

REBALANCING FORCES
Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation to a more responsive, lethal, and agile force based on capabilities rather than threats. As the transformation has progressed, it has become evident that the balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components is not the best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and individuals with skills in high demand. The Global War on Terrorism, which began after September 11, 2001 and has included Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, has accelerated the need for change.

This report provides a comprehensive review of the Services' rebalancing initiatives – both ongoing as well as those planned for fiscal year 2005 and beyond. Easing the stress on the force requires a multi-faceted approach – no single solution will resolve the challenges faced by the Services.¹ Three areas are the focus of the Services' rebalancing initiatives described in the following pages:

- Enhance early responsiveness
- Resolve stressed career fields
- Employ innovative management practices

To address the first two areas, the Services rebalanced about 10,000 military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in fiscal year 2003 and are rebalancing about 20,000 military spaces during fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2005, the budget supports an additional 20,000 force structure changes to resolve imbalances that put pressure on the force. The Services based these force structure changes on the planning metrics, established by the Secretary of Defense in his July 9, 2003 memorandum, *Rebalancing Forces*, to: a) reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid response operation, using the initial 15 days as the planning metric; and b) limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates, using not more than one year in every six as the planning metric.

¹ The strategy that formed the basis for the Department's rebalancing initiatives originated in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, December, 2002.

While these metrics seem appropriate for the current tempo of operations, lessons learned during the current operations will be examined to determine if additional or other metrics should be applied in the future.

By employing innovative force management practices, the Services can perhaps achieve the greatest degree of flexibility in utilizing the Total Force, while reducing both the stress on critical career fields and the need for involuntary mobilization. Approaches such as the continuum of service, reachback operations, rotational overseas presence, and improvements in the mobilization process can help to ensure that the Services have access to individuals with the skills and capabilities required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day activities.

In total, the initiatives described in this report reflect a cohesive rebalancing strategy that will ease the stress on the Reserve forces.² Many of these initiatives are already being implemented; others will require legislative changes, some of which are already being proposed for fiscal year 2005. As these initiatives are implemented and begin to take affect, the Services must monitor their impact and look for opportunities to implement additional measures that will further improve the balance of forces between the Active and Reserve components. Efforts to rebalance the force will be iterative and ongoing, as demands on the Total Force change and new requirements create different stresses on the force. By proceeding in this fashion, the Department will be able to achieve its transformation goals, ensure the judicious and prudent use of its Reserve components, and ultimately assure victory in the Global War on Terrorism.

² In the July 9, 2003 memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, in coordination with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Services and Joint Staff, was directed to determine Total Force requirements for Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. Based on these requirements, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is preparing a report on *Reserve Component Contributions to Homeland Defense and Civil Support* that will recommend the appropriate roles, force mix, priorities, command relationships, and resources required for conducting these missions. This report is due in early 2004.

INTRODUCTION

What we have to do is make sure we recognize that the single most important thing we've got in the Department of Defense are the people, and we have to make sure we manage that force—the Total Force—the Active component and the Reserve component in a way that's respectful of them. To do that you've got to be very sensitive about the risk of back to back deployment for active service, you've got to be very careful about short call up periods for the reserve, you've got to give them as much certainty as possible, you have to use volunteers to the greatest extent possible and you have to undertake a project to rebalance the Guard and the Reserve with the Active force.

Donald Rumsfeld

Remarks at the Eisenhower
National Security Conference
September 25, 2003

On July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, *Rebalancing Forces*, in which he directed the Services to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components. The memorandum further directed the Services to implement force rebalancing initiatives – that combine more efficient use of manpower with technological solutions – to ease the strain on Guard and Reserve forces. These initiatives, along with a disciplined force requirements process, are critical to the Department's ongoing efforts to relieve pressures on the force that are a result of today's high operational tempo.

This report provides a comprehensive review, for the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, of the Services' rebalancing initiatives – both ongoing as well as those planned for fiscal year 2005 and beyond. In total, these initiatives reflect a cohesive rebalancing strategy across the Services, yet opportunities still exist to implement additional measures in the future. Before reviewing these initiatives in detail, this report begins with an overview of Reserve component contributions to DoD missions and the challenges that lie ahead.

RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO DoD MISSIONS

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved the viability of the Reserve components as Total Force partners. Following this conflict, between 1996 and 2001, Reserve component contributions to ongoing DoD missions maintained a relatively consistent rate of between 12-13 million duty days annually. This rate changed dramatically, however, during the two years following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, reserve contributions to Total Force missions totaled about 42 million and 62 million days of support, as figure 1 illustrates.




Figure 1. Reserve Component Support to Total Force Missions

In recent months, as shown in figure 2, the total number of mobilized reservists has actually declined – a result of the change in mission in the Iraqi theater from major combat operations to sustainment operations. However, as a new rotation of forces is brought into the theater to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the number of mobilized reservists needed to replace forces currently in theater will increase for a time, before falling to a new sustainment level.




Figure 2. Reserve Component Mobilizations

Between October 2001 and December 2003, over 350,000 Active and Reserve Service members were deployed to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, which includes the Iraqi Theater of Operations (figure 3). During that period, the number of reserve forces supporting the OIF mission, increased from about 5 percent of the Total Force to as high as 34 percent. Since the peak in May 2003, the number of deployed personnel has dropped by over 180,000, as major combat operations ended. On December 31, 2003, the total number of forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility was 190,955, of which 30,988 were reservists.

Fighting the Global War on Terrorism is expected to be a long-term effort. While operational tempo should ease to some degree, it will, for the foreseeable future, remain substantially higher than the levels prior to September 11, 2001. Moreover, rapid-response operations will continue to cause temporary spikes in operational tempo, as have operations such as NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).




