

Austere Challenge: an Exercise in Operational Adaptability for Civil-Military Planning and Security-Force Assistance

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“The U.S. Army must ... hone its ability to integrate joint and interagency assets ... and adjust to rapidly changing situations to achieve ... operational adaptability.” – GEN Martin Dempsey, Army Capstone Concept foreword, Dec. 21, 2009

As the U.S. Army increasingly conducts complex operations in this era of persistent conflict, all Army leaders, including Armor officers, must recognize the importance of maintaining flexibility and working with joint and interagency partners. We offer the exercise Austere Challenge 2009 as an example of operational adaptability¹ – the exercise demonstrated that when a comprehensive, integrated approach to civilian and military planning in stability and security-force-assistance operations is used, potential synergies are gained.

In addition to these issues, this article discusses the critical interagency challenges identified during the exercise. First, the article discusses the need for civilian agencies and their liaisons within the combatant command and joint task force to engage in team-building activities. Second, this article discusses the lack of a common and understood planning process; differing operational tempos and planning time horizons; uncoordinated knowledge-management procedures; and lack of enough civilian personnel trained as planners.

Overview

Representatives from across the United States’ interagency community joined European Command in April 2009 for the execution phase of EUCOM’s annual geographic combatant command exercise, Austere Challenge. Very little documentation is available about the months

and years following this groundbreaking exercise that discusses lessons-learned and their implications for the future. To address the knowledge gap, this article seeks to describe how an integration of all agencies applied operational adaptability in a comprehensive approach to planning SFA² activities in AC 09.

The main exercise objectives of AC 09 were to certify Seventh Army as a JTF headquarters; exercise EUCOM subordinate component commands (the joint-force air component command and Sixth Fleet-led joint-force maritime component command) in conducting joint operations in response to a crisis affecting EUCOM’s area of responsibility; and serve as a vehicle in which to exercise and observe the Interagency Management System. As part of standing up the IMS, secondary objectives were to train people from the State Department’s nascent Civilian Response Corps and the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in planning, integrating and coordinating stability and reconstruction operations in conjunction with a U.S.-led JTF.³

Other objectives were to plan, coordinate and execute joint combat operations, theater-wide targeting, sustainment operations, coordination with Special Forces, strategic communications and information operations, EUCOM core joint mission-essential tasks, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff high-interest training issues and operational integration across U.S. government agencies and regional embassies at every level under S/CRS coordination.⁴

CRC members exercised organizational structures and processes extant in the IMS during the exercise. Per the IMS, described more in the sidebar (Page 23), the CRC formed an integrated planning cell to provide an organic interagency coordination⁵ capacity to the EUCOM commander and staff. The IPC also supplied an advance civilian team to provide the U.S. ambassador an organic planning and operational capacity, and a small operational element of the ACT (described in the exercise as a Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team) was co-located with the JTF to provide connectivity and assist in JTF-embassy coordination and planning.

Notably, this was the first time CRC members participated in an exercise, and AC 09 received the largest commitment of interagency support to a GCC exercise to date. During AC 09, the CRC’s challenge was to maintain situational awareness and accurately assess conditions in the host nation. Their diligence provided urgent humanitarian assistance and met immediate civil-security and public-service needs. Simultaneously, they made plans for long-term governance, rule-of-law and economic-development activities. They completed these essential tasks while applying operational adaptability to coordinate and integrate their activities and actions with the JTF.

Background

Planning for AC 09 began in the summer and fall of 2008, with EUCOM, Seventh Army and U.S. Joint Forces Command hosting a series of exercise-planning conferences. Parallel to this process, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Joint Center for International Force Assistance representatives integrated with and assisted S/CRS planners in developing a national strategic plan for the exercise. This plan replicated activation of the IMS and efforts of the IPC, ACT, Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group (see sidebar for more information on the CRSG, IPC and ACT) and U.S. embassy at a contingency operation’s beginning stages.

