WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat. By Fred Schreier. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2009. 348 pages. $60.00 ($23.96 paper). **Reviewed by Benjamin E. Schwartz**, a Presidential Management Fellow.

"WMD and their proliferation, terrorism, and transnational organized crime are the preeminent security challenges confronting the world —the fulcrum of evil," writes Fred Schreier. True enough. Few thoughtful overservers of the international security environment will disagree with Schreier's contentions in *WMD Proliferation*. "Terrorism is a threat to all states;" "Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons is essential for creating a more secure world;" "A state must have the most effective intelligence services as the first line of defense;" etc. The book is filled with such truisms, which have the commendable attributes of clarity and accuracy. But they do not make for the most interesting read.

Fred Schreier is a retired Swiss colonel with experience in command and general staff positions, and his book is written with military precision. He provides a systematic breakdown of the various aspects of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat and identifies components of an effective, counter-proliferation posture. Describing the danger, Schreier lays out various characteristics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons technology. For example, the reader learns that Americium-241 is a radioactive element and an alpha ray emitter with a half-life of 432.7 years. Depending on one's professional background, such descriptions may appear elementary, overly technical, or somewhere in between.

Despite Schreier's subtitle, "Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat," his text is best characterized as a general reference guide on the topic of WMD proliferation. It includes a plethora of definitions and identifications that range from international treaties and conventions to the variety of intelligence collection sources (human intelligence, signal intelligence, etc.) to the concept of "the national interest." Schreier supplements description with proscription by putting forth the straightforward proposition that the evolving threat requires adaption, reorganization, and additional coordination within and between governments and the private sector. As part of such reform, he calls for policies and resources to be allocated based on "risk assessments" that evaluate plausible threats and existing vulnerabilities. This is not a hard case to make, and Schreier succeeds at it.

To his credit, the author delves into the dreary but decidedly important issue of bureaucratic process. The reader learns about NATO's internal communication structure and how the European Union does and does not share intelligence. Schreier explains the roles of the various levels of the US National Security Council policy-making structure with its Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees. This focus on a mundane bureaucratic component, one that is crucial to the functioning of the US national security machine, is consistent with Schreier's sober and sensible approach to his subject.

But sensible writing does not necessarily make a sensible book. Aristotle encourages us to ask, "What is the nature of the thing?" With respect to the text in question, the "thing" is a reference book that is both too broad and too shallow. The Internet has sapped the utility of paperback references in general, which often cannot compete

with the ease of navigation, tailored results, and constant updates provided on the World Wide Web. For Schreier's book, this challenge is compounded by an apparent disinterest in scoping the text to target a specific audience. This is demonstrated in his section on "Major Treaties," which provides a paragraph on each treaty's implementation requirements. These descriptions assume background knowledge so they are not aimed at the neophyte, but as single paragraphs they cannot provide value added to the professional either. Many of Scheier's descriptions contain detail that can be easily assimilated and retained, but not enough to be useful to policy-makers tasked with developing specific countermeasures. This begs the question, who is going to read this book?

To address the WMD thread that Scheier so ably identifies, the arms control community needs more than a catalogue of disparate initiatives. It needs a strategy. It needs a theory that proposes how to use the jumbled array of national and international capabilities, authorities, and cooperative mechanisms in concert to achieve specific objectives. Good strategy starts with basic questions: what inputs (e.g., technical knowledge, materials, infrastructure) are needed to create WMD; where are these components located (e.g., universities, mineral deposits, industrial sites); and what is the process (e.g., extraction, transportation, refining, assembly, testing, deployment) by which each weapon is created from its components. Once these questions are answered, it is then possible to identify chokepoints in the process of weapons creation and transfer and consider means of expoloiting them. Fitting the alphabet soup of counterproliferation initiatives (PSO [Proliferation Security Initiative], CTR [Cooperative Threat Reduction]) and nonproliferation regimes (NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group], AG [Australia Group]) into such framework would be an immensely helpful start.

Such a strategy would also recognize that while WMD proliferation is catalyzed by technological and economic developments, it is fundamentally a political phenomenon. Controlling the creation and transfer of strategic material is an imperative as old as human conflict. Today what we call "targeted international sanctions" and "export control regimes" in an earlier age was known as blockades and siege warfare. The thread from WMD may be unprecedented, but the mission of preventing adversaries from acquiring strategic resources is not. This is not a goal like eradicating AIDS or ending global warming that can unite humanity. There will be losers if the spread of WMD can be halted. The strategies for convincing, or compelling, states to accept such a loss require a knowledge of politics and diplomacy, not physics and technicalities.

Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942. By David M. Glantz with Jonathan M. House. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009. 896 pages. $39.95. **Reviewed by Dr. Alexander Hill**, Associate Professor of Military History at the University of Calgary and author of *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945: A Documentary Reader*.

Continuing from Volume 1 of his Stalingrad trilogy, David Glantz's *Armageddon in Stalingrad* is concerned primarily with the fighting for the city itself prior to the start of the Soviet counteroffensive leading up to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. After an introductory chapter outlining events prior to September 1942 and introducing key personalities, the authors move between the fighting in various parts of the city from the German