Figure 3. Deployments to U.S. Central Command

Today's high level of operational tempo is beginning to stress the Reserve force. Though recruiting, attrition rates, and end strength achievement rates remain good, other indicators, described in the next section, suggest that continued use of the Reserve components at current levels may have a negative impact on the stability of the Reserve force. The rebalancing initiatives, directed by the Secretary of Defense and discussed in this report, are an important step in preserving this important component of the All-Volunteer Force.

THE CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE JUDICIOUS AND PRUDENT USE

The Department of Defense, Congress, and the American public are concerned about overuse of the Reserve components. Specific concerns include the following:

- How frequently are the reserves mobilized and for how long?
- When should they be available?
- How quickly should they be expected to respond?

There is also concern about the impact of involuntary mobilization on reservists early in an operation. A recent analysis of the first 15 days of a hypothetical rapid response operation indicated that the Services, in their current configurations, would have to depend on about 9,000 early involuntary mobilizations. Such early mobilizations could preclude the Department from giving reservists, their families, and their employers the time needed to prepare for smooth transition to active duty.

With these concerns in mind, the Secretary of Defense established a number of planning considerations to govern future force structure decisions regarding the Active and Reserve components – considerations that are being incorporated into Service rebalancing initiatives. The guidance calls for applying the following two metrics to force structure planning decisions in order to help ensure the judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components:

- Structure the force to reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists during the early stages of a rapid response operation, using the initial 15 days as the planning metric
- Structure the force to limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates, using one year out of every six as the planning metric

While these metrics seem appropriate for the current tempo of operations, lessons learned during the current operations will be examined to determine if additional or other metrics should be applied in the future.

The Services are also directed to develop innovative management practices to support force rebalancing. The expectation is that by employing these metrics and innovative management techniques, the Department will ease the stress on the Reserve components and help ensure their viability over the long run.

KEY INDICATORS OF STRESS

As the Department examines ways to rebalance the Total Force, it is useful to understand how choices in using the reserves can lead to stress on the force. A review of current Reserve component usage pointed to three measurable factors that, when taken together, provide a good assessment of stress on the force. The three factors are frequency, percent of inventory used, and duration.

Frequency

Frequency refers to how often Reserve component members are called up – for multiple contingencies or multiple deployments within a given contingency. The review showed that, since 1996, less than 12,000 Reserve component members (including some volunteers) in the Selected Reserve force of around 880,000, have served in both current operations (ONE, OEF, OIF) and another ongoing contingency such as Bosnia, Southwest Asia, or Kosovo. Thus, over the past seven years, the frequency of call-ups for most reservists does not appear to have been a significant problem. However, the data also show that about 16,000 reservists have been called up more than once for various intervals of time to support current operations. As the Department continues to mobilize the Reserve components, it will need to monitor the frequency factor to prevent undue stress in any specific career specialty.

Percentage of Inventory Used

The percentage of the inventory used is the amount of the force used as compared to a target usage rate. To limit involuntary mobilizations to one year out of every six, consistent with the current force structure planning metric, the Services would have to maintain a Reserve component base force that is large enough and with the appropriate skill mix so that no more than 17 percent of the force, in any particular functional area or career field, is used per year.

In current operations, the data suggest that some functional areas are being used at rates that cannot be sustained for long durations. When the Secretary's planning metric is employed, specialties

experiencing stress are those where more than 17 percent of the capability is used annually. Table 1 shows some of the career fields that are experiencing high use. Table 2 specifies the percentage of the inventory that has been used in a sample of eight higher stressed specialties (defined here as specialties reflecting a usage rate of more than 34 percent during the 2 years of current operations). Tracking such data will help point to specialties that are candidates for mitigating action.

Table 1. Higher Use Career Specialties

FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY	CAREER SPECIALTIES
Logistics/Service	Law Enforcement Transportation Materiel
Combat Arms	Special Forces Installation Security Aircraft Crews
Intelligence	General Intelligence Electronic Countermeasures Counter Intelligence
Civil Engineering/ Utilities	Construction Related Utilities
Maintenance	Aircraft Related Automotive Other Equipment
Electronic Repair	Communications-Radio Communications-Navigation Electronic Instruments
Technical & Misc	Civil Affairs NBC Specialists Memorial Activities
Administrative/ Functional Support	Information and Education Data Processing Finance
Health Care	Medical Care Physicians Nurses

Table 2. Selected Higher Stressed Specialties

OFFICER		
SPECIALTIES	% OF RESERVE INVENTORY CALLED-UP	RESERVE COMPONENT % OF TOTAL FORCE INVENTORY
Civil Affairs	56	72
Police	51	45
Intelligence	48	37
Fixed Wing Pilots/Crews	42	33
ENLISTED		
SPECIALTIES	% OF RESERVE INVENTORY CALLED-UP	RESERVE COMPONENT % OF TOTAL FORCE INVENTORY
Installation Security	86	30
Law Enforcement	69	44
Air Crews	67	25
Special Forces	65	24

Duration

Duration is the amount of time for which Reserve component members are called up – the duration of the mobilization tour. The data on this factor revealed that tour lengths have increased. For example, in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the average tour length was 156 days. For regional contingencies such as Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and Bosnia, the majority of tours between 1996 and 2003, were 200 days or more. For recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, most tours were 300 days or more. Importantly, of the approximately 300,000 Reserve component members called up for these operations, about 10 percent, or 30,000, have been extended from one to two-year tours. More extensions are likely.

The data suggest that overall, the frequency of deployments is moderate to low; the percentage of inventory used is moderate to high, with the highest stress factors concentrated in selected career fields; and the duration of deployments is also moderate to high. *Thus, force rebalancing – or more specifically, changing the mix of Active and Reserve forces – is necessary in some areas, but in other areas innovative management actions may be sufficient to reduce stress.* Those areas where force rebalancing may be necessary are few – we estimate only about

10 to 12 percent of the force – and are concentrated in select career fields.