The strategic plan, developed through use of a planning framework developed by S/CRS and JFCOM, was key in tying strategic objectives at the agency level to essential tasks that needed to be performed at the tactical level, essentially “operationalizing” policy.⁶

The replicated CRSG was composed of people from the Departments of State (including S/CRS and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency), Defense, Justice, Homeland Security and Commerce, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. While acting as the CRSG, they portrayed the United Nations, European Union, DoS, Europe/Eurasia Desk, public diplomacy, USAID, regional country teams, U.S. Department of Agriculture, DoC, Department of Energy, DHS, DoJ and foreign embas-

sies for the purposes of the exercise. The IPC consisted of experts from DoJ, USAID, USDA and S/CRS.

The most robust civilian group in the exercise was the ACT. It consisted of regional and sector experts from DoS, S/CRS, INL, the Diplomatic Security Service, USAID (including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), DoJ, DHS, Department of Health and Human Services, DoC, Department of the Treasury, Director of National Intelligence and Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. Finally, members of the JIACT included representatives from S/CRS, DHHS, DoJ, DoC and PRM. All these interagency members replicated the functions of IMS elements in AC 09.

SFA in AC 09

The AC 09 exercise scenario consisted of a contingency operation that involved an aggressor nation who attacked a sovereign nation. Deputies on the National Security Council determined that the United States would respond under the aegis of the United NSC with Chapter VII authorization and with coalition support to restore sovereignty. The NSC's desired two- to three-year end state was to compel the aggressor to withdraw and to establish new security arrangements to prevent further aggression.

As the conflict evolved, an assessment revealed that the host-nation society, particularly its essential services and armed forces, required significant post-conflict assistance. Its government officials formally requested this assistance.

During major combat operations to eject the aggressor, the GCC (augmented with an IPC), embassy (augmented with an ACT) and JTF (augmented with a JI-ACT) prepared for Phase IV stability operations. During the culmination of Phase III operations, EUCOM received a planning order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasking it to assess the host-nation security forces, then plan and prepare for SFA. This new task integrated into the Phase IV planning.

The PLANORD facilitated host-nation capability to restore order, secure its borders and provide minimal deterrence to external threats. The plan included one important caveat, derived from replicated NSC guidance: avoid becoming a destabilizing influence in the region. The host-nation forces could not exceed their pre-conflict size. This guidance placed the emphasis on regional security arrangements developed through medium-term diplomatic initiatives as the main deterrence factor.

As operations commenced in the joint operating agreement and coalition forces



Representatives from across the United States' interagency community joined European Command in April 2009 for the execution phase of EUCOM's annual geographic combatant command exercise, Austere Challenge. (U.S. Army photo)

began to engage the aggressor nation in combat operations, the extent of the damage to the host nation became clear. Assessments from the host nation and JTF units began to paint a picture of what would be actually required during stability operations.

The aggressor nation inflicted significant casualties in the country and destroyed about 25 percent of the host nation's forces. Its remaining forces were in various stages of disarray and suffering from poor morale. The entire military infrastructure system sustained damage to varying degrees. Police and border forces throughout the country required assistance and materiel. As the level of vital assistance became evident, the host nation's president requested assistance from the USG – ranging from humanitarian to SFA.

In response, the country team and ACT – headed by the ambassador to the host nation – and the JTF with ACT planners supported the development of an R&S plan that included a significant SFA element. This assistance included DoD support to DHS, DOJ and INL. Support of these agencies was to re-establish police and border forces and thus restore civil authority and regain territorial integrity. Civilian-agency support to DoD was to return the host nation's military forces to pre-combat levels (reconstituting the 25 percent of military forces lost in the conflict) and reinstate the regional balance of military force.

The JTF on the ground or a newly formed task force for the SFA mission implemented DoD-led tasks. The GCC deferred a decision until assessments revealed the entirety of the SFA obligation. The GCC also kept its options open and

began initial planning for a task force or security-assistance command designed to handle the SFA mission. DoD conducted support tasks, including assistance to local and national police as well as to justice and corrections organizations to regain internal security and rule-of-law.

The country team led these efforts, particularly elements from DoJ, DHS and DoS/INL. Invited coalition elements supported the R&S efforts, including SFA. Other nations willing to provide support, such as the Italian carabinieri and/or French gendarmerie, trained paramilitary security elements within the host nation.

