OPERATION STEADFAST HISTORICAL SUMMARY

A HISTORY OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND (1972-1973)



HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA

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Kalergis on 23 August had established a suspense date of 30 September for a complete update of the Detailed Plan, the STEADFAST planning group listed some ten major unresolved issues as of 20 September. This fact alone militated against meeting the 30 September suspense and served to underscore a significant need for major decisions in the near future. Although the CONARC plan for management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program had been submitted to the Project Manager on 8 September, no specific guidance had been received concerning its approval. This action impinged upon the staff of the Training and Doctrine Command, the staffs of the subordinate armies, and the establishment of firm space requirements and costs. In addition, it impacted upon certain installations in that spaces and personnel would have to be transferred from Fort McPherson to Fort Bragg, from Fort Meade to Fort Knox, from Fort Sam Houston to Fort Riley, and from the Presidio of San Francisco to Fort Lewis. In the same vein, a decision briefing was scheduled for General Abrams on 21 September regarding the concept of Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR) for management of the Reserve Components. As an adjunct to proper management of the Reserve Components, General Haines had expressed the desire to retain some dedicated advisers at the battalion level. The concept of Readiness Assistance Regions affected the staffing of the subordinate armies, the general officer personnel lists, as well as the costing and garrison staffing at a number of installations.[63]

The CONARC study for establishing the three major combat developments centers was still incomplete. While an informal inprocess review of the study was completed on 20 September, Forts Leavenworth, Lee, and Benjamin Harrison had been tasked to provide analyses of a functional center with a suspense of 29 September. The final configuration of the three centers would have a major impact on the combat developments process itself, on the overall spaces allocated to the Training and Doctrine Command, and the staffing of both the Training and Doctrine Command headquarters and of the agencies at the three locations. Likewise, work on a finalized schools model was not complete since the CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training had just hosted a conference of School Commandants to integrate their ideas on the proposed schools model. The draft of the schools model would have to be staffed through CONARC headquarters with a probable completion date of late October. The lack of a firm doctrinal side for the schools model impacted upon the integration of the Combat Developments Command Agencies into their respective schools as well as upon the actual job descriptions. Still in the areas of schools, no decision had yet been reached by the Department of the Army on the assignment of the Judge Advocate

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63 MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG G.J. Duquemin and BG L.M. Jones, 20 Sept 72, subj: On-Going Actions as of 20 September 1972.

General School, the Medical Department schools, the Army Logistics Management Center, and the Defense Department schools. This factor impacted upon the combat developments processes, the staffing of the Training and Doctrine Command, the organization of the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and upon overall spaces and costs for the reorganization.[64]

In other matters concerned with the Department of the Army, the lack of resolution with regard to the functions of the new U.S. Army Health Services Command was significantly affecting the organization of schools for the Training and Doctrine Command, the location of the Medical Combat Developments Agency, and on the status of Fort Sam Houston, Tex., as an installation. In addition, the Department of the Army had not yet established an official position concerning the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and direct management of installations. This guidance was essential for alignment of the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of both new major commands. No reply had been received from the Department of the Army concerning the STEADFAST Management Information Systems (MIS) Concept which included plans for handling personnel reporting in the event that the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS) was not operational. Neither had replies been received to the two letters from General Pepke to the Project Manager and to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel concerning this problem. Because of the lack of guidance for the development of Management Information Systems, all STEADFAST planning in this area was based entirely upon assumptions. All of these factors militated against any useful update of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan by the end of September as directed by General Kalergis in his 23 August guidance.[65]

Establishment of the STEADFAST Steering Group

At the end of August 1972, it was evident that the level and scope of activities in connection with Operation STEADFAST had increased the involvement of all CONARC staff offices in STEADFAST actions. It was also evident that the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization would be levying many and varied requirements on the U.S. Continental Army Command for the refinement and expansion of material contained in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which had been submitted on 20 July. In order to ensure the necessary control and co-ordination of actions concerned with Operation STEADFAST, the CONARC Chief of Staff rescinded the charter of the

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64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

