



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume V

United Nations, 1969–1972

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Richard M. Nixon. The subseries will present a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions of President Nixon’s administration toward the United Nations. This volume documents U.S. policy toward the United Nations during President Nixon’s first administration from 1969 through 1972 and is organized according to six major subject areas: Chinese representation, the U.S.

withdrawal from the Committee of 24 on Decolonization, special Security Council meetings, changes in senior UN personnel, reducing the U.S. financial assessment, and routine issues.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1972, Volume V

The editor of the volume sought to present documentation illuminating responsibility for major foreign policy decisions of the U.S. Government, with emphasis on the President and his principal foreign policy advisers. The documents include memoranda and records of discussions, telegrams, policy papers, and other documents that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the development of U.S. policy and on major aspects and repercussions of its execution rather than on the details of policy execution.

While United Nations affairs were not a high priority during the Nixon administration, they were a major concern for the Department of State. While two key issues, the question of Chinese representation and the selection of a new Secretary-General to succeed U Thant, rose to the level of high interest, most UN issues fell below the purview of the upper echelons of the Nixon administration's foreign policy leadership. Furthermore, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger both believed that they were realists more concerned with national self-interest and major power relationships than with political, social, and economic issues of the United Nations. Both Nixon and Kissinger were skeptical of the effectiveness and value of the United Nations. They therefore devoted scant attention to a organization dominated by smaller and developing nations and replete with specialized international organizations. Nixon and Kissinger did recognize that the United Nations was the most important and visible world organization and therefore could not be totally ignored. It could even be used to provided a useful and high-profile venue to support U.S. foreign policies. For these reasons the two issues that the Nixon administration believed were vitally important—Chinese representation in the United Nations and the selection of a new Secretary-General—are given the most coverage in the volume.

The documentation on Chinese representation is primarily an account of Department of State efforts, as seen through primarily Department of State documents, to hold the line on Chinese representation while developing a formula for dual representation of Mainland China and Taiwan in the General Assembly that would be acceptable to both the Republic of China and to a majority within the UN General Assembly. When Kissinger returned from a secret trip to China and announced that President Nixon would be going to Beijing, any chances for dual representation were gone. On October 25, 1971, the

General Assembly voted to admit the PRC and to expel the Republic of China.

Although the United States opposed colonialism and favored self-determination, it had grown frustrated by the increasingly radical tone of the Committee of 24 on Decolonization. The volume documents this disillusionment and the final decision to leave the Committee. During the 1972 session of the General Assembly, the United States unsuccessfully opposed a proposal to grant observer status to representatives of liberation movements in southern Africa. A major theme in this UN volume is how the Nixon administration sought to promote U.S. interests, or at least how to minimize damage to them, in an organization with a Third World majority that was less interested in cold war concerns and passionately interested in eliminating the last vestiges of colonialism.

The issue of special meetings of the Security Council as allowed for under Article 28 of the UN Charter is another theme of the volume. One such meeting was held on October 21, 1970, but none were held thereafter. There was, however, pressure from members to hold Security Council meetings overseas, which the Nixon administration opposed as being unfavorable to orderly deliberation and an undue burden on the UN's precarious finances.

Another theme of the volume is the possible successor to Secretary General U Thant after he announced his intention not to seek another term. The candidate preferred by the United States was Finnish Permanent Representative Max Jakobson, who was opposed by the Soviet Union and the Arab Group. The United States was active in defeating the candidacy of Felipe Herrera of Chile. In the end, Kurt Waldheim of Austria emerged as the compromise candidate. Also emphasized in the volume are successors to UN Under Secretary-General Ralph Bunche and Paul Hoffman, director of the UN Development Program.

The final major focus of the volume is the critical issue of UN budget and financing. Not only was the United Nations facing bankruptcy, but the U.S. Congress was casting an increasingly cold eye on the U.S. share of UN expenses. In 1971, the Lodge Commission recommended that the United States seek to reduce its assessment from 30 to 25 percent while maintaining its overall level of contributions. In 1972, the United States conducted a successful campaign to reduce its assessments.

Various topics involving U.S. foreign policy and the United Nations are or will be treated in other volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* in the 1969–1976 subseries. The already-published volume I, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, covers general attitudes toward international organizations that President Nixon and

National Security Adviser Kissinger brought with them to the White House. A similar volume scheduled for 1973–1976 will cover such attitudes during the Nixon–Ford administration. Internet-only volumes on Global Issues for 1969–1972 and 1973–1976 will cover U.S. involvement with UN initiatives concerning oceans policy, narcotics, space exploration, terrorism, and the environment. Two print volumes on China, 1969–1972 and 1973–1976, will document steps toward normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China, a move that had a clear impact on the increasing role of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. Three print volumes covering the Arab–Israeli dispute and war, 1969–1976, also have large UN components. The printed volume on Southern Africa, 1969–1976, will cover UN initiatives to end Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa, minority rule in Southern Rhodesia, the status of Namibia, and apartheid in South Africa. The South Asia print volume documents the India–Pakistan War of 1971, including UN initiatives to defuse the conflict.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld

for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on problems that come to its attention.

The Advisory Committee has not reviewed this volume.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to

notify the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they are a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Resources Management Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review for the Department of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

The final declassification review of this volume, which began in 2001 and was completed in 2002, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 5 documents. The editor is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate account of U.S. policies toward the United Nations from 1969 to 1972.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland.

The editor wishes to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access.

Evan M. Duncan collected, selected, and edited the documentation for this volume under the general supervision of General Editor

of the *Foreign Relations* series Edward C. Keefer, Rita M. Baker, Vicki E. Futscher, and Renée A. Goings did the copy and technical editing, and Susan C. Weetman coordinated the final declassification review. Juniee Oneida prepared the index.

October 2004

Marc J. Susser
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Most of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, those that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved with the Nixon Presidential Materials at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (P.L. 93–526; 88 Stat. 1695) and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon estate.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume V

Almost all the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. While research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, all the material printed in this volume has been declassified. It is possible that some of the documents extracted or cited to in this volume are from still-classified documents, but the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume and virtually all should be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of Presidential Papers and other White House records at the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives. The most useful files from the Nixon Presidential Materials came from the National Security Council Files, especially Agency Files relating to the United Nations, Country Files, China and Chinese representation, and Files for the President, China Materials. Also of note in the National Security Files are the NSC Institutional Files (H Files), the Subject Files that contain National Security Study Memoranda, Nixon/Kissinger memoranda of conversations, and Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, China. The White House Special Files, President's Office Files, supplemented the National Security Council Files. The Henry A. Kissinger Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, including NSC Files, Memoranda of Conversation with the President, and Miscellany, 1968–1976 also proved valuable. The White House Tapes of Presidential recordings were valuable in documenting U.S. policy on Chinese representation at the United Nations.

The records of the Department of State were another important source. The Department's central files contain the cable traffic between the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN); memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Many important documents are found only in the Department's lot files. The conference files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in office or bureau files.

Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

The following list identifies the most important files consulted and cited in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records for this period has been completed and most of them are ready for public use at the National Archives in College Park Maryland.

Unpublished Sources

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Files, 1967–1969 and 1970–1973

- POL CHICOM-US: relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States
- POL 16 CHICOM: recognition of the People's Republic of China
- POL 1 CHINAT-US: relations between the Republic of China and the United States
- POL 17 CHINAT-US: diplomatic representation between the Republic of China and the United States
- POL 19 UN: government of dependencies, United Nations
- UN 3: meetings, sessions of the UN
- UN 3 GA: meetings, sessions of the UN General Assembly
- UN 3 SC: meetings, sessions of the UN Security Council
- UN 3-1: agenda, meetings, and sessions of the UN
- UN 6 CHICOM: UN membership, People's Republic of China
- UN 6 CHINAT: UN membership, Republic of China
- UN 6 GER E: UN membership, German Democratic Republic
- UN 6 KOR N: UN membership, North Korea
- UN 8-1: UN Secretary-General
- UN 8-3: UN Secretariat
- UN 8-4: UN committees and working groups
- UN 10: UN budget and finance
- UN 10-1, UN budget estimates
- UN 10-4: UN contributions
- UN 22-2 CHICOM: foreign country delegations and representatives, People's Republic of China
- UN 22-2 GA: foreign country delegations and representatives, UN General Assembly

Lot Files

Conference Files, Lot 71 D 227

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1970, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State

EA Files, Lot 74 D 471

Letters and memoranda prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1972–1973

EAP Files, Lot 75 D 76

Files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs pertaining to Republic of China affairs

XVI Sources

S/P Files, Lot 77 D 112

Files of Policy Planning Director Winston Lord (1973–1977), covering the period 1969–1977

S/S NSC Files, Lot 80 D 212

National Security Council files pertaining to NSSMs and related documents as maintained by the Department of State, 1969–1980

Department of State

Files of the Office of the Historian, Research Projects

Historical research projects prepared by the Office of the Historian

Nixon Presidential Materials Project

National Security Council Files

Agency Files, UN; U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN)

Country Files, Far East, China; Far East, Chirep

Files for the President, China Material

Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, China

Name Files, Robert Murphy

Nixon/HAK Memoranda

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)

President Daily Briefs

Subject Files, NSSMs

White House Central Files

President Nixon's Daily Diary

White House Special Files, President's Office Files

Memoranda for the President

White House Tapes

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Manuscript Division

Kissinger Papers

NSC Files, 1969–1977

Memoranda Conversations—President's Files

Miscellany, 1968–1976

Private Papers of William P. Rogers

Appointment Books

Abbreviations

ACABQ, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, United Nations

ACC, Administrative Committee on Coordination, UN Economic and Social Council

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ADB, Asian Development Bank

AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AFs, African members of the United Nations

AF/I, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AF/RA, Regional Affairs Staff, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AFL/CIO, American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations

Amb, Ambassador

AMS, Administrative Management Service

ANC, African National Congress

AR, Albanian resolution

ASAF, Asian-African; Asia-Africa

ASAP, as soon as possible

ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASWI, Associated States of the West Indies

BOB, Bureau of the Budget

BWC, Biological Warfare Convention

C, Counselor of the Department of State

C-24, Committee of 24 (Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), United Nations

CA, circular airgram

CAR, Central African Republic

CBW, Chemical and Biological Weapons

CC, Credentials Committee

CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

CCK, Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, Republic of China

CDF, Capital Development Fund

Chicoms, Chinese Communists

Chirec, Chinese recognition

Chirep, Chinese representation

cmte, committee

COREMO, Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)

CPC, Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, UN Economic and Social Council

CPR, Chinese People's Republic

CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CY, calendar year

DCs, developed countries

DDII, Second UN Development Decade

del, delegation, delegate

deloff, delegation officer

Dept, Department

XVIII Abbreviations

Deptel, telegram from the Department of State

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EC, European Community

ECA, Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations

ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations

ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations

ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council, United Nations

EE, Eastern European

Emboff, Embassy officer

ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, United Nations

EPS, Executive Protection Service

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations

FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

FODAG, Food and Agricultural Agency, United Nations

FonMin, Foreign Minister(s)

FRELIMO, Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

GA, General Assembly

Gadel, series indicator for telegrams from the delegation to the General Assembly

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCD, general and comprehensive disarmament

GDR, German Democratic Republic

Gimo, Generalissimo

GOA, Government of Algeria; Government of Argentina; Government of Australia

GOB, Government of Belgium; Government of Barbados

GOE, Government of Finland; Government of France

GOG, Government of Guyana; Government of Guinea

GOI, Government of India; Government of Italy

GOJ, Government of Japan

GOM, Government of Malaysia

GON, Government of the Netherlands; Government of Nicaragua

GONZ, Government of New Zealand

GOP, Government of Panama; Government of Peru

GOS, Government of Syria

GOTT, Government of Trinidad and Tobago

GNP, gross national product

GNZ, Government of New Zealand

GRAE: Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)

GRC, Government of the Republic of China

GRZ, Government of the Republic of Zambia

-
- H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HCHR, High Commissioner for Human Rights
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HICOM, High Commissioner
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICSAB, International Civil Service Advisory Board, United Nations
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSU, International Council of Scientific Unions
IDA, International Development Association
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank; Industrial Development Board
IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government
IEY, International Education Year
IFC, International Finance Corporation
IFI, international financial institutions
IG, inspector general
ILC, International Law Commission
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/BAPS, UN Budgetary and Administrative Policy Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/CMD, Coordinator for Multilateral Development Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/EX, Executive Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/LABW, Agency for Labor and Women, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/OIA, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/PPR, Policy, Planning, and Reports Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/SEC, Executive Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/TRC, Agency for Transportation and Communications, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UN/COR, UN System Coordination Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
IQ, Important Question
ITU, International Telecommunications Union
IUOTO, International Union of Official Travel Organizations
- JIU**, Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations

XX Abbreviations

K-M, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet

LA, Latin American countries at the United Nations

L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Department of State

LDCs, less-developed countries

LOS, Law of the Sea

MAB, International Coordinating Council of the Programme on Man and the Biosphere

MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions

ME, Middle East

Misoff, Mission officer

MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola)

mtg, meeting

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA/GRK, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, De-
partment of State

NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State

NEA/TRK, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State

NGO, non-governmental organization

NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSC, National Security Council

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

NY, New York

NZ, New Zealand

O/B, Office of the Budget, Bureau of Administration, Department of State

O/FM, Office of Funds Management, Bureau of Administration, Department of State

O/BP, Office of Budget Planning and Presentation, Bureau of Administration, Depart-
ment of State

OAS, Organization of American States

OAU, Organization of African Unity

OCAM, Organisation commune africaine et malgache (Joint African and Malagasy Or-
ganization)