APPROACHES TO REBALANCING

Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve requires a multi-faceted approach – no single solution will resolve the challenges faced by the Services. Three approaches, as described in the December 2002 *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, should be the focus of the Services' efforts to rebalance the force. They are:

- Enhance early responsiveness
- Resolve stressed career fields
- Employ innovative management practices

A number of assumptions underlie how these approaches will be implemented by the Services. These assumptions address end strength considerations, expected operational tempo, and choices about how Active and Reserve component forces will be employed. More specifically:

- Existing end strengths should be properly distributed and utilized before recommending an increase in end strength.
- The allocation of capabilities both within and between the Active and Reserve components may change.
- The steady state for the next three to five years will find the Reserve components supporting operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, and other posture of engagement operations with a total of about 100,000-150,000 personnel. This requirement will be filled primarily by Army Guard and Reserve component forces, but all Reserve components will contribute.

- Mobilizations of up to one year or more will be the norm for Reserve component members during the next three to five years.
- The early conflict phase of future operations will be met by immediate response forces consisting of both Active and Reserve components, with a minimal use of involuntary mobilization.

The sections that follow discuss the Services' force rebalancing initiatives, both ongoing as well as those proposed in the fiscal year 2005 budget.³

ENHANCE EARLY RESPONSIVENESS

As stated in the assumptions above, during the early phases of a conflict, both Active and Reserve component forces will be among the early responders. However, the Services have reviewed their requirements and are structuring their forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations during the early stages of a rapid-response operation using the initial 15 days as the planning metric. Through a variety of measures, the Services are positioning themselves to rely more on Active structure, Reserve component volunteers, and enhanced readiness to meet early response requirements.

ARMY

The Army's force structure rebalancing efforts are indicative of its emphasis on joint and expeditionary operational capabilities. The Army conducted an analysis of various rapid-response scenarios and identified areas where rebalancing and innovative management were needed. As a result of this analysis, the Army is converting 5,600 spaces of lower priority active structure to higher priority active

³ Because of the unique relationship between DoD and the U.S. Coast Guard in supporting combat operations in the Global War on Terrorism and conducting maritime homeland security operations, the rebalancing initiatives of the Coast Guard are included in this report in Appendix A.

structure. These conversions will add capabilities in chemical, military police, engineer (bridging and fire fighting units), medical, quartermaster (fuel, water, and mortuary affairs units), and transportation specialties. The conversion will take place over several years, with the Army converting 800 spaces in fiscal year 2004, 2,200 spaces in fiscal year 2005, and an additional 2,600 spaces between fiscal years 2006-2009. The Army is further developing plans to convert an additional 129 spaces of active force structure in fiscal year 2005 in the transportation and medical specialties. In addition, the Army supports current efforts to increase accessibility and flexibility of Reserve component capabilities during the early phases of an operation.

To ensure that the Army remains capable of providing ready forces in a timely fashion, particularly in the key opening days of any major deployment, an increased emphasis on modularity is being integrated into force structure planning and doctrine. Modularity permits detaching selected functions and capabilities from a parent unit and tailoring the capabilities of the detached assets to meet the unique needs of the force. Modularity provides a combatant commander with a force that is interchangeable, expandable, and responsive to changing requirements.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The Navy and Marine Corps envision support to rapid-response operations coming from those forces already forward deployed or capable of being surged. The Navy has taken a proactive approach to minimizing involuntary mobilizations through the following actions:

- Added over 7,200 new Active component and over 1,800 Reserve component antiterrorism/force protection billets primarily for ship and port security to meet Force Protection Condition (FPCON) "B" and the first 60 days of FPCON "C" without mobilization
- Established new Reserve Flexible Drilling Contracts Programs that will be especially valuable in helping

to meet the Navy's Reserve medical program requirements

- Proposed Naval Reserve Component First Call Program which allows rapid accessing of a limited number of key Selected Reservists through volunteerism
- Ensured adequate additional funding to maintain a high state of readiness for high demand units and individual skills such as those required by the organic fleet airlift units (VR)

Typically, mobilization of Marine Corps Reserve forces is only necessary for large-scale contingencies. For rapid-response operations, the majority of reserve unit deployments are tied to combatant commander requirements beyond the early stages of a rapid-response operation. One exception is units associated with the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) Fly-in-Echelon. In a rapid-response operation, Marine Corps Reserve personnel could be activated through volunteerism for the early phase of operations to assist in the preparation and offload of MPF equipment. Other reservists deployed within the early stages of an operation are generally individuals who augment Marine and joint staff headquarters without the need for involuntary mobilization.

AIR FORCE

With its focus on joint and expeditionary forces, the Air Force integrates its Reserve components into every aspect of the Air Force mission. Air Reserve components are fully engaged in full-time, daily missions and operations. Volunteers from the Reserve components provide between 15 and 25 percent of the capability embedded in the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF). Because the Air Force is organized around readily deployable units, it is able to source, deploy, and tailor forces to meet theater requirements without full-scale mobilization. Based on their "one tier of readiness" concept, all components whether Active, Guard, or Reserve are ready to deploy globally within 72 hours.

During the AEF planning process, reserve volunteers are solicited to fill requirements. This force rotation process is a key to the Air Force's ability to use volunteers for sustained periods of time without mobilization. At the same time, the Air Force is continuing to pioneer new policies and practices that support volunteerism in order to improve the rotational pool available to the AEF and preclude the need for early involuntary mobilizations. One area of particular interest is Reserve component support and availability to TRANSCOM since the Air Reserve components make up 53 percent of TRANSCOM's capabilities and provide approximately 25 percent of strategic airlift support on a continuous, ongoing basis. Air Reserve component intelligence squadrons are also making significant mission contributions since they are integral to Air Force mission tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence data related to the Predator and Global Hawk.

