Obs/S

AOE

ATSG-DDO 12 Jul 91

Memorandum for Record

Subject: ALBF GOWS, 9-10 Jul 91

1. CASCOM hosted an ALBF General Officer Workshop at Ft Lee 9-10 Jul 91 for all TRADOC schools, integrating centers and HQ TRADOC. The focus was on CSS organization design at division and an introduction to CSS structure at corps. The agenda is at encl 1.

2. Senior participants were Gen Foss, LTG Wishart, and LTG Salomon. PSS participants were MG Brooks, Col Daugherty, Col Simms, Col Heard, CH (Col) Windmiller, Maj Currie, Maj Morrison, Ms Hawley and Mr Bordner.

3. MG Tait, Director of the Operation Desert Storm Special Study Group led off with a 90 minute presentation of "emerging observations." A complete copy of his briefing charts have been provided to DOTD and an extract of the issues associated with PSS is enclosed (encl 2).

4. SSC and proponents made three presentations on the second day of the workshop. Col Daugherty briefed "PSS Audit Trail" and "Personnel Group Design" and Col Heard briefed "Finance Group Design."

a. PSS Audit Trail (Encl 3). This briefing was a follow-up on two issues from the June GOWS: the audit trail and the optimum location for the supporting Strength Management, Personnel Operations, Safety, and Replacement sections. There was considerable discussion.

(1) MG Brooks stated that the automation must be in place for this concept to work, and if for some reason the 31 personnel are not resourced, division commanders will reach out and "get" the required number of support personnel, just as they did in Saudi Arabia.

(2) Col Daugherty mentioned that the alternative of returning the PSC to Division will be discussed with senior personnel officers scheduled to visit Fort Benjamin Harrison later this month. Gen Foss made a comment about "objectivity" and the need to change the military symbol above the PS Command block from two lines (battalion) to one line (company). During the discussion the status of the "Soldier Data Tag" (Individually Carried Record (ICR)) surfaced. LTG Salomon told Gen Foss that SSC will provide a current paper on its status. Later the TRADOC commander's XO provided a suspense date of "week of 29 July" for the paper and then CASCOM injected a 24 July suspense for clearance of the paper through CASCOM.

3-26

(3) LTG Wishart asked if OTJAG concurred with the JAG School concept of reducing the number of JA's at division level. Maj Currie, representing the JAG School answered affirmatively. Actually the redistribution of JAG assets was done in order to comply with the AirLand Operations concept of a small division headquarters. There are two important considerations: one, the JA's moved to corps will still support division soldiers during the appropriate stages and secondly, at some point in the future, the JAG School could possibly propose that the CJA section at Brigade headquarters be increased.

(4) The SSC position on issue number 2 was not challenged. MG Knudson advised that he would show a chart later that indicated the division headquarters was the same size as before - about 400. (Note: such a chart was not shown.)

b. Personnel Group Design (Encl 4).

(1) Col Daugherty emphasized the shortcomings of the current design: communications, automation, and structure. MG Brooks explained how the organization had been developed as a no-growth venture by combining the old P&A Bn and Corps AG assets.

(2) There was general discussion about personnel accountability problems.

(a) Gen Foss referred to SIDPERS as a peacetime stovepipe system designed to support PERSCOM. He said it should be a wartime system to facilitate strength management at the tactical level.

(b) LTG Wishart and BG Orton (Chemical Sch) questioned the ability of the personnel accountability system to account for cross-attaching. MG Brooks stated that the existing software has a "task-forcing" capability, but that it does not work very well.

(c) Corps' in Op Desert Storm couldn't account for people. Although doctrine says accountability is managed by corps it hasn't been done that way in peacetime. Further, the TDY war exacerbated the accountability problem.

(3) LTG Wishart asked if we had given additional thought to consolidating the Personnel and Finance Group into an Admin Group.

(4) Gen Foss thought future organization charts should be "split" to display the organization's major functions, similar to the type chart used in the audit trail briefing which showed functions of Division Strength Management, Personnel Operations, Safety and Replacement sections.

c. Finance Group Design (Encl 5).

(1) Col Heard inserted a slide showing the tremendous amount of cash taken into country, early-on, by the U.S. Army. Gen Foss remained unconvinced that the USAF didn't do it better and bigger. In summary remarks later, Gen Foss said "we [U.S. Army] should be in mindset to be able to buy right away and don't worry about it . . ." There was implied reference to subsequent audits.

(2) Col Heard summarized by saying there were two significant issues which must be considered: the absence of the deployable battlefield pay system with a communications link to CONUS and the problems associated with not deploying a Theater Finance Command. BG Kelley, Sig Sch said their decision to not deploy a Theater Communications Command-Army to theater contributed to the communications link problem.

(3) LTG Wishart asked again why AG and Finance organizations could not be consolidated at the Group level. Col Heard responded by saying that same staff finance personnel who provide functional expertise also have command and control responsibilities; therefore, it would not be feasible to have other than Finance personnel command the organization. Although we believe LTG Wishart's questions were sincere we did not bring away the feeling that there is a requirement to restudy this old issue.

d. The issue of subordinating the Personnel and Finance Groups to the COSCOM did not come up.

5. Judge Advocate, Chaplain, and Public Affairs had backup charts and were prepared to explain how their organizations provided support at corps level, if they had been asked.

6. Gen Foss' concluding remarks.

a. Remember, we are developing a "clear alternative" based on the AirLand Operations concept. The intent is to develop a better way, a different way. We are not building a clear alternative for a 1991 Army, we are building a clear alternative for a 1995 and beyond Army - based on the AirLand Operations concept.

b. So far, it appears that the major changes are at battalion level and above. At platoon and company/battery level (at least in maneuver organizations) he sees little change. He said if there is no advantage you have to ask yourself if it is necessary to change design.

c. We must challenge planning factors used to preclude developing unnecessary force structure. We must look at the way we fight regional contingencies. There will be a long warning time in a central Europe scenario - so it may be necessary to develop two sets of usage factors. Apparently we moved 99 percent more ammunition and spare parts to Saudi than was required. When we question planning factors it must be with a clear alternative for better command and control in mind.

d. Combat Service Support is involved in getting ready for war. Commanders expect low casualties, accurate and simultaneous pay servies and knowing where everyone is (personnel accountability).

7. There was no discussion of future ALBF (now referred to as AirLand Operations (ALO)) events or milestones. I queried CAC action officers following the workshop and they are awaiting additional guidance. For the record enclosed is a copy of the latest ALBF milestones chart provided at the June GOWS (encl 6).

8. Gen Foss stated that his change of command ceremony will be at 0900, 23 Aug 91. His successor, to be named, will hold a commander's/commandants meeting from 1300 to 1600 that day. LTG Wishart's change of command ceremony will be at 0900, 16 Aug 91. His successor will be LTG Shoffner.

B. Bordner
B. Bordner
FS Br, DCD

6 Encl
1. Agenda
2. Extract
3. Audit
4. Pers Gp
5. Fin Gp
6. Milestones

CF:
Cdr
Dep Cdr
Cmdt, AG Sch
Cmdt, FI Sch
Cmdt, JA Sch
Cmdt, CH Sch
C, PAPA

Dir, Tng & Doctrine
Dir, Cbt Developments
C, PSSPO
C, CAD
C, OMSD, DCD
C, AD, DCD
C, C4, DCD
C, CSDm DCD

CPT Sedlak
Mr Delaney
Ms Hawley
CASCOM AO
(CPT Fehn)
CACSCOM LO
to CAC
(LTC McCabe)

Encl 2

Emerging *Strategic, Operational* and *Tactical* Issues from Operation Desert Shield/Storm

Presented by MG Tait,
Special Study Group Director,

ALBF GOWS 9 July 1991

PSS Extract

Extract prepared by SSC (ATSG-DDO) 16 July 1991

bb/psss1

Strategic Level

Force Requirements and Readiness

- Unclear lines of funding for units hampered the mobilization process.
- RC payroll rollover took too long.

bb/psss2

Operational Level

Support

- Troops did not revelve mail because of inadequate structure, training, and doctrine. (postal units)
- Lack of a single personnel system that works in peace and war negatively impacted all personnel areas.
- Levels of personnel accountability, strength reporting, and casualty reporting were below standards.
- The late deployment of PSS units negatively impacted all personnel functions.
- Fiscal regulatory laws and policies were unresponsive to the Theater commander's need to support contracting and construction.
- Contracting support is critical for contingency operations.
- Lack of a deployable automated input system with corresponding telecommunications support caused military pay change input to JUMPS-Army to take too long and limited feedback of pay status.

bb/psss3

Operational Level

Support (continued)

- Finance doctrine does not recognize loss of manpower from MTOE units to support CONUS installations.
- Complex and out-of-date rates for entitlements made a complex pay system more cumbersome.
- Promotions not imputted to Single Source Database resulted in no corresponding pay increase.

C2

- The Personnel Group (PG) is not structured to provide command and control to personnel companies and detachments.