STEADFAST Study Group on 22 August 1972. This action was necessary since the study group had been strictly a planning organization. Concurrently, the former Study Group was redesignated as the STEADFAST Steering Group (SSG), an element of the Office of the Chief of Staff. The Steering Group would function as the overall co-ordinator of STEADFAST actions which would have to be referred to the functional staff offices of the headquarters for required action. In this regard, all STEADFAST tasking actions would emanate either from the Office of the Chief of Staff or from the STEADFAST Steering Group, itself. By designation, the STEADFAST Steering Group was composed of the three Specials Assistants to the Chief of Staff -- Brigadier Generals Duquemin, Jones, and West -- and all personnel formerly assigned to the STEADFAST Study Group. Personnel authorized to act for the STEADFAST Steering Group were the three Special Assistants, along with Colonels E.M. Fry and J.J. Brockmyer, the designated Deputy Special Assistants for Operation STEADFAST. General Pepke directed that all STEADFAST actions would be processed through the STEADFAST Steering Group prior to forwarding to the Command Group for final decision; all policy decisions concerning STEADFAST were reserved to the Command Group.[66]

Management Concepts for the Training and Doctrine Command

The University Concept

The introduction of the "University Concept" for the control of Army schooling into the approved guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization convinced General Haines that all Army schools, except the U.S. Military Academy, should be placed under the control of the new Training and Doctrine Command. This concept would provide for educational integrity and economy and would parallel the placement of all strategic forces and reserve forces under the command of the Force Command. Centralized responsibility for individual military training and education under a single commander would assure that the training product was directly related to the actual requirements of the Army. The organizational concept developed by the STEADFAST planning group was analagous to a university system with administrative control on the main campus exerted over satellite colleges granting 2-year associate degrees. This co-ordinated instructional effort would avoid curricular duplications and provide for overall economies. The university concept was not merely a matter of balancing curricula and training programs, but actually provided for integrated instructional substance, procedures, plans, and personnel. The system also would make use of sophisticated management techniques to improve

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66 DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CofS to the CONARC Stf, 22 Aug 72, subj: Establishment of the STEADFAST Steering Group.

the use of resources at a lower cost. The U.S. Continental Army Command commanded twenty-three Army schools, while the Training and Doctrine Command, under the University Concept, was to command thirty-five schools. The twelve schools not under the U.S. Continental Army Command were monitored by five different elements, a factor which inhibited the use of standard measures of effectiveness and standard management techniques. With the consolidation of all of the Army's schools, the Training and Doctrine Command would have the capability to monitor the Army school system in its entirety, thus ensuring better co-ordinated training and education programs for Army personnel throughout their careers. The twelve non-CONARC schools to be added to the Training and Doctrine Command were as follows:[67]

Defense Information School
Joint Military Packaging Training Center
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General School
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
U.S. Army Management Engineering Training Agency
U.S. Army Materiel Command Ammunition School
U.S. Army Medical Field Service School
U.S. Army Medical Optical and Maintenance Agency
U.S. Army Medical Veterinary School
U.S. Army Security Agency School
U.S. Army War College
The Defense Language Institute

As indicated above, General Kalergis in mid-August indicated that the University Concept was a major problem and that the concept name was being changed to The Army School System (TASS). By the end of September, the Army War College had been removed from consideration for transfer to the Training and Doctrine Command; the Army Materiel Command strongly opposed the transfer of its schools and the Army Logistics Management Center; and the proposed U.S. Army Health Services Command intended to retain command of all the Medical Department schools and activities.[68] By mid-December the decisions had been made at the Department of the Army level

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67 Incl 1, "Executive Summary," to ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCofSA, 20 Jul 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, pp. 19 - 20.