RESOLVE STRESSED CAREER FIELDS

Under the current level of operational tempo, each Service has experienced high demand for some capabilities and career specialties, which have required resolution. Some of the Services were able to identify rebalancing requirements early and have already programmed initial efforts to address stressed career fields; other Services are putting plans in place for the near term years ahead.

ARMY

As part of its transformation efforts, the Army identified certain parts of the force that were likely to experience excessive stress in the changing global security environment. Beginning in 2001, the Army reprogrammed over 30,000 spaces in the Active and Reserve components. Almost 3,000 of these conversions were implemented in fiscal year 2003, providing additional capabilities in the areas of civil affairs, psychological operations, special operations forces, intelligence, and military police. In addition, the Army has accelerated the conversion of 2,000 National Guard field artillery spaces to military police in fiscal year 2004. Over 4,000 additional

Reserve component spaces have also been identified in the military police, transportation, quartermaster, and medical specialties and will be converted beginning in fiscal year 2005.

The Army continues to develop rebalancing initiatives that could result in the conversion of an additional 3,600 reserve spaces in the special forces and military police specialties across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Beginning in fiscal year 2006, the Army will undertake a major rebalancing effort involving over 80,000 spaces to further relieve stress on the force and continue to improve its Reserve component capabilities and readiness. For example, the Army Guard Restructuring Initiative will convert approximately 14,000 heavy combat brigade forces to more agile and useful Mobile Light Brigade forces. All of these actions posture the Army to achieve its goals of relieving stress on high demand career specialties by building a larger rotational base and rebuilding a lighter and more flexible force structure, thereby adding additional capabilities and improving the readiness of existing forces.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The Navy began rebalancing forces following the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS COLE. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Navy recruited and converted 4,477 active sailors and 2,300 Naval reservists to the security force career field. This rebalancing effort continues into fiscal year 2005, with 1,200 additional active recruitments and conversions to the security force career field. In addition, the Navy has converted 1,275 active spaces to its Naval Coastal Warfare units, and 500 active spaces to its medical career fields. In fiscal year 2004, the Navy rescinded an earlier decision to decommission an active Seabee battalion, and instead decommissioned several reserve Seabee units as a neutral cost action. As a result, the Navy retained the ability to meet the construction requirements of the first 60 days of surge using active Seabee forces.

In fiscal year 2004, the Navy plans to rebalance its hospital corpsman capability by converting 525 vacant and non-corpsman reserve billets to active corpsman billets. These corpsmen are

specifically designated for assignment to Marine Corps combat units and will ease the pressure on the reserve corpsman career specialty experienced in recent deployments. The existing reserve corpsmen billets will continue to be used to support Marine Corps combat units that deploy later in a conflict and to backfill positions vacated by Active component corpsmen deployed with the Marines. Additionally, there are several ongoing efforts to relieve stress in the naval intelligence field.

The Marine Corps stood up one Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company in the Active component in fiscal year 2003, and will man two additional Active component companies in fiscal years 2004–2005. Where previously this capability resided entirely within the Marine Corps Reserve, there is now a mix of 55 percent Active and 45 percent Reserve forces, relieving stress in this capability area. In fiscal year 2004, fixed-wing aviation will be rebalanced as a result of tactical air integration with the reassignment of 93 Active Reserve personnel from a Reserve component squadron to the Active force.

The Marine Corps also created the Intelligence Support Battalion (ISB) to consolidate command and control of reserve intelligence assets which will increase the number of reserve intelligence billets as early as fiscal year 2005. As a result, more of these specialists can be used to support real-world intelligence requirements, with the added benefit of improved career progression opportunities for reserve intelligence specialists. In fiscal year 2005, ISB detachments will be established and drill at 12 of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers located nationwide.

Future actions include the establishment of two additional Reserve component military police companies and four new reserve anti-terrorism/force protection companies (approximating 1,000 additional Reserve component security personnel). To meet the requirement for civil affairs personnel during ONE/OEF/OIF, the Reserve component civil affairs units operated with overstaff personnel within existing Reserve component end strength. A rebalancing course of action has been identified to increase the size of the units as well as to integrate active personnel into this stressed field.

The heavy use of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve since September 11, 2001, was ameliorated by the use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The activation rate of the entire Ready Reserve was 17 percent. Continued study is warranted to ensure the Marine Corps IRR has the appropriate mix of career fields and grades to be able to relieve stressed career fields in the future.

AIR FORCE

Air Force efforts to address stress on the force date back to the months immediately following September 11, 2001. Systematic assessment tools were developed and used to identify areas of stress on the force. The Air Force took both programmatic and non-programmatic actions in its initial rebalancing efforts, including manpower and personnel realignments to the most stressed career fields, utilization of technology to offset manpower requirements, and training pipeline adjustments. Two areas of notable concern are addressed below.

The Air Force has already begun to reduce stress in the security force specialty by adding 500 civilian positions and 400 contractor guards in fiscal year 2004, and has plans to convert an additional 2,700 military positions for selected force protection functions through the FYDP. In addition, the Air Force is using technology to offset up to 3,000 security force requirements and has invested \$351.7 million in fiscal year 2003 to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf technologies to improve force protection. Currently, the Army is providing force protection assistance to the Air Force in a unique joint venture that bridges the Air Force shortfall in capability until rebalancing and innovative management solutions can take effect. The Air Force will continue to plan and program for the integration of these technologies, provide a more effective protection capability, and further reduce its manpower requirements.

