ATSG-TSH 22 March 1996

MEMORANDUM THRU Director, Training and Support

FOR Commandant, U.S Army Adjutant General School
Commandant, U.S. Army Finance School

SUBJECT: Evolution of C^2 for Personnel and Finance TOE Units: 1970's-Present

PURPOSE. To trace the evolution of C^2 for Personnel and Finance TOE units from the 1970's to the present.

CONCLUSION. Command and control of personnel and finance TOE units from 1973 through the present is directly related to the efficacy of Personnel Service Support (PSS) as a separate functional area distinct from logistics and Combat Service Support in general.

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PSS FUNCTIONAL AREA. Prior to the establishment of TRADOC in 1973, personnel and finance proponent areas were generally subsumed under the Combat Service Support functional area along with the various logistics proponent areas. Accordingly, command and control of personnel and finance units usually fell under one variation or another of the WWII Services of Supply organization that was heavy with logistics support structures, but also included personnel, finance, and other PSS support structures. However, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, senior leaders in the Army began to view PSS as a functional area separate and distinct from logistics. More importantly, they saw the elevation of PSS as one of the principal means of rebuilding the Army and restoring soldier morale and commitment shaken by the experience of Vietnam. As PSS grew in stature, the command and control connection and the close association with the logistics community began to fade. Key events in the establishment of PSS proponency include:

   a. Establishment of the U.S. Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN) and the Institute of Administration (2 Jun 1973). Despite minor resistance from some senior leaders in the Army, the U.S. Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN) was established in 1973 as one of three TRADOC mid-level managers for combat developments. During 1972-73, Operation Steadfast dissolved the Continental Army Command and the Combat Development Command and replaced them with TRADOC and FORSCOM. Under the TRADOC organization, three "mid-level" combat development management centers were created to relieve HQ TRADOC of some of the command responsibility for doctrinal and combat developments. The Combined Arms Center (CAC), Logistics Center (LOGCEN), and ADMINCEN became the TRADOC mid-level managers for the Army's doctrine and combat development program. ADMINCEN became the Army and TRADOC proponent for personnel and administration, finance, religious affairs, public affairs, legal affairs, Army bands, medical service, and the Women's Army Corps until it was disestablished. Together, these military specialties were collected under the Personnel Service Support mission area.

   b. Establishment of the U.S. Army Institute of Administration (2 Jun 1973). USAIA included the Adjutant General and Finance Schools. The creation of this agency out of the existing Fort Harrison schools had the effect of subordinating personnel and finance business to the larger notion of PSS.

   c. Establishment of the Personnel and Administration Combat Development Activity (PACDA) (3 Jun 1973). The resources used to form CAC and LOGCEN came primarily from already established combat development agencies (Combat Systems Group and the Personnel and Logistics Systems Group) formerly belonging to the Combat Development Command. These agencies did not correspond directly to the combat development activity of any service school gathered under TRADOC. However, the resources used to form the Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA), ADMINCEN's combat

development activity, came exclusively from the former Combat Development Command's Personnel Administrative Services Agency (PASA), the combat development activity for the AG and Finance Corps. PASA, itself, was an agency imposed on the AG and Finance branches by the Combat Developments Command to reduce headquarters overhead.

d. While other TRADOC schools assumed control of the combat development resources which corresponded to their respective school's mission, AG and Finance Corps combat and doctrinal development assets went into the formation of the Integrating Center agency for ADMINCEN. PACDA did acquire additional resources for a new Human Resources and Development Division (Equal Opportunity/Drug Abuse), a staff agency that took on part of the command's new integrating mission. These additional resources over the years were used to staff the Institute of Personnel, the Personnel Management School (1980), Community Activities School (1984), the Directorate of Soldier Developments (1981-1982), and the Directorate of Soldier Advocacy (1984).

