Introduction

The United States Institute of Peace and the Intellectual Map Project

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During its initial meetings in the spring of 1986, the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace devoted considerable time to weighing the charge given it under the federal legislation establishing the Institute, considering how best to proceed in creating "an independent institution established...to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts."

Although the directors cumulatively had extensive knowledge about international conflict and its management, all agreed that none knew with any certainty how best to proceed. The directors further agreed that even the sum of the existing experience and expertise available to them would not suffice to bring the Institute the type of definition and programs it needed to fulfill its broad mandate.

Accordingly, the Board decided that one of its first preoccupations—and one of the first formal projects of the Institute—should be an investigation of the salient approaches to the study of international conflict and peacemaking. The Board concluded that information and insights gathered from and about a large variety of scholars and practitioners was the best way to acquire the guidance necessary to set up the programs of the United States Institute of Peace.

From the beginning, Board members worked closely with the Institute's staff to push forward what came to be called the "Intellectual Map Project." Doing so offered several advantages. On one hand, the staff had Board experience and expertise to draw on. On the other, Board involvement—frequently daily—meant that the directors acquired information as it was being gathered, rather than having to wait until all the results were in. Thus it was possible to begin in earnest the Institute's program work in several areas—especially in making grants-in-aid for research, education, and information services.

As the Institute grew and the body of information gathered under the Intellectual Map Project increased, Board and staff members working on the project concluded that they should proceed in a more structured and

coherent manner. They decided to do three things: first, to organize the approaches to understanding and managing conflict and peace into a coherent typology; second, to begin a series of formal colloquia during which the proponents of various approaches could gather and testify about the character and utility of their work; and, third, to refine project goals.

The Institute's early experience strongly suggested that, although an enormous body of literature already sought to delineate the most useful ways to attain a more peaceful world, considerable confusion and competition existed among proponents of various approaches. Furthermore—and precisely because of this confusion and competition—vital lines of communication among various schools of thought either had never existed or had broken down.

This breakdown was most notable in the gap between scholars and practitioners. Few diplomats, negotiators, and arms control policymakers seemed to find much utility in the theoretical writings of scholars; few scholars found much promise in the practitioners' experience. Although less apparent, the same could be said about relations between and among scholars, even those with seemingly related pursuits, such as deterrence and arms control theorists. In the main, the proponents of each approach seemed to the Institute to have staked their claims and, thereafter, to have withdrawn to work them—and to protect them from competing claimants.

These circumstances led the Institute to regard the Intellectual Map Project in new ways. Not only might it better inform the Institute regarding its purposes and work: the Intellectual Map might also directly serve the scholarly and policy communities it surveyed. It was clear that Intellectual Map activities in themselves could bring proponents of the various approaches to peace together immediately and help build and repair communications links. Further, exposure to one another might encourage a considerable amount of reflection and self-evaluation, for participants could not help measuring their claims against one another's.

The Institute was not alone in its appraisal of the conflict and peace field: contacts with scholars and practitioners showed that the field was indeed ready for the Intellectual Map. As one scholar said during an early discussion of the Institute's project,

> Developing an "intellectual map" takes place at the second stage of the evolution of a field, when work has begun but there remains overlapping and conceptual confusion. People then stop for a bit to see where different areas converge and diverge. Creating an intellectual map would have the additional advantage of demonstrating the historical progression of peace research and activity. Travelers on individual roads on the map would see their historical and analytical relationship to other travelers.

World Without War Council President Robert Pickus held a related view, which is echoed in his contribution to the present volume. According to

Pickus, there were too many "maps" of the conflict and peace field, and such maps—visions of the obstacles and means to peace—were most often constructed without knowledge of "past efforts, past assumptions, and...[past] consequences of acting upon them.... We need a better conceptual map to help people most likely to be caught in a single current of thought, unaware of even its history, let alone its relationship to other perspectives."

