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The Iran Primer

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Supreme Leader Rejects U.S. Overture

February 7, 2013 | 10:38am

            On February 7, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected an offer by Vice President Joe Biden for direct talks. “Some naïve people like the idea of negotiating with America. However, negotiations will not solve the problem,” he said in a speech to Iranian Air Force commanders.
            Khamenei’s official Twitter account also posted more than 30 comments on U.S.-Iran talks within hours. One tweet from Khamenei questioned whether "crippling sanctions" are proof of U.S. goodwill. Khamenei’s comments came one day after the United States announced new economic sanctions on Iran. Iran will judge the United States by its actions, another Khamenei tweet said. The following are excerpts from his speech, followed by his recent tweets.

            “American policy in the Middle East has been destroyed and Americans now need to play a new card. That card is dragging Iran into negotiations...”
            “You take up arms against the nation of Iran and say: ‘negotiate or we fire.’ But you should know that pressure and negotiations are not compatible and our nation will not be intimidated...”
            “Some naïve people like the idea of negotiating with America, however, negotiations will not solve the problem…”
            “If some people want American rule to be established again in Iran, the nation will rise up to face them…”
Tweets
Tags: Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear, Sanctions, U.S., United States
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Treasury Sanctions Oil Revenues and Targets Human Rights Abusers

February 6, 2013 | 3:07pm

            On February 6, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and other financial institutions to restrict Tehran’s ability to spend oil revenues. The Treasury Department also designated one individual and four entities for involvement in censorship activities. The entitles included Iran’s official broadcasting agency, its cyber police, the Communications Regulatory Authority and Iran Electronics Industries. The United States will “target those in Iran who are responsible for human right abuses, especially those who deny the Iranian people their basic freedoms of expression, assembly and speech,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. The following are excerpts from the press release.

            The United States is taking a number of actions today that tighten sanctions on Iran’s access to its oil revenues and further expose the Iranian government’s continued abuse of human rights.  Key provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) that go into effect today, expand the scope of sanctionable transactions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions by restricting Iran’s ability to use oil revenue held in foreign financial institutions as well as preventing repatriation of those funds to Iran.  The U.S. Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the U.S. Department of State, also designated one individual and four entities for their involvement in the Iranian government’s censorship activities.  These censorship activities restrict the free flow of information in Iran and punish Iranian citizens who are attempting to exercise freedom of assembly and expression.
 
            “Our policy is clear – so long as Iran continues to fail to address the concerns of the international community about its nuclear program, the U.S. will impose tighter sanctions and intensify the economic pressure against the Iranian regime,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.  “We will also target those in Iran who are responsible for human right abuses, especially those who deny the Iranian people their basic freedoms of expression, assembly and speech.”
 
Humanitarian Exceptions
The increased restrictions, however, do not apply to the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.  Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is issuing guidance today to make it clear that such humanitarian trade with Iran is neither subject to these sanctions nor to sanctions previously imposed on Iran.
 
Sanctions Linked to Censorship in Iran
In addition to increasing economic pressure on Iran, the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department, designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its director, as well as three other entities in Iran, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13628, which implements the TRA by giving the Treasury Department the authority to designate those in Iran who restrict or deny the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people. 
 
Any property or interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which the designated entities or individuals have an interest are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. 
 
Click here for the press release.
Tags: Human Rights, Iran, Nuclear, Sanctions, Syria, U.S., U.S. Policy
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Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle

February 6, 2013 | 2:09pm

            Iran is still years away from developing nuclear weapons, according to a new report by the Arms Control Association. Evidence suggests that the Islamic Republic has not decided whether or not to build a weapon. But in the meantime, Tehran is building up its technological base and gathering materials needed to produce a weapon. The report warns that Iran could produce enough enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb by the end of 2013.
            The report also explores potential ways to solve the nuclear issue. It argues that sanctions alone cannot halt Iran’s program. A military strike would only set back the program and could close the door to diplomacy, or spark a regional war. But a deal that satisfies the needs of Iran’s nuclear power plants, combined with more extensive U.N. safeguards, could guard against a nuclear-armed Iran. The following are excerpts from the report with a link to the full text at the end.