e. Institute of Personnel (1 Jul 1979). The Institute of Personnel was established as part of ADMINCEN. Later this agency was rolled into the U.S. Army Institute of Personnel and Resource Management and redesignated the Personnel Management School. Subsequently, it became known as the Personnel and Community Activities School, and finally the Community Activities School before it was absorbed into the Adjutant General School as the Personnel and Community Activities Department (1986). Among the programs initiated by the Institute of Personnel in 1979 included (1) the creation of the Battalion S1/Adminstrative Officer Course, "to institutionalize the broader concept of personnel management," and (2) the development of the Primary Leadership Course.

f. Establishment of the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center (1 Jul 1980). With the expansion of the ADMINCEN mission to include "people doctrine," a concept generally prescribing the development of policy, doctrine, and organization affecting soldier performance and commitment to the Army, the command reorganized into the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center on 1 July 1980. The broader emphasis on the "human-dimension" of military operations caused a change in the name of the command since the term ADMINCEN reflected inaccurately the command's new mission. The reorganization followed a memorandum of agreement among the SSC, the Army DCSPER, and the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) establishing the SSC-National Capitol Region and assigning personnel management doctrine to the SSC, personnel management policy to the DSCPER, and personnel management operations to MILPERCEN. Because of the command's broadened mission, USAIA was redesignated the U.S. Army Institute of Personnel and Resource Management (USAIPRM).

g. Establishment of The U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI) (1 Aug 1984). USAIPRM redesignated the U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute (USASSI). In part, the change in name stemmed from the inclusion of the Army's School of Music and the Soldier Physical Fitness Center within the USASSI organization. By 1986, USASSI embraced 8 schools -- AGS, FIS, RRS, Computer Science, Physical Fitness, School of Music, Community Activities, and ROTC.

2. PSS AND THE ARMY OF EXCELLENCE (AOE) (1984-1989). The wholesale revision of doctrine, organization, equipment, and training imposed upon the PSS community by AOE initiatives attracted the attention of senior Army leaders. AOE gave the PSS functional area unprecedented visibility as a specialty distinct from logistics and combat service support. As a result of the impact of AOE on PSS business, senior leaders turned increasingly to the PSS community to resolve its own issues. Key events leading to this development included:

a. Army of Excellence Force Design (29 Oct 1984). The DCSPER (LTG Elton) directed the personnel community to "reduce the cost of business" to support the Army's plan to increase combat power and the development of the light division. As the DCSPER said, AOE was moving "the personnel community into uncharted territory" and that reduced manning levels would require the installation of additional computer hard and software, the redesign of a major portion of the personnel management system, and the

reorganization of most personnel and administrative units. The immediate consequences of AOE constraints on PSS force structure development included the following:

(1) Turned the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) on its head. Instead of moving from developmental concept to force structure, doctrine, training, and materiel, AOE forced the PSS community to begin with a constrained resource base and build doctrine, force structure, training, and materiel requirements around it.

(2) Reduction of 3,136 personnel spaces out of Compo 1 AG TOE units and 170 out of Compo 1 Finance TOE units.

(3) Reduction of PSS organic support to the division structure. Division AG and Finance Companies were eliminated (represented a 40% reduction of manpower formerly allocated to the AG Company). Division G1 and AG consolidated. AG functions considered critical in support of the division commander remained with the G1/AG and the rest were embedded in new corps-level Personnel Service Companies (PSC). Division finance functions were tranferred to new corps-level Finance Support Units (FSU) leaving the G1/AG responsible for coordinating finance support for the division.

(4) Emphasis on high technology information management systems to compensate for the loss of manpower.

(5) Requirement to implement the new force structure before publication of doctrine and training materials and before the fielding high tech automation equipment.