Taking these realizations into account, the goals of the Intellectual Map Project thus became

- to gather information on the various approaches to peace;
- to bring proponents of the various approaches into public fora designed to expose them to one another and to make it possible for them to interact;
- to encourage reflection and self-evaluation among scholars and practitioners involved with each of the approaches;
- to create new—and rejuvenate old—lines of communication between and among approaches; and
- to stimulate conceptual cross-fertilization and to encourage inter- and multidisciplinary (that is, multiapproach) efforts regarding international conflict and peacemaking.

The Intellectual Map Typology

During the winter of 1986–87, the Institute began the formal structuring of the Intellectual Map Project. The first order of business was to create a typology, which was necessary for the conceptual organization of the approaches to international conflict and peacemaking. Our intention was not to create a rigorous structure, but to begin to sketch the outlines of relationships between and among the various approaches. We did not intend to produce a definitive analysis, but to encourage thought about those relationships.

Initially, two main divisions suggested themselves: traditional approaches and newer approaches. "Traditional" implies those approaches, such as the study of treaty arrangements and alliance systems, that have been long since brought to bear and are most commonly referred to as part of the study of international relations. "Newer" implies those approaches, such as the psychological study of human conflict, that have only recently been applied in international affairs. It seemed to us that the principal difference between the two categories—apart from the fact that one preceded the other historically—lay in the emphasis placed on one or another sort of international actor. The traditional fields of international relations by and large emphasize interactions between and among sovereign nation-states, while the newer approaches tend to look to the

interactions of individuals and subnational groups that cut across the psychological boundaries of nation-states.

Beyond this difference, the traditional and newer approaches seem to draw on different sorts of resources. For example, traditional approaches tend to make more use of history and the study of politics and diplomacy. They also tend to draw on those political philosophies that treat human beings and social institutions as rational actors. The newer approaches, on the other hand, seem to give far greater significance to the role of irrational forces. Regarding states—and to some extent their leaders and elites—as irrational actors, the newer approaches tend to seek insights into international behavior through means derived from the behavioral sciences, such as sociology and psychology, that study the irrational in individuals and subnational groups. Exponents of the newer approaches, when they go to political philosophers for assistance, are likely to find the work of those who deal with the role of impersonal forces in social organization most useful.

In preparing the Intellectual Map typology, we broke the general category of traditional approaches into three subcategories: collective security and deterrence, diplomacy and negotiation, and strategic management and arms control. The principles that guided this disaggregation were more complex than those used to divide the older from the newer approaches. What follows is not rigorous but is intended, rather, to portray some of the differences among the three traditional approaches, as we saw them.

The notion of collective security derives, by and large, from a classical liberal view of mankind—ranging from a Hobbesian to a Lockean view, if you will. Men—and nation-states made by men—are imperfect and will always be capable of producing evil. Nonetheless, most men, and nation-states, are rational enough to realize that it is in their best interests to live together in peace and order. When a nation-state deviates from this realization, it is in the best interests of the community to join together to discipline the deviant—that is, to create (or recreate) its security collectively.

The concept of collective security has its historical sources in the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe. Exponents of the concept regard the collective security arrangements of the nations of the Concert as responsible for the general peace that followed the French Revolution. They also regard the Concert's decline as a principal cause of World War I. Similarly, collective security proponents tend to regard the lack of "concert" (as expressed in the failure of the League of Nations) as an important cause of World War II. Accordingly, in essence they place their hopes of forestalling future major conflicts on collective efforts from large alliances like NATO and the UN.

Deterrence approaches were placed alongside collective security in the typology, for their proponents generally take a similar view of the ultimate source of world order and regard deterrence as the principal means of maintaining collective security against the threat of deviant nation-states.

One assumption here is that deviant nation-states are sometimes irrational actors and can be most readily and effectively encouraged to be otherwise by the threat of force. We chose not to subsume deterrence in collective security, for its proponents tend to regard other means of attaining collective security as only moderately useful when compared to deterrence.

