David Albright's Blog

NAM Countries Hypocritical on Iran

September 7, 2012 | 11:57am

David Albright and Andrea Stricker

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit ended on August 31 in Tehran with the adoption of a communiqué that is troubling and even hypocritical in its support for Iran’s nuclear program. The final NAM document—in addition to the “Tehran Declaration,” a separate paper written by Iran—also criticized unilateral sanctions against Iran, including penalties by the United States and European Union.

The core issue is that the NAM statement misinterprets the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Contrary to widespread perception, the international treaty signed by 190 nations does not guarantee a signatory country access to the nuclear fuel cycle if that state is under investigation for not complying. The 120 NAM states appear unwilling to join the world’s six major powers in pressing Iran to abide by successive U.N. resolutions. They basically do not want to acknowledge Iran’s intransigence—even though many members are U.S. or European allies and claim to oppose Tehran’s nuclear policies.

The final statement could embolden Iran’s efforts and, in turn, undermine nonproliferation and international security—which the NAM states claim to uphold.

The NAM communiqué supports Iran’s “nuclear energy rights,” specifically the right to develop all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. This position misconstrues the NPT. Under Article IV, Iran cannot claim the right to nuclear energy production—or a right to enrich at all—while under investigation for possible non-peaceful uses of these capabilities.

Iran’s right to nuclear energy is qualified—as long as there are no major lapses in its Article II obligations. The NPT specifically requires a pledge

·“not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”

·and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons

or other nuclear explosive devices.”

These commitments are now being challenged by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

U.N. resolutions also require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment until it has cleared up questions about its activities with the IAEA. Most of the NAM members are signatories to the NPT. They are also U.N. members, and therefore aware of U.N. resolutions on Iran and of their legal obligations to enforce and fully comply with them.

So the NAM communiqué failed to acknowledge the need for Iran to fully comply with the international treaty on nuclear weapons. Iran tried to portray that the final communiqué represented a diplomatic victory for Tehran and its controversial nuclear program. But the summit’s resolution instead undermined the Non-Aligned Movement’s credibility, since it demonstrated that developing nations cannot be counted on to deal seriously with nuclear nonproliferation issues.

*ISIS Interning Research Associate Andrew Ortendahl contributed to this report.

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Tags: IAEA, Iran, Non-Aligned Movement, Nuclear Program, UN

Iran’s Nuclear Moves Point to Increased Tensions

July 13, 2011 | 7:11am

David Albright and Andrea Stricker

The conflict over Iran’s nuclear program appears to be getting worse. In June, Iran decided to relocate 20 percent enrichment at its fortified Fordow enrichment plant near Qom and install advanced centrifuges that would triple its enrichment output. These steps will make it easier for Iran to quickly break out to nuclear weapons. As British Foreign Secretary William Hague pointed out in a recent Guardian op-ed, moving enrichment to Fordow and tripling output makes little sense in terms of its civilian nuclear program, which Iran claims is the only purpose of its nuclear program.

Iran’s appointment of Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has increased the crisis atmosphere. Abbasi-Davani is a physicist widely suspected of having background in Iran’s nuclear weapon research programs. He has regularly been linked to Iran’s efforts to actually craft a nuclear weapon, a process called weaponization. Abbasi-Davani was a key scientist in the Iranian covert nuclear weapons program headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a strong supporter of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, according to an expert close to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Abbasi-Davani personally directed work to calculate the yield of a nuclear weapon; he also worked on high energy neutron sources, the expert said. Iran’s continued work on nuclear capable ballistic missiles and failure to announce these launches adds further to this growing list of suspicions.

Iran’s decision to move 20 percent enrichment to Fordow could be aimed at acclimatizing the international community to conditions that would make a breakout to nuclear weapons more feasible. By increasing the enrichment level and its stock of 20 percent low-enriched uranium, Iran could reach a so-called “break out” capability that would enable it to make enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in a few months. Iran already has the knowledge to build a crude nuclear weapon, according to the IAEA.

Iran is likely to continue to expand its enrichment capability until it needs less time to make the requisite amount of weapon-grade uranium for one explosive device. Once Iran reaches a certain capability, it could decide to take that step to make nuclear weapons. Having a device sufficient for testing may be all Iran wants. North Korea settled for that scenario, while it improved its ability to make deliverable nuclear weapons.

Enrichment at Fordow also offers Iran the benefit of protection from air strikes, since the facility is located 90 meters underneath a mountain. If Iran were to restrict IAEA inspectors from having access to the plant, little could be done aside from bombing the facility’s tunnel entrances or introducing ground troops, which could trigger a full-scale war.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, Iran appears to be steadily moving to a status as a virtual nuclear weapons state in which it could build nuclear weapons quickly and easily. Once it reaches this capability, what will the Iranian regime decide? Will the temptation be too great to resist? In order to bridge the gulf and prevent Iran’s slow slide to nuclear weapons, the most viable option for the international community is an intensified dual track approach of both pressure and negotiations.

Read David Albright and Andrea Stricker's chapter on Iran's nuclear program in “The Iran Primer”

David Albright, a physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector, is the president and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. Andrea Stricker is a research analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).