(6) Requirements to develop new corps-level personnel and finance C^2 structures to manage expanding PSS operations for which the corps commander was now responsible and to study the emerging role of corps AG and Finance officers and the role of the COSCOM commander in operating PSS systems. Early sentiment within the PSS community suggested that new corps-wide PSS systems would not operate effectively within the COSCOM during war since the COSCOM commander's span of control would be too great and his technical expertise too small.

b. Proposals for C^2 PSS structures for the Corps (Oct 1985). SSC proposed the formation of Personnel and Administration Groups and Finance Groups to command subordinate corps personnel and finance units. The corps finance officer would be dual-hatted as the Finance Group commander responsible for the command of subordinate Finance Support Units, and the corps AG would be dual-hatted as the PA Group commander. SSC envisioned the PA Group providing C^2 for corps PA battalions and other corps personnel units. Corps PA battalions would control the newly formed PSCs even as they directly supported the division.

c. Force Structure Panel: PSS Systems Program Review (SPR) (11-12 Jun 1986). The PSS SPR in 1986 was the first opportunity for senior leaders to sit in review of the personnel community's effort to rebuild itself in lieu of AOE force structure constraints. The VCSA, TRADOC Commander, COA, DCSPER, SSC Commander, and MILPERCEN Commander were a among those senior officers in attendance. The briefing presented by the Force Structure Panel was notable for its presentation of the following:

(1) Comparison of the pre-AOE force structure design to the emerging concepts under study by the PSS community. Personnel and finance units under the pre-AOE design were subject to Corps Support Group (CSG) and Theater Support Group (TSG) C^2.

(2) AOE force structure design that included the consolidation of the G1/AG positions within the division, reduction of the size and the reassignment of AG and Finance units from the division to the corps, and a recognition for theater-level AG and Finance structures.

(3) Two options for C^2 of corps personnel and finance units -- combining personnel and finance group HQ at corps level or placing AG and Finance technical functions in corp HQ with C^2 of personnel and finance units provided by existing corps support groups (CSG).

(4) Absence of the C^2 option ultimately approved by the VCSA -- Personnel Group and Finance Group as separate C^2 headquarters in each corps/TAACOM.

(5) Two options for theater-level personnel and finance structures -- separate PERSCOM and Theater Finance Commands or a consolidated Personnel/Finance Command.

d. Soldier Support Center Authority (22 Jul 1986). One of the outcomes of the historically significant Personnel Service Support Systems Program Review (PSS SPR) (11-12 July 1986), hosted by the VCSA, was to establish SSC as the proponent for Personnel Service Support, responsible for developing and integrating PSS wartime doctrine, combat developments, and training. A document signed by GEN Thurman and others essentially validated the special mission of SSC and PSS as a stand alone functional area.

e. Briefing to VCSA on C^2 of AG and Finance units on the battlefield (18 Aug 1986). VCSA directed that

(1) Personnel Group and Finance Group be separate C^2 headquarters in each corps/TAACOM.

(2) Personnel Group and Finance Group commanders be dual-hatted as Corp AG and Corps Finance Officers respectively.

(3) Personnel Group and Finance Group commanders have C^2 of all personnel and finance organizations in the Corps/TAACOM areas.

(4) SSC study Personnel and Finance TDA theater level commands.

(5) Personnel and Administration battalions not be created as intermediate HQs between the Personnel Groups and Personnel Service Companies.

f. Publication of FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine (Aug 1989) and FM 14-7, Finance Operations (Oct 1989). Publication of these two "how-to-fight" manuals was the culmination of the PSS community's AOE redesign efforts begun in 1984. The new doctrine did not include any significant changes to previously approved C^2 relationships of personnel and finance units on the battlefield.

g. CINCUSAREUR and other senior leaders raise the flag on PSS shortfalls (31 Mar 1989). Shortly after the publication of personnel and finance AOE doctrine, GEN Saint, CINCUSAREUR, alerts the VCSA to the dreadful condition of PSS in Europe and the impact of AOE on the personnel and finance community's ability to perform its mission. GEN Saint wrote that he was convinced the Army had "some serious shortfalls in the peacetime PSS arena." For him, the most disturbing fact of the matter was that he was "having to rip-off our foxhole strength to cover these shortfalls." He recommended immediate repair in three areas, the last having to do with the new Personnel Group and C^2 issues:

(1) Division G1/AG. The structure was cut by 60%, including a 50% reduction in officers and without any real change in the way we do business. Saint reported that one his divisions had 107 people in the G1/AG shop against 51 authorizations. The situation needed to be resolved with either more people or with promised automation.