68 (1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones and BG G.J. Duquemin, 14 Sep 72, subj: Telecon between MG Kalergis (DA PMR) and BG Duquemin and BG Jones. (2) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones and BG G.J. Duquemin, 20 Sep 72, subj: On Going Actions as of 20 September 1972.

that only the Defense Information School and the Defense Language Institute would be added to the schools then under the command of the U.S. Continental Army Command. Thus ended the University Concept which would have placed all Army schools, and those for which the Army acted as Executive Agent, under the control of the Training and Doctrine Command.[69]

The Three Center Concept -- Task Force ATLAS

The need for a mid-management level in the combat developments processes became apparent to both General Haines and the STEADFAST planning group by the time that the Outline Plan had been completed and submitted to the Department of the Army in May 1972. Consequently, General Haines directed the establishment of Task Force ATLAS to determine the need for, and feasibility of, a Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Va., and an Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., in addition to the proposed Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. In addition, the task force was to determine the appropriate organizational structure for all three centers along with associated missions and functions. In accomplishing its mission, the task force was to determine the existing methods of operation; survey existing and potential organizational problem areas; determine the operational and functional guidelines as envisioned if centers were established; determine appropriate structures, chain of command, and locations for the centers; determine the relationship of each center to one another and the interface with the Army War College; determine the doctrinal responsibility for the Division, Corps, Field Army, and Theater Army Support Commands within the operational parameters provided by Fort Leavenworth; determine the command relationships of the Center Commanders and the School Commandants; determine what portions of the Army Logistics Management Center and the Logistics Documents Systems Research Agency (LDSRA) would be integrated into the centers; and determine the relationships between the centers and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.[70]

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Task Force. By mid-June, the Task Force ATLAS study group had completed its preliminary studies and was ready to present its conclusions and recommendations for a command decision prior to inclusion in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. The task force defined the Combined Arms Center at

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69 Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCofSA, 18 Dec 72, subj: Revision to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, dated 20 July 1972 (C2, Phase II).

70 CONARC SSG, 15 May 72, "Charter for Task Force ATLAS."

Fort Leavenworth as an activity responsible for the development of operational doctrine, organization, and selected materiel needs for combat and combat support forces within assigned areas of proponency for division through field army. It also was a location where resident and nonresident instruction was conducted in the exercise of combined arms command and the functions of the general staff for the Army in the field. The Logistics Center at Fort Lee was defined as an activity which made available at one central point those personnel and services specialized in the science of planning and carrying out the training, education, and doctrinal aspects of supply, maintenance, and movement of forces and related logistical functions. The Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison was defined as an activity which made available at one central point those personnel and services to provide the focal point for development, co-ordination, and communication of the Army doctrine and education related to the functional areas of personnel, administration, finance, military justice, religious activities, and medical service.[71]

On 17 June 1972, the task force recommended that Combined Arms and Logistics Centers be established but that the idea of the Administrative Center should be eliminated. A Combined Arms Center should be established at Fort Leavenworth under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command by combining both the Command and General Staff College and most of the elements of the Combat Developments Command's Combat Systems Group, along with specific elements of the Concepts and Force Design Group and the Intelligence and Control Systems Group. Likewise, a Logistics Center should be established at Fort Lee under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command, using the personnel assets and facilities of the Combat Developments Command's Personnel and Logistics Systems Group. Additional assets would come from the Combat Developments Command Maintenance Agency -- which would be disestablished and merged into the center -- the major portion of the Logistics Document Systems Research Agency (LDSRA), and the LOGEX Planning Group. The task force further recommended that all logistical training, educational, and doctrinal developments functions be placed under the Training and Doctrine Command by the transfer of the Army Logistics Management Center from the Army Materiel Command. While the task force recommended against the establishment of the Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, it did recommend that the Combat Developments Command's Personnel Administrative Services Agency (PASA) be integrated into the Adjutant General and Finance Schools to accomplish the combined education, training, and combat developments missions under the command of the Training and Doctrine

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71 DF TF ATLAS, SSG to CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: Task Force ATLAS Study, w/2 incls.