Integrating a significant SFA element is the key to operational flexibility in R&S planning. Whether it was the IPC located at the GCC, or the planners from the JTF co-located with the ACT/U.S. Embassy, integration allowed for a truly whole-of-government approach.

While the process wasn't perfect, learning occurred along the way. The exercise allowed military elements to focus on overall security in the host nation and assist its military forces. Concurrently it allowed the civilian agencies headed by the country team and ACT to focus on reconstruction efforts and re-establish host-nation law enforcement and rule-of-law capacity.

Challenges to effective interagency performance

Planning and executing AC 09 displayed many challenges in integrating civilian and military agencies while conducting whole-of-government stability and SFA operations. These challenges will have

significant implications as the USG develops and executes comprehensive operations around the world.

Building the IMS implementation team, both within the CRSG and as the IPC and ACT integrate with military forces, was a significant event. The IMS process is ad hoc by nature; it will differ in each situation. Different specialties are essential in each R&S operation, and in different quantities.

Some operations, like those exercised in AC 09, will initially be military-intensive, while others, such as strictly humanitarian-assistance operations, will largely be civilian efforts supported by military logistics. Civilian and military planners who understand all facets of security-sector reform, stability operations and SFA operations will add value in any scenario or contingency. Regardless of the type of operation, and in lieu of habitual relationships overcoming the realities of ad hoc entities, building a team with the correct personnel and integrating them efficiently will be crucial to its success.

A second challenge the exercise addressed is a lack of common doctrine and processes. In AC 09, each organization understood their agency's culture, doctrine, planning processes and role in the operation. However, they didn't understand every other organization's doctrine, planning or roles. Nor did they understand how their organization fit within the development of the whole-of-government approach. For example, unlike the military, not every agency conducts planning through the "boards, bureaus, committees, cells and working groups" process. Therefore, IMS implementing members may not understand the importance of each meeting and how to articulate their positions into the military or civilian decision-making cycles. This is especially critical as we exercise the interagency process through military exercises as the primary learning environment.

Civilian participants must understand the military decision-making process and where they must engage to be effective. Military organizations must understand that civilian processes can be just as efficient, if not more so, than the military's 24-hour battle rhythm or progress depiction in "green/amber/red" slides.

One of the most difficult challenges, requiring a paradigm shift among all participants, was the difference between civilian and military optempos. The challenge stems from one primary source: the time horizon for accomplishing goals. The military's role of immediate effects has come to assume the immedi-

ate acquisition of information or its proxy.

To accomplish military operational goals measured in hours, days and months, military units require as much information as fast as possible to support their planning. In contrast, the needs of civilian agencies, who measure their goals in years and decades, are not as urgent; their goals take time to develop, requiring patience and the development of relationships to accomplish them.

In AC 09, this radically different view of time led to initial friction between military and civilian planners. The military inundated the IPC, embassy and ACT with requests for information that had near-instantaneous completion times. IPC, embassy and ACT elements often viewed the substance of the RFIs as irrelevant to the facts on the ground, driven by a drive to "know everything about everything now" than by considered analysis of the information critical to mission accomplishment. Unanswered RFIs led to frustration and confusion. From the other side, civilian participants requested information from the JTF and EUCOM that was unanswered or ignored due to more immediate concerns.

Even with the different optempos aside, managing these RFIs were a significant challenge during AC 09. Questions from JTF to JIACT, JIACT to embassy/ACT and embassy/ACT to CRSG received inadequate attention, as did their answers. RFIs were lost in the wave of information requests, leaving all organizations without necessary information.

The end of the scenario affected the issues identified during the exercise as well as the solutions. RFI managers at all organizations cross-leveled their RFIs to ensure each RFI was addressed. Development of a Web-based system allowed all requesting agencies to ask for information on-line and answering organizations to filter, track and answer RFIs in one place.

