



# **Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component**

## **Volume II Annexes A, B, and C**

Prepared by

Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
and  
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

*Draft current as of: 19 January 2011 (Version 06)*

ANNEX A  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

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# **Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component**

## **Annex A**

### **Service Force Costing Methodologies and Cost Estimates for Total Force Rebalancing Options**

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**Quadrennial Defense  
Review Directed Study  
of the Future Role of the  
Reserve Component**

**EXCOM Brief  
Objective 1  
November 16, 2010**

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Per the Terms of Reference, the first objective of the Review was to establish “a common Departmental baseline costing methodology for the Total Force” and to identify “the instances where such common baseline costing is not feasible.” In furtherance of that objective, the study leaders established the Objective 1 Issue Team, under the leadership of Mr. John Hastings, OSD(RA).

This presentation describes the approach taken by the Objective 1 Issue Team to estimate the costs for a diverse set of options for rebalancing the AC/RC mix within the Total Force. Accordingly, it describes the specific cost cases examined, the methodologies used, the underlying assumptions, and the results obtained. Additional information was provided by the Air Force, Navy, and Army, which services contributed to the Objective 1 assessments.

The presentations were briefed at the 16 Nov 2010 meeting of the Study’s Executive Committee.

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## Agenda

- Review of Recommended Cases
- Costing Methodologies
  - Air Force
  - Navy
  - Army
- Next Steps

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## Recommended Cases for Cost Estimates

Option	Cases Recommended for Cost Estimates	Projected Cost Results
1) Rebalance RC to remedy AC capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Compare costs for sourcing 4 additional engineering companies from the AC with those for sourcing 8 additional engineering companies from the RC	Over near-term, sourcing 8 new RC engineering companies will cost more than sourcing 4 new AC engineering companies owing to the cost of the equipment. Over the long term RC companies will cost less due to much lower cost of reserve duty
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Compare costs for (1) AC and ARNG MLRS Battalion personnel, (2) AC and ANG fighter squadron personnel, (3) AC and ANG refueling squadron personnel	Over 8-year time period, RC battalions and squadrons should cost less than similar AC units due to much lower cost of reserve duty
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Using TRANSCOM's JRU as a model, determine the staff required to manage the "overhead" associated with directly aligned reserve forces – including any staff required at component level to coordinate with TRANSCOM. Compare to the base case consisting of only that staff required to manage the overhead of individual reserve components. Optional excursions: (1) Determine one-time costs associated with reorganizing a COCOM's reserve forces to the TRANSCOM paradigm; (2) Determine whether TRANSCOM-like unit alignment results in decreased pre-deployment training time.  To determine cost-benefit advantage of align RC units with DoD components: (3) Compare cost for providing 20 5-person teams per year from AC to a GCC with the cost for providing 20 5-person teams per year from RC to the same GCC	Results should show that costs for establishing JRUs at COCOMs are not excessive and may be compensated for by reduction in pre-deployment training.  Comparison of costs for sourcing 20 5-person teams from AC vice RC should show that RC teams are less expensive over an 8-year time period due to much lower cost of reserve duty

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 <b>Recommended Cases for Cost Estimates</b> 		
Option	Cases Recommended for Cost Estimates	Projected Cost Results
4a) Create national and/or regional units within RC staffed by personnel willing to be deployed more frequently and/or for longer periods	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 200-person unit with AC personnel and (2) sourcing same 200-person unit with RC personnel for different periods of active duty [40, 60, 90, 120 days] and different BOG-Dwell ratios [1:3, 1:4, 1:5]	Cost comparison should show that for certain AD periods and BOG-Dwell ratios that sourcing unit from RC is less expensive than sourcing unit from AC
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 200-person "cyber" unit with AC personnel and (2) sourcing same 200-person unit with RC personnel	Cost comparison should show that sourcing unit from RC is less expensive than sourcing unit from AC
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Compare costs for aviation squadrons with (1) 100% manpower from AC, (2) 80% manpower from AC, 20% from RC and (3) 20% manpower from AC, 80% from RC. "Nominal" Squadron for cost analysis assumed to include 200 total personnel [30 Officers / Warrant Officers (aviators), 15 SNCOs, and 170 E1-E6].	Cost comparison should show that unit cost declines as portion obtained from RC increases
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 100% of drill instructors from AC and (2) sourcing xx% of drill instructors from AC and 100-xx% from RC	Cost comparison should show that costs decline as fraction of drill instructors obtained from RC (i.e., xx) increases

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## ***Comprehensive Review Objective 1***

### **EXCOM Brief**

November 16, 2010

*Global Posture – F15 illustrative example*

*Emerging Missions – ISR illustrative example*

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## ***Option 2: Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture (Personnel Only)***

- **Notional 18 PAA fighter squadron (F-15C Lakenheath example)**
  - 34 Officers, 197 Enlisted (ops and maintenance)
- **Replaced with 180 day rotational AC or RC 12-ship lead Unit Type Code (UTC) from central geographic location to Lakenheath**
  - 28 Officer, 128 Enlisted (ops and maintenance)
- **Used Dr. Bob Atwell of IDA's Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST)**
- **Assumptions**
  - Standard rates used for PCS
  - \$60 per day partial per diem
  - Avg of 30% of RC dwell manpower are full time
  - 1% BOS savings for rotational (versus permanent PCS)
  - Deploy to dwell AC = 1:3, RC = 1:5
  - Individuals deploy for the duration

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## Analysis Results (Fighter Squadron Ops and Maintenance)

### Annual Costs (BY 2011\$)

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
COA	Lakenheath Costs (1 unit)	CONUS Costs	Total Costs	Notes
Baseline Annual Costs (Current Lakenheath)	\$33,271,913		\$33,271,913	1 Permanent Lakenheath
RC Deploy to Dwell at 1:5 (annual)	\$23,675,110	\$26,823,580	\$50,498,691	6 Reserve Units - 5 Home, 1 Deployed each 6 months
AC Deploy to Dwell at 1:3 (annual)	\$23,335,682	\$43,593,627	\$66,929,309	4 Active Units - 3 Home, 1 Deployed each 6 months

➤ Baseline is 18 PAA to provide 12-ship UTC capability

➤ Replaced by rotational 12-ship UTC

**Further Consideration:**

- NATO/EUCOM Demands (Mission)
- Mobilization vs Personnel days
- Rotations decrement Building Partnership Capacity by taking presence from the community
- SECDEF-directed Efficiency Integration



**4 Squadrons**

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## Expanding Total Force ISR Capabilities

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Use	Command	Enlisted Spaces	Officer Spaces	Enlisted Costs	Officer Costs	Total Costs
*AFRC support to ACC	Air Combat Command	493	346	\$41,738,193	\$39,872,097	\$81,610,290
	AF Reserve Command	61	37	\$589,185	\$832,666	\$1,421,851
*NV ANG/ACC Association	Air Combat Command	788	107	\$66,713,380	\$12,330,388	\$79,043,769
	NV Air National Guard	47	18	\$453,962	\$405,081	\$859,043
Nellis AFB support to Creech AFB ISR	Air Combat Command	248	7	\$20,996,089	\$806,661	\$21,802,750

\* Example units have different manning levels based on unique capabilities

- AF is approaching all emerging needs, e.g. expanding ISR capabilities, from a Total Force perspective
- Creech AFB Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) is an example of an existing AF Total Force solution to successfully and efficiently maximize ISR capabilities
- Total Force Enterprise Review Process is being developed to determine the best mix of Active, ANG, and AFR assets across all mission sets

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## ***Precision Recruiting & Retention***

**Air Force continues to target candidates for recruitment and retention into emerging missions and high tech jobs, such as Cyber Defense and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and analysis through a variety of methods:**

- **Bonus and Special Pays targeted toward career field shortages**
- **Education benefits and opportunities**
- **Online social networking sites, such as ANG's Facebook page, is opening up new ways to discuss opportunities in the Guard and help potential recruits with contacting local recruiting offices.**
- **Rise to the Challenge is a high-tech recruiting program that offers interactive simulations utilizing reality scenarios and Air Force themed challenge games connecting recruiters with potential recruits.**

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# ***Obj. 1 Working Group Navy Costing Methodology***

**Presented to  
EXCOM  
16 Nov 2010**

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## **Objective**

- **Objective**
  - Cost examples of RC Options from Working Group 2
  - Output is 15-year cost comparison between AC and RC
  - Identify additional assumptions, barriers, and challenges to costing methodology
- **Philosophy**
  - Linking RC to warfighter requirements providing continuity and relieving AC disruption at little or no additional costs

***Costing analysis for scenario purposes ONLY!!!!!!  
This DOES NOT represent official Navy position***

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 <h2>Option 3: Align RC Elements with Specific DoD Components</h2> 		
<p><b>Description:</b> Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected Joint Force HQs, COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships.</p>	<p><b>Cost Cases:</b> (1) Estimate cost and staffing needs for a standard Joint Reserve Unit located at a GCC HQ. (2) Estimate costs for 20 rotations of 12-person Mobile Training Teams for 3-weeks each into AFRICOM AOR for a 15-year period assuming sourcing from (a) AC personnel on TAD/TDY or (b) traditional RC on AT. Account for infrastructure and support costs for the AC.</p>	
<p><b>Examples:</b> (1) Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs (e.g., AFRICOM) (2) Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions (e.g., US Army TRADOC) (3) Align specific RC units/personnel with DOD agencies (e.g., DIA), but also consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions.</p>	<p><b>Implementation Issues:</b> <b>(1) Conditions and Standards:</b> (a) Assured access is key; (b) will need to communicate mission important to units, employers, families, American public. <b>(2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</b> (a) Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective RC elements; (b) Joint, multi-year funding is key to implementation of this; (c) "Assignment" may be appropriate for some COCOMs, "allocation" for others; (d) requires a common doctrine for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications.</p>	
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 <p style="text-align: center;"><small>UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</small></p> <h2>Example #1</h2> 		
<p><b><u>Scenario</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Sending Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to AOR</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Engagements per year: 20</li><li>– MTT Personnel: 12-person teams</li><li>– Engagement Length: 3-weeks</li></ul></li></ul>		
<p><b><u>Assumptions</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No End-Strength increases, use existing capacity</li><li>• AC rotations accomplished with TAD/TDY</li><li>• RC rotations accomplished with AT</li></ul>		
<p style="background-color: yellow; padding: 5px;"><b>Assumptions developed by OSD(RA) Working Group</b></p>		
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## Example #1 (cont.)

- **RC Cost**
  - Dependent on AT cost, programming rates, team composition
  - PB-11 budgets 2-weeks of AT; scenario asks for 3-weeks of AT
  - 2-Week AT included in PB-11; additional week is not included

RC - 2 Week AT			
Rate	2-Weeks	Qty	Team Cost
Officer	\$5,008	1	\$5,008
Enlisted	\$2,396	11	\$26,352
2-Week Cost			\$31,360

RC - 3 Week AT			
Rate	3-Weeks	Qty	Team Cost
Officer	\$7,511	1	\$7,511
Enlisted	\$3,593	11	\$39,528
3-Week Cost			\$47,040

RC Annual Cost			
Grade	Qty	2-WK AT	3-WK AT
O-3	1	\$20,190	\$22,694
E-7	1	\$11,955	\$13,153
E-6	2	\$9,863	\$11,061
E-5	3	\$8,065	\$9,263
E-4	5	\$6,439	\$7,637
Annual Cost		\$108,263	\$123,943
Additional Cost			\$15,680
20 Engagements			\$313,597

**One additional week of AT incurs an additional \$16K per team and an additional \$313K for 20 engagements**

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## Example #1 (cont.)

- **AC & RC Cost Comparison**
  - AC and RC at same seniority
  - Travels costs are round trip to Africa

Annual Cost Comparison per Team		
Cost	AC	RC
Base	\$857,781	\$123,943
Travel	\$48,994	\$48,994
<b>1-Yr Cost</b>	<b>\$906,775</b>	<b>\$172,937</b>

Team Cost Comparison - 15 Yrs		
Cost	AC	RC
15-Yr Cost	\$13,601,625	\$2,594,055
20-RC Teams	--	\$51,881,100
4-AC Teams	\$66,165,060	--

**- 20 RC Teams cost ~\$14.3M less than 4 AC Teams**  
**- Capability or capacity issue separate from cost considerations**

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## Example #2

- **Assumptions**
  - Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) at a Geographic COCOM
  - 200 personnel
  - Output is 15-year cost comparison between AC & RC
  - Officer-to-Enlisted Ratio = 7:193
  - FTS-to-SELRES Ratio = 30:170

**Assumptions and constraints from OSD(RA) and working group**

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## Example #2 (cont.)

AC Option				15% FTS, 85% SELRES Option			
Grade	Qty	Rate	Cost	Grade	Qty	Rate	Cost
O-6	1	\$202,538	\$202,538	O-6	1	\$202,538	\$202,538
O-5	1	\$168,956	\$168,956	O-5	1	\$168,956	\$168,956
O-4	2	\$145,693	\$291,386	O-4	1	\$145,693	\$145,693
O-3	3	\$121,354	\$364,062	O-3	1	\$121,354	\$121,354
E-9	1	\$131,593	\$131,593	E-9	1	\$131,593	\$131,593
E-8	6	\$109,422	\$656,532	E-8	3	\$109,422	\$328,266
E-7	6	\$96,690	\$580,140	E-7	3	\$96,690	\$290,070
E-6	18	\$82,411	\$1,483,398	E-6	6	\$82,411	\$494,466
E-5	54	\$67,735	\$3,657,690	E-5	5	\$67,735	\$338,675
E-4	108	\$54,342	\$5,868,936	E-4	8	\$54,342	\$434,736
<b>Team</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$13,405,231</b>	<b>Team</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,846,164</b>

Unit	Annual Cost	# Years	Cost per Unit
AC	\$13,405,231	15	\$201,078,465

➔

Unit	Base Cost	Dep Ratio	15 Year Cost
AC	\$13,405,231	n/a	\$201,078,465
RC	\$6,365,853	1:2	\$95,487,795
RC	\$5,485,931	1:3	\$82,288,965
RC	\$4,957,977	1:4	\$74,369,655
RC	\$4,606,009	1:5	\$69,090,135

FTS

SELRES

Ratio	Deployed Cost	Dwell Cost	Annual Cost
1:2	\$13,405,231	\$2,846,164	\$6,365,853
1:3	\$13,405,231	\$2,846,164	\$5,485,931
1:4	\$13,405,231	\$2,846,164	\$4,957,977
1:5	\$13,405,231	\$2,846,164	\$4,606,009

- Does not compare or inform capability or capacity decision  
 - Is demand for continuous presence in theater or strategic depth for surge capacity?

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# Questions

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**AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION™**



Draft Army Costing Options  
Post QDR Comprehensive Review of the Future  
Role of the Reserve Components  
11 January 2011



SOLDIERS • FAMILIES • ARMY CIVILIANS  
**ARMY STRONG.**



## Introduction

### □ Stakeholders

- ASA (M&RA) – lead\*
- ASA (FM&C)
- Director of the Army National Guard\*
- Chief of the Army Reserve\*

\*EXCOM Members

### □ Key References

- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
- Terms of Reference, Comprehensive Review of the Reserve Components

### □ Objective

- Apply Army Costing Model Methodology to Objective 2-5 workgroup developed options

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
## Army ARFORGEN Costing Model Explanation of Key Terms

- ARFORGEN Cycle:** The period of time in which an Army unit conducts Reset operations, Training, and is Available for a mission.
- BOG:** Boots-on-the-Ground; period of time an Army unit performs its mission in theater. Does not include Post Mobilization Training or Post Deployment operations for RC units.
- BOG Month:** Period of time used to calculate and compare Army component costs
- 1:3 AC:** An ARFORGEN cycle for an active unit: consists of 6 months Reset, 18 months Train/Ready and 9 BOG months; a 36-month ARFORGEN cycle.
- 1:5 RC:** An ARFORGEN cycle for an Army National Guard of Army Reserve unit; consists of 12 months Reset, 48 months Train/Ready and 9 BOG months within a 12-month Available year; a 72-month ARFORGEN cycle.
- Steady State Output:** Capability provided by similar Army units to maintain back-to-back replacement in theater. In a 1:3/1:5 scenario, it takes 4 active units and 8 RC units to maintain steady state output.
- Aim Points:** Goals established by Army G3/5/7 to measure Personnel, Equipment and Training readiness during each phase of the ARGFORGEN cycle.

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## Army ARFORGEN Costing Model Design



### Facts

Cost of a Soldier Model is used for military personnel costs  
 Army ConOps Model (ACM) used for deployed and mobilized costs  
 FORCES Costing Model (FCM) used for non-deployed OPTEMPO costs  
 Cost of a Soldier data includes FTE and additional Man Days for RC  
 AC BOG is computed at 1:3 9 month BOG  
 RC BOG is computed at 1:5 9 month BOG  
 RC Post Mobilization, Culminating Training Event is included

### Assumptions

Models incorporate ARFORGEN Aim Point for manning, training and equipping levels  
 Non deploying RC units will not conduct Culminating Training Event  
 All personnel use their 30 days of accrued leave annually  
 Models support ARFORGEN and 12 month MOB policy  
 RC 1:5 ARFORGEN cycle the T/R 1 period will be two years  
 Unimpeded programmed access to the Reserves of the Army  
 Funded Operational Reserve

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
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## Cost Measurement Points of View ARFORGEN Unit Cycle Detail

Pipeline Cost of One Unit over all phases of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle.

AC 1:3 @ 9 months BOG



Cost to maintain Steady State Output (Multiple units in different stages of readiness).

\*\* "Width" of cross section must equal BOG Months. In this case, it is 9 months.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Unit 1	6	21		9	6	21		9
Unit 2	9	6	21		9	6	21	
Unit 3		9	6	21		9	6	
Unit 4			9	6	21		9	6


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## Cost Measurement Points of View ARFORGEN Cycle Time Variation

1:3 AC yields 9 months BOG in a 36-month ARFORGEN cycle.


1:5 RC yields 9 months BOG in a 72-month ARGORGEN cycle.



- RC 12-month Mobilization results in 1 to 3 months Post-mobilization Training, depending on the unit type, and up to 1 month Post-deployment.
- For times where demand is greater than the 12-month Available phase – less post-mob training – RC force generation must be accelerated.

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### Theater Rotational Capability Army Engineer Battalion

Cost of sustaining Army Engineer Battalion capability in theater over 72 months

Course of Action	Cost per Cycle	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost
AC rotational	\$334.2	4*2 (8 cycles)	\$2,673.6

Course of Action	Cost per Cycle	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost
Integrated rotational sourcing 2 AC /4 RC	\$334.2	2*2 (4 cycles)	\$1,336.8
	\$306.5	4*1 (4 cycles)	\$1,226.0
<b>Total AC/RC mix</b>			<b>\$2,562.8</b>

**Caveats**  
Not Official Army Position  
\$17.4 per rotation transportation costs 8 rotations = \$139.3M  
Theater Provided Equipment  
Reflects Personnel, O&S and Reset Costs

**Caveats**  
Uniform 9 month deployments  
Costs in millions  
FY 11 dollars  
Includes pre and post mobilization training  
Does not reflect Capital Re-investment Costs



## Compare Army Enabler Cost AC/RC Mix

- Compare costs for AC and RC to provide 30,000 support troops at an overseas location for 6 years at 1:3 for AC and 1:5 for RC with 9-month BOG and 60 days RC training the year prior to activation for the RC units. Costs calculated for 6 years to capture 1:3 and 1:5 ARFORGEN Cycles.

Course of Action	Force Requirement	Cost per BOG month	6 Year Cycle Cost
<b>30K AC Enabler</b>	<b>120K</b>	<b>\$1.4B</b>	<b>\$100.7B</b>
<b>30K RC Enabler</b>	<b>240K</b>	<b>\$1.2B</b>	<b>\$85.8B</b>
<b>30K AC/RC Mix 12.9K/17.1K</b>	<b>AC: 51.6K RC: 136.8K</b>	<b>\$1.3B</b>	<b>\$92.2B</b>

- Comparison: the cost per BOG month for the All-RC Enabler option is 85% of the cost for All-AC Enabler option; the cost of the AC/RC Enabler mix option is 92% of the cost for the All-AC Enabler option

**Caveats**

Not Official Army Position  
FY 11 dollars  
Reflects Personnel, O&S and Reset Costs

**Caveats**

Uniform 9 month deployments  
Includes pre and post mobilization training  
Does not reflect Capital Re-investment Costs

Caveats: Did not cost out entire 15 year period requested in the scenario since the least common multiple of 36 month cycle (AC) and 72 month cycle (RC) is, drum roll.....72 months. Any multiple thereafter would result in the same cost per BOG month (144 month = 12 years; 216 month = 18 years).

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## Global Posture Army Fires Brigade

Cost AC and ARNG rotational Fires Brigades to Korea with 9-mo BOG to same location, mobilization for one year, 60 days of training the year before mobilization, AC BOG: Dwell 1:3, RC BOG: Dwell 1:5, use in-place equipment.

Course of Action	Cost per Cycle	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost
AC rotational FiB	\$683.8	4*2 (8 cycles)	\$5,470.5

Course of Action	Cost per Cycle	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost
Integrated rotational FiBs 2 AC /4 ARNG	\$683.8	2*2 (4 cycles)	\$2,735.2
	\$430.4	4*1 (4 cycles)	\$1,721.7
		<b>Total AC/RC mix</b>	<b>\$4,456.9</b>

**Caveats**

Not Official Army Position  
\$3.5M transportation cost per, 8 rotations = \$27.7M  
\$37.9M annual BAH cost avoidance based on 1,644 PAX  
Reflects Personnel, O&S and Reset Costs

**Caveats**

Uniform 9 month deployments  
Costs in millions; FY 11 dollars  
Theater Provided Equipment  
Does not reflect Capital Re-investment Costs

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## Variable Participation Option

Cost 200 person RC unit willing to train/operate 90 days/yr and deploy for 9 months on 1:3 cycle. Examine 40, 60, 120, and 180 day periods of employment.

<b>Cycle Costs</b>	<b>40 Day Employment</b>	<b>60 Day Employment</b>	<b>120 Day Employment</b>	<b>180 Day Employment</b>	<b>9 Month BOG</b>
<b>ARNG</b>	<b>\$22.3</b>	<b>\$24.5</b>	<b>\$31.1</b>	<b>\$37.7</b>	<b>\$44.3</b>
<b>USAR</b>	<b>\$21.2</b>	<b>\$23.2</b>	<b>\$29.1</b>	<b>\$35.1</b>	<b>\$43.3</b>

- Variable participation seems to work with small discreet groups. The Ready Response Reserve Unit (R3U) Pilot Program 2007-2008 examined three units.
- USAR R3U Pilot Program Units
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon 342<sup>nd</sup> Chemical Company (BIDS) (31 PAX)
  - A CO 1<sup>st</sup> BN 321 Regiment Drill Sergeant company (18 PAX)
  - 7222<sup>nd</sup> Medical Support Unit (18 PAX)
- Units achieved P-1/C-1 readiness levels with significant resources and were subsets of larger units which provided over manning capability (110/6/6 respectively).

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**Caveats:**

1. To achieve a higher readiness level and increased training time the R3U test in the USAR showed that manning levels had to be increased beyond 100% to ensure the unit was P-1.
2. Assumed that the unit would be used as a company and would be at company level proficiency prior to MOB.
3. For shorter durations of employment did not cost any reserve training during the remainder of the 9 month available period
4. or the 40 day employment soldiers would be short 4 points for a creditable year, assuming no Annual Training or additional UTAs in addition to the employment period.
5. For shorter durations of employment, costed 3 months of traditional weekend training plus the employment period. Assumed that the employment period plus the traditional period would meet the requirement for a creditable year of service.
6. For shorter durations of employment assumed that soldiers will not be used in an imminent danger/hostile fire scenario.

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## Integration below unit of employment IBCT Infantry Battalion

Cost a ARNG Infantry Battalion integrated into an AC IBCT. The ARNG Infantry Battalion trains 90 days/year and rotates at 1:3. ARNG soldiers paid per day of duty and incentivized at \$10K/year.

	<b>1:3 Cycle</b>
<b>AC only</b>	<b>\$1,885.6</b>
<b>AC w 1 RC Maneuver BN</b>	<b>\$1,729.0</b>

- ❑ The Army has integrated aviation and maneuver units below the level of employment. In the last 20 years this integration has been attempted at company, battalion and brigade levels. Differences in training cycles and available periods preclude the development of unit cohesion and limit the effectiveness of this level of integration.
- ❑ Previous Army integration initiatives
  - Echo Company: AH-1 Cobras to AC Attack Battalions
  - All AC Combat Aviation Brigades had one RC UH 60 Battalions
  - All CONUS Army of Excellence Heavy based divisions had an RC Brigade
- ❑ Integration below level of employment is of limited utility

**Caveats**  
 Not Official Army Position  
 Costs in millions  
 FY 11 dollars  
 Reflects Personnel, O&S and  
 Reset Costs  
 Does not reflect Capital Re-  
 investment Costs

**Caveates:**

- Potential savings is \$156.7M per cycle. Reduced employment times will increase savings.
- Included Post Mobilization training time to integrate with parent IBCT.
- Included \$10K per year per soldier bonus for RC paid at the end of full cycle.
- Non-quantifiable benefit is reduced stress on the AC.



## Institutional Support Options

Determine the relative costs of using an Army Reserve Basic Combat Training Drill Sergeant Company (18 personnel) to meet the annual summer surge.

	<b>Number Days</b>	<b>Cost</b>
<b>AC Company</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>\$2.058</b>
<b>RC Company</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>\$1.014</b>

The FY11 total mission 133,700 Soldiers. The mission load projected through the summer will be 59,813. This load is slightly higher than the historic summer load of 44%.

Currently the load is sustained with 168 AC and 25 RC Army Reserve Basic Training Companies (conducting 86% & 14% of the load respectively).

**Caveats**

Not Official Army Position  
Costs in millions  
FY 11 dollars

**Caveats**

Reflects Personnel, O&S and Reset Costs  
Does not reflect Capital Re-investment Costs

## **Options for Rebalancing Total Force Capabilities Cost Results for Illustrative Cases**

As its fifth objective, the Terms of Reference for this review directed that cost-benefit considerations be employed to assess proposals for rebalancing the mix of Active and Reserve Components. Toward that end, the Review estimated the potential costs associated with the specific rebalancing options selected for consideration. This section provides a brief overview of each of those cases and shows the specific costs obtained. Unless indicated otherwise, the cost estimates were developed by the Service whose name appears in the title of each cost case. Additional details regarding the specific cost cases considered, the methodologies and assumptions used in developing the estimates, and the results obtained are provided in the subsequent section of this annex. While many of these illustrative cases suggest potential cost savings from increased use of the Reserve Component, a more detailed assessment, to include budget-quality cost estimates would be advisable before implementing any of the specific rebalancing options identified here.

### ***Remediating Capacity Shortfalls within the Total Force***


**Example 1a – Army Combat Heavy Engineering Battalion.** To illustrate the cost implications of using the Reserve Component to remediate capacity shortfalls within the Total Force, the Army estimated the cost of a Reserve Component Engineer Battalion, which could be used in lieu of an Active Component Engineer Battalion as the Army moves through the ARFORGEN cycle. In conformance with current Army rotation policy, costs for the Reserve unit were estimated assuming a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio while those for the Active unit were estimated assuming a 1:3 BOG-to-dwell ratio<sup>1</sup>. Equipment costs were not included in the estimate; rather, the Army assumed that needed equipment would be provided in theater. Additional reasons for excluding equipment costs include the need for specificity regarding such considerations as desired level of equipage (i.e., fraction of Table of Organization and Equipment specifications fully met), use of shared equipment training sets, unit locations (not identified), time required to stand up units, equipment manufacture, and procurement time lines. Given these limitations, this case is provided as a “proof of concept” rather than as a detailed budget or program projection.

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<sup>1</sup> BOG:Dwell refers to the ratio of the time that a unit spends with “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) when deployed overseas to the time that the unit spends in “Dwell” status at its home base. During Dwell periods, units typically spend time recovering from their just-completed deployment, before getting ready for their next deployment. In the case of the Reserve Component, the report typically cites the Mobilization-to-Dwell ratio since Reserve units typically spend a portion of their total activation period completing pre-deployment training. The time required to accomplish this must be added to the time that they spend with Boots on the Ground when deployed when determining their mobilization-to-dwell ratio.

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Three specific cases were considered: (1) four Active Component units with a 1:3 BOG:Dwell ratio, (2) eight Reserve Component units with a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio (the rationale underlying the need for eight Reserve units in lieu of four Active units appears in the preceding section of the report), and (3) a mixed AC-RC unit with the Active and Reserve units providing equal numbers of deployed units (2AC/4RC). Figure A-1 shows the resulting costs and the number of units provided for these cases.



**Figure A-1. Personnel Cost and Number of Units Provided for an Army Engineering Battalion Sourced from AC or RC**

**Results.** Relative to the Active unit, the unit composed entirely of Reservists reduces costs by \$222 million over 6 years (about 8 percent), while the mixed unit reduces costs by \$111 million over that same time period (about 4 percent). The Active option provides four battalions, the mixed AC/RC option provides six, and the all-Reserve option provides eight.

**Analysis.** The most significant savings factor for the Reserve unit is the reduced personnel cost during the dwell years. In addition to the cost savings associated with use of Reserve forces, creation of new units (if necessary) would enhance strategic depth since all but one of the new units would be in dwell status at any given time.<sup>2</sup>

**Example 1b – Army 30,000-Troop Enabler Force.** As a second illustration, the Army estimated the cost of providing 30,000 support troops at an overseas location on a 6-year cycle, using either Active or Reserve forces. The Active forces were assumed to deploy on a 1:3 BOG:Dwell cycle, while the Reserve forces deployed on a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell cycle. A 9-month BOG

<sup>2</sup> If the Reserve units already exist as strategic depth, the only additional cost that need be considered is the “marginal cost” incurred from the rotational deployments, in which case the cost savings would be greater on a relative basis.

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period was used for both types of forces. As a further example, the Army considered a mixed group of enabling units, comprised of 12,900 Active service members and 17,100 Reserve service members. Figure A-2 shows the costs and the numbers of personnel provided for these three cases.



**Figure A-2. Cost for 30,000 Support Troops Sourced from AC or RC**

**Results.** Relative to the Active forces, use of the Reserves yields a total 6-year cost savings of \$14.9 billion, while use of the mixed force yields a cost savings of \$8.5 billion.


**Analysis.** In addition to these cost savings, reliance on the Reserves to source this requirement would increase strategic depth by adding twice as many personnel to the Total Force (240,000 vice 120,000). Use of the Reserves would also enable DoD to take advantage of the substantial experience levels within the Reserve Component, while relieving stress on the Active Component or freeing it for other missions.

***Providing Rotational Units to Meet Recurring Demands***

**Example 2a – Army Fires Brigade in Korea.** In the case of the Fires Brigade, the Army currently has units permanently stationed in South Korea, and has invested considerable resources to provide the infrastructure necessary to implement accompanied tours similar to those used in the European theater. The specific option for which cost estimates were developed by the Army assumed replacement of a permanent unit by either four rotational Active units deployed on a

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1:3 BOG:Dwell ratio, eight rotational Reserve fires brigades deployed on a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio, or an integrated brigade that included a force mix of two active and four reserve units. Costs for these excursions were compiled over two deployment cycles (3 years each) for the Active Component and one deployment cycle (6 years) for the Reserve Component. Figure A-3 shows the costs and number of units obtained for these three cases, assuming that the deploying personnel fall in on theater-provided equipment. The estimate is applicable for a single Fires Brigade that is stationed close to the DMZ. Because this particular Brigade is not currently programmed to change to accompanied tours with associated infrastructure, costs were not estimated for the status quo. The determination of whether to change from current hardship tours on an individual fill to unit rotations will depend on operational and strategic concerns rather than cost. Accordingly, the cost estimate assumes that the decision to fill this requirement with rotating units was to be made separately. Specific costs cases were structured to determine whether using Active, Reserve, or a mixed Fires Brigade would be more cost effective.




**Figure A-3. Cost for Rotational Army Fires Brigade Deployed to Korea**

**Results.** Relying exclusively on the Army National Guard to provide the rotational Fires Brigade would reduce the total 6-year cost by \$2 billion, while relying on a mixed AC-RC unit would yield a 6-year savings of \$1.0 billion. The cost estimates for the all Active case and the mixed Active-Reserve case were developed by the Army; the cost of the all Reserve case was extrapolated from the cost of the mixed brigade. Costs associated with standing up new units to meet the capacity demand or to re-station the existing unit were not estimated given the substantial number of variables. A more detailed estimate would have to take such factors into consideration.

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**Analysis.** These savings arise primarily from the lower personnel costs incurred by the Reserve units during their dwell periods. In addition, according to the Army, the transition from permanent units to rotational units would be expected to yield additional cost savings due to the lower infrastructure, basic allowance-for-housing (BAH), and permanent-change-of-station (PCS) costs associated with rotational forces. Additional cost savings may result from a reduction in demand for in-country infrastructure such as family housing, schools, and medical services associated with a decrease in the number of accompanied tours; these cost savings were not estimated, however.

**Example 2b – Air Force F-15C Aircraft in Europe.** As a second illustration, the Air Force estimated the costs associated with use of Active or Reserve Component F-15C Fighter Squadrons to meet operational requirements in the European theater. The Air Force currently maintains a permanent F-15C Squadron at Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. As an alternative, costs were estimated assuming that this capability was provided either by four Active squadrons using a 1:3 BOG:Dwell cycle or by six Air National Guard squadrons using a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell cycle. Both cases assumed a 6-month deployment period (or BOG). Figure A-4 shows the annual costs and number of units obtained for these two cases as well as the annual costs for the F-15C Squadron permanently based at Lakenheath.



**Figure A-4. Cost for Rotational Air Force F-15C Squadron Deployed to Lakenheath When Sourced from the AC or RC**

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**Results.** Cost estimates are shown under two conditions: (1) using only the costs directly attributable to the deployed unit or its permanent counterpart and (2) including the costs for the deployed unit as well as those for the squadrons that remain on dwell status within the United States.

**Analysis.** Use of Active rotational units yields an annual cost savings of \$9.9 million, while use of Reserve rotational units yields a savings of \$9.6 million relative to the costs for the permanently based Active unit owing to savings from the lower infrastructure, basic allowance-for-housing, and permanent-change-of-station (PCS) costs associated with rotational forces. Additional cost savings may result from a reduction in demand for country infrastructure such as family housing, schools, and medical services associated with a decrease in the number of accompanied tours; these latter cost savings were not estimated, however.

If the costs associated with dwell units are charged against the rotational options<sup>3</sup>, the permanently based squadron realizes substantial savings relative to sourcing this requirement using either Active or Reserve rotational units. The validity of including these costs, however, depends on whether the rotational units are assigned other tasks during their dwell periods. As for the effect on strategic depth, sourcing this capability from the Reserves adds 6 units to strategic depth, while sourcing it from rotational Active forces adds 4.


**Example 2c – Marine Infantry Battalion in a Continuous Presence Mission.** The Marine Corps forward deploys expeditionary capabilities in many parts of the world and occasionally requires the use of the Marine Corps Reserve in response to Combatant Commander operational demands. This example depicts the use of Reserve forces to relieve Active forces assigned a mission that is continuous in nature. While many examples of such deployments could be considered, each situation is based on unique requirements and assigned using existing Global Force Management practices. The Marine Corps has twenty-seven Active and nine Reserve battalions. Pre-deployment training is the same for all Active and Reserve battalions. Marine Corps Reserve infantry battalions conduct ninety days of pre-deployment training and spend approximately two months to reconstitute and expend accrued leave following their deployment. Hence, the actual BOG period for reserves activated for a one-year period is just over seven months long. In order to fulfill deployments over a six-year period, ten reserve units are required to serve a seven-month-and-one-week deployment. Active units, on the other hand, deploy for a year and then spend 3 years in dwell status. Figure A-5 shows the total 6-year cost incurred to meet continuous presence mission requirements for three options: (1) all Active, (2) all Reserve, and (3) maximum Marine Reserve possible taking into account the fact

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<sup>3</sup> Accounting for costs in this way, however, would presume that the dwell units are not performing required CONUS missions while waiting to rotate. If the rotating Active or Reserve units are currently performing CONUS missions and funded as strategic depth, their operating costs should be considered as “sunk” for the rotational mission, and only the increased “marginal costs” to deploy them should be compared to the “opportunity cost” of redeploying the permanent unit to another mission. For example, all operational Air National Guard F-15 units in dwell status currently perform the 24/7/365 Homeland Defense mission of Air Sovereignty Alert. Similarly, CONUS-based Active Air Force fighter squadrons are also regularly tasked to perform Homeland Defense missions.

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that the Marine Corps has only nine Reserve infantry battalions. As indicated, the numbers of units included within each option are four for the all-Active force, ten for the all-Reserve force, and nine Reserve and one Active battalion for the maximum-use option. The results shown account specifically for the previously cited difference between the BOG-to-dwell ratio for the Active units (1:3) and the activation-to-dwell ratio for the Reserve units (1:5).



**Figure A-5. Cost for Providing Continuous Presence Marine Corps Infantry Battalions When Sourced from the AC or RC**

**Results.** The use of Active battalions supporting a continuous presence mission is the most cost effective means for the Marine Corps to support continuous operations. The use of Reserve units for missions when Active units need relief due to mission, tempo or dwell requirements is a more effective use of Reserve forces in lieu of creating more Active battalions.

**Analysis.** The additional cost associated with using the Reserves in this case equates to the additional costs for ten Reserve units to meet a similar BOG as four Active units. Because the Marine Corps only has nine Reserve infantry battalions, the 9RC/1AC example cost is driven up due to the additional use of one Active Component infantry battalion during a six-year period. Emergent operational requirements that are episodic in nature do not necessitate the creation of additional active Marine units, which over the course of their entire life cycle will cost more than activating comparable reserve units for a brief period. Only when the active force is under pressure of high operational tempo for sustained periods of time is it appropriate to grow new active units, rather than rely on activation of reserve units.

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The Marine Corps also notes that this cost example does not take into account that Active Component forces in dwell are resourced to maintain a high state of operational readiness and accessibility to respond to contingencies. While the value of this operational readiness and accessibility is difficult to quantify in comparison to cost, it must be taken into consideration. Because they are part time, Reserve Component forces do not provide the same level of operational readiness and accessibility.


***Aligning Reserve Units with Combatant Commands or Other DoD Components***

***Example 3a – Joint Reserve Unit (JRU).*** To illustrate the cost implications associated with aligning Reserve Component assets and capabilities with the Combatant Commands, the Navy estimated the cost associated with establishing a Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) based on the existing USTRANSCOM concept, or a modified version thereof, at one of the geographical combatant commands (e.g., USAFRICOM). The JRU would be designed to enable the employment and management of required Reserve forces without degrading permanent staff functions. Establishment of JRUs within the combatant commands would foster unity of effort and efficiency across all Services and supporting units, and provide management oversight that ensures readiness and training of both Reserve Component resources and subject matter experts to assist each command tailor its available resources to specific needs. In addition, the JRU could potentially satisfy the requirement for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

The notional JRU examined here was assumed to include 200 Reserve Component personnel, who would provide support capability and facilitate Reserve Component alignment and access for the combatant command on a rotational cycle. During Reserve dwell periods, the JRU would make judicious use of the Reserve members' Annual Training (AT) and drill periods. The organizational structure for the JRU was based on an existing U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) model, but could be modified as needs change.

For comparison purposes, the Navy estimated costs for providing 200 full-time Reserve Component personnel at the combatant command. As a reference, the Navy estimated costs assuming the JRU was staffed by Full Time Support (FTS) Reserve personnel. Comparisons are then made to Reserve members serving on rotational cycles that were varied from 1:2 to 1:5. Figure A-6 shows the cost estimates obtained for this case. It is worth noting that costs for the JRU would depend on the grade mix of the unit and annual personnel costs (i.e., programming rates). Further study would be required to determine whether the demand for the JRU should be based on continuous presence or surge capacity for strategic depth as well as the specific unit structure best suited for the particular Combatant Command.

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
**Figure A-6. Average 15-Year Unit Cost for 200-Person Joint Reserve Unit Using AC or RC Personnel (on Different BOG:Dwell Rotation Cycles)**

**Results.** Average 15-year unit costs for a 200-person JRU sourced from the Reserve Component range from \$69 million when the Reserve personnel rotate at a 1:5 rotational cycle to just under \$95 million when the Reserve personnel rotate at a 1:2 rotational cycle. By comparison, the estimated 15-year cost for a JRU staffed by FTS Reserve personnel amounted to \$201 million. The corresponding 15-year cost savings range from \$106 million to \$132 million depending on the specific rotational cycle ratio at which the Reserve forces are deployed.

**Analysis.** Because the Reserve Component rotations would not replace 200 full-time Active personnel on a 1-for-1 basis, a 200-person JRU staffed by Guard or Reserve personnel rotating at 1:2 could free perhaps 100 Active personnel for other missions. Further study would be required to determine the specific JRU structure best suited for any particular combatant command.

**Example 3b – Mobile Training Teams.** For this case, the Navy estimated the cost for providing twenty rotations per year of 12-person Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to a combatant command (e.g., USAFRICOM) for use in Building Partner Capacity missions. The deployment period was assumed to be a 21-day BOG with two travel days. For comparison purposes, the Navy also estimated costs that would be incurred to provide four 12-person Active Component teams (each comprised of 1 officer and 11 enlisted personnel). Figure A-7 shows the results obtained for these two cases.

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**Figure A-7. 15-Year Cost To Provide 20 12-Person Mobile Training Teams Per Year to USAFRICOM**

**Results.** Drawing the MTTs from the Reserves rather than the Active Component would save roughly \$15 million over 15 years. The principal factor driving the cost for the Reserve option is the need to fund a third week of Annual Training to enable the 21-day deployment to theater. The Reserves currently provide only two weeks of Annual Training each year. The cost for the Active option is driven by the need to fund four teams to meet the overall requirement providing 20 MTTs to USAFRICOM each year.


**Analysis.** While the Reserve Component can provide the desired set of Mobile Training Teams for a lower cost, those teams are available only during their extended Annual Training period. The Active units are available full time and can provide other capabilities when not engaged as MTTs. Thus, the decision maker will have to weigh the cost savings associated with using the Reserve Component to source this requirement against the additional capability that would be provided by an Active component solution.

***Enabling Differing Methods of Service within the Reserve Component***

**Example 4 – Army Differentiated Military Police Company.** To illustrate the cost implications associated with differentiated Reserve Component units, the Army estimated the cost that would be incurred by a 127-person Army Reserve or Army National Guard Military Police Company as a function of the length of the unit’s annual Active Duty deployment period to Afghanistan. Five different annual deployment periods were considered: 40 days, 60 days, 120 days, 180 days, and 270 days. The results obtained for the Army National Guard unit are shown in Figure A-8 (costs for the Army Reserve unit differ only slightly) along with the cost for a 127-person Active Component unit assuming the same deployment periods. Costs that are constant

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for all the options (e.g., transportation to and from Afghanistan), while significant, have not been included in the estimates.



**Figure A-8. Total 3-Year Cost for Providing AC or RC Military Police Company as a Function of RC Unit's Annual Deployment Length**

**Results.** The results show substantial cost benefit from sourcing this requirement from the Reserve Component rather than the Active forces. Total 3-year savings range from \$4.7 million to \$31.6 million, depending on the number of days per year that the Reserve unit is deployed to Afghanistan.


**Analysis.** The Army has indicated some success with small-scale pilot programs that incorporated differentiated service. This concept is also currently in use elsewhere, including in Canada's reserve force and the United Kingdom's High Readiness Reserves. (More details on Total Force approaches used by other nations are provided in Appendix D of this volume.)

**Adjusting Reserve Capabilities To Meet Emergent Needs**

**Example 5 – Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (ISR) Units.** In this example, the Air Force estimated costs for two differently sized Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) units. The DCGS is an Air Force's ISR weapon system that provides reachback processing, collection, analysis and dissemination of data collected by several airborne ISR platforms. One of the units was assumed to be made up of 835 enlisted personnel and 125 officers (13 percent), while the second was comprised of 554 enlisted and 383 officers (41 percent). Two

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options were considered for each: (1) staffing the unit entirely from the Active forces [from the Air Combat Command (ACC)] and (2) staffing the unit with a mix of Active and Reserve forces [the Nevada Air National Guard (NV ANG) in the case of the 960-person unit and the Air Force Reserve Component (AFRC) in the case of the 937-person unit]. The 960-person unit included 65 reservists while the 937-person unit included 98 reservists. Figure A-9 shows the annual costs for each of these cases. The size of the unit and the numbers of enlisted (E) and officer (O) personnel are indicated on the chart.




**Figure A-9. Annual Cost To Staff ISR Unit with Indicated Numbers and Mix of Personnel**

**Results.** These results show that costs can be reduced by sourcing at least a portion of this requirement from the Reserve Component rather than relying exclusively on Active forces. In the officer heavy unit (937 personnel), the cost savings amount to over \$8 million per year, while for the other unit (960 personnel), the cost savings amount to nearly \$5 million per year.

**Analysis.** As the Air Force indicates in their detailed description of this case, the Active Component sometimes finds it difficult to retain trained service members who are in high demand within the civilian economy. By offering a reduced period of service, the Reserve Component may be able to retain such personnel for the benefit of the Department and the nation.

**Enhancing Reserve Integration with the Active Component**

**Example 6a – Reserve Integration within Army Active Helicopter Unit.** At the study sponsors’ request, IDA estimated costs for a 200-person OH-58D helicopter unit as a function of the mix of Active and Reserve Component personnel. The specific cases examined assumed that the unit was staffed: (1) entirely (i.e., 100 percent) by active personnel, (2) at a higher level by the addition of 20 percent reserve personnel in order to provide higher per-aircraft crew ratios and thus higher sortie rates from the existing set of aircraft, (3) by an integrated unit made up of 80 percent active forces and 20 percent reserve forces, (4) by an integrated unit made up of 20 percent active forces and 80 percent reserve forces, and (5) entirely by reserve personnel. Figure A-10 shows the 3-year costs obtained for these cases, assuming a 1:3 deployment cycle from Fort Carson, Colorado to Afghanistan.



**Figure A-10. Total 3-Year Costs for OH-58D Helicopter Squadron as a Function of Composition**


**Results.** Relative to the cost of staffing the unit entirely from the active forces, use of an 80/20 mix of active and reserve forces provides a 3-year cost savings of nearly \$6 million.

**Analysis.** Use of a larger fraction of reserve personnel would further reduce the cost but could significantly reduce the unit’s annual deployment availability. Overstaffing the unit by adding a 20-percent increment of reserve forces offers the possibility of increasing crew ratios and thus per-aircraft sortie rates for nearly \$6 million less than would be the case if the Active force were increased by 20 percent (shown by dashed line). This option would seem to offer the Army a relatively low cost means of increasing helicopter availability without necessitating the addition of more aircraft. Given the high demand for rotary wing assets in Afghanistan, a number of ongoing efforts are underway within DoD to address this issue. In particular, the Director CAPE

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is sponsoring the collection of data from deployed Combat Aviation Brigades to identify potential means to increase the availability of rotary wing aircraft. If the findings show personnel, or crew ratio specifically, to be a limiting factor, the increased reliance on the Reserve Component may provide part of the solution.