Command. On 20 June, General Haines indicated that he still desired the establishment of the Administrative Center and that action should be taken to correct this matter in the Detailed Plan. He pointed out this was the time to bring up the issue of the Commandant versus the Deputy Commandant at the Army schools. General Haines indicated that it would be appropriate to designate the individual who actually ran the school as the Commandant and to differentiate this position from that of the Installation Commander or the Center Commander.[72]

Further Guidance by the CONARC Commander. At a briefing concerning Task Force ATLAS on 11 July 1972, General Haines emphasized that the Three Center Concept would have to stress strong middle management. Because of the span of control of the Training and Doctrine Command, middle management was essential to relieve the burden on the higher headquarters in the area of combat developments. Therefore, the centers should have tasking authority over the various schools for doctrine and development only. General Haines directed that the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth should be a lieutenant general, with a major general as commandant of the Command and General Staff College and a major general supervising the Combat Doctrine and Developments Activity. The two major generals would serve as deputy commanders, responsible to the commander in their areas of interest. A senior major general should command the Personnel and Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison since that center included actual command of the Adjutant General and Finance Schools and the Personnel and Administrative Doctrine and Development Activity. However, the situation at Fort Lee was to be different; a senior major general -- not necessarily Quartermaster -- would command the Logistics Center and the Army Logistics Management Center, while the Quartermaster School would be commanded by a brigadier general. Both the Quartermaster School and the LOGEX Planning Group would be tenants on the installation which would be commanded by the Logistics Center. This guidance resulted in a revision of the Task Force ATLAS concept just a few days prior to the suspense date for the Detailed Plan.[73]

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(1) Ibid. (2) MFR, BG R.L. West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and Status of Planning Actions (STEADFAST).

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(1) Memo, Cdr CDC to Cdr CONARC, 11 Jul 72, subj: Combined Arms Center. (2) Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, Sp Asst to CofS to the CONARC CofS, 12 Jul 72, subj: Three Center Concept (Task Force ATLAS).

Additional Guidance of the Project Manager for Reorganization. While General Kalergis had included some minor guidelines concerning the Three Center Concept in his overall guidance for the revision of the Detailed Plan, he issued definitive guidance concerning this concept on 5 October. At that time, General Kalergis directed that the three centers be structured so as to be strong focal points for the formulation, development, and integration of new concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel requirements, and functional systems. These centers would report directly to the Training and Doctrine Command and would manage the combat developments programs as designated by that headquarters. The centers would not directly command the service schools, but would have tasking authority for combat developments activities over certain schools associated with the respective center's primary functional area of responsibility. In tasking schools outside their immediate purview, the centers would pass such tasking through the appropriate functional center. Each center would be responsible for maintaining consistency in the doctrine for which it had primary functional responsibility, to include its promulgation throughout the Army School System. Each center would be responsible for the curriculum and instructional consistency at all service schools for that portion of the curriculum for which it had primary responsibility. Consequently, the three centers would be charged with monitoring doctrine dissemination at all Army schools. The service schools, however, were the grassroots base for the training and combat developments efforts of the Training and Doctrine Command. The schools would provide the basic building blocks which were to be used by the centers in developing organization, doctrine, and materiel requirements.[74] The later guidance resulted in a complete rewrite of Volume B, Book I, of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, with the latest revision taking place on 22 December 1972.

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74 Incl 1, "Concept of Operations of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Functional Centers," to Ltr DACS-PMR, DA PMR to CONARC CofS, 5 Oct 72, re: The Three Center Concept.

Training and Doctrine Command, with command responsibility exercised through four ROTC Regional Commands located at Forts Bragg, Knox, Riley, and Lewis. The new ROTC organizational structure approved for implementation provided a highly visible and responsive management system for the administration of the U.S. Army's largest source of qualified commissioned officers. Within this dedicated ROTC management system, policy decisions would be expedited, command response would be rapid, and operating costs could be easily identified, thus enhancing resource management and programing. The assigning of a major general as the Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC at the Training and Doctrine Command gave proper emphasis and prestige to the total program through an interface with the highest civilian educational authorities. This general officer, along with the four brigadier generals commanding the ROTC Regions, increased the senior officer supervision of the operating elements five-fold. In addition, each regional commander also served as the ROTC summer camp commander for his area, thus eliminating the requirement for additional general officers and providing for close year-round co-ordination with installation commanders for summer camp planning.

