contrary to what their propaganda has sometimes implied, the Soviets have had no illusions about Liu's attitude toward the CPSU, and have admitted this privately. A responsible China specialist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry remarked in May 1967 that "Liu came out strongly against the Soviet Union long before Mao," and that "there are two groups, both of which are anti-Soviet."*

and whereas all the others named (particularly Mao, of course) have been repeatedly attacked in Soviet propaganda over the past eight months, Chou has not. This studied omission probably represents no more than a forlorn hope to which the CPSU still clings without much conviction. The CPSU has always had hopes for Chou, whom Khrushchev characterized as the only decent man in the Chinese leadership but who however was afraid to act independently. The CPSU has made private overtures to Chou (at the 22nd CPSU Congress, and perhaps at other times) to no avail,* and has received innumerable demonstrations, public and private, of Chou's subservience to Mao and his unwillingness to run serious risks of incurring Mao's anger for the sake of Chou's own convictions.

If Mao were to die at this moment, Chou might soon become an important factor working for a moderation of Chinese extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets, however, cannot even be sure that Chou would try to do this; nor can they be sure that Chou would not immediately fall victim in a power struggle after Mao's demise; nor can they even be confident that Chou (who is now already sixty-nine, and is badly overworked) will necessarily outlive Mao; and most uncertain of all is the assumption that Chou in the meantime will not be purged by Mao. Brezhnev in October 1966 in fact predicted [redacted] that Chou would be purged, and a Soviet commentary in April 1967 darkly hinted that after the "extremist forces of Mao's entourage, most likely guided by Mao himself" had disposed of Liu and all Liu's supporters they would turn against "the 'moderate forces' inside the Mao Tse-tung group." Stalin in his purges in the 1930's had done something of this sort, and this is what the Soviets by extrapolation

*As late as June 1966, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, who had ignored Liu Shao-chi during the latter's visit there in the spring, was reported by two different observers to have greeted Chou on his arrival there with effusive friendliness.*

from their own experience would expect Mao to do.*

From the point of view of Soviet calculations, Chou En-lai is therefore only an outside possibility as a factor for a future improvement in CCP policy toward the CPSU. On the other hand, Lin Piao, Mao's new heir-apparent, has built his career by consistently demonstrating to Mao over a period of several decades his unswerving obedience to Mao's will, his fervor in advancing Mao's most extreme desires, and his ability to apply policies as Mao wanted them applied. This pertains of course to Mao's policies toward the Soviet Union in particular. Upon Mao's death Lin will probably at the very least become the single most powerful leader in China. While the Soviets of course will hope that Mao will prove to have been mistaken in Lin, it is unlikely that they have any grounds to suppose so.

It is also doubtful that the Soviets have any other important individuals specifically in mind--in the military establishment or anywhere else in the Chinese hierarchy--who have not already been purged, are not likely to fall victim before Mao has finished, or would not disappoint the Soviets if they survived. Mao's best endeavors are now being bent to precisely this end.

Mao has of course made mistakes in cadre selection before and may well make them

*Moreover, Mao has in the past shown that he is well aware of the Soviet attitude toward Chou, and however loyal and obedient Chou has been to Mao in recent years, Mao can have no assurance that Chou would not backslide after Mao's death. Indeed, if Mao is as desperately concerned with preserving China from the horrors of revisionism after his demise as he has appeared to be, he must purge Chou. The Soviets know this, too.*

again,* but for the CPSU this is a matter of distant speculation. For the foreseeable future, the CPSU has burnt its bridges with the present regime and with the persons most likely to be dominant immediately after Mao's death. And whereas the CPSU through all the years of the Sino-Soviet dispute in Khrushchev's time was striving desperately to get the Chinese to cease their attacks on the Soviet party, this situation has now fundamentally changed. The polemic is now largely to the advantage of the CPSU. The Soviets are in fact heavily in debt to the counterproductive policies Mao has followed over the last two years toward the world Communist movement, and would be seriously embarrassed if those policies were abandoned--if the CCP ceased its denunciations of the CPSU and copied the Soviets in their hypocritical professions of desire for unity.** The gains the CPSU has made in the international movement over the last two years, and the gains it hopes to make through the convocation of some form of world conference, are both predicated upon the Maoist intransigence that has estranged so many former friends and forced even parties such as the Italians to admit that the Chinese cannot be induced to cooperate.

*One knowledgeable observer has suggested that the restoration of former Senior General Su Yu to the CCP's Military Affairs Committee in 1967 might be such a Maoist mistake.*

**The Soviets would also be dismayed by the risks of confrontation with the United States that might be created if the Chinese were to take the Soviets up on their professed desire for unity of action to defeat the United States in Vietnam.*

The CPSU must calculate, however, that once Mao is gone any successor regime, even if it retains a considerable degree of hostility to the USSR (as is likely, because of fundamental conflicting national interests), is also likely quickly to modify some of Mao's more paranoid tactics toward the Communist world which have been recognized by everyone but Mao to be counterproductive for the Chinese competition with the CPSU: Mao's attitude toward the Japanese Communist Party, to take one example. The present situation of virtually complete CCP isolation even from the radical Communist neutrals is not likely to survive Mao's death, therefore. This is an additional reason for the CPSU to make every effort to exploit its current fragile advantage while it lasts and take some tangible organizational step at the November 1967 ceremonies which can afterward be used to shore up CPSU influence and authority.

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