Iran’s Nuclear Program in 2011: Key Findings and Resources

June 16, 2011 | 3:04pm

David Albright and Andrea Stricker

Throughout 2011, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has closely followed the Iranian nuclear crisis, including Iran’s technical advancements, setbacks, controversy over possible military dimensions to its nuclear program, and internal politics that may make any diplomatic deal weakened or unlikely. Below is a “reader’s digest” of key developments and findings with links to resources for more information for the interested reader:

Iran has largely recovered from the 2009/2010 Stuxnet cyber attack which likely destroyed 1,000 centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. Iran has taken steps to maintain and increase its low enriched uranium production. Nevertheless, the attack may have delayed Natanz’s expansion and the deployment of more advanced centrifuges. Meanwhile, the United States released its international cyber security strategy, which underscores that the United States finds itself vulnerable to similar attacks.

See: A Good Defense, but what’s the Impact on Future State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks?

Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report

ISIS Analysis of May 24, 2011 IAEA Iran Safeguards Report

ISIS Analysis of February 25, 2011 IAEA Iran Safeguards Report

Iran may continue a “slow-motion breakout” with its decision to move 20 percent enrichment to its once-secret Fordow enrichment facility at Qom. Iran’s aim may be to slowly acclimatize the international community to conditions that would make a breakout to nuclear weapons more feasible.

See: Moving 20 Percent Enrichment to Fordow: Slow Motion Breakout Continues?

Iran continues to refuse to answer the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) questions about military dimensions of its nuclear program, including work with high explosives, advanced neutron initiators, and detonators. In its May 2011 safeguards report on Iran, the IAEA highlighted that “there are indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004.” ISIS continues to assert that any diplomatic deal that accepts Iran not coming clean about its military nuclear-related work and allows for continued enrichment may be, in the long run, a fruitless policy.

See: IAEA Worried about Ongoing Military Work in Iran

Time for Iran to Come Clean and Cooperate with the IAEA

Internal Iranian politics may prevent any substantive movement on negotiations over the nuclear issue. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Majles’ attempts to rein in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could signify chances for only a weakened nuclear deal or make any deal at all unlikely.

See: The Iranian Power Struggle and its Implications for the Nuclear Crisis

Katherine Tajer, an intern at ISIS, contributed to this report.

Tags: Reports

New Claims on Iran Nuclear Program Questionable

April 8, 2011 | 2:23pm

David Albright and Andrea Stricker

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a longstanding opposition group, claimed on April 7 that the Iranian regime has a secret facility producing centrifuge components for uranium enrichment, a process that can be used for both peaceful energy and nuclear weapons. But the opposition group provided no evidence for its claim and some assertions are highly questionable.

The NCRI alleged that the secret TABA facility, once known as the Iran Cutting Tools company, was taken over by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 2006. Over the past four years, the group claims, the TABA factory produced enough composite tubes, molecular pumps, and bellows, among other items, for more than 100,000 gas centrifuges.

The claim that the TABA facility could make centrifuge components may be valid, but the details that NCRI provided about this facility are far less credible. The NCRI did not provide any evidence to confirm these claims.

It is beyond Iran’s capability to have procured, manufactured, and assembled items for over 100,000 centrifuges in that time period. This highly questionable claim ignores the great difficulty Iran has had with procuring key items for its centrifuge program in the face of United Nations and bilateral sanctions. If TABA does indeed make centrifuge components, the number produced would be far lower.

NCRI also claimed that this facility primarily makes components for IR-1 centrifuges. The composite tubes that NCRI claimed were manufactured at this plant, however, would be used in a more advanced centrifuge and not the IR-1 machine.

Iran stopped informing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the locations of its gas centrifuge component manufacturing and assembly facilities in 2006. In the past, Iran has utilized existing commercial and military industries to manufacture centrifuge components. As such, it is plausible that the TABA facility makes centrifuge components for AEOI under contract.

Regardless of the validity of NCRI’s claims, its presentation detailing the TABA facility highlights the level of uncertainty regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment program and the lack of information provided by Iran to the IAEA. Iran would build international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program if it resumed compliance with the Additional Protocol and suspended its centrifuge program as required by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Paul Brannan, a senior research analyst at ISIS, contributed to this report.

Read David Albright and Andrea Stricker's chapter on Iran's nuclear program in “The Iran Primer”

Tags: Centrifuge, NCRI, Nuclear, Secret Facility

Iran’s Nuclear Setbacks: A key for U.S. diplomacy

January 18, 2011 | 8:29pm

David Albright and Andrea Stricker

Iran’s nuclear program is suffering mounting setbacks, which in turn will provide more time for diplomacy and reduce the imminence of military strikes. The problems fall into three broad categories :

increased difficulty of obtaining essential parts on the international market,
trouble operating large numbers of centrifuges,
and apparent covert actions by foreign intelligence agencies.

Foreign intelligence agencies now appear to be targeting Iran’s nuclear activities with a variety of methods. They include:

cyber attacks,
sabotaging key equipment Iran seeks abroad,
infiltration and disruption of Iran’s smuggling networks,
and the assassination of nuclear experts.