**Example 6b – Reserve Integration within Army Infantry BCT.** In the second example of an integrated unit, the Army estimated costs for the case in which the Texas Army National Guard was assumed to provide one maneuver battalion for an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Hood. To enable the ARNG battalion to maintain a higher level of readiness, the Army assumed that battalion’s training days would be increased from the current level of 63 training assemblies per year to 90 training assemblies per year and a 1:2 mobilization-to-dwell ratio with a 9-month BOG to synchronize the unit with the Active brigade that it will support. Figure A-11 compares the total 3-year costs for the resulting integrated IBCT with those for an all-Active IBCT.



**Figure A-11. Total 3-Year Costs for IBCT Options as a Function of Composition**

**Results.** Relative to the costs for the all-Active IBCT, 3-year costs for the integrated IBCT are lower by \$160 million.


**Analysis.** Much of this savings is due to the lower dwell costs for the Reserve battalion as determined by the Army models (a more detailed description is provided in Annex A). Further study would be needed to determine if these savings justify the cultural and logistical changes necessary to implement integration of Reserve units into Active Component units. The Army contends that this has been tried a number of times in the past and does not work given the

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way that the Army employs its Active and Reserve Component units. On the other hand, use of integrated forces has worked well for Air Force and Navy units.

**Providing Institutional Support**

**Example 7 – Army Drill Sergeant Surge.** For this example, the study independently estimated the costs for using either Active or Reserve Component personnel to provide training drill sergeants during the annual summer surge period (during which just over half of the Army’s nearly 134,000 annual accessions receive their Basic Combat Training). Today, this training is accomplished by personnel from the Army’s 168 Active Component and 25 Reserve Component Basic Training Companies (with 18 personnel each). It is believed that there are numerous individuals in the Guard or Reserve (e.g., school teachers) who would be willing to serve for longer periods during the summer months were the Department to move away from the existing Reserve service paradigm of one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. The specific cost results shown in Figure A-12 compare the annual costs for 100 active duty drill sergeants with those for 100 reserve drill sergeants serving an additional 90 or 120 days per year.



**Figure A-12. Annual Costs for U.S. Army Active and Reserve Drill Sergeants**

**Results.** As is apparent from the figure, costs for the Reserve drill sergeants are less than half those for their Active counterparts even when the reservists are paid for 120 additional active duty days each year, yielding savings of \$4.0 to \$4.5 million per year.

**Analysis.** By enabling capabilities to be “switched on and off” more easily when surge conditions arise and then decline, use of the Reserves for seasonal demands such as training provides a more economical way to accomplish such essential tasks.

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## Options for Rebalancing Total Force Capabilities Cost Results for Illustrative Cases – Additional Details

The sections that follow provide additional details regarding the cost estimates developed to support the study’s assessment of the potential cost-benefit implications associated with seven specific options for rebalancing total force capabilities. The specific options considered are summarized in Table A-1.

**Table A-1. Options for Rebalancing the Total Force**

Option	Description
1) Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve longer or more often	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services’ institutional support requirements

For each option, the Issues Team for Objectives 2-5 provided a brief characterization of one or two specific cases to the Issues Team for Objective 1 and asked that team to develop appropriate costs. As described here, the Objective 1 Team turned to the Services and IDA, working under contract to OASD(RA) to estimate specific costs. Those estimates are summarized here. The section also describes the costing methodologies used and identifies the key assumptions. Shortened versions of these presentations appear in the Main Report.

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**A. Cost Case 1a: Army Engineer Battalion and Company**

<b>Cost of Sustaining Army Engineer Battalion capability in theatre over 72 months</b>			
Course of Action (FY11 \$)	Cost per Unit per Cycle (\$M)	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost (\$M)
AC rotational	\$321.1	4*2 (8 BOG cycles)	\$2,568.0

<b>Army's 2 AC 4 RC Excursion – 72 months (two 36 month cycles)</b>			
Course of Action (FY11 \$)	Cost per Unit per Cycle (\$M)	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost (\$M)
Integrated rotational sourcing (2 AC /4 RC) AC units	\$321.1	2*2 (4 cycles)	\$1,284.0
RC units	\$306.7	4*1 (4 cycles)	\$1,226.7
		Total AC/RC mix	\$2,510.7
<b>Extending Analysis to Notional 8 RC – 72 months</b>			
RC units only – 6 units	\$306.7	6 units (8 cycles)*	\$2,453.6
<b>IDA Engineering Company “Differential Only” Analysis – 12 years</b>			
4 AC companies – 12 yr			\$597.94
8 RC companies – 12 yr			\$545.44

**BACKGROUND**

- Joint Staff (J8) force sufficiency assessment tools were used to identify “over-stressed” capabilities such as Horizontal Engineering Companies, Vertical Engineering Companies, Military Police Companies, and Naval Construction Battalions based on prescribed BOG:Dwell objectives.
- In this illustrative example the Army compares the cost of 4 additional active Army Combat Heavy Engineer Companies to gain one rotational unit (at 1:3 BOG:Dwell) versus a force mix of 2 additional active and 4 additional RC companies (RC at 1:5 RC BOG:Dwell) in an effort to remediate established force capacity shortfalls and/or enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios.
- Three months of RC pre-/post-deployment mobilization time in addition to the 60 days of RC additional training the year before deployment was included in the costs.
- The Army utilized costing data from the Cost per Soldier, Army CONOPS and Forces models. The Army also used the fully burdened costs and schedules developed in each phase of the Army Force Generation cycle (ARFORGEN). The goal is to determine the most cost effective employment alternative.

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## ASSUMPTIONS

- The Army's unofficial cost analysis includes transportation cost of \$17.4 million per year (\$139.3M for 8 cycles) for both AC and RC. The Army costed engineering battalions vice companies and used Afghanistan for the deployment.
- The analysis assumed theater-provided equipment and use of existing structure. Therefore no new equipment or activation costs were implied. Both AC and RC costed nine month deployment periods. The analysis includes pre and post deployment costs related to RC mobilization.
- Because of the assumed 3-month pre-/post-deployment mobilization period, an RC unit can only deploy once every eighth cycle while satisfying the 1:5 mobilization/dwell ratio.
- The original scenario called for the comparison against 8 RC companies; however, the Army stated there were force generation synchronization issues of pre-deployment training and unit handoff that does not lend itself to a 8 RC battalion alternative. The Army suggested, instead, a mix of 2 AC and 4 RC provides a workable model to add the capability and it is, therefore, costed for comparison.

## RESULTS

- The Army's analysis finds the cost for an AC battalion on a 36 month cycle (four 9 month periods =1:3) to be \$321.1 million. The total cost for all four AC battalions supporting the rotations is, thus, \$2,568.0 million.
- In the 2 AC 4 RC mix alternative the Army found the cost of an RC battalion 72-month cycle \$306.7 million as compared to \$321.1 million for the AC cycle. The most significant savings factor for the RC is the lower cost of manpower in the dwell years. These savings are marginally offset by the longer cycle period, additional training in force generation, and the full cost of the deployment period.
- When comparing the total cost of the full 72 month period of four AC units to the cost of alternative mix of 2 AC and 4 RC, the four AC unit total cost of \$2,568.0 million is slightly higher than the \$2,511 million for the AC/RC mix (a cost savings of 2.3%).
- Extending the Army's cost of \$306.7 million per RC company cycle, if an all RC effort of 6 RC units could execute 8 cycles totaling 72 months, the cost to add the capability would be \$2,453.6 million resulting in an approximately 5% cost savings.
- Potential advantages of using the AC/RC mix alternative or an "all RC" option are for less cost the alternative mixes covers the deployment requirement, adds more strategic depth, exercises operational use of the strategic depth, and relieves active OPTEMPO stress.
- The force mix alternative of 2 AC and 4 RC units covers the deployment requirement will freeing 2 AC units from alternative 1 to do other missions or relief their OPTEMPO.

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**IDA ANALYSIS RESULTS**

- IDA provided a “differential only” cost analysis using exclusively the Forces model; this excluded any cost that would be considered approximately equal between AC and RC. Thus, deployment costs, equipment, activation and transportation costs were excluded, however, manpower, operations and training costs were included.
- The IDA analysis was on the smaller company scale vice battalions and costed 4 AC companies compared to 8 RC companies over a 12 year period vice 6 years. Four AC companies over a 12 year period were \$597.94 million versus the cost of 8 RC companies at \$545.44 million. The “differential” costs of \$52.5 million resulting in a savings of 8.8%.
- The AC dwell cost was \$448.45 million with a deployment cost of \$149.48 million, while the RC dwell cost was \$303.44 million and the deployment costs were \$199.31 million.
- Of note, if the RC capability already exists in strategic depth, then the RC cost advantage increases as only the “marginal cost” of RC deployments (\$149.48M) would be compared to the full cost of adding new active capability (\$597.49M).

**B. Cost Case 1b: Provisioning of 30,000 Support Troops (Force Enablers)**

**ARMY COSTING**

Course of Action	Force Requirement	Cost per BOG month	6 Year Cycle Cost
30K AC Enabler	120K	\$1.4B	\$100.7B
30K RC Enabler	240K	\$1.2B	\$85.8B
30K AC/RC Mix 12.9K/17.1K	AC: 51.6K RC: 136.8K	\$1.3B	\$92.2B

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### IDA COSTING

Course of Action	Force Requirement	Cost per BOG month	12 Year Cycle Cost
30K AC Enabler	120K	\$669M	\$96.3B
30K RC Enabler	240K	\$396M	\$28.5B

### BACKGROUND

- Although the number of Reserve Component (RC) personnel that support the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) changes daily the current figure is approximately 120,000 (August 2010) and is made up of cohesive units and individual “enablers” or support personnel.
- This analysis provides a comparison of the Active Component (AC) and the RC annual costs from Army data for AC and RC to provide 30,000 support troops at an overseas location for a 6 year cycle at 1:3 for AC and 1:5 for RC, with 9-month BOG and 60 days premobilization training the year prior to activation for the RC personnel. The logic is to capitalize on the experience levels of our RC personnel by utilizing a percentage of the Soldiers already paid for in the RC base budget to provide this support, relieving stress on the AC personnel that would otherwise be needed to cover these requirements.
- This analysis takes into account not only the direct costs of the deployments, but the costs of maintaining the ‘bench’ needed to achieve the respective rotation schedules for the AC and RC throughout the cycle.

### ASSUMPTIONS

- The Army’s cost analysis used their Cost per Soldier model, Army ConOps model and the Army FORCES model. Since the enablers are generic personnel and not specified units, assumptions were not made with regard to equipment levels or specific grade structures.
- IDA used a different approach to the analysis. Due to the lack of details provided in the scenario, assumptions were made that units would be deployed vice individuals. A hypothetical list of required units was developed by IDA for use in this scenario. Using this approach, IDA was able to incorporate modeled BASEOPS and more detailed O&M costs, which is reflected in the difference between their results and the Army’s.
- The scenario dictated a basic assumption that end strength and force structure would not be impacted/changed for this scenario, existing personnel and/or units would be used. The task was simply to find the respective costs of employing the RC versus the AC to meet a generic future demand.
- Equipment assumptions are that existing equipment would be used in training, and units would fall in on equipment in theater when deployed.

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Specific skills that are provided additional pays (jump pay, foreign language proficiency, etc) were not identified. Should this option be selected for further study, these specifics would need to be identified by the COCOMs to be able to generate budget quality numbers.

- Transportation cost differentials between AC and RC soldiers were considered a 'wash' since these would depend on the location of the individual home stations which were not specified in the scenario. Over time, the cost differential for rotations from various points in CONUS for AC and RC personnel would be negligible, and the majority of the cost disparity of this scenario would be in MPA.

## DISCUSSION

- While utilizing the RC Soldiers in this manner would relieve stress on the AC force, if these Soldiers are mobilized as individuals there would be a corresponding reduction to the personnel readiness of their respective units when those units need to be mobilized for an OCO.
- Using IDA's methodology provides an in depth look at enabler unit costs and can easily be restructured to a specific unit mix as all costs are currently provided by the Army FORCES model and OSD Comptroller COST model. IDA's analysis would also lend itself more readily to estimating costs/savings of shifting force structure between components.
- There was not an attempt by the costing teams to determine the "optimal" mix of AC and RC enabler unit force structure, but only to provide a ROM funding impact of utilizing various force mixes in generic terms to inform future force mix deliberations. Finding the optimal balance would need to take into account anticipated overall demand as well as specific demands for unique military skills and beneficial civilian acquired skills that could be applied to a given mission set. Changing force structure between AC and RC results in a trade-off between a higher cost immediate reaction capability and a larger bench for future large-scale conflicts.

## SUMMARY

- Depending on the approach used to capture the costs in this scenario, it is estimated that utilizing an all RC enabler force would cost between 65% and 85% for land forces as compared an all AC force. A sliding scale between the two shows costs increase as the percent of AC in the force mix increases. Further study would need to be undertaken before assuming this result would be applicable across all services, due to differences in unit structure, manning and RC utilization strategies of the sea and air forces.
- Utilizing the RC in an operational capacity, as exemplified by this scenario, not only reduces costs to the Services but maintains and capitalizes upon the experience levels gained by the RCs over a decade of war. The RC is capable of performing these mission sets, and an increased RC force structure can further relieve stress on AC units while

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simultaneously providing a greater strategic depth as a larger force would be more affordable and sustainable.

**C. Cost Case 2b – Rotational MLRS Battalion to Korea**

Course of Action	Cost per Cycle	Number of units (cycles)	Total Cost
AC rotational FiB	\$683.8	4*2 (8 cycles)	\$5,470.5
Integrated rotational FiBs 2 AC / 4 ARNG	\$683.8	2*2 (4 cycles)	\$2,735.2
	\$430.4	4*1 (4 cycles)	\$1,721.7
		<b>Total AC/RC mix (8 cycles)</b>	<b>\$4,456.9</b>
ARNG rotational FiB	\$430.4	8*1 (8 cycles)	\$3,443.2

**BACKGROUND**

- Currently, the Army has units permanently stationed in South Korea. Army is investing considerable resources to provide infrastructure necessary to implement accompanied tours in Korea similar to Europe.
- This analysis provides a comparison of the Army Active Component (AC) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) annual costs to provide rotational Fires Brigades (FiBs) to replace permanently stationed units. It is believed that there could be savings generated from reducing infrastructure, BAH and PCS costs while maintaining the forward presence required by current agreements between the US and South Korea by using units in a rotational capacity rather than permanent basing.
- This analysis takes into account not only the direct costs of the deployments, but the costs of maintaining the required number of rotational units during their dwell periods to determine whether it is more cost effective to assign this type of mission to the AC or ARNG.
- The task was to cost various mixes of AC and ARNG rotational Fires Brigades to Korea with 9-month BOG to same location, RC mobilization for one year with 60 days of training the year before mobilization, AC BOG: Dwell 1:3, RC BOG: Dwell 1:5.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

- Existing unit equipment would be used in training, and units would fall in on equipment in theater when deployed. No equipment transportations costs would be incurred specific to this scenario.
- OPTEMPO costs in theater would be equal for AC and ARNG units since the mission and equipment would be the same.

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- The scenario dictated a basic assumption that end strength and force structure would not be impacted/changed for this scenario, existing personnel and/or units would be used. The task was simply to find the respective costs of employing the ARNG versus the AC to meet the requirement.
- Personnel transportation cost differentials between AC and ARNG soldiers were considered a 'wash' since over time, the cost differential for rotations from various points in CONUS for AC and ARNG personnel should be negligible.

## DISCUSSION

- Dedicating RC units in this manner is consistent with the COCOMs expressed desire to have RC units aligned to them and/or their AORs. It is anticipated that the long-term predictability of the mission and OPTEMPO should have a positive effect on the RC units with regard to recruiting and retention.
- Using units in this manner will remove them from the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle for OCO since their mobilizations and deployments will be dedicated to the mission in Korea.
- There was not an attempt by the costing teams to determine the "optimal" mix of AC and ARNG rotations, but only to provide a ROM funding impact of utilizing various mixes to inform future deliberations. Finding the optimal balance would need to take into account the anticipated overall demand for this capability in other theaters as compared to the current and projected inventory.

## SUMMARY

- Both Army and IDA analysis support the conclusion that this mission would be less expensive if performed by ARNG units. Depending on the approach used to capture the costs in this scenario, it is estimated that utilizing an ARNG FiBs in the rotational scenario would cost between 20% and 35% less than using strictly AC FiBs depending on the AC/ARNG mix. A sliding scale between the two shows costs increase as the percent of AC in the force mix increases.
- Utilizing the Reserve Component (RC) in an operational capacity, as exemplified by this scenario may reduce costs to the Services and maintains and capitalizes upon the experience levels gained by the RCs over a decade of war.

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**D. Cost Case 2b Theater Rotational Capability: Air Force F-15s in Europe**

<b>Air Force Air National Guard F-15C Rotation</b>				
Course of Action	Lakenheath Deployment Cost	CONUS Dwell CostsPrimary Mission	Total CONUS Mission and Lakenheath Cost	Notes
Baseline Annual Costs* (Current Lakenheath)	\$33,271,913	0	\$33,271,913	1 Permanent unit at Lakenheath
RC Deploy to Dwell at 1:5 (annual)	\$23,675,110	\$26,823,580	\$50,498,691	6 RC units – 5 CONUS 1 deployed each 6 months
AC Deploy to Dwell at 1:3 (annual)	\$23,335,682	\$43,593,627	\$66,929,309	4 Active units – 3 CONUS, 1 deployed each 6 months.

**BACKGROUND**

- The overall goal is to leverage the Total Force AC/RC capabilities gained over the past decade in an effort to provide capability more efficiently. These examples explore replacing one of the permanent Active Air Force F-15 squadrons in Lakenheath, England, by temporarily rotating RC and AC F-15 squadrons to Europe on unaccompanied tours.
- The first option proposes the concept of using RC units as rotational force to provide global posture in lieu of forward deployed AC units in order to lower cost, improve AC Deploy to Dwell ratios, and attain other efficiencies. The second option proposes 6 month rotations using AC F-15 squadrons.
- In this example, the cost of maintaining an Active notional 18 aircraft F-15 fighter squadron with a manpower structure of 34 Officers and 197 Enlisted (operations and maintenance) is compared with a 180 day rotational RC or AC 12-ship lead Unit Type Code (UTC), from central geographic CONUS locations to Lakenheath, England. The rotations are manned at 28 Officers and 128 Enlisted (ops and maintenance).
- The Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) was used for the rotational costs. The assumptions made are: Standard rates used for PCS; \$60 per day partial per diem; Average of 30% of RC dwell manpower are full time; 1% BOS savings for rotational versus permanent PCS (which represents some level of infrastructure cost savings for family housing, schools, day care, exchanges, health care); Deploy to dwell AC = 1:3, RC = 1:5; Individuals deploy for the duration. Concerns beyond the scope of this study are the ability of RC to perform the mission without mobilization authority, whether mobilization for a steady-state mission is desired, and the required force posturing for EUCOM requirements.

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- This example does not make a statement on the ability of the current or potential force structure to support these alternatives versus the permanent basing status quo. Some portion of the alternatives would definitely exceed currently available force structure, considering current rotational schedules. Additionally, this example is narrowly focused and the aperture would have to be widened to view the F-15 enterprise (as a minimum) before executing either rotational plan.

## DISCUSSION

- The Air Force analysis determined an approximate cost of \$33 million annually for the current active squadron at Lakenheath. This cost estimate includes only personnel costs. There are two alternative cost estimates developed for comparison to the status quo.
- The first alternative looked at rotating RC F-15 units (12-ship UTC) to Lakenheath. Covering the mission through six month deployments, within the RC deploy to dwell limitations (1:5), would require six RC units deploying once every 3 years. The annual cost for 2 six month personnel deployments is estimated at \$23.7 million.
  - To provide a holistic cycle cost estimate of the entire 6 unit rotation, the annual costs of the five CONUS F-15C units in dwell were also estimated in the chart above. This is a representation of the opportunity costs of having these units in reconstitution (dwell) under the rotational scenario and doesn't fully capture all opportunity cost considerations.
- The second alternative was to also rotate Active units on 6 month unaccompanied deployments. Covering the mission, within the AC deploy to dwell limitations (1:3) would require four AC units deploying personnel once every 2 years. The annual cost for 6 month deployments is estimated at \$23.7 million.
  - To provide a holistic cycle cost estimate of the entire 4 unit rotation, the annual costs of the three CONUS F-15C units in dwell were also estimated in the chart above. This is a representation of the opportunity costs of having these units in reconstitution (dwell) under the rotational scenario and doesn't fully capture all opportunity cost considerations.


## RESULTS

- Both alternatives (6 RC and 4 AC unit rotations) cost approximately \$23.7 million annually to deploy to Lakenheath. Each alternative's rotational costs are \$10 million less than the \$33.3 million annual cost for the Regular Air Force PCS squadron currently there, due to estimated decreased BOS costs for unaccompanied deployed airmen.
- The annual costs for the five RC units in dwell (CONUS) is approximately \$26.8 million, combined with the \$23.7 million in deployed costs, totals \$50.5 million annually for the six RC units in the Lakenheath rotation. Although the RC units in CONUS could not be available for deployment during their dwell, if we adhere to the desired deploy to dwell ratio, they would be available as a strategic reserve during a general mobilization.

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Additionally, CONUS units would be available for traditional exercises, Air Defense alert missions.

- CONUS portion of the alternatives is included in the analysis to somewhat capture the number of units the Air Force would require to accomplish the “deploy to dwell” ratios for Lakenheath. There are currently six RC F-15C units in strategic depth in RC. The AC currently does not have the depth for the 1:3 rotations. Additionally, not examined was the disposition of the permanent F-15C squadron as to new missions in CONUS or elsewhere, transitioning to the RC or remaining in the AC.
- The Air Force, through the Total Force Enterprise Review, is aggressively pursuing the right AC/RC mix and addressing Total Force decisions holistically at the enterprise level.




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**E. Cost Case 3a Alignment of Reserve Component Elements in Joint Reserve Unit (JRU)**

Unit	Annual Cost	# Years	Cost per Unit
AC	\$13,405,231	15	\$201,078,465

Ratio	Deployed Cost	Dwell Yr Cost	Annualized Cost
1:2	\$13,405,231	\$2,093,718	\$5,864,222
1:3	\$13,405,231	\$2,093,718	\$4,921,596
1:4	\$13,405,231	\$2,093,718	\$4,356,021



Unit	Base Cost	Dep Ratio	15 Year Cost
AC	\$13,405,231	n/a	\$201,078,465
RC	\$5,864,222	1:2	\$87,963,330
RC	\$4,921,596	1:3	\$73,823,940
RC	\$4,356,021	1:4	\$65,340,315

**BACKGROUND**

- This concept seeks a more efficient alignment of specific Reserve Component (RC) units, teams, capabilities and individuals with selected Joint Force HQs, Combatant Commands (COCOM), and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate more effective access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships. The goal is that better alignment will result in better utilization of the RC.
- This analysis estimates the cost and staffing needs for a standard Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) located at a geographical combatant commander (COCOM) headquarters.
- Having a greater RC presence at the COCOM is intended to provide awareness of RC forces available and to ensure easier access of the RC. Additionally, members of the JRU could also perform collateral duties at the COCOM not related to the RC.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

- The size of a Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) was based on the only “like” unit currently in force which is at the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The TRANSCOM unit is comprised of approximately 200 RC personnel. (This assumed structure is shown in the tables below.)
- The RC personnel would operate at the COCOM in the dwell years as well as mobilize to the COCOM at various rotation rates. Therefore, comparisons are made against a similar full time AC unit at different RC rotation rates of 1:2, 1:3, and 1:4.
- The various rotations are offered as a way to seek efficiencies and provide a range of potential savings at the COCOM staff, relieving AC personnel to perform other missions and to aid the COCOM in gaining better access to the RC.
- The total AC/RC cost comparison is primarily personnel dollars for staff duty extended to a 15 year period and are in constant dollars. The RC used the same cost as the AC for the deployed year (\$13.4M) with the cost of the RC dwell years of roughly \$2.1 million per year as indicated in the table below.

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**RESULTS**

- The Navy analysis determined the full cost of 200 active personnel on a COCOM staff at the unit structure listed in the table below to cost approximately \$13.4 million per year and \$201 million for the 15 year period.
- The JRU RC cost is estimated at 3 different rotation rates of 1:2, 1:3 and 1:4 at which the costs were \$87.9, \$73.8 and \$65.3 million respectively. This is less expensive than the active estimate; however, the JRU varied rotations could not produce the same level of support as 200 active personnel that are full time. The comparison with the AC is primarily for a reference point. However, the various rotation cycles each year 1:2, 1:3 or 1:4 would provide some opportunity to relieve portion of the active staff for other missions.
- Other excursions of various terms of service in the dwell years could be explored. The JRU would also be an inexpensive way to align the RC with COCOM to produce efficiencies, add or augment capability, or bring in special expertise at a COCOM rather than bear the full cost of full time active increases.
- For an annualized cost of roughly \$4 to \$6 million per year a Joint Reserve Unit could be added. This cost could be partially offset by freeing a portion of the AC to other priority missions.

AC Option			
Grade	Qty	Rate	Cost
O-6	1	\$202,538	\$202,538
O-5	1	\$168,956	\$168,956
O-4	2	\$145,693	\$291,386
O-3	3	\$121,354	\$364,062
E-9	1	\$131,593	\$131,593
E-8	6	\$109,422	\$656,532
E-7	6	\$96,690	\$580,140
E-6	18	\$82,411	\$1,483,398
E-5	54	\$67,735	\$3,657,690
E-4	108	\$54,342	\$5,868,936
<b>Team</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$13,405,231</b>

15% FTS, 85% SELRES Option			
Grade	Qty	Rate	Cost
O-6	1	\$202,538	\$202,538
O-5	1	\$168,956	\$168,956
O-4	1	\$145,693	\$145,693
O-3	1	\$121,354	\$121,354
E-9	1	\$131,593	\$131,593
E-8	2	\$109,422	\$218,844
E-7	2	\$96,690	\$193,380
E-6	6	\$82,411	\$494,466
O-4	1	\$20,190	\$20,190
O-3	2	\$16,566	\$33,132
E-8	4	\$13,863	\$55,452
E-7	4	\$11,955	\$47,820
E-6	12	\$9,863	\$118,356
E-5	54	\$8,065	\$435,510
E-4	108	\$6,439	\$695,412
<b>Team</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,093,718</b>

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**F. Aligning RC Mobile Training Teams with Combatant Command**

**BACKGROUND**

- This concept is seeking more efficient alignment of specific Reserve Component (RC) units, teams, capabilities and individuals with selected Joint Force HQs, Combatant Commands (COCOM), and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships. It is hoped that better alignment will result in better utilization of the RC.
- This particular example aligns forces with Combatant Commanders such as Africa Command (AFRICOM) in areas of interest to them such as Building Partnership Capacity (BCP) i.e. agriculture, medical, and construction teams).

**DISCUSSION**

- The Navy prepared an AC/RC cost comparison of 12-person Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to provide 52 weeks coverage to the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR).
- The deployment rotation is for a three-week period. The teams are assumed not to be blended and are comprised of either 100% AC personnel or 100% RC. Full year coverage would require 17.3 teams.
- Other assumptions in this analysis are: Existing personnel/units will be used, no increase in personnel; the AC teams would be on TAD/TDY and the RC rotations would be on 3 week AT periods; the three week AT calculation was based on 1.5 times the rate for 15 days of AT in the FY11 President's Budget (the rates are non-designator specific); the Officer-to-Enlisted Ratio was estimated at 1:11; CONUS based, travel costs are not included. The AT calculation comes to approximately 23 days which includes 2 days for travel which in real terms would provide for a 21 day BoG.
- Also provided is a "differential analysis" in which all "like" costs for both AC and RC such as travel & per diem costs, budget pay & allowances, transportation costs and operating costs are excluded. The estimated costs provide a 15 year comparison between AC and RC is in constant dollars.

**RESULTS**

- The Navy prepared the below tables that show annual personnel cost using the pay rates for an AC and RC 12 person team for 1 full year. Since this example has persistent teams in AFRICOM for 52 weeks per year, we are using this to approximate the number of teams required for the AC and the RC personnel to achieve this mission at 17.3 teams.
- The tables below shows a one year cost comparison but also extends the cost to 15 years. The AC and RC tables represent the full year pay and allowances cost that would cover most of the pay except the "differential" unbudgeted third week of AT for the RC.

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AC 52 Week Cost		
Grade	Qty	Rate
O-3	1	\$121,354
E-7	1	\$96,690
E-6	2	\$82,411
E-5	3	\$67,735
E-4	5	\$54,342
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>\$857,781</b>

RC Team 52 Week AT Cost	3 Week AT	Team Qty	Full Team Cost
<b>Officer</b>	\$7,511	1	\$7,511
<b>Enlisted</b>	\$3,593	11	\$39,523
<b>Total per team</b>			\$47,034
<b>17.3 Teams 52 Weeks Full Cost</b>			\$815,240
<b>17.3 Teams 15 Year Full Cost</b>			\$12,228,605

52 Week MTT Coverage in AFRICOM		
	AC	RC
<b>1 Year Cost</b>	\$857,781	\$815,240
<b>15 Year Cost</b>	\$12,866,715	\$12,228,605

Additional Cost for RC Over Budget	
3rd Week of AT for 1 Year	\$271,608
3rd Week of AT for 15 years	\$4,074,122

- The cost difference of deploying AC or RC is minor. The RC is slightly less expensive in absolute terms by 5%, however, the RC is not budgeted for a 3<sup>rd</sup> week of AT which would require funds added or redistributed to this program to fund the AT.
- The “differential” cost of \$4.1 million for 15 years for the third week of AT that the RC would require in order to meet a 21 day deployment period is shown in the table below.
- One concern is the cost of travel which is roughly \$49,000 per team round trip to central Africa (from the COST model). This example did not examine an excursion to compare rotating teams every three weeks versus a permanent team in Africa due to the wide variance in BPC missions. One premise was that some teams may be medical, others construction, security or agricultural. Thus rotating varied teams was preferred to a permanent team.
- Although the absolute cost is approximately the same, the decision maker would have to weigh the high “opportunity cost” of the AC being distracted from their primary mission against the increased “differential” cost to use the RC for this mission. An evaluation of which component is best suited to perform this mission in relation to current missions would need to be done.

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**G. Cost Case 4 Differentiation – Building 200-Person Variable Participation Teams**

Full 1:3 Cycle Costs (\$M)	9 Month BOG Deployment plus dwell periods	40 Day Employment plus dwell periods	60 Day Employment plus dwell periods	120 Day Employment plus dwell periods	180 Day Employment plus dwell periods
ARNG	<b>\$44.30</b>	<b>\$22.30</b>	<b>\$24.50</b>	<b>\$31.10</b>	<b>\$37.70</b>
USAR	<b>\$43.30</b>	<b>\$21.20</b>	<b>\$23.20</b>	<b>\$29.10</b>	<b>\$35.10</b>

**BACKGROUND**

- This variable participation concept seeks to employ national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve more frequently and/or for longer periods of time in order to support on-going and future Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions as well as institution support missions.
- Such *differentiation* of terms of service within the RC could provide additional innovative sources for units/teams/ personnel utilization required by important DoD missions. The goal is to determine new innovative, cost effective employment alternatives to affect these missions.

**DISCUSSION**

- In this option the Army costed a 200 person RC unit based on a variation of the traditional RC terms of service using notional 90 day training periods in three nine month dwell periods.
- The RC units would rotate on a 1:3 deployment cycle and would deploy for a nine month boots on ground (BOG) in the deployment period. The intent is to show an RC unit that can deploy more than the traditional 1:5 rotation.
- In addition the Army developed four other excursions for cycle costs using 40, 60, 120, and 180 day Active Duty (AD) deployment periods. The Army used Afghanistan as the deployment destination. In the table above the Army used four nine month periods to total to 3 year cycle cost for each excursion. The deployments were in the fourth period. Cost estimates were developed for both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.
- Using the Army calculated “full rotation cycle” costs for the three dwell periods and the deployment period to provide both reserve components’ 1:3 BOG/dwell cycle cost. The Army did not cost an active unit for comparison purposes; however, the IDA analysis below does provide a comparison for the 90 day option with a 1:3 rotation cycle.

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- The Army indicated that in previous pilot programs the variable participation seems to work with small discreet groups. The Army’s Ready Response Reserve Unit (R3U) Pilot Program in 2007, 2008 examined three units; USAR R3U Pilot Program Units; 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon 342<sup>nd</sup> Chemical Company (BIDS) (31 personnel); A CO 1<sup>st</sup> BN 321 Regiment Drill Sergeant company (18 personnel); 7222<sup>nd</sup> Medical Support Unit (18 personnel). In the pilot program these units achieved P-1/C-1 readiness levels with significant resources and were subsets of larger units which provided over-manning capability. The over manning was necessary to achieve the high readiness levels.
- Additionally, new terms of Service that allow for more persistent active duty in greater amounts could lead to more reservists reaching full-time retirement or higher levels of retirement pay. Potential increased retirement costs were not estimated or included in the calculations.

**IDA ANALYSIS RESULTS**

IDA Analysis	AC Units Operations Costs	RC Units Operations Costs	
Annual	\$16,288,000.00	\$4,694,000.00	
Annual 90 Days Training		\$10,832,307.69	
Annual While Mobilized		\$15,304,000.00	
1 Cycle = 4 nine month periods	27 MOS Dwell Period	9 MOS Deploy Period	Total 3 Year Cycle Cost
AC 3 (1:3) year Cycle	\$36,648,000.00	\$12,216,000.00	\$48,864,000.00
RC 3 (1:3) Year Cycle	\$24,372,692.31	\$11,478,000.00	\$35,850,692.31

- IDA provided a “differential only” cost comparison of operating costs of a notional 200 person unit by picking unit cost data from three types of units in the Forces Model. Annual manpower and operating costs were considered while “like” costs such as transportation costs to theater were excluded for both AC and RC.

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- The unit operating cost was approximated by choosing the percentages of unit annual costs listed in the table below that correlate to the actual cost of 200 personnel from the three units. This combination resulted in an annual operating cost of \$16.3 million for the notional active unit.
- The 39 day RC annual operating cost was found to be \$4.7 million that was extended to \$10.8 million for the 90 training period in a given dwell year.
- The cost of a mobilized RC unit was estimated to be \$15.3 million which is approximately 6% less due to a reduction taken from the Forces Model for less BOS costs and additional costs for the Reserve Operations Center.
- The annual costs for dwell and deployments (BOG) were then converted to nine month periods and estimated at \$48.9 million for the active unit vs. \$35.9 million for the RC unit. While in this scenario comparing both AC and RC at the same 1:3 rotation rate the RC is roughly 25% less expensive primarily due to the low cost dwell portion of the cycle,
- The RC execution of this mission, while less expensive, frees the AC unit to do other missions, an opportunity cost of roughly \$49 million for the cycle.

**H. Cost Case 5. Providing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability To Support Emerging Missions**

Use	Command	Enlisted Spaces	Officer Spaces	Enlisted Costs	Officer Costs	Total Costs
*AFRC support to ACC	ACC	493	346	\$41,738,193	\$39,872,097	\$81,610,290
	AFRC	61	37	\$589,185	\$832,666	\$1,421,851
*NV ANG/ACC Association	ACC	788	107	\$66,713,380	\$12,330,388	\$79,043,769
	NV ANG	47	18	\$453,962	\$405,081	\$859,043
Nellis AFB support to Creech AFB ISR	Air Combat Command	248	7	\$20,996,089	\$806,661	\$21,802,750

\* Example units have different manning levels based on unique capabilities

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## BACKGROUND

- There is a need for the Department to analyze ways to adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent demands arising from new challenges, such as expanding Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and intelligence analysis capabilities, creating cyber defense capabilities, augmenting Homeland Defense and performing sustained engagement with foreign partner military establishments.
- The Active Components are finding it difficult to receive an adequate return on investment in time and money to train individuals in these specialized fields. The skills required for cyber warfare, for example, are also highly sought after in the private sector at compensation levels with which the military services cannot compete. This makes retention of our trained service members difficult for the Active Components.
- It is believed that the RCs can more readily capitalize on the civilian acquired skills of its members in many of these areas, and the Department could benefit from partnerships with industries where the skills honed in the private sector are often more advanced than military training and experience can provide.

## DISCUSSION

- AF is approaching all emerging needs, e.g. expanding ISR capabilities, from a Total Force perspective
- Creech AFB Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) is an example of an existing AF Total Force solution to successfully and efficiently maximize ISR capabilities
- Total Force Enterprise Review Process is being developed to determine the best mix of Active, ANG and AFR assets across all mission sets
- Air Force continues to target candidates for recruitment and retention into emerging missions and high tech jobs, such as Cyber Defense and ISR operations and analysis through a variety of methods:
  - Bonus and Special Pays targeted toward career field shortages
  - Education benefits and opportunities
  - Online social networking sites, such as ANG's Facebook page, is opening up new ways to discuss opportunities in the Guard and help potential recruits with contacting local recruiting offices
  - Rise to the Challenge is a high-tech recruiting program that offers interactive simulations utilizing reality scenarios and Air Force themed challenge games connecting recruiters with potential recruits

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**SUMMARY**

- By leveraging the skills of our RC members, and partnering with industry in areas such as software and network security, the Department can continue to improve in many of these emergent capabilities.
- Since these are emerging missions, there is limited historical data to show long-term costs, and projecting future costs of various options would take a more rigorous study. However, it is anticipated that retaining these technologically skilled members in the Reserve Components, where their skills are continuously honed on the front lines of cyber security in the private sector, would be more cost effective than trying to compete for them on full-time compensation levels as we do with many of the medical fields.
- The Air Force has taken the lead in the ISR arena by melding AC and RC personnel and units very effectively, with promising results. Continuing to build upon this foundation and it is expected this success can be replicated throughout a host of emerging mission areas.

**I. Cost Case 6a – Integrate RC into AC Army Rotary Wing Unit**

IDA COSTING

OH-58D (200 Person)	100 % AC	100 % AC plus 20% RC	80% AC + 20% RC	20% AC + 80% RC	100% RC
Total of MOB costs (IDA cost model)	\$47,303,130	\$56,470,406	\$47,380,831	\$48,583,536	\$48,751,636
Dwell years	\$50,658,750	\$53,812,350	\$43,680,600	\$22,746,150	\$15,768,000
3 Year Cycle	\$97,961,880	\$110,282,756	\$91,061,431	\$71,329,686	\$64,519,636

**BACKGROUND**

- Integrating RC personnel into AC units or AC personnel into RC units, especially in the Air Force aviation communities (both pilots and maintenance/support personnel), has been successfully utilized/demonstrated in numerous instances. Air Force experience suggests an optimal mix is 80/20 for both AC/RC and RC/AC blended units.
- This concept can be advantageous to both Active and Reserve Components and to DoD, if limitations are overcome.
- When applied under the correct circumstances, integration may increase capabilities, flexibility and efficiency, thus enhancing Service capability and capacity.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

- IDA costed a complete 1:3 deployment cycle of an OH-58D Army Rotary Wing unit. IDA cost scenario assumed deployment from Ft. Carson to Afghanistan.

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- The IDA costing used pay rates from IDA’s COST model, and Base Ops and PCS costs from Army FORCES model. IDA’s COST model also captures the cost of activation and pre-deployment training for the RC portion in each mix.
- The scenario dictated a basic assumption that end strength and force structure would not be impacted/changed for this scenario, existing personnel and/or units would be used, and no savings would be assumed from deactivating the AC portion of the unit.

**DISCUSSION**

- The Army has integrated aviation and maneuver units below the level of employment. In the last 20 years this integration has been attempted at company, battalion and brigade levels. Differences in training cycles and available periods preclude the development of unit cohesion and limit the effectiveness of this level of integration. While this example synchronizes deployment cycles, the nature of the RC will preclude a fully integrated training cycle. The increased training days for the RC in this scenario attempts to ameliorate most of this disconnect.
- Several successful integration examples include the USAF (78<sup>th</sup> FS, numerous AR Squadrons), the Navy (HM, VAQ, VFC), and in the USCG’s ‘Team Coast Guard’ approach.

**SUMMARY**

- IDA analysis supports the conclusion that monetary efficiencies could be achieved by integrating RC units into AC commands. Depending on the approach used to capture the costs in this scenario, direct savings would be between 5% and 10% for the 80/20 mix of AC to RC over a 100% AC unit.
- Further study would be needed to determine if the amount saved justifies the cultural and logistical changes necessary to fully implement this scenario as well as the applicability to the Services and their ability to replicate this on a wide scale. It is the Army’s contention that this concept has been attempted and does not work the way the Army, with units built around personnel instead of platforms, employs AC and RC formations.
- Additional development of the concept of operations would have to further define execution before a refined cost estimate could be developed.

**J. Cost Case 6b Integrate ARNG Maneuver Battalion into AC IBCT**

**ARMY COSTING**

<b>Unit Type</b>	<b>Annual Operations</b>	<b>1:3 Cycle</b>
<b>AC only</b>	<b>\$628.5M</b>	<b>\$1,885.6M</b>
<b>AC w/1 RC Maneuver BN</b>	<b>\$576.3M</b>	<b>\$1,729.0M</b>

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IDA COSTING

<b>Unit Type</b>	<b>Annual Operations</b>	<b>36 Month Cycle Cost</b>
<b>IBCT</b>	<b>\$285.3M</b>	<b>\$855.8M</b>
<b>IBCT using ARNG Inf BN with Incentives</b>	<b>\$269.7M</b>	<b>\$809.1M</b>

## BACKGROUND

- The Texas Army National Guard could provide one maneuver battalion for the IBCT at Fort Hood. By increasing the annual training requirement from the current 39 days to 90 days to maintain a much higher level of readiness, the ARNG BN would be able to mirror the parent IBCT rotation rate of 1:3 with a 9 month BOG.
- Integrating RC personnel into AC units or AC personnel into RC units, especially in the Air Force aviation communities (both pilots and maintenance/support personnel), has been successfully utilized/demonstrated in numerous instances.
- This concept can be advantageous to both Active and Reserve Components and to DoD, if limitations are overcome.
- When applied under the correct circumstances, integration may increase capabilities, flexibility and efficiency, thus enhancing Service capability and capacity.

## ASSUMPTIONS

- The Army used a fully-burdened Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) cost and maintained the integrity of the current ARFORGEN training and deployment cycle.
- The IDA costing used Army FORCES model for home station costs and OSD Comptroller COST model for deployment costs. Transportation of equipment was not considered as that cost is theater dependent, and no details were provided in the scenario. It was assumed that the AC and ARNG equipment transportation costs would be identical or nearly so since equipment would start in the same relative location (Texas), or that there would be minimal transportation costs for units deploying to a developed theater and falling in on existing theater provided or prepositioned equipment.
- OPTEMPO costs in theater would be equal for AC and ARNG units since the mission and equipment would be the same. Savings would be generated by the lower dwell costs of the RC unit.
- The scenario dictated a basic assumption that end strength and force structure would not be impacted or changed for this scenario, existing personnel and/or units would be used, and no savings would be assumed from deactivating the AC maneuver battalion being replaced by the Texas ARNG. This can therefore only be categorized as an

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opportunity cost saved as the replaced AC battalion personnel and equipment would then be freed up to be used in another capacity. This opportunity cost would offset the cost increase for the higher OPTEMPO of the ARNG supplied battalion.

## DISCUSSION

- The Army has integrated aviation and maneuver units below the level of employment. In the last 20 years this integration has been attempted at company, battalion and brigade levels. Differences in training cycles and available periods preclude the development of unit cohesion and limit the effectiveness of this level of integration. While this example synchronizes deployment cycles, the nature of the RC will preclude a fully integrated training cycle. The increased training days for the RC in this scenario attempts to ameliorate most of this disconnect.
- Several successful examples include the USAF (78th FS, numerous AR Squadrons), the Navy (HM, VAQ, VFC), and in the USCG's 'Team Coast Guard' approach. However, some not-so successful examples include 4ID and ARNG 49AD.
- This example may work in the small scale utilized in this scenario but would be difficult to replicate nationwide without further study. Due to BRAC and other consolidation efforts over the past several years, there are fewer instances where RC forces are co-located with an AC counterpart. Increased travel time and expense to integrate training of dispersed RC units may prove problematic in all but a few isolated cases.

## SUMMARY

- Both Army and IDA analysis support the conclusion that there could be monetary efficiencies gained by integrating RC units into AC commands. Depending on the approach used to capture the costs in this scenario, we expect the direct savings would be between 5% and 10% within the constraints of the scenario.
- Further study would be needed to determine the appropriate level of incentive to ensure the RC battalion would be fully manned, and it is anticipated that this amount would not be constant over time due to economic and operating environment fluctuations.
- Further study would also be needed to determine if the monetary efficiencies are significant enough to justify the cultural and logistical changes necessary to fully implement this scenario as well as the applicability to the other Services and their ability to replicate this on a wide scale. It is the Army's contention that this concept has been tried a number of times and does not work the way the Army employs AC and RC units.

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**K. Cost Case 7 Use of RC Units To Provide Institutional Support (Drill Sergeants)**

**ARMY COSTING**

	Number Days	Cost
AC Company	365	\$2.058M
RC Company	179	\$1.014M

**IDA COSTING**

<b>Opportunity Cost Of Using 100 Reserve Drill Sergeants at Ft. Jackson</b>	
Staffing Option	Cost
1 Year Reserve Drill Sergeant Offset Pay	\$930,006
1 Year Active Duty Drill Sergeant Pay	\$6,384,394
90 Day Active Duty Drill Sergeant Pay	\$1,596,000
120 Day Active Duty Drill Sergeant Pay	\$2,128,134
E-7 BAH for 30 Days	\$1,461
E-7 PCS (Rotational) per Drill Sergeant	\$31,348
Staffing Option Includes Basic Pay, BAH for E-7, and PCS for 20%	Yearly Costs
100 Active Duty Drill Sergeants	\$7,028,886
100 Reserve Drill Sergeants Serving 90 Extra Active Duty Days	\$2,530,389
100 Reserve Drill Sergeants Serving 120 Extra Active Duty Days	\$3,063,984

**BACKGROUND**

- Task: Determine the relative costs of using Army Reserve training personnel to meet the annual summer surge for Basic Training.
- The Army's FY11 total basic training mission is 133,700 Soldiers (AC, Army Reserve and Army National Guard). The training load projected for the summer surge will be 59,813 or 53% of the annual mission. This is slightly higher than the historic summer load of 44%. Currently the load is sustained with 168 AC and 25 RC Army Reserve Basic Training Companies (conducting 86% & 14% of the load respectively).