Like other traditional points of view, diplomacy and negotiation presume that nation-states are, or can be made to be, rational actors. While exponents of the use of diplomacy and negotiation share many of the basic views of those who support collective security and deterrence, their concern with nation-state behavior lies less with the transcendent realm of collective interests than with the more limited (and more easily knowable) realm of the interests of immediate parties to conflict. While they may place their ultimate hopes in international institutions dedicated to collective security, proponents of this view tend to concentrate their efforts on understanding and building rational relationships among leaders and policy-making elites internationally, to exposing mutual interests among actual and potential parties to conflict, and to creating rational mechanisms by which agreements can be more easily reached.

Of the traditional approaches, those of strategic management and arms control are the most realpolitikal in character. Historically, they find their roots in the balance-of-power politics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. Like collective security, these approaches presume that peace is a more orderly state of affairs than war, that war does not ultimately serve the self-interest of any nation-state party to it. In contrast to collective security, however, the balance-of-power schools presume that a peaceful, orderly world derives not from the surrender of national self-interest but from maximization of it. This maximization requires acute attention to forces without, to ensure sufficient strength to avoid tempting aggressors and to deal effectively with them when they arise. The guiding concept is derived from a view held in classical liberal economics—that self-interested forces, if effectively pursuing their self-interests, create a state of relative equilibrium. While they take a dynamic view of world order (that is, one in which the forces will constantly change and require constant rearrangement vis-à-vis one another), proponents of the balance-of-power approaches fear unlooked-for turns of events that seriously destabilize equilibrium. As we see in the area of arms control, they tend to feel that the world is safer when both parties to a potential conflict are endowed with similar means of maintaining their national interests. Similarly, they tend to feel safer when national interests are aggressively stated rather than obscured.

We broke the newer approaches down into transnationalism, behavioral approaches, and conflict resolution. We disaggregated this group based on principles different from those by which we disaggregated the traditional approaches. While proponents of the newer approaches share views that separate them from the traditional in the manner suggested previously, it

is difficult to separate them from one another by examining their principles. It might be said that the three newer approaches differ from one another in focus more than in principle.

While the proponents of transnational approaches may be noticeably closer than the others to the traditionalists in their view of the nation-state and its institutions, for instance, their central interest lies in the role of the individual and the subnational group in creating international community and maintaining international order. In pursuing that interest, however, they are often less concerned with the effect of "transnationally disposed" individuals and groups on the nation-state than they are with the effect of such individuals and groups on one another. This concern brings the transnationalists very close to their behavioralist colleagues in anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political science, whose interest in the nation-state is minimal.

Conflict resolution, the newest approach to international conflict and peace, shows a tendency to embrace all other approaches—traditional as well as new—and more besides. Indeed, conflict resolution would itself be a sort of intellectual map of approaches to peace were it not for the fact that, as yet, it has not found the means to integrate all the other approaches. We have chosen to give conflict resolution a place apart from the transnational and behavioral among the newer approaches in respect to its intents. Nonetheless, the emphasis conflict resolution proponents currently place on bringing transnationalism and behavioralism into play in the study of conflict and into peacemaking puts them, for the time being, much closer to these fields than to others in the Intellectual Map and makes it difficult to discern the real differences between conflict resolution and the other newer approaches.

After looking at the traditional and new approaches, the Institute concluded that the categories established were too cut and dried and, further, that not all approaches could be subsumed within them. Among the first unsettling questions that the Institute asked itself at this juncture was what to do with international law. In many ways, it fit under the "traditional" rubric, both conceptually and historically. In many other ways, it did not. In the final analysis, international law seemed to us to be of interest and utility to the proponent of any approach to conflict and peace. Accordingly, we decided to create a third major category for international law and related fields. Our notion here was not to differentiate it from other approaches but to accord it a place in the Intellectual Map that was consonant with its importance to the whole.