There are no first-hand accounts, but the biggest problems appear to have been caused by the Stuxnet malware, which started to impact the gas centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant in 2009.

Iran has made some progress. It has increased its monthly production of low enriched uranium. By late 2010, it had also bolstered from 4,000 to 5,000 the number of IR-1 centrifuges used to enrich uranium, surprising most foreign analysts.

But Iran’s problems with the IR-1 centrifuges may be more telling. Production of enriched uranium at the Natanz enrichment facility is significantly lower than expected by now. Only about 60 percent of the installed centrifuges are actually enriching uranium. And operations of the centrifuges are often disrupted. The most noticeable was a still-unexplained and rare halt to all enrichment in mid-November 2010 at Natanz, which was confirmed by the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency.

Iran’s IR-1 centrifuge has faced a relatively high failure rate of about 10 percent per year. The plant also experienced an unexplained breakage of about 1,000 centrifuges in late 2009 or early 2010. In total, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimates that about 2,000 IR-1 centrifuges have broken at the centrifuge plant since it started in 2007.

The Stuxnet malware may be a big part of the sudden spike in centrifuge breakage at Natanz. Yet Stuxnet is not the only candidate for explaining breakage and other problems. Iran may also have significant centrifuge manufacturing and assembly problems, including shortages of domestically-produced, high quality centrifuge parts. The enrichment plant has an elaborate computer control system which may have caused other problems.

Iran has also had more trouble obtaining material, which has limited production of IR-1 centrifuges. (The IR-1 is Iran’s copy of a Pakistani centrifuge known as P-1; it is two meters long with four short aluminum tubes connected by three maraging steel “bellows,” and nominally rotates at about 330 meters per second). Iran depends on smuggling for key items. It accelerated efforts to reverse-engineer equipment, but has failed so far to do so successfully. Sanctions and trade controls have also hindered procurement of centrifuge material, such as maraging steel tubes necessary to make bellows; vacuum measuring equipment; and possibly vacuum pumps.

Iran has a maximum production capability of between 12,000 to 15,000 IR-1 centrifuges, ISIS now estimates. With about 9,000 already in place and another 2,000 broken, Iran may be close to a limit on the number of IR-1 centrifuges it can build, unless it manages to obtain more raw materials overseas.

With so many problems in the first generation of centrifuges, Iran has said its future depends on the advanced centrifuges now under development at Natanz and elsewhere. But their large-scale use may be delayed. The United States estimates that Iran again faces raw material shortages, specifically of high-quality carbon fiber. Iran may have enough components to build about 1,000 advanced centrifuges. Some of these centrifuges are five times more powerful than the IR-1 centrifuge, so 1,000 advanced centrifuges would have the same output as 5,000 IR-1s –and be far easier to hide in a secret site.

Iran announced plans to build 10 new enrichment plants shortly after revelations about the secret Fordow enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom in 2009. Construction of the first plant is scheduled for March 2011; it could be ready for centrifuges next year.

Tehran says it will not notify the International Atomic Energy Agency about these new sites until they are essentially finished. The danger is that Iran will build a secret site and, if discovered, merely claim it was among the 10 planned facilities. And one site is enough for international alarm. Iran could make enough for a bomb in little more than six months using 1,000 advanced centrifuges if it decided to divert its stock of U.N. safeguarded low enriched uranium in a dash for a weapon.

But predicting when Iran might obtain nuclear weapons is highly uncertain. Most international analysts believe Iran has not yet made the critical decision about whether to build nuclear weapons. Yet Tehran’s actions increasingly appear to be working toward that capability.

Israel’s recently retired Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, shifted the debate by claiming in January that Iran was still far from being capable of producing nuclear weapons. He reportedly said a series of malfunctions had delayed its nuclear program and estimated Iran could not produce a bomb before 2015.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted differing opinions within the Israeli security establishment. Dagan subsequently backtracked, adding that that some scenarios could shorten the timeframe.

Technically, Iran could decide to build a nuclear weapon now using the Natanz enrichment plant. The United States has estimated that Iran could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb in about one year. ISIS estimates Iran could halve that time to six months with advance preparation, and with somewhat better operation of the IR-1 centrifuges. U.N. experts say Iran knows enough now to build a crude weapon but faces problems in missile delivery.

At the same time, there is wide international consensus behind the U.S. estimate that Iran is unlikely to use the Natanz plant to dash to weapons in 2011 or 2012. It would have to divert a stock of low-enriched uranium under safeguards. Iran could try to delay inspectors’ access to the enrichment plant, but the inspectors are highly likely to detect this diversion within two months, long before Iran could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb. The resulting international condemnation, and possible military strikes, would likely deter Iran from even trying to use Natanz.

In the longer term, thwarting Iran’s growing options to develop a nuclear weapon remains a major challenge. If Iran built a secret site using more advanced centrifuges, it could be ready to build a bomb as soon as 2012 or 2013.

Read David Albright and Andrea Stricker's chapter on Iran's nuclear program in “The Iran Primer”

Tags: Centrifuge, Fordow, Iran, Israel, Natanz, Nuclear, Stuxnet

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