The Schools Model. The STEADFAST planners had developed a standardized model for all of the schools of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command which were now required to combine their training mission with a combat developments mission. The approved organizational model is shown on Chart 20 (page 150 above). The principal feature of this organization was the establishment of a Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments at the same level as the Deputy Commandant for Training and Education. The approved organization merged the existing missions and functions of the Combat Developments Command agencies with those of the Army service or branch school most closely associated with that combat developments mission. It also helped to facilitate the integration of the instructor/student input into doctrinal development. As a result, the commandant of each school was assigned overall responsibility for both the combat developments mission and the training mission.

The Functional Centers for Combat Developments. Three functional centers had been developed to integrate doctrine and developments as the middle managers for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison were responsible for integrating the combat developments efforts of the various schools under tasking authority delegated by the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth served as the focal point for the integration of all combined arms doctrine developed by other organizations; developed appropriate force development materials for combat and combat support

Chart 28 -- THE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS MID-MANAGEMENT CONCEPT, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND THE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS CENTERS

THE COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH



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THE LOGISTICS CENTER, FORT LEE



* TENANTS
- - - - - COORDINATION
-·-·-·- TASKING, INVOLVING WHOLESALE/RETAIL LDG INTERFACE

THE ADMINISTRATION CENTER, FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON



* ALSO COMDT INSTITUTE OF ADMIN

forces for divisions and echelons above divisions; and integrated concepts for the personnel and logistics headquarters associated with those same command levels. The Administration Center served as the focal point for the development and integration of the Army's administrative doctrine, organizations, materiel requirements, and systems development functions resulting from the efforts of that activity, itself, and other organizations. In addition, the Administration Center was responsible for evaluating the administrative education and training at all Army service schools and colleges. The Logistics Center at Fort Lee served as the focal point for those combat developments systems related to the management and integration of the Army's logistics concepts, plans, doctrine, organization, materiel requirements, and systems. The Logistics Center also was responsible for reviewing and evaluating logistics systems development and logistics-oriented education and training at all related Army service schools and colleges. The organizational structures and command relationships for the functional centers is shown on Chart 28. It should be noted, however, that in contrast to the other two functional centers, the Logistics Center was only a tenant activity at Fort Lee, with a mere tasking relationship to the Army Logistics Management Center which remained assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC).

The U.S. Army Forces Command. The revised and updated organizational structure of the new U.S. Army Forces Command and its subordinate elements is shown on Charts 18 and 19 (pages 140 and 141 above). In contrast to his counterpart, the commander of the new U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, was charged with performing missions both as an Army component commander of designated joint commands and as a major Army commander of the Department of the Army. As an Army component commander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, was designated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Readiness Command (CINCARRED), and was further designated as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Atlantic Command (CINCARLANT), for the sole purpose of developing contingency plans. This latter command would be activated only on orders of the Army Chief of Staff when so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a major Army commander of the Department of the Army, the commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command directly commanded all Active Army troop units in the continental United States, except those assigned to another command or agency by the Department of the Army; the subordinate numbered armies in the continental United States (CONUSA); all assigned U.S. Army Reserve TOE and TDA troop program units and reinforcement training units within the continental United States; and those subordinate commands, installations, and activities directly assigned by the Department of the Army. One major exception to these command relationships stipulated that the Commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command exercised command, less operational control, over the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions.

end of February 1973, that higher headquarters took the first step in the reorganization process when it directed the reassignment of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command from its status as a major command of the Department of the Army to that of a subordinate major command of the U.S. Continental Army Command, effective 1 March 1973. At the same time, the Department of the Army directed the establishment of the U.S. Army Health Services Command as a major command of the Department of the Army with headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., effective 1 April 1973.[45]

In May 1973, the Department of the Army directed the actual establishment of the two new major Army commands, effective on the approved target date of 1 July 1973. With the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the need for a separate U.S. Army Combat Developments Command ceased to exist. Consequently, the Combat Developments Command (-) was to be disestablished as a major subordinate command of the U.S. Continental Army Command, effective 1 July 1973.[46] With the establishment of the U.S. Army Forces Command, the necessity arose for reassigning the U.S. Continental Army Command's subordinate CONUS armies, as well as the U.S. Army Reserve units assigned thereto. Effective 1 July 1973, the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies were relieved of their assignment to the U.S. Continental Army Command and assigned as major subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Forces Command. At the same time, the Department of the Army directed that all U.S. Army Reserve units assigned to each respective subordinate CONUS army would remain in their current assignment. This left the U.S. Army Forces Command to accomplish the realignment of the CONUS army boundaries and the reassignment of U.S. Army Reserve units as stipulated in the approved operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.[47]

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional). The U.S. Continental Army Command established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) at Fort Monroe, Va., on 1 March 1973. The commander of the new provisional command was charged with the mission of both an Army Component Commander and a Major Field Commander of the Department of the Army as set forth in Army Regulation 10-7 and special instructions. In addition to his other duties, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was designated as Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional).