Combat Service Support

- Squads, crews, and teams deployed to theater for the purpose of WSRO were used as individual replacements.

bb/psss4

Encl 3



Divisional PSS Audit Trail



aa/audit15

ALBF GOWS 10 Jul 91

Soldier Support Center

ALBF GOWS 91

Briefing Purpose

- Followup on *two* issues from June GOWS:

1 Migration of Divisional PSS Elements

Audit Trail

- Focus on AG organizations

2 Requirement for Personnel support organization somewhere in the Division

C2 Issue

Added ? Put PSCs back in the Division

Audit Trail

Divisional PSS

	Pre-AOE	ALB	ALO
G1	9	5	6
AG	1		
Str Mgt		13	16
Pers Ops		15	12
Safety			1
Repl		7	8 2/6
Admin Svc		8	
Repl Det	17		
AG Co	292		
Div Band	319	41 89	41 84
Fin Co	91	2	
Chap	4	4	2
SJA	35	28	11 8/3
PA	9	4	4
PSS	458	127	101

aa/audit1 25 Jun 91

Audit Trail

Division Personnel Force Structure

	Pre-AOE	ALB Div	ALB Corps	ALO
G1	9	5		6
AG	1			
Str Mgt		13		16
Pers Ops		15		12
Admin Svcs		8		
Safety				1
Repl Det/Sec	17	7 (48)		2
Ofc of MILPO			2	
AG Co HQ	24		17	
Ofc of AG	3			
Admin Svcs	24		8	
Postal Div	27			
MWR	4			
Pers Svcs Div	3			
Records	80		45	
Management	34		30	
Actions	29		26 (114)	
Data Base Mgt	35		16	
Band	29 (292)	41 (89)		41
Personnel Total	319 (- 86)	233		84

(31) 6 to Bde

aa/divno5

Pre-AOE Functions

MGT	ACTIONS	RECORDS	POSTAL
Coord repl/ assign repl	Casualty management	All	All
Str accounting	Casualty operations		
Pers accounting	PSS Planning		
Class/reclass	Marriage application		
Appt/prom/ reduction	Branch transfers		
Application for schools/tng/ sp assignments	Tvl clr/passports		
Reassignments	Security Clearances		
	ID cards		
	Flags		
	Congressionals		
	Elim/sep/ret/ Reup		
	Leaves & passes		
	Service benefits		

Functions moved from Div to Corps

aa/funct20 10 Jul 91

DRAFT

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION PLAN (IEP)

FOR

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE PERSONNEL SUPPORT SYSTEM (AOEPSS)

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

28 NOVEMBER 1984

HQ, US ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER

ATTN: ATSG-DDN

FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, IN 46216-5380

BY: CPT G. D. HYPES

AV 699-3815

MS. MARY L. COOK, DAC, GS-12

AV 699-3817

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. Name and Purpose. Army of Excellence Personnel Support Sy m (AOEPSS). The AOEPSS is a generic term for the system which prov s personnel and administrative (P&A) support to the Army of Excellence (AOE). The evaluation here is limited to the P&A support to the Light Infantry Division. Therefore, all discussions in this document will focus on the P&A support provided to the Light Infantry Division by the AOEPSS. This IEP also excludes the following parts of personnel service support: finance, legal, public affairs, band, and chaplain.

1.2. Background. The AOEPSS is a part of the overall effort called the AOE. The basic thrust of the redesign to the AOE came from HQ DA. TRADOC has developed new PSS force structure for the Active and Reserve TOE Army. Units will begin the reorganizational transition to the new design using the living TOE process beginning in FY . The organization of each P&A unit is based on the new high technology equipment that will be fielded. The force structure provides the manning based on the functions each unit has to perform and the equipment designed to support these functions. The new organizations take advantage of labor savings resulting from functions redesign contracting out, elimination, and the automation.

a. Current personnel service support (PSS) is dependent on and evolved from the use of slow, paper heavy, labor intensive methods and procedures. Included among these are paper personnel records, manually prepared rosters and reports, batch oriented SIDPERS processing, and a three page manually prepared casualty report. Critical strength accounting and reporting is still prepared manu

from by-name data collected and processed in batch mode and relies on FM voice or courier for delivery from origin to destination. No advantage has been taken of the vast technological increases made in ADPE and communications processing.

b. The division Adjutant General Company will be eliminated in the Army of Excellence. A small G1/AG element will remain in the division as part of the HHC. The balance of the soldier support mission will be performed by a Corps-level PSC. As a new concept is executed approximately 40 percent of the manpower in the current AG Company will be taken from the P&A structure to support combat power increases.

c. The Army can achieve significant manpower savings. The loss of approximately 2,500 manpower authorizations in support of the divisions in the active component requires extraordinary action to bring the workload in line with the authorizations. An advanced personnel system, currently under development, will use existing ADPE and communications technologies. Reducing manpower requirements for PSS functions depends on using ADP and communications equipment to perform drastically designed PSS functions. The speed and accuracy of PSS data processing will also be markedly increased. The goal of the functional redesign effort is to reduce manpower requirements by redesigning, transferring to other existing organizations, automating, or eliminating the 84 functions currently being performed. Soldiers will perform PSS on the modern battlefield using portable, powerful microcomputer operated with user-friendly software, coupled with user-operated digital communications devices, linked to communications networks.

d. One limitation to efficient PSS operations in the past was

limited communications. Many reports, transactions, and other information necessary to PSS were sent by courier. User oper 1 communications devices, such as the SINGARS radio, will allow for rapid digital transmission of strength and personnel accounting data.

1.3. System Description. AOEPSS provides synergism through the following components: a. Organizational Structure. The Light Infantry Division receives P&A support from the following organizations:

(1) Division G1/AG Section. This small team (31 people) deploys with the division to do the critical P&A tasks of strength accounting, casualty reporting, and replacement operations for the division.

(2) Personnel Service Company (PSC). The PSC provides all necessary P&A support to the division that is not done by the G1 section. This 89 person organization, sometimes called a "corps plug", normally will not deploy with the division. PSC can be deployed as the combat situation permits and the functions of the PSC are required in the theater of operations.

(3) Brigade Personnel Sections. This section, consisting of approximately 6 personnel, performs the P&A functions for the brigade headquarters. The primary function is to keep the commander and staff informed of personnel strength status and to relay strength information received from subordinate units to higher headquarters.

(4) Battalion Personnel Administration Center (PAC). P&A functions for the battalion are accomplished by the battalion adjutant (S1) and his PAC (approximately 7 personnel). Combat essential functions are replacement processing, strength accounti

and casualty reporting. Non-critical functions include SIDPERS reporting, P&A actions, distribution of mail and correspondence, maintenance of reference libraries and functional files, and reporting personnel management information to the commander and staff.

(5) Company headquarters. The company has no personnel assigned specifically for P&A functions. The commander and first sergeant usually do this work, consisting of reporting of personnel data. Combat critical functions are strength reporting (numbers, grades and MOS only), casualty reporting, and the acceptance of replacements. Personnel accounting (by name transactional data is a noncritical function, done when the tactical situation permits.

b. Material Requirements. Several pieces of equipment are necessary to support the AOEPSS in the Light Infantry Division. This IEP does not address use of the DAS3 (Decentralized Automated Service Support System) or the ITASC (Interim Theater Automation Service Center) which are found into overall AOEPSS automation architecture.

(1) Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS). The TACCS is a mini-computer consisting of a central processor, printer, mass storage device, visual display unit(s), keyboard, and power source. These elements are packaged in two or three cases for transporting. Each case is man-portable and provides environmental and physical protection for the computer and auxilliary equipment when the computer is not in use. The total system weighs approximately 200 pounds and can be readily carried on vehicles organic to using organizations. The TACCS can operate on 120 + 12 volts at 60hz + 3hz, 220 + 22 volts at 50 hz + 2.5hz, or 3KW generator. Set up and tear down of the TACCS can be accomplished in

30 minutes or less. In its operational configuration, the TACCS components can be employed either in or on their carrying cases and are connected by cables, one to the other, into specially designed connectors in the equipment. The TACCS is equipped with modems which permit electronic interface by radio or wire with VIABLE, DAS3, and ITASC mainframe computers and with the Unit Level Computer (ULC). Portable magnetic media used for data storage on the TACCS is also compatible with these computers. The TACCS is constructed to withstand the expected environmental hazards and physical abuse of outdoor, combat operation.

(a) The TACCS is a general purpose minicomputer used by many functional elements of the Army. Within the light division the TACCS is found in the following:

1. Battalion - 1 each (PAC).

2. Brigade - 1 each (personnel section).

3. Division - 3 or 4 (G1/AG section).

4. PSC - number dependent upon operational requirements.

where? 5. Personnel Replacement Detachment - 1 each.

where? 6. Postal Organizations - 1 each.

where? 7. Morale Services Organizations - 1 each.

(b) The TACCS comes with a package of application software to do a myriad of personnel functions previously done manually. In addition, spreadsheet and word processor software will permit user innovations to improve efficiency. In a theater of operations, its primary use is to receive, process, store, and transmit personnel data pertaining to strength account

replacement operations, and casualty accounting and reporting. An important secondary use is the processing, recording and transmittal of SIDPERS update transactions. This SIDPERS use is possible because the TACCS data base contains an extract of the master personnel data base. This extract contains that portion of each personnel record of every soldier in the organization necessary to perform personnel management operations. This capability also enables TACCS to operate independently at all levels when access to the master personnel data base is not possible. TACCS will also be fielded for logistics applications.

(2) Unit Level Computer (ULC). The Unit Level Computer (ULC) is a microcomputer consisting of a central processor, visual display, keyboard, and magnetic media storage device all encased in a single package. The ULC may also have a large monitor and printer for garrison use. The ULC weights approximately 10 pounds and its physical dimensions are such that it can be held in one hand while being operated and can be carried by one individual without interfering with his movement during the normal physical exertion expected in a combat environment. The ULC can be operated from 110-115/220-230 volts AC, 50/60 Hz commercial, 12-24 volts DC, and tactical 1.5 KW generator. The case for the ULC is made of a rugged and resilient material which will absorb a level of impact normally encountered by an individual during combat operations without damaging the computer. The case and visual display unit may be cleaned without the use of special cleaning equipment or material.