Due to the stress on C-130 pilots and crews, the Air Force has been authorized to mobilize up to 3,086 additional aircrew and support personnel, if required, to support a C-130 intra-theater rotation plan under the Air and Space Expeditionary Force concept for the next

two years. This rotation plan will support current known airlift requirements while the Air Force develops and implements a variety of mitigation proposals designed to alleviate the need for mobilized forces. Current proposals include validating current airlift requirements; giving incentives to volunteers; and optimizing the use of contract, intratheater, and strategic airlift. A review of Civil Reserve Air Fleet capabilities is also underway. Greater use of commercial assets in low-threat environments will provide improved availability of military aircraft for higher threat/priority missions.

EMPLOY INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

By employing innovative force management practices, the Services can perhaps achieve the greatest degree of flexibility in utilizing the Total Force, while reducing the stress on critical career fields and the need for involuntary mobilization. Each Service is unique. Approaches such as the continuum of service, reachback, improved predictability through rotational overseas presence, as well as improvements in the mobilization process, can help to ensure that the Services have access to individuals with the skills and capabilities required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day activities.

Several of the approaches discussed in this section will require changes to current laws. The Department of Defense is working on legislative proposals for inclusion in its fiscal year 2005 Omnibus Legislative Program that support the continuum of service concept and a new mobilization training approach. These proposals, if enacted, will make it easier for Reserve component members to support military operations on both a voluntary and involuntary basis as well as improve responsiveness and effectiveness.

CONTINUUM OF SERVICE

One innovative management practice is a new availability and service paradigm, called the *continuum of service*, that provides individual service members greater flexibility in becoming involved in and supporting the Department’s mission. The continuum of service sets aside the traditional definitions of Active and Reserve components, as described on the left side of figure 4, and recognizes that service may range from full-time duty to availability in the event of mobilization without participation in military training or performance of duty on a regular basis. Between these extremes is a pool of individuals who may participate at varying levels of service throughout a career, as depicted on the right side of figure 4, moving along the continuum as circumstances in their lives and needs of the Department evolve. Movement along the continuum should be transparent, or seamless, and supported by a continuum of benefits that match service member contributions.




Figure 4. The Continuum of Service

The continuum of service focuses on all classes of affiliation: active status members of the force such as ready reservists, inactive status members such as military retirees, as well as civilians who

want to contribute their services. At issue is the need for programs that facilitate access to these individuals and their capabilities.

Active status members of the force may be accessed through volunteerism – either by individual or unit. Inactive status members of the force can be accessed through affiliated unit programs and civilian auxiliaries. The Services are beginning to put in place initiatives that will incorporate the continuum of service concept into their force management practices and gain better accessibility to these individuals. However, to fully realize this concept, new personnel management and accounting legislative initiatives must be made into law.

Personnel Management and Accounting

Perhaps the most significant legislative initiative included in the Omnibus Legislative Program is a proposal to amend title 10 (and some relatively minor changes to title 32) of the U.S. Code to provide for more consistent management of and accounting for Reserve component members. Current practices are often convoluted and in many cases discourage participation by reservists beyond the traditional 39-day training requirement. Instead, the proposed amendments will eliminate barriers to changing levels of contribution and reward, rather than discourage additional service during a career. Key elements of this proposal are as follows:

- Establish a separate strength category for Reserve component members serving on active duty or full-time National Guard duty. (This does not include Active Guard and Reserve personnel who already have a separate strength authorization.) Specifically, this proposal eliminates the 180-day rule, which has been a major barrier to effectively employing Guard and Reserve personnel. Instead, all reserve personnel on active duty in support of a contingency operation would automatically be authorized as additional strength under this category – which provides visibility of the demand for reservists

without discouraging their use. No grade limitations would be imposed.

- Keep reserve personnel who are paid from Active component appropriations and are on active duty for fewer than 1,095 days (three years) out of the preceding 1,460 days (four years) under the reserve personnel management system. Only when this threshold is exceeded, would a reservist be treated as an Active component asset for personnel and career management and strength accounting purposes. (This particular provision also does not affect Active Guard and Reserve personnel.)

A second proposal would update the purpose of the Reserve components to reflect their current relevance in today's force. The Reserve force is no longer used "during and after planned mobilization" [10 USC 10102], but instead is an integral part of many daily military operations. The legislative proposal accurately reflects this expanded role of the National Guard and Reserves in the Total Force.

Another legislative proposal would change inactive duty training to inactive duty. This change is the first step in streamlining and reducing the number of statuses under which Reserve component members may perform duty. Under this proposal, unit commanders would have greater latitude to train and employ Reserve component members in an inactive duty status, and, in particular, to capitalize on technology that enables members to perform duty away from the traditional worksite. Mission requirements that are not classified and do not require direct supervision could be performed by Guard or Reserve members at their home or alternate location. Inactive duty is an ideal means of accomplishing "virtual duty."

Individual Volunteerism

By promoting volunteerism, the Services can better position themselves to meet some of the sudden requirements that emerge during times of national emergency. Many skills that are useful to the uniformed military are difficult to acquire through traditional

accession policies, are difficult to acquire on short notice, or have emerging requirements of limited duration. These skills might include cutting edge, technical skills such as those possessed by engineers, scientists, or information technology professionals.

The Department needs to allow the Services greater flexibility in accessing civilians who have skills that can meet military requirements but who do not fit the traditional career-oriented profiles generally recruited by the Services. Many individuals are willing to volunteer for some form of military service for short periods of time or in response to specific emergencies. Often they are not motivated by financial compensation but by other incentives such as accelerated U.S. citizenship or simply a sense of patriotism. By accessing “ready volunteers” through direct entry programs, the Services can acquire additional manpower without affecting end strength, realize cost savings in certain specialty skills, open new avenues for developing community partnerships with industry and academia, and increase opportunities for using retirees.

Several pilot programs have been established for the Reserve components to test direct entry concepts into the IRR. These programs target civilians who already possess “uniform-required” skills and require little or no initial career sub-specialty training.