            Iran has been engaged in efforts to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Although it remains uncertain whether Tehran will make the final decision to build nuclear weapons, it has developed a range of technologies, including uranium enrichment, warhead design, and delivery systems, that would give it this option in a relatively short time frame. Such an effort is not the same as a crash program designed to acquire a nuclear weapon as soon as possible, in which case Iran would eject inspectors and produce weapons-grade material at its existing facilities. Tehran appears to be taking a more deliberate approach, building up as much of its technological base as possible under the guise of a peaceful program, while putting off the need to make a political decision to build and deploy nuclear weapons…
 
Steps to Building Nuclear Weapons (Via the Uranium Route)
 
Mining or Importation of Uranium Ore
Iran is believed to have large reserves of uranium and two working mines.
 
Milling of Uranium
Concentrating uranium from ore, i.e., increasing uranium oxide content to 65-85 percent to produce “yellow cake.”
 
Processing (Conversion)
Converting yellow cake, a solid, into uranium hexafluoride, a gas, for subsequent enrichment.
 
Enrichment
Increasing the relative abundance of the uranium-235 isotope in the uranium hexafluoride
• to light-water power-reactor grade (3.5
percent)
• to research-reactor grade (20 percent)
• to weapons grade (90+ percent)
 
The IAEA estimates that 25 kg of weapons grade
uranium is sufficient to produce one nuclear
device.
 
Fabrication
Converting weapons-grade uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide powder and into metallic forms for use in the fissile core of a nuclear device.
 
Weapons Design and Assembly
Designing and assembling the other non-nuclear components in and around the fissile material core to make a device capable of forming the “physics package” of a warhead, suitable for use as part of a combat-ready weapons system.
 
Nuclear Explosive Testing
Detonating the nuclear device as proof of concept. Typically, multiple nuclear test explosions are necessary to perfect warhead designs, particularly smaller, lighter, more efficient designs.
 
Weapons Integration With a Delivery System
Adapting the warhead for placement into a bomb or the nose cone of a delivery vehicle, in Iran’s case, either a Ghadr-1 or Sejjil-2 medium range ballistic missile.
 
Missile Testing With Inert Warhead
Performing flight tests with an inert warhead to confirm the performance of the non-nuclear functions of the warhead, such as safing, arming, and fusing, which are necessary in order to achieve higher levels of confidence and reliability...
 
Conclusions
 
            International sanctions have slowed Iran’s nuclear program and increased pressure on Tehran to respond more favorably to P5+1 overtures. Yet these sanctions, even if tightened further, cannot stop Iran’s nuclear pursuits.
 
            The use of military force against Iran’s extensive and highly dispersed nuclear infrastructure, short of a complete military occupation of the country, can only
temporarily set back Iran’s program and would likely prompt Iran to eject the IAEA inspectors and actively pursue nuclear weapons.
 
            Consequently, the military option would be counterproductive and costly, and would foreclose diplomatic options, erode international support for sanctions, lessen Iran’s isolation, and possibly trigger a regional war leading to enormous civilian casualties
and human suffering.
 
            President Obama and other leaders must redouble efforts to engage Iran in serious, sustained negotiations on arrangements that guard against a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran’s leaders must, of course, also be willing to engage in good faith in these efforts.
 
            To do so, it is essential that Iran agree to halt its accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium and restrict its enrichment operations and stockpiles to normal power reactor-grade levels and other civilian, peaceful needs. To verify and monitor Iran’s commitments, the IAEA must be allowed to conduct more intrusive monitoring and it must be able to ascertain that any past weapons-related work by Iran has been discontinued. In exchange, there should be an appropriate and proportional paring back of international sanctions on Iran and P5+1 recognition that Iran has a legitimate claim to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 
            A diplomacy-centered approach is the only option that can prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Pursuing such a course is difficult, but it is the best option on the table.
 
Click here for the full report.
 

 

Tags: Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear, Reports, Sanctions, Strike
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What is Iran’s Strategy at New Talks?

February 5, 2013 | 11:05am

Alireza Nader

What is Iran's strategy on diplomacy today — now that a fourth round of talks is scheduled in Kazakhstan on February 26?
 