Proceeding in this way, we were also able to find a suitable place in the Intellectual Map for interstate organization and third-party dispute settlement approaches to conflict and peace. Proponents of the salutary role of interstate organizations (that is, international bodies comprising official representatives of nation-states) share views equally close to those of the transnationalists and those of the collective security exponents. Nonetheless,

they are by no means the same as either and play a sufficiently important role in international conflict management to entitle them to a category apart. Inasmuch as third-party dispute settlement may involve a wide variety of actors in mediating roles (including individual states, superpowers in condominium, interstate organizations of all shapes and sizes, and so forth), and as the mediators are disinterested parties and stand outside the self-interest of the traditional approaches, the approach fits much better with international law and interstate organizations than it does elsewhere in the Intellectual Map.

Our final quandary during the construction of the Intellectual Map typology came when we asked ourselves where the proponents of the most general, systemic, and philosophical approaches to peace and conflict fit. Where to put those who believe that the ultimate sources of conflict and the ultimate means to peace reside in fundamental understandings of such things as community, human nature, history, politics, economics, race and sex relations, and the like? Where do Gandhians, World Federalists, Marxists, and advocates of liberal democracy and the free market belong? As we considered this dilemma, we also realized that we had not found a place for that considerable school of political thought that holds that an important relationship exists between a society's political system and institutions and its international behavior. Where should we put those who believe that domestic tyranny and injustice are immediately and inextricably linked to interstate conflict? What about those who believe that freedom and social justice within states make them pacific international actors?

In the end, the Institute created a final major category called "Political Systems Approaches," which we subdivided into approaches that focus on the general character of domestic arrangements ("Internal Systems") and international behavior and approaches that focus broadly on worldviews ("Systemic Theories/World Systems"). In creating this category, we did not mean to differentiate those evincing such concerns from the proponents of other views so much as we meant to recognize the importance of political systems approaches to the understanding of international conflict and peacemaking. Proponents of these approaches have much to say to those traveling other roads. It can also be fairly said that the proponents of all approaches from time to time engage in the sort of reflections that the advocates of political systems approaches make their abiding concern.

The resultant typology appears in outline form below. Again, we emphasize that this Intellectual Map is provisional and intended to encourage reflection rather than conclusion. It should be taken in the same open and cautious spirit in which it was created. The outline nature of its form does not reflect the value or "weight" of any given approach.

I. Traditional Approaches
   A. Collective Security and Deterrence
   B. Diplomacy and Negotiation
   C. Strategic Management and Arms Control
II. International Law Approaches
   D. International Law
   E. Interstate Organizations
   F. Third-Party Dispute Settlement
III. New Approaches
   G. Transnationalism
   H. Behavioral Approaches
   I. Conflict Resolution
IV. Political Systems Approaches
   J. Internal Systems
   K. Systemic Theories/World Systems

The Intellectual Map Colloquium Series

In late 1986 the Institute began a series of seven colloquia under the Intellectual Map Project. The colloquia ranged in length from a morning or afternoon to two days. Although all but one event was held in Washington, D.C., participants came from throughout the country and, on occasion, from abroad. The first event was held on December 5, 1986: the last was on March 24, 1988.

Some colloquia addressed a single major division of the Intellectual Map (such as the session on Capitol Hill in July 1987 that was devoted to international law approaches). But in keeping with our goal of bringing together scholars from diverse fields, most of the colloquia were devoted to several subdivisions. Perhaps the best example of the latter was a session in Palo Alto, California, on February 19–20, 1987, where the Institute heard from scholars and practitioners in arms control, collective security and deterrence, systemic theories, transnationalism, behavioral approaches, and conflict resolution. Participants included both well-known and aspiring talents in international affairs, history, philosophy, behavioral theory, psychology, and peace activism.

A number of Institute Board members, including the Institute's president and other senior members, were present during each colloquium, as were Institute staff. The events were open to the general public, and, when time permitted, the audience was encouraged to take part in the discussions. By the end of the series, several hundred observers had benefited from the testimony of a total of forty-five scholars and practitioners (see appendix A).

While the colloquium series covered an enormous amount of ground, the Institute was nonetheless forced to conclude that its mapping effort had only begun. We learned that a great deal of work was being undertaken under the various approaches to peace and that the contact between and among approaches was all the more difficult and important given that fact.