1. Each company and detachment sized unit and each battalion and brigade S1 will be equipped with the ULC. It has ports for the electrical connection of auxilliary equipment that

operates in conjunction with the computer. This equipment includes, a printer, modem for radio and wire communication interface, an a Soldier Data Tag Read/Write device. All auxilliary equipment for the ULC is plug-in and modular. 2. The primary use of the ULC is as a portable information processor and input/output device for the company commander to use in his unit administration. In a combat environment, the ULC with the appropriate application software is the primary means of strength accounting, unit personnel management, and casualty reporting. In the personnel functions, the ULC is primarily used to store and process information relating to unit strength and personnel management and to record personnel transactions for transmission to higher headquarters.

3. The ULC is used as a computer host for the Soldier Data Tag (SDT) Reader/Writer. Personnel information to be entered or changed on an individual's personnel record is placed on the SDT through the keyboard of the ULC, transferred automatically from other portable magnetic media, or direct entry from a remote computer electronically connected to the ULC.

4. The ULC performs a combined personnel and medical function when a bar code reading device is connected to it. Bar coding of certain medical or personnel procedures or medical or other supplies enables the rapid capture and transfer of data to internal or external data storage with a minimum of operator interaction.

5. The ULC will also be fielded for logistics applications.

(3) Soldier Data Tag (SDT). The SDT is a micro

technology system used for individual records for finance, medical, and personnel applications. The SDT system consists of three elements: the soldier data tag; hardware for reading, processing, and recording information; and software to perform necessary functions. The system provides for data base storage at needed locations and hard copy output as desired. Access to data base elements is limited to functional users. The ability to change data is restructed by internal machine and external supervisory checks.

(a) The SDT is an off-the-shelf item, consisting of a microchip embedded in a durable carrier measuring 1 3/4 by 1 1/4 by 1/8 inches, roughly the size of the well-known "dog tag" or identification tag. The microchip has a storage capacity of 64,000 (64k) bits of electronic erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM). This is a form of magnetic memory used for storage (read only) that may be initially set by the user (programmable) and later changed as needed (electronically erasable). The SDT contains data in three separate files: personnel, medical, and finance, each having unique access requirements. Access is limited to the functional area of each user, with file access procedures developed by each functional area proponent. The tag has the capability of supporting other functions as they are identified.

(b) Hardware. The SDT system hardware consists of the following components: reader/writer, display screen, disk storage unit, and microprocessor. Most applications of the SDT use equipment already planned to be at unit level, such as the TACCS (battalion level) and the ULC (company level). (c). Software. The software for use with the SDT performs 3 basic functions: records the data on the SDT, reads the data from the SDT, and checks the data

against predetermined eligibility criteria. As an example of the latter, the SDT can be used to check a soldier's eligibility - acceptance into officer candidate school (OCS). The soldier inserts his SDT into the tag reader in the company orderly room battalion PAC, the reader reads the data on the tag, and the monitor gives the soldier a menu of eligibility checks that can be made. Once the soldier keys in the code for "OCS", the machine compares the eligibility requirements to the soldiers qualifications and gives him a report on the printer telling each item of eligibility and whether or not he qualifies.

c. Methods of Operation.

(1) Personnel Services Support (PSS) under the AOE is designed for wartime employment and is modified for peacetime operations.

(2) Personnel and equipment resources specifically applied to PSS functions in the light division and its units are limited to those which are essential to the success of the combat missions of those organizations. Under AOEPSS, there are no Adjutant General units assigned below corps level. In the place of the division AG Company, there is assigned to division headquarters a staff element called the G1/AG section which provides essential personnel support for the division. Essential support is defined as replacement operations, casualty reporting, and strength accounting. Other personnel functions formerly performed by the AG Company are split between a TOE PSC and a garrison military personnel office (MILPO). Below the division headquarters, the only personnel service support assets authorized are found in the brigade S1 sections and

battalion PAC. No unit clerks or personnel specialists are authorized at company level.

(3) The division usually deploys without its supporting PSC. As the combat situation permits and the functions performed by the PSC are required in the theater of operations, the PSC can be deployed. The PSC is normally deployed as a subordinate unit to a Personnel and Administrative Battalion; but, if necessary, can be placed under the operational control of the division, working under the direction of the division G1/AG. The PSC may be employed in its entirety or in part, as determined by the needs of the division commander.

(4) Personnel service support organizations are normally located behind the division rear boundary. Responsibility for PSS is also moved rearward to the headquarters level that can effectively provide the support. Direct and close support is furnished by forward support elements from the higher headquarters.

(5) Computers and electronic communications are used at every level of command. Computers at each level of command interface with existing communictions nets through the use of appropriate modems.

(a) Commanders of divisions, brigades, battalions, and organizations of equivalent size have the TACCS which serves the dual purposes of receiving and transmitting by-name personnel information up and down the chain of command and accumulating, computing, and transmitting numerical strength data for command and control purposes. Application software for TACCS is used to input SIDPERS personnel transactions and to generate desired personnel reports.

(b) Commanders at the company/battery/troop level have

the Unit Level Computer (ULC). The primary purpose of the ULC is to transmit numerical strength reports and free text messages to the next higher headquarters; however, the ULC also has the capability of automating numerous company level administrative functions and software is designed for that purpose as well.

(c). A chart of the AOEPSS communication architecture is attached at figure 1-1. Radio communication is the preferred method of data transmission; but it is recognized that alternatives will frequently be required, particularly at lower command levels. TACCS and ULC are capable of wire/cable connection and all computers are equipped to download data to portable magnetic media for courier transport.

1.4. Transition to AOE. This section describes the major actions now planned to lead the P&A community into the new force structure

a. A manpower base line will be established by function and work center to record the current cost of doing business. A major redesign of the P&A system will be directed by HQ DA to reduce the manpower cost of the P&A system. The P&A operations of each division will be reorganized into the AOE structure in FY 86. As part of the reorganization, an interim transition authorization will be provided through FY 86 (USAREUR) and FY 87 (FORSCOM) for each PSC that supports a division. The living TOE process will be the methodology used to document the transition to the AOE structure.

b. As part of the divisional reorganization, the 9th ID and Fort Lewis will become the prototype for P&A in the AOE and the HQ DA directed functional redesign. A plan will be developed in FY 85 to standardize personnel operations and manpower standards and to cr

AOE PSS OVERVIEW

COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE



SOURCE: SSC-DCD
POC: CPT OLSEN, AV 699-3827
DATE: 12 SEP 84
ATTN: ATZI-DDC

Figure 1-1.

level manpower requirements among P&A activities. The 9th ID and Fort Lewis will serve as the model.

c. TACCS fielding will begin with the 24th ID during the f half of FY 85. SIDPERS 2.5 will be developed to operate on TACCS. It will be field validated in the 24th ID. After validation, SIDPERS 2.5 will be extended to the 9th ID, and then to other divisions according to the TACCS fielding schedule. Beginning in FY 85 SIDPERS 2.75 will be developed and fielded on an incremental basis to support the redesign effort. The Individual Record Brief (IRB) will be fielded before the end of FY 86. Initially, it will be in paper form and provided by HA DA. In SIDPERS 3, the IRB will be resident on local data bases. Within the 9th ID prototype a brigade (plus) slice will test and evaluate the high tech personnel system to include the soldier data tags, unit level computers, and wartime strength accounting. As new procedures are developed, testing at the 9t will validate the workability and the actual manpower cost.

d. SIDPERS 3 will be developed NLT 1989.

e. The functional redesign and validation will continue until SIDPERS 3 is fielded.

1.5. AOE PSS Fielding. Charts are attached on the following pages which explain the changes that will occur to field the AOEPSS.

a. Force Structure Changes. The challenge of going from the current structure of the AG company to the G1/AG and DSPSC is shown at figure 1-2.

b. Equipment Fielding. An overview of the equipment fielding is shown at figure 1-3.

c. Software Fielding. The software necessary to use the AOE equipment is expected to be available as follows:

Figure 1-2
Light Infantry Division
P&A Strength



TOTAL 229 154 TOTALS G1/AG 29
DSPSC 89
118

Source: FMR slides
C/J 51

Figure 1-3.

AOE PSS OVERVIEW

CURRENT PLAN



SOURCE: SSC-DCD
POC: CPT COMISH, AV 699-4584
DATE: 12 SEP 84
ATTN: ATZI-RA

(1) SIDPERS 2.5 (personnel software to run on TACCS). May 85.

(2) ULC. August 85.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER
FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, INDIANA 46216
BLDG 401

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

16 JAN 1990

ATSG-DDB

SUBJECT: Annex D, SIDPERS to the Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan

1. Final of subject annex is forwarded at enclosure.

2. This annex describes the operational and organizational concept for SIDPERS-3, Tier III, Version 1 on TACCS. This plan will be incorporated into the overall TACCS O&O Plan.

3. We recognize that there is very little chance that the approval of this O&O will result in the purchase of any additional TACCS for the personnel community. This documentation will, however, serve as the basis for the development of requirements for future generations of personnel service support automation hardware.