- The Army’s Arab Linguist Program is focused on recruiting native Arab speakers into the IRR. These individuals are available for immediate mobilization and military service overseas once they complete their basic training. Since the program’s inception in August, 2003, the Army has successfully recruited 120 native Arab speakers, exceeding its recruiting goal. Trained soldiers will soon be provided to combatant commanders to serve as translators and language facilitators for the military.
- The Defense Wireless Service Initiative, that has recently been implemented, is aimed at attracting spectrum managers and wireless engineers into the military. Studies suggest that there is a significant pool of individuals in these highly technical fields

who are willing to apply their skills to military requirements. Once connectivity channels are in place, individuals accessed through this initiative will be able to participate remotely with flexible drill schedules that allow them to balance the demands of their civilian careers with the requirements of military service.

Two legislative proposals are also designed to enhance the accession and deployment of individuals with unique or special skills. These proposals address expedited basic training requirements and the service obligation.

- The Secretaries of the military departments would be able to establish expedited basic training (or equivalent training) requirements for a wider range of professionals in designated skill areas. This legislation would provide the same flexibility in determining the basic training requirement that is currently provided in law for healthcare professionals.
- The Service Secretaries would be authorized to establish the minimum military service obligation for individuals accessed into the armed forces who have unique skills acquired in a civilian occupation, rather than imposing the existing six to eight year military service obligation. Since these individuals would be accessed because of their unique civilian-acquired, cutting-edge skills and experience, there is no training investment, which helps to justify a shorter obligation period.

Finally, legislation has been introduced to allow the Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Civil Air Patrol to transform into fully functioning service auxiliaries. The proposed legislation provides for other Services to develop their own auxiliaries as well. Service auxiliaries can provide a ready source of civilian volunteers who are trained to Service standards to perform a broad variety of missions. They also serve as a natural umbrella, if properly resourced, for the formation,

coordination, and execution of civilian volunteers wishing to provide service during times of national emergency or in response to homeland security threats. Auxiliaries provide an extremely cost-effective bridge between civilian and military service and are a ready-made model for retiree participation and volunteerism.

Unit Volunteerism

Another concept associated with volunteerism is the Variable Pool of Reserves (VPR) at the unit level. "VPR-Unit Level" builds on the positive aspects of volunteerism that are already present within the Reserve components at the individual level and applies them to the unit in order to increase the responsiveness of and access to reserve units needed in the early phases of an operation or to meet predictable overseas presence or other missions that are rotational in nature. Employing unit-level volunteerism is not meant to replace traditional processes to mobilize Reserve component personnel or units for duty under appropriate mobilization authorization. Rather, reserve members would voluntarily participate in units with higher readiness levels and deployment requirements, without being constrained by the current structure of the traditional 39-day training program for reservists.

The VPR-Unit Level concept appears to be an advantageous option to the Department for accessing Reserve component capabilities. Initial evaluations suggest that force-generation or force-enabler type mission areas and "prime the pump" or "early responder" unit types are very compatible with this concept. An example of such a unit that has achieved outstanding results over the years is the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard (Commando Solo) in which 100 percent of the Air Force's psychological operations capability resides. Other mission areas being examined for applicability include stability operations missions, reachback operations, and homeland defense requirements. Unit types being looked at for VPR include cargo handlers, psychological operations units, and security forces.

ROTATIONAL OVERSEAS PRESENCE

The predictability and long lead time associated with rotational overseas presence allows for substantial planning and preparation of units, individual service members, their families, and their employers. Thus, it is an attractive mission in which to use Reserve component units. By using reservists for rotational overseas presence, Active component units are free to support rapid-response requirements that may arise and the Services are able to better manage the operational tempo of the Total Force. Each of the Services has ongoing or planned activities in this area.

The Army has developed long-range plans for the use of Reserve components in stability and support operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai; and is developing plans for Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

The Navy uses the “fleet response” concept to maximize the employment of resources while maintaining a sustainable overseas presence level. Naval Reserve logistics support plays a significant role in the Navy’s overseas presence posture. The Naval Reserve contains 88 percent of the Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift capability, and these assets are fully integrated into the continuum of Navy airlift requirements. The Naval Reserve maintains 13 aircraft at overseas bases and in fiscal year 2003 only required mobilization of 11 percent of the community due to the high level of volunteerism. During this period they flew over 7,000 missions with a 99 percent completion rate. The Naval Reserve also provides 40 percent of the Navy’s maritime patrol capability. The Naval Reserve maintains three of the Navy’s 40 deployed maritime patrol aircraft using only volunteers as crew.

The Marine Corps Reserve has assumed responsibility for supporting the UNITAS exercise every other year to provide operational tempo relief for the active duty Marine Corps and for supporting one Guantanamo Bay security platoon every year to provide operational tempo relief for the active duty Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST). The Marine Corps is

investigating other courses of action for employing rotational Reserve component forces.

The Air Force uses the AEF concept to provide for a fully integrated Active and Reserve force that is trained and ready to meet national commitments. Air Reserve component personnel and units are aligned with and scheduled with Air and Space Expeditionary Forces in the same way as the Active Air Force. Air Reserve components provide about 25 percent of the aviation requirements and 13 percent of the expeditionary combat support requirements. The AEF uses a rotational approach to provide predictability and stability and enhances Total Force readiness and sustainment.

REACHBACK INITIATIVES

In an effort to reduce the number of forward deployed personnel needed to support combat troops during an operation, DoD has taken a closer look at mission areas that might be accomplished remotely using a concept called “reachback.” Reachback refers to the ability to connect electronically to sites in CONUS or other locations around the world to accomplish essential tasks and missions. By employing reachback, the in-theater force can be both smaller and more agile, while corresponding combat support and physical security requirements are also reduced. Reachback can also provide additional capabilities to the combatant commander without requiring additional mobilizations. By using computer connectivity, reserve units and individuals can provide mission support during drill periods as well as on short-duration active duty tours. This innovative concept adds tremendous value to operational missions, as the following examples illustrate:

- The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program is comprised of 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) located in CONUS where reservists provide mission support to supported commands. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, USCENTCOM used mobilized reservists in JRICs to perform targeting, bomb damage assessment, and imagery exploitation

functions. This construct provided ready forces that contributed to mission accomplishment while easing the burdens and costs associated with deploying members directly into the theater of operations.