Despite the often-demonstrated tendency of approaches to peace to diverge and go their own ways, the Institute became more than ever convinced that the task of strengthening "the nation's capacity to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts" was a multidisciplinary approach. The experience of the colloquia demonstrated that each approach to international conflict management had virtue, but also that none could be dubbed "the answer" to the problem of achieving peace.

In addition, the more the Institute delved into the history of approaches to peace, the more apparent it became that this history was a story of waves of enthusiasm for one approach or another. In the nineteenth century, for example, the balance-of-power approach to the regulation of international conflict appeared to many to be a masterstroke. By the end of World War I, of course, the enthusiasm for the balance-of-power approach had been replaced by a new enthusiasm for multinational organizations such as the League of Nations. The twentieth century has brought a new rash of enthusiasms, most recently arms control, with a myriad of others vying to replace the old.

While this history shows that there are no "silver bullets," it also shows that the enthusiasms of the past were by no means wholly unwarranted. Our colloquia suggested that each approach clearly has something of merit to offer. In seeking to promote effective peacemaking, then, it was clear that those things ought to be sought out and combined. On this approach, peacemaking becomes quite naturally inter- and multidisciplinary.

This understanding came to inform nearly everything that the Institute attempted in the first two years of its existence.

The Airlie House Conference

As the Intellectual Map colloquium series drew to an end in the spring of 1988, the Institute concluded that an effort ought to be made to gather representatives of all of the approaches named in the Map typology into one large conference for extended discussion and interaction. Such a conference, we felt, would be a useful experiment. At the very least, we would learn the answers to several important questions, such as, Would proponents of widely variant approaches listen to one another, let alone interact? Would such a conference draw its disparate participants together or would it only serve to reinforce their prejudices regarding one another? Our hope, of course, was that the conference would serve to begin to pull the conflict and peace field together and to bring about a number of new,

cooperative undertakings by proponents of the various approaches to peace.

To ensure the best possible chances of success, we planned the conference carefully. The Institute sought plenary papers from experts who could speak to the intentions, interests, and work of their respective general approaches to conflict management: the traditional, the international law, the new, and the political systems approaches. Other papergivers were chosen to represent approaches subsumed in each major category.

Each plenary session involved a paper presentation and a question-and-answer period. Thereafter, the conference broke into working-group sessions on each of the eleven Intellectual Map subdivisions. These sessions proceeded from a formal paper presentation to a critique by a formal commentator to a general discussion involving other participants. The moderators of the working-group sessions were carefully chosen for the contributions they might make to drawing out the papergivers and commentators and to encouraging participants with divergent views to get involved in the discussion.

The conference's general participants (that is, those who were not assigned papers or asked to make formal comments) were selected from the range of conflict and peace fields reflected in the Intellectual Map typology. The conference was also open to the public. In the end, more than eighty-five individuals took part in the proceedings. A look at the list of participants and their affiliations testifies to their diversity (see appendix B).

The conference was held June 19–22, 1988, at Airlie House outside Washington, D.C. This site was chosen to minimize distractions and to encourage participant interaction between sessions, over meals, and during the evenings. The conference principals—papergivers, commentators, moderators, and Institute Board members and staff—gathered on the first day to discuss conference intents and to go over details of the complicated schedule. Plenary and working-group sessions held on June 20 and 21 culminated in a dinner address by Ambassador Max Kampelman, followed by general discussion. The conference principals met again on the morning of June 22 to conduct an intense four-hour evaluation of the activities of the preceding days. They were joined at that time by many of the general conference participants.

The Airlie Conference was a splendid exercise. Discussion was abundant, surprisingly friendly, and, above all, intense. All participants showed a willingness to take seriously the need to acquaint themselves with work in fields foreign to them, and few were shy about giving detailed explications of their approaches and work. At many conferences, the most interesting and important things transpire informally, between sessions and during the relaxed times, when participants characteristically encounter one another as human beings rather than as advocates or professionals. Common ground is discovered indirectly and, often, quite by accident. While the Airlie Conference was no different in this regard, it can be fairly

said that such encounters occurred as much during formal sessions as outside them.

