Farideh Farhi's Blog
Three Revelations from the Non-Aligned Summit
Farideh Farhi
The Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran highlighted three aspects about Iran’s foreign relations and domestic politics.
First, given Iran’s geographic location and resources, many countries in the neighborhood believe it is simply not good business to isolate Iran. For some, Western sanctions are even being perceived as an opportunity, illustrated by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tehran. Before his four-day visit, India made clear that bilateral economic relations were a top priority. The same was true for Iran. Singh’s large delegation was met at the airport by Iranian Economy Minister Shamseddin Hosseini.
Iran and India currently do about $15 billion in trade. But the balance is heavily in favor of Iran, to the tune of more than 4 to 1, which has turned into a real issue because of U.S. and European sanctions on financial transactions between the two countries. For Iran, getting paid in rupees for 45 percent of its exports to India has been a partial solution, but India is hoping to increase its export of agricultural goods as well as machinery as another alternative.
Second, the presence of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and new Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi reflected the benefit of engaging Iran directly. Their words created a conversation in Tehran, partly because Iran did not want to appear to be isolated. Ban Ki-moon’s focus was on the basic contradiction in Iranian foreign policy — seeking to be a respected member of the international community while also loudly challenging international codes of conduct.
Khamenei entered the summit followed by former president and current Expediency Council Chairman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also an unelected official. They were followed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was mostly treated as a non-person by the Iranian media. It was a telling contrast to the last major international meeting in Iran during the 1997 Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit. Fresh off his election, new President Mohammad Khatami took charge of the meeting—while Khamenei had almost no presence.
Iran’s deepening internal battle
Farideh Farhi
- Two years after his controversial re-election, President Ahmadinejad faces mounting pressure from the supreme leader, parliament and the Guardian Council on several issues. Is his presidency really in jeopardy?
- Supreme Leader Khamenei staked his own leadership on support for Ahmadinejad after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Has Khamenei’s support for Ahmadinejad changed—and if so, how much and to what end?
- What are the risks or benefits for either Khamenei or the regime in challenging Ahmadinejad ?
- On May 25, 2011, parliament voted to investigate the Ahmadinejad government’s alleged vote-buying—reportedly $80 each for 9 million people—during the 2009 election. The opposition Green Movement made similar allegations after the election but was ignored. Why is parliament acting now—and to what end?
- On May 20, the 12-man Guardian Council ruled that Ahmadinejad could not take over the oil ministry. On June 1, parliament voted overwhelmingly —165 of the 198 members present—to refer Ahmadinejad to the judiciary for illegally attempting to take over the oil ministry. What are the potential consequences of these two actions?
- How is Ahmadinejad responding to the mounting pressure?
- What is Khamenei’s situation?
Rafsanjani Dislodged From a Top Job
Farideh Farhi
- Iran’s Assembly of Experts voted March 8 to replace former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from the chairmanship. What happened and why is the outcome significant?
- Why did hardliners replace Rafsanjani, a pivotal political player since the 1979 Revolution? Had Rafsanjani’s chairmanship changed the Assembly of Experts?
- First, it relays the message that trying to stand in the middle of Iran’s polarized political environment to moderate political cleavages is no longer acceptable—and will lead to sidelining if not a complete purge. Rafsanjani had not taken a clear position on the 2009 unrest. While publicly asserting his loyalty to Khamenei, he nevertheless continued to stand by his call for a more open political system and the need to redress some of the issues that prompted post-election protests.
- Second, hardliners were unable to win with a candidate of their own so they pressured a traditional conservative to head the body—at least temporarily.
- What is the Assembly of Experts? How many members does it have and how are they chosen? How often do they meet?
- Has the Assembly of Experts ever criticized or challenged the supreme leader for anything?
- Selecting the leader
- Dismissing him if he is unable to perform his constitutional duties or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the initial qualifications such as “social and political wisdom, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership.”
- What role does the Assembly of Experts play in Iranian politics today? How does its role compare to what was envisioned in the post-revolutionary constitution?
- What are the political views of the Assembly of Experts’ members in the Islamic Republic?
Iran’s Troubled Five-Year Plan
Farideh Farhi
Farideh Farhi is an independent scholar and affiliate graduate faculty at the University of Hawaii at Mānoa.
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