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- Service members performing Institutional Support represent a large portion of the overall force. As a result, effective and efficient integration with the RC will have a significant impact.
- In many cases, RC can provide Institutional Support with little to no significant cost, especially for activities that do not require equipment or personal protective gear.
- The skill sets needed to provide Institutional Support tasks are often resident in mid-career service members and/or civilians as a result of their experience. Thus they can immediately contribute once available.
- Most Institutional Support roles do not require service members to deploy, are conducive to members seeking advanced education, addressing family needs, or dealing with long term medical issues that prevent deployment.

### ASSUMPTIONS

- Cost will likely decrease with support of RC personnel, especially in cases such as recruiting and admin functions that can be performed remotely.
- Cost of the training remains the same - leveraging the use of RC members that can be “switched on and off” allows for surge ops will allow for a smaller, more economical steady-state cadre.


### DISCUSSION

- Army’s costing was a straight-line personnel cost, and did not apply a fully burdened cost to the AC (no PCS or other overhead costs typical for an AC unit). This cost was calculated for an 18 person Army Reserve Basic Combat Training Drill Sergeant Company and compared to utilizing a similar unit made up from AC personnel. This costing can easily be scaled to meet a given demand signal.
- IDA costing was for 100 Drill Sergeants (E7) to perform duty at Fort Jackson for various periods of time and compared to the cost of the same 100 personnel if staffed full-time from the AC.
- While this issue encompasses utilizing RC units and Soldiers for any institutional support function across the Services to include medical, administration and finance, this costing drill only looked at the Army’s training base. Further excursions would need to be conducted to determine cost and feasibility of expanding into the other areas of institutional support.

### SUMMARY

- Analysis indicates it may be more cost effective to use reserve component personnel in this capacity as the cost effectiveness of the scalability is much more efficient than maintaining a large permanent staff that may be underutilized during non-surge months.

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# **Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component**

## **Annex B**

### **Roles for Which the Guard and Reserve are Well Suited**



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<i>Annex B9: Institutional Support .....</i>	<i>B-63</i>
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Pre-decisional Working Papers

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***Comprehensive Review of the  
Future Role of the Reserve  
Components***

**OBJs 2-5 Update to EXCOM**

**Mr. Robert Smiley**

**5 August 2010  
3D921  
1330-1500**

A/O 8-Nov-10 15:47 UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 1

On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation represents a roll-up of each the four working groups' input to the missions and tasks question. It was presented to the Study's Executive Committee on August 5, 2010.

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## Conference Participants AWC; 21-22 Jul 10



- Service Secretariats
  - Army
  - Navy
  - Air Force
- OSD
  - USD(Policy)
  - USD(P&R)
  - USD(Comptroller)
  - USD(AT&L)
  - USD(Intelligence)
  - OSD General Counsel
  - Director CAPE
  - Director Net Assessment
- Offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - Chairman, JCS
  - Chief of Staff, Army
  - Chief of Naval Operations
  - Chief of Staff, Air Force
  - Commandant, Marine Corps
- Joint Staff, J8
- US Coast Guard
- Combatant Commands
  - USCENTCOM
  - USEUCOM
  - USPACOM
  - USSOUTHCOM
  - USAFRICOM
  - USNORTHCOM
  - USJFCOM
  - USSOCOM
  - USTRANSCOM
  - USSTRATCOM
- Reserve Components
  - Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
  - Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau
  - Office of the Director, Army National Guard
  - Office of the Chief, Navy Reserve
  - Office of the Chief, Air Force Reserve
  - Office of the Director, Air National Guard
  - Office of the Director, Coast Guard Reserve
  - Reserve Forces Policy Board

Requirements Briefs

- J3 – Global Force MGT / FADM
- J8 – Operational Availability 10
- OSD Policy – DPPG Analytic Agenda Scenarios

A/O 8-Nov-10 15:47 UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 2

The conference was well attended by representatives from the Service Secretariats, from 8 Offices of the Secretary of Defense, from 5 Offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from ten Combatant Commands, and from 8 offices related to the Reserve Components (plus the US Coast Guard).

As noted on the slide, the conference participants received the following three requirements related briefs to help them in their deliberations: a J-3 presentation on the Global Force Management process, a J-8 brief on the OA-10 analytic process/ results, and an OSD Policy brief on the Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG) analytic agenda scenarios.

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

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<b>Information Sought</b>				
Type Information	Mission Set			
	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces(Home&Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;"> <p><b>Conference attendees divided into four Working Groups, one for each of the broad mission sets</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working Groups led by OSD(RA) or JS personnel, assisted by AWC faculty facilitators</li> <li>Primary objective: identify missions / tasks for which RC is well-suited to include underlying justification</li> <li>Secondary objective: to the extent possible, provide information related to other study objectives</li> </ul> </div>			
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				
<small>A/O 8-Nov-10 15:47 <span style="margin-left: 200px;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</span> <span style="float: right;">3</span></small>				

The conference attendees were divided into four working groups, one for each of the broad mission sets that had been identified – individual augmentees, rotating operational forces (home and abroad), military engagement teams, and institutional support (i.e., in support of the generating force). Each working group was led by either senior staff from OSD Reserve Affairs or senior members of the Joint Staff. In all cases the working groups were ably assisted by Army War College faculty (serving in facilitation roles).

The primary objective of the working groups was to identify missions/ tasks for which the Reserve Component is well-suited including the underlying justifications of that RC suitability. The secondary objective (time permitting) was to provide information related to other study objectives, e.g., conditions and standards (i.e., that provide for a trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve), organizational adjustments, and law/ policy/ doctrinal changes that may be required.

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

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<b>Missions / Tasks for RC IAs</b>					
Type Information	Mission Set				
	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (Generating Force)	
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cyber</b></li> <li>• Linguists</li> <li>• Planners &amp; Strategists</li> <li>• Specific Logistics</li> <li>• Finance</li> <li>• <b>Acquisition/Contracting</b></li> <li>• <b>UAV – RPA</b></li> <li>• Scientists</li> <li>• Regional Experts</li> <li>• Human Resources</li> <li>• <b>Environmental</b></li> <li>• <b>Agriculture</b></li> <li>• <b>Energy</b></li> <li>• PSYOPS</li> <li>• CBRNE Response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Medical</b></li> <li>• Legal</li> <li>• Intel</li> <li>• IT/C4I</li> <li>• Logisticians</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Engineers (combat &amp; civil)</li> <li>• Public Affairs</li> <li>• Operations / AOs</li> <li>• Training</li> <li>• Aviation Support</li> <li>• Specific Combat Arms</li> </ul>		
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4					
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5					
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6					
Red text indicates new or emerging task All are likely to require non-standard approaches					
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4					

Individual augmentees are Service members (Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation or U.S. Government civilian employees who perform duties that support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve its assigned mission with existing resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member. The accompanying slide, reflecting the output of the Carlisle working group deliberations, delineates the types of missions or tasks that could be assigned to Reserve Component individual augmentees. The ones highlighted in Red were considered to be new or emerging tasks, e.g., cyber.

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

Type Information		Mission	
	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)	
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3			<b>Combat</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full spectrum Sustainment/ Follow on forces</li> <li>• Cyber</li> <li>• Nuclear C2</li> <li>• Space C2</li> <li>• Strategic Intel/ Targetteering</li> <li>• Theater specific C2</li> <li>• National C2</li> <li>• ISR</li> </ul> <b>Security</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection</li> <li>• Foreign Internal Defense &amp; Irregular Warfare</li> <li>• Stability Ops</li> <li>• Cyber</li> </ul> <b>Engagement</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theater Security Cooperation</li> <li>• Allied exercises</li> <li>• Security Force assistance</li> <li>• Partnership Programs</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <b>Relief and Reconstruction</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief</li> <li>• Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction</li> <li>• Medical Readiness Training (MEDRET)</li> </ul>
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			

Rotating operational forces are those units which rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with that Service's specific readiness policies or requirements, from reset and maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window, such units will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). The accompanying slide, reflecting the output of the Carlisle working group deliberations, delineates the types of missions or tasks that could be assigned to Reserve Component rotational units.

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

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<b>Missions / Tasks for RC Military Engagement Teams</b>				
Mission Set				
Type Information	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3				
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				

- Civil-Military Operations
- Professional Military Education
- Conventional Military Operations
- Intelligence
- Health Affairs
- Maritime Security
- Engineering
- Logistics
- Security
- Stability Operations
- Information Operations
- Air and Missile Defense
- Homeland Defense & Security
- Defense Support to Civil Authorities

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Military engagement teams consist of Service members (Active and Reserve Component) and U.S. Government civilian employees who are assigned to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance (e.g., missions/ tasks related to theater security cooperation, building partner capacity or other activities). Such teams may also include personnel from the host nation, coalition partners, other U.S. Government agencies, and non-Government organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross. The accompanying slide, reflecting the output of the Carlisle working group deliberations, delineates the types of missions or tasks that could be assigned to Reserve Component military engagement teams.

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UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT		<b>Missions / Tasks for RC Institutional Support Forces</b>	
<b>Type Information</b>	<b>Individual Augmentees</b>	<p><b>Training</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basic Training</li> <li>Advanced Individual Training</li> <li>Instructor Support</li> <li>Instructor Training</li> <li>Officer Professional Development Training</li> <li>NCO Professional Development Training</li> <li>ROTC Support</li> <li>Small Arms Instructors</li> <li>Support Services to the Academies</li> </ul> <p><b>Recruiting</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recruiting</li> </ul> <p><b>Logistic Support</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Central Issue Facilities</li> <li>Transportation Support</li> <li>Depot Maintenance</li> </ul> <p><b>Services</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical</li> <li>Health</li> <li>Dental</li> <li>Legal</li> </ul> <p><b>Admin</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pay / Admin Services</li> <li>Personnel Support Activities</li> <li>HQ Staff Augmentation</li> <li>Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains</li> <li>Inspector General Complaints / Fraud</li> </ul> <p><b>Investigations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MOB Center Operations</li> </ul> <p><b>Readiness</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement &amp; Integration (JRSOI)</li> </ul> <p><b>Certifications</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training Evaluation</li> <li>Inspector General Inspection Teams</li> <li>Exercise Validation</li> </ul> <p><b>Public Affairs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communication Support</li> <li>Public Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Cyber Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Network Security</li> <li>Base Security</li> <li>Firefighters</li> </ul> <p><b>Facilities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engineering Construction</li> </ul>	<p><b>Institutional Support (Generating Force)</b></p> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; width: 50px; height: 50px; margin: 10px auto;"></div>
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3			
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			

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In addition to operational forces, the Services require a substantial number of personnel that support those forces by providing specific capabilities attendant to the Title 10 responsibilities levied on the Service Secretaries for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing forces. Reserve Component units or individual Reservists assigned to institutional support would support the Service's Operational Forces, would normally be based in CONUS, and would move through their Service's Force Generation Model. The accompanying slide, reflecting the output of the Carlisle working group deliberations, delineates the types of institutional support tasks that could be assigned to Reserve Component units, teams, or individual augmentees.

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## Applicable Laws

- **TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES**
  - Subtitle A—General Military Law (§§ 101—2925)
  - Subtitle B—Army (§§ 3001—4842)
  - Subtitle C—Navy and Marine Corps (§§ 5001—7913)
  - Subtitle D—Air Force (§§ 8010—9842)
  - Subtitle E—Reserve Components (§§ 10001—18506)
- **TITLE 14—COAST GUARD**
  - PART I—REGULAR COAST GUARD (§§ 1—693)
  - PART II—COAST GUARD RESERVE AND AUXILIARY (§§ 701—894)
- **TITLE 32—NATIONAL GUARD**
  - CHAPTER 1—ORGANIZATION (§§ 101—115)
  - CHAPTER 3—PERSONNEL (§§ 301—335)
  - CHAPTER 5—TRAINING (§§ 501—509)
  - CHAPTER 7—SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT (§§ 701—717)
  - CHAPTER 9—HOMELAND DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (§§ 901—908)
- **TITLE 37—PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES**
  - CHAPTER 1—DEFINITIONS (§ 101)
  - CHAPTER 3—BASIC PAY (§§ 201—212)
  - CHAPTER 5—SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAYS (§§ 301—374)
  - CHAPTER 7—ALLOWANCES (§§ 401—438)
  - CHAPTER 9—LEAVE (§§ 501—504)
  - CHAPTER 10—PAYMENTS TO MISSING PERSONS (§§ 551—559)
  - CHAPTER 11—PAYMENTS TO MENTALLY INCOMPETENT PERSONS (§§ 601—604)
  - CHAPTER 13—ALLOTMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF PAY (§§ 701—707)
  - CHAPTER 15—PROHIBITIONS AND PENALTIES (§§ 801—805)
  - CHAPTER 17—MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND BENEFITS (§§ 901—910)
  - CHAPTER 19—ADMINISTRATION (§§ 1001—1015)
- **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)**
- **Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)**
- **Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)**
- **Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986**
- **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)**
- **Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR)**

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The workshop participants were mindful of the existing laws that govern the use of armed forces (Title 10), the coast guard (Title 14), and the National Guard (Title 32). These laws can potentially be an impediment to gaining access to the Reserves and the Guard under some circumstances; these laws were addressed (as time permitted) as part of the working group deliberations on missions/ tasks suitable for the Reserve Component. In addition there are other laws that address pay and allowances of the uniformed services (Title 37) and other pieces of legislation (shown in the chart) that relate to employment/ reemployment rights, personnel management, and other topics of interest to Active and Reserve Component members. These laws will be revisited during subsequent workshops to determine whether changes are needed to address general conditions and standards issues, or whether changes are needed for incorporating specific options for rebalancing the mix of Active and Reserve Components (that are needed to meet COCOM and other demands).

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**OBJ 2-4 Workshop 17-19 Aug 10**

Objectives

Requirements

EXCOM Key

Army War

OBJs 1-4 U

**OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10**

Interim Report Submission; 31 Aug 10

OBJ 5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 21-22 Sep 10

OBJ 5 Outbrief to EXCOM; o/a 30 Sep 10

OBJ 6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10

OBJ 6 Outbrief to EXCOM; o/a 4 Nov 10

- Further Refine and Prioritize RC Tasks and Missions
- Flesh out Conditions and Standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop

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This slide shows the steps in the study that have already been accomplished. It also highlights the objectives of the 17-19 August workshop that will be held to further address Objectives 2-4. That workshop is intended to refine and prioritize the Reserve Component tasks/missions, flesh out conditions and standards, begin identification of Active and Reserve Component mixes that provide cost-effective approaches to meeting COCOM/other demands (subject of a future Objective 5 workshop), and also begin identification of potential law, policy and doctrinal changes (subject of a future Objective 6 workshop). At the moment we are on track to finish the workshop series and to provide a final outbrief to the Executive Committee in November.

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**QDR Directed  
Comprehensive Review**

**Center for Strategic  
Leadership  
Army War College  
Mr. Robert Smiley**

**21 July 2010**

A/O 9-Nov-10 08:01 UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 1

On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation represents the conference introduction to include a description of the study objectives, the terms of reference, and the guiding questions and principles that the participants would address in their deliberations. The participants were then divided into four working groups, one for each of the four categories listed above, in order to address the primary and secondary tasking.

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## Comprehensive Review Mission



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**Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component (RC) including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces leveraging future demand on use of the capabilities and capacities of the Reserve Component to determine roles, missions, and tasks for which they are well suited and the conditions and standards related to those missions and tasks.**

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## Comprehensive Review



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- **Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010**
  - **Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component (RC) including an examination of the balance between active and reserve**
- **DPPG approved by SecDef on 12 July 2010**
  - **USD(P&R), in coordination with USD(P), D, CAPE, CJCS, CNGB the Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, will present a report to the SecDef on the future role of the RC**
    - **Final report by 31 Jan 2011**
    - **Interim report by 1 Sep 2010 that identifies potential programmatic issues**

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## Terms of Reference

- **Charter\***
  - Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component (RC) including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces
- **Objectives**
  - Establish a common DoD Total Force baseline costing methodology and identify instances where such common baseline costing is not feasible
  - How to use RC capabilities and capacities to best advantage
  - Roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice
  - Conditions and standards that provide a trained and ready RC
  - Recommendations on AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals
  - Law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet demands and conditions

*\*Quadrennial Defense Review Report; Feb 2010*

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## Objectives 2-5

2. Leveraging Departmental plans for the future to best determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage during drill time, periods of Active Duty, and during mobilization
3. Determining those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice
4. Determining the conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve available for Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers. Areas of consideration include (but not limited to):
  - Force Generation Models
  - BOG : Dwell Ratios
  - Methods of Service
  - Continuum of Service
  - Employer Partnerships
  - Accessibility

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**Objectives 2-5 (Cont)**

**5. Proposing recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals**

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**Objectives 2-5 (Cont)**

- **RA lead: DASD; RTM**
- **Key Stakeholders:**
  - **Offices of Under Secretaries of Defense**
  - **Service Secretary representatives**
  - **Representatives of Service Chiefs**
  - **Office of the CJCS**
  - **Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau**
  - **COCOM representatives**
  - **Reps for Directors of CAPE and Net Assessment**
- **Method:**
  - **Strategic context for this review will be provided by:**
    - **QDR; JOE; Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; DPPG; GEF**
  - **Focus on ramifications for the Total Force**
    - **Leverage GFMP; Operational Availability 10; Force Sufficiency GOSC, etc**

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## Conference Mission

**At the planner level, leverage departmental plans for the future to best determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage during drill time, periods of Active Duty, and during mobilization.**

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
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## Governance for Comprehensive Review