4. Comments can be provided at any time on DA Form 2028.

5. Our POC for this action is Ms K. Dawkins, AV 699-3802.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RKPhelps

Encl

RANDALL K. PHELPS
Colonel, AV
Dir, DCD

DISTRIBUTION:
HQDA (DAMO-FDZ)

Commander,
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U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CAM/ATZL-CAC-PA/ATZL-CAC-CD/ATZL-CAC-AT
U.S. Army Materiel Command, ATTN: AMCDE-PA/AMCDE-SD
U.S. Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, ATTN ATZH-CMD/ATZH-FC
U.S. Army Information Systems Command, ATTN: CC-FD/AS-PIN-RM
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSL-CD-MS
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U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, ATTN: ATSL-CD-CS
U.S. Army Health Care Systems Support Activity, ATTN: HSHS-V/HSHA-CTT
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, ATTN: TAPC-FSS-A
PM TACMIS, ATTN: AS-PES-TP

4-8

ATSG-DDB
SUBJECT: Annex D, SIDPERS to the Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan

DISTRIBUTION: (CONT'D)

Commandant,
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U.S. Army Quartermaster School, ATTN: ATSM-CD
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U.S. Army National Guard Bureau, ATTN: NGB-MA-C
III Corps and Fort Hood, ATTN: AFZF-GT-PT
U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers, ATTN: ATZH-CM-CO/ATZN-MP-CCC
U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, ATTN: ATZK-CD
U.S. Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, ATTN: ATZQ-D-CC
U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-CD
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: ATSU-CD-M

ANNEX D

OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATION (O&O) PLAN
STANDARD INSTALLATION/DIVISION PERSONNEL SYSTEM (SIDPERS 3.0)

I. PURPOSE.

A. Commanders and personnel managers at all levels need timely and accurate personnel information. In a rapidly deploying, fast moving Army it is essential that they have rapid access to data and that the data be current and accurate.

B. Army structure decisions have created a need to eliminate the Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3) as the SIDPERS host computer in divisions. This need stems from the size and relative immobility of the DAS3.

C. Reductions in personnel service support community authorizations create a need for increased efficiency through automation of personnel service support functions to compensate, in part, for manpower reductions.

II. THREAT/DEFICIENCY.

A. SIDPERS has been the Army's automated personnel accounting and records keeping system since the mid 1970's. It is a system of flat files updated cyclicly, three to five times weekly, at installation and division level. (System inputs are primarily 80-character transactions.) System outputs are paper or microfiche reports back to installation or division input sources and AUTODIN tapes to the US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to update HQDA data bases.

B. In late 1983, the Army's leadership made major restructuring decisions under the banner "Army of Excellence". The decisions impacted SIDPERS in two major ways. First, was the creation of new light infantry divisions. The mobility criteria for these new light divisions prohibits movement of the large DAS3 computer with the division. SIDPERS has operated since its inception on a host mainframe computer owned by the division. The personnel service support community was faced with the challenge of designing a method of operation using the Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) and a fixed-site host to eliminate the need for the mobile, division-owned computer for SIDPERS cycle processing. Second, in order to increase combat power, the personnel service support community was cut some 2,900 spaces and instructed to use TDA linkage and automation, particularly TACCS, to compensate for the space reduction.

ENCL

C. At the time, a major redesign of SIDPERS was underway. Called SIDPERS-3, the redesign was moving toward the use of state-of-the-art software and hardware to improve the timeliness, accuracy, efficiency of processing, and access to personnel data. SIDPERS-3.Ø, Tier III, Version I (formerly SIDPERS-2.5/SIDPERS-2.75) is an evolutionary step toward automating the Personnel Service Support work center tasks in AR 6ØØ-8 with user friendly, menu driven software designed to take full advantage of the immediate availability of the personnel data base with TACCS hardware, with the intent that software developed in these two packages will be prototypes of SIDPERS-3.Ø, Version II & III applications.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN.

A. To address the two challenges posed by the Army of Excellence restructuring decisions, Field Systems Directorate, PERSCOM began development of application software packages for the TACCS. Because PERSCOM intended that these packages be evolutionary toward SIDPERS 3.Ø, Versions II & III, they are titled SIDPERS 3.Ø, Tier III, Version I.

B. SIDPERS 3.Ø, Tier III, Version I is the application software to integrate the TACCS into SIDPERS to replace the lack of mobility of the DAS3 in Division, using fixed-site hosts for the SIDPERS mainframe cycle processing. The concept of SIDPERS-3, Tier III, Version I is that all SIDPERS cycle processing is accomplished on a fixed or mobile host mainframe capable of supporting SIDPERS 2, and at the completion of cycle processing, an extract of the SIDPERS data base is downloaded to all TACCS within the installation/division. Application software is provided to allow immediate update of the distributed database, creation of SIDPERS cycle inputs for the host mainframe, individual soldier and full data base queries, a Command and Control Strength Reporting System (C2SRS) for the deployed environment, and a wide variety of personnel and administrative applications. Additionally, environmental and developmental software is provided for word processing, spreadsheet, graphics, and local software development.

C. SIDPERS-3, Tier III, Version I will interface with the STANDARD INSTALLATION DIVISION PERSONNEL SYSTEM (SIDPERS-2) for host mainframe cycle processing.

D. SIDPERS-3, Tier III, Version I is being developed in modules with each module released for fielding as soon as testing is complete. The current baseline of SIDPERS-3.Ø, Tier III, Version I will be fielded concurrently with TACCS throughout the Army. System Change Packages (SCP) will be fielded by standard software broadcast techniques to all TACCS equipped sites.

E. Operation Mode summary for SIDPERS-3.Ø, Tier III, Version I is attached as Appendix 1.

F. SIDPERS-3.Ø, Tier III, Version I requires TACCS to be able to communicate with ASIMS, DAS3, CTASC-I (until all are taken out of the system), CTASC-II and other TACCS both electronically and through the use of magnetic media. Electronic communications with ASIMS, DAS3, and CTASC-I will use external, high-speed modems and commercial and/or government owned telephone lines, or direct wire connections. TACCS to TACCS electronic communications will use 2 or 4 wire field wire or standard government or commercial telephone. SIDPERS TACCS host computer communications data is attached as Appendix 2.

G. SIDPERS 3.Ø, Tier III, Version I provides the operational capability, using TACCS, to replace the lack of mobility of the DAS3 when used in conjunction with a fixed or mobile host mainframe and to begin to compensate for large space loss sustained by the personnel service support community under the Army of Excellence restructuring.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN.

A. SIDPERS-3.Ø, Tier III, Version I will be employed in all Army organizations, both TOE and TDA, at every level. Functionally, it operates at five personnel service support operational levels: unit, Personnel Service Center (PSC), Command/Staff, SIDPERS Personnel Automation Section (PAS), and Echelons above Division (EAD).

B. At unit level each battalion (PAC) Personnel Administration Center (and comparable TDA organization) will initially be equipped with one master workstation (logic module and KVDU), one remote workstation (logic module and KVDU), and 2 printers. Each separate company orderly room (and comparable TDA organization) will be initially equipped with one master workstation and one printer. If the authorized personnel strength of a separate company exceeds 25Ø, that separate company will be equipped with one remote workstation (logic unit and KVDU) to augment their master workstation. As SIDPERS 3.Ø expands and efforts to automate unit level administration increase, it may be necessary to add remote workstations to process added automated workload efficiently. The functional proponent will provide additional requirements through the combat developer for inclusion in the BOIP when requirements are validated.

C. At PSC level (includes replacement processing organizations) multiple TACCS will be required in each of the functional work centers (both TOE and TDA). Actual quantity will be a function of population supported (See Appendix 3 for details). Further study at TACCS test sites will be required to determine whether this is the appropriate mix of master workstations, remote workstations, and printers for each functional work center. Additionally, evaluation will be made of the need for special high speed and/or letter quality printers. Requirements for BOIP change, if necessary, will be provided to the combat developer when validated.

D. At Command/Staff level (includes division G1/AG, separate brigade S1/AG and installation AG) will initially be equipped with one master workstation (logic module and KDVU), one remote workstation (logic module and KVDU), and 2 printers. The installation AG requirement will be a function of non-divisional population supported. Further study at TACCS test sites will be required to determine whether this is the appropriate number and mix of master workstations, remote workstations, and printers. Additionally, evaluation will be made of the need for high speed or letter quality printers. Requirements for BOIP changes, if necessary, will be provided to the combat developer when validated.

E. At the Personnel Automation Section (PAS) level (TOE and TDA) multiple TACCS will be required (a minimum of 3 master, 3 remotes, 3 printers). TDA organization quantities will be a function of population supported (a minimum of 3 masters, 3 remotes, 3 printers). See Appendix 3 for details. If further study indicates a different number or mix of master workstations, remote workstations, and printers, validated requirements for BOIP changes will be provided to the combat developer.

F. At EAD, multiple TACCS will be required. Actual quantities are listed in Appendix 3. The combat developer and the functional proponent will develop and validate any new requirements and submit them for inclusion in the BOIP.

V. PERSONNEL IMPACT.

A. SIDPERS 3.0, Tier III, Version I, will be operated by functional personnel holding MOS 71L, 75B, 75C, 75D, 75E, 75F and 75Z. No additional personnel or new MOS will be required.

B. At the Personnel Automation Section (PAS) level, SIDPERS 3.0 will require support of personnel in MOS 74F for software systems maintenance and troubleshooting.

VI. TRAINING IMPACT.

A. At SIDPERS 3.0 extension, equipment operator training, operator functional training, system administration training, and supervisory/managerial training will be required.

B. Institutional training in support of SIDPERS 3.0 will be required at the US Army Adjutant General School, Ft Benjamin Harrison, IN (officer SC 41 and 42 courses; S-1 courses; WO MOS 420A courses; AG NCOES courses; MOS 75B, 75C, and 75F courses) at the US Army Training Center, Ft Jackson, SC (MOS 71L, 75D, and 75E courses); and at US Army Reserve Forces (RF) Schools and National Guard Academies (officer SC 42, WO MOS 420A, AG NCOES, and MOS 75B, 75C, 75D, 75E, 75F courses).

C. Collective and sustainment training products will be required. Products will be developed jointly by USASSI and PERSCOM and will consist of both traditional and computer based instruction (CBI). Embedded training tutorials are to be used to facilitate instruction.

D. Sustainment training for MOS 74F for software systems maintenance and trouble shooting will be required at the Computer Science School, Ft. Gordon, GA.