Finally, there was a gap in specialized training and preparation of civilian planners. There were civilian planners in both the JIACT and ACT, but too few. Civilian personnel were subject-matter experts in their select functions from commerce to governance, development to diplomacy. However, their ability to take part in integrated planning with the JTF, and even within the embassy/ACT, was limited to those with prior training.

The IMS and military participants integrated and pushed through a rigorous exercise for two weeks. The exercise challenged them to develop the operational flexibility and planning systems that allowed civilian and military agencies to

cooperate in multiple operations. The solution also resulted in the development of multiple courses to address the shortfall identified before AC 09 and S/CRS. The courses include Foundations of Interagency R&S Course, R&S Planner Level I Course and R&S Planner Level II Course.

Conducting more exercises with interagency integration will refine the systems and processes until doctrinal development can occur. Ultimately, AC 09 led to a deeper understanding of civilian and military roles, including specific agency practices and cultures during planning and execution of stability and SFA operations. This understanding leads to greater "flexibility of thought ... for leaders at all levels who are comfortable with collaborative planning,"⁷ improving the conduct of joint-interagency planning and decision-making. This is the best and quickest way the USG will achieve operational adaptability in a whole-of-government approach.



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Len Hawley and Michael Zorick contributed significantly to this article. According to the authors, they "truly show the benefits of applying operational adaptability to the integration of civilian and military efforts."

Notes

¹Operational adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible and timely actions. (Army Operating Concept, Dec. 21, 2009, Page 51)

²Security-force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07)

³U.S. Joint Forces Command, Austere Challenge 2009 Planning Phase Exercise Control Plan, January 2009.

⁴Joint Multinational Training Center, distinguished-visitor briefing, Slide 5, April 26, 2009.

⁵Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of the Defense Department and engaged U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental agencies/organizations, regional and international organizations to ac-

complish an objective. (Joint Publication 3-08)

⁶Stull, Jon W. "Effects-Linked Comprehensive Planning: Integrating Military Planning with Interagency Implementation," essay included in **Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation: Interactions and Innovations among People, Organizations, Processes and**

Technology, edited by Derrick Neal, Henrik Friman, Ralph Doughty and Linton Wells II. Washington, DC: The Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2009. Page 239.

⁷Dempsey, GEN Martin. **Army Capstone Concept**, Dec. 21, 2009, Page i.

ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

AC – Austere Challenge

ACT – advance civilian team

CRC – Civilian Response Corps

CRSG – Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group

DHHS – Department of Health and Human Services

DHS – Department of Homeland Security

DoC – Department of Commerce

DoD – Department of Defense

DoJ – Department of Justice

DoS – Department of State

EUCOM – European Command

GCC – geographic combatant command

IMS – Interagency Management System

INL – International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency

IPC – integrated planning cell

JFCOM – (U.S.) Joint Forces Command

JIACT – Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team

JTF – joint task force

NSC – National Security Council

PLANORD – planning order

PRM – (Bureau of) Population, Refugees and Migration

R&S – reconstruction and stabilization

RFI – request for information

S/CRS – State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

SFA – security-force assistance

USAID – U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA – U.S. Department of Agriculture

USG – U.S. government

How the Whole-of-Government Approach Works

The National Security Council begins the whole-of-government approach to contingency operations by activating the Interagency Management System. The IMS establishes operational integration of all elements of the U.S. government's power, including the geographical combatant command, in response to the triggering events or situation. This system, as established by the Deputies Committee, is the approved method by which the USG organizes itself when responding to foreign events determined to require total-government action.

The IMS has three components: Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group, integrated planning cell and advance civilian team.

CRSG. The CRSG serves as the central coordinating body for the USG effort and prepares the whole-of-government strategic plan. This group is co-chaired by the regional assistant secretary, coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization and relevant NSC director.

The CRSG secretariat supports this component. Its focus is the country-specific concerns related to the intervention's R&S elements.¹ Specifically, the CRSG secretariat (staffed and coordinated through State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) formulates policy through a strategic-planning team, which develops goals with a two- to three-year end state that contains multiple options and major mission elements.² We'll come back to the MMEs.