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graph TD; CS[Co-Sponsors: VCJCS and ASD RA] <--> CC[Co-Chairs  
OASD RA: Mr. McGinnis  
Joint Staff: Lt Gen Spencer]; CS <--> RS[Review Secretariat:  
OASD RA Strategic Initiatives Group]; CS <--> ES[External Support:  
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab]; CC <--> RS; CC <--> ES; CC <--> EXCOM[EXCOM GO/FO/SES participants from:  
Services, Joint Staff, OUSDs, NGB, OGC, CAPE, COCOMs, Net Assessment, RFPB]; EXCOM <--> PL[Planner level Issue Teams per EXCOM direction]; PL --> IT1[Issue Team OBJ 1  
DOD Baseline Costing Methodology  
RA Lead: Mr. Hastings  
Key Stakeholders: CAPE, Joint Staff, Comptroller, & Services]; PL --> IT2[Issue Team OBJs 2-5  
Requirement Identification & Analysis  
RA Lead: Mr. Smiley  
All Stakeholders]; PL --> IT3[Issue Team OBJs 6  
Law, Policy & Doctrinal Adjustments  
RA Lead: Ms. Boyda  
All Stakeholders];
```

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ANNEX B  
Pre-decisional Working Papers



- UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT
- ## Guiding Questions/Principles
- Is the Nation's security improved by using the RC on a rotational basis?
  - Does this improvement come, in part, from the connectivity to the American people inherent in RC service?
  - Is the country's defense posture improved by having access to a larger body of ready and capable forces (i.e., the AC and the RC)?
  - Does the initiative(s) result in Departmental cost savings?
  - Does the initiative(s) reduce stress on the AC?
  - Does the initiative(s) preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?
- UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 11

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## Guiding Questions/Principles



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- **Develop the Department’s business case/overarching framework for utilization of the RC in support of the National Security Strategy.**
- **Determine if current RC policy and guidance is adequate in support of the Department’s business case and associated employment considerations.**
- **Develop methodology to better manage involuntary mobilizations to meet requirements.**
- **Assess the cost/benefit of continued access to and use of the RC in an operational role.**

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## Criteria for Assigning Missions to the RC in Contemporary Strategic Environment



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- **Predictability**
  - “...degree to which requirements are/can be anticipated”
  - The more predictable the mission, the more suited for RC
- **Availability**
  - “...amount of time needed to prepare for requirements”
  - Easier to prepare for static vice dynamic requirements
- **Tempo**
  - “...frequency and duration of a mission”
  - Many steady state demands could be fulfilled by rotational RC units
- **Timing**
  - “...when forces are needed in the area of operation”
  - RC can significantly contribute to persistent mission requirements
- **Civil-Military Advantage: an RC Strength**
  - Inherent civilian skills
  - Familiarity with civilian perspectives and relationships
  - Ability to foster and sustain long-term partnerships

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## Trends Influencing The World's Future Security

Source: October 2009 JOE



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- **Demographics** – Populations growth/decline, age disparities, migration
- **Globalization** – Rising powers, interconnections, and inequities
- **Economics** – Trade imbalances, rising expectations vs failing economies
- **Energy** – Resource competition, future energy demands, shortages
- **Food** – Demand, production, transportation, shortages
- **Water** – Competition among states, pollution, land use issues
- **Climate Change and National Disasters** – Sea level rise, growing coastal populations, storms, environmental regulation
- **Technology** – Exponential growth, ubiquity, nanotechnology, lower cost of entry
- **Cyber** – Exponential growth, both an advantage and a vulnerability
- **Space** – More will have access, defense of US space assets

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## Opportunities in this Strategic Environment



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<i><b>Campaign (Steady State)</b></i>	<i><b>Contingency (Surge)</b></i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Predictable and recurring requirements</li> <li>• Provides adequate time for planning and preparations</li> <li>• Synonymous with engagement, shaping activities, Phase 0 tasks, campaign plans, security cooperation, building partner capacity and institutional support</li> <li>• Potential to primarily source with RC units and personnel in operational role</li> <li>• Demand signal not complete as Global Force Management concentrates on OCO requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unanticipated or relatively unforeseen contingencies</li> <li>• Limited initial response time</li> <li>• Potential to primarily source with AC and specific capabilities in strategic reserve</li> <li>• Surge responsibilities can transition to include continually greater contributions from RC in operational role over time</li> <li>• Additionally, expect Phases IV and V to be lengthy with requirements that become increasingly more predictable over time</li> </ul>

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## AO Developed Options (RC 2020)



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- **Status Quo (Post 9-11) (Today's Operations)**
- **Status Quo (Pre 9-11) (1980's)**
- **Geographic and Functional Commands**
- **Domestic Based**
- **Stay at Home**
- **Specialization Model**
- **Corporate Model**
- **Everybody is a Reservist**
- **Federal Reserves**

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## Conference Framework



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ASD/RA Category	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Definition</u>				
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 and 3				
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<u>Law, Policy, and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				

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 <h2 style="margin: 0;">Individual Augmentation</h2> 	
<p><b><u>Definition</u></b></p>	<p>Situation wherein the organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources and requires additional personnel augmentation. Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, are required to perform duty to support mission requirements. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.</p>
<p><b><u>Missions / Tasks</u></b></p>	
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 <h2 style="margin: 0;">Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</h2> 	
<p><b><u>Definition</u></b></p>	<p>Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. Normally assigned or designated for a mission when in the available window to fulfill their Service's requirements, possibly for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or at home for Homeland Defense (HLD) or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).</p>
<p><b><u>Missions / Tasks</u></b></p>	
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<b>Military Engagement Teams</b>	
<b><u>Definition</u></b>	Umbrella concept to describe relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.
<b><u>Missions / Tasks</u></b>	
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<b>Institutional Support (Generating Force)</b>	
<b><u>Definition</u></b>	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.
<b><u>Missions / Tasks</u></b>	
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## Proposed Definitions

- **Individual Augmentee**: Situation wherein the organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources and requires additional personnel augmentation. Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, are required to perform duty to support mission requirements. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
- **Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)**: Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in various states of readiness, from reset or maintenance through training and deployment. Normally assigned or designated for a mission when in the available window which could be deployed for Overseas Contingency Operations or at home in Homeland Defense (HLD) or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Possible AO developed options: Geographic and Functional Commands, Status Quo (Post 9/11), Specialization Model, Corporate Model.

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



## Proposed Definitions



- **Military Engagement Teams**: Umbrella concept to describe relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Can include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs. Possible AO developed options: Geographic and Functional Commands, Status Quo (Post 9/11), Federal Reserve.
- **Institutional Support (Generating Force)**: Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, as they move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility to man, train, and equip forces. Possible AO developed options: Status Quo (Pre 9/11), Federal Reserve, Domestic Based, Stay at Home.

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## Tentative Agenda for July

- Wednesday, 21 July 2010
  - 0800-0900: Check-in/Registration
  - 0900-0910: Welcome and Admin (Mr. Tussing)
  - 0910-0950: Conference Overview/Background (Mr. Smiley)
  - 0950-1030: Canadian Army Reserve Info Brief (Col Patrick Kelly)
  - 1030-1045: Break
  - 1045-1215: Requirements/Demand Briefs (CJCS J3, OSD Policy, CJCS J8)
  - 1215-1315: Lunch
  - 1315-1330: Military Engagement Team Workgroup Brief (COL Price)
  - 1330-1345: Individual Augmentee Workgroup Brief (Mr. Stratton)
  - 1345-1400: Rotational Forces Workgroup Brief (COL Sheridan)
  - 1400-1415: Institutional Forces Workgroup Brief (Col Castaldi)
  - 1415-1430: Admin (additional instructions) (TBD)
  - 1430-1700: Workgroup Session (Breaks as Required)
  - 1700-1730: Free Time
  - 1730-1930: Social at Golf Club

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## Tentative Agenda for July

- Thursday, 22 July 2010
  - 0800-1200: Workgroup Sessions (breaks as required)
  - 1200-1300: Lunch
  - 1300-1330: IA Workgroup Presentation & Facilitated Discussion
  - 1330-1400: MET Workgroup Presentation & Facilitated Discussion
  - 1400-1415: Break
  - 1415-1445: Rotation Force Workgroup Presentation & Facilitated Discussion
  - 1445-1515: Institutional Workgroup Presentation & Facilitated Discussion
  - 1515-1600: Conference Wrap-up
  
- Out-Brief Senior Leadership (TBD)

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## Reserve Component Studies



Task	Lead	Tasked By	Due Date	Purpose
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR)	CNGR	US Congress	Ongoing - no due date stipulated	Charged by Congress to recommend any needed changes in law and policy to ensure that the Guard and Reserves were organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements.
SecDef Memo to MilDepts - Crisis Response ("RC Business Rules")	OSD-RA	SD via ASD/RA	Ongoing; no due date stipulated	Promulgate SD guidance for RC mobilizations for crisis response
Codifying an Operational Reserve	OASD (M&RA)	VCSA	Completed 29 Mar 10	Identify major policy, statutory and programming implications for transforming the Army's Reserve Components into an operational force.

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## Reserve Component Studies



CSA Study on Operationalizing the RC	DA G3/5/7	CSA	1-Jul-10	Conduct historical analysis on why we have the current AC/RC force mix. Ascertain the principles on which the current AC/RC force is established, develop changes required to meet the demands of an era of persistent conflict. Present initial findings to GO mentors for their consideration and recommendations. Present the final set of AC/RC force-mix principles to the CSA.
Operationalizing the RC Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF)	JFCOM J8	VCJCS	25-Aug-10	Gain COCOM consensus on enduring Reserve Component (RC) attributes required to enhance Global Force Management and improve access to the Reserve Components. Identify, validate and prioritize required attributes with ascribed definitions.
Assured Access the Reserve Components	JCS J33	CJCS	2-Jun-10	Identify statutes and policies to assure access to the Reserve Components over the next 60 months in order to meet current and projected global requirements.

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 <h2 style="margin: 0;">Reserve Component Studies</h2> 				
Strategic verse Operational Reserve Study	JCS J8	VDJ8	1-Sep-10	Study requirements for strategic and operational forces and form a DoD perspective, frame potential approaches to best leverage the totality of US military capacity and meet operational requirements with effective expenditure of critical resources.
Rebalancing the Force: Analysis of Army Active and Reserve Component Capabilities	OSD CAPE	DepSecDef	1 Oct 10 (T)	Identify and analyze critical factors and metrics for improving the allocation of capabilities to active and reserve forces of the US military, with specific focus on the Army. The goal is to provide the SecDef and CAPE a broad framework for assigning roles, functions, and resources to active and reserve components.
Proposal for CJCS to sign "so that the RC doesn't snap back to its pre 9/11 condition"	NGRM	CJCS	15-Jun-10	Provide the CJCS the rationale that their future use of the RC should take maximum advantage of the nation's war dividend in capability and RC readiness so that they do not snap back to a "pre-9/11" condition.
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 <h2 style="margin: 0;">Reserve Component Studies</h2> 				
Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the RC	OSD-RA	Directed by 2010 QDR; VCJCS & ASD-RA Sponsored	1-May-11	Review objectives include: 1) Establishing common DoD Total Force baseline costing methodology; 2) Determine how to use Guard and Reserve to best advantage; 3) Determine roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice; 4) Determining the conditions and standards that provide for a trained and ready RC; 5) Proposing recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on GEF; 6) Proposing needed law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands/conditions described in OBJs 2-5.
Reserve Component in 2020	OSD-RA	Directed by 2010 QDR; VCJCS & ASD-RA Sponsored	1-May-11	Determine and define the future roles and missions for the RC and determine the "ways and means" to get there; Understand the joint operating environment in 2020 and develop several broad visions of the RC in 2020, with emphasis on how to position the RC in terms of roles and missions to best support the total force and achieve national security objectives.
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## Reserve Component Studies



Joint Force After Next	JCS J7	CJCS	Ongoing; initial review late Jun 11	<p>The JFAN OPT will inform the CJCS's vision and provide a framework to guide the evolution of the future Joint Force circa 2025 and beyond. This focus will be informed by planned and projected programs and events anticipated to occur over the intervening years (2015 to 2025) as the US resolves its major commitments to conflict and postures to meet current, anticipated and unforeseen missions and challenges.</p>
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
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
## Contemporary Security Posture



**Pre 9/11; 2 Major Combat Ops**



**Current Environment**



Source: Integrated Security Posture Defense Planning Scenario; April 2008

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## Leveraging Products

- Operational Availability 2010 (OA-10)
- OASD/RA Criteria Paper
- Joint Operating Environment (JOE)
- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)
- Defense Program Planning Guidance (DPPG)
- Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)
- Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (QDR)
- DoDD 1200.17
- DoDD 1200.17 White Paper
- Guidance for the Development of the Force 2009 (GDF)
- Comprehensive Review Terms of Reference (TOR)
- JOE RC Futures Seminar
- CNGR Executive Summary
- Force Sufficiency GOSC Results 2010
- Multiple ongoing studies by DoD and other agencies

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## Conference Participants

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Office of the Secretary of the Army</li><li>• Office of the Secretary of the Navy</li><li>• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force</li><li>• Under Secretary for Policy</li><li>• Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness</li><li>• Under Secretary Comptroller</li><li>• OSD General Council</li><li>• Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics</li><li>• Under Secretary for Intelligence</li><li>• Director, Capability Assessment &amp; Program Evaluation</li><li>• Director, Net Assessment</li><li>• Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</li><li>• Office of the Chief of Staff, Army</li><li>• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</li><li>• Office of the Chief of Staff, Air Force</li><li>• Office of the Commandant, Marine Corps</li><li>• Reserve Forces Policy Board</li><li>• U.S. Coast Guard</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• USCENTCOM</li><li>• USEUCOM</li><li>• USPACOM</li><li>• USSOUTHCOM</li><li>• USAFRICOM</li><li>• USNORTHCOM</li><li>• USJFCOM</li><li>• USSOCOM</li><li>• USTRANSCOM</li><li>• USSTRATCOM</li><li>• Joint Chiefs of Staff J8</li><li>• Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab</li><li>• Office of the Chief, Army Reserve</li><li>• Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau</li><li>• Office of the Director, Army National Guard</li><li>• Office of the Chief, Navy Reserve</li><li>• Office of the Director, Coast Guard Reserve</li><li>• Office of the Chief, Air Force Reserve</li><li>• Office of the Director, Air National Guard</li></ul>
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***Rotating Operational Forces  
(Home and Abroad)***

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On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation served as a catalyst for discussion for the Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad) Working Group. They noted that the definition for rotating forces implied that RC units would fit into the services' generation model. Still, it was recognized due to the nature of RC service, that some adjustments may be required to make this work. For example, not all missions may be appropriate for RC elements, even when given a robust training cycle.

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 **Rotating Operational Forces (Definition)** 

Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. Normally assigned or designated for a mission when in the available window to fulfill their Service's requirements, possibly for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or at home for Homeland Defense (HLD) or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).

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 **Strategic Context** 

**Quadrennial Defense Review (Feb 2010) Defense Strategic Priority Objectives**

- Prevail in today's wars
- Prevent and Deter Conflict
- Prepare and defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies
- Preserve and Enhance the all volunteer force

**JFCOM Joint Operating Environment (2010)**

- Era of persistent conflict
- Economic outlook and fiscal constraints
- Enemies seek to employ WMD against the US
- Increased reliance within interagency on DoD for HA/DR

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## Where can the RC Units plug in on a rotational basis?

**1 Requirements Integration and Sourcing**  
1. Annual Army Global Conventional Forces Sourcing Conference identifies units to source Joint and Army rotational force requirements  
2. Emergent requirements sourced in monthly batch cycle or quicker if necessary

**2 Training Support and Resourcing**  
Monthly VTC / Quarterly Training Support and Resourcing Conferences (TSRC) to adjust unit resourcing plans

**3 RESET Support and Resourcing**  
Monthly VTC / Quarterly RESET Support and Resourcing Conferences (RSRC) to develop and synchronize unit resourcing plans

**4 Guiding**  
Quarterly ARFORGEN Synchronization Board (ASB) resolves issues and approves outputs

**ARFORGEN Synchronizes**  
MAN System, TRAIN System, MOBILIZE System, ORGANIZE System, EQUIP System, DEPLOY System, SUSTAIN System

**Attributes:** Continuous, Flexible, Agile, Collaborative

**1a Sourcing Approval:**  
-SECDEF via Global Force Mgmt Bd (GFMB)  
-HCDR via ARFORGEN Synch Order (ASO)

Army synchronizes its organizing, manning, equipping, training, modernization, mobilization and deployment, and sustainment systems through ARFORGEN, exercising oversight of the process through myriad synchronization fora.

**Nation's acceptance to establish a different Reserve Component**

**Political will, Access authorities, Operational constraints, Service Bias, Training strategies, Resources, others**

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**Problem Statement:** Because the RCs comprise such a large percentage of overall forces, the US can not meet worldwide force requirements by implementing force generation models for active component units alone.

In order for ARFORGEN to work for the RCs, the services require both institutional and operational changes, not only within DA but also at the DoD level.

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## To Determine Proposed Missions

**It may be easier to ask:**

- "What can't the Nation depend on Reserve Component (RC) units to do?"
  - These should be executed by Active component (AC)
  - Is RC accomplishment of those other missions feasible and supportable?
- How much depth do you need in the AC?
- Can you achieve appropriate level of mission readiness in RC units
- Can you recruit to fill required units in the RC? Propensity to serve / ability to become trained given length of individual and collective training length.
- Are RC end strengths and structure appropriate for Rotational and Operational forces?

**Does the initiative(s) result in cost savings for the Department?**

**Does the initiative(s) reduce stress on the Active Component?**

**Does the initiative(s) preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within the RC over the past decade?**

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**Workgroup Process**

Forget today's paradigms  
See things through the prism of a future RC which may not look like the one we have today.

- All opinions are valid
- Recommendations must meet the needs of the Nation's National Command Authority
- Don't assume away because of today's operational environment
- Identify benefits
- Identify constraints
- Identify constraint resolution
- Represent your service without proselytizing

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At the end of the two days, the group should be able to identify what types of missions are well suited for RC units populated by persons who are wanted in the RC that remain Guard and Reservists.

**ARFORGEN Force Pools**

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graph LR; Reset[Reset] --> TrainReady[Train/Ready]; TrainReady --> Available[Available]; Available --> ME[Mission Execution]; ME --> Return[Return from deployed mission to Reset]; Return --> Reset;
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**Reset**

- Reintegrate Soldiers/Family
- Manning units
- New equipment fielded
- Individual and Institutional training
- Collective training by exception

**Train/Ready**

- Continued fill of unit manning
- Continued fielding of unit equipment
- Collective training
- Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)

**Available**

Units prepared to deploy or deployed to meet combatant commanders' and service requirements

- Should the Reserve Component be recast?
- How does the US capitalize on the “war dividend” of 20 years of investment and operational Capability?

**Questions?**

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***Rotating Operational Forces  
(Home and Abroad)***

A/O 9-Nov-10 10:00 UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 1

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Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation represents the outbrief presented by the Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad) Working Group. They noted RC missions for Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction, as well as a myriad of roles for Defense Security Cooperation and Homeland Defense. This group surmised that among the conditions and standards, political will and national will would be thrown into the mix with the traditional reserve paradigm, the RC's readiness levels, and its end strength and resourcing. An important law/policy change that they noted, which was replicated by other groups, is the notion that the DoD should be able to call RC members to service for missions other than named contingency operations.

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## Options Aligned with CCJO Mission Sets



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<p><b>Combat</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Full spectrum Sustainment/ Follow on forces</li><li>•Increase RC presence in Combat Air Forces<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪Consider AC Associates</li></ul></li><li>•Cyber</li><li>•Nuclear C2</li><li>•Space C2</li><li>•Strategic Intel/ Targetteering</li><li>•Theater specific C2</li><li>•National C2</li><li>•ISR</li><li>•Civil Affairs</li></ul>	<p><b>Engagement</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Geographically aligned units</li><li>•1:4/ 1:5 Deployments (based on service rotation goal)</li><li>•TSC</li><li>•ULB (non-OCO)</li><li>•Allied exercises</li><li>•Security Force assistance</li><li>•Partnership Programs</li><li>•Civil Affairs</li></ul>
<p><b>Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•ATFP</li><li>•FID &amp; IW</li><li>•Stability Ops</li><li>•Cyber</li><li>•Civil Affairs</li></ul>	<p><b>Relief and Reconstruction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Haiti/ HA/DR in the Western Hemisphere<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•Support SECDEFs guidance for access to RC during crisis situations</li></ul></li><li>•Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction</li><li>•MEDRET</li><li>•Civil Affairs</li></ul>

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## DSCA and Homeland Defense



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- Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear
- Incidence Awareness and Assessment
- Critical Infrastructure Protection/ Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Disaster Response
  - Natural (no Title 10)
  - Manmade
- Land Defense
- Enhanced Protective Posture
- Missile Defense
- National Special Security Event
- Counter-drug
- Air Defense/ Air Sovereignty
- Tactical Airlift
- Contingency Response Group (Open the Airbase)

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## Conference Framework

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Conditions and Standards:

- Fast, Good or Cheap
- Traditional Reserve paradigm
- IAW Service Force Generation goals
- National Will
- Political Will
- Resource = readiness
- Endstrength caps
- Appropriate RC funding to the base budget
- Service bias

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## Conference Framework

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Organizations and Adjustments:

- Dedicated support versus ad hoc
- Increase reverse associated units (AF)
- Balance based off of assigned mission requirements
- Creation of specialized units

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## Conference Framework


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Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required:

- Mobilization authority for non-OCO
- Mobilization authority for Title 10 RC for domestic natural disasters
- SECDEF guidance to allow access to RC during crisis situations
- Expand the Patch Chart to include domestic operations

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On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation represents the brief presented to the Military Engagement Team (MET) Working Group as a catalyst for their discussions. It stipulates the need to develop a sustainable force to perform engagement missions as exemplified by the Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. To do so, it suggests that a plan must be developed to evolve from the original ad-hoc construct to a capability that is consistent and enduring. The brief also notes that members of the RC represent a valuable asset to these missions because of the connections that RC members have with academia, non-governmental organizations, and private enterprise.

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## Challenge

**Limited current capability to meet Joint Force Commanders' persistent requirements for engagement forces with a range of military and non-military skills, local knowledge, and relationships sustained over time**

**“...put the best folks we can in and build a bench and then keep them engaged in it, even when they are back in the United States...and then rotate them back out there.”**

- GEN Petraeus; Center for New American Security; 11 June 2009

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## Proposal

- Replace ad hoc capabilities for engagement activities with sustainable, long-term RC forces**
- Develop a proof of concept for security, engagement, relief and reconstruction activities that ensures mission continuity**

**“We need to develop new capabilities and change the capabilities of existing ones....We need to envision and create new organizations.”**

- ADM Mullen; Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; Jan 2009

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 **Benefits for Joint Force Commanders** 

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- **Provides Joint Warfighter improved mission continuity, a significantly positive force multiplier**
- **Increases effectiveness in theater as RC specialists achieve situational awareness on particular regions both on the ground and through reachback**
- **Permits focused training on regions during dwell, such as culture and language**
- **Supports a learning environment where tactics, techniques, and procedures can be adapted in near real time based upon experiences in theater**

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 **Benefits for Joint Force Commanders (Cont)** 

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- **Success in era of persistent conflict is based on level of legitimacy local governments have with citizens. RC can draw on both military and civilian skill sets**
- **Facilitates establishment of long-term relationships with interagency partners and advances Whole of Government (WOG) solutions**

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## Uses the RC to Best Advantage



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- Security cooperation requirements are becoming more **predictable, enduring, and recurring**, which makes them well suited for **periodic participation** of RC formations within today's **rotational force generation models**
- Can leverage RC's **community basis** strength for reachback: partnering with academia, NGOs, and private sector entities for greater effectiveness
- Shortens predeployment training time and provides competent trainer pool of recently-returned RC members

**Uses Guard and Reserve as the force of first choice for requirements for which they are well suited -- increasing Total Force capacity**

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## Opportunities in this Strategic Environment





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

<i><b>Campaign (Steady State)</b></i>	<i><b>Contingency (Surge)</b></i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Predictable and recurring requirements</li><li>• Provides adequate time for planning and preparations</li><li>• Synonymous with engagement, shaping activities, Phase 0 tasks, campaign plans, security cooperation, building partner capacity and institutional support</li><li>• Potential to primarily source with RC units and personnel in operational role</li><li>• Demand signal not complete as Global Force Management concentrates on OCO requirements</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unanticipated or relatively unforeseen contingencies</li><li>• Limited initial response time</li><li>• Potential to primarily source with AC and specific capabilities in strategic reserve</li><li>• Surge responsibilities can transition to include continually greater contributions from RC in operational role over time</li><li>• Additionally, expect Phases IV and V to be lengthy with requirements that become increasingly more predictable over time</li></ul>

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## Defense Planning and Programming Guidance

- **DPPG approved by SecDef on 12 July 2010**
- **SECARMY, in conjunction with USD (P&R) and the Chief, National Guard Bureau by FY 13 develop and implement pilot programs to establish 2 RC METs from the National Guard and 1 from the Army Reserve**
- **SECNAV, in conjunction with USD (P&R) by FY 13 develop and implement a pilot program to establish 1 RC MET from the Navy Reserve**

**RC delivers focused and experienced capabilities to Joint Force Commanders that ensure continuity and adaptability**

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On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

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This presentation represents the outbrief presented by the Military Engagement Team (MET) Working Group. They identified several mission areas that are suitable for the RC, but in particular noted RC employment for Civil Affairs, Stability Operations, and Defense Security Cooperation.

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**Directed Comprehensive Review**



**Individual**  
**Small units**  
**Conventional Units**  
**Ad Hoc or Designed**

**Engagement:**  
Military-to-Military  
Civil-Military-Interagency  
Civil-Military-International

**Forces or Capabilities iso**  
**Combatant Commands**

**Reservists:**  
**Public or**  
**Private Sourcing?**

**Engagement**  
**leads to Engagement:**  
**Theirs and Ours.**

**Operator**  
**Generator**  
**Engager**

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Civil Affairs	Professionalization of the Military	Conventional Military Operations	Intelligence
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Agri-Business</li> <li>•NG State Program</li> <li>•Population Resource Control</li> <li>•Civil Administration</li> <li>•Communications</li> <li>•Mortuary Affairs</li> <li>•Vulnerability Assessment</li> <li>•Interagency Coordination</li> <li>•Command and Control</li> <li>•Social Science Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•PME</li> <li>•Tactical</li> <li>•Operational</li> <li>•Strategic</li> <li>•Ethical</li> <li>•Other Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Organize, Train and Equip</li> <li>•Air Traffic Control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Area Assessments</li> <li>•HUMINT</li> <li>•ISR</li> <li>•Interagency Coordination</li> <li>•Meteorological Support</li> </ul>

Foreign

PLANNING

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<b>2010 RC SYMPOSIUM QDR</b> U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Directed Comprehensive Review			
Health Affairs	Maritime Security	Engineering	Logistics
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Interagency Coordination</li> <li>•Medical Screening</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Port Security</li> <li>•Port Opening</li> <li>•VBSS</li> <li>•Counter-Piracy</li> <li>•SAR</li> <li>•Medical Screening</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Interagency Coordination</li> <li>•Public Works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Interagency Coordination</li> </ul>
Security	Stability Operations	Information Operations	Aerospace and Missile Defense
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Security Sector Reform</li> <li>•Defense Sector Reform                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Institutional</li> <li>•Military Capabilities</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Economic Development</li> <li>•Infrastructure Development</li> <li>•HADR</li> <li>•Governance</li> <li>•Border Security</li> <li>•JRSOI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•PSYOPS</li> <li>•Military Information Support</li> <li>•Public Affairs</li> <li>•Strategic Communication</li> <li>•Cyber Defense</li> </ul>	

<b>2010 RC SYMPOSIUM QDR</b> U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Directed Comprehensive Review	
Homeland Defense & Security	DSCA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Border Security                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•ISR</li> <li>•Detection and Monitoring</li> </ul> </li> <li>•Aerospace and Missile Defense</li> <li>•ATC</li> <li>•Migrant Operations</li> <li>•JRSOI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Emergency Response to Disasters</li> <li>•Counter Drug</li> <li>•Information Awareness and Assessment</li> <li>•Illicit Trafficking</li> <li>•Detection and Monitoring</li> <li>•Migrant Operations</li> <li>•SAR Planning</li> <li>•JRSOI</li> <li>•Transportation Security</li> <li>•Temporary Communications Systems</li> <li>•Mortuary Affairs</li> </ul>

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Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee (IA), Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation represents the outbrief presented by the Individual Augmentee Working Group, which first looked to the definition of Individual Augmentee, revising it slightly to include civilians. In reviewing the missions that IAs can perform, the working group also noted that the current model of identifying and bringing IAs to the fight is too slow. Like the other groups, they identified missions that are suitable for IAs with emphasis on some non-traditional roles for RC members such fields of endeavor as Acquisition and Culture, UAV mission sets, Agriculture, Environmental, and Energy. In looking to law and policy, perhaps this group's most salient point is that DoD should be able to call RC members to active duty for missions other than those identified by a named contingency operation.



## Themes:

- **Accessibility**
- **Requirements**
- **Resources**
- **Oversight**
- **Unpredictability**



## Definition

**Situation wherein the standing or temporary organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources and requires additional personnel augmentation. Active or Reserve Component and civilians, with appropriate capabilities, with or without unit affiliation, are required to perform duty to support mission requirements. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.**



## Missions and Tasks

(best advantage and well suited)

- Current “enterprise” model is slow and cumbersome:
  - Up to one year to validate IA requirements.
  - Requirements are dynamic and will remain so in the future.
  - Funding is complex and disjointed.
  
- Implement new business model to capture and source:  
combatant commander and service requirements
  - Require changes to Title 10, 14, 32, 37 and Joint Federal Travel Regulations.
  - CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and TRANSCOM are experimenting with new programmatic and manpower policies to have continued access to RC manpower.
  - Requirements and skills – requires continuous updating.



## Missions and Tasks (For example:)

- |                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| • <i>Cyber</i>                   | • Medical   |
| • Linguists                      | • Legal   |
| • Planners & Strategists         | • Intel   |
| • Specific Logistics             | • IT/C4I  |
| • Finance                        | • Logisticians  |
| • <b>Acquisition/Contracting</b> | • Force Protection                                      |
| • <b>UAV – RPA</b>               | • Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation) |
| • Scientists                     | • Civil Affairs   |
| • Regional Experts               | • Engineers (combat & civil)                            |
| • Human Resources                | • Public Affairs  |
| • <b>Environmental</b>           | • Operations / AOs                                      |
| • <b>Agriculture</b>             | • Training  |
| • <b>Energy</b>                  | • Aviation Support                                      |
| • PSYOPS                         | • Specific Combat Arms                                  |
| • CBRNE Response                 |   |

*Need an enterprise wide data base*



## Condition and Standards

(trained and ready)

- **Better management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)**
  - Habitual relationships
  - Identification of an available “pool”
  - IRR muster and continuum of service
- **Drilling reservists (i.e., units) participate w/o degrading unit readiness**
- **Reservists serve using their civilian skills – commensurate compensation**
- **Exercises, engagement and joint education**
- **Skills mix to match anticipated mission sets:**
  - **Combat, Engagement, Security and Relief and Reconstruction**



## Organizational Adjustments

(COCOM demands and cost-benefit analysis)

- **Cultural change to Purple (CNGR 84 and Goldwater-Nichols)**
- **Include IA sourcing as part of the Global Force Management Board**
  - **Request for Forces (RFF) does not work**
  - **Need flexible sourcing solutions for first 120 days of operations**
- **Standing and temporary**
- **Cost – effort ongoing**



## Law, Policy, Doctrine Changes

- **Law:**
  - **Modify Title 10, 14, 32, 37 and Joint Federal Travel Regulations**
    - *For example:* **Modify law to allow for mobilization outside of contingency operations (to support national security objectives)**
  - **Modify USERRA to include job protection for “civilian” IA volunteers**
  - **Funding**
  - **Incentivize employers**



## Law, Policy, Doctrine Changes

- **Policy and Doctrine:**
  - **Revise current policy re: billet structure and sourcing**
    - *For example:* **Cold War CJCSI instructions**
    - **Joint manning policy and process doesn't address future needs, especially niche capabilities**
  - **Establish “joint” account - discretionary funding**
  - **Create a data warehouse**
    - **Joint military and civilian skills database**
    - **Database validation**
  - **Manpower policy that:**
    - **Allows member to serve in civilian skill set**
    - **Allows civilians to serve – uniform and non-uniform**
    - **Pay commensurate with skill set**
  - **Families**

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- No means to capture/update civilian/military skills and occupations
- No means to share skills across services and components
- Tracking and maintaining skill sets
- Need for “voluntary pool”
  - IRR
  - Efficient use of IRR
  - More than a pool for those who don’t want to serve
  - Quality of living changes between service and civilian life
- We don’t mobilize for civilian skills, but for military skills
- What to do with soldiers with “acquired” skills from service and deployment?
- Return on investment for IRR – habitual relationships
- Biggest use of IA: medical, MP, intel,
- Need for use of augments out of units
- Negative connotation associated with IRR
- Tiered reserve categories
- Better management and use of IRR

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- IAs aligned to a command
- Preference for structured unit (such as the Navy uses for IMA)
- Unique skill sets
- Better IMA management needed
- Jointness... remove the service?
  - Problems exist within the sourcing process
- Don’t confuse discretionary need with IA or mob
- How to do we get the people and skills we need?
- JMD IA vs. specialized individual augment
- Validated need
- JFTR (Joint Federal Travel Regulation)
- Suitable mission sets are in the eye of the customer
- Future is cyber-centric. Begin building force now

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<b>2010 RC SYMPOSIUM QDR</b> <small>U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE</small> <b>Directed Comprehensive Review</b>	
<b>ASD/RA Category</b>	<b>Individual Augmentee</b>
<b><u>Definition</u></b>	Situation wherein the <b>standing or temporary</b> organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources and requires additional personnel augmentation. Active or Reserve Component <b>members and civilians, with appropriate capabilities</b> , with or without unit affiliation, are required to perform duty to support mission requirements. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
<b><u>Missions / Tasks (2 and 3)</u></b>	
<b><u>Conditions and Standards (4)</u></b>	
<b><u>Organizational Adjustments</u></b>	
<b><u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u></b>	Streamline the number of legal authorities and simplify pay, benefits and entitlements. Change funding streams to include combatant commanders. Simplify the Joint Federal Travel Regulations.

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**INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT**

- **Breakout Moderator – Col Mike Castaldi (ANG)**  
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs)
  
- **Breakout Facilitator - Professor James Kievit (USA Ret)**  
(Army War College)

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On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

This presentation served as a catalyst for discussion for the Institutional Support Working Group. In particular, it notes the definition of Institutional Support according to Title 10 for each of the services which includes recruiting, organizing, and equipping.

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## The Challenge

- **Future projections indicate continued and increased stress on DoD resources and requirements**
- **Resources more likely to decrease**
- **Requirements more likely to increase**

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## Proposal

- **Consider the range of *Institutional* roles Reserve Component personnel can perform to help relieve stress**
- **Webster's defines *Institutional* as - An important custom, relationship or behavioral pattern in a culture or society. A lasting feature to public service.**
- ***Institutional* for the purposes of this conference – Responsibilities of Military Service Secretaries specified in USC Title 10, chapters 307 Army; 503 Navy; & 803 Air Force**

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## Responsibilities of Military Service Secretaries



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- Recruit
- Organize
- Supply
- Equip (includes R&D)
- Train
- Service
- Mobilize
- Demobilize
- Administer
- Maintain
- Construct, outfit, and repair military equipment

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## Conference Framework



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ASD/RA Category	Individual Augmentee	Rotating Operational Forces(Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Definitions</u>	Situation wherein the organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources and requires additional personnel augmentation. Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, are required to perform duty to support mission requirements. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.	Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. Normally assigned or designated for a mission when in the available window to fulfill their Service's requirements, possibly for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or at home for Homeland Defense (HLD) or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).	Umbrella concept to describe relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.
<u>Missions / Tasks</u>				
<u>Conditions and Standards</u>				
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u>				
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u>				

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**2010 RC SYMPOSIUM QDR**  
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
**Directed Comprehensive Review**

# Institution Support

**Main Focus-What roles/ missions/ tasks is the RC particularly well-suited to do as part of or in support of the “institutional” Title 10 responsibilities of the Service Secretaries?**

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This presentation is the outbrief from the Institutional Support Working Group. It emphasizes that the RC can perform roles other than Institutional Support, and the group should avoid suggesting the RC only fill niche capabilities that do not incorporate a force generation model. Additionally, it was suggested that for some an Institutional Support role may be less attractive than other types of RC service.



## Institution Support

### Concerns:

- Cannot assume that institutional support is the only function that reserve components are well suited to do.
- Increase in institutional support missions may detract from operational support and /or reduce attractiveness of RC service.
- Avoid being drawn into only delivering niche capabilities without incorporating a force rotation model.



## Institution Support

Questions ?

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**Institutional Support Matrix**

Categories	Missions		Remarks
		Why RC well Suited	
Training	Basic Training	Predictable, recurring, enduring mission that capitalizes on reserve competencies and allows for the maintenance of currency on a part time service.	
	Advanced Individual Training		
	Instructor Support		
	Instructor Training		
	Officer Professional Development Training		
	NCO Professional Development Training		
	ROTC Support		
	Small Arms Instructors		
	Reach Back Subject Matter Experts		
	Support Services to the Academies		
Recruiting	Recruiting	Hometown is best. Engages the community.	Part time recruits can work in the evening.
Logistic Support	Central Issue Facilities	Enduring mission.	Best done by civilians?
	Transportation Support	Enduring mission.	
	Depot Maintenance	Enduring mission.	
Services	Medical Services	Leverage resident expertise.	Great for community relations and leveraging skills.
	Health Services	Leverage resident expertise. Flows both ways.	
	Dental Services	Leverage resident expertise.	
	Legal Services	Leverage resident expertise.	

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**Institutional Support Matrix (continued)**

Categories	Missions	Why RC well Suited	Remarks
Admin	Pay/ Admin Services	Expertise of the broader experience which allows for more creative thinking.	
	Personnel Support Activities	Develop staff and integrates civilian skills into the process.	
	HQ Staff Augmentation	Develop staff and integrates civilian skills into the process.	
	Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains	Tap expertise and tied to community	
	Inspector General Complaints/ Fraud Investigations	Episodic requirement	
Readiness	MOB Center Operations	Episodic requirement	
	Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement & Integration	Episodic requirement	
Certifications	Training Evaluation	Cyclical requirement and captures experience.	
	Inspector General Inspection Teams	Cyclical requirement and captures experience.	
	Exercise Validation	Episodic requirement	
Public Affairs	Communication Support	Local presence.	

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**Institutional Support Matrix (continued)**

Categories	Missions	Why RC well Suited	Remarks
	Public Affairs	Located within the community for public outreach.	
State Partnerships	State Partnership Program	Outreach with various nation states. Provides corporate memory.	
	Multi-National Defense Support of Civil Authorities	Outreach with various nation states. Provides corporate memory.	
	Defense Support of Law Enforcement	Local familiarity and legal authority.	
Cyber	Network Security	Special skill sets within the communities.	
Security	Base Security	Necessary for backfill of AC forces and community outreach.	
	Firefighters	Necessary for backfill of AC forces and community outreach.	
Facilities	Engineering Construction	Necessary for backfill of AC forces and community outreach.	

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On July 21 and 22, 2010 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] hosted the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all of the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

Through this event, OASD RA sought input from all participants to determine the missions and tasks that the Reserve Component (RC) is well suited for in four categories: Individual Augmentee, Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad), Military Engagement Teams, and Institutional Support. A secondary task was to review each of these types of RC employment in terms of Conditions and Standards, Organizational Adjustments needed, and Law, Policy, and Doctrinal changes needed.

Colonel Patrick Kelley, Director of the Canadian Land Reserve Component shared this informational presentation, which described how Canada organizes and employs its reserve forces.



## Outline

- Organization of the CF
- CF Mission, Roles, and Priorities
- Reserve Mission(s)
- State of Play today
- The future for the Reserve



## *The Reserve – Delivering strategic effect well beyond its size*





## **BLUE**

- The CF Reserve delivers an effect well beyond its weight
- The National Defence Act supports an “Ask versus Task” employment model
- Recent conflicts have re-vitalized the Reserve and the public perception of its utility
- Real world fiscal realities are and will impact the Reserve – now is the time to consider how best to address future change




## **Canada First Defence Strategy**

- **Three Roles:**
  - Defending Canada
  - Defending North America
  - Contributing to International Peace and Security
- **Four Pillars:**
  - Personnel
  - Equipment
  - Readiness
  - Infrastructure
- **Six Core Missions:**
  - Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD
  - Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics
  - Respond to a major terrorist attack
  - Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster
  - Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period
  - Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods

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## Strategic Review

- A review of 100% of the Defence program in order to identify the bottom or lowest performing 5% for re-investment or re-allocation

Total \$18.8B

Invest \$

Capital

O & M

Personnel

Grants

Baseline 2010

**5 % Equals**

\$943M needs to be isolated and removed from our baseline and "parked" to be either...

**Re-invested** in other higher Dept / CF priority activities or initiatives (internal)

↗

?

**Re-allocated** to other Govt priorities activities or initiatives (external)

↘

TB decision will be based almost entirely on the scope / scale of the review we conduct and the storyline we tell



## Reserve Mission(s)

### Naval Reserve Mission

- Generate sailors to support and sustain CF operations

- **Air Reserve Mission**

- To provide a flexible, responsive and reliable contribution to Air Force capabilities where and when required

- **Army Mission (no specific Reserve Mission)**

- The Army will produce **combat-effective** and sustainable forces that deliver focused and integrated land effects across the full spectrum of operations. These forces will be strategically relevant to the Government of Canada, as well as **operational and adaptive**, to ensure full integration within a comprehensive joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) context...

- **Special Forces Mission**

- Will provide the Government of Canada with agile, high-readiness Special Operations Forces capable of conducting special operation across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad



## Terms of Service

- Class A – Part time
- Class B > 180 days
- Class B < 180 days
- Class B"A" (Permanent B)
- Class C – Equivalent to Regular Force TOS\*

\* The only TOS that has equal pay to Regular Force personnel, Class A & B are at 85% of Regular Force pay

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## NAVRES

The Naval Reserve is different from other Primary Reserves in that it has its own unique operational roles which are different from the Regular Force Navy. These include:

- Manning of Maritime Coastal Defense Vessels (KINGSTON class)
- Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping - Recognized Maritime Picture Compilation
- Port Security
- Port Inspection Diving
- Naval presence in 24 cities across Canada
- Community and public relations



## FUTURE OF THE NAVAL RESERVE



- The Naval Reserve's mission will remain that of a Force Generator to ensure that we can best support the Navy's current and future needs
- Planning assumptions indicate a high demand for generation of full-time sailors both now and in the future for a variety of platforms
- There must be a viable and achievable role for part-time sailors
- We have demonstrated success in generating Reserve specific capabilities include Port Security, Port Inspection Diving and Intelligence
- Whither the Naval Reserve?
  - How do we train, develop and retain part-time sailors and ensure a meaningful and achievable role for this community?
  - Should we continue to train and limit ourselves with a platform specific model or Reserve specific missions?




## Future Mission and Vision

- The Naval Reserve's mission will likely remain that of a Force Generator to ensure that we can best support the Navy's current and Future needs
- Will there continue to be a high demand for generation of full-time sailors both now and in the future for a variety of platforms?

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

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
## Army Reserve Issues

- The Army Reserve has been “Operationalized
- Army Reserve Transformation is aiming to “right structure” the Army Reserve to deliver an *Integrated Force*
- Harmonization of policies is required to deliver One Army
- The Army Reserve can deliver predictable capability with predictable funding

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## Air Reserve

- Air Reserve model is unique:
  - Reserve positions integrated into the establishment of almost all Air Force units and organizations
  - Contributes on a day-to-day basis to the operation of the Air Force
  - Smallest size relative to Regular Component – 25% of Regular Force establishment (Navy Reserve: 58%; Army Reserve 77%)
- Rationale for this model:
  - Expense of Air Force weapon systems and day-to-day utilization rate makes providing equipment and flying hours to Reserve only functions unaffordable
  - Air War is generally “come as you are”
    - Air Force national mobilization lead time is long
    - more important issue is ability to surge activity rapidly
  - Complementary tasks (e.g. CIMIC) assigned to others



## Translating the Vision

- Integral to Air Force Capability
  - Part of the Total Force establishment
    - Part-time contribution is essential to unit having sufficient personnel resources to fulfill its mission
  - Work generally 2-3 days per week
- Ready to Serve
  - Meets same job qualification standards as Reg Force
  - Same occupation structure as Reg Force
  - Certain readiness “tiered”
- At Home and Abroad
  - Expectation to deploy
  - Last four years: 10% - 20% of Air Force tasks and operations



## CANSOFCOM Reserve



## Why a SOF Reserve ?

- Retention
  - Of costly skills sets
  - Experience
  - Right mix of part / full time
- Capacity
  - Op Tempo
  - Enhancement of Existing Capabilities
  - Require all CF MS' + SOF MOS
- Capabilities
  - Explore new concepts
  - Refine development of new capabilities.



## SOF Reserve Task

- Counter-Terrorism (CT) Operations
- Maritime Counter-Terrorism (MCT) Operations
- High Value Tasks (HVT)
  - Counter-proliferation
  - Special Reconnaissance
  - Direct Action
  - Defence, Diplomacy, and Military Assistance
  - Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

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## Health Services Reserve

- Health Services Reserve - 1700 pers
  - Routine parade strength of approx 1100
  - 14 Field Ambulances:
    - Approximately 1400 pers
    - Standardized purpose-oriented organizations
  - Health Services Primary Reserve List (PRL):
    - Created in 2001 to augment and sustain deployment of a Role 3 field hospital
    - Provides complementary capabilities
    - Currently 324 personnel



## Health Services Reserve – Current Support to National Roles




Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD



Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics



Respond to a major terrorist attack



Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster



Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period



Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods

- Ability to support/augment at all 4 levels of Health Care
  - **Role 1** – pre-hospital care (i.e., with disembarked troops, triage, sorting, preparation for evacuation)
  - **Role 2** – stabilization, life-saving treatment, evacuation
  - **Role 3** – initial wound surgery, post-operative care, short-term surgical/med in-patient care
  - **Role 4** – Definitive Care




## HS Res Future Focus

- Six core lines of operation
- Integrated Regular/Reserve response (i.e., Olympics)
- Capable of supporting multiple missions simultaneously




Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD



Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics



Respond to a major terrorist attack



Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster




Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period



Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods




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Future CF Reserve Capability



## **Future Reserve Capability**

- “an effective and responsive Reserve integral to the capability of the CF – ready to serve when and where needed...” has yet to be realized
- Achievement will require a fully integrated force and the compendium of supporting policies and tools



## **Future Reserve Capability**

- A thorough review will require:
  - Definition of the FG and FE models
  - Development of enduring operational and institutional structure
- A validated strategic costing model that “protects” monies assigned to deliver the Reserve
- Define the responsibilities and commitments of a full and part-time force model
  - Key to this is reinforcing the relevance of Reserve service



## **Future Reserve Capability**

- The creation of an effective military personnel resource system for the Reserve
  - CF career management vice service driven management
- Institutionalization of CF strategic level participation of Reserves
- Institutionalization of outreach to Reserve families



## **Future Reserve Capability**

- A return to a classic part-time force
- Reduction in the fulltime Reserve cohort to manageable levels
- Continued integration of Reserves in operations with a view to contributing expanded capabilities
- Strategic communications plan to demonstrate that the Reserve is money well spent and a key component of the Defence Strategy

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## **Total Force Approaches Adopted by Other Nations**

### ***Introduction***

This section provides information regarding the organization and management of the military reserve forces of selected NATO nations as well as a number of non-NATO countries.

All countries use a combination of two basic mechanisms to create and maintain their reserve forces. The first method is to recruit or conscript personnel for full-time military duty for some period, and follow the initial period with a reserve period in which the members remain subject to recall. Reserve members may or may not have an obligation to train to maintain their readiness to resume active duty while in this status. Unlike the United States, where a typical initial enlistment contract requires 3 or more years of active duty followed by a relatively short period of reserve obligation, many other countries require a shorter period of initial active duty (some less than 1 year) and then impose a much longer period of time in the reserve. For example, a conscript leaving a year of active duty in the Russian army theoretically is subject to recall until age 50. The result is a reserve that is heavily populated with personnel who are not only relatively poorly trained and inexperienced, but who are older and possess atrophied skills and capabilities.

The second method is to create militia organizations that individuals without prior military experience may join, and that provide training on a part-time basis near the individual's home. The National Guard is the U.S. version of a militia. Many international militias are trained as well as the Guard, but not all. For example, in Iran, the Basij are a militia largely composed of personnel that most militaries would consider unfit for active duty. Most countries view their reserve forces as assets usable for a wide range of purposes, including internal security, search and rescue, and consequence management in the event of natural disasters, riots, terrorist attacks and other events. Reserve members train for these specific events, and are expected to respond quickly when required.

The paramilitary or national police forces of many countries are dual-purpose, meaning their daily duties are law enforcement but they may act as a military force as well. The closest U.S. equivalent is the Coast Guard, which performs the day-to-day function of law enforcement, but can be employed as a military force under certain conditions.

Many countries have created special units or reservist categories for personnel who possess useful knowledge and skills acquired in their civilian careers. These personnel perform the same or similar function for the military as they perform as civilians, and in some countries, reservists serve as part-time or temporary employees of the military while legally remaining civilians.

Most countries (including the United States) require different levels of training readiness for different classes of reservists. Components of the reserve that are designated as high readiness

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(frequently, pilots) train more intensively than other components. Commonly, a reservist has an obligation to train for a specified number of hours or days per year; such training is generally conducted on a regular periodic basis in groups, i.e. meetings/ drills / assemblies of a unit and in exercises involving multiple units. There is a wide variation around the notional U.S. schedule of one weekend per month and two weeks per year; for example, Russia conducts practice mobilizations on a three-year cycle, and other countries have weekly training periods. Many countries have a “one size fits all” approach to training while others, such as Canada, are very flexible with respect to how much, where or when training will be performed. Some countries that employ individual reservists on a part-time or temporary full-time basis in the job they would fill on active duty, count the time toward the reservist’s training obligation. The Internet is increasingly used as a means to facilitate training, either by delivering lectures by an instructor at one location to reservists at another location, or through distance learning conducted on reserve members’ individual schedules.

In contrast to the cyclic approach to readiness used in the United States, most countries maintain some portion of their reserves at a permanently higher state of readiness, and draw on these units first in the event of emergencies. The units with the highest state of readiness may receive more intensive training and better equipment than others, or may be made up of members with the most recent active service.

***Reserve Forces of Selected NATO Nations***

Six out of the 28 NATO members rely on conscription: Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. The Danish and Norwegian systems of conscription are largely selective.

NATO policy characterizes the importance of the reserve component as follows: “the overall readiness of the Alliance is derived not only from the readiness of the active forces, but also from the availability and readiness of their Reserves. The availability of Reserves, whether for NATO missions or for their periodic training, depends heavily upon national policy, legislation, and societal factors such as the encouragement and assistance of the family, the community, and the employer whose support and assistance are vital.”<sup>1</sup>

NATO policy also states that there can be substantially differing national approaches to the structure, quantity, type, funding, availability, training, call-up, and utilization of Reserves in the three missions now assigned to NATO: collective defense, conflict prevention or crisis management and the projection of stability. The policy asserts the need for Reservists to participate in individual and crew skills training, collective training, and exercises, to become “as well qualified as Regular personnel, particularly if nations intend to use their Reserves to support NATO missions.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> North Atlantic Military Committee, “NATO Framework Policy on Reserves.”

<sup>2</sup> North Atlantic Military Committee, “NATO Framework Policy on Reserves.”

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The United States is the main contributor of both active and reserve forces, followed by Turkey. In active forces, the two leaders are followed by France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. In reserves, they are followed by Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, and Portugal.

**Canada**

The Canadian Reserve Force consists of the Primary Reserve (P Res), the Supplementary Reserve (Sup Res), the Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC), and the Canadian Rangers.

The P Res is the largest component of the reserve, and consists of the Army Reserve (Militia), Navy Reserve, Air Reserve, Communication Reserve, Health Services Reserve, Legal Reserve, and the National Defence Headquarters Primary Reserve List. The P Res augments the active component by contributing approximately 10 percent of the country's forces involved in recent foreign military operations, and performs certain active duty tasks including port security and mine countermeasures.

The Supplementary Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve forces available for recall to active duty in an emergency, but who do not otherwise train or perform duties. If recalled, Supplementary Reserve members are upgraded to either the Regular Forces or the P Res.

The Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) supervises and trains the Cadet training program for teenagers. The Canadian Rangers provide a military presence and serve as first responders in Canada's remote northern, coastal, and isolated areas.

Service in the Canadian Reserve falls in three classes: (1) Class A is used for periods up to a maximum of 12 consecutive days, and 60 days annually; (2) Class B is used for service of 13 or more consecutive days on a training staff; and (3) Class C service may be used at any authorized location. Class A and B reservists are paid at 85 percent of regular force pay; class C reservists receive the same pay as regular force personnel.

**Denmark**

Since the end of the Cold War, Denmark no longer maintains mobilization plans, although it is one of the few NATO countries to maintain a system of conscription. Denmark's draft is based on a lottery. Conscripts serve an initial training period of 4-12 months, depending on their specialties. Following initial training, approximately 25 percent of conscripts volunteer for further service in the Home Guard (HG), which operates on Danish soil in response to terrorism or natural, civil, or military emergencies.

The HG is composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force branches. Although unpaid, HG volunteers wear the same uniforms as active component members, participate in a retirement plan, and receive meals and transportation to and from their training sites. In addition to providing support to the armed services, HG members also support the police and the country's Emergency Management Agency

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To remain active in the HG, members must perform a minimum of 24 hours operationally relevant service each year. To be issued weapons, HG personnel are required to undergo an additional 250-300 hours of training within the first three years of service, and complete annual shooting practice thereafter.

**France**

Following the end of conscription in 1996, French authorities undertook a review of defense policies and initiated a major restructuring to develop a professional military that is smaller, more rapidly deployable, and better tailored for operations outside of mainland France. As part of this restructuring, French reserve components have transformed from their previous mass mobilization orientation to a smaller operational component that is more fully integrated with the active force.

Legislation passed in 1999 created two reserve components, the operational reserve, intended as trained reinforcements for the active-duty forces, and the citizens' reserve. Upon discharge from active service, active duty members are normally required to serve an additional 5 years in the operational reserve; volunteers may also join the operational reserve. Members of the operational reserve are affiliated with a specific branch (Army, Navy, or gendarmerie), and may serve alongside their active duty counterparts.

