By MAJ Eric McCoy, Guest Blogger

Editor’s Note: MAJ Eric McCoy is an Infantry Brigade Combat Team Executive Officer. He wrote this blog as part of an Intermediate Level Education Course and asked WTC to share their unit lessons learned with other Army units. The expressed comments and views of guest bloggers do not reflect the views of WTC or the United States Army.

The purpose of this commentary is to provide information on observations and lessons learned from the two suicides experienced by my battalion during the first 90 days of our initial stand-up and formal activation in the hopes that other leaders can learn from the challenges we experienced and intervene at the right place and time to save the lives of other Soldiers. Since then we have published a Battalion Suicide Prevention Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and aggressively implemented active suicide prevention policies to mitigate potential for successful suicide ideation. Our strategies include: identification of high-risk Soldiers by company, continual enrollment of leaders and Soldiers in Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) in excess of the requirements imposed by our higher headquarters, quarterly safety stand downs focused on risk mitigation, counseling, and communication between Soldiers and the first line supervisors, and finally, continual assessment and intervention in garrison and the field by unit ministry teams and health care providers.

The first Soldier to commit suicide in my unit was last seen at the end of July and was subsequently listed as Absent without Leave (AWOL). He was discovered approximately three weeks later in a barracks room. Post-mortem investigations determined that the servicemember had disciplinary problems. He was pending administrative separation for drug use, was under criminal investigation for drug possession with intent to distribute, and was pending civilian charges for grand larceny. He had visited an off-post behavioral health provider prior to his AWOL and subsequent suicide. During this visit, he divulged a prior suicide attempt that was communicated to the escort by the health provider but not passed back to the chain of command. The second Soldier to commit suicide in my unit did so approximately 10 days after the first Soldier’s body was discovered. He was discovered hanging from the balcony above his apartment. A civilian police investigation determined that the servicemember had committed suicide by hanging utilizing a belt tied to the banister of the balcony. Post-mortem investigations indicate that he was depressed by suspicions of infidelity from his spouse, whom he married less than a month prior to the suicide.

There were three important lessons that we learned from the incidents as a unit that we would like to share with the rest of our brother and sister units.

First, planners and senior leaders must work the personnel staffing of newly activated/ reconstituted units to ensure that continuity within the chain of command is maintained. For the six months prior to our formal activation, the unit advance party (ADVON) operated as one company mass formation. Additionally, 75% of our company first sergeants were laterally appointed prior to unit activation, which created confusion, and hindered unity of command as separate companies had not yet activated. Unit leadership did not begin breaking down into separate companies until the second week of July. As a result, Soldiers had “musical” squad leaders who did not have full situational awareness of their issues or concerns. Earlier awareness of Soldier issues could have mitigated, if not prevented, one or both of the suicides. I recommend that straight lines of command be stressed earlier in the unit stand-up and activation process.

Secondly, behavioral health assets to include unit ministry teams and mental health providers must be made available earlier in the unit building process. During our initial activation, a chaplain was not assigned to our brigade footprint until seven months after our Soldiers began arriving and a behavioral health officer was not assigned until eight months thereafter. While area coverage is a mitigation strategy, it does not replace impact of chaplains and behavioral health providers being on ground. Additionally, a lack of health care providers (medics and physician assistants) hindered feedback to organic chains of command on systemic health issues (to include behavioral and self-reported substance abuse) that affect our Soldiers. I recommend that we advocate for earlier building of health care providers and assets into footprints of newly activating units.

Finally, the medical history of high risk Soldiers must be made more readily accessible to unit leadership. In the post-mortem medical reviews on both suicides within our battalion, information was discovered that, while unknown to the chain of command, could have changed unit actions toward the servicemembers. In the case of the first Soldier, he admitted to illegal drug use prior to and since his enlistment. The Soldier also divulged a history of long protracted behavioral healthcare since early childhood (to include two prior suicide attempts). I recommend that both unit leadership and health care providers be educated through leader professional development seminars, unit training schools, and policies on the need to cross talk, within the limits of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), on health care issues that involve Soldiers’ immediate well-being. Additionally, I recommend that units establish internal systems to ensure that unit leaders are immediately notified of behavioral health issues involving their Soldiers when there is a possibility of homicidal or suicidal ideations.

Soldier deaths due to off-duty and/or accidental risk can be prevented with implementation of the proper mitigation strategies. It is my hope that these observations can aid leaders in seeing themselves and their units in a more objective light so that they can help themselves and their Soldiers as well.