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

OPI, Office of Public Information, United Nations

PAC, Pan-African Congress

PAIGC, Partido Africano de Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party for
the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)

PCIJ, Permanent Court of International Justice

permrep, permanent representative

PM, Prime Minister

Polcouns, Political Counselor

POW, prisoner of war

PRC, People's Republic of China

PriMin, Prime Minister

refair, referenced airgram

reftel, referenced telegram

- rep**, representative
res, resolution
ROC, Republic of China
ROK, Republic of Korea
- SA**, South Africa
SAs, specialized agencies, United Nations
SAA, South African Airways
SAG, South African Government
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SC, Security Council
SecGen, Secretary General
septel, separate telegram
SMUN, Soviet Mission to the United Nations
SR, Southern Rhodesia
SRG, Senior Review Group, National Security Council
Sov, Soviet Union
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SVN, South Vietnam
SWAPO, South West Africa People's Organization
SYG, Secretary-General
- TANU**, Tanganyika African National Union
TC, Trusteeship Council, United Nations
TDB, Trade and Development Board
TTPI, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
- UAR**, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UKUN, Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNCURK, UN Commission for the Unification and Reunification of Korea
UNDATs, UN Development Advisory Teams
UNDCC, United Nations Development Cooperation
UNDel, UN delegation
UNDP, UN Development Program
UNEPRO, UN East Pakistan Relief Operation
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNFPA, United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF, United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNISIST, Intergovernmental Conference for the Establishment of a World Science Information System
UNITA, Unio para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNITAR, United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNROD, United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca
UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Arab Refugees from Palestine
UNSCEAR, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
UNSYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
UNV, United Nations Volunteers

XXII Abbreviations

UPU, Universal Postal Union

U.S., United States

USDeI, U.S. Delegation

USG, United States Government

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

USYG, Under Secretary-General

VM, visiting mission

WCF, Working Capital Fund, United Nations

WDC, World Disarmament Conference

WEO, Western European and Others Group, United Nations

WG, working group

WHO, World Health Organization

WTO, World Town Organization

WYA, World Youth Assembly

ZANU, Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People's Union

Names

- Abdel-Rahman, Ibrahim H.**, Executive Director, United Nations Industrial Development Organization
- Abdel-Wahab, Mostafa Wateb**, United Arab Republic Alternate Representative on the UN Council for Namibia 1969
- Abdulah, Frank Owen**, Minister-Counselor, Trinidad and Tobago Mission to the United Nations; Vice Chairman, United Nations Committee of 24, 1972
- Abdulgani, Hadji Roeslan**, Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Abdulla, Rahmatalla**, Sudanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1972
- Ackerman, Karl D.**, Deputy Executive Secretary of State for Management
- Adebo, Chief S. O.**, Executive Director of UNITAR until 1970
- Aichi, Kiichi**, Foreign Minister of Japan until July 1971
- Akwei, Richard Maximilian**, Ghanaian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Aldrich, George H.**, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Algard, Ole**, member, Norwegian Delegation to the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1970
- Ali, Amjad**, Chairman, Committee on Contributions, 5th Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 1969
- Allen, Mark E.**, U.K. Alternate Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council
- Allen, Ward P.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1969
- Alphand, Herve**, Secretary-General, French Foreign Ministry, 1972
- Amerasinghe, Hamilton Shirley**, Ceylonese Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Amin Dada, Idi**, President of Uganda
- An Chih-Yuan**, Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Seabeds Committee
- Anand Panyarachun**, Thai Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Anderson, G. Norman**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Annenberg, Walter H.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, April 1969–October 1974
- Arita Quinonez, Roberto**, Honduran Alternate Representative to the United Nations
- Armitage, John A.**, Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Aryubi, Mohammed Hakim**, First Secretary, Afghan Mission to the United Nations, 1971; Rapporteur, United Nations Committee of 24, 1972
- Asensio, Lionel E.**, First Secretary, Guatemalan Mission to the United Nations
- Ashwin, Charles Robin**, Australian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971
- Atherton, Alfred L., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Auraujo-Castro, Joao Augusto de**, Brazilian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Bailey, Kenneth H.**, political and economic officer, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, UN Budgetary and Administrative Policy Staff from April 1972
- Baker, Raymond W.**, Counselor, Fiji Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Banda, Albert J. M.**, Malawian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1972

- Bandaranaike, Sirimavo R. D.**, Prime Minister of Ceylon
- Baroody, Jamil M.**, Saudi Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Bayulken, Umit Haluk**, Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Beam, Jacob D.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union April 1969–January 1973
- Bell, Kathleen**, Chief, Division of Institutional Development and Coordination Affairs, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Bell, S. Morey**, Country Director for Panama, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Bender, Albert F.**, Counsellor for Legal and International Organization Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Benites, Leopoldo**, Ecuadorian Deputy Representative to the United Nations; Chairman of the Preparatory Committee on the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
- Bennett, W. Tapley**, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative on the Security Council, 1971
- Bergsten, C. Fred**, member of the National Security Council staff
- Bleha, C. Thomas**, Desk Officer for Thailand, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, 1972
- Bokassa, Jean-Bedel**, President of the Central African Republic
- Bomboko, Justin Marie**, Foreign Minister, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), 1969
- Bouayad-Agha, Fathih Khaouane**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations
- Bouciah, Alfred**, Counsellor, Gabonese Mission to the United Nations
- Boughton, James H.**, Senior Regional Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Boyd, Aquilino E.**, Permanent Representative of Panama to the United Nations
- Boyd, John D. I.**, First Secretary, British Embassy to the United States, 1971
- Bray, Charles W. III**, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 1971
- Breer, William T.**, Politico-Military Officer, Office of Japanese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 1971
- Brewster, Robert C.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, 1969–1971
- Brooks, Angie E.**, member of the Liberian Delegation to the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1970; President of 24th UN General Assembly, 1969
- Brown, Elizabeth Ann**, Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Brown, Dr. Harrison**, Foreign Secretary, U.S. National Academy of Sciences
- Brown, Robert L.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State
- Brown, William A.**, international relations officer, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Department of State, August 1970–August 1972
- Brown, Winthrop G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
- Buffum, William B.**, Deputy Representative of the United States to the Security Council until December 1969
- Bunche, Dr. Ralph**, Under United Nations Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs until October 1971
- Burnham, Forbes**, Prime Minister of Guyana
- Burns, John H.**, Ambassador to Tanzania until June 22, 1969
- Burns, Robert T.**, Deputy Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Bury, Leslie H. E.**, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1971
- Bush, George Herbert Walker**, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations March 1, 1971–January 18, 1973

- Butler, Richard William**, First Secretary, Australian Mission to the United Nations; Australian representative to the 5th Committee, UN General Assembly, 1972
- Cabral, Amilcar**, Secretary-General, Partido Africano de Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
- Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabriv**, Foreign Minister of Turkey until March 1971
- Caradon, Lord (Hugh Mackintosh Foot)**, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations until June 1970
- Cargo, William I.**, Director, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, August 1969–July 1973
- Carrillo Flores, Antonio**, former Foreign Minister of Mexico; Secretary-General, UN World Population Conference
- Carter, W. Beverly, Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
- Cash, Frank E., Jr.**, Country Director for Turkey, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Castaneda Cornejo, Ricardo Guillermo**, Salvadoran Alternate Representative to the United Nations
- Ceausescu, Nicolae**, President of Romania
- Chadha, S. M. S.**, First Secretary, Indian Mission to the United Nations; Rapporteur, Committee of 24, 1970
- Chang, Chun-Ming**, Republic of China Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Chang Chung**, Secretary-General, Office of the President, Republic of China
- Chao Wei**, Second Secretary, People's Republic of China Mission to the United Nations
- Chase, Robert W.**, Multilateral Organizations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Chayet, Claude**, French Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Che Yin-shou**, Director of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
- Ch'en Chu**, People's Republic of China Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Chen, Henry**, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
- Cheng Pao-nan**, Republic of China Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva
- Chi Peng-fei**, Acting Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China
- Chi Peng-tei**, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
- Chi Shu-jang**, Assistant to the Military Adviser, People's Republic of China Mission to the United Nations
- Chiang Ching-kuo**, Vice Premier, Republic of China
- Chiang Kai-shek**, President of the Republic of China
- Chiao Kuan-hua**, Vice Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China; led first delegation to the United Nations, November 1971
- Chien, Frederick F.**, Director of North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
- Chihota, Lovemore P.**, chief representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Tanzania
- Chou En-lai**, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
- Chou Nan**, First Secretary, Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
- Chow Shu-kai**, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States; Foreign Minister of the Republic of China from April 1971
- Chuchukin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich**, First Secretary, Soviet Mission to the United Nations
- Cleland, Joseph Quao**, Deputy Permanent Representative and Acting Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, 1972
- Cole, Daniel O.**, Alternate Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations Economic and Social Council

- Combs, Richard E., Jr.**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Coote, Wendell B.**, Director of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, 1971
- Coradin, Jean**, Haitian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Corner, Frank**, New Zealand Ambassador to the United States
- Crimmins, John Hugh**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, April 1969–March 1973
- Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring)**, British Ambassador to the United States from February 1971
- Cromwell, W. Kennedy**, Regional Affairs Officer, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Crosby, Oliver S.**, Country Director for Southern Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Crowe, Sir Colin**, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from June 1970
- Cuevas Cancino, Francisco**, Mexican Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Cumes, J. W. S.**, member of the Australian Delegation to the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1970
- Cummins, Sidney S.**, Officer-in-Charge of Financial Management Reports and Statistics, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1969
- Cunningham, William J.**, Political officer, US Embassy, Tokyo, 1971
- Curran, Robert T.** Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State
- D'Anethan, Roland**, Director of Western European and North American Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Belgium
- Da Mota, D. Silvera**, Chairman, 5th Committee of the UN General Assembly, 1969
- Dadzie, Emmanuel K.**, Secretary of the United Nations Committee of 24 in 1969
- Danieli, Akili B. C.**, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the United Nations until 1969
- Danielson, George E.**, Democratic Congressman from California, 1971
- Davidson, George F.**, UN Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management
- Davies, Rodger P.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1971
- Davignon, Vicomte Etienne**, Director-General, Foreign Ministry of Belgium
- Davis, Jeanne W.** Director, NSC Staff Secretariat, 1970–1971
- Day, Arthur R.**, Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Dean, John Wesley, III**, Counsel to the President July 1970–April 1973
- De la Gorce, Francois**, French Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations from late 1970
- De Palma, Samuel**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs February 7, 1969–June 20, 1973
- De Prat Gay, Gaston**, Argentine Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1972
- De Zavala-Urriolagoitia, Julio**, Bolivian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1972
- Del Castaldo, Massimo**, Italian Alternate Representative to the Committee of 24
- Derwinski, Edward J.**, Representative, U.S. Delegation to the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1971
- Deutch, Michael J.**, consulting engineer, Washington, D.C.
- Dipp-Gomez, Kemil**, Counselor, Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, 1972

- Djermakoye, Issoufou**, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Non-Self-Governing Territories
- Dlamini, Mboni Naph**, Permanent Representative of Swaziland to the United Nations
- Dobles Sanchez, Luis**, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations
- Donald, Richard H.**, Director of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Donelan, Joseph F., Jr.** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Budget and Finance, 1970
- Dos Santos, Marcelino**, Acting Vice-President of Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
- Douglas-Home, Sir Alec**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom June 1970–March 1974
- Drexler, Robert W.**, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1970
- Driss, Rachid**, Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations
- Dubs, Adolph**, Country Director for the Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Dunn, Paxton T.**, Adviser for Economic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
- Echeverria, Luis**, President of Mexico, 1970–1976
- Ehrlichman, John D.** Counsel to the President, January–November 1969; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, November 1969–May 1973
- Eliot, Theodore L., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, August 1969–September 1973; thereafter Ambassador to Afghanistan
- Ericson, Richard A.**, Country Director for Japan, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Espinosa, Augusto**, Colombian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Fakhreddine, Mohamed**, Sudanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Feldman, Harvey J.**, Officer-in-Charge of Dependent Area Affairs, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1972
- Fessenden, Russell**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, July 1971–December 1972
- Finger, Seymour Maxwell**, Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations; U.S. Representative to the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24)
- Fisher, Joel M.**, Deputy Director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Flanigan, Peter M.**, Assistant to the President
- Flemming, Harry S.**, Special Assistant to the President
- Fletcher, Arthur**, Alternate Representative, U.S. Delegation to the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1971
- Fobes, John E.**, Deputy Director-General, UNESCO
- Folger, Kathryn N.**, Legislative Management Officer, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
- Frechtling, Louis**, Director, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Frei, Eduardo**, President of Chile until 1970
- Frisbie, Norman**, Officer-in-Charge of Dependent Area Affairs, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Froebe, John A., Jr.**, Desk Officer for New Zealand, Department of State, 1971
- Fukuda, Takeo**, Japanese Foreign Minister, 1971