Renewable contracts in the operational reserve range from one to 5 years, and specify the member's military field and specialization. Members typically train 20-30 days per year, and can deploy in support of overseas operations for up to 120 days. In practice, only a limited number of French reservists have deployed, typically those with special skills such as language proficiency. Only about two percent of deployed French forces are reservists.

Reserve members serve as specialists in some specific non-military jobs (e.g., linguists, lawyers, communication and information advisers, and engineers), and form units trained for Homeland Defense missions.

Members of the citizens' reserve consist of those former military personnel who are not required to join the operational reserve, former members of the operational reserve, and civilian volunteers. Citizens' reserve members receive no training, uniforms, or regular pay, and are restricted by law to participation in nonmilitary tasks.

Relations between the French military and civilian employers have been at times strained. French law requires employers to grant reserve members 5 days of military-related leave per year, and demands that reservists seek their employers' specific approval to miss any additional workdays. Growing strain between employers and reserve members led the government to create a forum for discussion of reserve issues in 2000, and in 2005, the government passed a law providing a tax credit to employers to help compensate for the financial costs of employing reservists.

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**Germany**

A defense policy review conducted in 2003 stressed the need to restructure the Bundeswehr, or German Federal Defense Force, into a more agile force focused on multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management operations rather than on defending against a conventional attack. The Bundeswehr is currently transforming from a Cold War territorial defense force into an expeditionary force.

The size of the German reserves, historically home-based forces that served either as individual replacements or to operate garrisons in wartime, has been reduced 50% since the end of the Cold War. Germany sees its reservists as a link between the armed forces and the citizenry.

The modern reserve is divided into three components: the active components consisting of the Reinforcement Reserve and Manpower Reserve, and the inactive General Reserve component.

The Reinforcement Reserve consists primarily of volunteers available for general assignments. Reinforcement Reserve members are assigned to active posts to increase units' sustainability and provide capabilities for reconstitution. The Manpower Reserve consists of volunteer specialists who fill specific short-term vacancies or otherwise augment units. Members of the Reinforcement and Manpower Reserves typically serve no more than 90 days per calendar year, although members serving in a stabilization / peacekeeping mission outside the country may serve up to 7 months per calendar year.

The German government considers anyone who has ever served in the military, either through universal service or by volunteering, to be a member of the reserve. All former members of the German armed forces who are not members of the Reinforcement Reserve or the Manpower Reserve are required to belong to the General Reserve. Members of the General Reserve are not connected to any unit or post, but remain subject to call up until they reach the age of 60 years for officers, 45 for NCOs and 32 for regular soldiers (60 years in the case of emergency). Regular soldiers who have to leave active duty because they have reached the maximum retirement age can be recalled until the age of 65. However, in practice, members of the General Reserve are not called up in peacetime.

Members of the Reinforcement Reserve and Manpower Reserve who agree to serve at least 24 days per year receive an incentive bonus. Retired active members may volunteer to serve in the Manpower Reserve up to age 65; such service entitles them to compensation in addition to their military pensions.

The Job Reservation Act guarantees reservists the ability to reclaim their civilian jobs. Employers are required to continue to pay reservists during their active service, but are reimbursed by the government. Self-employed reservists are eligible to receive compensation for hiring a substitute while they serve on active duty.

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**Norway**

The Norwegian Constitution obligates all fit male citizens between the ages of 19 and 44 to be available for military service; the actual number of conscripts depends on operational requirements. In 2010, women became subject to the same requirement as men. Draftees serve 12 months on active duty, which in practice is shortened to 8 to 9 months. Reserve officers, NCOs and some specialist categories normally serve for 30 days every 4th year; other ranks have a liability to serve for 21 days every 4th year. A limited numbers of reservists are allowed to volunteer for UN and NATO missions.

The Norwegian Home Guard, or Heimevernet (HV), was established following WWII. Its missions are to protect important infrastructure, support national crisis management, strengthen the military presence as required throughout the country, and provide support to the civil community. The HV can be activated on short notice, and its members maintain their uniforms and personal weapons at home. Although the Norwegian HV is spread over the land, navy, and air force components, most members are affiliated with the army. Members of the HV wear the same uniforms as their active counterparts, and receive some pay for training. In addition, Norway is considering a pension plan for HV members. The HV includes highly trained rapid reaction forces, follow-on forces who take part in annual training, and reinforcement forces who train less frequently.

**Poland**

Poland's reserve forces are designed to supplement active units in peacetime and to form new units upon national mobilization. Reservists provide the main source of reinforcements during wartime. Reserve officers and NCOs may volunteer to take part in NATO-led missions and operations. In 2005, Poland's initial service obligation was shortened from 12 to 9 months, and conscription is set to end in 2012. Only soldiers who have completed their initial term of service are allowed to volunteer for professional service.

There are four categories of Polish reserves: Alert Reserve, Qualified Reserve, Passive Reserve, and Ineffective Reserve. The Alert Reserve includes the youngest and most well trained members. Members of the Qualified Reserve perform periodic rotations in peacetime. The Passive reserve can be called up for reinforcement, and the Ineffective Reserve is used for territorial defense. Training may not be longer than 90 days a year, but in practice is limited to 10 days a year.

**Romania**

Romanian military service is voluntary in peacetime and compulsory during wartime. Reserve volunteers, consisting of both retired active duty personnel and qualified civilians, agree to an initial 2-year term of service that can be extended by additional contracts of 2 to 3 years. Reserve volunteers can be used for collective defense and other operations, including humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of military and civil infrastructure, disaster assistance, medical assistance, force protection for special facilities and refugee camps and civil and

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military cooperation (CIMIC) activities. In wartime, reserve volunteers serve as a resource for force regeneration and support.

Reserve volunteers have three components: operational reserve, consisting of reserve volunteers who signed a contract to serve in military units; general reserve, who fill military units during wartime; and the citizens reserve, populated with politicians, cultural leaders, and other influential individuals, whose role is to strengthen the links between the nation and the Armed Forces.

Reserve personnel without previous military background undertake a four-month training period at the beginning of their first contract. In addition, reserve members train 2 days monthly during the weekends and another 5 days annually.

***Spain***

There are two categories of Spanish reserve forces: the volunteer reserve consisting of former military and civilians who possess university degrees or professional skills, and the obligatory reserves, composed of all citizens between the ages of 19 and 25. Volunteer reserve members receive initial training of less than 30 days, and seven days per year if not called to service. They perform reinforcing functions in existing units, as well as serving as a link between the military and civil society. When called to service, volunteer reserve members serve alongside their active duty counterparts, and they can be deployed abroad in support of peace and security operations as well as on Spanish soil. Members sign contracts specifying the length of activation and their willingness to serve abroad. The obligatory reserves exist solely for mobilization in the event of a national crisis.

***Turkey***

At age 19, males are eligible to be conscripted for a 15-month tour of active duty. University graduates may be conscripted as reserve officers for a 12-month period.

Turkish law limits the use of reserve personnel to mobilization and war, and prohibits their assignment abroad except under limited circumstances. Upon mobilization or declaration of war, members of the reserve would augment active forces to enable them to operate at 100 percent capacity. The reserves can be called to active duty for mobilization exercises and individual mobilization training. Mobilization training is performed for 45 days, although this period can be shortened or extended by the council of ministers.

***United Kingdom***

Similar to the manner in which the United States has transitioned to an operational reserve, members of the UK reserve component now expect to be called up for active duty at least once during their service commitment. Britain's "total force" concept treats activated reservists the same as their active duty counterparts. The government intends for the Reserve Forces to be part of any major operation, and reservists may be recalled to provide special capabilities or as reinforcements for units.

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The British reserves consist of two main components: the Regular Reserve and the Voluntary Reserve Forces (VRF). The Regular Reserve consists of former members of the Regular Forces who remain eligible for compulsory mobilization, although this component is primarily used as a standby reserve. Some Regular Reserve members may also be required to complete periodic training, although training is not currently funded.

VRF members are the reserve force of choice for most deployments. Members are required to commit to at least 27 days of annual training each year, although some specialized units may perform less training. Training typically consists of 1 night per week, 1 weekend per month, and 2 weeks per year, with additional volunteer training opportunities for reservists who wish to acquire special skills. Training time can be used to deliver military support as well as for training. Some retired members of the active force voluntarily affiliate with the VRF, rather than the Regular Reserve, and continue to be available for deployment.

In addition to these main categories, the U.K. offers several other forms of reserve duty. Reservists may volunteer for Full-Time Reserve Service (FTRS) and fill specific billets with the active forces, typically to fill manning shortfalls. Another category is that of Additional Duties Commitment (ADC) Reserves, who serve part-time. Sponsored Reserves are civilian contractors who, in peacetime, provide support to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Sponsored Reservists may be mobilized and deployed to support military operations, and the MOD has made the award of some contracts contingent on a certain number of the contractor's workforce affiliating with the reserves. Members of the High Readiness Reserves possess specialized skills, and agree to be mobilized on short notice for a maximum of 9 months. Civilian employers of High Readiness Reserves must consent to their employees' participation.

Reservists may be recalled under three powers. In the event of national danger, great emergency, or an actual or anticipated attack, members may be recalled for 3-6 years. If the Secretary of State believes warlike operations are in progress, reserves may be recalled for 1-3 years. If necessary to protect the use of life or property, such as in response to a natural disaster, reserve members may be recalled for 9-17 months. By policy, the MOD attempts to provide a minimum of 21 days notification to recalled reservists.

### ***Selected Non-NATO Countries***

#### ***Australia***

Reserve members make up approximately 40% of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), including most of the military's lawyers and doctors. The Naval Reserve is employed in routine peacetime operations and supplements the active Navy in wartime. The Air Force Reserve provides trained personnel for operations and support activities. The Naval and Air Force Reserves are both well integrated within their respective Services. The Army Reserve has specific roles to backup the Australian Regular Army's role of national defense.

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Previously called the Citizen Military Forces (CMF), the reserves were originally designed to defend Australia against foreign invasion. Australian law was amended in 2001 to permit reservists to participate in foreign operations, including not only disaster relief and humanitarian missions but also major military campaigns.

The two largest categories of Australian reservists are the Standby Reserves, composed of former active duty members who do not incur a training commitment, and the Active Reserves, who supplement active-duty units. Members of the High Readiness Reserves and High Readiness Specialist Reserves must take part in additional training and service obligations; the distinction is that the latter category possesses high value skills. In addition to these categories, each branch of the military has its own special categories of reserves. The length of reserve service contracts varies from four to 12 years, depending on the member's rank and branch.

The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act of 2001 expanded employment protection for reserve members. Employers are required to reemploy reservists, are not allowed to compel reservists to use vacation time for military service, and must treat reserve employees on long-term deployments as being on leave without pay. In 2005, the Australian government introduced the Employer Support Payment (ESP) Scheme, which provides compensation to employers for losses resulting from their employees' reserve service. Although this measure and other efforts to ease the burden associated with reserve duty have made it easier for reservists to participate, recruitment shortfalls still remain.

### ***Iran***

Iran's minimum age for service is 16 for volunteers and 18 for draftees. The country's military is divided into three branches: Islamic Republic of Iran Army (the Artesh), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Resistance Force. The Artesh is further divided into army, navy, and air force components. The Artesh maintains an army reserve consisting of approximately 350,000 men who receive little training and are not considered ready for rapid deployment.

The Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) is a paramilitary volunteer force consisting of approximately 90,000 active members, and inactive reserves estimated between 300,000 (U.S. estimate) and 30 million (Iran estimate). The Basij is aligned with extreme conservatives, and consists largely of youths, men who have completed military service, and the elderly.

### ***Israel***

"In ways similar to the case of Switzerland, from their beginnings the reserves in Israel were conceived of not as simple auxiliary forces tasked with secondary tasks, but rather as full-fledged units and the only way that Israel as a small nation could offset the demographic imbalance with its neighbors. Thus, although considerably downsized, reserve components still comprise the bulk of Israel's forces."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> "Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Professional and Conscript Forces," Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop held 10-12 December 2003 in Bratislava, Slovakia.

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The Israeli government considers the reserve to be an essential component of its defense, and maintains the reserve force at a high state of readiness. Mobilization normally takes place within 48 hours. Active duty members are generally required to transfer to the reserves upon release from active service, and membership in the reserve force far outnumbers that of the active duty components.

The Israeli Defense Force encourages its officers to pursue a civilian career upon discharge, a practice that keeps the military closely tied to the populace. Israelis also believe that universal military service helps integrate their large immigrant population. Reservists typically train for 1 month or less each year, and remain eligible for recall, although female reservists are rarely recalled unless they have special skills.

Employers continue to pay reservists their normal salaries when they are recalled, and since 1996, the government has reimbursed employers for this expense. Self-employed workers may also be reimbursed up to a specified maximum amount. The Israeli government also provides other tax breaks and benefits to reservists, especially to those mobilized for prolonged periods. The significant number of reserve members relative to the size of the general population has demonstrated its potential to be severely disruptive to the Israeli economy.

#### ***Japan***

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) separates reserve components into three categories: Regular Reserves, High-Readiness Reserves, and Reserve Candidates.

Regular Reserve members typically have 1 year of active duty experience, and serve part-time in an administrative, logistical, or other support capacity. In times of war or emergency, regular reserve units would assume responsibility for rear area security and logistical support. Members of the Regular Reserve volunteer for a renewable 3-year term of service and normally train 5 days each year.

High-Readiness Reserves consist of selected Regular Reserves and recently retired active duty members who agree to join active units during an emergency to perform combat operations, homeland security missions, or respond to natural disasters or accidents. High-Readiness Reserves perform 30 days of training annually for a minimum of 3 years, and are the most highly compensated reserve personnel.

The category of Reserve Candidates was created in 2001 to broaden the pool of potential recruits, enhance the connection between the Japanese military and society, and provide access to professional and technical skills found primarily in the civilian economy. Few Reserve Candidates have active military experience, and members are not subject to mobilization. "General" reserve candidates perform support functions such as rear area security, and after completion of 50 days of training in 3 years, graduate into the Regular Reserves. "Technical" reserve candidates possess special skills, such as medical, language, information technology, architecture, and maintenance. After the successful completion of 10 days of training in 2 years, technical candidates advance into the Regular Reserves.

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The government compensates reservists and their employers for the time members spend away from their civilian jobs. However, employers still discourage their employees from participating.

***North Korea***

North Korea has one of the largest armies in the world, fourth in size after those of China, the United States and India. The country imposes an unusually severe period of compulsory service, ranging from three to ten years.

Paramilitary reserve membership is estimated to include 30 percent of the population between ages 15 to 60. The reserve has four components: Worker's-Peasants' Red Guard, Red Youth Guard, People's Guard, and Paramilitary Training Unit. The latter is the primary ready reserve, capable of immediate mobilization and incorporation into the regular army. The ubiquity of the military in North Korean society provides the country with a vast trained labor pool that can be rapidly mobilized when required.

***Peoples Republic of China***

Chinese Law requires all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 22 to be available for compulsory active-duty service, although not all of them actually serve. The initial term of obligated service is 24 months. Although the reserve is predominantly composed of former regular soldiers and officers who have been discharged from active duty, not all demobilized active members join the reserves. In recent years, the reserve has increasingly incorporated members with no prior service, but with special skills valuable to the military, such as chemical warfare, information warfare, and information operations.

China's reserve force consists of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and the Second Artillery Force Reserve. Reserve units are organized mainly on a regional basis. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) reserve is a key component of China's national defense. During peacetime, it conducts training and maintains social stability, and during wartime, reserve units may be mobilized.

One third of the authorized strength of each reserve unit is required to undergo 30 days of training annually. Training tasks are based on possible wartime assignments and the caliber of the reservists. The Chinese government characterizes its reserve force as being "in the process of shifting its focus from quantity and scale to quality and efficiency, and from a combat role to a support role."<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the reserve types described above, China has two large paramilitary forces, the People's Militia and the People's Armed Police, which it could draw upon during wartime. All civilian males between the ages of 18 and 35 are considered members of the militia, which includes a primary militia that numbers between 8 and 10 million strong and serves as a labor

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<sup>4</sup> "China's National Defense in 2008 (II)," *Beijing Review*, No. 6 February 12, 2009.

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pool for the PLA. Militia members are subject to wartime mobilization to serve within their home province and perform air defense, emergency response, and technical support functions, as well as critical infrastructure protection and border security. The People's Armed Police forces guard prisons and perform infrastructure protection, disaster relief, and border and internal security.

***Russian Federation***

Russia inherited the legacy military structure of the former Soviet Union, which was based on a large pool of well-trained military reservists who could be mobilized rapidly to fill minimally manned "skeleton" structures. This structure did not serve Russia well during the first Chechen War in the mid-1990s, when the Army proved unable to mobilize a significant number of effective units rapidly. The 2008 conflict with Georgia further highlighted the need for modernization, and resulted in an increased push to improve the training and organization of the military. Reform efforts since then have included sweeping changes to the army's end strength, structure, and command system. Goals of the reform include significant downsizing of the active force, increased readiness of all units, and the elimination of legacy Soviet skeleton formations.

Although the majority of service members are still conscripts, the Russian government recently reduced the period of conscription to one year, and the military plans to transition to a mixed force in which 70 percent of the members are professionals. Males must register for the draft at age 17, and are subject to being called for compulsory or voluntary military service from the ages of 18 to 27; over 60 percent of draft-age Russian males receive some type of deferment. Former service members maintain a reserve service obligation to age 50, although an estimated one-third of reservists ignore their call-up notices.

The MOD periodically exercises full-scale training call-ups of reservists for exercises and other training; training is prohibited from exceeding one 2-month call-up every 3 years, or a career total of 12 months. Although Russian law guarantees reservists their jobs and some their normal pay, mobilized reservists are not compensated for the loss of other forms of compensation. Some Russian employers also reportedly discourage employees from performing reserve duty.



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# **Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component**

## **Annex C**

### **Using the Guard and Reserve To Best Advantage**



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***Comprehensive Review of the  
Future Role of the Reserve  
Components***

**Executive Committee (EXCOM)  
Update**

**07 Sep 2010  
1500-1630  
Pentagon Rm 3D921**

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This is the status out-brief for the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component effort that was given to the Executive Committee (EXCOM) after the 17-19 August workshop that primarily addressed study Objectives 2-4 (but also began the initial framing of issues for Objective 5).

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## Purpose and Content


- **Purpose**
  - Provide in-progress review of what we have done
  - Seek guidance on future efforts
  
- **Content:**
  - OBJ 2: Using the RC to best advantage
  - OBJ 3: Roles for which the RC is best suited
  - OBJ 4: Conditions and standards
  - OBJ 5: Options for rebalancing the AC-RC Mix
  - Next steps

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The intent of the brief is to review what the study has accomplished to date and to seek guidance from the EXCOM on future efforts.

The material provided related to Objective 2 (using the RC to best advantage), Objective 3 (roles for which the RC is best suited), Objective 4 (conditions and standards), Objective 5 (options for rebalancing the AC-RC mix), and will then close with an indication of the way ahead for the study.

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The study is following the overall approach shown schematically in the accompanying figure. Initial efforts focused on Objective 1 (establish common total force costing methodology) and, as a separate effort, addressed Objective 2 (using RC to best advantage) and Objective 3 (roles for which RC is well suited). These latter two objectives were begun at a 21-22 July workshop held at the Army War College. At the most recent workshop (17-19 August), Objectives 2 and 3 were further explored along with Objective 4 (conditions and standards considerations). These Objectives were intended to help the study to develop a set of options for rebalancing the AC/RC mix (Objective 5), which will be the primary focus of an upcoming workshop (20-22 September). After exploring the rebalancing options in detail, a subsequent workshop (26-27 October) will explore the law, policy, and doctrine considerations both for the rebalancing options and for the conditions and standards to provide a trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve (while supporting service members, their families, and employers). Finally, the cost-benefit considerations associated with the employment of each of the rebalancing options will be addressed based on the methodology establish in Objective 1, thus completing the circle.

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## OBJ 2-4 Collaborative Analysis Workshop



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### 72 Participants

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Workshop held at JHU/APL 17-19 Aug</li> <li>• 70 attendees from COCOMs, Reserve Components, Services, OSD, Joint Staff, and JHU/APL</li> <li>• 14 Presentation/ Discussion Sessions             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In addition to verbal discussion, attendees submitted over 1,500 textual comments to Workshop electronic "Blog"</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Surveys conducted to assess             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demand for RC Contribution</li> <li>• RC Best Uses</li> <li>• RC Sourcing Options</li> <li>• Conditions &amp; Standards</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>COCOMs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COL William Bartheld, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• Col Edward Rapp III, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• MAJ Ivan Udell, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• Mr. John Klesch, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• Mr Richard McCalla, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• Mr. Julian Saramago, USAFRICOM</li> <li>• CDR Shaun Murphy, USCENTCOM</li> <li>• CDR Jonas Jones, USEUCOM</li> <li>• LCDR Valerie Lacroix, USEUCOM</li> <li>• LtCol Kenneth Woodard, USJFCOM</li> <li>• CAPT Anthony Rizzo, USNORTHCOM</li> <li>• Col Steve Kirkpatrick, USSOCOM</li> <li>• Col Daniel Heires, USSTRATCOM</li> <li>• COL Troy Kok, USTRANSCOM</li> </ul> <p><b>Reserve Components</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lt Col Robert Siani, AFR</li> <li>• Lt Col James Roberts, ANG</li> <li>• COL Douglas Curell, ARNG</li> <li>• COL Robert Williams, ARNG</li> <li>• LTC James Yocum, ARNG</li> <li>• LTC Dale Fair, OCAR</li> <li>• LTC David McLain, OCAR</li> <li>• LTC Bryan Ross, ARNG</li> <li>• Col Gordon O'Very, OMFR</li> <li>• Mr. James Grover, Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reserve Components (Cont.)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Col Mark Zechman, NGB</li> <li>• LTC Norman Jenkins, NGB</li> <li>• Lt Col Diane Belmessieri, NGB</li> <li>• Major Sean Conroy, NGB</li> <li>• MAJ James Erb, NGB</li> <li>• Mr. Michael Petring, NGB</li> <li>• Mr. Steven Wright, NGB</li> </ul> <p><b>Services</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Col Walter Ward, HQ Air Force</li> <li>• Col Cathleen Haverstock, SAF/MRR</li> <li>• Lt Col Barbara Lee, AF/A5XW</li> <li>• COL Scott Sharp, ASA (M&amp;RA)</li> <li>• LTC Stephen Johnson, HQDA</li> <li>• Mr. James Boatner, Army G8</li> <li>• Mr. Joseph McInnis, Army</li> <li>• Colonel Kevin Wild, HQMC</li> <li>• LtCol Paul Webb, USMC</li> <li>• Maj Kenneth Casais, HQMC</li> <li>• CAPT Robert Louzek, ASN-M&amp;RA</li> <li>• CDR Kathryn Scott, OPNAV</li> <li>• LCDR Vidal Valentin, USNavy</li> <li>• CDR Kirby Sniffen, USCG</li> <li>• Mr. Jeffrey Smith, USCG</li> </ul>	<p><b>OSD</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr. Robert Smiley, OSD RA</li> <li>• Mr. John Hastings, OSD RA</li> <li>• Mr. Guy Stratton, OSD RA</li> <li>• Col Michael Castaldi, OSD RA</li> <li>• COL Walid Chebli, OSD RA</li> <li>• COL Vince Price, OASD RA</li> <li>• COL John Scocos, OSD RA</li> <li>• COL David Smith, OSD RA</li> <li>• COL Robert Waring, OSD Policy</li> <li>• LTC Stephen Beller, OSD</li> <li>• Mr. Donald DeVries, OSD(I)</li> <li>• Mr. Robert Leach, OSD(AT&amp;L)</li> <li>• Dr. Drew Miller, IDA</li> </ul> <p><b>Joint Staff</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COL David Sheridan, OCJCS</li> <li>• LTC Robert Haldeman, JS J-8</li> <li>• Mr. Robert Fancher, JS, J8</li> </ul> <p><b>JHU/APL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Dean Simmons</li> <li>• Mr. John Benedict</li> <li>• Mr. Joseph Callier</li> <li>• Mr. Randy Dean</li> <li>• Mr. Jeff Hamman</li> <li>• Mr. Keith Kowalski</li> <li>• CAPT Randall Lynch, USN FEF</li> <li>• Ms. Lesa McComas</li> <li>• Mr. Stephen Phillips</li> <li>• Mr. Edward Smyth</li> </ul>
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The main portion of this brief will highlight the results that came out of the 17-19 August Collaborative Analysis Workshop held at JHU/APL. There were 70 attendees from the COCOMs, Reserve Components, Services, OSD, Joint Staff, and JHU/APL. Over the three days of the workshop, there were 14 separate presentation/discussion sessions; in addition, the attendees took advantage of the electronic "blog" by providing over 1500 textual comments. As part of the workshop, various surveys were conducted of the participants to assess the following: the demand for RC contributions in particular scenarios, the best uses of the RC, the best sourcing options, and the most important conditions and standards considerations.

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## OBJ 2: Using the RC to Best Advantage

**Approach**

- **Reviewed**
  - Guidance for Employment of the Force
  - OA-10 Study Results
  - Global Force Management Process
  - Integrated Security Constructs
  - Steady State Security Posture Vignettes
- **Examined Total Force Employment in Planning Scenarios**
  - Large-Scale Conventional Campaign: CC 3
  - Large-Scale Stability Operation: IR 3
  - Steady State Engagement Activities: SSSP 1-03
  - Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response: SSSP 1-06
  - Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities: SSSP 4-02

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For Objective 2 (using the RC to best advantage), the team’s approach was to review key source materials related to future operating environments and potential demand for RC. These sources included the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the OA-10 Study Results, the Global Force Management Process, the Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs), and the Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) Vignettes. After deliberations with OSD and Joint Staff, five planning scenarios were selected for use in the study in support of Objective 2. Total force employment (AC, RC, coalition partners, interagency partners) was examined for each of the following scenarios: large-scale conventional campaign (CC 3), large-scale stability operations (IR 3), steady state engagement activities (SSSP 1-06), humanitarian assistance/disaster response (SSSP 1-06), and homeland defense/defense support to civil authorities (SSSP 4-02). In addition to these 5 scenarios/operations, the group also addressed total force employment (including potential RC contributions) in the institutional support category, i.e., organizations and personnel who are tasked with recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, and demobilizing the units and personnel assigned to each of the Services.

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## OBJ 2: Using the RC to Best Advantage



**RC seen as having:**

- Primary role in Large-Scale Stability Ops, Steady State Engagement, and Homeland Defense
- Secondary role in Large-Scale Conventional Campaign, HA/DR, and Institutional Support

**Results**

Component	Large-Scale Conventional Campaign	Large-Scale Stability Operation	Steady State Engagement Activities	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response	Homeland Defense / Defense Support to Civilian Authorities	Institutional Support
<b>Active Component</b>	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary	Primary
<b>Reserve Component</b>	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
<b>Government Civilians</b>	Little	Secondary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary	Secondary-Little
<b>Contractors</b>	Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary	Secondary-Little-None

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD attendees at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 2010

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The accompanying table is a high-level summary of one of the key surveys conducted at the 17-19 August workshop. It was given after the five planning scenarios were discussed in detail by the Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, and OSD attendees with particular emphasis given to where RC could be used to best advantage, i.e., make primary or secondary contributions. The Reserve was seen as having a *primary* role in large-scale stability operations, steady state engagement activities, and homeland defense (due to the significant National Guard role in such activities). The Reserve Component can be expected to play a *secondary* role (compared to the Active Component) in future large-scale conventional campaigns, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, and institutional support activities.

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## OBJ 3: Roles for Which RC Is Well Suited



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**Approach**

- **Examined Reserve Component employment for broad mission sets at Carlisle Workshop**
  - **Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)**
  - **Military Engagement Teams**
  - **Individual Augmentation**
  - **Institutional Support**
- **Prioritized missions/tasks at recent Collaborative Analysis Workshop (JHU/APL) based on attendee input**

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### RC Mission Sets Considered

<u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</u>	Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
<u>Military Engagement Teams</u>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small, collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustenance of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.
<u>Individual Augmentation</u>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
<u>Institutional Support</u>	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretary Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.

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
For Objective 2 (roles for which RC is well suited), the team's approach was to examine RC employment for the following four broad mission sets at the Carlisle Workshop (21-22 July):

- Rotating operational forces – those units which rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with that Service's specific readiness policies or requirements, from reset and maintenance through training and deployment as operational forces (home and abroad).
- Military engagement teams – teams that support DoD's theater security cooperation, building partnership capacity and other engagement activities and consist of Service members (AC and RC) and US Government civilian employees from various agencies (including DoD); teams could also include host nation, coalition partners and non-Governmental organizations.
- Individual augmentation – are Service members (AC and RC) with or without unit affiliation or U.S. Government civilian employees who perform duties that support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve its assigned mission with existing resources.
- Institutional support – personnel that support operational forces by providing specific capabilities, e.g., recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing forces.

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*Prioritization* of missions/tasks (identified at Carlisle) related to these four broad mission sets was accomplished at the 17-19 August workshop based on attendee input, and a summary of the results will be shown on the next slide.

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Delineated within the columns on this slide are specific missions/ tasks (or potential roles) associated with the four broad mission sets (rotating operational forces, military engagement teams, individual augmentation, institutional support) that were identified for RC at the Carlisle workshop. These specific missions/tasks were further discussed at the 17-19 Workshop and then prioritized based on a survey taken by the attendees. Military engagement team and individual augmentation items received the highest overall priority ratings with about 60% scoring as significant or higher, and all scoring moderate or higher. Rotating operational forces received the next highest overall priority ratings with about 40% scoring at least significant, and all scoring at least moderate. Institutional support received the lowest overall priority ratings with 55% scored as moderate or higher.

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## OBJ 3: Roles for Which RC Is Well Suited



Rotating Operational Forces, Military Engagement Teams, and Individual Augmentees are all seen as playing comparable roles for sourcing RC needs

RC Sourcing Option	Large-Scale Conventional Campaign	Large-Scale Stability Operation	Steady State Engagement Activities	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response	Homeland Defense / Defense Support to Civilian Authorities	Institutional Support
<i>Rotating Operational Forces</i>	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary
<i>Military Engagement Teams</i>	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary
<i>Individual Augmentees</i>	Primary-Secondary-Little	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary-Secondary

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD attendees at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 2010

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Continuing with Objective 3 (roles for which RC is well suited), the Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, and OSD attendees were asked to answer the following conditional question: given that RC *is assigned* to a specific scenario, what would be the preferred sourcing method from among rotating operational forces, military engagement teams and individual augmentation? The results are summarized on the accompanying table and indicate that all three sourcing methods would likely be used extensively across the six scenario cases shown (which include the institutional support case). Rotating operational forces would be a preferred sourcing method for large-scale conventional campaigns, large-scale stability operations, steady state engagement activities, HA/DR, and HD/DSCA. Military engagement teams would be a preferred sourcing method for large scale stability operations, steady state engagement activities, and HA/DR. Individual augmentation would potentially be a preferred sourcing method for all six cases (and would perhaps be the most likely/ preferred method for institutional support).

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## OBJ 4: Conditions and Standards

**Approach**

- **Prior to Collaborative Analysis Workshop, JHU/APL team**
  - Reviewed 43 recent studies focused on Reserve Component
  - Identified 30 issues in 12 areas
  - Identified 159 potential solutions
- **At Collaborative Analysis Workshop**
  - Workshop attendees identified 23 additional solution options
  - Survey used to establish Issue priorities
    - 11 issues rated as being of **SIGNIFICANT** concern
    - 109 of 182 solutions rated as having at least **MODERATE** benefit

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APL

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For Objective 4 (conditions and standards that provide for a trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve), the team’s approach in preparation for the workshop was to review 43 recent studies that focused on the RC. Participants were able to identify 30 issues (or topics of concern) in about a dozen areas, including the identification of 159 potential solutions associated with these issues. As indicated in the figure with its four quadrants, these conditions and standards included considerations related to the Guard or Reserve service member’s military unit, as well as his or her military career, personal life, and civilian career. At the 17-19 August, Collaborative Analysis Workshop, the attendees were able to identify an additional 23 solution options. After much presentation material and related discussion, the attendees were then surveyed to establish issue priorities. Eleven issues were rated as being of significant concern, and 109 of the now 182 solutions were rated as having at least moderate benefit.

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## OBJ 4: Conditions and Standards



**Of Significant Concern**

1. Deployment Notification & Predictability
2. Pay & Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
3. Civilian Employer Satisfaction (Goodwill)
4. RC Career Path – JPME
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
6. Small Business Concerns (small-business owner reservists)
7. Readiness – Training
8. Health Benefits (transition between civilian health care plans and TRICARE)
9. Small Business Concerns (burden on small business owners associated with hiring RC members)
10. Readiness (individual medical readiness)
11. Accessibility of RC members

**Principal Concerns**

- Underscored +
- Basing & Infrastructure
- National Support

12. Readiness (equipment)
13. Civilian Occupation and MOS (some civilian skillsets require surge levels not sustained in the RC)
14. Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD
15. Suitability – Manning (unit-level manning is insufficient, requiring cross-leveling)
16. Health Benefits (RC members and their families do not fully understand their health care options)

**Remedies Implemented**

17. Recruiting- Accession, Transfers (ability of RC to attract mid-career civilians and AC members)
18. Resourcing (some force generation model resource requirements are ill defined)
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistencies between RC and AC)
21. Health Benefits (insufficient post-deployment care for demobilizing RC)
22. Resourcing (RC equipment shortfalls)
23. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (protections to RC members)
24. Civilian Employer Compensation (burden of mandatory contributions to reservists' retirement accounts and health insurance premiums)
25. Suitability – Skillsets (RC not focused on irregular war, stability operations)
26. Family Support
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
28. Educational Benefits (eligibility criteria)
29. RC Career Path – RC-only Career Dwell (20 year career yields 3 MOB under 1:5 dwell)
30. Educational Benefits (amount)

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD reps at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 10

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This slide delineates the 30 conditions and standards issues (or topics of concern). The eleven shown in Red were of significant concern, and the ones shown in green were of the least concern, largely because remedies were already being implemented. In the end six issues/topics were identified during the workshop by attendees to be of principal concern and worthy of considerable more investigation during the remainder of the study. These six items were accessibility of RC members, RC career type, and duty status, readiness and training, medical readiness, basing and infrastructure, and national support.

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## OBJ 5: Rebalancing the AC/RC Mix



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***Progress To Date***

- **Based on results of OBJ 2 and OBJ 3, identified 7 potential options for Rebalancing AC/RC mix**

***Work Remaining***

- **Determination of Conditions and Standards needed to implement Rebalancing Options**
- **Comparison of Rebalancing Options based on Cost-Benefit considerations**
- **Determination of Law, Policy, or Doctrinal changes needed to implement Rebalancing Options**

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For Objective 5 (rebalancing the AC/RC Mix), some initial progress has been made, although this was not the primary focus of the 17-19 August workshop; it will, however, be the focus of the next workshop to be held on 20-22 September. That said, the team did develop seven initial rebalancing option possibilities based on the results of Objectives 2 and 3. These options were put in front of the attendees and their feedback was incorporated. The remaining work focuses on refining these rebalancing options by determining the conditions and standards needed to implement each of them, comparing the options based on cost-benefit considerations, and establishing areas in law, policy, or doctrine that potentially need to be changed in order to implement each of these options.

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<b>OBJ 5: AC/RC Rebalancing Options</b>		
Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces	RC units from CONUS provide Fires Brigade, Fighter Wing units, and Aerial Tanker units for Korea; Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Europe
Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units	Integrate RC aircrews into AC rotary-wing aircraft units
Rebalance RC to remedy AC capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls within AC (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable AC units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)	Examine Service plans to address existing capacity shortfalls in Engineers, Intelligence, Combat Aviation, Riverine, and SOF units
Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats	Establish cyber units and capability within the RC to support COCOM, Service and state future cyber warfare mission requirements.
Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected JF HQs, COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Establish Joint Reserve Units at selected JF HQs</li> <li>2) Align specific RC units with selected COCOMs</li> <li>3) Align specific RC units with selected DoD and Service components</li> </ol>
Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements	From existing RC structure, designate units, teams, and/or individuals to support recruiting, training, and base support activities
Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs	Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services

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
Seven AC/RC rebalancing options were broadly characterized during the workshop. In the order shown in the accompanying figure, they can be generally described as follows:

- Rotating units to meet recurring demands – use of RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of forward deployed AC units in order to lower cost, improve AC BOG:Dwell ratios, or attain other efficiencies.
- Integrating AC-RC - enhance integration between AC and RC by either incorporating selected RC personnel or elements into operational AC units or by incorporating selected AC personnel or elements into RC units.
- Remediating capacity shortfalls within Total Force – rebalance selected Total Force capacities as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls or enable AC or RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios.
- Adjusting Reserve capabilities to meet emergent needs – adjust capabilities within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emerging demands/challenges (e.g., cyber defense).
- Aligning Reserves with specific DoD components – align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agencies, or Interagency partners to facilitate access and long-term relationships.

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- Providing institutional support – provide units, teams or individuals to support Service institutional activities such as recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, and demobilizing their assigned forces.
- Enabling differing methods of service within RC – create national or regional units staffed by personnel willing to serve more frequently or for longer periods of time to support either ongoing TSC/BPC engagements, institutional support activities, or other selected missions.

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Now the focus shifts to further refinement of these rebalancing options, including defining them to the point that an assessment of the cost-benefit implications, the conditions and standards implications, and the law, policy and doctrine implications can be derived. This refinement of options will conclude at the Objective 5 focused workshop to be held on 20-22 September; that workshop will then be followed by an Objective 6 workshop to be held on 26-27 October that will revisit conditions and standards considerations but focus primarily on the associated law, policy, and doctrine considerations including those specifically related to the rebalancing options. In parallel, the Objective 1 team will continue establishing a common Total Force costing methodology and will get ready to apply that methodology to the refined options emerging from the scheduled 20-22 September workshop.

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
## Next Steps

- Objectives 2-5 Kickoff Meeting; 17 Jun 10
- Requirements identification discussion; 30 Jun 10; 1000-1130
- EXCOM Kickoff Meeting; 16 July 10; 1300-1400
- Army War College, Carlisle, PA; 21-22 Jul 10
- OBJs 1-3 Update to EXCOM; 5 Aug 10; 1330-1500
- OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10
- Interim Report Submission; 1 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-4 Update to EXCOM; 7 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 20-22 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-5 Outbrief to EXCOM; 30 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10
- OBJ 2-6 Outbrief to EXCOM; 4 Nov 10

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This is the current view of the schedule, having completed the Objective 2-5 collaborative workshop and summarized it in this briefing to the EXCOM. In another five weeks, the team will be at a similar point for the Objective 2-6 collaborative workshop and back to brief the EXCOM (currently scheduled to occur on 4 November).

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This is the last slide and it reminds the team where the study has been and where it still needs to go, including a currently scheduled 16 November close-out briefing to the EXCOM. That will be followed by a period of final report preparation and vetting that culminates in a January 31, 2011 report to the Secretary of Defense (in order to meet the reporting requirement directed by the QDR).

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# Backups

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## Terms of Reference

- **Charter\***
  - Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the RC including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces
- **Objectives**
  - Establish a common DoD Total Force baseline costing methodology
  - How to use RC capabilities and capacities to best advantage
  - Roles for which Guard and Reserve well suited as a force of first choice
  - Conditions and standards that provide a trained and ready RC
  - Recommendations on AC/RC mix with associated cost-benefit analysis
  - Required law, policy and doctrinal changes

*\*Quadrennial Defense Review Report; Feb 2010*

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## Defense Planning and Programming Guidance



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- DPPG approved by SecDef on 12 July 2010
- USD(P&R) present the SecDef a report on the future role of the RC
- Coordinate with:
  - USD(P)
  - D, CAPE
  - CJCS
  - CNGB
  - COCOM CDRs
  - Service Secretaries
- Interim report by 1 Sep 10 on potential programmatic issues
- Final report by 31 Jan 11

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## Governance for Comprehensive Review



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Co-Sponsors: VCJCS and ASD RA

Review Secretariat:  
OASD RA Strategic  
Initiatives Group

Co-Chairs  
OASD RA: Mr. McGinnis  
Joint Staff: Lt Gen Spencer

External Support:  
Johns Hopkins  
Applied Physics Lab

EXCOM GO/FO/SES participants from:  
Services, Joint Staff, OUSDs, NGB, OGC, CAPE, COCOMs, Net Assessment, RFPB

Planner level Issue Teams per EXCOM direction

Issue Team OBJ 1

DOD Baseline Costing Methodology  
RA Lead: Mr. Hastings  
Key Stakeholders: CAPE,  
Joint Staff, Comptroller, & Services

Issue Team OBJs 2-5

Requirement Identification  
& Analysis  
RA Lead: Mr. Smiley  
All Stakeholders

Issue Team OBJs 6

Law, Policy &  
Doctrinal Adjustments  
RA Lead: Ms. Boyda  
All Stakeholders

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## Objective 1

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- 1. Establishing a common DoD baseline costing methodology for the Total Force and identifying the instances where such common baseline costing is not feasible**
  - **OASD RA lead: Resources**
  - **Key Stakeholders:**
    - OUSD Comptroller
    - CAPE
    - Net Assessment
    - JS J8
    - Military Departments
  - **Method:**
    - First phase of review
    - Feeds results to EXCOM and those working other objectives

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## Objectives 2-5

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- 2. Leveraging DOD plans for the future to determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage**
- 3. Determining those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice**
- 4. Determining the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers.**

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## Objectives 2-5 (Cont)

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**4. Areas of consideration include (but not limited to):**

- Force Generation Models
- BOG : Dwell Ratios
- Methods of Service
- Continuum of Service
- Employer Partnerships
- Accessibility

**5. Proposing recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the GEF and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals**

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## Objectives 2-5 (Cont)

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- OASD-RA lead: DASD; Readiness , Training & Mobilization
- Key Stakeholders:
  - Offices of Under Secretaries of Defense
  - Service Secretary representatives
  - Representatives of Service Chiefs
  - Office of the CJCS
  - Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau
  - COCOM representatives
  - Reps for Directors of CAPE and Net Assessment
- Method:
  - Strategic context for this review will be provided by:
    - QDR; JOE; Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; DPPG; GEF
  - Focus on ramifications for the Total Force
    - Leverage GFMP; Operational Availability 10; Force Sufficiency GOSC, DPPG Analytic Agenda

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## Objective 6

6. Propose needed law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands and conditions determined in Objectives 2-5.

- RA lead: DASD; Manpower & Personnel
- Key Stakeholders:
  - As stated for Objectives 2-5
  - Others as required
- Method:
  - Informed by work on Objectives 2-5
  - Bin change recommendations toward appropriate issue resolution tools
  - Propose mechanisms to effect change

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
## Organization of Final Report

- Forward signed by Co-Sponsors
- Concise Executive Summary
- Extensive Main Body Report
- Annexes with detailed analysis IAW Objectives:
  - Annex A: OBJ 1
  - Annex B: OBJs 2-5
  - Annex C: OBJ 6

**Allocating significant time for vetting (Nov 10 – Jan 11)**

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## Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab

**Status:**

- University Affiliated Research Center
- National Security Analysis Department

**Role:**

- Facilitate Pentagon EXCOM/Planner level sessions
  - Readahead and Executive Summary preparation
  - Maintain Review website
- Host Collaborative Analysis Workshops
  - Laurel, MD campus
  - NLT Sep 2010, Crystal City location at full operational capability
- Document research and analysis
- Conduct Interviews
- Perform key stakeholder surveys
- Final outbrief and report preparation

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Draft Working Paper

**Comprehensive Reserve  
Review Collaborative  
Analysis Workshop**

*Objectives and Agenda  
17 Aug 2010*

Dean Simmons  
240 228 2835  
dean.simmons@jhuapl.edu

**APL**  
*The Johns Hopkins University*  
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

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This briefing provided an overview of the collaborative analysis workshop including the following information: the workshop purpose, agenda, and associated tasks/ focus; the relationships between key study components, a summary of the output from the previous Carlisle workshop/ conference; the contemporary security posture including the selected scenarios to be examined in this workshop for RC roles and contributions; and the types of information that will be presented and the associated surveys that will be conducted for Objectives 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

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## Workshop Objectives

This Collaborative Analysis Workshop is being conducted in support of the Comprehensive Reserve Review directed in the FY2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Workshop will

- Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks
- Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop

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## Objectives 2-4


2. Leverage Departmental plans for the future to best determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage during drill time, periods of Active Duty, and during mobilization
3. Determine those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice
4. Determine the conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve available for Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers. Areas of consideration include (but not limited to):
  - Force Generation Models
  - BOG : Dwell Ratios
  - Methods of Service
  - Continuum of Service
  - Employer Partnerships
  - Accessibility

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## Carlisle Conference Participants

**OASD(RA)**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Service Secretariats</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Army</li> <li>• Navy</li> <li>• Air Force</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>OSD</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USD(Policy)</li> <li>• USD(P&amp;R)</li> <li>• USD(Comptroller)</li> <li>• USD(AT&amp;L)</li> <li>• USD(Intelligence)</li> <li>• OSD General Counsel</li> <li>• Director CAPE</li> <li>• Director Net Assessment</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chairman, JCS</li> <li>• Chief of Staff, Army</li> <li>• Chief of Naval Operations</li> <li>• Chief of Staff, Air Force</li> <li>• Commandant, Marine Corps</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Joint Staff, J8</u></li> <li>• <u>US Coast Guard</u></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Combatant Commands</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USCENTCOM</li> <li>• USEUCOM</li> <li>• USPACOM</li> <li>• USSOUTHCOM</li> <li>• USAFRICOM</li> <li>• USNORTHCOM</li> <li>• USJFCOM</li> <li>• USSOCOM</li> <li>• USTRANSCOM</li> <li>• USSTRATCOM</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Reserve Components</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Office of the Chief, Army Reserve</li> <li>• Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau</li> <li>• Office of the Director, Army National Guard</li> <li>• Office of the Chief, Navy Reserve</li> <li>• Office of the Chief, Air Force Reserve</li> <li>• Office of the Director, Air National Guard</li> <li>• Office of the Director, Coast Guard Reserve</li> <li>• Reserve Forces Policy Board</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>Requirements Briefs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• J3 – Global Force MGT / FADM</li> <li>• J8 – Operational Availability 10</li> <li>• OSD Policy – DPPG Analytic Agenda Scenarios</li> </ul>
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## RC Mission Sets Considered

**OASD(RA)**

<b><u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</u></b>	Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
<b><u>Military Engagement Teams</u></b>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.
<b><u>Individual Augmentation</u></b>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
<b><u>Institutional Support</u></b>	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.

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## Carlisle Conference Output

**OASD(RA)**

Type Information	Mission Set			
	Rotating Operational Forces (Home&Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentee	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<b><u>Missions / Tasks</u></b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3	<div style="border: 1px solid gray; padding: 10px; background-color: #f0f0f0;"> <p><b>Conference attendees divided into four Working Groups, one for each of the broad mission sets</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working Groups led by OSD(RA) or JS personnel, assisted by AWC faculty facilitators</li> <li>Primary objective: identify missions / tasks for which RC is well-suited to include underlying justification</li> <li>Secondary objective: to the extent possible, provide information related to other study objectives</li> </ul> </div>			
<b><u>Conditions and Standards</u></b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<b><u>Organizational Adjustments</u></b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<b><u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u></b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				

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## Workshop Agenda

0830	Introduction: Mr. Smiley	RC Utilization	Conditions & Standards Personal Life	0830	
	Overview: Dr. Simmons	Mission Prioritization			
0930	Best Uses – Scenario 1	Break	Conditions & Stds Survey	0930	
	Break	Conditions & Standards Military Assignments		Break	
1030	Best Uses – Scenario 2	Conditions & Standards Military Career	AC/RC Mixes	1030	
	Best Uses – Scenario 3		Lunch	Lunch	
1130	Lunch	Conditions & Standards Military Career	AC/RC Costs	1130	
	Best Uses – Scenario 4		Laws, Policies, Doctrine		
1230	Best Uses – Scenario 5	Conditions & Standards Civilian Career	Conditions & Stds Survey Results	1230	
	Survey		Break		
1330	Break	Conditions & Standards Civilian Career	Wrap-Up Mr. Smiley	1330	
	Preferred RC Roles				
1430	ROT, MET Survey				1430
	IA, INST Survey				
1530				1530	
1630				1630	

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## Workshop Tasks

- **Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks**
  - **Best uses (OBJ 2)**
  - Preferred roles (OBJ 3)
  - Best uses and preferred roles for institutional forces (OBJ 2 & 3)
- Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve (OBJ 4)
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop
- JHU/APL role

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## Objective 2: Leverage Future Plans / Studies of the JS and Services Page 1/2

- **Leverage future plans/studies of the JS and Services [or other sources] to determine how to use the capability and capacity of Guard and Reserve to best advantage, e.g.,**
  - DoD / JS / Service plans, policies and budget documents related to RC training, equipping and use (in coordination with AC)
  - DoD / JS / Service reports and testimony to Congress on related RC initiatives & issues
  - DoD / JS / Service sponsored studies and assessments on RC issues (e.g., the RC 2020 Study)
  - Other studies and assessments - by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, by think tanks (e.g., CSIS), by the GAO, and by others
  - Military lessons learned documents for RC activities - both overseas and homeland related
  - Other RC-related thought pieces in professional journals, in graduate theses, from reservist associations and from other venues

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## Objective 2: Leverage Future Plans / Studies of the JS and Services Page 2/2

- **Comprehensive study review must address:**
  - All reserve and national guard components of all Services, to include the USCG
  - All major national security challenges
  - Full array of required military capabilities
  - Potential reforms to better operationalize RC for overseas activities
  - Potential reforms to better operationalize RC for roles and missions in defense of the homeland
  - Elements and capabilities required to provide strategic depth & surge capability when needed
  - Best way to integrate RC and AC as a total force

Additional information regarding each of these broad subject areas appears in “Supporting Detail”

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## Objective 2 Focus

- Characterize potential force employment scenarios
- Conduct facilitated discussion of AC, RC, and Civilian participation in each scenario
  - Primary role
  - Secondary role
  - Limited role
  - No role
- Given RC involvement, discuss nature of that involvement
  - Rotational operational forces (ROT)
  - Military engagement teams (METs)
  - Individual augmentees (IAs)
- Once all scenarios have been discussed, participants take scenario-by-scenario survey to establish
  - Expected level of AC, RC, and CIV involvement
  - Nature of RC involvement (ROT, METs, IAs)

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
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## Contemporary Security Posture

OASD(RA)



- Major Combat Operation
- Large-scale Stability Op
- Steady State Engagement
- Homeland Defense
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Institutional Forces

Source: Integrated Security Posture  
Defense Planning Scenario; April 2008

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## Scenarios Considered

- **Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)**
  - Examples: Iraq (early OIF)
- **Large-scale Stability Operations** – security, reconstruction, development
  - Examples: Iraq, Afghanistan
- **Steady State Engagement Activities** – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance
  - Examples: Horn of Africa, Philippines, Colombia
- **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)**
  - Examples: Haiti earthquake, Indonesia tsunami, Pakistan earthquake
- **Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)**
  - Examples: Katrina

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## Broad Mission Sets Considered

### OASD(RA)

<p><b><u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</u></b></p>	<p>Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).</p>
<p><b><u>Military Engagement Teams</u></b></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.</p>
<p><b><u>Individual Augmentation</u></b></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.</p>
<p><b><u>Institutional Support</u></b></p>	<p>Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.</p>

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## Force Employment Surveys (For each of five Scenarios)

### Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

Results to be aggregated by Force Providers [Services, RC] and by Force Employers [COCOMs]

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



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



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## Force Employment Survey Results

### Force Employment in Scenario i



### RC Force Employment in Scenario i



NOTIONAL



Results to be aggregated by Force Providers [Services, RC] and Force Employers [COCOMs]

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## Workshop Tasks

- **Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks**
  - Best uses (OBJ 2)
  - **Preferred roles (OBJ 3)**
  - Best uses and preferred roles for institutional forces (OBJ 2 & 3)
- Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve (OBJ 4)
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop
- JHU/APL role


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## Objective 3: Determine Missions Where Guard / Reserve Is the Force of First Choice



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# How We Choose To Employ the RC May Be Affected by the Intensity of Use

**Non-Stressing Case:** Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11

**Stressing Case:** Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11





Figure 1. Reserve Component Members on Active Duty

Source: Hoffman, F., "The Guard and Reserve in America's New Missions," *Orbis*, Spring 2005.

Source: Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.

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## Missions / Tasks for RC Rotating Operational Forces

OASD(RA)

Type Information	Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Team	Support Force)
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3			
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			

**Combat**

- Full spectrum Sustainment/ Follow on forces
- Cyber
- Nuclear C2
- Space C2
- Strategic Intel/ Targeteering
- Theater specific C2
- National C2
- ISR
- Civil Affairs

**Security**

- Anti-Terrorism Force Protection
- Foreign Internal Defense & Irregular Warfare
- Stability Ops
- Cyber
- Civil Affairs

**Engagement**

- Theater Security Cooperation
- Unified Legislation & Budgeting [non-Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)]
- Allied exercises
- Security Force assistance
- Partnership Programs
- Civil Affairs



**Relief and Reconstruction**

- Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
- Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction
- Medical Readiness Training (MEDRET)
- Civil Affairs

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## Missions / Tasks for RC Military Engagement Teams

**OASD(RA)**

Type Information	Mission Set			
	Rotating Operational Forces(Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentee	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3		□		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Professional Military Education</li> <li>• Conventional Military Operations</li> <li>• Intelligence</li> <li>• Health Affairs</li> <li>• Maritime Security</li> <li>• Engineering</li> <li>• Logistics</li> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Stability Operations</li> <li>• Information Operations</li> <li>• Air and Missile Defense</li> <li>• Homeland Defense &amp; Security</li> <li>• Defense Support to Civil Authorities</li> </ul>