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45 DA GO 7, 26 Feb 73.

46 DA GO 16, 18 May 73.

47 DA GO 23, 27 Jun 73.

The staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to commence such internal reorganization actions as were applicable to establish both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command as reflected in the tables of distribution which previously had been approved by the Department of the Army. These actions were to be taken so that the two new major commands could become fully operational on 1 July 1973.[48]

With the transfer of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command to the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command on 1 March 1973, concurrent action was taken by the latter command to reassign the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) from the Combat Developments Command, proper, to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, where it was placed under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments.[49] Numerous other actions in the combat developments area were taken at the same time, particularly with regard to the new functional centers and the existing combat developments agencies which previously had been collocated with an appropriate Army Service School. At Fort Leavenworth, Kans., the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Leavenworth, was redesignated as the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth with the Commander, Fort Leavenworth, assuming the dual command functions. At the same time, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was relieved from assignment to the U.S. Continental Army Command and assigned to the new Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. To complete the new center, the Combat Developments Command Combat Systems Group was redesignated the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA); relieved from assignment to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command; and assigned to the control of the new Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.[50] At Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Benjamin Harrison, was redesignated as the U.S. Army Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison. Concurrently, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Personnel and Administrative Services Agency was redesignated as the U.S. Army Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA). Both the latter activity and the U.S. Army Administrative Schools Center were relieved from their current assignments and reassigned to the control of the new U.S. Army Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison.[51] In

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48 CONARC GO's 21, 23 Feb 73, and 39, 1 March 73.

49 CONARC GO 19, 23 Feb 73.

50 CONARC GO's 24, 30, and 32, all dated 23 Feb 73.

51 CONARC GO's 26, 29, and 31, all dated 23 Feb 73.

a related move sixteen branch functional agencies of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command were relieved from assignment to that parent organization and reassigned to the control of the pertinent Army service schools with which they were collocated.[52]

The third of the three functional centers, however -- the U.S. Army Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Va., -- was not organized until 1 July 1973, concurrent with the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.[53]

The U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional). The U.S. Continental Army Command established the U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional) at Fort McPherson, Ga., on 1 March 1973. The commander of this new provisional command was charged with the missions of both an Army Component Commander and of a Major Field Commander of the Department of the Army as set forth in Army Regulation 10-7. He was additionally responsible for the missions assigned to Third U.S. Army in its currently approved table of distribution. In addition to his other duties, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was designated as Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional). As an additional duty, the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, served as the Chief of Staff for the new provisional major command. During the provisional period of operations, both administrative and logistical support were to be provided for the new major command by the Commander, Third U.S. Army. The Third U.S. Army staff was directed to commence internal reorganization actions so as to establish the organization of the U.S. Army Forces Command as reflected in the approved Operation STEADFAST tables of organization. All actions were to be taken so that the new command would be fully operational by 1 July 1973.[54]

Actions also were taken during the provisional period of operations to reorganize the subordinate CONUS armies to their newly approved configurations on 1 July 1973. While, as directed by the Department of the Army, the CONUS armies were transferred from the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command to the U.S. Army Forces Command on 1 July 1973, exceptions were made with regard to residual CONUS army/U.S. Continental Army Command functions relating primarily to summer training activities of the Reserve Components and the preparation of the necessary final reports.

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52 CONARC GO 27, 23 Feb 73.

53 CONARC GO's 60, 29 Mar 73, and 246, 8 Jun 73.

54 CONARC GO's 25, 23 Feb 73, and 38, 1 Mar 73.