- Garcia Robles**, Alfonso, Mexican Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971
- Garob, Moses**, Administrative Secretary, South West Africa People's Organization
- George, Scott**, Director, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malta Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Gleysteen, Culver**, Deputy Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Gleysteen, William H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Office of UN Political Affairs, Department of State, August 1966–September 1969; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, September 1969–June 1971
- Gontha, Hubert Rudy**, Indonesian Representative to the 5th Committee of the UN General Assembly, 1972
- Goott, Daniel**, Labor Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Gore, Louise**, U.S. Representative to the Executive Board of UNESCO
- Gorton, John G.**, Prime Minister of Australia, 1968–1971
- Gough, Betty**, Chief, Human Resources Affairs Division, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Graham, Pierre**, Deputy Director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1969
- Green, Marshall**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 1969–May 1973
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Griffiths, John C.**, Economic Officer for United Kingdom Affairs, Department of State, 1972
- Grigg, Ernest C., III**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Grinberg, Barouh**, Counselor, Bulgarian Mission to the United Nations; Vice Chairman, Committee of 24, 1971
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Gumane, Paulo**, President of Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique
- Guyer, Roberto E.**, Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations
- Haig, Brigadier General Alexander M., Jr.**, USA, Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969–June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 1970–January 1973
- Haldeman, H. R.**, Assistant to the President, January 1969–April 1973
- Hall, William O.**, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia until May 15, 1971
- Halsted, David C.**, international relations officer, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from February 1971
- Hambro, Edvard**, Norwegian Permanent Representative to the United Nations; President of the UN General Assembly, 1970
- Hamid, Agha Abdul**, Assistant Secretary-General for Public Information, United Nations, 1969
- Harmel, Pierre C. J. M.**, Foreign Minister of Belgium, March 1966–November 1972
- Hartley, Virginia E.**, special assistant, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Hearn, Godfrey Lewis**, Counselor, Canadian Mission to the United Nations
- Heath, Edward**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 1970–March 1974
- Helms, Richard M.**, Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973
- Helseth, William A.** Multilateral Organizations Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Hennes, Richard V.**, Deputy Director, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; Executive Secretary of the Bureau, 1971

- Hennig, Georg**, personal assistant to the UN Secretary-General, 1972
- Henry, Paul-Marc**, Assistant Administrator and Associate Director, Bureau of Operations and Programming, UNDP; Coordinator, UN Relief Operations in Dacca (UNROD), 1971
- Herrera, Felipe**, former President of the Inter-American Development Bank and Chilean candidate for Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Herter, Christian A., Jr.**, Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of State
- Herz, Martin F.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from June 1970
- Hillenbrand, Martin J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1969–April 1972
- Hoffman, Paul**, Administrator, United Nations Development Program until January 1972
- Holdridge, John**, member of the National Security Council staff, 1970–1972
- Holmes, Richard A.**, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1970
- Holyoake, Keith**, Prime Minister of New Zealand
- Horwitz, Leonard J.**, Deputy Director, Office of Panama Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Hsueh, Yu Chi**, Republic of China Ambassador to Canada; member of the ROC Delegation to the 25th UN General Assembly, October–December 1970
- Huang Hua**, People's Republic of China Permanent Representative to the United Nations from November 1971
- Hulinsky, Ilja**, First Secretary, Czechoslovakian Mission to the United Nations; Vice Chairman, Committee of 24, 1972
- Hurwitch, Robert A.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, September 1969–August 1973
- Idzumbuir, Theodore**, Democratic Republic of the Congo Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Ionescu, Vergiliu**, Second Secretary, Romanian Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Irwin, James C.** Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Irwin, John N.** Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State, July 1972–February 1973
- Ismail, Dato Mohamed bin Mohamed Yosef**, Malaysian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1969
- Issraelyan, Viktor Levonovich**, Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Jackson, Sir Robert**, Under Secretary-General in charge of UN Relief Operation in Dacca, 1972
- Jakobson, Max**, Finnish Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Jamieson, Kenneth D.**, British Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971
- Jankowitsch, Peter**, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1971
- Jardim, Anne**, Guyanese Ambassador to Venezuela, 1971
- Jarring, Gunnar V.**, Special Representative, United Nations Middle East Mission
- Javits, Jacob L.**, Senator (Republican–New York), member of the U.S. Delegation to the 25th UN General Assembly, 1970
- Jenkins, Alfred le S.**, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 1970
- Jimenez, Privado G.**, Philippine Acting Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1970
- Johnson, Peter B.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1971
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, February 1969–February 1973

- Jones, Betty-Jane**, Officer-in-Charge, UN Political Affairs, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Jones, Norvill**, staff member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
- Jones, Paul W., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Joueji, Rafic**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations; Vice Chairman of the Committee of 24, 1971
- Judd, Dr. Walter**, Chairman, Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations
- Kamil, J. A.**, Counselor, Malaysian Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Kankasa, Timothy**, Zambian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
- Kao Liang**, First Secretary, Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
- Kaunda, Kenneth**, President of Zambia
- Kekkonen, Uhro**, President of Finland
- Kennedy, Colonel Richard**, member of the National Security Council Staff, 1970
- Kerley, Ernest L.**, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State, from December 1971
- Khampang Panya**, member, Laotian Delegation to the 25th UN General Assembly
- Killefer, Thomas**, former Vice President, Export-Import Bank, and U.S. Executive Director, Inter-American Bank
- Kishi, Nobosuke**, former Prime Minister of Japan, 1971
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969
- Kittani, Ismat T.**, Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs, United Nations
- Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques**, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, February 1970–May 1972; thereafter French Ambassador to the United States
- Kosygin, Alexei N.**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
- Kreisberg, Paul H.**, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Kulaga, Eugeniusz**, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations
- Kutakov, Leonid N.**, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations
- Kyprianou, Spyros**, Foreign Minister of Cyprus, 1971
- Laird, Melvin R.**, Secretary of Defense, January 1969–January 1973
- Lakeland, Albert**, Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob L. Javits
- Lawrence, Edward W.**, Officer in Charge of United Nations Affairs, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Lehman, John**, member of the National Security Council Staff
- Levin, Herbert**, staff member, National Security Council
- Levine, Melvin H.**, staff member, National Security Council
- Lin Chia-sen**, Second Secretary, Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
- Lin Fang**, military adviser, Chinese People's Republic Mission to the United Nations
- Lindsay, John V.**, Mayor of New York City
- Lion, Rene**, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Belgian Embassy to the United States
- Liu Chieh**, Permanent Representative of the Republic of China to the United Nations
- Lockhart, Frank P. Jr.**, planning adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, January 1953–September 1960

- Long, Jay H.**, Officer-in-Charge of UN Organization and Far Eastern Affairs, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Longerstaey, Edouard**, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations
- Lord, Winston**, member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1971
- Loridan, Walter**, Ambassador of Belgium to the United States
- Lovestone, Jay**, Director of International Affairs, AFL–CIO
- Lusaka, Paul J. F.**, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, 1972
- Macomber, William B.** Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1969; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) October 1969–April 1973
- Maga, Hubert**, President of Dahomey
- Makeyev, Evgeny Nikolaevich**, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations
- Makonnen, Tassew**, Second Secretary, Ethiopian Mission to the United Nations, 1970
- Malik, Adam**, Foreign Minister of Indonesia
- Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich**, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations
- Marcy, Carl**, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1969
- Martin, Edwin M.**, U.S. Consul General, Hong Kong, 1970
- Martin, Graham A.**, Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs; Ambassador to Italy, September 1969–February 1973; thereafter Ambassador to Viet-Nam
- Martin, James V., Jr.**, Director for Australian and New Zealand Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Martin, Thomas G.**, Country Officer for Portugal, Department of State, 1971
- Masmoudi, Mohamed**, Foreign Minister of Tunisia
- Matheson, Angus J.**, Counselor, Canadian Mission to the United Nations
- Matthews, H. Keith**, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, United Nations
- Mayo, Robert P.**, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969
- McBride, Robert H.**, Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo until May 16, 1969
- McConaughy, Walter P.**, Ambassador to the Republic of China June 1966–April 1974
- McDonald, John W., Jr.**, Director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1969; Coordinator for Multilateral Development Programs, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, 1971
- McGee, Gale W.**, Senator (Democrat–Wyoming), member, U.S. Delegation to the 27th UN General Assembly, 1972
- McGuire, Ralph J.**, Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- McIntyre, Sir Laurence**, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, 1971
- McMahon, William**, Prime Minister of Australia, 1972–1975; Minister for Foreign Affairs 1969–1971
- McNamara, Robert S.**, Director of the World Bank from 1968
- McNutt, Louise**, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- McSweeney, Katherine B.**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
- Meany, George**, Chairman of the AFL–CIO
- Mendelevich, Lev Isakovich**, Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1970

- Merrillees, Robert Stuart**, Second Secretary, Australian Mission to the United Nations
Mestiri, Mahmoud, Chairman of UN Committee of 24 until August 20, 1969
Meyer, Charles A., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Meyer, Frank G., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, September 1969–May 1971
Meyer Picon, Santiago, Second Secretary, Mexican Mission to the United Nations, 1969
Migliuolo, Giovanni, Minister-Counselor, Italian Mission to the United Nations
Millard, Guy E., Minister, British Embassy to the United States
Miller, Robert H., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, 1971
Moberly, John C., Counselor, British Embassy, 1971
Mojsov, Lazar, Yugoslav Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Molina, Jose Luis, Costa Rican Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Molina-Duarte, Simon, Counselor for Economic Affairs, Venezuelan Mission to the United Nations, 1972
Monsma, George N., International Organizations Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Moore, C. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Moore, Robert W., Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Moose, Richard, member of the National Security Council staff, 1969–1970
Mori, Haruki, Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, 1971
Moro, Aldo, Foreign Minister of Italy
Morris, Henry L., member, UN Staff Pension Committee
Morse, David, Chairman, Advisory Panel on Program Policy, UNDP
Morse, F. Bradford, Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs, United Nations, from March 1972
Mosbacher, Emil, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, January 1969–June 1972
Moser, Leo J. Director, Republic of China Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 1971
Mott, Charles, First Secretary, Australian Mission to the UN, 1971
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, Representative to the U.S. Delegation to the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1971
Mueller, Richard B., Second Secretary, Finnish Mission to the United Nations
Mueller, Richard W., Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from 1972
Murray, Richard W., Director, Office of Budget Planning and Presentation, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, 1969
Mwaanga, Vernon Johnson, Zimbabwean Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Nachmanoff, Arnold**, member of the National Security Council staff
Naito, Takeshi, Counselor, Japanese Mission to the United Nations
Nakagawa, Toru, Japanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971–1972
Narasimhan, C. V., Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations; Acting Administrator of the UN Development Program in 1971; UN Under Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs and Coordination, 1972–1978; Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General, 1972
Nava Carrillo, German, Venezuelan Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Vice President of the Committee of 24; Acting President August 20, 1969–March 5, 1970, President January 1–July 9, 1971
Ndhlovu, Edward, Deputy National Secretary, Zimbabwe African People's Union
Nethercut, Richard D., political officer, Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1970
Newlin, Michael H., Counselor for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1971
Newsom, David D., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, July 8, 1969–January 13, 1974

- Nicol, Davidson**, Sierra Leonean Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; President of the Committee of 24 in 1970
- Nielson, Oscar H.**, Executive Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1971
- Niklessa, Ivan Guryevich**, Senior Counselor, Soviet Mission to the United Nations
- Nishibori**, Director-General of UN Affairs, Japanese Foreign Ministry, 1971
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States, January 20, 1969–August 9, 1974
- Nokwa, Duma**, Deputy Secretary General, African National Congress
- Norland Donald R.**, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Guinea, December 1971–June 1972
- Nouira, Hadi**, Prime Minister of Tunisia
- Nyerere, Julius**, President of Tanzania
- Nzo, Alfred**, Spokesman, African National Congress
- O'Connor, Patrick T.**, political and economic officer, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, June 1970–May 1971; UN Budgetary and Administrative Policy Staff, May 1971–September 1972
- Ogiso, Motoo**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations
- Okun, Herbert S.**, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos**, Argentine Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Overby, Andrew**, former assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, 1952–1957
- Paemen, Hugo**, press officer, Belgian Foreign Ministry
- Papendorp, J. Theodore**, country officer for Belgium, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Parsons, Anthony Derrick**, Counselor and Head of Chancery, British Mission to the United Nations
- Pastinen, Ilkka**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations
- Peale, Samuel R.**, international relations officer, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from March 1969; Acting Chief, Dependent Area Affairs, February–October 1971
- Pedersen, Richard F.**, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN Security Council, 1968; Counselor of the Department of State, January 1969–July 1973
- Pelcovits, Nathan A.**, special assistant, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Percy, Charles**, Senator (Republican–Illinois)
- Perez-Alonso, Gilberto**, Minister-Counselor, Nicaraguan Mission to the United Nations
- Perez-Guerrero, Manuel**, Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
- Peterffy, George von**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1971
- Peterson, Rudolph A.**, Administrator of the United Nations Development Program from January 1972
- Petri, Lennart**, Vice President, United Nations Industrial Development Board, 1970
- Phillips, Christopher H.**, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States on the United Nations Security Council
- Phouma, Souvanna**, Prime Minister of Laos
- Pitty Velasquez, Nander A.**, Permanent Representative of Panama to the Organization of American States, 1972
- Platt, Nicholas**, Chief, Asian Communist Areas Division, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Plimsoll, Sir James**, Australian Ambassador to the United States
- Pompidou, Georges**, President of France from June 1969