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				

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## Force Utilization Survey: Military Engagement Teams

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Professional Military Education</li> <li>• Conventional Military Operations</li> <li>• Intelligence</li> <li>• Health Affairs</li> <li>• Maritime Security</li> <li>• Engineering</li> <li>• Logistics</li> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Stability Operations</li> <li>• Information Operations</li> <li>• Air and Missile Defense</li> <li>• Homeland Defense &amp; Security</li> <li>• Defense Support to Civil Authorities</li> </ul>		

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

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## Missions / Tasks for RC IAs

**OASD(RA)**

Type Information	Mission Set			
	Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentee	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cyber</b></li> <li>• Linguists</li> <li>• Planners &amp; Strategists</li> <li>• Specific Logistics</li> <li>• Finance</li> <li>• <b>Acquisition/Contracting</b></li> <li>• <b>UAV – RPA</b></li> <li>• Scientists</li> <li>• Regional Experts</li> <li>• Human Resources</li> <li>• <b>Environmental</b></li> <li>• <b>Agriculture</b></li> <li>• <b>Energy</b></li> <li>• PSYOPS</li> <li>• CBRNE Response</li> </ul>			
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				
<div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">                     Red text indicates new or emerging task                      All are likely to require non-standard approaches                 </div>				

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## Force Utilization Survey: Individual Augmentees

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cyber</b></li> <li>• Linguists</li> <li>• Planners &amp; Strategists</li> <li>• Specific Logistics</li> <li>• Finance</li> <li>• <b>Acquisition/Contracting</b></li> <li>• <b>UAV – RPA</b></li> <li>• Scientists</li> <li>• Regional Experts</li> <li>• Human Resources</li> <li>• <b>Environmental</b></li> <li>• <b>Agriculture</b></li> <li>• <b>Energy</b></li> <li>• PSYOPS</li> <li>• CBRNE Response</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Legal</li> <li>• Intel</li> <li>• IT/C4I</li> <li>• Logisticians</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Engineers (combat &amp; civil)</li> <li>• Public Affairs</li> <li>• Operations / AOs</li> <li>• Training</li> <li>• Aviation Support</li> <li>• Specific Combat Arms</li> </ul>		<div style="border: 1px solid gray; padding: 10px; background-color: #e0e0e0;"> <b>Response Choices</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 = Extensive</li> <li>• 4 = Significant</li> <li>• 3 = Moderate</li> <li>• 2 = Limited</li> <li>• 1 = None</li> </ul> </div>

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

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## Individual Augmentation: Notional Survey Results

**NOTIONAL**



### Goals

- Identify “preferred missions/tasks” for RC
- Identify differences in preferences for “stressing” and “non-stressing” cases

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## Workshop Tasks


- **Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks**
  - Best uses (OBJ 2)
  - Preferred roles (OBJ 3)
  - **Best uses and preferred roles for institutional forces (OBJ 2 & 3)**
- **Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve (OBJ 4)**
- **Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop**
- **Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop**
- **JHU/APL role**

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## Broad Mission Sets Considered

**OASD(RA)**

<p><b><u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</u></b></p>	<p>Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).</p>
<p><b><u>Military Engagement Teams</u></b></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.</p>
<p><b><u>Individual Augmentation</u></b></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.</p>
<p><b><u>Institutional Support</u></b></p>	<p>Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.</p>

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## Force Employment Survey: Institutional Forces

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

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
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
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## Institutional Forces Survey Results

### Role in Providing Institutional Force Capabilities



### RC Force Employment when Providing Institutional Force Capabilities



Results to be aggregated by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]

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## Missions / Tasks for RC Institutional Support Forces

OASD(RA)			
Type Information	Rotating Op Forces(Home)		Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<u>Missions / Tasks</u> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3		<u>Training</u> Basic Training Advanced Individual Training Instructor Support Instructor Training Officer Professional Development Training NCO Professional Development Training ROTC Support Small Arms Instructors Support Services to the Academies  <u>Recruiting</u> Recruiting  <u>Logistic Support</u> Central Issue Facilities Transportation Support Depot Maintenance  <u>Services</u> Medical Health Dental Legal  <u>Admin</u> Pay / Admin Services Personnel Support Activities HQ Staff Augmentation Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains Inspector General Complaints / Fraud Investigations  <u>Readiness</u> MOB Center Operations Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement & Integration (JRSOI)  <u>Certifications</u> Training Evaluation Inspector General Inspection Teams Exercise Validation  <u>Public Affairs</u> Communication Support Public Affairs  <u>Cyber Security</u> Network Security Base Security Firefighters  <u>Facilities</u> Engineering Construction	
<u>Conditions and Standards</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<u>Organizational Adjustments</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<u>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</u> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			

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## Force Utilization Survey: Institutional Missions / Tasks

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<u>Training</u> Basic Training Advanced Individual Training Instructor Support Instructor Training Officer Professional Development Training NCO Professional Development Training ROTC Support Small Arms Instructors Support Services to the Academies  <u>Recruiting</u> Recruiting  <u>Logistic Support</u> Central Issue Facilities Transportation Support Depot Maintenance  <u>Services</u> Medical Health Dental Legal  <u>Admin</u> Pay / Admin Services Personnel Support Activities HQ Staff Augmentation Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains Inspector General Complaints JRSOI  <u>Readiness</u> MOB Center Operations JRSOI  <u>Certifications</u> Training Evaluation Inspector General Inspection Teams Exercise Validation  <u>Public Affairs</u> Communication Support Public Affairs  <u>Cyber Security</u> Network Security Base Security Firefighters  <u>Facilities</u> Engineering Construction		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; background-color: #f0f0f0;"> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Response Choices</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 = Extensive</li> <li>• 4 = Significant</li> <li>• 3 = Moderate</li> <li>• 2 = Limited</li> <li>• 1 = None</li> </ul> </div>


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## RC Utilization for Institutional Tasks

NOTIONAL



### Goals

- Identify “preferred missions/tasks” for RC
- Identify differences in preferences for “stressing” and “non-stressing” cases

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## Workshop Tasks

- Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks
  - Best uses (OBJ 2)
  - Preferred roles (OBJ 3)
  - Best uses and preferred roles for institutional forces (OBJ 2 & 3)
- Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve (OBJ 4)**
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop**
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop**
- JHU/APL role**

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## Objective 4

Determine the conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve available for Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families, and employers

- Military benefits (e.g., medical/dental, commissary, education, retirement)
- Training
- Quality of life (e.g., deployments)
- Career progression
- Impact on employers/impact on ability of reservists to get and keep civilian jobs

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
## Key Questions

- Identify the conditions that must be set or in place to enable a reservist (whether in a Unit Rotation, a MET, or serving as an IA) to perform equally as well as his/her active duty counterparts.
- Identify the standards that must be achieved by the reservist to ensure that he/she performs equally as well as his/her active duty counterpart.


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- ## Conditions & Standards: Workshop Approach
- Provide relevant background information:
    - Applicable laws
    - DoD policies
    - DoD regulations or instructions
    - Service doctrine
  - Identify key issues / concerns / shortcomings
  - Discuss potential solutions/remedies
  - Use stakeholder survey to prioritize issues and solution options
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- ## Workshop Tasks
- Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks
    - Best uses (OBJ 2)
    - Preferred roles (OBJ 3)
    - Best uses and preferred roles for institutional forces (OBJ 2 & 3)
  - Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve (OBJ 4)
  - **Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop**
  - **Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop**
  - JHU/APL role
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## Why Revise the Current AC/RC Mix?

- Provide a selected pool of additional capability not needed on a steady-state basis to meet some potential high-priority surge in demand
- Improve active component CONUS/overseas deployment ratios by fulfilling some current deployed force demands on a short-term basis
- Change Reserve Component unit types to better reflect operational needs


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## Comparing AC/RC Mixes



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## Total Force Capability Considerations

AC/RC Mix	Large-Scale Conventional Campaign	Large-Scale Stability Operation	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Existing AC/RC Mix	<i>Included as a baseline against which alternative mixes can be compared</i>				
AC/RC Mix 1					
AC/RC Mix 2					
AC/RC Mix 3					

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## Comparing AC/RC Mixes

OASD(RA)

AC/RC Mix	Relative TF Cost	TF Capability Considerations	Other Considerations
Mix 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RC Cost</li> <li>AC Cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RC Capability Impact</li> <li>AC Capability Impact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recruiting</li> <li>Retention</li> <li>Basing &amp; Infrastructure</li> <li>Equipment</li> <li>Others?</li> </ul>
Mix 2			
Mix 3			
Retain Existing AC/RC Structure	<i>Included as a baseline against which alternative mixes can be compared</i>		

**Assessment Scenarios**

- Large-scale Conventional Campaign
- Large-scale Stability Operation
- Steady State Engagement Activities
- HA/DR
- HD/DSCA

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## Workshop Tasks

- Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks
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- **Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop**
- JHU/APL role

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## Applicable Laws

OASD(RA)

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➢ Subtitle A—General Military Law (§§ 101—2925)</li><li>➢ Subtitle B—Army (§§ 3001—4842)</li><li>➢ Subtitle C—Navy and Marine Corps (§§ 5001—7913)</li><li>➢ Subtitle D—Air Force (§§ 8010—9842)</li><li>➢ Subtitle E—Reserve Components (§§ 10001—18506)</li></ul></li><li>• TITLE 14—COAST GUARD<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➢ PART I—REGULAR COAST GUARD (§§ 1—693)</li><li>➢ PART II—COAST GUARD RESERVE AND AUXILIARY (§§ 701—894)</li></ul></li><li>• TITLE 32—NATIONAL GUARD<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➢ CHAPTER 1—ORGANIZATION (§§ 101—115)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 3—PERSONNEL (§§ 301—335)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 5—TRAINING (§§ 501—509)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 7—SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT (§§ 701—717)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 9—HOMELAND DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (§§ 901—908)</li></ul></li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• TITLE 37—PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➢ CHAPTER 1—DEFINITIONS (§ 101)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 3—BASIC PAY (§§ 201—212)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 5—SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAYS (§§ 301—374)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 7—ALLOWANCES (§§ 401—438)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 9—LEAVE (§§ 501—504)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 10—PAYMENTS TO MISSING PERSONS (§§ 551—559)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 11—PAYMENTS TO MENTALLY INCOMPETENT PERSONS (§§ 601—604)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 13—ALLOTMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF PAY (§§ 701—707)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 15—PROHIBITIONS AND PENALTIES (§§ 801—805)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 17—MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND BENEFITS (§§ 901—910)</li><li>➢ CHAPTER 19—ADMINISTRATION (§§ 1001—1015)</li></ul></li></ul> |
|--|---|
- Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)
  - Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
  - Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)
  - Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
  - Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)
  - Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR)

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## Workshop Tasks

- Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks
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- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop
- **JHU/APL role**

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## JHU/APL Contributions

*JHU/APL analysis team will assist the Government Issue Teams charged with accomplishing the study by providing support in the following specific areas:*

### Information Collection and Synthesis

- Review related studies and assessments
- Conducted independent assessments as requested
- Prepare presentation materials to provide essential information and enable structured discussion of all relevant issues

### Collaborative Analysis

- Host study team meetings
- Conduct Collaborative Analysis Workshops to address OBJ 1, 2-5, 6
- Conduct surveys to assist in prioritizing rebalancing options and potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes

### Documentation

- Prepare presentation materials to support study IPRs
- Document full range of review & assessment activities
- Prepare initial draft of study report

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## JHU/APL Role

- Facilitate discussion of relevant issues and potential solutions
- Be attentive to “Guiding Questions / Principles”
- Conduct surveys to prioritize issues and solutions
- Identify factors that may affect AC/RC mix
- Identify potential changes to laws, policies, or doctrine
- Create After-Action Report to support ASD(RA) brief to Senior Leadership

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## Guiding Questions/Principles

**OASD(RA)**

- Is the Nation’s security improved by using the RC on a rotational basis?
- Does this improvement come, in part, from the connectivity to the American people inherent in RC service?
- Is the country’s defense posture improved by having access to a larger body of ready and capable forces (i.e., the AC and the RC)?
- Does the initiative(s) result in Departmental cost savings?
- Does the initiative(s) reduce stress on the AC?
- Does the initiative(s) preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?

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## Guiding Questions/Principles

**OASD(RA)**

- Develop the Department's business case/overarching framework for utilization of the RC in support of the National Security Strategy.
- Determine if current RC policy and guidance is adequate in support of the Department's business case and associated employment considerations.
- Develop methodology to better manage involuntary mobilizations to meet requirements.
- Assess the cost/benefit of continued access to and use of the RC in an operational role.

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## Opportunities in this Strategic Environment

**OASD(RA)**

<b><i>Campaign (Steady State)</i></b>	<b><i>Contingency (Surge)</i></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Predictable and recurring requirements</li><li>• Provides adequate time for planning and preparations</li><li>• Synonymous with engagement, shaping activities, Phase 0 tasks, campaign plans, security cooperation, building partner capacity and institutional support</li><li>• Potential to primarily source with RC units and personnel in operational role</li><li>• Demand signal not complete as Global Force Management concentrates on OCO requirements</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unanticipated or relatively unforeseen contingencies</li><li>• Limited initial response time</li><li>• Potential to primarily source with AC and specific capabilities in strategic reserve</li><li>• Surge responsibilities can transition to include continually greater contributions from RC in operational role over time</li><li>• Additionally, expect Phases IV and V to be lengthy with requirements that become increasingly more predictable over time</li></ul>

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## Backup Charts

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## Objective 1

**1. Establishing a common Departmental baseline costing methodology for the Total Force and identifying the instances where such common baseline costing is not feasible**

- **RA lead: Resources**
- **Key Stakeholders:**
  - OUSD Comptroller
  - CAPE
  - Net Assessment
  - JS J8
  - Military Departments
- **Method:**
  - First phase of review
  - Feeds results to EXCOM and those working other objectives

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## Objective 5

5. **Propose recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals**

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## Objective 6

6. **Propose needed law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands and conditions determined in Objectives 2-5.**
  - **RA lead: DASD; M&P**
  - **Key Stakeholders:**
    - As stated for Objectives 2-5
    - Others as required
  - **Method:**
    - Informed by work on Objectives 2-5
    - Bin change recommendations toward appropriate issue resolution tools
    - Propose mechanisms to effect change

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Draft Working Paper

**Scenario(s) for Reserve  
Component Mission and Roles  
Assessment**

*Read-Ahead for 17 August Exercise*

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

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APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

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This brief described five scenario categories that were important in helping to refine the Objectives 2 and 3 output from the previous Carlisle workshop/ conference. For each scenario category the following information was provided: key definitions, historical and projected examples of this type scenario, an overview depiction of a relevant OSD planning scenario, the concept of operations and/or lines of operation for that same scenario, and the primary Blue forces notionally involved in that scenario.

ANNEX C  
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## Scenario Categories for Objectives 2 & 3

- **Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)**
- Large-scale Stability Operations – security, reconstruction, development
- Steady State Engagement Activities – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)
- Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

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## Relevant Definitions Related to Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)

- **Major Operation:** A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. (JP 1-02)
- **Full-spectrum Superiority:** The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. (JP 1-02)
- **Major combat operation military problem:** Adversaries with capable militaries, including access denial, information operations, advanced conventional, WMD and irregular warfare capabilities may creatively use them in new ways to coerce or attack friends or Allies, threaten regional stability, or take other actions that pose an unacceptable threat to the United States. The US military must be capable of defeating such adversaries while minimizing the prospects for unintended escalation and considering the burdens of post-war transition and reconstruction. (Source: Major Combat Operations JOC)

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## Historical and Projected Examples of Large-Scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)

- Historical Examples of Large-scale Conventional Campaigns
  - World War II
  - Korean War
  - 1990 Gulf War
  - OIF (initial stages)
  
- OSD Large-scale Conventional Campaign planning scenarios
  - MCO-1, MCO-2, MCO-3
  - CC-1, CC-2, CC-3
  - ISC-A, ISC-B, ISC-C

Today's exercise will focus on the CC-3 large-scale conventional campaign in lieu of an appropriate ISC scenario (still in development – not ready for use in studies/analyses)

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## Depiction of Selected OSD Planning Scenario With Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO) Focus (Classified, Not Shown)

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## Generic Operational Level Objectives\* for Large-Scale Conventional Campaign (MCO) Based on Joint Operation Concept (JOC) Guidance

### Isolate the Adversary

- Isolate from external physical, informational & moral sources of support
- May include CP efforts, embargoes or even blockades
- Could include following operations: joint shaping; access and access denial; air, land, maritime/littoral & space; special and irregular warfare, and public affairs

### Gain & Maintain Operational Access

- Gain access & control in all dimensions & domains
- Take actions to blind enemy
- Exploit basing and force projection options
- Logistics capability options as enabler for sustainment
- Strikes, raids, and other methods (e.g., undersea warfare, offensive counter-air) to defeat enemy's anti-access strategy
- Deny enemy use of WMD

### Deny Enemy Battlespace Awareness (BA)

- Attack enemy's ISR capabilities
- Use IO measures to conceal own operations
- Deny accurate/ actionable intelligence and info to enemy

### Deny Enemy Freedom of Action

- Execute kinetic/ non-kinetic actions against enemy critical areas
- Use operational maneuver to gain positional advantage
- Control of "common" (air, water, space, cyberspace)

### Disrupt Enemy Ability to C2 His Forces

- Employ rapid maneuver & precision engagement capabilities
- Use kinetic and non-kinetic means to destroy or disrupt enemy C3/ coordination

### Deny Use of and Contain WMD & Other

#### Critical Capabilities

- Warn enemy against WMD use and associated extreme consequences after use
- Neutralize enemy-held WMD & their delivery means as needed

#### Disrupt Enemy Sustainment System

- Attack enemy ability to regenerate combat power – with both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., CNA) means
- To include attacks of depots, arsenals, forward supply points, logistics organizations & distribution points

#### Selectively Degrade Enemy Critical

##### Infrastructure & Production Capacity

- Attack & neutralize enemy critical infrastructure nodes and war-related production capacity
- Balance the consequences on the population and for stabilization operations (post-war)

\* To include CNO, EW, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC as appropriate; also to include space system support (navigation, environment monitoring, ISR, communications, etc.) enablers as needed

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## Key Capabilities/ Assets\* Identified for Large-Scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)

### Phase I: Deter

- Liaison packages
- ISR and high priority air mobility assets (tankers and strategic lift)
- Defensive counterair (DCA)
- Theater BMD assets
- IO assets
- Undersea warfare (USW)
- C4 systems (JTF and liaison officer packages)
- NEO
- Offensive counterair (OCA) and strike forces
- Maritime combat forces
- SOF
- Personnel recovery (PR)

### Phase II: Seize the Initiative

- OCA & strike forces
- ISR and high priority air mobility assets (tankers, strategic lift & mission critical tactical lift)
- TBMD assets
- USW
- Maritime combat forces
- Liaison packages
- Space operations assets
- Logistics assets (port opening units)
- Ground combat assets to fall on Army Prepositioned Stocks
- DCA
- IO assets
- C4 systems (JTF & LNO packages)
- PR

### Phase III: Dominate

- IO assets
- OCA and strike forces
- TBMD assets
- Air mobility assets (tankers)
- Ground combat assets
- Maritime amphibious assets
- Logistics assets (CS and CSS)
- Maritime combat forces
- C4 systems (JTF & LNO packages)
- PR
- Space operations assets

**Note:** Phases 0 (Shape), 4 (Stabilize) and 5 (Enable Civil Authorities) are not the focus of this portion of the workshop and are not delineated


\* To include CNO, EW, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC as appropriate; also to include space system support (navigation, environment monitoring, ISR, communications, etc.) enablers as needed

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## Blue Forces for Selected OSD Scenario [Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)]

<p><b>In Place US Forces (Classified, Not Shown)</b></p> 	<p><b>Arriving US Forces (Classified, Not Shown)</b></p> 
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• Note: Does not include force contributions from other coalition members

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## Scenario Categories for Objectives 2 & 3

- Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)
- **Large-scale Stability Operations – security, reconstruction, development**
- **Steady State Engagement Activities – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance**
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)
- Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

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## Historical and Projected Examples of Large-scale Stability Operations

- **Historical Examples of Large-scale Stability Operations**
  - Post-WWII during occupations of Germany & Japan
  - Vietnam War
  - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
  - Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-Afghanistan)
- **OSD Major Combat Operations (ISC-A, ISC-B, ISC-C)** would potentially have large-scale stability operations in the post-conflict stage
- **Several other OSD Planning Scenarios (IR-1, IR-2, IR-3)** have primarily focused on large-scale stability operations
- Approximately two dozen SSSP vignettes have significant stability operations components but are on a smaller scale than IR-1, IR-2, IR-3

Today's exercise will focus on the IR-3 large-scale stability operations scenario

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## **Depiction of Selected OSD Planning Scenario With Large-scale Stability Operations Focus (Classified, Not Shown)**

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## Lines of Operation\* for Selected OSD Scenario (Large-scale Stability Operations Focus)

### Information Operations\*

- Develop C2 network to integrate operations across HN security institutions
- Synchronize intelligence operations conducted by coalition and HN police and military
- Design, plan and conduct tactical information operations
- Provide integrated ISR support (US, coalition allies, HN; sea air, ground)
- Develop and share common operating picture (COP) among US forces, coalition allies, HN, commercial entities, as appropriate
- Disrupt insurgent/ terrorist C2, comms, situation awareness

### Develop HN Security Forces

- Train and advise HN military to provide population security
- Train and advise HN police to conduct law enforcement & intelligence collection operations
- Train and advise HN military to conduct HVT operations (as part of COIN/CT efforts)
- Train and advise HN security ministries and sustaining institutions (service, ministry, district, province)

### Security/ Combat Operations

- Conduct joint security operations with HN security forces ISO COIN/CT/Stability efforts
- Provide combat support enablers to HN security forces, e.g., intel, C2, logistics, precision fires, mobility, sustainment
- Assist HN in defeating adversary indirect fire and IED networks
- Assist HN in establishing public order and developing/ implementing population and resource control measures
- Assist HN in incentivizing, disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former belligerents
- Assist HN to strengthen border security, port, and maritime security, immigrations control and customs enforcement

### Essential Services/ Governance/ Economic Development

- Assist HN/ other organizations in providing for immediate humanitarian needs of HN population
- Conduct distributed small unit security and reconstruction activities
- Support HN in development of local governance
- Assist HN government in the conduct/ obtainment/ coordination of economic development efforts including those from foreign/ international sources

\* To include CNO, EW, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC as appropriate; also to include space system support (navigation, environment monitoring, ISR, communications, etc.) enablers as needed

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## Blue Forces for Selected OSD Scenario (Large-scale Stability Operations Focus)

### Joint, USA, and USMC Forces (Classified, Not Shown)

### USN, USAF, and SOCOM Forces (Classified, Not Shown)

\* Note: Does not include force contributions from other coalition members

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## Scenario Categories for Objectives 2 & 3

- Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)
- Large-scale Stability Operations – security, reconstruction, development
- **Steady State Engagement Activities – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance**
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)
- Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

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

## Relevant Definitions Related to Steady State Engagement Activities

- **Security Assistance:** A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 3-57)
- **Security Cooperation:** All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02)
- **Security Cooperation Activity:** Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a COCOM's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation [TSC] plan. (JP 1-02)
- **Security Force Assistance:** Activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. Also called SFA. (Draft DoD Instruction)
- **Building Partnership Capacity (BPC):** Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DoD and its partners (2006 QDR Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap)
- **Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan:** Strategic planning document intended to link combatant-commander-planned regional engagement activities with national security objectives, this supporting the "engagement" portion of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. (Security Force Assistance Planner's Guide, SFAPG)
- **Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Tools:** combined/multinational education, combined/multinational exercises, combined/multinational experimentation, combined/multinational training, counternarcotics assistance, counter/non-proliferation activities, defense and military contacts, defense support to public diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, information sharing/intelligence cooperation, international armaments cooperation, security assistance, other programs and activities. (TSC portion of SSSP scenarios)

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ANNEX C  
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## Lines of Operation\* for Selected SSSP Vignette (Steady State Engagement Activity Focus)

### Train & Employ Indigenous and/or Surrogate Forces

- Provide security training/advisors/military assistance for host nation (HN) forces to increase their capacity
- Provide support/training on intelligence fusion
- Provide security until rebuilt HN security forces (mil, police)
- Train air units (fixed, rotary) on security; develop needed air capabilities
- Increase capacity of HN police for counter-narcotics (CN)
- Train, advise, and assist HN to conduct combined and/or unilateral counter-terrorism (CT) operations

### Combat

- Interdict lines of communication (LOCs) – ground, air, maritime, finance, cyberspace
- Deny/defeat/destroy terrorist networks; deny safe havens & other supporting operations
- Capture/kill high value individuals (HVIs) on actionable intel
- Employ effective security forces – combat, combat support (CS), CSS (augmenting HN capabilities as required)
- Intercept arms/money for terrorists
- Interdict/undermine support for drug production/trade
- Coordinate/develop fixed wing and rotary aircraft capabilities

### Essential Services

- Stabilize contested areas/former safe havens
- Support HN efforts to provide security for nation building activities
- Provide combat service support (CSS) functions to augment HN capabilities
- Improve HN ability to govern and meet citizen needs
- Assist in construction of key infrastructure
- Assist in establishing basic services and utilities (medical, power, water (irrigation/wells) and crop development)

### Economic Development

- Stabilize contested areas/former safe havens
- Conduct civic assistance project (CAP) activities to increase pro-US/pro-HN sentiment

### Unconventional Warfare (UW)

- (Classified, Not Shown) - separate UW activities focused on a particular locale in region

\* With requisite C2, mobility/logistics, ISR, medical, IO (CNO, EW, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC), space system support (navigation, environment monitoring, ISR, communications, etc.)

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## Blue Forces for Selected SSSP Vignette (Steady State Engagement Activity Focus)

**USA, USAF, and USMC Forces  
(Classified, Not Shown)**

**USN and SOCOM Forces  
(Classified, Not Shown)**

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## Scenario Categories for Objectives 2 & 3

- Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)
- Large-scale Stability Operations – security, reconstruction, development
- Steady State Engagement Activities – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)
- Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

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## Relevant Definitions Related to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)

- **Humanitarian Assistance:** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 1-02)
- **Foreign Disaster Relief:** Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 1-02)
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance:** Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02)
- **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance:** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

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## Historical and Projected Examples of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)

- Various Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) efforts, e.g.,
  - Bangladesh typhoon relief (Operation SEA ANGEL, 1991)
  - Kurds in Iraq refugee camps/feeding (Operations PROVIDE COMFORT I & II, 1991-1996)
  - Rwanda humanitarian crisis (Operation SUPPORT HOPE, 1994)
  - Central American Hurricane Mitch relief (Operation FUERTO APOYO, 1998)
  - Kosovo and Albania humanitarian crisis (Operation SHINING HOPE, 1999)
  - Mozambique (Maputo) flood relief (Operation ATLAS RESPONSE, 2000)
  - Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka tsunami relief (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, 2005)
  - Haiti earthquake relief (Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, 2010)
  
- More than a dozen of the SSSP vignettes are related to FHA

Today's exercise will focus on an SSSP vignette related to a projected FHA mission that has a significant U.S. military component

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## Depiction of Selected SSSP Vignette With Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) Focus (Classified, Not Shown)

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## Blue Operations/Methods\* for Selected SSSP Vignette (Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response Focus)

- **Specific Details for This Vignette are Classified (Not Shown) but a Notional Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operation Would Contain the Following Elements (according to USFFC):**
  - Situation assessment
  - Mission statement development (and associated metrics)
  - CONOPS development (including support to other USG agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, and international organizations as appropriate)
  - Phased deployment of forces
  - Strategic lift and logistics considerations
  - Command and control
  - Communications security
  - Interoperability
  - Intelligence support during crisis response
  - Liaison with U.S. embassy's country team, UN, and other humanitarian relief agencies
  - Civil-military operations (CMO)
  - Civil engineering support
  - Medical/ health services support
  - Security/ force protection
  - Media/ strategic communications

\* With requisite C2, mobility/logistics, ISR, medical, IO (CNO, EW, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC), space system support (navigation, environment monitoring, ISR, communications, etc.)

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## Blue Forces for Selected SSSP Vignette (Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Response Focus)

USA  
(Classified, Not Shown)

Joint, USAF, USMC, and USN Forces  
(Classified, Not Shown)

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## Scenario Categories for Objectives 2 & 3

- Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)
- Large-scale Stability Operations – security, reconstruction, development
- Steady State Engagement Activities – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)
- **Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)**

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## Relevant Definitions Related to Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

- **Homeland Defense:** The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 1-02)
- **Homeland Security:** A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. Also called HS. (JP 1-02)
- **Domestic Emergencies:** Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. Domestic emergencies include civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, and natural disasters. See also civil defense emergency; civil disturbance; major disaster; natural disaster. (JP 1-02)
- **Civil Support:** Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. See also military assistance to civil authorities. (JP 1-02)
- **Defense Support of Civil Authorities:** Civil support provided under the auspices of the National Response Plan. Also called DSCA. (JP 1-02)
- **Consequence Management:** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

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## Historical & Projected Examples of Homeland Defense/ Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)

- Various US natural disasters including Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (that had a significant DSCA component to the associated disaster response)
- A half-dozen DSCA vignettes and a half-dozen HD related vignettes are contained in the SSSP documentation
- (15) National Planning Scenarios against all hazards, both man-made and natural (nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, natural disasters, explosives, cyber), e.g., for federal interagency community use in disaster response & consequence management planning
- Various OSD scenarios related to large catastrophic events (e.g., WMD related) to the homeland – six such scenarios were used in 2009 in a study sponsored by OSD PA&E (now CA&PE) that examined both prevention/ interdiction and disaster response

Today's exercise will focus on an SSSP vignette related to DSCA that has a significant RC (primarily NG) component

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## Depiction of Selected SSSP Vignette: 4-02 U.S. With Homeland Defense/ Defense Support of Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA) Focus

Vignette: SSSP 4-02, U.S.: DSCA – Preparation for Hurricane

Time: Notionally 2014 w/ event lasting up to 7 weeks

Location: US with the anticipated JOA to include Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina

Issue: Steady state capabilities and total force response to prepare for major, but less than catastrophic, hurricane; this is a DSCA vignette with DoD in a supporting role

- Significant local, state, and interagency preparation and response to notional Category 3 Hurricane "Kira"
- Unity of effort is needed among DoD, local and state governments, state NG forces, and primary and coordinating agencies
- DoD military response will come primarily from the NG under state control (state active duty or Title 32); however federal military (Title 10) forces may also be engaged when requested
- DHS will provide overall coordination for the federal response
- When directed DoD, through NORTHCOM, will conduct DSCA activities (CONPLAN 2501)



Key goals are:

- Save lives and prevent suffering
- Protect critical infrastructure
- Renew essential services ASAP

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## Blue Concept of Operations\* for Selected SSSP Vignette (HD/ Defense Support to Civil Authorities Focus)

- **Shaping (Phase I)**
  - Gain situation awareness via appropriate ISR assets including various space systems (e.g., NPOESS) and WC-130 sorties
  - Alert Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)
  - Identify units
  - Nominate base support installation (BSI) for staging support to Title 10 forces
  - Conduct training and rehearsals
  - Develop/ maintain common operational picture (COP)
  - Public affairs outreach (continues all phases)
- **Staging (Phase II)**
  - Deploy DCO/DCE/CAE/EPLOs\* in timely manner for effective interagency (fed, state, local) coordination
  - Position forces to facilitate quick response
  - Identify potential DSCA mission (e.g., C2, LOG, MED)
  - Establish base support installation (BSI)
  - Request for forces (RFF) to support DSCA mission
  - Request/establish federal mobilization center to assist logistics & support provided to FEMA/other agencies
- **Deployment (Phase III)**
  - Activate and deploy C2
  - Establish RUF
  - Establish LNOs
  - Movement of forces, e.g., initial response forces
  - Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)
- **Support of Civil Authorities (Phase IV)**
  - Conduct DSCA to include IO, logistics/lift, C3, rotary- and fixed-wing support, CS/CSS, sustainment
  - NG forces conduct operations as needed, e.g., security, transportation and logistics, patient movement/treatment
  - Maintain COP, assess mission and adapt as needed
  - Report Commander's Critical Info Requirements (CCIR)
  - Transition planning
- **Transition (Phase V)**
  - Forces redeploy incrementally/ C2 stands down
  - Transfer of OPCON back to respective commands
  - Maintain awareness and capture lessons

\* DCO=Defense Coordinating Officer, DCE=Defense Coordinating Element, CAE=Commander's Assessment Element, EPLO=Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer

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## Blue Forces for Selected SSSP Vignette (HD/ Defense Support to Civil Authorities Focus)

Joint, USAF\*, USMC, and USN Forces  
(Classified, Not Shown)

USA\*  
(Classified, Not Shown)

\* Includes Guard units under Title 32 authority

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## Proposed Survey (One per Scenario)

### Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

• Discussion of AC, RC, and Civilian participation in each scenario  
 Primary role  
 Secondary role  
 Limited role  
 No role

• Given RC involvement, discuss missions/ roles where Guard/Reserve are the force of first choice

• Given RC involvement, discuss nature of that involvement  
 Rotational operational forces (ROT)  
 Military engagement teams (METs)  
 Individual augmentees (IAs)

When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]


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
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## Force Employment Survey Results

### Force Employment in Scenario i



### RC Force Employment in Scenario i



Results to be aggregated by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]

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## Backup Charts

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## Workshop Objectives

This Collaborative Analysis Workshop is being conducted in support of the Comprehensive Reserve Review directed in the FY2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Workshop will

- **Further refine and prioritize RC missions and tasks**
- Flesh out conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve
- Begin to identify alternative AC/RC mixes for consideration in OBJ 5 Workshop
- Begin to identify potential law, policy, and doctrinal changes for consideration in OBJ 6 Workshop

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## RC Mission Sets Considered

**OASD(RA)**

<b><u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home &amp; Abroad)</u></b>	Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
<b><u>Military Engagement Teams</u></b>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.
<b><u>Individual Augmentation</u></b>	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
<b><u>Institutional Support</u></b>	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.

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

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## Objective 2 Focus

- **Characterize potential force employment scenarios**
- **Conduct facilitated discussion of AC, RC, and Civilian participation in each scenario**
  - Primary role
  - Secondary role
  - Limited role
  - No role
- **Given RC involvement, discuss nature of that involvement**
  - Rotational operational forces (ROT)
  - Military engagement teams (METs)
  - Individual augmentees (IAs)
- **Once all scenarios have been discussed, participants take scenario-by-scenario survey to establish**
  - Expected level of AC, RC, and CIV involvement
  - Nature of RC involvement (ROT, METs, IAs)

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## Objective 3: Determining Missions Where Guard / Reserve Is the Force of First Choice

### Identify Planning Factors and Assumptions that inform the mission area analysis, e.g.,

- Availability is limited by law and policy (i.e., duration and dwell)
- **Guard:**
  - DoD requirements should be complementary to role of serving the state
  - Personnel profile similar to active component
  - "Standalone" force
  - Civilian skill alignment may have penalty when supporting domestic disaster or security disturbance (e.g., Guard doctors and security personnel may be already occupied)
- **Reserve:**
  - Full Mobilization "gap fill"
  - Personnel profile more senior than active component
  - "Standalone" force and / or capability "enhancement"
  - Civilian skill alignment with mobilization needs minimizes DoD's training and development costs



### Key questions:

- What OEF / OIF missions have the guard and reserve supported?
- How has the guard / reserve supported individual augmentation/ mobilization requirements?
- National Security Strategy documents provide guidance regarding roles and missions, and QDR identifies force structure requirement for DoD / what are implications for guard and reserve force structure?
- What high demand Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) skills and capabilities place significant risk on AC?
- Do components plan to source SSSP requirements with Guard / Reserve?



### Analysis Output:

- List of missions well-suited for Guard
- List of missions well-suited for Reserves

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## Proposed Survey: Optimal Rotational Force Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<p><b>Combat</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full spectrum Sustainment/Follow on forces</li> <li>• Cyber</li> <li>• Nuclear C2</li> <li>• Space C2</li> <li>• Strategic Intel/ Targeteering</li> <li>• Theater specific C2</li> <li>• National C2</li> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection</li> <li>• Foreign Internal Defense &amp; Irregular Warfare</li> <li>• Stability Ops</li> <li>• Cyber</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Engagement</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theater Security Cooperation</li> <li>• Unified Legislation &amp; Budgeting [non-Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)]</li> <li>• Allied exercises</li> <li>• Security Force assistance</li> <li>• Partnership Programs</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Relief and Reconstruction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief</li> <li>• Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction</li> <li>• Medical Readiness Training (MEDRET)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul>		<p><b>Response Choices</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 = Extensive</li> <li>• 4 = Significant</li> <li>• 3 = Moderate</li> <li>• 2 = Limited</li> <li>• 1 = None</li> </ul> <p><b>Stressing Case:</b> Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11</p> <p><b>Non-Stressing Case:</b> Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11</p>

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## Proposed Survey: Preferred MET Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Professional Military Education</li> <li>• Conventional Military Operations</li> <li>• Intelligence</li> <li>• Health Affairs</li> <li>• Maritime Security</li> <li>• Engineering</li> <li>• Logistics</li> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Stability Operations</li> <li>• Information Operations</li> <li>• Air and Missile Defense</li> <li>• Homeland Defense &amp; Security</li> <li>• Defense Support to Civil Authorities</li> </ul>		

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

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## Proposed Survey: Preferred IA Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cyber</b></li> <li>• Linguists</li> <li>• Planners &amp; Strategists</li> <li>• Specific Logistics</li> <li>• Finance</li> <li>• <b>Acquisition/Contracting</b></li> <li>• <b>UAV – RPA</b></li> <li>• Scientists</li> <li>• Regional Experts</li> <li>• Human Resources</li> <li>• <b>Environmental</b></li> <li>• <b>Agriculture</b></li> <li>• <b>Energy</b></li> <li>• PSYOPS</li> <li>• CBRNE Response</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Legal</li> <li>• Intel</li> <li>• IT/C4I</li> <li>• Logisticians</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Engineers (combat &amp; civil)</li> <li>• Public Affairs</li> <li>• Operations / AOs</li> <li>• Training</li> <li>• Aviation Support</li> <li>• Specific Combat Arms</li> </ul>		

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

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## Proposed Survey: Optimal RC Utilization for Institutional Missions / Tasks

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<p><b>Training</b> Basic Training Advanced Individual Training Instructor Support Instructor Training Officer Professional Development Training NCO Professional Development Training ROTC Support Small Arms Instructors Support Services to the Academies</p> <p><b>Recruiting</b> Recruiting</p> <p><b>Logistic Support</b> Central Issue Facilities Transportation Support Depot Maintenance</p> <p><b>Services</b> Medical Health Dental Legal</p> <p><b>Admin</b> Pay / Admin Services Personnel Support Activities HQ Staff Augmentation Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains Inspector General Complaints MOB Center Operations JRSOI</p> <p><b>Readiness</b> Training Evaluation Inspector General Inspection Teams Exercise Validation</p> <p><b>Public Affairs</b> Communication Support Public Affairs</p> <p><b>Cyber Security</b> Network Security Base Security Firefighters</p> <p><b>Facilities</b> Engineering Construction</p>		

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

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

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## Proposed Survey for Institutional Forces

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

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
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ANNEX C  
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This brief provided an overview for study Objective 4 related to conditions and standards. As such, it provided the following: an overall context for a conditions and standards assessment; an introduction to (and framing of) the survey that would be given to the workshop participants at the end of their conditions and standards deliberations; and a delineation of the key references used to generate the information that would be provided to the these same participants.

## Task 4

Determining the conditions and standards that provide for trained and ready Guard and Reserve available for Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families, and employers

- Military benefits (e.g., medical/dental, commissary, education, retirement)
- Training
- Quality of life (e.g., deployments)
- Career progression
- Impact on employers/impact on ability of reservists to get and keep civilian jobs



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## Task 4 Questions

- Identify those conditions that must be set or in place to enable a reservist (whether he be in a Unit Rotation, MET, or IA) to perform equally as well as his active duty counterparts.
- Identify those standards that must be achieved by the reservist to ensure that he performs equally as well as his active duty counterpart.

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ANNEX C  
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- **Educational Assistance for Recruitment and Retention: Enabling an Operational Reserve.** Lieutenant Colonel Maria I. Lopez, United States Army Reserve, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 15 March 2008.
- **Sustaining the National Guard as an Operational Force.** Colonel Walter L. Mercer, United States Army National Guard, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 29 January 2010.

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## Conditions and Standards References (4 of 5)

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- **White paper, New Guard and Reserve.**
- **PowerPoint: A Total Force Policy for the Operational Reserve.** Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
- **AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge.** Dallas D. Owens, Jr., The Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001.
- **Deployment Experiences of Guard and Reserve Families Implications for Support and Retention,** Laura Werber Castaneda, et al, RAND, 2008.
- **How Can the Military Best Support Guard and Reserve Families During Deployment?** RAND, 2009.
- **Reserve Component Programs, The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,** April 2005.
- **Reserve Officers Association Legislative Agenda,** 2010.
- **ROA Position Paper: Continuity of Health Care: TRICARE for Reservists.** 7 January 2010.
- **Preparing and Using the Army National Guard for Future Wars.** Rodney Robinson, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050, 30 March 2007.

9

## Conditions and Standards References (5 of 5)

- Medical and Physical Readiness of the U.S. Army Reserve for Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom: Recommendations for Future Mobilizations. *Military Medicine*, 170, 6:443, 2005. COL Michael Silverman, MC USA, et al.
- The Operational Reserve. *The Officer*, Jun 2007, David A. Smith.
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- Personnel Policies for an Operational Army National Guard. Barry K. Vincent, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301, 13 June 2008.
- Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model. William O. Woodring, Major, USARNG, Master's Thesis US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.
- The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report. Christine E. Wormuth, et al, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006
- How Can the DoD Minimize the Impact on the Reservist/National Guardsman's Civilian Employer while Transforming to an Operational Force? Maj. Timothy H. Wright, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301, 13 June 2008

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## Rules of Engagement

YOU ARE HERE



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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- ➔ ▪ **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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**BACKUP**

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## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (1 of 3)

### **Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (Title 10 USC § 12304)**

- To respond to use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States. Not to be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection.
- ≤ 200,000 total, including ≤ 30,000 IRR
- ≤ 365 days.

### **Partial Mobilization. (Title 10, § 12302)**

- National emergency declared by the President
- Service Secretaries may activate ≤ 1M members of the Ready Reserve
- ≤ 24 months.

Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008

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Davis, Lt. Col. Jose. *Army National Guard Readiness Transforming to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College. Web. <<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA423418>>

*MILITARY Pre-Deployment Guide*, Updated September 3, 2008.

Wormuth, Christine E., Michele A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006. Web. <[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf)>.

### **Presidential Reserve Call-Up**

Under a Presidential Reserve call-up (PRC), the President has the authority to activate, without declaration of a national emergency, no more than 200,000 National Guard and Reserve service members (no more than 30,000 of which may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve) for a period of up to 365 days to meet mission requirements within the United States or overseas. Service members called to active duty under PRC may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection. To execute a PRC, the President must notify the Congress within twenty-four hours and state the reason for this action.

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**Partial Mobilization**

Partial mobilization is the expansion of the active duty force resulting from action by the Congress or by the President to mobilize the Ready Reserve Component units, individual National Guard or Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency. When expanded as an act of the Congress, partial mobilization can increase up to full mobilization, but when done as an act of the President, no more than one million National Guard and Reserve service members may be mobilized, and they cannot be mobilized for more than twenty-four consecutive months. Partial mobilization responds to an external threat to national security. Full Mobilization Full mobilization is the expansion of the active duty force resulting from an action by Congress and the President to mobilize all National Guard and Reserve service members. This mobilization includes all units and personnel in the existing approved force structure, as well as retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support. National Guard and Reserve service members can be placed on active duty during full mobilization for the duration of the emergency plus an additional six months. Full mobilization is done to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

**Total Mobilization**

Once a state of emergency exists, the Congress can extend full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure and the resources needed for their support. Total mobilization brings the industrial base up to full capacity to provide the additional resources, equipment, and production facilities needed to support the military and involves the active force, the National Guard and Reserve, and the entire Militia of the United States. The Militia of the United States consists of the Organized Militia and Unorganized Militia. The Organized Militia is comprised of the National Guard and Naval Militia. The Unorganized Militia consists of every able-bodied male citizen or person wishing to be a citizen between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, as well as female members of the National Guard.

More information on National Guard and Reserve mobilization can be found on the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs website, located online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/index.html>.

## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (2 of 3)

### **Full Mobilization. (Title 10 USC § 12301)**

- In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law
- Service Secretaries may activate any member of the reserve components for the duration plus six months.
- Inactive and retired reservists may be called up if required.

### **Total Mobilization**

- Once a state of emergency exists, Congress can extend full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units or personnel. Total Mobilization involves the active force, the National Guard and Reserve, and the entire Organized Militia (National Guard and Naval Militia ) and Unorganized Militia (every able-bodied male citizen or male wishing to be a citizen between the ages of 17 and 45).
- Includes Industrial Mobilization.

Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008

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Davis, Lt. Col. Jose. *Army National Guard Readiness Transforming to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College. Web. <<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA423418>>

*MILITARY Pre-Deployment Guide*, Updated September 3, 2008.

Wormuth, Christine E., Michele A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006. Web. <[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf)>.

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Under a Presidential Reserve call-up (PRC), the President has the authority to activate, without declaration of a national emergency, no more than 200,000 National Guard and Reserve service members (no more than 30,000 of which may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve) for a period of up to 365 days to meet mission requirements within the United States or overseas. Service members called to active duty under PRC may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection. To execute a PRC, the President must notify the Congress within twenty-four hours and state the reason for this action.

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**Total Mobilization**

Once a state of emergency exists, the Congress can extend full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure and the resources needed for their support. Total mobilization brings the industrial base up to full capacity to provide the additional resources, equipment, and production facilities needed to support the military and involves the active force, the National Guard and Reserve, and the entire Militia of the United States. The Militia of the United States consists of the Organized Militia and Unorganized Militia. The Organized Militia is comprised of the National Guard and Naval Militia. The Unorganized Militia consists of every able-bodied male citizen or person wishing to be a citizen between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, as well as female members of the National Guard.

More information on National Guard and Reserve mobilization can be found on the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs website, located online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/index.html>.

## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (3 of 3)

### **National Guard (Title 10, § 12406)**

- The President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard as necessary to repel an invasion, suppress a rebellion, or execute the laws of the U.S.
- Orders shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

### **State Authority: (Title 32 USC § 328)**

National Guardsmen can also be called up by their governor. When employed in this capacity, National Guardsmen are considered state employees.

Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008


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## Other Mobilization Authority

- **12322. Active duty for health care.** A member of a uniformed service... may be ordered to active duty...for a period of more than 30 days while the member is being treated for (or recovering from) an injury, illness, or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of duty...
- **Title 32, Section 109. In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense forces. A defense force established under this section may be used within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.**

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Category I military retirees are those within their first five years of retirement, under age 60, and not disabled. Category II, those who have been retired more than five years, under age 60, and not disabled; Category III includes all others, including those who are disabled.

Reserve Components of the Armed Forces. Reserve Component Categories. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Rev. September 2005). <http://osd.dtic.mil/ra/documents/RC101%20Handbook-updated%2020%20Sep%2005.pdf>

AGR = Active Guard/Reserve

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
## Comparison of Duty Statuses for National Guard Personnel

	<b>State Active Duty</b>	<b>Title 32</b>	<b>Title 10</b>
<b>Command &amp; control</b> <sup>12</sup>	State Governor	State Governor	Federal President
<b>Who performs duty</b>	Federally organized NG	Organized NG in service of US <sup>1</sup>	AC <sup>8</sup> , RC and National Guard of US <sup>1</sup>
<b>Where duty performed</b>	IAW state law	CONUS	Worldwide
<b>Pay</b>	IAW state law	Federal pay & allowances	Federal pay & allowances
<b>Federal reimbursement</b>	IAW Stafford Act <sup>2</sup> or Cooperative Agreement <sup>11</sup>	N/A personnel costs paid by Federal funds	N/A personnel costs paid by Federal funds
<b>Tort immunity</b>	IAW state law	FTCA <sup>6</sup>	FTCA <sup>6</sup>
<b>PCA<sup>3</sup> application</b>	No	No	Yes
<b>USERRA<sup>4</sup></b>	No, IAW state law	Yes	Yes
<b>SSCRA<sup>5</sup></b>	No, IAW state law	No	Yes
<b>Mission types</b>	IAW state law	IDT, AT, state AGR & other Federally authorized	ODT, ADT, AGR & as assigned, subj. to PCA
<b>Discipline</b>	State military code	State military code	UCMJ <sup>7</sup>
<b>Federal retirement points</b>	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Other benefits</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Medical</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Disability</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Involuntary order to duty</b>	IAW state law	Yes <sup>9</sup>	Yes <sup>10</sup>
<b>Voluntary order to duty</b>	IAW state law	Yes	Yes

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*The Reserve Components of the United States Military With Particular Focus on the Reserve Components of the United States Army, The Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve. An Executive Primer. 2006.*  
<http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/pages/primers/Reserve%20Primer%2026%20May%202006.pdf>

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This slide addresses options to resourcing the Army’s Force Generation Model specifically. What level of manning, training, and equipping is needed at each phase of the rotation? If one assumes that a unit will be ready to be deployed, with no more than minimal theater- or mission-specific training at the beginning of their deployment year, what requirements are generated throughout the other phases of their rotation cycle? A training plan that sustains a short “reset” period of unreadiness followed by a long training period that ramps-up to being ready to deploy at mobilization will generate different costs than a rotation phase that has a long period of relative unreadiness, punctuated by a year of frantic catch-up before a unit can be deployed.

This chart shows two different views for resourcing the readiness of RC units. The first shows an early identification of a mission requirement, and three-four years spent in training, with increasing readiness, so that upon mobilization, the unit is ready to deploy. This is an example of the train-mobilize-deploy model we in Reserve Affairs have been promoting.

The second is a depiction of how the US Reserve Units are currently operating. A RC unit is identified for a mission and works diligently to achieve the readiness necessary to deploy. The unit is mobilized and must spend 3-5 months in additional training. Net result: mobilizations of 15-18 months. This approach holds units in a low level of readiness for a substantial part of their cycle, with an intensive ramp-up in training the year before they are

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expected to deploy. This is a rough depiction of some of the current plans and is undoubtedly believed to be more affordable. Can this really work? If held at low readiness, can a part-time force surge to needed readiness without having to be mobilized? If units must spend 3-6 months mobilized but not deployed, is it really cheaper? What is the impact on retention? On employer support? On families?

There are not easy answers to these questions, but the answers chosen will have a substantial impact on the cost of the reserves in the future.


## Reserve Income Replacement Program (RIRP)

- The Reserve Income Replacement Program (RIRP) pays eligible RC members the difference between civilian and military compensation. Eligibility:
  - Completed 18 months of involuntary active duty, or
  - 24 cumulative months of involuntary active duty within the last 60 months, or
  - Be serving on involuntary active duty for a period >180 days that starts within six months of separation from a previous period on involuntary active duty > 180 days.

RIRP info from 2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook, <http://www.militaryhandbooks.com>

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## Employers of Reserve Component Members



Type of Employer	Total # Employers
Federal Government - DoD	51,437
Federal Government - Other	7,875
Non Profit Institution	2,267
Private, Less Than 500 Employees	61,315
Private, More Than 500 Employees	50,481
State and Local Government	26,239
Unknown	70,788
Total	270,402

Source: ESGR 12/28/09

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## **National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008**

**President Bush signed into law the National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008. The new law aids Guard and Reserve members who are enduring financial hardships to receive bankruptcy assistance. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act of 2005 required that filers go through a rigorous means test in order to prevent individual debt to be discharged into bankruptcy. The National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act exempts them from the means test, allowing for more time to get their finances back in order and to file for bankruptcy protection. This new law applies to those Guard and Reservists who have been on active duty since September 11, 2001. The protection is effective while the service member is on active duty for more than 90 days and for 540 days following activation.**

2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook

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

**Military Unit**

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240-228-2793

**APL**  
*The Johns Hopkins University*  
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