(2) Personnel Service Companies. The PSC took a 42% cut in records clerks without any significant change in the number of functions performed or the way personnel records were maintained. Promised automation intended to cover the shortfall had not yet materialized. "I will not," wrote Saint, "divert

more soldiers. I've covered 240 spaces with civilians but need approximately 215 additional civilians spaces in TDA linkage."

(3) Personnel Groups. Saint indicated he was not comfortable with the staffing level of the Per Group and felt the Army was investing a colonel with "an unwieldy span of control." The Personnel Group was about 35 people short of what it needed to do the combined work of the corps/TAACOM AG and PA Battalion. "Consolidation generates space savings," said Saint, "but additional span of control and geographic dispersion will negate some of those savings."

h. Operations Desert Shield and Storm (ODS/S) (Aug 1990-Feb 1991). The shortcomings of the AOE PSS force structure became all too apparent during ODS/S. Among the many PSS lessons learned from the war, several had to do with the Personnel Group's C^2 responsibility. In short, GEN Saint's concerns were borne out by the experience of Personnel Group commander's during the war -- too few people, a burdensome span of control, and no automation to compensate for either.

3. REENGINEERING OF TRADOC (1990-1991). In the context of the PSS community's continuing effort to recover from AOE, the Army began drawing down in earnest. The institutionalization of PSS in the 1970's and 1980's gave SSC authority over personnel and finance proponent developments (to include the structure and control of TOE units on the battlefield), but the reorganization of TRADOC and the establishment of the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) began to erode that authority and the efficacy of the PSS functional area in general. Key events in the disestablishment of the PSS functional area include:

a. Establishment of the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) (2 Oct 1990). The reengineering of TRADOC caused consolidation of some CAC and HQ TRADOC combat development activities at Fort Monroe, and the transfer of the SSC integrating mission, including C^2 authority for the PSS functional area, to LOGCEN, reorganized into the CASCOM on 2 October. The AG and Finance Schools became two of nine schools and one proponent activity organized under the CASCOM integrating umbrella. Four of the schools and the proponent activity formerly fell under SSC integrating center authority -- AG, Finance, Recruiting, JAG, and Chaplain, and the Public Affairs Proponent Activity (PAPA). Historically, the establishment of CASCOM meant the subordination of PSS to CSS once again.

b. PSS integration ceased when CASCOM used 41 transferred SSC personnel spaces to pay part of their drawdown bill (2 Oct 1990). There is not much evidence that CASCOM takes its new PSS integration mission very seriously. As MG Brooks said recently, "Does anyone know what the Chaplain, JAG, and Public Affairs people are doing any more."

c. Creation of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC). The development and implementation of this course in recent years at Fort Lee went on as if the PSS community and CASCOM's new found mission did not exist. As you know, it's essentially a course for logisticians.

d. Consolidation of CASCOM Associated School Combat and Training Development Assets at CASCOM HQ, Fort Lee, Virginia (January 1994). Although the DCSPER rescued SSI from this monumental realignment that moved all CASCOM associated school TD and CD spaces to Fort Lee, SSI still took the personnel cuts that had been programmed by CASCOM. SSI retained its personnel and finance TD and CD missions, but lost 130 of our 195 personnel spaces in the process. Although MG Brooks believed the DCSPER intervention saved the AG and Finance branches from virtual extinction, he said the personnel cut came close to making the new SSI at Fort Jackson dysfunctional.

e. Airland Battle-Future (ALBF) GOWS on CSS organization and design at division and corps (9-10 Jul 1991). As a new subordinate command of the CASCOM, SSC participated in this event. The TRADOC, CAC, CASCOM, and SSC commanders were in attendance. The Commandant, AG School briefed the Personnel Group Design and the Commandant, Finance School briefed the Finance Group Design. The workshop was noteable for the following developments:

(1) One of the topics slated for discussion was subordination of Personnel Groups and Finance Groups to the COSCOM, but the CASCOM commander never raised the issue.