- Prentice, Colgate S.**, officer in charge United Nations Affairs, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Rackowski, Stanislaw**, member, United Nations Committee on Contributions, 1971
- Rae, Saul F.**, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1972
- Rahnema, Majid**, former Iranian Minister of Science
- Ramphal, Shridath S.**, Attorney General and Minister of State of Guyana; candidate for Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1971
- Razak, Tun Abdul**, Prime Minister of Malaysia
- Reinstein, Jacques**, Coordinator for United Nations Development Decade, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Reis, Herbert K.**, Legal Adviser, Mission to the United Nations
- Rendahl, John D.**, Special Assistant and Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Reyes, Narciso**, Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Rhodes, John I. M.**, Minister and Treasury Adviser, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 1969
- Rice, Walter L.**, Ambassador to Australia, September 1969–May 1973
- Richardson, Eliot L.**, Under Secretary of State, January 1969–June 1970
- Rios, Didimo**, Panamanian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Roberts, Ralph S.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, 1969
- Rodriguez, Teofila Acosta**, First Secretary, Cuban Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State January 1969–September 1973
- Rolz-Bennet, José**, Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations, 1970
- Rooney, John L.**, Representative (Democrat–New York), Chairman, Subcommittee on the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
- Rosenstock, Robert B.**, Adviser for Legal Affairs, Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Ross, Claude G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Ambassador to Tanzania, December 27, 1969–June 25, 1972
- Rothenberg, Morris**, Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Rowberg, Brynhild C.**, country officer for the Republic of Korea, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, 1969
- Sacksteder, Frederick H., Jr.**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, Mission to the United Nations
- Sadrudin Aga Khan, Prince**, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- Salim, Salim Ahmed**, Tanzanian Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Chairman of the Committee of 24, 1972
- Salins, Carl F.** Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1971
- Samuels, Nathaniel**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, April 1969–April 1972
- Sato, Eisaku**, Prime Minister of Japan until July 1972
- Saunders, Harold L.**, member, National Security Council staff
- Sayre, Robert M.**, Ambassador to Panama
- Schaufele, William E., Jr.**, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative on the United Nations Security Council
- Schiff, Stanley D.**, Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Schumann, Maurice**, French Foreign Minister

- Scott, John Vivian**, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Seignoret, Eustace E.**, Trinidad and Tobago Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Selassie, Haile**, Emperor of Ethiopia
- Sen, Samar**, Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Senghor, Leopold Sedar**, President of Senegal
- Sevilla-Sacasta, Guillermo**, Nicaraguan Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Shahi, Agha**, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Shakhov, Pavel Fedorovich**, Soviet Alternate Representative to the United Nations Committee of 24 until 1969
- Shaw, John D. B.**, British Alternate Representative to the United Nations Committee of 24
- Shen, James C. H.**, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States from May 1971
- Shepard, Rear Admiral Alan B.**, Alternate Representative, U.S. Delegation to the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1971
- Shi Yen-hua**, interpreter, Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
- Shoesmith, Thomas P.**, Country Director for the Republic of China, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Singh, Sardar Swaram**, Indian Foreign Minister, June 1970–October 1974
- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Sloan, Blaine**, Director, UN General Legal Division, 1972
- Small, Francis Anthony**, New Zealand Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations 1971
- Smith, Ian**, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia
- Smith, Thomas W. M.**, Chief of the UN Economic Affairs Division, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Smyser, Richard**, member, National Security Council staff
- Solomon, Anthony M.**, President, International Investment Corporation for Yugoslavia; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, June 1965–January 1969
- Solomon, P. V. J.**, Trinidad and Tobago Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, member, National Security Council staff, January 1969–January 1974
- Sontag, John P.**, foreign affairs policy analyst, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Southworth, Winthrop**, officer-in-charge of Other International and Regional Organizations, Office of International Organization, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; Director, United Nations Budgetary and Administrative Policy Staff 1971
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, September 1969–August 1973
- Spigler, Donald S.**, Deputy Director, Office of Inter-American Affairs; Special Assistant for Commercial Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, 1972
- Starbird, Linwood R.**, country desk officer for the Republic of China, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Stark, Andrew A.**, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management, 1970
- Starr, Robert**, Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Stavropoulos, Constantin A.**, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel

- Stevenson, John R.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1972
- Stillman, Arthur M.**, Adviser for Economic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
- Stottlemeyer, David L.**, Counselor for International Organization Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Strulak, Tadeusz**, First Secretary, Polish Mission to the United Nations
- Suzuki, Takeshi**, Chief of the Policy Planning Bureau, Foreign Ministry of Japan
- Tack, Juan Antonio**, Foreign Minister of Panama
- Tadesse, Yilma**, First Secretary, Ethiopian Mission to the United Nations, 1970–1972; Rapporteur for Fourth Committee of the Committee of 24, 1971
- Talbot, Frederick H.**, Guyanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1971
- Tambo, Oliver**, Acting President, African National Congress
- Taylor-Kamara, Ismael Byne**, Sierra Leonean Permanent Representative to the United Nations; President of United Nations Security Council December 1971
- Tekoah, Yosef**, Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Telli, Diallo**, Secretary-General, Organization of African Unity until July 1972
- Terence, Nsanze**, Burundi Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Thant, U**, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 31, 1971
- Thayer, Harry E. T.**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Timmons, William E.**, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, 1970
- Tombalbaye, Ngarta Francois**, President of Chad
- Tomeh, George J.**, Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Torbert, Horace G., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1970; thereafter Ambassador to Bulgaria
- Torrijos, Brigadier General Omar**, President of Panama
- Toukan, Baha Ud-Din**, Jordanian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Trepczynski, Stanislaw**, President of the 27th United Nations General Assembly, 1972
- Trezise, Philip H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs July 1969–November 1971
- Troxel, Oliver L., Jr.**, Ambassador to Zambia, May 27, 1969–May 12, 1972
- Tsuruoka, Senjin**, Japanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1970
- Tubby, Roger Wellington**, U.S. Representative to the European Office of the United Nations, October 18, 1967–September 24, 1969
- Turner, Bruce R.**, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, United Nations, 1969
- Urquhart, Brian**, Director of the United Nations Offices of the Under Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs
- Van Ussel, Michel**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations
- Vinci, Piero**, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations
- Visessurakarn, Klos**, Counselor, Thai Mission to the United Nations
- Volcker, Paul A.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, January 1969–June 1974
- Vorontsov, Yuly M.**, Counselor, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Waldheim, Kurt**, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 31, 1971; thereafter Secretary-General
- Waldron-Ramsey, Waldo E.**, First Secretary, Tanzanian Mission to the United Nations, 1969–1970; Barbadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1971

- Walker, Peter C.**, United Nations and Regional Affairs Adviser, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Wang Jun-sheng**, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
- Watson, Arthur K.**, Ambassador to France April 8, 1970–October 30, 1972
- Watts, William**, member, National Security Council staff, 1969
- Wei Tao-ming**, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
- Weir, Michael S.**, Counselor and Head of Chancery, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Werner, Sally**, Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Weston, Michael C. S.**, First Secretary, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Whalley, K.**, Counselor and Treasury Adviser, U.K. Mission to the United Nations, 1971–1972; member, Committee on Contributions, 1972
- Williams, James A.**, staff assistant to the Under Secretary of State
- Williams, Mack Geoffrey**, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
- Williams, Priscilla Jane**, Second Secretary, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, 1971
- Witman, William II**, Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Woodward, Robert F.**, Ambassador to Spain, May 1962–February 1965
- Wright, W. Marshall**, member, National Security Council staff, June 1970–April 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, April–December 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary until May 1973; thereafter Assistant Secretary
- Wyzner, Eugeniusz**, Chairman, Legal Subcommittee United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- Yahya Khan, Muhammad**, President of Pakistan
- Yamada, Chusei**, Counselor, Japanese Mission to the United Nations, 1972
- Yang Hsi K'un**, Vice Foreign Minister, Republic of China
- Yoshida, Nagao**, Minister, Japanese Mission to the United Nations
- Yost, Charles W.**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 23, 1969–February 25, 1971
- Yunis, M.**, Pakistani Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1969
- Zagorin, Bernard**, U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council from May 11, 1971.
- Zakharov, Aleksei Vasilyevich**, Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Ziegler, Ron**, White House Press Secretary
- Ziehl, Wilbur H.**, Deputy Controller, and Head of the United Nations Office of Financial Services
- Zodda, Abele**, member, United Nations Committee on Contributions, 1971

United Nations, 1969–1972

Expansion of UN Headquarters

1. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 10, 1969.

Dear Mr. President:

I respectfully propose for your consideration the enclosed joint resolution to authorize a grant of not more than \$15 million to defray a portion of the cost of expanding the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York.² If you approve this legislation as part of your program, I should greatly appreciate your so informing the Congress.

There is an urgent need to adapt the physical facilities of United Nations Headquarters to meet the requirements of an organization that has more than doubled in membership since its original plant was constructed almost twenty years ago and has expanded substantially the scope of its activities. There is a serious shortage of office space with consequent overcrowding and scattering of components of departments which should function as integral units in adjacent accommodations. There is as well a major problem of space for document storage resulting in the inefficient and hazardous use of corridor areas for this purpose. Moreover, facilities for reproduction of documents and language training are both makeshift and inadequate, as are the organization's conference and staff dining arrangements. The only available recourse has been to rent office space outside the original Headquarters site. But the use of rented space is both expensive and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. I. No classification marking.

² A memorandum from Rogers to President Nixon, also dated May 10, elaborated on the reasons why the U.S. contribution was in the national interest: "(1) The existence of a strong UN Headquarters in this country enables the U.S. more effectively to maximize its influence in the organization. (2) Expansion in Geneva at the expense of New York could cost the U.S. economy millions of dollars annually just in UN salaries now spent in the country. (3) A special contribution by the country hosting an international organization is customary. (4) Concentration of the functions of the United Nations in one location is conducive both to the organization's efficiency and its economy of operation." A draft letter of transmission to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate and a draft joint resolution authorizing a grant to defray part of the cost of an expanded UN Headquarters were attached to this memorandum. (Ibid.)

inefficient in its scattering of office units. It adds over \$1 million annually in rental charges alone.

At its most recent session last fall, the UN General Assembly examined a feasibility study prepared by the Fund for Area Planning and Development, Inc. on expanding UN Headquarters facilities through new construction and major alterations to existing premises. After consideration, the Assembly authorized the UN Secretary-General to proceed with the preparation of plans and specifications on the basis of which cost estimates could be presented to the Assembly for decision at its 1969 session. At the same time, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on the over-all problem of accommodations at the New York Headquarters in relation to available or potential space at all locations utilized by the United Nations. One reason for this latter request is that some members are interested in moving the focus of United Nations activities to locations outside the United States.

In my view, both the United Nations and the United States would benefit from a decision to expand the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The UN would benefit by being able to keep related activities together and thereby provide unified and efficient direction to them. Similarly, the United States would be better able to supply the constructive leadership required for an effective United Nations. Moreover, American citizens who are needed for many tasks of the United Nations can be more readily recruited for service in this country thereby making significant contributions to the organization's efficiency.

One of the most important considerations that will influence the decision of the General Assembly on expansion will be the magnitude of the burden that would fall on the regular budget of the United Nations. As host government, the United States would be expected to assist Headquarters expansion as, among others, the Austrian and Swiss Governments have aided the construction of facilities for UN activities within their borders. The City of New York plans to make the necessary land available south of 42nd Street and has indicated it will give favorable consideration to matching such funds as may be appropriated by the Congress for capital costs. It is also expected that private philanthropic sources will assist in financing this project. Should these contributions all materialize, our Mission to the United Nations believes it likely that the UN will decide in favor of expanding its Headquarters in New York.

Respectfully,

William P. Rogers

2. **Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget (Rommel) to the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman)**¹

Washington, May 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Federal contribution for expansion of the UN Headquarters

The Department of State is proposing legislation to authorize a special grant of up to \$15 million to cover a portion of the estimated \$60 million cost of expanding the United Nations Headquarters in New York on land to be made available by the City of New York. The remainder of the cost would be financed by the City of New York, the Fund for Area Planning and Development, Inc. (composed of private foundations and businesses in the area), and the UN regular budget.

In the attached memorandum to the President, State recommends that the President transmit this legislation to the Congress. For this purpose it has prepared the attached Presidential transmission letter, accompanying back-up letter from the Secretary to the President, and a draft joint resolution.²

Justice has no legal problems with the draft resolution and defers to State on the policy issue. The package has been cleared informally with NSC staff (Moose). We have no objection to the proposal.

State plans to ask for the appropriation in its 1971 budget, but seeks early action on the authorization in order to facilitate the raising of the balance of the funds.

We should like to call to your attention the final paragraph of the attached transmittal memorandum of May 10, 1969, from the Secretary to the President which reads as follows:

"The Department's preliminary notification to the Congress of the Headquarters' expansion problem has elicited, on the whole, mildly favorable reactions. However, it would be advisable to inform appropriate Congressional members in advance of your submission of the legislation, should you decide to do so. We would especially need to alert Congressman Ross Adair, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who has told us of his strong reservations to the proposal. If your decision is favorable, we should therefore very much appreciate having a few days advance notice to permit these important preliminary consultations."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. I. No classification marking.

² Attached but not printed; regarding this memorandum and its attachments, see footnote 2, Document 1.

Also, Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has indicated to State that this bill might become the occasion for focusing in general on U.S. policy toward the UN.

We are forwarding State's proposal to you for appropriate action.

Wilf Rommel

3. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

New York, August 19, 1969.

Dear Henry:

Just a brief note on two procedural matters.

First, I see that the NSC is due to meet on Southern Africa on September 17. As you know this is a meeting at which I would very much like to be present because we have a whole series of problems on this area before the United Nations. This is however a particularly difficult date for me, being the second day of the forthcoming General Assembly, and the whole first week of a General Assembly is an extremely hectic time. Would it be possible to have the NSC meeting on Southern Africa either during the week of September 7 or the week of September 21, or indeed at any other generally convenient time? I should perhaps note that I am receiving an honorary degree at Hamilton College on September 10 so would be unavailable on that day.