This briefing addressed the various conditions and standards issues related to the military unit and the military career of the RC members. Under the military unit category issues were delineated that related to unit suitability, unit accessibility, unit readiness and unit resourcing. In each of these four areas some background information was provided along with specific issues and the associated potential solutions. Under the military career category issues were delineated that related to accession/transfers, civilian occupation and MOS (military occupational specialty), RC career path, and RC duty status. As before background information, specific issues and the associated potential solutions were provided for each of these four areas.

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- ➔ ▪ **Military Unit**
  - **Unit Suitability**
  - **Unit Accessibility**
  - **Unit Readiness**
  - **Unit Resourcing**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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## Definitions

- **Suitability** – the unit is manned at required levels with personnel that have the right skillsets
- **Accessibility** – policy and procedure allows unit to be employed
- **Readiness** – the unit is able to train and equip to meet standards
- **Resourcing** – there are sufficient funds to sustain the unit at the required levels of readiness

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- ➔ ▪ Unit Suitability
  - Background
  - Issues, Potential Solutions
- Unit Accessibility
- Unit Readiness
- Unit Resourcing
- Military Career
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life

ANNEX C  
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**Background**  
Suitability

“Coupled with the need for significant numbers of military forces in the future, the national security strategy also requires a military capable of executing a wide range of different kinds of military missions. In this context, it does not make sense to focus the Reserve Component exclusively on one or two missions. The Reserve Component should remain multi-mission capable, but also should broaden its focus to include irregular warfare and preparing for catastrophic or disruptive challenges, just as the active duty military is doing. It is time to move beyond the historical focus on fighting “the big war,” and place more emphasis on missions like stability operations and homeland defense and civil support.” (Wormuth)

“According to officials, the key reasons for the brigades’ continuing difficulties in meeting the readiness goals are (1) personnel shortages and (2) too much to do in the time available although many other problems also influence readiness.” (GAO/NSIAD – 00-114)

“While deploying units abroad, it must still maintain the training and readiness of units at home, which may themselves be needed to deploy quickly for a variety of different threats and emergencies. It must preserve its manpower base through successful recruiting and retention in both the AC and the RC. And it must ensure that future generations of soldiers get proper training for both warfighting and stability operations.” (Davis)

“Recognizing that the National Guard is likely to form a significant component of any response force to a major event in the United States it makes sense to have a senior leader from the Guard community directly in the NORTHCOM chain of command to ensure the capabilities, culture and constraints of the Guard are well understood, and to build partnerships among NORTHCOM, the states and territories, and the National Guard Bureau. (Wormuth)

- Themes: Issues of Manning and Skillsets
  - The RC must ensure it has the proper manning levels to meet the nation’s current mission requirements.
  - The RC must ensure it has the proper skillsets to meet the nation’s current mission requirements.
  - The RC must continue to embrace irregular warfare and civil support.
- References:
  - Davis, Lynn E, et al. “Stretched Thin: Army forces for Sustained Operations.” Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005.
  - GAO/NSIAD – 00-114 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel and Workload Are Problems.
  - Wormuth, Christine, et al. “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report.” Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Manning (1 of 2)

Suitability

- **Issue:** Unit-level manning is insufficient, requiring cross-leveling prior to MOB
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Army should closely monitor the multifunctional support brigades to determine whether manning levels are sufficient (Wormuth)
  - Man units in the two years preceding MOB year at 105% or more so that units can deploy under ARFORGRN without having to undergo cross-leveling (Wormuth)
  - Create a web-enabled, Joint Mobilization Processing System to provide end-to-end tracking and visibility of activated RC units and individuals (RFPB 2005)

8

- References:

Reserve Forces Policy Board. "2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Manning (2 of 2)

Suitability

- **Issue:** Unit-level manning is insufficient, requiring cross-leveling prior to MOB
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Streamline service access to the IRR and increase IRR relevance and reliability as a service mobilization asset (RFPB 2005)
  - RC members may only transfer to another unit during their “reset” phase

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- References:

Reserve Forces Policy Board. “2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.”  
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

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**Skillsets**  
Suitability

- **Issue:** Historically, the RC focuses on 1-2 mission sets, does not consider irregular war, stability operations
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly (Wormuth)
  - The RC need to remain multi-mission capable, but put less emphasis on conventional campaigns (Wormuth)
  - Leverage the NG to form the backbone of regional Civil Support Forces (Wormuth)
  - Appoint a NG GO as Deputy Command of NORTHCOM (Wormuth)

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- References:

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
  - **Unit Suitability**
  - ➔ ▪ **Unit Accessibility**
    - **Background**
    - **Issues, Potential Solutions**
  - **Unit Readiness**
  - **Unit Resourcing**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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**Background**  
Accessibility

In the post-September 11 period, the existing authorities may no longer be structured appropriately to strike the delicate balance among providing the President access to the Reserve Component for a variety of different contingencies, ensuring that the Reserve Component is used prudently and judiciously, and enabling the Reserve Component to function as part of an operational force over a sustained period of time. (Wormuth)

“Re-engineer mobilization and demobilization policies, practices, and procedures to reverse the trend towards lengthier mobilization times, and improving predictability and notice.” (SECDEF Reserve Affairs)

RC forces need to be more responsive. Each component should create quick reaction forces for both the Reserve and National Guard to support homeland defense mission. The National Guard has already addressed creating a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This force is called the Rapid Response Force (RRF) which consists of one Battalion Headquarters at each FEMA region. (Woodring)

“The Commission believes that the mobilization statutes provide no effective limitation on the number and duration of mobilizations under a partial mobilization. The cap on the number of reservists that can be mobilized under a partial mobilization is now a meaningless threshold, given the size of the Ready Reserve.” (CNGR)

- Themes:

- Law and policy should allow for easier access to the RC

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [White Paper], "The New Guard and Reserve." 6 November 2006.

Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. "Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model," Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

## Access to RC Units (1 of 5)

Accessibility

- **Issue:** Access to RC is prevented by policy, procedure
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Department of Defense needs to propose a new set of mobilization authorities to Congress to enable routine but judicious use of the RC as part of the operational force (Wormuth)
  - Revise laws/policies that impede timely delivery of DoD support (IDA - Gotz)
  - Each RC should develop a quick reaction force similar to the NG Rapid Response Force (RRF) (Woodring)
  - Review the entire issue of how we fund our service members in order to get them into the fight. Problems associated with this issue inhibit planning and execution and is a source of enormous frustration (RFPB 2005)

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- References:

Gotz, Glen A. "Strengthening Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve." Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. "2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. "Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model," Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Access to RC Units (2 of 5)

Accessibility

- **Issue:** Access to RC is prevented by policy, procedure
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Secretary of Defense should mandate that future programming decisions and budget requests be linked to the delivery of desired outcomes, conveyed in budget justification material in a manner that clearly delineates funding for reserve programs.(CNGR)
  - The Army should adopt the policy to mobilize whole units for deployment. Combatant Commanders should request required capabilities by unit type and FORSCOM should work with NGB to obtain candidate units to meet those requirements. (Vincent)

14

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Vincent, Barry K. "Personnel Policies for an Operational Army National Guard." Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 June 2008.

## Access to RC Units (3 of 5)

Accessibility

- **Issue:** Access to RC is prevented by policy, procedure
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Modify the NRP-CIA to include immediate consideration for DoD to allow National Guard response in Title 32 status. This would enable NGB to work with the individual states to start bringing Guardsmen onto duty and preparing to move to the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Also, follow the existing NRP premise that a Presidential declaration makes the situation an INS, and the INS triggers the NRP-CIA. Caution must be taken to ensure that the “push” of resources is coordinated to ensure the capabilities needed are “pushed,” with minimal duplication or gaps in capability. (Meyer)

15

- References:
  - Meyer, Allen L., Colonel. “National Guard Use in Response to Incidents of National Significance.” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 30 March 2007.

## Access to RC Units (4 of 5)

Accessibility

- **Issue:** Access to RC is prevented by policy, procedure
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Congress should update 10 U.S.C. §12311 to provide for contract-based service agreements for units and individuals of the reserves. (CNGR)
  - DOD should employ a contract-based service and incentive system to ensure access to the reserve components and to provide predictable and sustainable activations. (CNGR)
  - The services should expand the number of variable participation reserve units. (CNGR)
  - The contract-based system of assured availability recommended here should form the basis of accessing the Operational Reserve. (CNGR)

16

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Meyer, Allen L., Colonel. "National Guard Use in Response to Incidents of National Significance." USAWC Strategy Research Project, 30 March 2007.

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## Access to RC Units (5 of 5)

Accessibility

- **Issue:** Access to RC is prevented by policy, procedure
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Congress should amend the partial mobilization statute (10 U.S.C. §12302) to clarify congressional intent with regard to the duration of the mobilization obligation. (CNGR)

17

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
  - **Unit Suitability**
  - **Unit Accessibility**
  - ➔ ▪ **Unit Readiness**
    - **Background**
    - **Issues, Potential Solutions**
  - **Unit Resourcing**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background (1 of 2)

Readiness

“Our analysis of the training conducted by the replacement and roundout brigades the year before Operation Desert Storm showed that replacement brigade soldiers had substantially more opportunities to develop proficiency in the key building blocks of Army training: leadership, individual, and crew skills. As a result, replacement brigade soldiers were better trained to lead, achieved higher rates of individual skill qualification, and were more proficient in tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunnery skills. Replacement brigade units completed far more collective training exercises at the company, battalion, and brigade levels, thus providing brigade and battalion staffs with a greater opportunity to develop proficiency in complex synchronization skills—the most difficult doctrinal and leadership task in the Army.” (GAO)

“When decision-makers compare the cost-value of various options, they must plan to compare units that are at the same level of readiness. Indeed, it serves little purpose to maintain only partially ready units because they require significant investment in time and money prior to deployment either at home or abroad. It is better to have fully manned, trained, and equipped units—both Active and Reserve Components—that are capable of deploying with minimal train-up periods.” (McKinley)

“Assessments of personnel and equipment readiness are generally based on calculations of the percentage of these resources available. Assessments of training readiness however, based on the unit commanders’ subjective estimate of the time needed for the unit to be fully trained for its mission once called to active duty.” (GAO)

“The Army also desires to move RC units away from the alert-mobilize-train-deploy scenario that has been so common to date to one where RC units only need to train-alert-deploy.” (Whitlock)

“As recently as March 30, 2006, a senior official testified that the Army “expects the requirement beyond fiscal year 2006 to be \$12 billion to \$13 billion per year through the period of conflict and for two years beyond. Any reset requirement that goes unfunded in one year rolls over to the following year, increasing that following year’s requirement.” (Wormuth)

19

- Themes: Equipment, Training, Individual
  - When expected to be fully mission capable, and given the means, RC can meet standards
  - An operational RC must be given the means; manning, training, equipment – to meet AC standards
  - RC units should be assessed/evaluated in the same manner as the AC
  - If following the AC standards for readiness, the RC can evolve from “alert-mobilize-train-deploy” to “train-alert-deploy” model
  - To do so requires enhancement in training, equipment, and other aspects of personnel readiness such as individual medical readiness
- References:
  - “ARMY TRAINING: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades.” Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 4 November 1992.
  - McKinley, Craig R., General. “The National Guard: A Great Value for America.” Washington DC: The National Guard Bureau, July 2010.

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Whitlock, LTC Joseph E, USAR. "How to Make Army Force Generation Work for the Army's Reserve Components." Carlisle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

ANNEX C  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Background (2 of 2)

Readiness

“The ARFORGEN model needs to be implemented and more detailed to expand on the five-year or six-year training cycle. Each similar unit should have similar training over the course of the model. Units in year one should send soldiers to courses or advanced schooling. Year two would be individual training. Year three would be squad, platoon, and company collective training on METL tasks. Year four would be validation of battalion training, and year five consists of validation of mission requirements.” (Woodring)

“Recent Service procurements have not always been sufficient to meet growing requirements to replace and modernize the RC equipment inventories; therefore Congress provides additional funds for the RC in the form of NAREA. These funds which vary from year-to-year have helped significantly to alleviate shortfalls in RC equipment procurement. NAREA projections beyond FY 2010 are not provided because the Services do not budget for these funds.” (Taylor)

“Create training policies and procedures that enable the Reserve components to train to a higher readiness level prior to mobilization, expanding opportunities for joint and coalition training, and increasing the use of technology to expand training alternatives.

“Develop equipping strategies which provide sufficient equipment to effectively train Reserve component units through all phases of their deployment rotational cycle, and ensure that all Reserve component units are fully supplied with compatible equipment upon deployment.

“Ensure that the Reserve components are provided the resources necessary to man, equip, and train units, with a particular emphasis on the cyclical needs of rotational use.” (SECDEF Reserve Affairs)

Medical Readiness Days: Instituting two medical readiness days per year would allow reserve component soldiers to go on active duty in order to get medical or dental care completed without loss of income. The days can be pooled, meaning that if one soldier does not need all or some of the annual two-day allotment, a commander may transfer that allotment to another soldier in the unit, who may require additional days of treatment. (HASC)

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
- Themes: Equipment, Training, Individual
  - Readiness of the RC must evolve from “alert-mobilize-train-deploy” to “train-alert-deploy” model
  - This requires enhancement in training, equipment, and other aspects of personnel readiness such as individual medical readiness
- References:
  - “Challenges Associated with Achieving Full Dental Readiness in the Reserve Component.” Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress Second Session. 23 April 2008.
  - Taylor, Stuart, COL. “National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2011.” Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2010.
  - US General Accounting Office. “Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved, but Personnel and Workload Are Problems.” Washington DC: GAO, June 2000.

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Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. "Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model," Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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The slide features a header with the word "Equipment" in large red font and "Readiness" in smaller black font below it. The background of the header is a light beige color with a faint, circular seal on the left side. The main content area is white and contains two bullet points. The first bullet point is "Issue: Enhancements are needed to ensure RC equipment must be congruent with AC performance requirements". The second bullet point is "Potential Solutions:" followed by a sub-bullet point: "The Department of Defense needs to address the substantial equipment shortfalls facing the RC (Wormuth)". A small number "21" is located in the bottom left corner of the slide.

**Equipment**  
Readiness

- **Issue:** Enhancements are needed to ensure RC equipment must be congruent with AC performance requirements
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Department of Defense needs to address the substantial equipment shortfalls facing the RC (Wormuth)

21

- References:

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Training (1 of 2)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Training regimen must be adjusted, fit into force generation models to ensure RC can fulfill mission
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Army should either increase the training levels envisioned under ARFORGEN, or make explicit that additional post-mobilization training will continue to be required and adjust deployment lengths accordingly (Wormuth)
  - Evaluate RC unit readiness one year prior to MOB
    - RC units that fail to meet standards remain on AD until certified

22

- References:

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Training (2 of 2)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Training regimen must be adjusted, fit into force generation models to ensure RC can fulfill mission
  
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The ARFORGEN model needs to be implemented and more detailed to expand on the five-year or six-year training cycle. Each similar unit should have similar training over the course of the model. Units in year one should send soldiers to courses or advanced schooling. Year two would be individual training. Year three would be squad, platoon, and company collective training on METL tasks. Year four would be validation of battalion training, and year five consists of validation of mission requirements. (Woodring)

23

- References:

Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. "Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model," Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

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## Individual (1 of 4)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Individual medical readiness represents a significant problem
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Establish an RC individual medical readiness (IMR) standard (RFPB 2005)
  - Resource medical readiness screening to ensure compliance with statutory/regulatory requirements (RFPB 2005)
  - The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should create an account in the Defense Health Program for the reserve components to meet the individual medical readiness (IMR) requirements that it has established, and then hold individuals and their unit commanders responsible for maintaining individual medical readiness standards. (CNGR)

24

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. "2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Individual (2 of 4)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Individual medical readiness represents a significant problem
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - DOD should provide annual dental screening at no cost to service members. (CNGR)
  - To encourage reservists to maintain dental readiness, Congress should, for the member only, reduce the out-of-pocket costs for restorative dental care (currently 20–50 percent) under the TRICARE Dental Program. (CNGR)
  - All services should adopt a policy of requiring service members to be medically ready at the time they complete annual training requirements. (CNGR)

25

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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## Individual (3 of 4)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Individual medical readiness represents a significant problem
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Commanders of all National Guard and Reserve units should be held responsible for the individual medical readiness of their unit, and reserve component members should have appropriate incentives to meet IMR standards. (CNGR)
  - Congress should authorize that service Secretaries may provide members of the Ready Reserve any medical and dental screening and care that is necessary to ensure that the member meets the applicable medical and dental standards for deployment. (CNGR)
  - To provide such screening and care, service Secretaries should be authorized to use any available funds appropriated for the operations and maintenance for the reserve components involved.(CNGR)

26

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

ANNEX C  
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## Individual (4 of 4)

Readiness

- **Issue:** Individual medical readiness represents a significant problem
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Release within 30 days from active duty reporting Army Reserve soldiers with permanent or temporary conditions that are not qualified for deployment (Silverman)

27

- References:

Silverman, Michael, COL, MC, USA, "Medical and Physical Readiness of the US Army Reserve for Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom: Recommendations for Future Mobilizations." *Military Medicine*, 170, 6:443, 2005.

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration


- **Military Unit**
  - **Unit Suitability**
  - **Unit Accessibility**
  - **Unit Readiness**
  - ▪ **Unit Resourcing**
    - **Background**
    - **Issues, Potential Solutions**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

ANNEX C  
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## Background (1 of 2)

Resourcing

“It is too early in the modularization process to determine whether the planned design for support units will have sufficient capabilities to support the brigade combat teams. It is also too early to determine whether there are sufficient numbers of these units, or to assess whether near-term manning and equipment shortages will have a significant negative effect on their performance. As the Army gains experience with these new units, it should monitor them closely so that it will be better positioned to determine whether adjustments to the design or quantity of support brigades is needed.” (Wormuth)



29

- Themes: Equipment shortfalls, Funding ARFORGEN
  - The full impact of equipment degradation due to WOT is not yet clear.
  - Funding will be needed to ensure ARFORGEN is successful.
- References:

Wormuth, Christine, et al. “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report.” Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

ANNEX C  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Background (2 of 2)

Resourcing

**“In addition, as the conflict in Iraq becomes more protracted, the Guard has had to leave much of its equipment in Iraq so that it can be used by incoming units. The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that since 2003, Army National Guard units have left over 64,000 items valued at over \$1.2 billion overseas. Non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls primarily because: Prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with only 65 percent to 79 per-cent of their required wartime items; and Guard units returning from overseas operations, most notably in Iraq, have left behind equipment, such as radios and trucks, for follow-on forces.” (Eaglen)**

**“Recommend the ARNG change to a Direct Deployment as it transforms to Units of Action and Units of Employment. In addition to the Direct Deployment Process, I recommend the Army utilize LTA’s [Local Training Areas] and standardize Mobilization Standard Operating Procedures. The Army will save resources by taking care of the soldier immediately rather than replacing him at the end of a tour. The current transformation process includes the equipment and training funding. If the Combatant Commander projects the unit mobilization cycles, opportunities for improvement will increase. Redundancies will be reduced or eliminated; units will have their training validated prior to the deployment; and their funding will be based on projected mobilization cycles. Their families, their employers, and their states will have time to prepare for the absence of the soldier and organization. Recommend the Direct Deployment process for the benefit of the soldiers, their families, their employers, and their ARNG organizations. “(Kempenich)**

30

- Themes: Equipment shortfalls, Funding ARFORGEN
  - The full impact of equipment degradation is not yet clear.
  - There can be savings if methods of Train/MOB RC is managed properly
- References:
  - Eaglen, Mackenzie. “Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/11/Equipping-the-Army-National-Guard-for-the-21st-Century>, accessed 12 August 2010.
  - Kempenich, Shawn. “The Army National Guard Unit Mobilization Process Transforming to Meet the Needs of the Future Force” Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2005.

## Equipment Shortfalls (1 of 2)

Resourcing

- **Issue:** The RC suffers from equipment shortfalls
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Army should closely monitor the multifunctional support brigades to determine if funding levels are sufficient (Wormuth)
  - Spending will have to increase. The Administration and Congress must be willing to fund the National Guard at the appropriate levels, not just for personnel increases but also for equipment readiness and training. (Brookings)
  - Training equipment must be sufficient to give service members regular access to modern warfighting equipment so that they can train, and can develop and maintain proficiency, on the same type of equipment with which they will be deployed and fight. (CNGR)

31

- **References:**

Colloquium Brief, U.S. Army War College and 21st Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution. State of the US Military Reserve Components. Compiled by Ralph Wipfli (The Brookings Institution) and Dr. Dallas D. Owens (Strategic Studies Institute), 6 March 2008.

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

## Equipment Shortfalls (2 of 2)

Resourcing

- **Issue:** The RC suffers from equipment shortfalls
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Program elements should be added to the DoD procurement budget justification material and accounting system to increase transparency with regard to reserve component procurement funding and to improve DoD's ability to track delivery of equipment to the reserve components. (CNGR)
  - The services should prioritize funding to restore equipment readiness for the current operations and prioritize programming and budgeting for requirements. (CNGR)

32

- **References:**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

## Funding ARFORGEN (1 of 3)

Resourcing

- **Issue:** ARFORGEN resource requirements are ill defined
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Additional funding is needed to ensure the ARFORGEN training strategy can succeed (Wormuth)
  - Fund units in the two years preceding MOB at 105% or more so that units can deploy under ARFORGEN without having to undergo cross-leveling (Wormuth)
  - Service Secretaries should be held accountable for resourcing and managing their total reserve manpower regardless of category in order to maintain, ready for activation, the optimal pool of personnel with required skills and experience. The Secretary of Defense should report annually to Congress on the status of both the Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. (CNGR)

33

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Funding ARFORGEN (2 of 3)

Resourcing

- **Issue:** ARFORGEN resource requirements are ill defined
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Each service should reassess the number of training and administrative days that reserve component units and members will need prior to activation. The services should fund and implement policies to undertake more pre-mobilization training and to focus training on mission requirements. (CNGR)
  - The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation. (CNGR)

34

- **References:**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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## Funding ARFORGEN (3 of 3)

Resourcing

- **Issue:** ARFORGEN resource requirements are ill defined
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - ARNG change to a Direct Deployment as it transforms to Units of Action and Units of Employment. (Kempenich)

35

- References:

Kempenich, Shawn. "The Army National Guard Unit Mobilization Process Transforming to Meet the Needs of the Future Force" Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2005.

## Military Career

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- ▪ Military Career
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- ➔ ▪ Military Career
  - Accession, transfers
  - Civilian Occupation and MOS
  - RC Career Path
  - RC Duty Status
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
- ➔ ▪ Accession, transfers
  - Background
  - Issues, Potential Solutions
- Civilian Occupation and MOS
- RC Career Path
- RC Duty Status
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life

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**Background**  
Accession, Transfers

“In order to attract prior service personnel to serve, the Reserves and National Guard should offer a contract that would guarantee prior service personnel at least two years at home prior to being called up with their Guard or Reserve unit. Although this approach would require some careful force management to ensure that units had adequate numbers of deployable personnel, the more flexible force management tools recommended above combined with the practice of over-manning reserve units should make this possible. National Guard units in a number of states have recently adopted this approach, and DoD should encourage its use by all reserve components.”  
(Wormuth)

“Many of the specialty areas in highest demand in the military today – such as civil affairs, information technology specialists, and experts in specific countries and cultures – require knowledge and skills that are more often found in civilians who have had years of professional experience. The National Guard and Reserves need to expand opportunities for mid-career professionals with valuable expertise to join these organizations, much as they long have done to recruit medical professionals.”  
(Wormuth)

“This study recommends soldiers be allowed to enter RC units as old as fifty-five if they are fit for duty. Soldiers currently in a duty status can serve until age sixty. It also recommends that soldiers that reach twenty years of Federal active service be allowed to remain on duty until they reach thirty years of Federal Active Service if they are qualified to continue after they reach their twentieth year of service.” (Woodring)

40

- Themes: Recruiting
  - RC should be willing to allow accession and transfer for mid-career professionals, AC members.
  - RC should be able to accept new members up to age 55.
- References:
  - Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. “Army Reserve Components’ Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model,” Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.
  - Wormuth, Christine, et al. “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report.” Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Recruiting ( 1 of 2)

Accession, Transfers

- **Issue:** Current law and policy does not permit RC components to attract mid-career civilians and AC members
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Services should enhance lateral entry opportunities to attract more mid-career recruits in priority specialties (Wormuth)
  - Shield prior service personnel from deployments for a two-year period upon joining the NG or RC (Wormuth)
  - Allow RC members to enter service as old as fifty-five if otherwise fit for duty (Woodring)

41

- References:

Woodring, William O., Major USARNG. "Army Reserve Components' Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model," Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Recruiting (2 of 2)

Accession, Transfers

- **Issue:** Current law and policy does not permit RC components to attract mid-career civilians and AC members
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Members of the current Individual Ready Reserve and all military retirees should be placed into either the Strategic Ready Reserve Force or the Strategic Standby Reserve—depending on their readiness and willingness to serve, and on the need for their skills—and both categories should be managed to take advantage of these individuals' vast experience, including for homeland-related missions. (CNGR)

42

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
  - **Accession, transfers**
- ➔ ▪ **Civilian Occupation and MOS**
  - **Background**
  - **Issues, Potential Solutions**
- **RC Career Path**
- **RC Duty Status**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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**Background**  
Civilian Occupation and MOS

“DoD has begun to explore the concept of a sponsored reserve as part of its Continuum of Service. The sponsored reserve concept originated from a 1992 British military study that recommended exploring whether civilians with reserve status could be used more widely for operational support functions. Under the sponsored reserve concept, contractors employed in the private sector to provide support services for the US military would also be members of a reserve component and would be activated as reservists if and when they were deployed overseas. As activated reservists, these individuals would be subject to the UCMJ, which would resolve many of the legal and operational challenges that traditional contractors present for the Department of Defense.” (Wormuth)

“Standardization of the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) Database. Improvements to the identification of knowledge, skills, and abilities inherent to each reservist courtesy of civilian and military assignments, schools, and training events.” (Punaro)

44

- Themes: Civilian Skillsets
  - The RC should be willing to adapt new methods of service such as the sponsored reserve.
  - Civilian skills should be readily available for reserve assignment, insight into those skills is needed.
- References:
  - Punaro, Arnold. “Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense.” Washington, DC: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 31 January 2008.
  - Wormuth, Christine, et al. “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report.” Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Civilian Skillsets (1 of 2)

Civilian Occupation and MOS

- **Issue:** Some skillsets require surge levels that are not sustained in the RC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - DoD should aggressively pursue the sponsored reserve concept to expand the number of contractors who can deploy into theater as reservists subject to UCMJ (Wormuth)
  - DOD should develop a standardized system for developing and maintaining a “civilian skills database” that is consistent with standardized database formats, such as that used by NATO, to allow worldwide interoperability. (CNGR)
  - The Secretary of the Army should also seek to generate additional military manpower for this purpose, including through military-to-civilian conversions. (CNGR)

45

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Wormuth, Christine, et al. “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report.” Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

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## Civilian Skillsets (2 of 2)

Civilian Occupation and MOS

- **Issue:** Some skillsets require surge levels that are not sustained in the RC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Sustainability and cost effectiveness must be further enhanced by formulating missions that integrate the strengths of the RC, specifically the skills that members retain from their civilian jobs. (Brookings)
  - Leveraging civilian skill sets may also be useful in areas such as information technology (IT) and communications technology. (Brookings)

46

- References:

Colloquium Brief, US Army War College and 21st Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution. State of the US Military Reserve Components. Compiled by Ralph Wipfli (The Brookings Institution) and Dr. Dallas D. Owens (Strategic Studies Institute), March 6 2008

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
  - Accession, transfers
  - Civilian Occupation and MOS
  - ▪ RC Career Path
    - Background
    - Issues, Potential Solutions
  - RC Duty Status
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life

ANNEX C  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

**Background**  
RC Career Path

Reserve component promotion and joint qualification inequities exist. Current laws and policies (Public Law 109-364, Section 519 and Title 10, U.S.C. Section 619a) address requirements for:

- service in joint billets
- completion of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements
- subsequent designation as “joint qualified”

“Current laws and policies do not apply to the reserve component. Advanced JPME (AJPME) program is now available to reserve component but not well integrated with active component; cultural issues exist.” (Joint Forces Staff College)

“...the JPME core curriculum must reflect the operational environment in the CONUS AOR as it relates to post 9-11 realities of Homeland Defense/Civil Support. The goal of JPME for this topic should be developing Joint leaders with a complete understanding of processes, procedures and governing statutes involved in military operations within multiple jurisdictions and levels of government regardless of component.” (Reserve Forces Policy Board)

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- Themes:
  - RC JPME must be congruent to AC

- References:

“Overview of AJPME.” Joint Forces Staff College.

[http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools\\_programs/ajpme/overview.asp](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/ajpme/overview.asp), accessed 12 August 2010.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. “2006 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006.

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**Joint Professional Military Education (1 of 4)**  
RC Career Path

- **Issue:** JPME for RC is not congruent with AC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - For the next five years, DoD should annually increase the number of fully funded slots allocated to reserve component officers at the National Defense University, service war colleges, and the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education II in-residence course to foster greater interaction between active and reserve component students and to increase the number of educationally qualified reserve officers. (CNGR)
  - DoD should direct senior service schools to adjust the curricula and requirements in their distance learning programs to include material that will satisfy JPME II requirements for joint qualifications, as they have done for their in-residence courses. (CNGR)

49

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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**Joint Professional Military Education (2 of 4)**  
RC Career Path

- **Issue:** JPME for RC is not congruent with AC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Capitalizing on technology, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education should be redesigned to provide formats that encourage active and reserve component participation from all services in a manner that satisfies course objectives, affords social interaction, and values the individual service members' time and other obligations. (CNGR)
  - Active component officers should be permitted to attend and receive full credit for AJPME, and the course should be viewed as equivalent to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. (CNGR)

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- **References:**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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**Joint Professional Military Education (3 of 4)**  
RC Career Path

- **Issue:** JPME for RC is not congruent with AC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - DoD should require that all reserve component officers selected for general or flag officer rank attend CAPSTONE; the services should provide full funding for this effort, and the school should have sufficient capacity to accommodate these officers without significant delay. (CNGR)
  - Ensure Homeland Defense / Civil Support are reflected in JPME core curriculum (RFPB 2005)

51

- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. "2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

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**Joint Professional Military Education (4 of 4)**  
RC Career Path

- **Issue:** JPME for RC is not congruent with AC
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - For both active and reserve component officers, criteria for granting joint duty experience credit should be flexible enough to allow for a qualitative assessment of proficiency based on knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint matters, not on inflexible time-based requirements. Congress should expand the statutory definitions of joint matters to incorporate service involving armed forces in operations, including support to civil authorities, with state and local agencies. (CNGR)

52

- **References:**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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## Background

RC Career Path


**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000  
 JAN 15 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Utilization of the Total Force

For several months, the Department has been assessing a number of options on how best to support global military operational needs. A significant question

Third, the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units will remain a one year mobilized to five years demobilized ratio. However, today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that such exceptions be temporary and that we move to the broad application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible. Continue to plan your force structure on that basis.

Year	1, 7, 13, 19, 25	2, 8, 14, 20, 26	3, 9, 15, 21, 27	4, 10, 16, 22, 28	5, 11, 17, 23, 29	6, 12, 18, 24, 30
Task	Train	Train	Train	Train	Train	MOB

The planning objective for the Active Force remains one year deployed to two years at home station. Today, most active units are deploying for one year, returning home for one year, then redeploying. Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.



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- Themes: RC- Only career dwell
  - RC –only career dwell will yield only three MOB in an RC-only career
  - Increase RC career to gain more MOB per member
- References:
  - SECDEF Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force, Jan 2007.

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## RC-only Career Dwell

RC Career Path

- **Issue:** A 20 year RC-only career will only yield three MOB in 1:5 dwell
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Allow NG and RC recruits to attend college w/o risk of activation in exchange for a longer period of service (Wormuth)
  - Mandate 30 years of service for reserve retirement in order to achieve maximum output from the 1:5 BOG/Dwell rate (20 service years = 3 MOB, 30 years = 5 MOB)

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- References:

Wormuth, Christine, et al. "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report." Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006.

## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**


- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
  - **Accession, transfers**
  - **Civilian Occupation and MOS**
  - **RC Career Path**
- ➔ ▪ **RC Duty Status**
  - **Background**
  - **Issues, Potential Solutions**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background

RC Duty Status

“To carry out our mandate, the Commission reviewed the current system of reserve component categories (RCCs) to evaluate whether they provide the best structure for managing a reserve force that both is operational and maintains a strategic ability to surge and rapidly expand the armed forces in times of national emergency or major war. The Commission also examined whether the current categories facilitate the implementation of a true continuum of service, with service members moving smoothly and efficiently along a spectrum from full-time duty to minimal active duty obligation, based on the needs of the services and on individual willingness to accept training time and activations.” (CNGR)



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- Theme: RC Duty Status Types
  - The current RC structure is too unwieldy.
- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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## RC Duty Status Types (1 of 5)

RC Duty Status

- **Issue:** Duty status should be simplified
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - DoD should reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 drills should be replaced with 24 days of active duty. A day's pay should be provided for a day's work without reducing compensation for current service members. The system should be sufficiently flexible to deal with service-specific training requirements. (CNGR)
  - During the transition to two duty statuses, DoD should uncouple existing statuses from pay and other compensation, substantially reduce the number of duty statuses, and standardize them across the services for ease of understanding and use. (CNGR)

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- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

## RC Duty Status Types (2 of 5)

RC Duty Status

- **Issue:** Duty status should be simplified
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - As a part of the process of simplifying duty status categories, Congress should phase out the ADOS category and designate long-term billets as either active duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates reserve members on full-time active duty tours. Such a program would benefit both the reservists, to whom it would provide career-broadening experience, and DoD, which would take advantage of the unique talents and experience within the reserve component. (CNGR)

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- **References:**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

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## RC Duty Status Types (3 of 5)

RC Duty Status

- **Issue:** Duty status should be simplified
  
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Secretary of the Army should prescribe that all military technicians in the Army's reserve components be assigned to the same organization in both their military and civilian capacities at all times, that they be required to maintain full qualification in both their military and civilian capacities, that they deploy with the organization to which they are assigned, and that such technicians who lose their military qualifications shall be either reassigned to non-deploying civilian positions or separated in accordance with established civilian personnel procedures. (CNGR)

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- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

**RC Duty Status Types (4 of 5)**  
RC Duty Status

- **Issue:** Duty status should be simplified
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - The Marine Corps Active Reserve program should be merged into the active component with no loss to the Marine Corps Reserve in total full-time support billets. This merger should be completed in phases to protect the careers of marines currently serving in the Active Reserve. (CNGR)
  - The Navy Reserve's FTS program should be replaced with a program that provides active component full-time support to reserves with no loss in the number of billets that support the reserve component. The transition to active component FTS for the Navy should take place in phases to protect the careers of currently serving FTS Navy reservists. (CNGR)

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- References:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.

## RC Duty Status Types (5 of 5)

RC Duty Status

- **Issue:** Duty status should be simplified
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Provide more full-time support staff (FTSS) for the ARC to accomplish planning, preparation, and administrative tasks. The goal of this recommendation is to reduce the amount of time a soldier spends during mobilization being administratively assessed into the active military system. (Jensen)
  - DoD should exploit the concept of “double volunteer” units—units consisting of reservists who agree in advance to volunteer for mobilization. These units would be composed of reservists whose employers are less affected if they are called up or who do not believe that they will suffer any job-related consequences if frequently called up. (IDA)


61

- References:

Gotz, Glen A. “Strengthening Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.” Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003.

Jenson, Jon A., Major, USANG. “The Effect of Operational Deployments on Army Reserve Component Attrition Rates and its Strategic Implications.” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002.

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## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- ▪ **Civilian Career**
  - **Deployment Notification and Predictability**
  - **Civilian Employer Compensation**
  - **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
  - **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
  - **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
  - **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

1

This briefing addressed the various conditions and standards issues related to the civilian career and the personal life of the RC members. Under the civilian career category issues were delineated that related to deployment notification and predictability, civilian employer compensation, civilian employer satisfaction, synergies between civilian employers and DoD, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994, and small business concerns. In each of these six areas some background information was provided along with specific issues and the associated potential solutions. Under the military career category issues were delineated that related to educational benefits, health benefits, pay and allowances, retirement, family support, and Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). As before background information, specific issues and the associated potential solutions were provided for each of these six areas.

## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- ➔ ▪ **Deployment Notification and Predictability**
  - **Civilian Employer Compensation**
  - **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
  - **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
  - **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
  - **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

## Background: Deployment Notification and Predictability (1 of 2)

Two kinds of notice are provided to reservists:

- Informal alerts (Advance notice to reservists who may be called to AD)
  - In 2007, 58% of surveyed reservists stated they received 30 days advance notice or more
  - Reservists often don't share information with employers because deployment plans change frequently.
- Formal orders
  - 47% received orders 30 or more days prior to having to report. (GAO)

**Top three employers' requests in a 1999-2000 "Reserve Employer Survey":**  
(1) Copies of orders.  
(2) Official notification.  
(3) Longer notification times (with rationale and likely duration, to improve workload planning and lower costs). (Brinegar)

**USERRA requires that employers receive written or oral advance notification but does not specify how far in advance it should be given and does not require notification if "military necessity" or other relevant circumstances prevent giving notice. (GAO)**

In the build up to OIF, there were numerous incidents of Army Reserve Soldiers who were alerted for mobilization and didn't receive orders for weeks. On the other hand, there were a number of Soldiers who were alerted and had to mobilize and deploy in the space of 48 hours due to a new system for approving the mobilization of forces. (LTG James R. Helmly)

Army has increased the amount of notice it provides to mobilizing Army National Guard units from an average of 113 days in 2005 to 236 in 2008. (GAO)

**In a few focus groups there was general agreement that the reservists would each provide their respective employers no more than 30 days notice no matter how much formal or informal notice they received from DoD. (GAO)**

3

**Advance notice.** The law requires that service members provide their employers with advance notice of military service. Notice may be either written or oral. It may be provided by the employee or by an appropriate officer of the branch of the military in which the employee will be serving. However, no notice is required if military necessity prevents the giving of notice, or it is otherwise impossible or unreasonable to give notice.

### 1999-2000 "Reserve Employer Survey":

- A majority of employers indicated that absences due to military obligations were too long.
- Nearly 50% felt that absences over 14 days caused problems [in the workplace].
- 80% of employers were affected by absence of more than 30 days.
- Impact greater on smaller businesses; the most serious effect was increased workload on co-workers.
- More than 1/3 felt that increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve will cause problems in the workplace in the future. (Brinegar)

### References:

Brinegar, Col. George A. *Abrams Doctrine: Has It Been Abused in the GWOT?* Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College.

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<<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA424075>>.

GAO-02-608 Reserve Forces, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02608.pdf>

GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA507086&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

GAO-08-981R Reservists and Employers

<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485273>

Helmly, LTG James R. "The Army Reserve at War and Marching to the Future." as quoted in Dahms, Col. Jonathan A. *An Operational Army Reserve: Implications for Organizational Health*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College, 30 March 2007.

<<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA469094>>.

## Background: Deployment Notification and Predictability (2 of 2)

Predictability is the degree to which requirements are or can be anticipated — both in terms of the type of mission assignment as well as when the mission will occur and how long it will last. – OASD(RA)

Families and employers encounter considerable hardships upon mobilization of a member of the Guard and Reserve for months or years at a time, so predictability is an important issue for the member's family and employer. (*Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2003*)

Predictability – that is, knowing when and for how long a reservist is going to be mobilized – is perhaps the most frequently cited concern of reservists, their families and employers. (CSIS)

“I am willing to serve and the Army is free to deploy me as long as the Army needs me: be it 1 year or 5 years. However, when a Soldier returns home and works to build a career only to be deployed again after a year, or less, we place both the Soldier and employer in a position where they must choose.” (Junior Officer response to Army Reserve conducted an Accession and Analysis (ARARA) Study, cited in Lopez)

There is some apprehension that a long-term, unpredictable deployment system will weaken the employer-reserve component partnership...Greater predictability is vital for businesses in planning for their future as troops are deployed for longer periods of time. (U.S. Chamber of Commerce)

Items that demand immediate attention and that will enhance predictability include:

**Data Collection:** This is a first step toward any sustainable plan to enhance predictability is collecting data on the human resources within the reserve component. With knowledge of the skills within the reserve component, the DoD can then more efficiently assess capacity to meet mission needs and adjust recruiting efforts accordingly.

**Strategic Communication:** In order to help employers understand how the DoD intends to use the reserve component, the DoD should more aggressively communicate with the private sector. By learning directly from senior DoD officials on future mobilization plans, employers will be equipped to manage the work that needs to be done and the human assets available to do it.

**Modern Call Up System:** In order to call up its troops more efficiently, the DoD should implement a modern, information-technology driven call up system that gives employers, families and Guard and Reserve troops advance notification.

### ***Criteria for Assigning Missions to the Reserve***

### ***Components in the Contemporary Strategic Environment***

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, May 2009.

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- References:

Lopez, Lt. Col. Maria I. *Educational Assistance for Recruitment and Retention: Enabling an Operational Reserve*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College, 15 March 2008. Web.

<<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA479725>>.

US Chamber of Commerce,

<http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/defense/nationalguard.htm>

Wormuth, Christine E., Michele A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006. Web.

[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf)

Zapanta, Albert C. *Reserve Forces Policy Board*. United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board. April 2003. Web.

<<http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/documents/2002FYreport.pdf>>.

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## Deployment Notification and Predictability (1 of 2)

- **Issue:** Short notification of deployment adversely impacts the civilian employer and the family.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Stabilize the initial tour of returning soldiers who join RC units so they don't deploy for some reasonable period (RFPB).
  - Improve technology to provide better organization and efficiency to mobilization process (Brinegar).
  - Do not involuntarily recall a RC member for more than 2 years in a 6 year time frame (Brinegar).
  - Provide employers with information about their reservist-employees' activations as soon as the information is available (IDA).
  - Commit to providing members with notification of routine mobilization one year in advance, and mobilization orders at least 30 days prior to departure from home station (CNGR).
  - Structure RC participation to accommodate industrial seasonality, e.g., schedule annual training during the winter for units in northern tier states when it would be less likely to disrupt outdoor employment (CNGR).
  - Ensure that any notice considered sufficient for service members is also sufficient for the military [e.g., no delays in pay once the member is on active duty] (RAND).

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## Deployment Notification and Predictability (2 of 2)

- **Potential solutions (cont'd):**
  - Revalidate the current civilian employer database annually, require service members to update the information in this database annually, and expand the database to include résumé-type narrative information (CNGR, IDA, US Chamber of Commerce).
  - Develop a rotational system so that during a specific time frame, specific Guard/Reserve units would have priority for mobilization.
  - Identify units to be mobilized 24 months in advance (Vincent)
  - Authorize and fund an incentive based extension program to keep RC members in the unit prior to mobilization (Vincent).
  - Improve strategic communications to private sector (U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

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## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
  - **Deployment Notification & Predictability**
- ➔ ▪ **Civilian Employer Compensation**
- **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
- **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
- **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
- **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background: Civilian Employer Compensation

Despite the benefits that the guardsman's military experience brings to his fulltime job, his absences for training and active duty must be accommodated by his employer. Co-workers must take up the slack when a guardsman is absent and often the employer is not able to hire a competent replacement to cover even extended absences because of special skills requirements. Federal law offers the individual guardsman seniority protection, job security, and reemployment rights after required military training and activation. For this reason, the employer must hold a vacancy for the guardsman's return from active duty and in many cases continue to maintain the cost of personal benefits even during periods of absence. (Meyer)

Most employers, like most Americans, are willing to do their part to defend the nation. They find ways to get around the absence of a worker for twelve to eighteen months while he or she is gone for active duty. It is a sacrifice though; the loss of even unskilled employees negatively affects the bottom line. (Fuhr)

When a reservist-employee is demobilized and returns to work with the same employer, the employer must contribute to the reservist's retirement account *what the employer would have contributed had the reservist not been called up....*One company's human resources manager called this an "unfunded mandate" of the federal government. -IDA

**[Employers] must pay the employer's share of health insurance premiums when the reservist is ordered to active duty for 30 days or less. And employers may incur costs for overtime, temporary workers, and training when employees are called to active duty. -IDA**

- References:

Fuhr, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel. Future Army National Guard: Easing Contemporary Challenges of Transformation, USAWC Strategy Research Project. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2006.

Gotz, Glenn A. *Strengthening Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve*. Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003

Meyer, Colonel Mark P. The National Guard Citizen-Soldier: The Linkage between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People. ANG Air War College, 1 April 1996.

## Civilian Employer Compensation

- **Issue:** Federal law mandates certain contributions to reservists' retirement accounts and health insurance premiums. Employers may also incur costs for overtime, temporary workers, and training of replacement staff. Such costs place an unfair burden on the civilian employer.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Reimburse costs of retirement and health insurance costs upon proof of payment and eligibility (IDA).
  - Reimburse or defray overtime payments, costs of training temporary workers, lost sales, or other expenses (IDA).
  - Pay employers a set amount based on the duration of active duty (IDA).
  - Provide/enhance tax incentives for employing reservists (IDA, RFPB, Brinegar, Jensen, ROA).

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
  - **Deployment Notification & Predictability**
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  - **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
  - **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
  - **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
  - **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background: Civilian Employer Satisfaction

[In 2009] ESGR expanded employer outreach efforts, briefing 162,849 employers across all 55 field offices. While the number of volunteers remained fairly steady, their tremendous efforts yielded a 10% increase in briefings over FY 08 (briefed 148,463 employers)... ESGR ...is working with the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) to launch a Department of Defense Employer Survey in FY 10 to capture the pulse of employers and help shape ESGR's outreach efforts.  
-ESGR

DoD must counter the effects of mobilization on the employers of reservists, if the United States intends to maintain a strong and flexible reserve force. America's reserve system requires traditional training of 1 weekend per month and 15 consecutive days of training per year. Reserve soldiers rely on their civilian occupation for the remaining 326 days a year. Thus, the Army is not the reserve soldier's primary source of income. Of course, with every mobilization, soldiers demobilize and return to civilian jobs. In general terms, satisfaction of the employer weighs heavily on the mind of the reservist.  
-Brinegar

11

- References:

GAO-08-981R Reservists and Employers

<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485273>.

Klerman, Jacob Alex. Rethinking the Reserves, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Loughran, David S., Jacob Alex Klerman, and Craig Martin. Activation and the Earnings of Reservists, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

## Civilian Employer Satisfaction

- **Issue:** The loss of the goodwill of civilian employers could seriously impact the smooth functioning of the Guard and Reserve.
- **Potential Solutions:**
  - Expand the mission of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR) to provide employers with range of information across the Federal gov't (CNGR).
  - Establish an annual performance plan for ESGR (GAO).
  - Conduct a periodic survey of employers would help DoD identify changes, warn of new problems, and identify reasons for changes in employer attitudes and behavior (IDA).
  - Some reservists tend to volunteer for many individual duty days, which can be disruptive to the employer and the employer's workforce. Give employers the opportunity to provide input to unit commanders (IDA).
  - Establish an employer advisory council to meet regularly with and provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense (CNGR).

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
  - **Deployment Notification & Predictability**
  - **Civilian Employer Compensation**
  - **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
- ➔ ▪ **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
  - **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
  - **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background: Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD

### Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR)

- DoD agency conducting employer support programs, including informational briefings, mediation and recognition of employers whose policies support or encourage participation in the National Guard and Reserve.
- Missions:
  - Outreach
  - Public affairs
  - Mediation of conflicts between servicemembers and employers

**Since Employers and the Army Reserve share Soldier-Citizens, it makes good business sense to foster long-term relationships, collaborate on the best way to develop and retain our great human talent, provide stability to Families and communities, and promote the strengths of Army Reserve Soldiers.**  
–USAR Employer Partnership

### **Civilian job experience provides unique advantages:**

- **expertise in inherently civilian skills (e.g., IT, engineering)**
- **familiarity with civilian perspectives (e.g., civilian governance)**
- **greater continuity enhances ability to foster long-term partnerships**

### **Army Reserve Employer Partnership Initiative (EPI)**

- **Established in April 2008 to facilitate strategic and mutually beneficial relationships between employers and the Army Reserve.**
- **Partnership agreements currently exist with more than 1100 employers**

### Criteria for Assigning Missions to the Reserve Components in the Contemporary

Strategic Environment, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, May 2009.

- **References:**

US Army Reserve Employer Partnership Backgrounder and telephone conference with staff at [www.employerpartnership.org](http://www.employerpartnership.org)

## Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD

- **Issue:** Lack of synergy between reservists' civilian employers and their Reserve or Guard units represents a missed opportunity for coordinated training and career development efforts.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Explore a "contracted reserve" or "sponsored reserve" program developed around a contract between volunteer civilian employers, their volunteer employees, and the US government to provide a specialized and skilled reserve force for use in time of need that is subject to the UCMJ (CNGR, CSIS).
  - Establish a single agency or civilian contractor at the DoD level and be dedicated to be responsible for the application of all reserve component and civilian employer affairs (Wright).
  - Expand the Army Reserve EPI to other Reserve Components (APL).

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
  - **Deployment Notification & Predictability**
  - **Civilian Employer Compensation**
  - **Civilian Employer Satisfaction**
  - **Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD**
- ➔ **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)**
  - **Small Business Concerns**
- **Personal Life**

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## Background: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (1 of 3)

**USERRA** prohibits employers from discriminating against reservists with respect to hiring, retention, promotion, or other benefits and requires employers to give these individuals time off for military service, **regardless of whether the service is voluntary or involuntary.**

- **Employer requirements:**
  - **Allow employees to participate in military service**
  - **Promptly reinstate employees following military service**