VII. LOGISTICS IMPACT. See basic TACCS O&O Plan

VIII. FUNDING IMPLICATIONS (5-YEAR ESTIMATES).

A. R&D Costs - none.

B. Procurement/Life Cycle Costs.

1. TACCS Procurement: $117,128,200.
2. Generator Procurement: $15,159,200.
3. ASIMS Contract: $1,227,800.
4. Communication Procurement: $1,053,000.
5. Software Procurement: $7,010,600.
6. Software Development: $1,760,000.
7. ADP Maintenance: $115,733,700.
8. Communications Maintenance: $163,100.
9. Leased Communication: $2,526,940.
10. Extension Costs: $3,328,000.
11. Project Management: $378,000.

FACT SHEET

PSS SPR IPR
13 Mar 89

SUBJECT: PSS-SPR Task #2: TRADOC/DCSPER AOE P&A Task Force

ISSUE: Continue TRADOC/DCSPER (AOE P&A Task Force) efforts to absorb AOE structure reductions.

FACTS:

1. The Soldier Support Center and TAPERSCOM are developing personnel procedures that reduce associated manpower/time requirements. We have reviewed all personnel procedures and continue to develop efficient personnel programs and operations.

2. During the development of PSS LTOE's, SSC does a detailed analysis of the organizational structure and mission of the draft unit. This analysis provides the correct mix of MOS's and rank to support efficient and flexible operations.

3. Army efforts to make PSS operations more efficient through AOE are slow. The Army's ability to rapidly field new automated systems has not kept pace with the reduction of AG/FI force structure. Mission capability of the current TOE force structures for AG and Finance branches is at risk without the necessary automation systems.

4. Field Commanders think PSS organizations are not adequately staffed to accomplish their wartime missions. SSC is working with MACOM representatives to document the AOE shortfall and to recommend TOE changes when appropriate.

5. A review of the way PSS work is accomplished continues. All work efficiencies are being documented for incorporation into new procedures and the revision of AR 600-8.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this issue remain open.

2. That the Army make a concerted effort to field necessary automated systems.

3. That this issue statement be rewritten as "Continue efforts to review impacts of AOE force structure reductions."

MAJ FISHER/ATSG-DDO/AV 699-3816

AOE / TACCS

ISSUE PAPER PSS SPR June 1986

Materiel Panel
CPT Neal Shelley
ASNI-FSF
AV 221-8992

ISSUE: The need to expeditiously field TACCS to offset the loss of PSS manpower spaces in FY87 and FY88.

DISCUSSION:

1. Over a two year period the Personnel Service Support (PSS) community will suffer the loss of over 2,500 manpower spaces. This space cut was designed to help support the creation of the Army's new Light Infantry Divisions without requiring an increase in the Congressionally mandated ceiling on Active Army personnel strength.

2. The impact of the cut, proposed in 1984, was to have been alleviated by the Army of Excellence Personnel Systems (AOEPS) initiatives and the fielding of user level microcomputer systems and software.

3. The Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) was developed as the primary microcomputer to support CSS and PSS requirements. Operational in both garrison and deployed environments, the TACCS, when supported with appropriate software, can support most PSS functions.

4. TACCS PSS software includes:

a. SIDPERS-2.5 which provides the ability to operate portions of the personnel system at separate company, battalion, brigade, G1/AG and MILPO levels. It uses an extract of the SIDPERS data base from the mainframe computer and operates in a standalone mode providing essential personnel accounting, strength accounting, and personnel management information. SIDPERS-2.5 is operational at both the 7th ID (L) and 24th ID.

b. SIDPERS-2.75 automates many manual personnel service and support functions (e.g., redeployment/reassignments, promotions, evaluation reporting, etc.) by using the SIDPERS-2.5 data base and the TACCS processing capabilities. The first two SIDPERS-2.75 modules have been fielded at both SIDPERS-2.5 sites. Additional modules will be released as they are developed.

c. TAFIS (Tactical Army Finance Information System), now in the design phase, will use information from the SIDPERS data base to provide finance services in both garrison and deployed environments. TACCS is the primary system under consideration for this application.

d. Requirements for additional software to support JAG functions in a field environment are also under review.

5. The PSS slice of the initial purchase of 450 TACCS allowed the fielding of SIDPERS-2.5 and 2.75 to the 7th ID (L) and 24th ID. On 17 December 1985, the Army recommended full production of TACCS, dependent on a review by the DOD Computer Resource Council (CRC). On 29 January 1986, the CRC was briefed on the TACCS with full production authority requested. The CRC decision was to allow the production of 60 TACCS per month, with a maximum of 600 in CY86. Approval of increased production of TACCS is dependent upon additional operational testing of TACCS, preparation of complete life cycle cost estimates and a review of TACCS TEMPEST requirements.

6. The CRC was dissolved as an operating council in February. However this issue is now being managed by the DOD Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC), chaired by the Comptroller, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the same information requirements apply.

7. Given the standard PSS slice of TACCS production, a maximum of 300 TACCS can be anticipated during CY86. This will allow the fielding of a maximum of 4 additional divisions and 1 independent brigade. Based on the original full production schedule a total of 13 divisions, 1 independent brigade and 5 ARNG roundout brigades were to have been fielded by the end of CY86.

8. System Development Corporation, the contractor, has made a written offer to assume complete responsibility to investigate, redesign, test, correct and retrofit for any inherent design, reliability and quality specification deficiencies in the 1986 TACCS production identified prior to August 1986.

9. Follow-on operational testing of TACCS, with SIDPERS-2.5/2.75 as the test software, is scheduled to begin 30 May 1986, with completion of the test phase at the end of August. The results of the test and economic analyses of the various systems which will run on the TACCS will be utilized by the MAISRC to determine the future of the TACCS program.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

1. Full production of TACCS for CY86 be authorized concurrent with the preparation of additional documentation for the MAISRC.

2. Upon acceptance of the additional documentation by the MAISRC, full production authorization for CY87.

LEAD AGENCY: PM TACMIS

COSTS: Full funding (procurement and extension) is available for 10,000+ TACCS. There are currently firm requirements for over 9,000 TACCS with a projected requirement of 14,000+. An additional $26.8 million (FY87-$3.1 million, FY88-$23.7 million) is available to support TACCS SIDPERS-AOE initiatives.

BENEFITS: The requirement for deployable ADP resources exists

today, with TACCS and the operational software providing the only alternative for Light Divisions. The only limiting factor is approval for full production and distribution of the TACCS. Fielding adds significantly to the Army's readiness and provides commanders, at all levels, immediate access to personnel data otherwise unavailable to them.

ARMY/A.C.E. REGISTRY TRANSCRIPT SYSTEM

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Sections: Courses | Test Scores | MOS Groups | Other Learning

ARMY/ACE REGISTRY TRANSCRIPT SYSTEM

ISSUED: 8/18/2008 *** PERSONAL WEB TRANSCRIPT ***

Name: PAYNE ROBIN RENEE
Rank: SERGEANT, E5
Status: Active

AARTS ID: 2008-WB009414

Military Course Completions[Back to Top]

Course Title: Basic Combat Training Basic Training **ACE Exhibit: AR-2201-0399**
Location: US ARMY TRAINING CENTER at FT LEONARD WOOD, MO **Army Course Number: 750-BT**
From: 06/18/1999 **To: 08/19/1999**

Description: UPON COMPLETION OF THE COURSE, THE RECRUIT WILL BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE, MASTERY OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP COMBAT SKILLS INCLUDING MARKSMANSHIP AND FIRST AID, ACHIEVEMENT OF MINIMAL PHYSICAL CONDITIONING STANDARDS, AND APPLICATION OF BASIC SAFETY AND LIVING SKILLS IN AN OUTDOOR ENVIRONMENT. INSTRUCTION INCLUDES LECTURES, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE EXERCISES IN BASIC MILITARY CULTURE/SUBJECTS, INCLUDING MARKSMANSHIP, PHYSICAL CONDITIONING, FIRST AID, AND OUTDOOR ADAPTATION/LIVING SKILLS.

Recommendations: IN THE LOWER-DIVISION BACCALAUREATE/ASSOCIATE DEGREE CATEGORY, 1 SEMESTER HOUR IN PERSONAL PHYSICAL CONDITIONING, 1 IN OUTDOOR SKILLS PRACTICUM, 1 IN MARKSMANSHIP, AND 1 IN FIRST AID.

Course Title: Medical Laboratory Specialist **ACE Exhibit: AR-0702-0022**
Location: ACADEMY OF HEALTH SCIENCE at FT SAM HOUSTON, TX **Army Course Number: 311-91K10(MLT) (IET)**
From: 08/30/1999 **To: 03/21/2000**

Description: UPON COMPLETION OF THE COURSE THE STUDENT WILL BE ABLE TO PERFORM BASIC AND ADVANCED MEDICAL LABORATORY PROCEDURES, PROCESS BLOOD FOR DONATION, AND PERFORM BLOOD BANKING PROCEDURES. LABORATORY, AUDIO VISUAL MATERIALS, CASE STUDIES, DISCUSSION, CLASSROOM EXERCISE, PR 'CAL EXERCISES, LECTURE AND LEARNER PRESENTATIONS. TOPICS INCLUDE GENERAL LABORATORY, CI :AL MATH, SPECIMENS, CLINICAL CHEMISTRY, HEMATOLOGY, IMMUNOHEMATOLOGY, CLINICAL M BIOLOGY, AND PRACTICUM.

Recommendations: IN THE LOWER-DIVISION BACCALAUREATE/ASSOCIATE DEGREE CATEGORY, 1 SEMESTER HOUR IN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL LABORATORY, 5 IN GENERAL LABORATORY CHEMISTRY, 6 IN CLINICAL LABORATORY CHEMISTRY, 5 IN HEMATOLOGY, 7 IN IMMUNOHEMATOLOGY, 10 IN CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY, 1 IN

URINALYSIS, 3 IN SEROLOGY, 1 IN A MEDICAL LABORATORY PRACTICUM, AND 4 IN PARASITOLOGY.