The flavor of the discussions during the Airlie Conference is well captured by the following anecdote. During one of the sessions, one of the participants, to the astonishment of many others, made the suggestion that the Stinger missile be given the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in bringing Moscow to realize the futility of its war in Afghanistan. A longtime peace activist noted that "weapons are not exactly what the Peace Prize is about." She then went on to stress the limitations of realpolitik. A Foreign Service officer, in effect, synthesized the two views. While he agreed that the missile had played a vital role in "persuading" the Soviet Union to parley, little would have happened had the United Nations not already created a framework for peace negotiations to which President Gorbachev could turn without loss of face. The cease-fire and phasing down of that war could thus be seen as a consequence of the use of several roads to peace.

Perhaps the most fascinating—and successful—session at Airlie was one of the most ambitious in its intention of bringing together disparate intellects. Under the rubric of Systemic Theories/World Systems, classicist Michael Nagler, who teaches at Berkeley and resides in a Gandhian community, was asked to give a paper on "ideas of world order." Nagler's effort was a highly syncretic piece that drew on ancient Greek and Gandhian notions of social organization to produce a vision of world community without troublesome nation-states. The session was chaired by Board member W. Bruce Weinrod, a national security expert noted for his partiality to realpolitik and Hobbesian views of man. Nagler's commentator, A. Lawrence Chickering of the Institute for Contemporary Studies, is a student of ideology and a notable antiutopian. In his comments, Chickering quickly took the discussion in the direction of views of human nature. There followed a very rich and diverse interchange of views from a group that included everyone from psychologists and philosophers to former diplomats and arms control experts. By the end of the session, each had moved very far from his or her professional moorings and had eagerly indulged in serious conversation about an issue that is clearly basic to understanding human interaction in whatever form it might take. All agreed that it is a pity scholars and practitioners of international affairs could not take time out of their busy schedules to have more such discussions, for they deal with, as one participant put it, "the real stuff." When the evaluation session was held on the morning of June 22, conference camaraderie was still high and the participants were eager to speak about their experiences and the further implications thereof.

Nearly everyone at the evaluation session agreed that the conference represented a ground-breaking effort to bring together a variety of "cultures" that, for intellectual, ideological, and institutional reasons, had not traditionally interacted with one another. By fulfilling this "human" (as opposed to strictly "intellectual") function, the conference was deemed an

important first step toward opening new lines of communication that had previously been considered closed or unproductive. It was, in effect, a "happening."

The postconference summaries given by the conference principals did not simply constitute a mutual admiration society. In fact, many participants shared concerns about the negative side effects of addressing too many topics within a limited timeframe. They feared that analytical depth was sacrificed for intellectual breadth. The conference organizers, however, maintained that such a sacrifice was warranted because this was the first time any organization had undertaken such an effort and in consideration of the enormously wide range of topics discussed.

It also should be acknowledged that some participants expressed concern for the underrepresentation of grassroots, social movement, and other activist organizations at the conference. The organizers pointed out that individuals from such organizations had been invited and expressed disappointment that few had chosen to attend. If the absolute numbers of such people at the conference was not great, there was nonetheless a significant and very much engaged representation.

With regard to the project's typology, many participants suggested that the Intellectual Map be made more specific and that further categorization ought to ensue. Although no one particularly objected to the basic structure of the typology, several participants doubted whether it was—or could be—sufficiently inclusive. As might be expected, this line of thought brought the participants to a discussion on the operative scope of the definition of "peace." As might also be expected, some felt that peace ought to be defined narrowly, as "the absence of war," and others felt that peace ought to be defined as the condition that remains when all the significant sources of social conflict have been dealt with. As one might imagine, there was no consensus on this issue at the end of the discussion. With regard to the definition that informed the Institute's Intellectual Map, the group agreed that, while still not fully formed, it fell somewhere between the poles and was distant enough from the first to satisfy some of those closer to the second. One of the reasons for this was a group consensus that if "peace" were left undefined, that is, without limits on its meaning, it could be regarded as synonymous with almost any social condition that some individual or group regarded as desirable, including social conditions disagreeable to most. Toward the end of this part of the discussion, everyone agreed that the problem of defining "peace" must be addressed by every scholar and practitioner in the field. They affirmed that, because there is no simple formula for peace, the Map served its intended purpose to sketch the array of possibilities.