  - **Provide for accumulation of seniority, including pension plan benefits**
  - **Reinstate health insurance**
  - **Provide training or retraining of job skills, including accommodations for disabled**
  - **Protect reservists against discrimination**
- **Reservist employee requirements:**
  - **Provide advance notice of the employee's service**
  - **Return to work in accordance with USERRA guidelines**
  - **Not be separated from service with a disqualifying discharge or under other than honorable conditions**

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### *Reemployment Timetable*

To be eligible for protection under USERRA, the service member must report back to work or apply for reemployment within the following guidelines:

*1-30 days of service Report next scheduled work day \**

*31-180 days of service Apply within 14 days following completion of service.*

*181+ days of service Apply within 90 days following completion of service.*

\* After 8 hours rest plus normal travel time from military training site to place of civilian employment.

- **References:**

ESGR Fact Sheet #2, <http://www.esgr.mil>

## **Background: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (2 of 3)**

### **DoD guidance implementing USERRA:**

- **DoDI 7730.54 directs Army Reserve Soldiers to provide their civilian employment status, their employer's name(s), their employer's complete mailing address, their civilian job titles and the total number of years in their civilian occupation to include timely notification of any employment changes.**
- **DoDI 1205.22 directs all Military Reserve Components to develop policies, establish guidance, obtain technical assistance, and provide consultation and resource necessary to implement and promote employer support programs.**
- **DoDI 1205.12 directs each Reserve Component headquarters and Reserve Regional Command to establish points of contact who can render assistance in employment and reemployment.**
- **DoDD 1250.1 directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide initial and recurring USERRA and employer relations training to all Reserve component members.**

18

- **References:**

Hart, Ted. "Well-being: Army Reserve Employer Relations is Key to 'Optimizing a Shared Workforce'." *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2005.  
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0KAB/is\\_1\\_51/ai\\_n15379252/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_1_51/ai_n15379252/)

## Background: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (3 of 3)

ESGR assists servicemembers and employers by equipping them with information about USERRA. Four main areas serve as a means for increasing awareness of the law: Training, Employer Outreach, Military Outreach and Public Affairs... In FY 09, 4,559 ESGR volunteers hosted 7,339 events and briefings across the country as part of the outreach mission. -ESGR

ESGR informs and educates servicemembers and their civilian employers regarding their rights and responsibilities governed by USERRA. ESGR does not have statutory authority to enforce, but serves as a neutral, free resource to employers and servicemembers. ESGR's trained ombudsmen provide mediation of issues relating to compliance with USERRA. -Navy Reserve Almanac 2010

Congress provided the statutory authority for investigating alleged violations of USERRA to the US Department of Labor (DoL). If the DoL finds an employer has likely violated USERRA and is unable to secure voluntary compliance, the DoL may refer the case to the US Department of Justice for legal action against the employer. -Navy Reserve Almanac 2010

### USERRA gaps:

- **Complaints not resolved through ESGR mediation can take years to adjudicate through Department of Labor (DoL-VETS) complaint or lawsuit.**
- **Roughly 70% of surveyed reservists who said they had complaints did not seek redress.**

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## Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (1 of 2)

- **Issue:**
  - **The USERRA complaint resolution process is cumbersome, and complaints can take years to adjudicate.**
- **Potential solutions:**
  - **Make a single entity accountable for overseeing the entire USERRA complaint resolution process. (CNGR)**

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## Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (2 of 2)

- Issue:
  - Language in USERRA requires modification to ensure servicemembers and employers are adequately protected.
- Potential solutions:
  - Amend USERRA to establish that an employer is entitled to documentation, if available, confirming that an employee performed any period of military service. (CNGR)
  - USERRA's five-year limit and its exemptions should not be eliminated or modified. (CNGR)
  - Both the Internal Revenue Code and USERRA should be amended to specify that when service members are mobilized and until their deployment ends, the "year" in which funds were deposited into their flexible spending accounts be frozen. (CNGR)
  - USERRA should be amended to specify that an exclusion or waiting period may not be imposed in connection with the reinstatement of an employer-based health care plan upon reemployment or upon termination of health care coverage under the Transition Assistance Management Program, whichever is later. (CNGR)
  - Provide protections for mobilized Guard-Reserve students granting academic leave of absences, protecting academic standing and refund guarantees (ROA).
  - Amend to specify that an exclusion or waiting period may not be imposed in connection with the reinstatement of an employer-based health care plan (CNGR).

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
- Civilian Career
  - Deployment Notification & Predictability
  - Civilian Employer Compensation
  - Civilian Employer Satisfaction
  - Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD
  - Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)
- ➔ ▪ Small Business Concerns
- Personal Life

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## Background: Small Business Concerns

### **Small business owners:**

Self-employed reservists are a population of particular concern to DoD and the public, because the businesses these individuals own could be particularly vulnerable to absences resulting from activation... the self-employed are considerably more likely than non-self-employed to experience an earnings loss (24 versus 15 percent), an earnings loss of more than \$10,000 (15 versus 6 percent), or an earnings loss of more than 10 percent (20 versus 9 percent). (RAND)

**Mobilizing [a small businessman] will force his civilian clients to find a new service provider. When he returns to civilian life, he is likely to need to rebuild his client base. (Note that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act [USERRA] will not help such a small-business person. USERRA places obligations on employers. Small business owners are their own employers. (RAND)**

CBO (2005) estimates that about 0.6 percent of small businesses and 0.5 percent of self-employed individuals could be affected by the loss of a crucial employee (or owner) to activation. (RAND)

**Small business employers** represent nearly 70 percent of selected reservists' employers... To improve the effectiveness of DoD's efforts, we [recommend that DoD] develop initiatives to outreach to small businesses. (GAO)

- References:

GAO-08-981R Reservists and Employers

<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485273>.

Klerman, Jacob Alex. Rethinking the Reserves, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Loughran, David S., Jacob Alex Klerman, and Craig Martin. Activation and the Earnings of Reservists, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

## Small Business Concerns (1 of 2)

- **Issue:**

- The burden associated with hiring reservists is particularly acute for small business owners, who may rely heavily on a small cadre of key employees.

- **Potential Solutions:**

- Develop initiatives to specifically conduct outreach efforts to small businesses that employ reservists (GAO).
- Provide information on Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans (MREIDLs) and other assistance from the Small Business Administration to reserve component members and their small business employers at the time they join the National Guard or Reserves (CNGR).

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## Small Business Concerns (2 of 2)

- **Issue:**

- Small-business owner reservists may have their businesses collapse in their absence.

- **Potential Solutions:**

- Develop policies to minimize economic stress, particularly for small businesses and self-employed Reserve component members (New Guard and Reserve).

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
- Civilian Career
- ➔ ▪ Personal Life
  - Educational Benefits
  - Health Benefits
  - Pay and Allowances
  - Retirement
  - Family Support
  - Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life
- ➔ ▪ Educational Benefits
  - Health Benefits
  - Pay and Allowances
  - Retirement
  - Family Support
  - Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)

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## Background: Educational Benefits

Education benefits definitely contribute to retention and recruiting of Army Reserve Soldiers. In 2007, 19,088 Army Reserve Soldiers used TA, 1,021 earned degrees. These statistics provide clear evidence of the desire of Army Reserve Soldiers to further their education (Lopez)

### Montgomery GI Bill – Selected Reserve (MGIB SR):

- Up to 36 months of educational benefits (currently up to \$333/mo., 24% of MGIB benefits)
- Eligibility:
  - Determined by the Selected Reserve components.
  - 6-year obligation in SELRES or NG
  - Completed initial active duty for training.
  - High school diploma or equivalency
  - Remain in good standing in a unit.

### Post 911 GI Bill:

- Covers tuition and fees, not exceeding the most expensive in-state public college, monthly living stipend, stipend for books and supplies.
- Eligibility: at least 90 days of aggregate service on or after September 11, 2001, or individuals discharged with a service-connected disability after 30 days. Some hardship discharges may be eligible.
- Prorated based on active duty service; full benefits require 36 months active duty.

The Army is very inflexible when it comes to civilian education. Upon enlistment, soldiers are promised money for education, tuition assistance, etc., but never have the opportunity to use it because of deployments...I would stay in if I knew I could finish my degree without being snatched up and deployed for 12 to 18 months. - *Response to Army Reserve Accession and Analysis (ARARA) study, cited in Lopez*

“The TA application process is extraordinarily long and difficult to negotiate...Soldiers frequently do not understand the proper procedures for applying for TA and do not complete the application.... Last year [2007], USARC staff responded to 87 Congressional Complaints on TA, the majority related to delays in administrative procedures due to the competence and workload of Educational Services Specialists.” (Lopez)

- References:

Chapter 33, Title 38, U.S. Code.

Chapter 1606, Title 10, U.S. Code.

Hart, Ted. “Well-being: Army Reserve Employer Relations is Key to ‘Optimizing a Shared Workforce’.” *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2005.

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0KAB/is\\_1\\_51/ai\\_n15379252/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_1_51/ai_n15379252/)

Lopez, Lieutenant Colonel Maria I. Educational Assistance for Recruitment and Retention: Enabling an Operational Reserve. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 15 March 2008.

MGIB SR and Post 911 GIB info from 2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook

MGIB SR:

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[http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/ch1606/ch1606\\_pamphlet\\_general.htm](http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/ch1606/ch1606_pamphlet_general.htm)

VA Pamphlet 22-90-3, Revised January 2007

[http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/ch1606/CH1606\\_Pamphlet.pdf](http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/ch1606/CH1606_Pamphlet.pdf)

Post 911 GIB: [http://www.gibill.va.gov/documents/Benefit\\_Comparison\\_Charts.pdf](http://www.gibill.va.gov/documents/Benefit_Comparison_Charts.pdf)

## **Educational Benefits (1 of 3)**

- **Issue:**
  - Amount of MGIB SR benefits is insufficient to compensate RC members for their educational expenses.
- **Potential solution:**
  - Increase benefit of MGIB SR to 47% of MGIB (ROA).

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## **Educational Benefits (2 of 3)**

- **Issue:**
  - Eligibility criteria for MGIB SR and Post 911 GIB are too restrictive.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Permit RC members to utilize their MGIB-SR educational rights even if mobilized (RFPB)
  - Full student loan repayment plan for officer personnel or a four-year funded degree program for a four-year obligation of Reserve service (Lopez)
  - Expand Post 911 GIB eligibility to RC (ROA).
  - Reduce required obligation for MGIB SR to 4 years (ROA).
  - Permit RC servicemembers who have been activated for a specified period to use benefits after discharge (CNGR).

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## **Educational Benefits (3 of 3)**

- **Issue:**
  - The mechanisms for administering MGIB and Post 911 GIB are burdensome and inefficient.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Streamline the administration and execution processes for education assistance programs (Lopez).
  - Ensure Education Services Specialist positions are adequate to handle education assistance workload (Lopez).

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## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**
  - **Educational Benefits**
  - ➔ ▪ **Health Benefits**
  - **Pay and Allowances**
  - **Retirement**
  - **Family Support**
  - **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)**

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## Background: Health Benefits (1 of 2)

Members of the RC and their family members are eligible for different TRICARE benefits depending on their status. Family eligibility is triggered when the RC member:

- Is a participating member of the SELRES and is not eligible for Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP)
- Is serving on active duty for a period of > 30 days
- Is medically retired due to a service-connected injury, illness or disease
- Receives retired pay (> 20 years of qualifying active duty service, > age 60)
- Dies on active duty
- If ordered to active duty in support of a *contingency operation* for > 30 days, family covered up to 90 days before start of active duty and up to 180 days following release

IRR members may purchase TRICARE Dental, but usually do not qualify for any other health benefits when not on active duty

Tricare Reserve Select (TRS) is a premium-based health plan available for purchase by members of the Selected Reserve, excluding IRR and VTU, who are not eligible for or enrolled in Federal Employee Health Benefit plans. The current plan, which became effective Oct. 1, 2007, replaces a complex tier system with varying premiums. The premiums are \$47.51 a month for individual coverage and \$180.17 a month for family coverage. - The Navy Reserve Almanac 2010

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## Background: Health Benefits (2 of 2)

**Only 7% of Reserve Component members subscribe to TRS. - ROA position paper**

Because the health care eligibility and financial liability for service members and their families changes when the service members are mobilized and demobilized, the implementation of integrated pay and personnel systems is essential to ensure hassle-free access to the TRICARE system and its related eligibility and claims payment processes. - CSIS

**Only 8.3% of reservists are currently enrolled in the TRICARE Dental Program... "Just in time" care...is often more expensive, reduces time spent training for deployment, and may necessitate treatment short-cuts. - (HASC Subcommittee, 2008)**

National Guard and Reserve members experience problems when moving from their civilian health care to TRICARE when being deployed. [Family members] frequently must change physicians, which is extremely stressful ...[and] can also experience problems when returning to private healthcare from TRICARE if there is a condition which began while in the TRICARE system. -ROA position paper

A new program will offer "gray area" reservists the opportunity to purchase TRICARE health care coverage....The new provision will allow certain members of the Retired Reserve who are not yet age 60 ("gray-area" retirees), to purchase TRICARE Standard (and Extra) coverage....qualified retired reservists should be able to purchase coverage by late summer or early fall of 2010. -<http://www.tricare.com>

- References:

Hart, Ted. "Well-being: Army Reserve Employer Relations is Key to 'Optimizing a Shared Workforce'." *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2005.

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0KAB/is\\_1\\_51/ai\\_n15379252/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_1_51/ai_n15379252/)

The Navy Reserve Almanac 2010.

ROA Position Paper: Continuity of Health Care: Tricare for Reservists. 7 January 2010.

## Health Benefits (1 of 3)

- **Issue: Transition between civilian health care plans and TRICARE creates problems for RC members and their families.**
- **Potential solutions:**
  - **Retain the current Reserve Component health care benefit without further expansion; focus efforts on improving access to health care benefits in lieu of further expansion. (CSIS)**
  - **Establish health care savings accounts for mobilized RC members to allow a choice of employer-sponsored health plan for family members or to TRICARE for the period of mobilization (DSB, ROA).**
  - **Allow SELRES to participate in FEHBP as alternate to TRS (CNGR).**
  - **Establish collaborative program with VA hospitals to ensure continuity of coverage for injured RC members (Silverman).**
  - **Provide continuous TRICARE coverage across the RC (Vincent).**
  - **Allow demobilized RC members involuntarily returning to IRR to qualify for subsidized TRS and provide TRS coverage to mobilization ready IRR members (ROA).**
  - **Extend TRICARE coverage from time of alert prior to mobilization (ROA).**

35

- **References:**

Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.

Reserve Component Programs, The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, April 2005.

## Health Benefits (2 of 3)

- **Issue:** RC members and their families do not fully understand their health care options.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Provide demobilizing reservists with standard package describing veterans benefits (RFPB)
  - Enhance support for families not located near MTFs (e.g., better educational materials, establishment of an ombudsman office, simplify TRICARE claims process) (CNGR).

36

- **References:**

Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.

Reserve Component Programs, The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, April 2005.

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## Health Benefits (3 of 3)

- **Issue:** The current health care system does not provide sufficient post-deployment care for demobilizing RC members.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Improve post-deployment mental health evaluations of returning RC members (ROA).
  - Fund restorative dental care prior to mobilization and to 90 days following deployment (ROA).
  - Establish a single standard of reintegration care (CNGR).

37

- **References:**

Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.

Reserve Component Programs, The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, April 2005.

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**
  - **Educational Benefits**
  - **Health Benefits**
  - ➔ ▪ **Pay and Allowances**
  - **Retirement**
  - **Family Support**
  - **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)**

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## Background: Pay and Allowances

**The complexity of dealing with 29 duty statuses has frustrated combatant commanders, unit leaders, and reservists alike, as they often must resort to tortuous strategies to ensure that reservists receive the proper form of associated pay and benefits. -CNGR**

Generations of service members have had to muscle existing systems into compliance or find work-arounds and cosmetic solutions to bring reservists on active duty and ensure that they receive the pay and benefits they have earned. - CNGR

NMVA is concerned about ongoing DoD initiatives to end "two days pay for one days work," and replace it with a plan to provide 1/30 of a Month's pay model, which would include both pay and allowances....-NMVA Legislative Director

NMVA would apply the same allowance standards to both Active and Reserve when it comes to [incentive pays] and other special pays. -NMVA Legislative Director

In an era of runaway personnel costs, one of the Department's greatest challenges is finding ways to gain access to the critical skills it needs to perform its missions without unnecessarily shouldering the tremendous costs of paying for full-time military personnel. -CSIS

...with the exception of the Marine Corps, all of the military services maintain separate personnel and pay systems for active duty and reserve personnel ...this is further complicated by the fact that the National Guard has its own systems... [this causes] delays in the mobilization process, late or incorrect paychecks, and delayed or denied access to promised benefits. -CSIS

- References:

Hart, Ted. "Well-being: Army Reserve Employer Relations is Key to 'Optimizing a Shared Workforce'." *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2005.

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0KAB/is\\_1\\_51/ai\\_n15379252/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_1_51/ai_n15379252/)

<http://www.roa.org/site/DocServer/sac-d-nmva-04jun08.pdf?docID=8901>

RIRP info from 2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook,

<http://www.militaryhandbooks.com>

Testimony of The National Military and Veterans Alliance before the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations presented by CAPT Marshall Hanson, USNR (Ret), Legislative Advisor , NMVA, Legislative Director, Reserve Officers Association, Wednesday, June 4, 2008, 10:00 AM SD-192 Dirksen Senate Office Building.

## Pay and Allowances (1 of 3)

- **Issue:**
  - Differences in the way pay is administered between AC and RC result in delays/errors in processing RC pay and allowances that cause undue hardship for RC members and their families.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Each Service should create and implement a fully integrated personnel and pay system (CSIS).
  - Implement a Joint pay system (CNGR, Jensen).

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**WHEREAS**, the Department of Defense relies heavily on the Reserve forces (operators and aeromedical evacuation personnel) to fly peacetime and wartime operational and support missions;

**WHEREAS**, the active duty requirement for flying is a minimum of four hours a month to receive Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP) and Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP); and

**WHEREAS**, the Reserve forces HDIP/ACIP is prorated based on the number of man-days, annual tour days, drills per month; and

**WHEREAS**, the Reserve forces are required to have both active duty and inactive duty flying hours to receive HDIP/ACIP monthly; and

**WHEREAS**, Reserve forces are not allowed to bank active duty flying hours; and

**WHEREAS**, Reserve forces are being required to log more flying hours per month than active duty forces to receive HDIP/ACIP for duty performed in a month; and

**WHEREAS**, HDIP/ACIP is an incentive for hazardous duty performed;

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, chartered by Congress, urge the Department of Defense to correct the inequity in Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay and Aviation Career Incentive Pay for the Reserve forces regardless of crew members' pay status (active, inactive, or civilian).

From [http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resolutions\\_0922&printer\\_friendly=1](http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resolutions_0922&printer_friendly=1)

## Pay and Allowances (2 of 3)

- **Issue:**
  - Differences in pay and allowances between RC and AC pay members are inconsistent with the ways these forces are actually employed.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Eliminate restrictions on entitlement to full BAH benefit for recalled RC (RFPB, CNGR, EANGUS).
  - Obtain professional pay for RC consistent with AC (ROA).
  - Eliminate proration of RC hazardous duty and incentive pays (ROA).
  - Reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, with appropriate pay and other compensation (CNGR).

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## Pay and Allowances (3 of 3)

- **Issue:**
  - **Lack of flexibility in pay and allowances does not permit services to target pay as required to attract and retain qualified RC members.**
  
- **Potential solutions:**
  - **Authorize Service Secretaries to offer flexible compensation schemes (CSIS, New Guard & Reserve).**
  - **Target compensation on needed skills and capabilities (CSIS).**

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## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- **Military Unit**
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- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**
  - **Educational Benefits**
  - **Health Benefits**
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  - ▪ **Retirement**
  - **Family Support**
  - **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)**

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**Background: Retirement** (1 of 2)

Calculating RC Retirement Pay:

- 50 points per year required to qualify
- 20 qualifying years required for retirement eligibility
- RC members start receiving retirement pay at 60 years old.
- Formula:  $P/360 \times .025 \times B$  = monthly retirement pay.
  - P = total number of retirement points
  - B = base pay (in year member turns 60)

Unlike active duty personnel who can collect their retirement annuity immediately upon retirement, Reserve Component personnel who retire with a non-regular retirement must wait until age 60 to receive a retirement annuity. Reservists consistently identify earlier access to retirement benefits as desirable in DoD-sponsored attitudinal surveys, and there have been numerous legislative proposals by Guard and Reserve membership associations seeking to lower the retirement eligibility age to 55 as in the civil service or to structure the Reserve Component retirement system to match the active duty system. -CSIS

The non-disability retirement systems...were designed for a Cold War-era force that relied on a draft... the increasingly integrated [AC and RC] have two separate retirement systems... 20-year "cliff" vesting...excludes 85% of enlisted personnel and 53% of officers from receiving any non-disability retirement benefits. -CNGR

While reservists might prefer to have access to their retirement benefits earlier, lowering the eligibility age for the annuity without a clear understanding of its effect on retention behavior would likely result in negative cost and force structure consequences for the Department of Defense... Although reservist satisfaction levels might increase if the retirement age were lowered or changed to match the current active duty system, it does not appear that such changes would have positive effects on retention nor would they be cost effective for the Department of Defense. -Wormuth

- References:

Calculation of RC retirement pay from 2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook and Navy Reserve Almanac 2010.

Hart, Ted. "Well-being: Army Reserve Employer Relations is Key to 'Optimizing a Shared Workforce'." *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2005.

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0KAB/is\\_1\\_51/ai\\_n15379252/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_1_51/ai_n15379252/)

## Background: Retirement (2 of 2)

### Early Retirement:

- **Established January 2008.**
- **Early retirement can be earned through mobilization on contingency orders. For every 90 days of deployed service, the Guardsman or Reservists reduces his or her retirement from age 60 by 3 months.**
- **Allows Reservists to retire as early as age 50, although it would take ten years of mobilization after Reserve affiliation to accomplish this.**
- **Decouples TRICARE health from this earlier retirement. Retiree TRICARE would start at age 60.**
- **Only recognizes deployed service after January 2008.**

Sources: <http://www.roa.org>; <http://reserveofficer.blogspot.com/2009/10/fix-early-retirement-for-guard-and.html>

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## Retirement

- **Issue:** Differences in retirement eligibility and benefits between AC and RC members do not provide a sufficient retention incentive for RC members under the operational reserve concept.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Retain the current reserve retirement system which provides for an annuity at age 60. (CSIS)
  - Establish a common military retirement system, with graduated benefits based on years of active duty service (EANGUS, CNGR)
  - Amend laws to place the active and reserve components into the same retirement system (with an optional grandfathering period for current members) (CNGR)
  - Expand current statutory authority to permit all service members to obtain matching government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); gov't contributions vested at 10 years of service, and TSP benefits would be portable to a civilian 401(k). (CNGR)
  - Extend current early retirement legislation retroactively to Sept. 11 2001 (ROA).
  - Reduce the Reserve Component retirement age (ROA).
  - Permit mobilized retirees to earn additional retirement points with less than two years of activated service, and codify retirement credit for serving members over age 60 (ROA).

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## **Task 4 Areas of Consideration**

- **Military Unit**
- **Military Career**
- **Civilian Career**
- **Personal Life**
  - **Educational Benefits**
  - **Health Benefits**
  - **Pay and Allowances**
  - **Retirement**
  - ▪ **Family Support**
  - **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)**

## Background: Family Support

Family readiness is inextricably linked to readiness, recruitment, and retention. (LTG Jack Stultz, 2010)

**[Family support] has not received the same degree of attention and funding in the Reserve Component. The result is an inconsistent and frequently inadequate array of programs and services... - CSIS**

... the "suddenly military" National Guard and Reserve families find deployment to be especially stressful ...(Echterling et al)

Recent survey data suggests both a significant drop in spousal support for participation in the Guard and Reserves and the substantial influence of spouses on RC members who are deciding whether to stay in the military. -CSIS

79% of families had some type of deployment-related challenge... Emotional or mental problems (39% of spouses and 26% of service members) and problems with household responsibilities (40% of spouses and 20% of service members) were mentioned most frequently. Emotional and mental problems...were cited more frequently by younger spouses... older spouses...were more likely to discuss household issues. Other commonly mentioned problems were related to issues of employment and children. Also, 29% of service members (albeit only 14% of spouses) reported that their family had experienced no problems from deployment. -RAND

48

- References:

Echterling, Lennis, Anne Stewart, and Danielle Budash. Suddenly Military: Play-Based Interventions for Deployed National Guard and Reserve Families. *Ideas and Research You Can Use: VISTAS 2010*.

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Statement by LTG Jack Stultz, Chief, US Army Reserve. Before The House Armed Services Committee Military Personnel Subcommittee Second Session, 111th Congress, 15 April 2010

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## Family Support

- **Issue:** Family support systems and policies are primarily targeted to AC members' families, and inadequately address the unique needs of RC members' families.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Allow reservists to transfer educational benefits to spouses (CSIS).
  - Institutionalize RC family support infrastructure at the deploying unit level (CSIS).
  - Provide information to ensure family expectations are consistent with DoD vision (RAND).
  - Increase levels of readiness (e.g., wills, powers of attorney) among not-yet-activated RC families (RAND).
  - Improve centralized data about families (RAND).
  - Seek ways to provide deployment-phased and on-demand information to RC families (RAND, CNGR).
  - Seek ways to improve awareness of, and support or partner with, local and community resources for families (RAND).
  - Create one DoD-wide family assistance center (CNGR).
  - Increase funding for RC family support services (CNGR).
  - Increase family participation in mobilization/demobilization processes (CNGR).
  - Resume monthly drills immediately after demobilization and focus on reintegration (CNGR).
  - Provide employment protection and family leave for spouses of mobilized RC prior to deployment (ROA).
  - Services develop protocol to ensure needed services are available to RC members who do not demobilize at their home stations or who are IRR (CNGR).

## Task 4 Areas of Consideration

- Military Unit
- Military Career
- Civilian Career
- Personal Life
  - Educational Benefits
  - Health Benefits
  - Pay and Allowances
  - Retirement
  - Family Support
- ➔ ▪ Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)

## **Background: Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 (SCRA)**

- Enacted 2003 and amended 2004; completely rewrote and replaced the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) of 1940.
- Protects servicemembers from adverse consequences to their legal rights that may result because of such service.
- Applies to all military members on federal active duty including guard forces in Title 10 active duty. In limited circumstances (i.e., evictions, joint leases), the SCRA may apply to dependents of the military member.
- Protections generally begin the first date of the active duty period, and may extend from 30 days up to 180 days after the member is released from active duty.
- Protections:
  - Automatic stay of at least 90 days in civil court and administrative actions.
  - Default judgments can be reopened after release from active duty.
  - Limits information credit agency can provide to lenders.
  - Reduced interest (to 6%) on financial obligations existing before active service if active service materially affects the member's ability to repay the financial obligation.
  - Permits termination of auto leases and real estate rental agreements.
  - May permit a stay of foreclosure or repossession.
  - Does not require member to change legal domicile for tax purposes when relocated due to military orders.
  - Permits reinstatement of health insurance without waiting period or penalty.

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- References:

What You Should Know About the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)

[http://legalassistance.law.af.mil/content/legal\\_assistance/cp/scra\\_fact\\_sheet\\_dec04.pdf](http://legalassistance.law.af.mil/content/legal_assistance/cp/scra_fact_sheet_dec04.pdf)

## **Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 (SCRA)**

- **Issue:** SCRA protections do not adequately protect the deployed RC member.
- **Potential solutions:**
  - Amend to increase the period during which a service member may apply for reinstatement of health insurance from 120 days to 180 days, the period of TAMP eligibility (CNGR).
  - Amend to increase to a period greater than 90 days the time allowed a service member to file for relief from foreclosure (CNGR).
  - Enact protections for mobilized Guard-Reserve students granting academic leave of absences, protecting academic standing and refund guarantees (ROA).
  - Improve protections for deployed members from creditors that willfully violate SCRA (ROA).
  - Amend to prohibit a court from modifying any previous judgment that would change the custody arrangements for a child of a servicemember deployed in support of a contingency operation (ROA).

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**BACKUP**

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## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (1 of 3)

### **Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (Title 10 USC § 12304)**

- To respond to use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States. Not to be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection.
- ≤ 200,000 total, including ≤ 30,000 IRR
- ≤ 365 days.

### **Partial Mobilization. (Title 10, § 12302)**

- National emergency declared by the President
- Service Secretaries may activate ≤ 1M members of the Ready Reserve
- ≤ 24 months.

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Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008

### **Presidential Reserve Call-Up**

Under a Presidential Reserve call-up (PRC), the President has the authority to activate, without declaration of a national emergency, no more than 200,000 National Guard and Reserve service members (no more than 30,000 of which may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve) for a period of up to 365 days to meet mission requirements within the United States or overseas. Service members called to active duty under PRC may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection. To execute a PRC, the President must notify the Congress within twenty-four hours and state the reason for this action.

### **Partial Mobilization**

Partial mobilization is the expansion of the active duty force resulting from action by the Congress or by the President to mobilize the Ready Reserve Component units, individual National Guard or Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency. When expanded as an act of the Congress, partial mobilization can increase up to full mobilization, but when done as an act of the President, no more than one million National Guard and Reserve service members may be mobilized, and they cannot be mobilized for more than twenty-four consecutive months. Partial mobilization responds to an external threat to national security.

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**Full Mobilization**

Full mobilization is the expansion of the active duty force resulting from an action by Congress and the President to mobilize all National Guard and Reserve service members. This mobilization includes all units and personnel in the existing approved force structure, as well as retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support. National Guard and Reserve service members can be placed on active duty during full mobilization for the duration of the emergency plus an additional six months. Full mobilization is done to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

**Total Mobilization**

Once a state of emergency exists, the Congress can extend full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure and the resources needed for their support. Total mobilization brings the industrial base up to full capacity to provide the additional resources, equipment, and production facilities needed to support the military and involves the active force, the National Guard and Reserve, and the entire Militia of the United States. The Militia of the United States consists of the Organized Militia and Unorganized Militia. The Organized Militia is comprised of the National Guard and Naval Militia. The Unorganized Militia consists of every able-bodied male citizen or person wishing to be a citizen between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, as well as female members of the National Guard.

More information on National Guard and Reserve mobilization can be found on the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs website, located online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/index.html>.

- References:

Davis, Lt. Col. Jose. *Army National Guard Readiness Transforming to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College. Web.

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<[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf)>.

## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (2 of 3)

### **Full Mobilization. (Title 10 USC § 12301)**

- In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law
- Service Secretaries may activate any member of the reserve components for the duration plus six months.
- Inactive and retired reservists may be called up if required.

### **Total Mobilization**

- Once a state of emergency exists, Congress can extend full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units or personnel. Total Mobilization involves the active force, the National Guard and Reserve, and the entire Organized Militia (National Guard and Naval Militia ) and Unorganized Militia (every able-bodied male citizen or male wishing to be a citizen between the ages of 17 and 45).
- Includes Industrial Mobilization.

Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008

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### **Presidential Reserve Call-Up**

Under a Presidential Reserve call-up (PRC), the President has the authority to activate, without declaration of a national emergency, no more than 200,000 National Guard and Reserve service members (no more than 30,000 of which may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve) for a period of up to 365 days to meet mission requirements within the United States or overseas. Service members called to active duty under PRC may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress an insurrection. To execute a PRC, the President must notify the Congress within twenty-four hours and state the reason for this action.

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- References:

Davis, Lt. Col. Jose. *Army National Guard Readiness Transforming to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Defense Technical Information Center. US Army War College. Web.

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Wormuth, Christine E., Michele A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006. Web.

<[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf)>.

## Mobilization Policies and Authorities (3 of 3)

### **National Guard (Title 10, § 12406)**

- The President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard as necessary to repel an invasion, suppress a rebellion, or execute the laws of the US.
- Orders shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

### **State Authority: (Title 32 USC § 328)**

National Guardsmen can also be called up by their governor. When employed in this capacity, National Guardsmen are considered state employees.

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
Sources: U.S. Code 2010, and Military Pre-Deployment Guide 2008

## Other Mobilization Authority

- **12322. Active duty for health care.** A member of a uniformed service... may be ordered to active duty...for a period of more than 30 days while the member is being treated for (or recovering from) an injury, illness, or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of duty...
- **Title 32, Section 109. In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense forces. A defense force established under this section may be used within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.**

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Category I military retirees are those within their first five years of retirement, under age 60, and not disabled. Category II are those who have been retired more than five years, under age 60, and not disabled; Category III includes all others, including those who are disabled.

AGR = Active Guard/Reserve

- References:

Reserve Components of the Armed Forces. Reserve Component Categories. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Rev. September 2005)  
<http://osd.dtic.mil/ra/documents/RC101%20Handbook-pdated%2020%20Sep%2005.pdf>

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## Comparison of Duty Statuses for National Guard Personnel

	<b>State Active Duty</b>	<b>Title 32</b>	<b>Title 10</b>
<b>Command &amp; control</b> <sup>12</sup>	State Governor	State Governor	Federal President
<b>Who performs duty</b>	Federally organized NG	Organized NG in service of US <sup>1</sup>	AC <sup>8</sup> , RC and National Guard of US <sup>1</sup>
<b>Where duty performed</b>	IAW state law	CONUS	Worldwide
<b>Pay</b>	IAW state law	Federal pay & allowances	Federal pay & allowances
<b>Federal reimbursement</b>	IAW Stafford Act <sup>2</sup> or Cooperative Agreement <sup>11</sup>	N/A personnel costs paid by Federal funds	N/A personnel costs paid by Federal funds
<b>Tort immunity</b>	IAW state law	FTCA <sup>6</sup>	FTCA <sup>6</sup>
<b>PCA<sup>3</sup> application</b>	No	No	Yes
<b>USERRA<sup>4</sup></b>	No, IAW state law	Yes	Yes
<b>SSCRA<sup>5</sup></b>	No, IAW state law	No	Yes
<b>Mission types</b>	IAW state law	IDT, AT, state AGR & other Federally authorized	ODT, ADT, AGR & as assigned, subj. to PCA
<b>Discipline</b>	State military code	State military code	UCMJ <sup>7</sup>
<b>Federal retirement points</b>	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Other benefits</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Medical</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Disability</b>	IAW state law	Federal	Federal
<b>Involuntary order to duty</b>	IAW state law	Yes <sup>9</sup>	Yes <sup>10</sup>
<b>Voluntary order to duty</b>	IAW state law	Yes	Yes


60

- References:

The Reserve Components of the United States Military with Particular Focus on the Reserve Components of the United States Army, The Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve. *An Executive Primer*. 2006.

<http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/pages/primers/Reserve%20Primer%2026%20May%202006.pdf>

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This slide addresses options to resourcing the Army’s Force Generation Model specifically. What level of manning, training, and equipping is needed at each phase of the rotation? If one assumes that a unit will be ready to be deployed, with no more than minimal theater- or mission-specific training at the beginning of their deployment year, what requirements are generated throughout the other phases of their rotation cycle? A training plan that sustains a short “reset” period of unreadiness followed by a long training period that ramps-up to being ready to deploy at mobilization will generate different costs than a rotation phase that has a long period of relative unreadiness, punctuated by a year of frantic catch-up before a unit can be deployed.

This chart shows two different views for resourcing the readiness of RC units. The first shows an early identification of a mission requirement, and three-four years spent in training, with increasing readiness, so that upon mobilization, the unit is ready to deploy. This is an example of the train-mobilize-deploy model we in Reserve Affairs have been promoting.

The second is a depiction of how we are currently operating. A RC unit is identified for a mission and works diligently to achieve the readiness necessary to deploy. The unit is mobilized and must spend 3-5 months in additional training. Net result: mobilizations of 15-18 months. This approach holds units in a low level of readiness for a substantial part of their cycle, with an intensive ramp-up in training the year before they are expected to deploy. This is a rough depiction of some of the current plans, and is undoubtedly believed to be more affordable. Can this really work? If held at low readiness, can a part-time force surge to needed readiness without having to be mobilized? If units must spend 3-6 months mobilized but not deployed, is it really cheaper? What is the impact on retention? On employer support? On families?

There are no easy answers to these questions, but the answers chosen will have a substantial impact on the cost of the reserves in the future.


## Reserve Income Replacement Program (RIRP)

- The Reserve Income Replacement Program (RIRP) pays eligible RC members the difference between civilian and military compensation. Eligibility:
  - Completed 18 months of involuntary active duty, or
  - 24 cumulative months of involuntary active duty within the last 60 months, or
  - Be serving on involuntary active duty for a period >180 days that starts within six months of separation from a previous period on involuntary active duty > 180 days.

RIRP info from 2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook, <http://www.militaryhandbooks.com>

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## Employers of Reserve Component Members



Type of Employer	Total # Employers
Federal Government - DoD	51,437
Federal Government - Other	7,875
Non Profit Institution	2,267
Private, Less Than 500 Employees	61,315
Private, More Than 500 Employees	50,481
State and Local Government	26,239
Unknown	70,788
<b>Total</b>	<b>270,402</b>

Source: ESGR 12/28/09

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## National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008

President Bush signed into law the National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008. The new law aids Guard and Reserve members who are enduring financial hardships to receive bankruptcy assistance. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act of 2005 required that filers go through a rigorous means test in order to prevent individual debt to be discharged into bankruptcy. The National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act exempts you from the means test, allowing for more time to get your finances back in order and to file for bankruptcy protection. This new law applies to those Guard and Reservists who have been on active duty since September 11, 2001. The protection is effective while the service member is on active duty for more than 90 days and for 540 days following activation.

RIRP info from *2010 Guard and Reserve Military Handbook*, <http://www.militaryhandbooks.com>

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- National Guard Domestic Counterdrug Support to United States Law Enforcement. Stephen Bloomer, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050, 3 May 2004.
- Abrams Doctrine: Has it Been Abused in the GWOT? USAWC Strategy Research Project, Colonel George A. Brinegar, Texas Army National Guard. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 2004.
- Colloquium Brief, US Army War College and 21st Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution. State of the US Military Reserve Components. Compiled by Ralph Wipfli (The Brookings Institution) and Dr. Dallas D. Owens (Strategic Studies Institute), 6 March 2008.
- Determining Patterns of Reserve Attrition Since September 11, 2001. Michelle A. Dolfini-Reed et al. Center for Naval Analyses, 3 June 2005.
- U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
<http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/defense/nationalguard.htm>.
- The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 2008.
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- **Army National Guard Readiness: Transforming to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century.** USAWC Strategy Research Project, Lieutenant Colonel Jose R. Davis, United States Army National Guard.
- **US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 2004.**
- **Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.**
- **Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS) Point Paper: Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, 2008.**
- **Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel and Workload Are Problems.** Report to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. United States General Accounting Office, June 2000.
- **DoD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve Transparency over Reserve and National Guard Compensation to Manage Significant Growth in Cost.** GAO-07-828. United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC 20548, June 2007.
- **Military Personnel: Improvements Needed to Increase Effectiveness of DoD's Programs to Promote Positive Working Relationships between Reservists and Their Employers.** United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC 20548, 15, August 2008.
- **Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force.** United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-09-898, September 2009.

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- **Challenges Associated with Achieving Full Dental Readiness in the Reserve Component.** Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress Second Session. Wednesday, 23 April 2008.
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Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Survey (Large-scale Conventional Campaign, MCO)

### Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

**When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]**



This set of materials was provided to the workshop participants to show them the nature of the surveys that would be conducted related to Objective 2 (using the RC to best advantage) and Objective 3 (roles for which the RC is best suited). The participants were free to use this material as worksheets as they progressed through the workshop, i.e., after having been exposed to each of the scenarios and the deliberations by the workshop participants concerning the potential RC roles/ utilizations/ contributions.

## Survey (Large-scale Stability Ops)

**Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)**

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

**When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]**

**APL**

## Survey (Steady State Engagement Activities)

**Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)**

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

**When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]**

**APL**

ANNEX C  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Survey (HA/DR, FHA)

### Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]

APL

## Survey (Homeland Defense/DSCA)

### Force Employment in Scenario i (i = 1 ... 5)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]

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ANNEX C  
Pre-decisional Working Papers

## Survey: Optimal Rotational Force Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case	
<p><b>Combat</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full spectrum Sustainment/ Follow on forces</li> <li>• Cyber</li> <li>• Nuclear C2</li> <li>• Space C2</li> <li>• Strategic Intel/ Targeteering</li> <li>• Theater specific C2</li> <li>• National C2</li> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection</li> <li>• Foreign Internal Defense &amp; Irregular Warfare</li> <li>• Stability Ops</li> <li>• Cyber</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Engagement</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theater Security Cooperation</li> <li>• Unified Legislation &amp; Budgeting [non-Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)]</li> <li>• Allied exercises</li> <li>• Security Force assistance</li> <li>• Partnership Programs</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul> <p><b>Relief and Reconstruction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief</li> <li>• Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction</li> <li>• Medical Readiness Training (MEDRET)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> </ul>			<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p><b>Response Choices</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 = Extensive</li> <li>• 4 = Significant</li> <li>• 3 = Moderate</li> <li>• 2 = Limited</li> <li>• 1 = None</li> </ul> </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p><b>Stressing Case:</b> Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11</p> </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><b>Non-Stressing Case:</b> Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11</p> </div>

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## Survey: Preferred MET Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Professional Military Education</li> <li>• Conventional Military Operations</li> <li>• Intelligence</li> <li>• Health Affairs</li> <li>• Maritime Security</li> <li>• Engineering</li> <li>• Logistics</li> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Stability Operations</li> <li>• Information Operations</li> <li>• Air and Missile Defense</li> <li>• Homeland Defense &amp; Security</li> <li>• Defense Support to Civil Authorities</li> </ul>			<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p><b>Response Choices</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 = Extensive</li> <li>• 4 = Significant</li> <li>• 3 = Moderate</li> <li>• 2 = Limited</li> <li>• 1 = None</li> </ul> </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p><b>Stressing Case:</b> Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11</p> </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><b>Non-Stressing Case:</b> Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11</p> </div>

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## Survey: Preferred IA Utilization

	Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cyber</b></li> <li>• Linguists</li> <li>• Planners &amp; Strategists</li> <li>• Specific Logistics</li> <li>• Finance</li> <li>• Acquisition/Contracting</li> <li>• UAV – RPA</li> <li>• Scientists</li> <li>• Regional Experts</li> <li>• Human Resources</li> <li>• Environmental</li> <li>• Agriculture</li> <li>• Energy</li> <li>• PSYOPS</li> <li>• CBRNE Response</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Legal</li> <li>• Intel</li> <li>• IT/C4I</li> <li>• Logisticians</li> <li>• Force Protection</li> <li>• Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation)</li> <li>• Civil Affairs</li> <li>• Engineers (combat &amp; civil)</li> <li>• Public Affairs</li> <li>• Operations / AOs</li> <li>• Training</li> <li>• Aviation Support</li> <li>• Specific Combat Arms</li> </ul>		

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

**Stressing Case:** Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11

**Non-Stressing Case:** Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11

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## Survey for Institutional Forces (Not tied to a specific scenario)

Component/Category	Should Have Primary Role	Should Have Secondary Role	Should Have Limited Role	Should Have No Role
<b>Reserve Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Active Component</b>				
- Rotational Forces				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Government)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				
<b>Civilian (Contractor)</b>				
- METs				
- IAs				

**When completed, aggregate results by Force Providers [Services, RC], and Force Employers [COCOMs]**

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## Survey: Optimal RC Utilization for Institutional Missions / Tasks

		Stressing Case	Non-Stressing Case
<p><u>Training</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basic Training</li> <li>Advanced Individual Training</li> <li>Instructor Support</li> <li>Instructor Training</li> <li>Officer Professional Development Training</li> <li>NCO Professional Development Training</li> <li>ROTC Support</li> <li>Small Arms Instructors</li> <li>Support Services to the Academies</li> </ul> <p><u>Recruiting</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recruiting</li> </ul> <p><u>Logistic Support</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Central Issue Facilities</li> <li>Transportation Support</li> <li>Depot Maintenance</li> </ul> <p><u>Services</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical</li> <li>Health</li> <li>Dental</li> <li>Legal</li> </ul> <p><u>Admin</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pay / Admin Services</li> <li>Personnel Support Activities</li> <li>HQ Staff Augmentation</li> <li>Special Staff- EEO, POSH, Chaplains</li> <li>Inspector General Complaints</li> </ul> <p><u>Readiness</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MOB Center Operations</li> <li>JRSOI</li> </ul> <p><u>Certifications</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training Evaluation</li> <li>Inspector General Inspection Teams</li> <li>Exercise Validation</li> </ul> <p><u>Public Affairs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communication Support</li> <li>Public Affairs</li> </ul> <p><u>Cyber</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Network Security</li> </ul> <p><u>Security</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Base Security</li> <li>Firefighters</li> </ul> <p><u>Facilities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engineering Construction</li> </ul>			

**Response Choices**

- 5 = Extensive
- 4 = Significant
- 3 = Moderate
- 2 = Limited
- 1 = None

**Stressing Case:** Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11

**Non-Stressing Case:** Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11



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Draft Working Paper

**Comprehensive Reserve  
Review Collaborative  
Analysis Workshop**

***Objectives & Agenda***  
***17 Aug 2010***

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**APL**  
*The Johns Hopkins University*  
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

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This briefing was given to the workshop participants after the surveys for Objective 2 (using the RC to best advantage) and Objective 3 (roles for which the RC is best suited) were analyzed. The preferred uses (primary, secondary, little, none) of AC and RC for the five scenario categories were summarized along with the preferred methods of sourcing the RC (rotational units, military engagement teams, individual augmentees); this included any apparent differences in priority ratings between the COCOM participants and the Service and RC participants. It also included a distinction between stressing and non-stressing conditions that were related to the potential future utilization levels for RC, i.e., considered to be “stressing” if as high as has occurred since post-9/11 and considered to be “non-stressing” if more reflective of typical pre-9/11 levels of RC utilization.

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## Caveat

- Survey results are preliminary, we will not distribute or post them until processing is complete
- Our goal is to forward the finished package to our sponsors by 1 Sep

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## Observations <sup>1/3</sup>

- AC participation/role in order of priority
  - Large-scale conventional
  - Large-scale stability operation
  - HA/DR
  - Steady state engagement
  - HD/DSCA
- RC participation/role in order of priority
  - HD/DSCA
  - Steady state engagement
  - Large-scale stability operation
  - HA/DR
  - Large-scale conventional
- Reserve Component Rotational Units, Military Engagement Teams, and Individual Augmentees prevalent in all scenarios
  - Rotational units most pronounced in Large-scale Conventional, Large-scale Stability, Steady State Engagement
  - Military Engagement Teams most pronounced in Large-scale Stability, Steady State Engagement, HD/DSCA
  - Individual Augmentees most pronounced in Steady State Engagement, HD/DSCA
  - All three played equally in HA/DR

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## Observations <sup>2/4</sup>

- **COCOM perspectives (compared to survey respondents as a whole)**
  - Larger role for Reserve Component and smaller role for Active Component and Civilians in Steady State Engagement
  - Larger role for Reserve Component and smaller role for Active Component in Institutional Support
- **Force Provider perspective (compared to survey respondents as a whole)**
  - Larger role for Reserve Component in Large-scale Conventional
  - Larger role for Active Component and smaller role for Reserve Component in Steady State Engagement
  - Larger role for Active Component and Civilians (Government) in Institutional Support

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## Response Comparison: Force Employers vs Force Providers

Mission/ Task	Stressing Conditions		Non-Stressing Conditions	
	COCOMs	Services & RC	COCOMs	Services & RC
Rotational	3.7-4.7	2.9-4.3	3.2-4.4	2.6-3.9
Military Engagement Teams	3.5-4.8	3.4-4.1	3.4-5.0	3.1-5.0
Individual Augmentees	3.8-4.9	3.5-4.9	3.5-4.6	3.1-4.0
Institutional	2.7-3.7	2.5-3.2	2.4-3.2	2.2-2.7

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## Observations <sup>2/3</sup>

- **COCOM SMEs tended to assign slightly higher utilization scores for all missions/tasks than did Service and RC SMEs, for same employment conditions (i.e., Stressing, Non-Stressing)**
- **Both COCOM SMEs and Service and RC SMEs scored mission tasks in same relative order**
  - **Highest – Individual Augmentees**
  - **Next – Military Engagement Teams and Rotational**
  - **Lowest – Institutional Support**
- **Both COCOM SMEs and Service and RC SMEs assigned higher RC utilization scores for Stressing conditions than for Non-Stressing conditions**

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# RC Employment and Utilization

*Comprehensive Reserve Review  
Collaborative Analysis Workshop*

18 August 2010

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This briefing was given to the workshop participants after the more detailed surveys for Objective 3 (roles for which the RC is best suited) were compiled. The workshop participants rated the identified roles (from the previous Carlisle workshop) within each of the four categories of rotational forces, military engagement teams, individual augmentees, and institutional support. It included any apparent distinctions between the participants; the results were compiled by COCOM, Force Providers, Services, RC, and Grand Total. It also included a final distinction between stressing and non-stressing conditions that were related to the potential future utilization levels for RC, i.e., considered to be “stressing” if as high as has occurred since post-9/11 and considered to be “non-stressing” if more reflective of typical pre-9/11 levels of RC utilization.

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
# Survey Purpose and Respondents



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**Survey conducted to prioritize missions/tasks that might be undertaken by RC when providing:**

- Rotational forces
- Military engagement teams
- Individual augmentees
- Institutional support



Category	Attendees
Reserve Component	16
Service	11
Force Providers	27
COCOM	14
OSD	9
Joint Staff	3
Other	1

**Force Providers = Services + Reserve Components**

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# Average Utilization Score



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Utilization	Score
Extensive	5
Significant	4
Moderate	3
Little	2
None	1

$$\bar{S} = \sum S_i$$

where  
**S<sub>i</sub> = Score for ith participant**

**Scores computed for**

- All attendees
- COCOM reps
- Service + RC reps
- Service reps
- RC reps

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## How We Choose to Employ the RC May Be Affected by the Intensity of Use

**Non-Stressing Case: Less extensive use of RC comparable to that experienced prior to 9/11**

Source: DOD, Office of Reserve Affairs, Nov. 2004.

Source: Hoffman, F., "The Guard and Reserve in America's New Missions," *Orbis*, Spring 2005.

**Stressing Case: Heavy use of RC comparable to that experienced post 9/11**

Figure 1. Reserve Component Members on Active Duty

Source: Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007.

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## Average RC Utilization Scores

Reserve Task	Stressing Conditions	Non-Stressing Conditions
Rotational	3.2-4.5	2.9-4.2
Military Employment Teams	3.4-4.3	3.1-5.0
Individual Augmentees	3.6-4.4	3.1-4.0
Institutional Support	2.7-3.2	2.3-2.9

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## Observations

- Utilization of RC as Individual Augmentees received highest scores
- Utilization of RC for Institutional Support received lowest scores
- Scores for RC utilization for Rotational Unit tasks comparable to those for Military Engagement Team tasks
- Within each grouping, RC utilization score difference between highest rated Missions/Tasks and lowest rated Missions/Tasks is only 10-20%
- RC utilization scores were somewhat higher under stressing conditions than under non-stressing conditions (by ~10%)

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## Missions / Tasks for RC Rotating Operational Forces

Type Information	Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Institutional Support (g Force)
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3			
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			

**Combat**

- Full spectrum Sustainment/ Follow on forces
- Cyber
- Nuclear C2
- Space C2
- Strategic Intel/ Targeteering
- Theater specific C2
- National C2
- ISR
- Civil Affairs

**Security**

- Anti-Terrorism Force Protection
- Foreign Internal Defense & Irregular Warfare
- Stability Ops
- Cyber
- Civil Affairs

**Engagement**



- Theater Security Cooperation
- Unified Legislation & Budgeting [non-Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)]
- Allied exercises
- Security Force assistance
- Partnership Programs
- Civil Affairs

**Relief and Reconstruction**



- Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
- Infrastructure recovery, maintenance and construction
- Medical Readiness Training (MEDRET)
- Civil Affairs

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

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

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

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
## Missions / Tasks for RC Military Engagement Teams





Type Information	Mission Set			
	Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentee	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3				
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				

- Civil Affairs
- Professional Military Education
- Conventional Military Operations
- Intelligence
- Health Affairs
- Maritime Security
- Engineering
- Logistics
- Security
- Stability Operations
- Information Operations
- Air and Missile Defense
- Homeland Defense & Security
- Defense Support to Civil Authorities



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
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
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


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
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


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## Missions / Tasks for RC Rotating Operational Forces



Type Information	Mission Set			
	Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad)	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentee	Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3				
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4				
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5				
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6				



• Cyber  
• Linguists  
• Planners & Strategists  
• Specific Logistics  
• Finance  
• Acquisition/Contracting  
• UAV – RPA  
• Scientists  
• Regional Experts  
• Human Resources  
• Environmental  
• Agriculture  
• Energy  
• PSYOPS  
• CBRNE Response

• Medical  
• Legal  
• Intel  
• IT/C4I  
• Logisticians  
• Force Protection  
• Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation)  
• Civil Affairs  
• Engineers (combat & civil)  
• Public Affairs  
• Operations/AOs  
• Training  
• Aviation Support  
• Specific Combat Arms



Red text indicates new or emerging task  
All are likely to require non-standard approaches

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
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
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



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

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
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

## Missions / Tasks for RC Institutional Support Forces

Type Information	Rotating Operational Forces (Home and Abroad)		Institutional Support (Generating Force)
<b>Missions / Tasks</b> Supports Comp Review Objectives 2 & 3		<b>Training</b> Basic Training Advanced Individual Training Instructor Support Instructor Training Officer Professional Development Training NCO Professional Development Training ROTC Support Small Arms Instructors Support Services to the Academies <b>Recruiting</b> Recruiting <b>Logistic Support</b> Central Issue Facilities Transportation Support Depot Maintenance <b>Services</b> Medical Health Dental Legal <b>Admin</b> Pay / Admin Services Personnel Support Activities HQ Staff Augmentation Special Staff-EEO, POSH, Chaplains Inspector General Complaints / Fraud Investigations <b>Readiness</b> MOB Center Operations Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement & Integration (JRSOI) <b>Certifications</b> Training Evaluation Inspector General Inspection Teams <b>Public Affairs</b> Communication Support Public Affairs <b>Cyber Security</b> Network Security Base Security Firefighters <b>Facilities</b> Engineering Construction	
<b>Conditions and Standards</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 4			
<b>Organizational Adjustments</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 5			
<b>Law, Policy and Doctrine Changes Required</b> Supports Comp Review Objective 6			



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

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