            Iran is still willing to give diplomacy a chance after a seven-month hiatus, as demonstrated by the announcement of new talks. But Tehran wants the P5+1 to make the first move. The regime is inherently distrustful of negotiations, which explains its hesitation to engage in talks. The leadership appears to think Iran will not receive a fair deal—no matter what it does. This distrust is rooted in the Islamic Republic’s historic view of the United States.
 
            Tehran also has major issues with the proposal of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—the so-called P5+1. The six world powers want a gesture from Tehran demonstrating its commitment to a diplomatic solution before considering sanctions relief. That could include suspending uranium enrichment to 20 percent at Fordo, its underground nuclear facility or shipping out its current stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. The P5+1 has also asked Iran to shut down Fordo.
 

What are Tehran’s goals? On what issues might it compromise?

            Iran wants sanctions relief and international recognition of its right to enrich uranium. The P5+1 is highly unlikely to grant those demands up front. Tehran may be willing to stop enrichment of uranium to 20 percent. But this attitude change would take time.
 
How is Iran gaming diplomacy?

      Iran may have been stalling on negotiations to get the best deal possible. Tehran may prefer to walk away without a deal rather than sign an unfavorable one. The regime is increasing its leverage in the meantime.
 
      In January, the Islamic Republic upped the ante by announcing plans to install advanced IR-2 centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility, which could enrich uranium three to four times faster than the IR-1. Iran had been working on the centrifuges for years, so the move was not a total surprise. But the timing was important. 
 
How does Iran’s strategy differ from the U.S. strategy in negotiations?
 
            Both sides are using the same negotiating tactics—start with big demands and then possibly make concessions. There is still room for negotiations, given the mutual desire to avoid a military conflict.
 
            But Iran appears to have a contingency plan if negotiations fail. The regime’s behavior suggests that it recognizes the magnitude of its crisis. It is trying to survive by clamping down on civil society and reversing the gains made by reformists in the 1990s.
 
            Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is trying to consolidate and shore up his power to guarantee a stable presidential election in June. He wants to ensure that the principlist (fundamentalist) camp is united and presents a candidate acceptable to most of the conservative elite.
 
            The regime is also increasing repression to intimidate political opponents. In January, Iran arrested or harassed up to a dozen journalists, held several public executions, and introduced a finger amputating machine. Some of these measures are intended to deter crime, but they also send a message to domestic opposition forces—do not publically oppose the regime. Tehran is even harassing Iranian journalists abroad.
 
            Iran is already preparing its economy for increased sanctions and isolation. It is shoring up relations with neighboring countries like Pakistan. Tehran may take austerity measures in the coming months, such as rationing or issuing food coupons. Iran’s current situation resembles the economic crisis during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.
 
What role will the presidential election in mid-June have in Iran's strategy? Or in the timing of diplomacy?
 
            The elections could have a marginal effect on the nuclear negotiations. The president is the second most powerful figure in the Islamic Republic, according to the constitution. Khamenei makes all of the major decisions. So Iran’s nuclear policy is unlikely to fundamentally change after the election. Iran has committed to a new round of talks in February, so the leadership is not waiting for the election to negotiate.
 
            Dealing with Iran might be easier without Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, especially if a more diplomatic and less bombastic man becomes president. Khamenei wants to keep the next president under his control. So the new president may be less likely to publically rebuke the Supreme Leader.
 
Alireza Nader is a senior policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a lecturer on Iranian politics at the George Washington University.
 
Read Alireza Nader's piece - Iran: A Rough Year in 2013
 
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 

 

Tags: Ahmadinejad, Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear, P5+1, Sanctions, United States
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What are Prospects for Progress at New Talks?

February 4, 2013 | 3:03pm
Bruce Riedel
 
The world’s six major powers and Iran are due to hold the fourth round of talks in Kazakhstan on February 26. What has to happen to make these talks a success—even if it just means enough to hold a fifth round?
 
            Iran would need to announce a tangible reversal of its enrichment program for the talks to be a success. But, for those who believe like Churchill that “to jaw, jaw” is always better than “to war, war,” agreeing to a fifth round of talks would be good enough.
 

How important is Iran in John Kerry’s first year as secretary of state—and why?