The second matter relates to the recommendation to the President from Bill Rogers and myself that he request the Congress for \$15 million, as part of a package of \$60 million to which the United Nations, the City of New York and private foundations would also contribute equal amounts, for an extension of the United Nations Headquarters one block southward. The point is that the United Nations Secretariat is physically bursting at the seams and that unless it can enlarge its available space more and more of its subdivisions will be transferred to Geneva or elsewhere with consequent damage both to the Secretary General's capabilities for coordination and United States influence on the Organization. There is no disagreement at all about the desirabil-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Limited Official Use.

ity of this extension and the only question is whether the necessary funds can be obtained.

Our recommendation on the matter has been pending in the White House since May and I write you about it only because I was told it might have been referred to your office. The matter will come up for action in the General Assembly this fall and it is of great importance that we be able to say that the Administration is at least actively seeking the necessary funds. I should appreciate it very much if you could push this along.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Charlie

4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman)¹

Washington, August 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposed US Contribution for UN Building Expansion

You asked for my comments on a State Department recommendation that the President propose a \$15 million Congressional authorization as the US share in paying for proposed expansion of the UN Headquarters facility in New York. State documents are at Tab A.²

We have been trying for some time, with little success, to get some straight answers from State on the arguments for requesting the \$15 million. The State memo, it seems to me, is based on some questionable propositions, and I am frankly concerned that they have played fast and loose with giving the President free choice in this matter. The main State arguments for the \$15 million, and counter considerations, are as follows:

1. The new building strengthens the Headquarters operation of the Secretary General, and will enable the US to maximize its UN influence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 291, Agency Files, USUN. No classification marking.

² See Document 2 and footnote 2 thereto.

in the face of Soviet and Arab efforts to move the UN out of New York.

What we are really talking about here is staff people for the UN Development Program, UNICEF, and some incidental offices of the Secretariat. Without a new building in New York, these organizations or the Economic and Social Affairs Department will probably move to Geneva. But it is hard to see how even that move would seriously hurt our “influence” over all the UN. We are the biggest contributor to the UN Development Program, have the Chairmanship by tradition, and will call the shots wherever it is located simply because we hold the purse strings. Our role in UNICEF and Economic and Social Affairs is marginal despite our present location in New York, and thus we cannot lose much if these organizations go to Switzerland.

It is true that a shift overseas of UN agencies does cut into the recruiting of Americans for UN jobs, and to that degree we lose something. But the basic policy orientation in any of these agencies will still be determined by the financial and political weight we pull in the UN at large regardless of physical location of facilities.

2. State argues that a special contribution by the host country is customary when an international organization wants a building.

Again, the facts here are mixed. In some cases—such as Austria—the UN is either given a building or charged a token rent. But the Swiss, for example, do no more than provide favorable loans, and the French charge UNESCO the going commercial rate with a loan on its building in Paris. What has been “customary,” of course, is that the US has always paid a chunk—almost in toto—for any of the UN facilities in this country. In this proposal, the US share, public and private, would be almost 90 percent of the cost of the building. We should be under no illusions that we are driving a hard bargain.

3. State also argues that moving facilities from New York will cost our economy millions in UN salaries now spent in this country.

This is a more valid argument. Our research turns up a figure of \$14 million per year loss if UNDP and UNICEF personnel shift to Geneva. But this should be weighed against the fact that the \$15 million contribution from the USG and the \$15 million contribution from the City of New York will, under present estimates, only purchase enough space for projected UN needs through 1976. So sometime over the next four or five years we will be confronted again with a major building expansion program to accommodate needs beyond 1976. We have to assume that that cost will be considerably higher, and over time the arithmetic is such that the US could end up spending as much on new buildings as we lose in purchasing power of UN salaries.

But beyond these points, there is, in my view, a more serious question about State’s prior commitment to both the UN and the City of

New York on the \$15 million figure before they got Presidential approval. State and USUN argue that we walked into the \$15 million with the UN, and any lesser grant would require a “renegotiation” with Mayor Lindsay. I am simply not competent to judge the domestic political implications of all this. It is clear that the City of New York would like to have the expansion for economic reasons. But the present proposal leaves precious little room for the US to do any bargaining to get a larger contribution from the UN itself.

On balance, there is probably no reason to make a major issue out of this. But if we go ahead, it should be with the instruction that we take a much more independent line than we have planned in bargaining our contribution. I do not believe the President should pretend to the Congress or the United Nations that the presence of a UN staff in New York is a blessing for which we will pay without question.

Recommendation

I would support a Presidential request for these funds on the understanding that our Mission in New York would be instructed to undertake some hard negotiations to get the UN itself to shoulder a larger share of the \$60 million total than the 25 percent now contemplated for the UN in State’s proposal.

5. Memorandum From William Watts of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

UN Building Expansion

The question of our monetary support for expansion of the UN building facilities in New York City is now an urgent issue, since we have been informed that U Thant may raise it with the President when they meet Thursday.

Just after the decision had been taken to move ahead in getting State to redraft letters from the President to leaders on the Hill con-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 291, Agency Files, USUN. No classification marking. Sent for action.

cerning Administration willingness to support this expansion to the tune of \$15 million, the President announced the 75% cut back on federal building expenditures. Given the highly volatile prospects as to how a major commitment for international buildings would sit with Congress and many private citizens in view of the President's cut back order, I felt we must reopen the issue with Budget to see what kind of guidelines they were coming up with.

The Director of the International Division in Budget said this was indeed a major topic of concern there and he discussed the matter with Director Mayo. Mayo in turn has written a memo to the President (included in the attached package), which focuses on the possible political implications of this construction.²

A memo from you to John Ehrlichman stating that you see no overriding foreign policy reasons to oppose construction, but deferring to his judgment as to the domestic and political implications is also attached. This gets the issue back into the proper arena for the President's decision, since the most difficult decision he may have to deal with on this is domestic and not foreign.

Recommendation: That you sign the memo attached.³

² Attached but not printed. In his May 16 memorandum, Mayo observed that even though expansion of the UN Headquarters would be funded by a matching grant rather than by a "direct Federal construction" project, authorization would be politically sensitive among Congressmen and Governors who faced cutbacks in public works projects.

³ Attached but not printed. In this September 17 memorandum, Kissinger wrote: "My judgment remains that there is no reason to oppose State's proposal on foreign policy grounds. But the construction hold-back does put a new domestic light on the matter. Therefore, I would appreciate your carrying the matter through for Presidential decision." Reference is to President Nixon's statement on the construction industry, issued at San Clemente on September 4, in which he directed all Federal agencies to implement a 75 percent reduction in new construction contracts, urged state and local governments to make similar reductions, and urged businessmen to postpone non-essential construction projects so that the construction industry could devote more time and effort to building more homes. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969*, pp. 706–707)

6. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposed UN Contribution to UN Building Expansion

We have learned that Secretary General U Thant may raise with you the question of a US contribution to a proposed UN building expansion in New York. John Ehrlichman is now studying this issue, but I thought it useful to give you a brief run-down on the facts if John has not raised the matter for your decision prior to your session with U Thant.

State has proposed that you request the Congress to authorize \$15 million as the US Government's share of a \$60 million total package for the expansion of the UN Headquarters facilities in New York. Three other \$15 million contributions would be provided each by the City of New York, US private philanthropies, and the UN itself. State argues that the contribution is justified on two main grounds:

—The UN is badly over-crowded in New York. And there is an increasing tendency, supported by the Soviets and Arabs, to shift the focus of UN activities away from the United States. In this case, offices of the UN Development Program and UNICEF would probably move to Europe. State contends that this acts to weaken our influence in these agencies.²

—There is the added argument that the departure of UN personnel from New York will deprive the City's economy of the purchasing power of UN salaries.

I have reviewed these assertions from a foreign policy standpoint and find plausible counter-considerations. The physical location of UN offices is not the decisive factor in determining our influence over the Organization. The general thrust of our policy, and particularly our financial contributions, are likely to be the determining factors wherever the headquarters of the programs are located.

Furthermore, we would not necessarily lose money in a gross economic sense if we forego the contribution and UN personnel

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. No classification marking. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. A covering memorandum from Watts to Kissinger, dated September 17, bears a handwritten note in the left margin: "Memo handed by HAK to President on AF-1. 9/18/69."

² In the left margin is the handwritten notation: "no—RN, 10-6-69."

moved elsewhere. With regard to the economic sacrifice in lost purchasing power, it can be argued that a US outlay for the building expansion (almost 90% of the total when we count public and private sources as well as our major share of the UN budget) may be as great over time as the income which we would have gained in UN salaries spent here. This is particularly true since projected needs for UN Headquarters space in New York will involve another building expansion—and another US contribution—in the early 1970's.

On balance, however, I advised John Ehrlichman that I found no overriding objection on policy grounds to State's proposal, provided our Mission in New York be instructed to undertake hard negotiations to get the UN itself to shoulder a bigger share than the 25% contemplated. This issue has been complicated anew, however, by your order on a construction hold-back. I understand Bob Mayo feels that a US contribution for this construction could have adverse political effects in the Congress. Thus, John Ehrlichman is looking at the problem now in terms of its domestic implications.

If U Thant should raise the proposed contribution, and you have not yet reached a decision, I recommend you make the following reply:

—We fully appreciate the need for expansion of the UN facilities. We hope to have an answer very soon regarding a US contribution in order that the Secretary General may present his expansion plans to the General Assembly.

—But we have had to study this matter very carefully in light of the Administration's new guidelines on federal financing of construction in an effort to combat inflation.

7. Memorandum From the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 30, 1969.

The President has weighed the international and domestic political considerations relating to the proposed expansion of the U.N. Building.

In view of the construction moratorium and the war on inflation, he has decided not to approve the funding for this project at this time.

John D. Ehrlichman²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. No classification marking.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

8. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Assurance of Contribution toward UN Headquarters Building

In the light of your decision in September not to seek specific funding authority for a U.S. contribution at that time toward construction of an additional UN Headquarters building, our Delegation has been reviewing its preparations for handling the Headquarters issue when it comes before the General Assembly about November 15. To help keep the concentration of UN activities in the United States, the Delegation has recommended that it be authorized to state in the General Assembly debate that the U.S. Government strongly supports construction of the proposed additional UN Headquarters building and will request Congressional authorization and an appropriation in its fiscal year 1971 budget for a U.S. contribution not to exceed \$20 million toward the construction of this building. (This is a \$5 million increase over the previous figure, an increase which has resulted from an up-to-date architectural and engineering survey of the contemplated construction and a consequent total cost estimate by United Nations officials of \$75–\$80 million for the project.)

The Delegation reports that an assurance of this nature is the minimum necessary to counter growing pressures of a number of members, including the Soviet bloc, France and the Arab states, to shift the focus of UN activities from New York to Geneva or some other European location and that such an assurance would hopefully enable the UN Secretary General to obtain from this session of the General Assembly approval for the construction and financing of the new building, subject only to agreement on an acceptable financing package.²

I concur in this recommendation. I would point out that in any event no U.S. funds would need to be turned over to the United Nations for about 18 months, when hopefully the risk of inflationary

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Ward P. Allen and Richard V. Hennes (IO) on November 1, and cleared by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert, Jr. (H), Assistant Secretary Frank G. Meyer, Louis Frechling, Stephen M. Boyd, and Roberts. At the top of the page is the typewritten note: “Approved by memo of 11/25/69 from Mr. Watts to Mr. Eliot, recd 11/27,” and a handwritten note reading: “IO informed 11/28.”

² The views of the delegation were summarized in a November 3 memorandum to Rogers from Assistant Secretary De Palma. (Ibid.)

pressures will have been contained. I concur in the judgment of the Delegation that failure to be able to give such an assurance at this session would run the grave risk of being unable to check the movement of the United Nations away from New York at the expense of U.S. prestige and influence in the organization, as well as an appreciable loss of revenue.

I therefore recommend strongly that you authorize an assurance related to the fiscal year 1971 budget request.

Arrangements would of course be made to inform selected Congressional leaders before the assurance would be given so that Congress would not feel that its power of decision had been pre-empted.

WPM

9. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman)¹

Washington, November 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Assurances of Contribution Toward UN Headquarters Building

Secretary Rogers has come to the President with an urgent request concerning the issue of expansion of the United Nations Headquarters in New York. His memorandum is at Tab B.² You will recall that we were prepared last summer to recommend authorization of \$15 million as the U.S. government's contribution toward this expansion, but that in light of the President's order for a 75% cutback on federal building expenditures in September the authorization was denied on domestic political grounds.

Secretary Rogers now asks that our UN delegation be authorized to state in New York that the U.S. government strongly supports construction of the proposed additional UN headquarters building and will request Congressional authorization and appropriation in its fiscal year 1971 budget for a U.S. contribution not to exceed \$20 million.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. Drafted by Winston Lord on November 14.

² Document 8.

This \$5 million increase results from an updated architectural and engineering survey of the contemplated construction. Secretary Rogers believes that such an assurance now is the minimum necessary to counter pressure to shift the focus of UN activities from New York to Geneva or some other European location.

My judgment remains that there is no reason to oppose State's request on foreign policy grounds.

I do question the contention that we will lose a great deal of influence in the UN if some of its organs leave New York. Our policies and financial contributions are much more important than the physical location of UN offices. I also question the net revenue impact of some movement of UN bodies and personnel from this country. Our balance of payments position and New York City would clearly suffer, but these factors must be weighed against our budget outlays for this building expansion and possible future ones. However, I think it is desirable on general prestige and political grounds to keep the center of UN activities in this country. And there does appear to be the real probability of at least the economic and social functions of the UN moving to Europe if we refuse our contribution and the expansion project therefore collapses. I believe significant UN slippage away from New York for want of a U.S. contribution would entail some political costs.