The two subject areas of religion and economics were seen as needing increased attention in the Intellectual Map. Many participants felt that, because religious conviction and economic necessity are often given as rationales for going to war, it is essential that these forces be studied further

to determine their causal relationship to peace. The organizers acknowledged the omission and explained that had conference papers been assigned on these topics, they would have come under either the transnational subdivision or the systems subdivision, depending on what angle the authors took.

Another notable criticism voiced at the evaluation session concerned what some participants identified as an overemphasis in the conference papers on superpower relations and the matter of nuclear weapons. Their view was that, while these issues are of critical importance, concentrating on them obscures the problems posed by other matters, such as regional conflicts and politically generated internal violence. The same participants made the additional observation that greater superpower rapprochement, if it became a reality, would significantly increase the importance of regional and internal conflicts, especially in terms of the possibilities for superpower cooperation in peacekeeping efforts.

As the group turned to the future of the peace field beyond the Airlie Conference, several responses were evoked by the question of how best to synthesize a number of approaches into new and more effective means to address future conflict situations. While some argued that much could be accomplished by intellectual cross-fertilization—through the study and adoption of useful theories and data developed in other fields—most felt that the most promising approach might be what was referred to as an "integrated" or "multidisciplinary working-group" approach. Under such an approach, a group of scholars and practitioners from various fields might be brought together to address what ought to be done in a particular case of international conflict or crisis. The principal advantage here lies in the circumstance that all members of the group would have to deal with the same, finite case. In the end, the participants enthusiastically recommended that the Institute consider sponsoring an experimental version of such an undertaking.

After the Airlie House Conference

In evaluating the Intellectual Map Project in the wake of the Airlie House Conference, the Board and staff of the Institute concluded that it had been an important exercise in every regard. We were well satisfied with the beginning we had made in gathering together the approaches to peace. The responses of the various participants convinced us that the Intellectual Map approach was sound. The pursuit of peace is indeed a multipart, multiapproach endeavor that would benefit from dialogue as well as from the self-reflection of its exponents. There were no "silver bullets" and, as important, no obsolete approaches.

At the same time, we were less than satisfied with what we thought we knew. The principal effect of the Intellectual Map Project on the Institute in

the period following the Airlie Conference was to cause us to reconsider the sorts of projects we were undertaking ourselves and sponsoring through grants and fellowships. The Map experience served to expand the number and variety of individuals and groups that came to work with and be served by the Institute. We also learned much during the colloquium series and Airlie Conference about where unusually promising, yet under-supported, work was being done under a wide variety of approaches.

Looking back from late 1990, then, we have a strong sense that the Intellectual Map Project has borne substantial fruit. Not only has the community of experts working with the Institute broadened in its scope, but we have also noticed that work being done under all the Map rubrics has benefited from increased cross-fertilization and communication among the approaches to conflict and peace.

Although we would like to think that the Institute played at least a modest role, we cannot make any substantial claim to having brought more coherence and cooperation to the peace fields. Most responsible for the new coherence and cooperation have been the remarkable changes in interna-tional life over the past few years. Whether one refers to them as "the end of the Cold War," "the end of History," or "the victory of liberal dem-ocracy," recent changes have brought innumerable assumptions into ques-tion and made much more porous the boundaries between approaches to international conflict and peacemaking. For many, 1989—the year follow-ing the Airlie Conference—marked the point at which it was no longer possible for any reasonable observer to believe that anything less than great historical changes were afoot in the Soviet Union.