(2) TRADOC commander questioned the designation of the PSC as a battalion rather than a company on one of the Commandant, AG School's slide. Along with returning the PSC to the division, converting PSCs and FSCs to battalions was a recommendation for relieving the Per Group and Finance Group commanders of some of their C^2 responsibility.

(3) CAC commander asked if any thought had been given to consolidating the Per Group and Finance Group into an Admin Group.

4. The result of the recent reengineering of TRADOC and the rise of CASCOM has caused the PSS functional area to recede into the background in the last five years. However, the mission is still there, but without official sanction and the resources to perform it. TRADOC and CASCOM still looks to the SSI commander to resolve PSS issues for TRADOC and the Army. Proponency for Equal Opportunity is one of those things that SSC supposedly passed to the CASCOM when it gave up its integrating mission. We still have the mission, but not the resources to do it with. Much the same can be said of such things as the development of personnel and finance multi-functional units and the pay/personnel interface on the battlefield, legitimate integrating issues that CASCOM ought to be managing or that a more generously resourced SSI ought to be doing for itself. Instead we're taking people out of hide to get it done.

5. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION.

a. TAB K. Operation Steadfast Historical Summary: A History of the Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command [1972-1973]. Excerpts from this history discuss establishment of ADMINCEN in 1973 as one of three TRADOC integrating centers. See highlighted areas in particularly.

b. TAB L. Ltr, DCSPER for dist; subj: Personnel and Administration in the Army of Excellence, 29 Oct 1984.

c. TAB M. Fact Sht, subj: PSS-SPR Task/Action #31 -- Force Structure of Finance Organizations, 22 Jan 1987; Fact Sht, subj: C^2 of AG/FI Structure for TAA 93, 22 Jan 1987.

d. TAB N. "USASSC Authority," Concept agreed to by VCSA, COA, DCSPER, TRADOC Commander, and SSC Commander at PSS-SPR, Jun 1986; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC for dist; subj: Personnel Service Support (PSS) Responsibilities, 22 Jul 1986; MOU, USAMILPERCEN and USASSC; subj: Proponency for the Army's Personnel System, 3 Oct 86; MOU, USASSC ATSG-TSH and USAFAC; subj: Working Relationships and Agreements, 17 Feb 1987.

e. TAB O. MFR, Cdr, SSC; subj: VCSA Review of AG/FI Principles and Command and Control (C^2) of AG/FI Units on the Battlefield, 25 Aug 1986.

f. TAB P. Brf, subj: Battalion Thru Corps Personnel and Administration Organizations in the Army of Excellence, no date (probably late 1985, early 1986).

g. TAB Q. Brf, Force Structure Panel, Personnel Service Support - Systems Program Review, 11-12 June 1986.

h. TAB R. Msg, CINCUSAREUR to VCSA; subj: AOE Impact on Personnel Support, 31 Mar 89; Msg, DCSPER to Cdr, FORSCOM; subj: AOE Impact on Personnel Support, 21 Aug 89; Msg, Cdr, SSC to Cdr, CACDA; subj: Force Structure Review Personnel Service Support Issues, 14 Nov 89; Msg, Cdr, CACDA to

Cdr, SSC; subj: Force Structure Review Personnel Support Issues, 11 Dec 89; Msg, Cdr, SSC for dist; subj: PSS Mini-Functional Area Assessment, 15 Dec 89.

i. TAB S. MFR, B. Bordner (Finance Br, SSC DCD); subj: ALBF GOWS, 12 Jul 1991.

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