Budget Director Mayo recommends approval of Secretary Rogers' request. At Tab A is a memorandum from Mr. Mayo to the President which states BOB's position, outlines the financing details of the headquarters expansion and points out the relationship to the federal construction freeze. Mr. Mayo enclosed a proposed Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of State approving his request.³ If we do decide to go ahead, I support the terms of this proposed Presidential memorandum. It is important that the UN Delegation should be instructed to seek maximum contributions from private sources and to make it clear that the special U.S. contribution will in no case exceed \$20 million.

While there are therefore no international or budgetary problems with Secretary Rogers' request, the federal construction holdback continues to raise domestic political considerations. An essential judgment is whether a U.S. commitment now to earmark funds in the FY 71 budget (which would not be turned over to the UN for about 18 months) would still cause significant domestic problems in light of the construction freeze and the continuing issue of inflation. Domestic political reaction to the prospect of slippage of the UN from New York would appear to be another consideration.

³ Attached but not printed.

In light of these domestic factors I would appreciate your carrying this through for Presidential decision. This is urgent because of the need for a U.S. position at the UN as soon as possible and the indispensable requirement that State sound out selected Congressional leaders before instructing our Delegation in New York.

If you would let us know the President's decision we will follow up with State.

10. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Assurance of Contribution toward UN Headquarters Building

We understand that a problem has arisen with regard to the recommendation made in the Secretary's Memorandum for the President of November 11, 1969 and that a determination that there is an overriding foreign policy interest is necessary in order to make the case that the requested contribution should be considered as falling within the 25% exemption in the halt in federal construction.

We fully appreciate the difficulty we could expect in the Congress in presenting a request for a \$20 million appropriation for UN headquarters expansion in the 1971 budget, even though no expenditure of funds would be required at least for 18 months. Nevertheless, Ambassador Yost and we do believe there are overriding foreign policy considerations involved, as stated in the Memorandum for the President, and we therefore urge that this request be considered as falling within the area of the 25% exemption. Without repeating the arguments set out in the Memorandum for the President, there is a serious risk that our failure to act now will lead to abandonment of any further consolidation of New York Headquarters and accelerate the movement of elements of the UN to Europe, which has already begun. Such action would result in a further decline in our influence on the operations of the UN and a loss in the balance of payments and other economic benefits we derive from its location in New York.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. III. Confidential.

We have tried to think of a possible fallback position, but we cannot think of one which would not pose the risk of an unfavorable decision in the United Nations General Assembly. The only possibility that comes to mind is that we might advise the Secretary-General privately of our decision to seek Congressional authorization and appropriation of a \$20 million grant in the Fiscal Year 1971 budget, but refrain from making a public statement at this time. We strongly doubt that this would provide him an adequate basis for putting a proposal to the General Assembly which would head off the risk of an unfavorable General Assembly action. We are unable, therefore, to recommend that alternative.

Accordingly, we strongly recommend that, as a matter of overriding foreign policy interest, the U.S. Delegation be authorized to make the statement proposed in the Memorandum for the President. Time has run out in New York and we must give the Secretary-General our decision as soon as possible Friday, the 21st.²

Robert L. Brown³

² Authorization to inform UN officials of U.S. support for the construction of additional UN Headquarters facilities was transmitted to USUN in telegram 196348, November 21. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10-4)

³ Brown signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

11. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Expansion of UN Headquarters in New York

This memorandum is to a) inform you of the actions taken on the UN Headquarters problem after you telephoned White House concurrence to State Assistant Secretary DePalma on Friday and b) request your approval of a Watts to Eliot memorandum confirming the White House position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for action.

After learning of White House approval of State's request to commit \$20 million in the FY 1971 budget, I asked State to clear with us their telegram to our UN Mission in New York. The telegram is at Tab B²—I cleared it with Ehrlichman's office (Ehrlichman himself concurred in substance while his staff approved the wording) and BOB. We made two changes in the original State cable:

—The phrase "because of the urgency placed upon expansion of UN facilities" was added to the first paragraph at Ehrlichman's request, to underline White House understanding that State believes this to be an urgent matter.

—Paragraph three was added at my request, to spell out the two conditions, stipulated in Budget Director Mayo's memorandum to the President, of our going after private sources for contributions and our not exceeding \$20 million in U.S. government special contributions to the project.

I also confirmed that appropriate Congressional leaders were being informed before public disclosure of our position and that Harlow's office was aware of this action.

I believe it is now appropriate to confirm the White House approval in writing to State and have thus prepared a memorandum from Bill Watts to Theodore Eliot. I think this is the proper channel, rather than involving you personally. The Watts–Eliot memorandum is at Tab A³ for your approval.

At Tab C for your background is the original package plus the follow up memorandum that DePalma drafted at your request at last Thursday's AFSA lunch.³

Recommendation:

That you approve the Watts to Eliot memorandum at Tab A.⁴

² See footnote 2, Document 10.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Kissinger initialed his approval on November 25.

High-Level Meetings; Miscellaneous Issues

12. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to President Nixon¹

New York, August 11, 1969.

With reference to our brief conversation at Camp David concerning the address which you might wish to deliver at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly next month,² I am submitting herewith a list of themes with which, if you do make the speech, you might wish to deal.

The content of your remarks on each theme you select would presumably depend on the course of events and the development of policy on the relevant issues up to that time. The traditional date for the delivery of the US address is the first morning of the general debate (the third day of the session), which this year will be September 18.

I should very much hope that you would decide to make this address, first, because it has been traditional since 1945 for American Presidents to address the United Nations in the first year of their Administration and your absence would therefore be remarked, but more important, because the UN General Assembly would provide a unique sounding board for a statement of your goals and policies in the foreign field. If you should have new initiatives to announce appropriate to this forum, that would of course be particularly useful; President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal to the UN had a great impact. However, even if there were no new initiatives which were relevant and which were ripe for announcement next month, your appearance would nevertheless be most desirable. Most speeches by heads of state or government in the general debate are devoted to setting forth their government's policy on the main issues before the Assembly. President Eisenhower spoke to the Assembly along these lines three times after his initial appearance, and other Presidents have done likewise.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential.

² No record of this meeting was found. A May 16 memorandum from Yost to the President recommended that he address the UN General Assembly. (Ibid., Box 295, USUN, Vol. I) On August 23 Secretary Rogers informed Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs De Palma that the President was interested in addressing the General Assembly on September 18. Foreign Ministers attending the session would be encouraged to meet with either Rogers or Yost in New York rather than with the President in Washington. (Ibid.)

The following will be the principal issues before the Assembly, with some or all of which you might wish to deal:

1. *Disarmament* This is the issue to which the Assembly traditionally devotes most attention. Discussion revolves around but is not confined to the report of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. This year that Committee will not have concrete recommendations to make and this failure will give rise to considerable criticism. Whatever you might be able to say either on matters that will be dealt with in the Committee's report, such as control of biological and chemical warfare or of military uses of the seabed, or on our objectives in the SALT negotiations, or on any other arms control topics, will be very useful.

2. *UN Peacekeeping* Negotiations are proceeding slowly but perceptibly to strengthen the capability of the UN to deal with international conflict, particularly in the Third World. We might indicate our support of this process in general terms or by expressing willingness to contribute, proportionately with others, to a "Peace Fund", designed to finance the initial stage of such operations.

3. *Quality of the Environment* This is a subject, as you know, of increasing international concern, about which you have already urged concerted action by our NATO allies. I made it the main theme of my speech to the UN Economic and Social Council in July (copy attached).³ An indication of your interest and support in the UN context would be particularly timely and welcome.

4. *Second Development Decade* The question of the US contribution, through trade and aid, to development is a difficult and delicate one because of the increasingly reluctant attitude of the Congress and because some of the relevant policies of your Administration are still under review. However, you have proposed to the Congress increased appropriations for multilateral aid through the UN and your intentions in this respect will be heartening to this audience.

5. *Population* You may wish to stress your conviction of the vital importance of dealing urgently with this problem, from the standpoint of development, environmental quality and the maintenance of peace.

6. *Middle East* This will no doubt be a main theme of debate in the GA, as well as of negotiation behind the scenes. A reemphasis of your determination to exert the full influence of the US to bring about a settlement would be most timely.

7. *Southern Africa* Our attitude toward human rights self-determination in this area is another very delicate one because Black African feeling is so strong and yet there is so little that can be realistically

³ Attached but not printed.

done. I would not recommend your dealing with this subject at length but it should be touched on.

8. *Vietnam* This subject is not on the Assembly's agenda and agitation about it has considerably declined as a result of the Paris negotiations and the policies you announced in your May 14 speech. Nevertheless, as the largest war in progress, it continues to cause deep concern at the UN and a brief restatement of your policies directed to the Assembly would be most helpful.

9. *Era of Negotiation* A reiteration of the theme of your Inaugural Address would be eminently suited to the UN forum and could indeed most appropriately be the main thread running through your whole presentation.

I would suggest that the address be about forty-five minutes in length, though there is no fixed practice in this regard.⁴

Charles W. Yost

⁴ President Nixon addressed the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 18, 1969. His address is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969*, pp. 724–731.

13. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 18, 1969, noon.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September, 1969

SUBJECT

President Nixon's Courtesy Call on the Secretary-General

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 291, Agency Files, USUN. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on September 19 by Yost. A September 23 covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger bears a handwritten note indicating that Kissinger approved the memorandum of conversation on September 25.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Foreign</i>
The President	The Secretary-General
Secretary Rogers	Dr. Ralph Bunche
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger	
Ambassador Charles W. Yost	

The Secretary-General expressed warm appreciation for the President's willingness to speak to the United Nations General Assembly and thus to demonstrate in this tangible and emphatic way his support of the institution.

The SYG presented the President with a folder of United Nations stamps, and also with a memorandum urging early ratification of the United Nations Privileges and Immunities Convention. He explained that he had occasion to raise this subject a number of times in the past, that the present situation is anomalous in that a Third Secretary of the Burmese Mission to the United Nations, for example, is immune to prosecution whereas the SYG and his senior collaborators are not, and that he would greatly appreciate it if the President would find it possible to correct this anomaly. Secretary Rogers and Mr. Yost commented that the subject is under active consideration in the U.S. Government. The Secretary noted that, as a matter of fact, for many years no one had been prosecuted for the sort of activity covered in the Convention. The President commented that he nevertheless recognizes the symbolic importance of the matter but noted that the attitude of the Congress toward it is not clear.

The SYG then turned to a rather lengthy exposition of his views in regard to the significance of elections in Viet Nam. He pointed out that in a somewhat analogous situation in Burma just after the war, when every village had a supply of arms, theoretically free elections were held but in fact the government obtained 100% of the votes in villages it controlled while the Communists obtained 100% of the votes in the villages they controlled. The SYG feared that the outcome of elections held in Viet Nam under present circumstances would be much the same and would not in fact reflect the free choice of the people.

He thought that a more profitable course would be to establish in South Viet Nam a broadly-based coalition government, which after some interval for the reduction of tensions might more successfully carry out such elections. While he did not specify on this occasion whether or not he would suggest the Communists be included in such a government, he has on previous occasions indicated that they should *not*. He suggested as the sort of person who might play a prominent role in such a government "Big" Minh, who he felt is highly regarded by most elements throughout South Viet Nam and yet is definitely *not* a Communist. The SYG pointed out that 80 or 90% of the voters in

South East Asia vote for leaders, whom they consider "good" or "bad", rather than for parties or ideologies.

The President replied that he is very conscious of the difficulties of conducting fair elections under present circumstances in Viet Nam where arms are so widely held. It is for this reason that we have suggested that elections be supervised by an international body. What we have in mind moreover is not a small body but a large one, composed for the most part of Asians but with all points of view, including Communists and neutralists, represented. He would be pleased if it could be agreed that the UN might carry out this responsibility. He would hope that in this way the fairness of the elections might be assured.

He went on to say, however, that it should be clearly recognized that the United States has, since the cessation of bombing of the North, made a whole series of forthcoming proposals, which he had just reiterated in his speech, but that there has been so far no response from the other side, public or private, except a demand for total U.S. withdrawal and capitulation. It might be that the other side believes political pressures inside the United States will ultimately compel us to withdraw unconditionally. He wished to assure the SYG most solemnly that this would not be the case. He would under no circumstances yield to political pressures of this kind. Indeed it would be disastrous for many reasons if the United States should simply pull out of Viet Nam, not least of which would be that the effect on American public opinion would probably be such as to lead to almost complete U.S. withdrawal from world affairs. The President indicated that, on the other hand, the United States is prepared to discuss any settlement which would provide for self-determination in South Viet Nam and would wholly withdraw as a part of such a settlement.

There was some discussion as to whether the death of Ho Chi Minh would change the policy of Hanoi. The SYG expressed the view that since Ho had been "gaga" for the last year or two and the government had during that time been largely in the hands of others, principally Pham Van Dong and General Giap, there is unlikely to be any change in the near future. The President pointed out, however, that Ho had been a charismatic figure, popular throughout the whole of Viet Nam in a way that no other Northern leader was, and that this might make a difference. The SYG agreed that this might well be the case.

As time was drawing short, Secretary Rogers said that he would be very happy to continue the discussion of Viet Nam with the SYG at any time and explain the U.S. position in more detail.

The meeting ended on a warm note of mutual regard and reiteration by the SYG of appreciation for the President's presence and his speech.

14. **Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

25th Anniversary of the United Nations

The following notes are responsive to Mr. Lord's recent request for information on developments in connection with the United Nations' 25th Anniversary. The Department is working on appropriate recommendations to the President regarding such of these matters as require his decision.