      Iran is certain to be a central issue on Secretary of State Kerry’s agenda. The United States is reaching the moment of truth--one way or another--on Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s technological capacity is getting to a critical point.
 
      On the other hand, Kerry is likely to face a large number of burning crises when he takes office. The conflict in Syria will be a pressing one. There are serious security issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. Tensions between North and South Korea could boil over. The territorial dispute between China and Japan could intensify. So Kerry’s hands will be more than full. But Iran will be high on his agenda.
 
What factors might encourage a meaningful deal on the nuclear issue?
 
            The growing impact of economic sanctions is the main factor encouraging Iran to make a deal. The Iranians are clearly hurting as sanctions are causing serious distress. But the impact of sanctions may not be a deciding factor in Tehran’s final analysis. Iran has been under U.S. sanctions for three decades. It also survived high inflation and austerity during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Other countries have endured sanctions for long periods as well.
 
            Maybe the country will suffer so badly economically that the leadership has no choice but to cry uncle. Iran’s Central Bank reported that the annual inflation rate hit 27.4 percent at the end of 2012, one of the highest official levels ever reported in Iran. And the actual rate could be three or four times higher than the official figure.
 
What are the obstacles to diplomacy for Iran?
 
            The main obstacle to diplomacy is Iran’s refusal to give up, in any meaningful way, the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. The “capacity” to build a weapon is the knowledge of how to make and assemble the disparate parts and to have all the raw material—which differs from actually building a weapon.
 
            The kinds of deals that would be acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem--and London, Paris and others--would include inspection regimes and safekeeping mechanisms. This monitoring would make it hard—if not impossible—for Iran to acquire the capacity to build a future weapon. Such deals would have no value for the Islamic Republic.
 
            The intentions of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or those around him are unknown. The U.S. intelligence community seems to have concluded that Tehran has not made the final decision to build a bomb. And I think there is serious reason to believe that they haven’t made a final irrevocable decision.
 
            But my estimate is the Iranians are unlikely to give up the capacity to produce a weapon in short order because they probably believe they need one. Almost any Iranian national security advisor would probably argue that a nuclear weapons capability is the only guarantor of independence and deterrence. Clearly Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, surrounded by many enemies prepared to act against it. So how could Iran prevent them from taking military action? The track record of the past decade is clear. If you have nuclear weapons, you have deterrence.  Pakistan has them and, they deter India. Afghanistan and Iraq did not, and America invaded. Libya gave up its nuclear capability and was invaded.
 
            Arguments about whether or not Tehran is prepared to stop short of building or testing a bomb are intense and important. But the Iranians may decide that the only way to ensure their retention of that capacity is to build a bomb.
 
What are the obstacles to diplomacy for the United States?
 
            In the end, war is too costly, unpredictable and dangerous to be a practical option. And diplomacy shows no signs of imminent success.
 
            So the real challenge is that Kerry and Obama face their own policy trap—and the absence of other alternatives. They have said that containing a nuclear Iran is not an option—and is off the table. So if diplomacy fails, war is the only alternative. That stark choice is a mistake. 
 
            But there is a good chance that Kerry and Obama will bail themselves out of this trap by reopening the door to containment, although they would probably call it something else.
 
Is there a framework of a viable deal emerging?
           
            The United States should make every effort to find a diplomatic solution, even if chances are slim. But I am pessimistic about a viable deal emerging. I think Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability, which is very understandable given events of the last decade in Iran’s part of the world. Countries that do not have a nuclear weapons capability get invaded by the United States and its allies—from Afghanistan to Iraq and Libya. Countries with the capability do not get invaded, most notably Pakistan but also North Korea.
 
            This strategic lesson has long been apparent to the Iranians. A nuclear weapon is the only real assurance of their independence and territorial integrity. The United States cannot escape the history of the last decade. All the well-meaning promises of statesman like John Kerry and Barack Obama are unlikely to convince the Iranians that they are better off in terms of their long-term security without a nuclear weapons capability.
 
Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center, was special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.
 
 
Photo credit: U.S. Department of State via Wikimedia Commons
Tags: Iran, Khamenei, Negotiations, Nuclear, P5 1, United States
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