Course Title: Medical Laboratory Specialist
ACE Exhibit: AR-0702-0023
Location: W BEAUMONT ARMY MED CTR at FT BLISS, TX
Army Course Number: 311-[illegible]K10
From: 06/05/2000 To: 12/08/2000

Description: UPON COMPLETION OF THE COURSE, THE STUDENT WILL BE ABLE TO PERFORM BASIC AND ADVANCED MEDICAL LABORATORY PROCEDURES, PROCESS BLOOD FOR DONATION, AND PERFORM BLOOD BANKING PROCEDURES. LABORATORY, AUDIO VISUAL MATERIALS, CASE STUDIES, DISCUSSION, CLASSROOM EXERCISE, PRACTICAL EXERCISES, LECTURE, LEARNER PRESENTATIONS. CLINICAL PRACTICE INCLUDING GENERAL LABORATORY PROCEDURES & SPECIMEN PROCESSING, CLINICAL CHEMISTRY, HEMATOLOGY/SEROLOGY, IMMUNOHEMATOLOGY, CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY/SEROLOGY, AND URINALYSIS.

Recommendations: IN THE LOWER-DIVISION BACCALAUREATE/ASSOCIATE DEGREE CATEGORY, 4 SEMESTER HOURS IN CLINICAL CHEMISTRY PRACTICUM, 4 IN HEMATOLOGY PRACTICUM, 4 IN IMMUNOHEMATOLOGY PRACTICUM, 3 IN MICROBIOLOGY PRACTICUM, 1 IN IMMUNOLOGY PRACTICUM, AND 1 IN URINALYSIS PRACTICUM.

Course Title: Warrior Leader (Modified)
ACE Exhibit: AR-2201-0604
Location: PENNSYLVANIA NG MIL ACAD at FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
Army Course Number: 600-WLC (MOD)
From: 05/13/2006 To: 05/27/2006

Description: UPON COMPLETION OF THE COURSE, THE STUDENT WILL BE ABLE TO FUNCTION AS A JUNIOR LEVEL LEADER WITH ESSENTIAL SKILLS IN LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, WARFIGHTING AND ADMINISTRATION AUDIOVISUAL MATERIALS, PRACTICAL EXERCISES, DISCUSSION, AND CLASSROOM EXERCISES. TOPICS INCLUDE LEADERSHIP, BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING, MAP READING, AND FIELD TRAINING.

Recommendations: IN THE LOWER-DIVISION BACCALAUREATE/ASSOCIATE DEGREE CATEGORY, 1 SEMESTER HOUR IN PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP AND 2 IN MILITARY SCIENCE.

Test Scores[Back to Top]

NONE

Military Experience[Back to Top]

Military Occupational Specialties Held:	68K20	Primary	From: 11/2007	To: PRESENT
	68K20	Duty		
	68K10	Duty		

Description of 68K20: THIS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) IS NOT EVALUATED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (ACE) AT THIS SKILL LEVEL OR DURING THE TIME FRAME HELD BY THIS SERVICEMEMBER.

ACE Credit Recommendation for 68K20: THIS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) IS NOT EVALUATED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (ACE) AT THIS SKILL LEVEL OR DURING THE TIME FRAME HELD BY THIS SERVICEMEMBER.

Description of 68K10: THIS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) IS NOT EVALUATED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (ACE) AT THIS SKILL LEVEL OR DURING THE TIME FRAME HELD BY THIS SERVICEMEMBER.

ACE Credit Recommendation for 68K10: THIS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) IS NOT EVALUATED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (ACE) AT THIS SKILL LEVEL OR DURING THE TIME FRAME HELD BY THIS SERVICEMEMBER.

Military Occupational Specialties Held:	91K10	Primary	From: 06/1999	To: 10/2007
	91K10	Duty		

Military Occupational Specialty Group 91K
ACE Guide Number
Title: Medical Laboratory Specialist
MOS [illegible]01
SQT (Thru Oct 1991)/SDT (Nov 1991 thru Feb 1995) Taken: None

Description of 91K10: FOR 91K10: RECEIVES AND LOGS REQUESTS FOR LABORATORY TESTS; COLLECTS LABELS AND ACCESSIONS SPECIMENS; PREPARES EQUIPMENT, REAGENTS, AND SUPPLIES FOR ROUTINE LABORATORY TESTING; PERFORMS ROUTINE LABORATORY TESTS IN URINALYSIS, HEMATOLOGY, CLINICAL CHEMISTRY,

MICROBIOLOGY, BLOOD BANK AND SEROLOGY; RUNS APPROPRIATE QUALITY CONTROL; CALCULATES AND REPORTS RESULTS OF ANALYSES UNDER SUPERVISION; PERFORMS PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE ON LABORATORY EQUIPMENT.

ACE Credit Recommendation for 91K10: CREDIT MAY BE GRANTED ON THE BASIS OF AN INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF THE STUDENT.

Special Qualification Identifiers:

NO SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS (O)

Additional Skill Identifiers: None

Other Learning Experience[Back To Top]

This section provides a record of the servicemember's learning experiences that do not have credit recommended for one or more of the following reasons: course not evaluated by the American Council on Education (ACE); and/or course not completed during ACE evaluation period.

Course Title: SUPERVISOR DEVELOPMENT (SDC) **Army Course Number: 131 F21**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2003 To: 10/06/2004

Course Title: CBRNE BASIC COURSE **Army Course Number: 767 F16**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2004 To: 12/01/2005

Course Title: CBRNE OPERATOR/RESPONDER COURSE **Army Course Number: 767 F25**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2004 To: 06/13/2005

Course Title: FM 7-1 BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING - SQUAD **Army Course Number: 150 F71 (FM 7-1)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 12/01/2005

Course Title: FM 7-1 BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING - PLATOON **Army Course Number: 150 F72 (FM 7-1)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 12/02/2005

Course Title: FM 7-1 BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING - BATTALI **Army Course Number: 150 F74 (FM 7-1)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 06/28/2006

Course Title: FM 7-1 BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING - BRIGADE **Army Course Number: 150 F75 (FM 7-1)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 07/07/2006

Course Title: NCO PRIMARY LEADERSHIP SUBJECTS **Army Course Number: 553BD21**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 02/28/2006

Course Title: NCO BASIC LEADERSHIP SUBJECTS **Army Course Number: 553BD31**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 02/24/2006

Course Title: SENIOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER (SNCO) **Army Course Number: 553KF03**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

From: 10/01/2005 To: 02/28/2006

Course Title: DEFENSE BASIC PRESERVATION AND PACKING C **Army Course Number: 908 F13 (822-F13)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 01/31/2006

Course Title: DEFENSE MARKING FOR SHIPMENT & STORAGE **Army Course Number: 908 F32 (8B-F32)**
Location: CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
From: 10/01/2005 To: 01/31/2006

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS CENTER
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801-6000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

S: 21 May 86

APR 25

ATCL-CAA

SUBJECT: Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan

Commander
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
ATTN: DAPC-PSF-F
Alexandria, VA 22332

1. Reference FONECON between CW3 Hagan (Mil Per Cen) and Mr. E. Koegl (LOGC), on 21 Apr 86 at 0900 hours.

2. Per above conversation, it is requested that you provide this organization with Annex D: Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan to the TACCS O&O by 21 May 86.

3. POC, for this Center, is Mr. H. Forstall or Mr. E. Koegl, AUTOVON 687-2336/3162.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A. J. TUMMINELLO, JR.
Colonel, GS
Director, Concepts & Doctrine

ANNEX D

OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL (O&O) PLAN
STANDARD INSTALLATION/DIVISION PERSONNEL SYSTEM (SIDPERS-2.5/2.75

I. PURPOSE.

A. Commanders and personnel managers at all levels need more timely, accurate personnel information. In a rapidly deploying, fast moving Army it is essential that they have rapid access to data and that the data be current and accurate.

B. Army structure decisions have created a need to eliminate the Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3) as the SIDPERS host computer in the light infantry divisions. This need stems from the size and relative immobility of the DAS3. The need for standardization among divisions results in the application of this requirement to all divisions, not just the light divisions.

C. Reductions in personnel service support community authorizations create a need for increased efficiency through automation of personnel service support functions to compensate, in part, for manpower reductions.

II. THREAT/DEFICIENCY.

A. SIDPERS has been the Army's automated personnel accounting and records keeping system since the mid 1970's. It is a system of flat files updated cyclicly, three to five times weekly at installation and division level. System inputs are primarily 80-column punched cards or tape images of 80-column cards. System outputs are paper or microfiche reports back to installation or division input sources and AUTODIN tapes to the US Army Military Personnel Center to update HQDA data bases. Two major hardware upgrades have just been completed to take SIDPERS cycle processing off of obsolete mainframe hardware and on to more modern equipment. These upgrades, commonly referred to as SIDPERS-2, were the transfer of installation level processing from old BASOPS equipment to the new, contractor operated Verticle Installation Automation Baseline (VIABLE) system (now called Army Standard Information Management System (ASIMS)) and replacement of the Combat Service Support System (CS3) hardware to the DAS3. Even with these upgrades, SIDPERS is, by current standards, a slow, inefficient, and extremely difficult to manage system which requires a lot of work by units but provides very little timely,useful output.