- The Marine Corps Reserve used reachback to support intelligence requirements during recent combat operations in Afghanistan. Brig. Gen. Michael E. Ennis, the Marine Corps' Director of Intelligence, stated that being able to use reachback for intelligence support in planning operations contributed significantly to the success of the deployed Marine Task Force and to the overall U.S. effort in the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
- After the terrorists' attacks of September 11, 2001, personnel from three Air National Guard Imagery Intelligence Squadrons were activated and deployed to support the Air Combat Command at Langley and Beale AFB. Air Guard personnel were indispensable in supporting Air Force Global Hawk tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination operations from their deployed locations. The collection was accomplished in theater and the exploitation was conducted remotely using reachback.
- The Army uses the Reserve components to provide reachback support in split-based operations at its Theater Support Commands and Corps Materiel Management Center. The Army has extensively employed its reserves in support of telemedicine for nearly all types of medical units. Additionally, the Army Reserve Unit - Consequence Management provides technical expertise on chemical and biological matters through reachback to deployed Technical Escort Units.

To build on these early successes, the Secretary of Defense recently established a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, to identify additional opportunities and mission areas where reachback can be employed. The GOSC will focus specifically on tasks that can be accomplished through connectivity to CONUS locations and will develop a “roadmap” and initial capabilities description document for implementation in the 2004–2010 timeframe.

MOBILIZATION PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS

Since September 11, 2001, many improvements have been made in the mobilization process. From the establishment of standards that define judicious and prudent use, to improving visibility of reserve forces being activated, the mobilization process in its modified form is much more efficient than the one used to activate reserve members at the start of the Global War on Terrorism. These improvements are steps along the way to replacing a linear process with a collaborative, simultaneous, and balanced mobilization process that is responsive to the nation’s needs for reserve forces on active duty.

Judicious and Prudent Use

Clearly defining judicious and prudent use of reserve forces has provided the necessary guidance to ensure that reserve capabilities are used as an extension of the Department’s capability to wage war, not simply additional Active component end strength. Judicious and prudent use encourages volunteerism and the activation of members not previously used in the Global War on Terrorism. It underscores the need to use alternative manpower sources, to the extent they are legally and practically available – such as contractors, coalition forces, or foreign nationals – as well as technological solutions in lieu of reserve manpower. The use of alternate manpower sources reduced the need for reserve combat support and combat service support for OIF II by 35 percent, demonstrating the impact this policy has had on the mobilization process.

Individual Ready Reserve

Access to the Individual Ready Reserve is being redefined to make IRR members a more viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of capabilities. Efforts on the part of the Services to reconnect with their IRR members and to clarify their mission and expectations will reduce the amount of cross leveling needed between units to prepare for mobilization. Reconnecting and redefining the role of the IRR will play a major role in shaping how the IRR is used in the 21st century.

Approval Process


Since the start of the Global War on Terrorism, the mobilization process has improved at all levels. The time it takes to generate, source, and approve a Reserve component capability for mobilization has been greatly reduced. During OIF I, the staffing process used to present Reserve component mobilization requests to the Secretary of Defense was modified so that requests could be presented within 24 hours of approval by the Joint Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Requests at the Service level that initially took weeks to process can now be presented for decision to the Service Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in days and in some cases hours, as shown in figure 5. The figure shows that a year ago the mobilization process took up to 123 days. Today that timeline has been shortened to no longer than 93 days.

Visibility

Since September 11, 2001, each Service has implemented automated systems to improve the visibility of activated reserve members. These improved legacy automation systems enhance the ability of the Services to meet mobilization requirements and are contributing to the long-term effort to provide a joint solution for operational visibility of the Reserve force.

Predictability

Standards for the predictable use of reserve forces are guiding the Services toward rotational models and have had a significant influence on efforts to provide Reserve component members with 30 days notification prior to activation. With predictability, the Services can maximize the efficiency of inactive training periods and shorten the time it takes between mobilization and arrival of forces in theater. In some cases, combat support and combat service support units have been able to deploy directly into theater from their home stations. As the concept of predictability matures, the delivery time between activation and deployment will continue to be reduced.



* Consideration of alternate in-theater manpower sources before generating a request for forces keeps the time at 30 days.

** Post mobilization training requirements vary by capability

Figure 5. Mobilization Timelines

Train, mobilize, deploy

Today's National Security Strategy calls for swift, potentially preemptive action that requires more rapid access to Reserve component forces than in the past. Although the ability to respond rapidly varies among Reserve forces, all Reserve forces need to be trained and ready prior to starting the mobilization process to deploy. All too often during the Global War on Terrorism, combatant commanders' requirements were met by either creating new units through cross leveling from other units or providing additional training. Creating new units breaks the readiness of the units left behind and disrupts unit cohesion. Providing additional training during the mobilization process can slow the mobilization process significantly.

One solution to this problem is to increase training resources. However, resources are not the only solution to deploying cohesive organizations with increased unit integrity and morale. Timing of the training is also an issue.

The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that will add flexibility to the traditional training program by promoting a "train, mobilize, and deploy" concept. Under this proposal, individuals or units may be mobilized for training related to their mobilization mission in advance of being mobilized to deploy. This approach would provide reservists increased access to the training they need to be able to deploy with their unit, thereby minimizing the need to cross level personnel between units. It would allow for better planning of training requirements and spread the demand on training facilities and materials more evenly throughout the year. Additionally, the predictable, planned nature of this method of training would reduce the duration of extended mobilizations and the related disruptions to members, their families, and employers.