In AC 09's planning phase, a team of planners from the Defense Department and the S/CRs replicated the CRSG. This team produced the conceptual framework that USG power was pinned on to conduct operations in the AC 09 scenario. Forming the framework was a situational analysis describing the circumstances confronting the USG, followed by a policy-guidance memorandum presenting the Deputies Committee with response options. A follow-on Deputies Committee policy memo chose from among the response options to set forth the overarching "crisis transformation goal" that all elements of USG power were to achieve. The DoD-S/CRS team drafted the whole-of-government strategic plan, which a team of interagency planners later refined, to achieve the Deputies' crisis transformation goal.

A strategic plan contains a concept of operations and the essential tasks the USG must to undertake. Tasks include those shared with international partners. The plan also includes the resources required in achieving stability while pursuing the crisis transformation goal.

As replicated in AC 09, once the USG integrated strategic plan was approved, the CRSG facilitated the preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning, which produced the operational plan, in coordination with the GCC, that was put into effect on the ground by the U.S. embassy, ACT and a portion of the ACT called the Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team. The plan also facilitated operations support, information management, international/coalition partnership development and resource mobilization.

During AC 09's execution, a white cell drawn from DoD personnel and selected S/CRS partner agencies (Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Agency for International Development under S/CRS coordination) replicated the CRSG. As would happen in actual operations, the exercise CRSG managed the interagency process that prepared and forwarded strategic-guidance recommendations for decision by the Deputies Committee. As appropriate, the Principals Committee ensured guidance and direction to all elements of U.S. civilians in Washington and in the field.

It's important to note that the CRSG doesn't direct field operations. Rather, DoS' chief of mission retains control in-country of all USG activities not under the GCC commander.

IPC. As was the case in AC 09, an IPC can deploy to a GCC headquarters. The IPC assists in developing operational adaptability with interagency partners. It also integrates the civilian and military planning processes and supports current operations. In the exercise, when the Joint Staff sent the warning order for the GCC's intervention, the CRSG composed an IPC with relevant interagency planners, region and sector experts. With this support, the GCC commander gained more flexibility to integrate the evolving civilian components of the U.S. strategic and implementation plans with the military plan for operations.

ACT. Concurrent to the IPC process, an ACT was activated. The ACT deployed to supplement the embassy in the affected country. The ACT was a robust group comprised of members organized into functional and objective teams.

The functional teams broke down into groups dedicated to different operational aspects of the ACT. For example, operations, planning, monitoring and evaluation, situation analysis, strategic communication and resource teams functioned in the exercise.

The objective teams contained regional and sector experts organized around an MME. For example, a team of experts from DHS, Department of Justice and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency focused on rule-of-law issues in the affected country.³ When a joint task force deploys to an affected region, the JIACT integrates into the military organization to provide connectivity to the ACT and assist in JTF-embassy coordination and planning. The ACT has a communication and coordination link with the IPC but doesn't take direction from it.

MMEs. Identified in the strategic plan are MMEs – critical elements that, when accomplished, allow the USG to achieve its crisis transformation goal. MMEs are similar to military lines of effort in that they structure all capabilities to solve a categorized problem. MMEs break down into an analysis of the means, methods, timelines and costs to achieve initial, short-term stabilization. MMEs also perform required follow-on projects and programs needed to obtain the two- to three- year end state desired.

An assessment – both initial then continuous – of a conflict's root causes is the basis for the strategic plan. When USG policy goals resulting from this assessment are approved, the CRSG secretariat develops a strategy to begin the goals' implementation process. MME planning teams organize and develop strategies to achieve each MME's goals, identify essential task areas for each MME, determine lead agencies for each ETA and track donor contributions.

Once the national strategic plan is approved, the lead agencies, ACT or country team responsible for an ETA begin implementation planning for their tasks. No two situations will be identical – agencies, the ACT or country team will collaborate as required by the nature of the MMEs and ETAs. DoD, through orders from the Joint Staff to the GCCs or JTF, will coordinate with the IMS' civilian elements to conduct implementation planning. The goal of this implementation planning is to achieve stability-operations objectives or tasks assigned to DoD in support of its civilian counterparts as appropriate.