B. In late 1983, the Army's leadership made major restructuring decisions under the banner "Army of Excellence". The decisions impacted SIDPERS in two major ways. First, was the creation of new light infantry divisions. The mobility criteria for these new light divisions prohibits movement of the large DAS3 computer with the division. SIDPERS has operated since its inception on a host mainframe computer owned by the division. The

personnel service support community was faced with the challenge of designing a method of operation using the Tactical Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Computer System (TACCS) to eliminate the need for that mobile, division-owned computer for SIDPERS cycle processing. Second, in order to increase combat power, the personnel service support community was cut some 2,500 spaces and instructed to use automation, particularly TACCS, to compensate for the space reduction.

C. At that time, a major redesign of SIDPERS was underway. Called SIDPERS-3, the redesign was moving toward the use of state-of-the-art software and hardware to improve the timeliness, accuracy, efficiency of processing, and access to personnel data. SIDPERS-2.5 and SIDPERS-2.75 are evolutionary steps toward eliminating or reducing these deficiencies with the intent that software developed in these two packages will be prototypes of SIDPERS-3 applications.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN.

A. To address the two challenges posed by the Army of Excellence restructuring decisions, Field Systems Directorate, Personnel Information Systems Command (formerly PERSINSD, USAMILPERCEN) began development of two application software packages for the TACCS. Because PERSINSCOM intended that these packages be evolutionary toward SIDPERS-3 they were titled SIDPERS-2.5 and SIDPERS-2.75.

B. SIDPERS-2.5 is the application software to integrate the TACCS into SIDPERS to facilitate mobility and to eliminate the need for the DAS3 to process SIDPERS in the divisions. The concept of SIDPERS-2.5 is that all SIDPERS cycle processing is accomplished on ASIMS and, at the completion of cycle processing, an extract of the SIDPERS data base, called the Deployment File, is downloaded to all TACCS within the installation/division. Application software is provided to allow immediate update of the Deployment File, creation of SIDPERS cycle inputs for the host mainframe, individual soldier and full data base queries, and a Command and Control Strength Management System (C2SMS) for the deployed environment. Additionally, environmental and developmental software is provided for word processing, spreadsheet, graphics, and local software development.

C. SIDPERS-2.75 is application software which uses the Deployment File created in SIDPERS-2.5 to automate or provide automated assistance in the completion of many manual, labor-intensive personnel administrative functions (e.g., promotions, evaluations, casualty reporting) in order to reduce the manpower required to accomplish these tasks.

D. SIDPERS-2.5 and SIDPERS-2.75 will interface with the following standard systems:

1. Centralized Assignment Processing System (CAP III)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT INSTITUTE
FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, INDIANA 46216

ATSG-AG

17 October 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: FORSCOM Visit and USAREUR Personnel Management Conference Notes

1. On Friday, 30 September, I traveled to FORSCOM to meet with COL Thornberry; COL Bilberry, Deputy J-1; COL Harrison, FORSCOM AG; and MG Gourley. The key subjects discussed were:

a. FORSCOM's position on the Signal Corps' proposal to return TO&E ASD functions to the AG Corps.

b. Lack of FORSCOM response to our repeated proposal for a Mobile Postal Training Team.

c. AG School's proposal for a Mobile S-1 Training Team.

d. Coordination for a one-half day FM 12-6 Workshop during the February FORSCOM Personnel Conference.

2. FORSCOM Visit.

a. FORSCOM visit was very worthwhile and MG Gourley stated that the FORSCOM position was that the Signal Corps/IMA should either return all ASD functions in both garrison and the field to the AG Corps or they should take them all. His preference was that ASD functions should return to the AG Corps because he felt that the AG Corps would probably do a better job in running it for the Army.

b. To my surprise, the FORSCOM AG informed me that postal operations were now under the J-6 at FORSCOM and they had not seen any of our letters although addressed to the FORSCOM AG. I furnished COL Harrison copies of all our correspondence concerning our Mobile Postal Training Teams and he said that he would follow up with the J-6.

c. The FORSCOM AG and his staff also reviewed our proposal for a two-week S-1 training course to compensate for reduced TDY training at Fort Harrison. They appeared enthusiastic and said they would study the plan and get back with us.

d. COL Thornberry and MG Gourley agreed to coordinate a Monday afternoon workshop on FM 12-6 at their February Conference. They asked that we also bring down and put on demonstrations of the new Battlefield Simulation System and Regimental Displays.

3. P&A Conference. Monday, 3 October, we set up, rehearsed, and presented an FM 12-6 Workshop with key USAREUR personnel leadership. CPT McKinney presented the critical battle doctrine laydown. COL Ed Strong and I chaired

the workshop. MG Woods and BG Brooks took an active part. Some symbols and flows on the battlefield charts were reworked but for the most part the doctrinal diagrams were good tools. Questions which need coordination and clarification are:

a. How is replacement information passed by the CRC to Europe, or overseas command. Once TAPA defines the procedures then USAREUR would like to set up for a test.

b. The coordination necessary on WSRO operations with provisions on how it is actually done needs to be spelled out. Many AG/G1s don't believe that the current operation will work. They specifically ask that we cross check it with USAREUR Pamphlet 525-25.

c. We need to spell out doctrinally a chapter on reconstitution and re-equipping Returns to Duty. They specifically asked that the concept address both division and non-divisional operations. There was uniform unhappiness with the Quartermaster Platoon in the Replacement Company concept.

d. LTC Whitt asked that the sequence of the book be relooked. He had difficulty with the front end overview until he had read the back part. LTC Whitt was the only one who made this suggestion.

e. Task forcing procedures for personnel action, strength reporting, etc. are unclear. Personnel doctrine is designed to be direct support while Europe operates on a area support system. The AG/G1s express confusion on how unit accountability operated under various conditions; specifically, assigned, attached, or OPCON. (This is an area we have not resolved. Task forcing and accountability on the SIDPERS/TACCS equipment requires that the unit data base be loaded before we can actually serve a unit in our area.)

f. The European AG/G1s asked for an abbreviated casualty report (14-15 lines) as the systems change for SIDPERS/TACCS. Currently, they are forced to fill lines with information that they don't have in order to run the program. (What they say is that they make up data to fill in the lines just so the casualty reports will process.)

g. The AG/G1s uniformly believe that the TACCS V1 at battalion level will be overloaded during wartime.

h. The AG/G1s asked for a relook of finance services on the battlefield, particularly they asked for a matrix of services and users especially in regard to postal, their other special concerns were NEO, civilians, etc. The Postal Group felt a definite lack of adequate postal financial services is a war stopper for them. They believe that postal finance mission is clearly supported by the Army experienes in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Concern about casualty mail at the joint level was an area that they considered a war stopper but we did not have time to discuss.

i. They requested a check to ensure that TACCS is authorized for all postal units.

j. They asked where spaces are at the theater level (PERSCOM MTOE) to perform the casualty mail function.

k. They were unclear on total policy/responsibility for EPW. What are the G-2, G-3, and G-4 responsible for? EPW overall was an area in which there was a definite lack of expertise and understanding.

l. They all uniformily asked for tactical wartime safety missions and doctrine. They were especially concerned with the force structure to perform this and what they were distinctly responsible for and its impact.

m. The Commander, 90th P&A Battalion felt that a laydown of a typical AG/G1 shop on the battlefield would improve FM 12-6 as would a schematic of the deployed PSC with organizations of fast teams (LTC Marino).

4. On 5 October, MG Woods held an AOE discussion with the AG/G1s, Corps AGs, BG Brooks, and other senior personnel leadership in USAREUR. LTC Marino, Commander, 90th P&A Battalion, opened the discussion with USAREUR's concern over the 805 MOS 75D reductions for Europe. He indicated that the number of 75Ds record clerks in Europe would drop from 1,238 to 779. LTC Marino said from his unit's point of view they would lose close to 100 soldiers and he had not received the automation or other procedures to conpensate for space reductions. MG Woods asked for the historical manning levels for comparison between the old manning levels and the new manning levels. (These were displayed to him in a briefing but not furnished in writing.) COL Dean commented that the Army availability study should help validate the need for records clerks in Europe. COL Strong pointed out that regional manning in Europe is also costing us more. The bottom line is we were asked to review the 75D reductions at this time considering the fact that the automation and procedure changes to replace them have not been brought on line.

a. LTC Tom Whitt, AG/G1, 1st Armored Division, brought up the subject of IMA. He said the people to do the IMA job (Administrative Service Division functions) were gone and the DOIM will not take on the mission. He, of course, is still strapped with the mission and no resources to do it. MG Woods asked what do you want us to do--return all the ASD functions to the AG or give them all to the IMA? COL Sikora then pointed out that the issue needed to be resolved because there was a tremendously high confusion cost in the field right now. After some discussion in which I reiterated the position of FORSCOM, USAREUR, and the TAG, that ASD functions should either go in total to the IMA (Signal Corps) or the AG Corps, MG Woods provided me the guidance that I should inform the Signal Corps that that was the way he would probably go.

b. COL John Peck, 7th Corps AG, brought problems within the new personnel groups to be activated in FY 90. He expressed concern over the span of control, jumping from 10 to 16 or 20 PSC's, the loss of the interim commander i.e., P&A Battalions, the personnel requirements, and the fact that from his point of view there were significant equipment shortages in vehicle generators and other labor saving devices. He also was concerned with the peacetime TDA linkage. LTC Whitt came on line and said that in all probability the only way to survive on the battlefield is to task force by combining the

PSC, Finance Team, Postal, Replacement and to put them underneath the control of the AG/G1. COL Art Dean, a former commander of a postal group and a former Corps AG, expressed a different opinion and that he thought the personnel group should be able to function on the battlefield the same way that a Signal Brigade functions, i.e., obtaining support from the ASG (area support group). MG Woods expressed concern at the lack of a postal wizzard, i.e., postal staff officer or band staff officer, and if the personnel group was adequately designed against a mature corps of 72,000 on the battlefield. MG Woods is also concerned about the personnel group's MWR mission and what organization was within the personnel group to run it. He expressed concern that the issue was a wartime one and that it did not appear that the PERSCOM size was right for a mature theater. The analogy was that a mature corps would be serviced by two P&A Battalions plus a Corps AG and in peacetime constrained to one P&A Battalion plus an AG without expansion capability.