THE WAY AHEAD

The military Services have successfully met the demands of the Global War on Terrorism and won a number of great victories. In doing so, it has become evident that changes are needed to better optimize the force to fight this new kind of war. This report has summarized the major rebalancing efforts underway and planned in fiscal year 2005 and beyond.

As the Services continue to develop and refine approaches to reduce stress on the Reserve components, they will face a number of challenges. One of the greatest challenges for the Services is constructing a military force structure against an unknown or changing threat. Improvements are needed in defining requirements for capabilities. As the War on Terrorism ensues, the Services must closely monitor what capabilities are needed and ensure they are properly resourced in the force structure.

A critical and related challenge is determining the right mix of Active and Reserve forces needed to meet the requirements of the operational commanders without causing undue stress on any particular component of the force. The Services must monitor changes in stress on the force and evaluate whether their rebalancing initiatives are having the right effect. They must also ensure that programmed initiatives complement the modifications made to date. Importantly, the Department must continue to refine the analytical tools that will improve the Services' ability to accurately determine future requirements and distribution of capabilities across the force. Lessons learned from current operations are needed to inform the discussion about whether a modification is needed to the current force planning metrics described herein.

As the process of rebalancing proceeds, it will be essential to monitor the effects of these efforts and, in particular, to evaluate whether increases in end strength are required. It is too soon to reach a definitive conclusion on whether more end strength is needed. But as the Services continue to implement and evaluate rebalancing initiatives, they will gain a better understanding of whether increases in end strength might be necessary.

There are additional steps that can be undertaken today to ease the pressure on the force and set the conditions for success in the future. They include implementation of the continuum of service, greater use of volunteerism, and continued efforts to improve the mobilization process. In addition, there are many opportunities for further innovation in management processes beyond those currently in place and proposed in legislation. Rebalancing efforts such as these are part of a process of implementing and evaluating changes in force mix as the threat evolves and places new demands on the force.

APPENDIX A. COAST GUARD REBALANCING INITIATIVES

The Coast Guard has relied heavily on Selected Reservists since September 11, 2001, to carry out its maritime homeland security duties and support combatant commanders overseas. Today the Coast Guard is increasing its Active and Selected Reserve forces to ensure a more agile and flexible response to future contingencies. Unique among the federal Services, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has the authority under title 14 of the U.S. Code to recall Coast Guard reservists for domestic emergencies, including actual or threatened terrorist attacks. Between October 2001 and 2003, a cumulative total of over 5,400 Coast Guard reservists, or nearly 70 percent of the Service's Selected Reserve were mobilized worldwide in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Over 1,000 Coast Guard personnel were deployed overseas in support of OIF, about half of them reservists.

ENHANCE EARLY RESPONSIVENESS

The Coast Guard, initially under title 14 authority, relied heavily on its Port Security Units (PSUs) for early response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, deploying units to safeguard New York, Boston and Los Angeles harbors and Puget Sound in the state of Washington. PSUs are reserve-staffed units intended to support combatant commanders overseas in strategic ports of debarkation, making them a less-than-ideal fit for domestic security missions. Accordingly, in fiscal year 2002, in an effort to rebalance the force, the Coast Guard commissioned the first of several Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) for domestic security operations. Each MSST has 71 Active component and 33 Selected Reserve members to ensure a flexible, rapid response to emergent security missions. Six additional MSSTs were commissioned in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and seven more are planned for fiscal year 2004.

The Coast Guard has also placed increased emphasis on overall readiness, including implementation of systemic changes to ensure medical and dental examinations are current, to improve training and

tracking of personal qualifications, and to increase full-time support of the Reserve force. The Coast Guard is addressing mismatches between required billets and onboard strength and is working to fill undermanned ratings. These efforts are intended to ensure a rapid and balanced response to new contingencies while ensuring Active and Reserve forces are trained and ready for maritime homeland security missions under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

RESOLVE STRESSED CAREER FIELDS

Reservists in ratings associated with port security have been heavily impacted by the twin demands of maritime homeland security and Coast Guard support to combatant commanders. The commissioning of 15 Maritime Safety and Security Teams by the end of fiscal year 2004, is expected to significantly alleviate that burden. The Coast Guard Reserve is also working to increase strength in critical ratings, including boatswain's mate, machinery technician and port security specialist.

EMPLOY INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

The integration of virtually all Coast Guard reservists into Active component units during the mid-1990s has paid great dividends. Because approximately 85 percent of Coast Guard reservists are essentially individual mobilization augmentees, unit commanders enjoy the flexibility they require to leverage civilian and military skills through individual volunteerism. For instance, 85 percent of the reservists who are expected to be recalled to help implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 will be volunteers.

Rotational Overseas Presence

The commissioning of two additional Port Security Units in fiscal year 2004 is expected to provide greater flexibility in deployment of units overseas in support of combatant commanders.

Mobilization Process Improvements

The Coast Guard has made a concerted effort to capture lessons learned from the post-September 2001 mobilizations to implement improvements in personnel readiness and the mobilization system. In addition, the adoption by the Coast Guard in the 1990s of a single pay and personnel system for the Active and Reserve components significantly reduced pay errors and other administrative problems previously associated with mobilization and demobilization of reservists. During fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard began consolidating all IRR records at the Coast Guard Personnel Command in Washington, D.C. Previously, 10 Integrated Support Commands throughout the United States kept IRR records. This move has already improved management and accountability of the IRR and enhanced its value as a mobilization resource.

Better tracking of personnel readiness and qualifications, as well as measures to ensure command accountability for individual readiness, are expected to reduce the need to shift personnel among commands to ensure a unit is able to deploy.