1. *Visits of Heads of State or Government.* The UN 25th Anniversary resolution (copy enclosed)² "expresses the hope that as many Heads of State or Government as possible will be able to participate in the commemorative session" and it is likely that a considerable number will take advantage of this invitation.

This of course raised the question of the President's participation and in due course decisions will be needed on such matters as whether and for how long he may go to New York, whether he will address the commemorative session, what contacts with or representational functions for the other Heads of State or Government he may have, and what to do about the inevitable desires of some of these personalities to combine their visits to New York with visits to Washington. We have already had one informal inquiry of this kind on behalf of Ceausescu (copy enclosed). Pending firm decisions on these matters, we have given Embassy Bucharest an interim reply (copy enclosed).

2. *Presidential Commission for the 25th Anniversary.* The UN 25th Anniversary Preparatory Committee suggested "that Governments might

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential. A December 15 covering memorandum from Winston Lord to Kissinger cited three issues that would require early White House attention: visits of heads of state or government, the Presidential Commission for the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, and the World Youth Assembly. The memorandum bears handwritten notes by Kissinger about two of the three. Concerning the Presidential Commission, he wrote: "Can we get terms of reference and recommendations?" Concerning the World Youth Assembly, he wrote: "Let's write up issues and get a decision."

² None of the enclosures is printed. Only Enclosure 1, the text of the resolution commemorating the 25th anniversary, was attached. Enclosures 2 and 3 are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 30. Enclosure 4, Ambassador Yost's October 23 address to the UN General Assembly, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1, 1969, pp. 485–489.

wish to consider establishment of national committees for the purpose of coordinating all national activities relating to the anniversary in their respective countries.”

We share Ambassador Yost’s belief that a Presidential Commission of perhaps a dozen leading citizens should be appointed pursuant to this suggestion. Such a Commission would be very important to the nourishment of concerned and constructive public interest in the UN and what it does for peace and progress. Membership, size and composition, organization, financial implications, details of activity, etc. would have to be worked out. Experience with a similar Presidential Commission for the observance of Human Rights Year 1968 was very favorable.

3. *Opportunity for improving the UN image and effectiveness.* Both in the President’s address to the General Assembly on September 18, 1969 and in Ambassador Yost’s statement in the debate on the 25th Anniversary resolution (copy enclosed) certain possibilities of constructive exploitation of the anniversary were raised. We are hopeful that the occasion can be utilized both to inspire the UN to greater purpose, direction and effectiveness and to improve its public image in the United States. Ambassador Yost and his Mission are planning to give priority attention to these matters as soon as the current General Assembly adjourns later this month. We in the Department are setting up special machinery for the same purpose. One of the most complicated and important of the projects to be tied in with the Anniversary is the adoption of a plan for the Second Development Decade of the seventies. Other subjects mentioned in the Anniversary Resolution include a “Disarmament Decade,” the 10th Anniversary of the “anti-colonialism declaration,” an appeal for additional accessions to multilateral instruments supported by the United Nations, etc.

4. *World Youth Assembly.* In its Anniversary Resolution the General Assembly decided to convene a World Youth Assembly (WYA), currently scheduled to be held in New York July 9–18, 1970, to which each Member Government is to send up to five youth delegates (preferably not over age 25). The 25th Anniversary Preparatory Committee recommends that “Member States may consider merely conveying the names of youth representatives selected by appropriate national bodies . . . on the basis of participation of all major youth organizations of the given country.” Also, “the youth delegation will attend the meeting as representatives of either their specific youth group or as delegates from their Government. They would not be under the instructions of their Government. . . .”

There is already some American youth interest and activity in connection with the World Youth Assembly and we are taking appropriate action to ensure that US participation is representative and responsible.

5. *Presidential UN Day Proclamation.* The United Nations Association/USA and other private organizations are planning special anniversary events and activities. It would be helpful to their efforts and appropriate to the anniversary year if the President's traditional UN Day Proclamation could be issued earlier than the usual late summer date.

6. *Congressional Resolution.* There is some Congressional interest in passing a joint congratulatory resolution early in 1970. The Department will be in appropriate consultation with Congressional leaders interested in this project.

7. *Coordinators for 25th Anniversary.* As the date draws closer, events and developments connected with the 25th Anniversary will undoubtedly involve the interests of a wide range of offices in the Department, the rest of the Executive branch, Congress and private organizations. We have therefore felt it desirable to establish a central point of coordination in International Organization Affairs for these activities and have obtained the temporary assignment of a senior officer, Ambassador James K. Penfield, to assume this responsibility. Similarly, the Second Development Decade planning will have broad ramifications and the coordinating responsibility for this aspect of the Anniversary will be the full-time responsibility of another senior officer, Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein.

Robert L. Brown³

³ Brown signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

15. **Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, February 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your February 26 Luncheon with Under Secretary Richardson: United Nations

I strongly recommend that you take up the subject of the United Nations and preparations for the observance of its 25th Anniversary with Under Secretary Richardson at this week's regular Thursday lunch.

Several Anniversary proposals involving Presidential commitments have just converged, and it would be useful to sort out your thinking and that of Richardson and Rogers in order to advise the President. (These matters are discussed below.) In addition, I think you should express White House interest that we develop a coherent U.S. approach to the United Nations this year and mark the Anniversary with significant American initiatives. Finally, you could discuss the nature of the Presidential Commission that the President has just approved in principle (Tab A)² and urged that State move quickly on its establishment.

The major questions for early Presidential decision involve possible speeches/appearances and meetings with Secretary General U Thant.

Possible Presidential Speeches. I assume that, as I urged in my memorandum to you concerning the Presidential Commission, the President is no longer considering an early statement on the UN, the Commission being his only initiative at this time. There are now two prospective forums for a major UN speech:

—*Mid-September New York.* Secretary Rogers plans to speak to the President personally about the importance of his going to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly's 25th session which will include many visiting heads of state in September and October.

—*Late June San Francisco.* We have also gotten advance notice from Hugh Sloan (Tab B)³ that the President will be invited to go to San

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed. This February 24 memorandum from Kissinger to Secretary Rogers noted that the President had approved in principle Rogers' recommendation that he appoint a Presidential Commission for the observance of the UN 25th Anniversary.

³ Tabs B, C, and D were not attached.

Francisco on Friday, June 26 to speak at ceremonies connected with the United Nations' founding there. That would be a very appealing ceremonial gesture by the President, and he may wish to do it for a variety of reasons. However, it should not preempt the much more important September address to the General Assembly. Major substantive proposals should be reserved for that occasion and indeed will not be ready until then. (We envisage the Commission's making its recommendations by July 30.)

Meetings with Secretary General U Thant. Secretary Rogers has recommended that the President decline an invitation by U Thant to have lunch with him in New York on June 29 (Tab C).

In addition, Congressman Bradford Morse, Chairman of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law, has just written the President on behalf of 73 of his colleagues urging that the Secretary General be invited to pay a State Visit to Washington during the week of June 22 just prior to the San Francisco commemoration. They also suggest that U Thant address a joint session of the Congress. (The letter is at Tab D.) Paralleling this initiative, I have just received an informal feeler from a member of the United Nations office here in Washington that U Thant be invited by the President to Washington, although he indicated that this need not be a State Visit.

My own view is that the President could invite U Thant to lunch in late June on the latter's way to San Francisco with the two purposes being: (1) to underline U.S. support of the United Nations and to mark its 25th Anniversary; and (2) for the President to receive the Secretary General's views on the future of the UN in order to help develop a United States position in conjunction with the Presidential Commission recommendations which he would be receiving the following month. Other events, such as a Congressional reception, could also be arranged. This would be a very helpful gesture by the President and would assist him in shaping American initiatives for the General Assembly. It would at the same time avoid the time consumption and political problems of a State Visit and an address to Congress.

Possible Scenario

In sum, without having a feel for the President's or your thoughts on these questions, I am recommending the following scenario:

- Launch the Presidential Commission sometime in March.
- Invite U Thant for an official visit and luncheon, but not a State Visit, on his way to San Francisco the week of June 22.
- Either a strictly ceremonial visit by the President at the San Francisco convocation June 26 or the sending of a Presidential message.
- Decline U Thant's lunch invitation in New York June 29.
- A major Presidential speech with American initiatives at the September opening of the General Assembly, based on his Commission's and State's mid-summer recommendations and his June conversation with U Thant.

I hope that you can discuss these matters with Richardson and then give me guidance on whether and how to prepare a memorandum for the President. Alternatively, you may wish to take these subjects up verbally with the President, perhaps in conjunction with Secretary Rogers.⁴

⁴ A follow-up memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, dated March 12, sought confirmation that he and Richardson had agreed on President Nixon's participation in UN 25th Anniversary commemorative activities. Kissinger initialed that he had done so, but added at the bottom: "Not really—minimum Pres participation. He will not go to S. Francisco." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. III)

16. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

United Nations 25th Anniversary Matters

This will bring you up to date on matters related to the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations and in particular alert you to the problems that have arisen with regard to names for a Presidential Commission.

Presidential Invitations

The President has basically accepted your and Secretary Rogers' recommendations concerning Presidential activities (Tab A).² He is declining U Thant's invitation to a June 29 lunch in New York and Mayor Alioto's invitation to San Francisco for the commemoration ceremonies June 24–26. He has decided to hold a stag, black-tie dinner, including Congressmen, at the White House for U Thant on the latter's way to San Francisco on June 24 (you had suggested a lunch or a meeting). Peter Rodman and I are sorting out the various actions required to implement the President's decisions. With regard to the dinner, Dwight Chapin has asked for a scenario and proposed guest list. We are getting State's needed

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Haig, Peter Rodman (without attachments), and William Watts.

² Memorandum from Dwight L. Chapin to Kissinger, April 8; attached but not printed.

help on this by phone only (De Palma), saying that the President's decision is still tentative and should be closely held. No one is to notify U Thant or anyone else until we have a clearer idea of how the dinner should shape up.

Presidential Commission

You will recall that Ambassador Yost sent you a letter which suggested additions and deletions to the list of Commission candidates that Secretary Rogers proposed; Yost was unhappy with some of the changes in the list that had been made in the political review process at State. Per your instructions, I have taken no action on Ambassador Yost's suggestions and only sent Mr. Flemming's office the official names sent over by Rogers. At Tab B is a comparative listing of the Rogers and Yost recommendations.³

In the past week or two Mr. Flemming and, I believe, Mr. Dent and perhaps others have been going over the Rogers list and have come up with a brand new version which is at Tab C.⁴ I don't know whether Flanigan has been involved. *Almost nothing remains of the Rogers recommendations*: 26 of the 32 original names, including proposed Chairman Earl Warren, have been stricken. Flemming's staff told me that the Rogers list had too many Democrats and tired names, and they were frankly anxious to reward many faithful Republicans and financial contributors. They have thus completely emasculated Rogers' list and loaded the Commission with people who are either unknown, know little about the UN, or are hostile to it.

Everyone recognizes that some political massaging is required, but the resulting list is disastrous. It has almost no recognized UN experts—yet the Commission must have a hard core of experts if it is to produce substantive proposals for the President in time for a possible September speech at the UN. It is almost totally Republican—yet the United Nations has always been a bipartisan issue in the U.S.

Flemming's people, without checking with us, put together this list and sent it to State and Yost for their comments. The latter are predictably unhappy. Yost has just appealed to Rogers, who has promised "to do something."

I have remained completely aloof from this political game, only keeping informed as best I could. I told Flemming's staff man on a personal basis that his latest list was sure to displease State. And I have made clear to State that you have not been involved and have been out of town much of the time.

³ Tab B is attached but not printed. The list is dated March 25. Yost's letter to Kissinger is dated March 23.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

I do not know whether and how you wish to move on this. One outcome could be for State/Yost and the White House political people to hammer out a compromise list which we would then put together with the rest of the package on the Commission to forward to the President. However, you may wish to take a more active role. Rogers may call you in any event. He might even go to the President who, of course, knows only that he has approved the Commission in principle and has asked for names and a scenario.

I see three options:⁵

- (1) Call Rogers or Richardson
- (2) Call Flanigan or Flemming
- (3) Sit tight until State makes a move

I recommend (1), perhaps followed by (2).

⁵ None of the options was checked or initialed.

17. Memorandum From Winston Lord and Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Presidential Commission for the United Nations²

Here is the latest dismal status report on this subject, on which we call Flemming's office every few days.

Chairman. This apparently will be Henry Cabot Lodge, who we are told has accepted. We do not know if Flemming is aware of Lodge's upcoming Vatican assignment and did not mention it because of its sensitivity. Obviously Lodge thinks he can handle both jobs, although

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action.

² President Nixon announced the establishment of the President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations on July 9. Executive Order 11546 establishing the Commission and a list of members are printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 13, 1970, pp. 922-923.

we do not know how the UN Commission has been presented to him in terms of work load. As matters now stand, he would have to be in Rome just about the time the Commission would be getting underway.

Clearance Process. Flemming's office says that "they hope to complete this sometime next week". There are apparently a couple of slots still to fill. When reminded of the need to work through Timmons to line up the eight Congressional members, they admitted they had not started to do this yet and said they would begin now. They still show little sense of urgency. (The clearance process usually takes three weeks—next week will make it five weeks since they received the revised compromise list of Rogers which you endorsed. Time lost during the month of April was due to the fact that Flemming's office had erased 90% of the original State list and a compromise was clearly needed.)

Forwarding to the President. Flemming's office will forward the eventual list to the President but has promised that we will get a copy so that we can forward your memorandum concerning the proposed scenario for announcement, executive order, etc. at the same time.