c. COL Art Dean, Postal Group Commander, USAREUR, then discussed the issues within the Postal Command. The first issue he pointed out was the shortage of Sergeants E5 and that under the new force structure they were being civilianized. He recommended, based on the scope of responsibility, that Postal Commanders be upgraded to Major. He emphasized the fact that over one-half of his sergeants were gone and that equated to a 250 space reduction. MG Woods asked him how he kept small post offices open. The point is these significant reductions in leadership and workers is going to cause small communities to suffer and have to put soldiers on the road to get their mail. COL Ed Strong then asked if we were still on tract to have TACCS in each postal platoon and was the postal 76Y E4 upgraded to an E5 or E6 as appropriate. (I believe DCD is already working on this.) COL Dean then went on to express concern with the 37% equipment reduction within postal units. He specifically desired that a management study be conducted to validate the retention of this equipment. He is especially concerned that he cannot accomplish his wartime mission with the 37% equipment reduction. MG Woods asked what caused the demand of mail to go down in war. (i.e., That should be the only thing that would cause a reduction in TO&E equipment.) COL Dean then reemphasized that his major concern was the lack of ability to conduct wartime financial support in the postal unit. With the loss of money orders, stamps, etc., that capability will not return to a theater until it has a mature BASOPS established. He felt that had a significant impact on NEO, civilians in theater, and a wide range of other postal support services.

5. LTC McLinn, AG/G1 of the 3d Infantry Division, discussed the problem of overstaffing and the long overtime hours that the personnel community was working. MG Woods then asked if Europe, in their personnel units, could furnish us:

a. What is required and authorized.

b. What is presently assigned.

c. Hours worked daily.

d. Weekends worked.

e. Overstrength broken down by officer, NCO, and other ranks.

LTC McLinn then commented that the key to successful operations was highly qualified majors and captains. At that point the conversation turned to the problem of male and female mix in the AG MOS's. Bottom line is that the mix appears to be too high for females. The division is receiving its fair share of CMF 75, but because of assignment restrictions, line units are suffering shortages since females cannot be assigned to them and headquarters units are overstrength. While this sometimes solves the shortfalls, caused by AOE force structure reductions at the headquarters level, it exasperates operating strength problems at battalion level.

6. a. A workshop was held by four serving, or former AG/G1 to discuss the major challenges facing today's AG/G1. Safety training was the first and most significant issue that arose in the discussion. AG/G1 said that it often took 40% of their time and the responsibilities of the safety officer were unclear; was he a planner, coordinator, bookkeeper, or action officer?

b. The second major area of concern was the coordination of all health services on the battlefield.

c. A third area of concern was band management.

d. The fourth area is personnel sustainment particularly understanding what to do with the personnel estimate in regard to the commander's intent. With the large number area of responsibility, the AG/G1s were uniform in their need for high quality majors especially in the strength management arena where a major does the job that an AG lieutenant colonel used to.

7. In the challenge of being a successful AG/G1, the AG/G1s were concerned about:

a. Materiel

(1) The rapid development and fielding of a tactical copier/printer.

(2) Division automation and software development be sped up since TACCS was not much help at all at the division level.

b. Doctrine. They wanted us to press on in the direction we were going but remove all functions from the AG/G1s that belong elsewhere, and most of all the IMA ASD issue must be resolved.

c. Training. The AG/G1s asked us to put emphasis on the training in the following areas:

(1) Personnel estimate

(2) Applications of automatin

(3) Safety

(4) MWR

(5) Finance

(6) Civilian Personnel Management

(7) SIDPERS (management from afar)

(8) Equal opportunity and drug and alcohol

(9) Time management

(10) How to establish creditability.

8. The next morning I met with BG Brooks to discuss a number of issues between the School and USAREUR:

a. IMA. His position was that we should take back all the ASD functions or turn all the ASD functions to the Signal Corps. He pointed out that these functions were not glomerate, but interface with us and he believes that returning them to the AG Corps was probably best for the Army. Most of all he echoed sentiments of the LTCs and COLs and that was to resolve the issue as soon as possible since the confusion in the field was getting out of hand.

b. He thought that we needed to get a coordinated plan on the development of 42/53 officers or personnel systems managers. He asked that I coordinate directly with COL Sikora on this. COL Volrath and LTG Ono have also expressed an interest in this area.

c. I presented BG Brooks a plan for a Mobile Postal Training Team to help him during his period of reduction and the large influx of civilian postal employees. I have also given copies of this proposal to COL Dean and will wait for them to study and analyze their needs.

d. I laid out MAJ Marcel's proposal for a Mobile Battalion S-1 Training Course. I left them the detailed briefings and they seemed very interested. COL Sikora asked if we could possibly shorten it to a week. I tolk him all things were possible.

e. I reviewed and passed on to the AG/G1s and COL Sikora the POI outline for the AG/G1 Course. There was a tremendous ground swell of enthusiasm for this course and the fact that it's not being brought on line was a big disappointment to them all.

9. They asked that we be prepared next year to bring a demonstration of the Battlefield Simulations Center and exercise it throughout the Conference and train their Division staffs on it.

10. I discussed "1775," our professional AG Regiment publication, with them and they agreed to support it.

11. Highlights of the CINC and LTG Wall's (7th Corps Commander) speeches are summarized below:

a. All CSS soldiers (E4) in a Combat Arms Battalion should be the skill of the battalion. I believe this also came from GEN Saint or LTG Wall inferred that this came from GEN Saint.

b. Every S-1 school trained enroute to Europe. This was one of the bullets that GEN Saint put up on his briefing chart.

c. The CINC also expressed a desire not to automate at the top, but to start automating at the bottom.

d. Within 7th Corps, they plan to introduce a lap-top variation of the Zenith 248 to company level and interface with TACCS in the supply system.

f. LTG Wall plans to purchase 2500 lap-top computers and put one per principle staff officer at the battalion and brigade. He envisions carrying floppy discs back and forth from brigade and battalion to transmit information. It is not his intent to duplicate anything in TACCS but to supplement it. His goal is, by March, to put lap-tops into the 1st Brigade of the 1st AD and run full blast; then introduce it into an Engineer Brigade. He wanted to watch that for a few months and then go "big time" in a year.

g. LTG Wall thinks that COHORT/Kick Start COHORT is a good idea and he likes the idea of keeping soldiers together. LTG Wall no longer thinks that it is a way to go. He believes we need to go to a unit replacement system, however he does not think company and battalion COHORT is a way to go.

h. The CINC believes that a replacement system that provides replacements in a group every three months might be the way to go.

12. Mr. Spurlock layed out a number of issues when he spoke. These are summarized below:

a. Mr. Spurlock's address was aimed toward the young officers and he told them that they were inheriting a very successful Army. He believes there are two significant officer issues. (1) That we are losing too many good officers. (2) There is too much structure over young officers.

b. Mr. Spurlock thought the Army was being subjected to a number of forces pulling it apart. Specifically, too many branches and too many functional areas. He also lamented the loss of the functional areas assessments since we are only about one-third through modernization. He believes that the functional area assessment is critical to monitoring force modernization.

c. Mr. Spurlock believes that the IMA is stiffling development of most people. The worst of these forces is combined in the IMA instead of allowing each functional area to develop its own functional experts we now have IMA command structure that will not allow the best man to come to the forefront.

d. MWR is going to a professional business leadership to take the burden off the commander and have MWR more professionally run. All readiness items should stay with the commander; others should go to centralization.

e. Mr. Spurlock thought that AOE had stripped out significant force structure in personnel support areas. He felt that the challenge was to ask the right questions and to relook AOE where broken.

f. Mr. Spurlock felt that family members' presence in Europe may have to be redressed or force structure might have to be reduced.

g. He felt that we put too much emphasis on MWR and not enough emphasis on NEO. He also felt that the evacuation of non-combat personnel was a more critical issue in our war fighting ability than MWR. The summary of his speech was that young officers are inheriting a successful organization but must face changing times and that the changes will not come from above but must come from them--the young officers.

13. Additionally, throughout the Conference I met with our young graduates from the Officer Basic and Officer Advance Courses, all of which were pleased with the training which they will receive while here. Advance Course students asked that we enhance our USR training. The commanders and principle staff members at all levels expressed satisfaction with their Basic and Advance Course graduates. Field grade officers expressed concern with catching up with new doctrine, procedures, and automation; and confirmed the need for an exportable training package for field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers as we field AR 600-8, FM 12-6, and SIDPERS/TACCS. Overall the conference left me with the impression that:

a. The AOE personnel structure is significantly understaffed resulting in fairly high command approved overstaffing.

b. The issue of where ASD functions will be performed is unclear and creating confusion and inefficiency. Even when resolved, there is little force structure to perform the mission.

c. Postal may be in serious operating trouble based on reduced structure and NCO's.

d. TACCS is not being fully used at Division.

FRANK C. FOSTER, JR.
Colonel, AG
Commandant, Adjutant General School

CF:

Cdr, SSC
AC, USASSI
DAC, USASSI
COL Smith
Comdt, FS
Dir, DCD
Dir, DOTD
Dir, DOES
Cdr, Trp Bde
Dir, PDD, AGS
Dir, P&SSTD, AGS
Dir, IPTA, AGS
C, Prop Ofc, AGS
Bn S-1 Crs Dir, AGS
Dep Comdt, AGS