In AC 09, the crisis transformation goal was that "the government of the host nation exercises sovereign responsibility over the entirety of its national territory, and regional actors – particularly the aggressor nation – [use] internationally recognized mechanisms to resolve disputes." MMEs derived from this ranged from compelling the withdrawal of aggressor forces to securing critical infrastructure to providing assistance to conflict victims. Of concern here is the fourth MME, "*The host nation's armed forces and security arrangements with regional partners are sufficient to protect critical infrastructure and economic activities and deter future aggression.*"⁴ This critical MME was assigned to DoD as the lead agency and to DoS and other interagency partners as participating (i.e., supporting) agencies.

The MME concept paper resulting from the Deputies Committee policy statement and strategic-plan narrative further refined and conceptualized the method by which DoD and DoS would accomplish the fourth MME. The MME concept paper also articulated a mandate, key actors and structures, linkages to other MMEs, assumptions and a concept of operations, including sub-objectives. The concept paper was the base planning document for developing security-force assistance implementation plans.

The MME concept paper tasked DoD to:

- Lead the planning effort to develop competent, credible, capable and confident armed forces;
- Conduct SFA to enable the host nation to meet the goals outlined in the MME;
- Coordinate SFA funding issues with DoS;
- Support the training and equipping of police and border police with DoS, DoJ and DHS;
- Support the training and equipping of maritime security forces;
- Support DoS in the effort to advise and assist as required the requesting country's minister of the interior; and
- Support DoS efforts to develop regional security arrangements.

SFA. Within the context of AC 09, therefore, SFA was a subordinate task to the overall stability operation in progress. It focused on reinstating civil control and internal security within the wartorn country while also rebuilding the country's armed forces to constitute a kind of "trip-wire" deterrence to aggression from external sources.

SFA operations, like R&S operations, require significant operational adaptability to plan and conduct a whole-of-government approach.⁵ This ensures the integration of Army and interagency capabilities to achieve specific operational objectives.⁶ The system reflects the whole-of-government approach for SFA. The interagency partners, both military and non-military, conducting the operations under National Security Presidential Directive 44 and Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act produce the outcomes.

NSPD 44 assigns the Secretary of State, with the S/CRS's assistance, the lead roles in developing R&S strategies. This assignment also ensures coordination of interagency processes as well as civilian interagency programs and policies to identify countries at risk of instability. Also, the assignment provides decision-makers with detailed options for an integrated USG response in connection with R&S operations. Operational flexibility to carry out a range of other actions – including development of a civilian surge capacity to meet R&S emergencies – also results.

The Secretary of State and S/CRS also collaborate with DoD on R&S responses and integrated planning and implementation procedures. Title XVI of the 2009 NDAA resulted in the creation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. This improves civilian partnership with the U.S. armed forces in post-conflict stabilization situations and established a Civilian Response Corps of 250 active members and 2,000 stand-by members.

Notes

¹U.S. Joint Forces Command, draft *Handbook for the Interagency Management System*, Chapter 5, updated March 17, 2009.

²Department of State, *United States Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, Nov. 1, 2007.

³Joint Multinational Training Center, distinguished-visitor briefing, Slide 15, April 26, 2009.

⁴AC 09 exercise (notional) national strategic plan.

⁵See FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, Paragraphs 1-40, 1-42 and 2-9.

⁶Department of the Army, *Army Operating Concept*, Dec. 21, 2009, Page 21.

ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

ACT – advance civilian team

CRSG – Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group

DHS – Department of Homeland Security

DoD – Department of Defense

DoJ – Department of Justice

DoS – Department of State

ETA – essential task area

GCC – geographical combatant command

IMS – Interagency Management System

IPC – integrated planning cell

JIACT – joint interagency advance civilian team

JTF – joint task force

MME – major mission element

NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act

NSC – National Security Council

NSPD – National Security Presidential Directive

R&S – reconstruction and stabilization

S/CRS – State Coordinator for Reconstruction and stabilization

SFA – security-force assistance

USG – U.S. government