The period since then has been marked by one remarkable change after another and a steady increase in optimism. At the same time, a sense of uneasiness has developed regarding how the world will be post-Cold War, or after "the end of History." As one commentator recently noted, it is difficult for states long accustomed to steady-state adversarial relationships to operate in a world without their customary enemies. As the great conflict between East and West is being transformed, much intellectual reordering and reorienting is required for scholars and policymakers—as well as advocates of peace—to find a new way. The recent crisis in the Persian Gulf reminds us that world conflict in the post-Cold War era will be, if anything, more violent, more difficult to deal with, and much less easy to ignore. In each of the various approaches to peace, proponents could not ultimately avoid focusing on superpower relations, no approach could be validated without dealing effectively with the East-West conflict, and that took considerable time and effort. Needless to say, the possibility of a world without superpower conflict has shaken the foundations of most of the work on conflict and peace undertaken over the past forty years.

In a sense, then, the Institute's Intellectual Map Project may have been ahead of its time even while its organizers and participants thought of it as something long overdue. We attempted to encourage students of conflict

and peace to "group" at a time only shortly before they would need to "regroup." It is the Institute's hope that the lessons of the past that caused us to bring approaches together will not be lost as that regrouping goes forward. Dealing with conflict and peacemaking in the post–Cold War era will be increasingly complex and difficult. A return to the past, when approaches and disciplines went their own ways, seems to be among the least productive ways of dealing with the uncertain future.

The Present Volume

This volume presents material generated at the Airlie House Conference in sixteen chapters organized after the fashion of the Intellectual Map typology.

Part I (chapters 1–4) is devoted to traditional approaches to peace and conflict study. Edward Luttwak's plenary paper is followed by essays on deterrence, diplomacy, and arms control.

Part II (chapters 5–8) presents international law approaches. After a plenary presentation by Oscar Schachter, essays follow on international law, interstate organizations, and international third-party dispute settlement.

Part III (chapters 9–12) addresses new approaches, with Robert Pickus's plenary remarks followed by essays on transnationalism, behaviorism, and conflict resolution.

Part IV (chapters 13–16) is devoted to political systems approaches. Following Scott Thompson's plenary effort are essays on the international behavior of various political systems and ideas of world order. We have printed Ambassador Max Kampelman's keynote address here also. While it focuses on the broad problems of peace among nations, expressing ideas shared with most of the other contributors to this volume, this address stresses the importance of political systems approaches.

We provide the reader with introductory summaries of each chapter. All chapters containing papers given in working-group sessions include summaries of the formal commentary and discussions that followed them at the Airlie Conference. While brief, these summaries are intended to give the reader access to some of the richness of the discussion and the interaction among representatives of the various approaches.

The essays in this volume are written in a variety of styles and for a variety of purposes. Some (for example, that on law and peace by Myres McDougal) offer detailed and thorough arguments on difficult but vital principles and understandings. Others are wide-ranging and provocative, such as those by Edward Luttwak on traditional understandings of conflict and peace and Michael Nagler on ideas of world order. Several authors, such as Richard Bilder and James Laue, offer extensive bibliographies that give readers new to their approaches easier access.

In all instances, the authors offer considerable substance and clear perspectives. While no single volume dedicated to approaches to peace can do justice to the subject, we believe that this one may be ideal for several kinds of readers. For the neophyte inclined to enter the study of international conflict, *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* reflects a good part of the diversity of the field and a good deal of the seriousness with which scholars and practitioners pursue their work. It also reflects the fact that not everyone agrees with everyone else. For the veteran student of international conflict, perhaps frustrated with the confusion and lack of communication among fields and disciplines, the volume will suggest any number of new ways in which the exponents of the various approaches to peace might be brought together. Finally, and perhaps most important, *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* provides ready access to the various ways students of international peace and conflict think—that is, to their assumptions, their values, and their absorbing concerns. It will be the rare reader who comes away from this volume with the view that the attempt to understand conflict and peace is anything less than a serious and worthwhile endeavor pursued by capable and imaginative intellects.