There are two main problems. First, because of the many lost weeks, very little time remains for the Commission to fulfill its first function, that of submitting an interim report to the President for him to draw upon for U.S. initiatives at the September General Assembly. The executive order calls for this report by July 30—this will have to be slipped to August 15, which still will give the Commission less than two months to do this job. (State has been preparing proposals and studies for the Commission to draw upon.) Second, the Commission membership will not be distinguished. Even the Rogers compromise was a comedown; we do not know what further slippage has occurred the past few weeks.

These two problems prompted Ambassador Yost to make a request through State to have a quick look at the final list before it goes to the President in order to see whether the whole project might better be scrapped. (Attached is an earlier memo to you on this subject which I don't believe you have seen.³ This memo also points out that Pete Vaky has had similar problems with the Flemming operation.) We are probably too far along to drop the Commission idea at this point, but the idea is not an unreasonable one.

³ Attached but not printed.

Recommendation:

A call to Flemming by you or General Haig might save a few days, clarify Mr. Lodge's responsibilities, and reinsure that we see the final Commission list before it goes to the President.⁴

HAK to call

Haig to call

Other

⁴ None of the options is checked or initialed.

18. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 10, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
U Thant
Under Secretary Bunche
Ambassador Yost
Dr. Kissinger

Much of the conversation was taken up by discussion of the Middle East. The President emphasized our desire for a peaceful settlement, remarking that he was not too sure that the Soviets were equally interested in bringing about a cooling-off period. He referred to the increased Soviet military presence in Egypt as a most hazardous factor since the Israelis were bound to react if the creeping advance toward the Suez Canal continued. If a confrontation resulted and the Israelis asked for more U.S. assistance, we would find ourselves morally committed.

The Secretary General said that when he had been in Moscow, Kosygin had emphasized to him the Soviet desire for a peaceful settlement. The latest Soviet formulation on peace had represented a great concession which had been hard to squeeze out of the UAR.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. Kissinger initialed his approval of the memorandum of conversation on an attached memorandum from Marshall Wright, dated August 12.

The conversation ranged over the general question of what could be done to improve the UN's contribution to peace. The Secretary General mentioned peacekeeping and Ambassador Yost remarked that we were still waiting for some important word from Moscow.

The President spoke warmly about the need for multilateralism in the economic and social aid field and assured the Secretary General of our support. He stated flatly that we want to move more into that field, and he added that of course there are difficulties to overcome with our Congress, e.g., in the field of appropriations for the UNDP where we had gone in for \$100 million and would be lucky to get as much as we had last year. However, we hoped to do more next year. The President also remarked on the disadvantages of bilateralism in the matter of foreign aid.

With respect to visiting New York in connection with the 25th UN General Assembly, the President did not commit himself although he said he would "sympathetically consider" going. He said he was not sure of his schedule yet. The Secretary General suggested that the President come during the commemorative week in October. The President remarked that he might come at that time but that it would be difficult, and Ambassador Yost commented that another possibility would be for the President to come in September. The President said if he were to come he would expect to see a number of foreign leaders, which is always time-consuming ("half an hour if you speak the same language, otherwise an hour"). He supposed he would have to be there two days. U Thant referred to indications that some thirty leaders would be coming.

At one point in the conversation Mr. Bunche remarked that if the situation deteriorated further (presumably referring to the Middle East), there might have to be a meeting "at the top". The President said he was willing to do anything useful to avert a crisis, but on the whole he was not a great believer in summit meetings unless they could accomplish something. If a meeting raised hopes which were subsequently dashed, this would be worse than if no meeting were held at all.

19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Attendance at the UN General Assembly Session

I believe it would be useful for you to attend some portion of the UN General Assembly session this fall. By doing so, you would demonstrate our support for the UN during its 25th Anniversary year. You would also be able to see a relatively large number of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government in New York, if you wished, thereby minimizing the claims on your time from such leaders. A working group, chaired by a member of my staff and including White House members, is considering alternative approaches for your possible attendance and your meetings with foreign leaders. At this point, I want to outline what we now know about the plans for the General Assembly session and to describe some of the possibilities for your attendance.

Dates for Your Possible Attendance

If you attend the session, the best time would be during the week preceding the formal termination of the commemorative period on Friday, October 23 and Saturday, October 24. Although there would be certain advantages to your attendance during the General Debate in mid-September—a major speech would be appropriate during these substantive discussions—the commemorative period would offer a better opportunity to meet and entertain foreign leaders and thus would head off individual requests for meetings in Washington. Our current information indicates that many more foreign leaders will be coming in October than for the General Debate. Additionally, the focus of this year's session will be on the commemorative period and there will be greater public exposure given to it.

Arrangements for the Commemorative Celebration

Although plans for the commemorative celebration are not yet firm, about a week up to and including Friday, October 23 will probably be devoted to speeches by visiting leaders. Our delegation has put in a claim for the second spot on Friday afternoon (following Haile Selassie) but this could probably be switched to the morning hours, if

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. At the top of the memorandum are the handwritten initials "HK".

you desire. We have made no commitment as to who might speak. If you attend, you might also wish to offer a dinner Friday evening for Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. The present plans for Saturday, October 24 consist of speeches by the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly, a musical offering and a ceremony during which a Declaration will be signed by those present. A problem could arise if the Declaration agreed upon turns out to be inappropriate for your signature, but there are no present indications that it will.

Your Meetings with Foreign Leaders

A list of those leaders expected to attend as of August 3 is enclosed.² Upwards of 40 leaders will probably attend, most of them during the late October commemorative period. We have considered various ways to handle your meetings with Chiefs of State and Heads of Government attending the UNGA session. None of these is completely satisfactory, and all depend on the amount of time you will be able to spend in New York. We will want to minimize demands on your time, while avoiding, to the extent possible, bruised feelings on the part of foreign leaders with whom you will not be able to meet individually. The principal alternatives are the following:

1. If you attend Friday, October 23 and Saturday, October 24, you could have major bilateral meetings with a limited number of leaders of special importance (such as Heath, Pompidou, Trudeau, Sato, Golda Meir, should they attend, in addition to calls on the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary General) on Friday morning and afternoon. You could deliver your speech either Friday morning or afternoon and give a dinner that evening for all Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. Saturday morning you could attend the commemorative ceremony and depart in the afternoon.

2. Alternatively, in addition to the major bilateral meetings, you might wish to have brief meetings with a number of leaders—in effect courtesies lasting from five to fifteen minutes. This would, however, make your schedule quite tight if you attend only Friday and part of Saturday. You could still deliver your speech, offer a dinner and attend the commemorative ceremony.

3. A third possibility is to schedule no bilateral meetings in New York, only the delivery of your address and the dinner on Friday, and the Saturday ceremony.

4. If you were able to devote more time than Friday and Saturday, the most desirable plan would be to have both major bilateral meet-

² The attached list of heads of state and government who were expected to attend the 25th UN General Assembly is not printed.

ings and a larger number of brief meetings in New York in addition to the speech, dinner, and the Saturday ceremony.

In the coming weeks we will be receiving more information about the foreign leaders who will attend the UNGA session. When that is available, I will make specific recommendations regarding your attendance at the UN. A key factor will of course be the level of Soviet attendance and whether it will appear desirable for you to have a meeting with Kosygin if he should attend.

William P. Rogers

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Attendance at the UN General Assembly Session

You have agreed in principle to go to New York for the celebration of the UN's 25th birthday. Although the list of attendees is not yet complete, it is already evident that New York will have, during the week of October 24, one of the largest gatherings of Heads of State in history. We now expect between 30 and 40. We have a delicate problem of dealing with the sensibilities of so many heads of government and their many requests for personal meetings with you. This memo seeks your tentative approval of a scenario for handling the problem.

We want to avoid the hurt feelings and invidious comparisons that would result from your seeing some of your opposite numbers and having no contact at all with others. We therefore recommend that you host either a Reception or a State Dinner for *all* Heads of State in New

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. An attached memorandum of transmittal to Kissinger from Marshall Wright is dated August 17. Another attached memorandum from Dwight Chapin to Haig, dated September 9, gives a date of August 25 for the Kissinger–Nixon memorandum. According to the Chapin–Haig memorandum, “The President has approved it only as a start for a *general* approach to the UN plan—he has not approved either of the two check-off items in the plan specifically. In other words, the President thought it looked okay, but we have no final approval in any way, shape, or form.”

York. This will permit personal contact and a photo of a smiling handshake with even the least of your opposite numbers. It will also be a near-unique occasion, and should get heavy press coverage just prior to the November elections.

Longer substantive meetings will be necessary with the more important Heads of Government. As of now, “probables” in this category include Heath, Haile Selassie, and Sato. Kosygin is a possibility, as is Golda Meir. French attendance is undecided. I think we can hold the number of longer meetings to a maximum of 5 or 6.

In addition to these “principals”, there is another category who will expect and have a claim for at least a brief private meeting with you. Twenty or thirty minutes should suffice. Examples are Souvanna Phouma, Julius Nyerere, Lee Kwan Yew, Yahya, etc. I think we can hold it down to five or six.

To accomplish all this with grace, and without inflicting on yourself an inhuman schedule, you will need about 48 hours in New York. You are already scheduled to be in New York on the evening of October 21 for the Al Smith Dinner. The easiest way of handling this UN-related chore is simply to stay in New York for the next two days, returning to Washington on the morning of Saturday, October 24. In addition to the activities described above, this will permit you to make a speech to the General Assembly on Friday afternoon. We are at work on a philosophical and somewhat inspirational 15-minute draft for this occasion.

There is no need to make specific decisions now on precisely whom you would receive for either the long or short meetings. We can do that best when we have firmer information on who is coming. We will be mindful of the high necessity of protecting your time, and it may be that we will be able to drop part of this schedule at the end.

If you accept the recommendation below, we will keep your decision strictly secret, do all of the planning on a tentative basis, and come back to you for final approval. Tab A is an illustrative schedule. Tab B is a list of the Heads of State who have indicated their plans. Tab C is an information memo to you from Secretary Rogers on this subject.²

Recommendation:

That you agree for planning purposes to proceed to New York on the evening of Wednesday, October 21st and return to Washington on the morning of Saturday, October 24.³

² Tabs A, B, and C are attached but not printed.

³ The approve and disapprove options are neither checked nor initialed.

21. **Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, August 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

U Thant's Maneuvering for a "Summit Meeting" in New York

It is now perfectly obvious that U Thant is maneuvering for a "big four summit meeting" in New York in connection with the UN's 25th birthday in late October. The evidence is:

1. A series of press stories from New York last week quoting an authoritative UN source to the effect that a summit meeting between Nixon and Kosygin was expected in connection with the expected presence of both for the UN birthday celebration.

2. President Pompidou's principal assistant told our Chargé in Paris (Tab A)² that Pompidou had received an invitation from U Thant to attend a "big four ceremony and dinner" in New York in late October. U Thant's letter to Pompidou indicated that Kosygin and Heath have already accepted and President Nixon would "probably accept".

3. A UN official, during the course of a courtesy call today on a State Department official, casually said that U Thant intends to give a dinner for the four Heads of State on Thursday, October 22 (Tab B).³

4. A telegram in today from Moscow (Tab C) reports that the Soviets "seem to be evincing some interest in a possible summit meeting . . . in New York" in October.⁴

I am not aware of any invitation from U Thant to our President for this occasion, and I assume none has been received. If that is correct, I also assume that U Thant is trying to mousetrap us. It appears that he has invited the other three to break bread with our President and plans to come to us only after he has their acceptances to present us with a *fait accompli* which would be difficult to avoid.

Another aspect of this that deserves some thought: the UN official who told us about the dinner characterized it as a dinner for "the four principal Security Council member states". The interesting thing about that formula is not who it includes, but who it includes out. In other

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

² Telegram 10995 from Paris, August 18; attached but not printed.

³ Telegram 136473 to USUN, October 21; attached but not printed.

⁴ Telegram 4653 from Moscow, August 18; attached but not printed.

words, the UN Secretary General proposes to give a dinner for the “principal Security Council member states”, leaving out China which is, of course, the only other permanent member of the Security Council. It looks to me as if U Thant is trying to use us in his continuing efforts to downgrade Taiwan’s UN status.

As I see it, U Thant is being too clever by half. I do not know how you or the President would feel about a big four dinner in New York. However we feel about it, though, I assume we would prefer to make up our own minds rather than being gradually encircled. We can confirm my belief that U Thant is busily spinning a web around us by ascertaining from Heath and Kosygin whether they have in fact been invited to a big four dinner in New York. I believe we should do so forthwith, and if my suspicions are correct, ensure our own freedom of action by persuading Pompidou and Heath to “defer acceptance of U Thant’s invitation for the time being”.

Hal Sonnenfeldt has seen the memo and has “no objection.”⁵

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to inquire of Heath and Kosygin whether they have, in fact, received and accepted an invitation from U Thant to a big four dinner in New York.⁶

⁵ Wright added this sentence by hand.

⁶ Kissinger initialed the approve option and wrote below it: “Yes, if we can do delicately. But not in way that suggests we are angling for Kosygin visit.”

22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Interim Report from Your UN Commission

Your Executive Order required the Commission to present to you prior to September 15 an Interim Report. The Commission will give final approval to the report at a meeting in Washington on the 10th of September. Current indications are that it will be a useful and realistic

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Sent for action.

document which does not attempt to provide answers but indicates the main lines the Commission will pursue looking toward its final report to you next April.

The Chairman of the Commission, Henry Cabot Lodge, would be glad to present the report to you personally if you wish to give the Commission's work the extra publicity boost that such a meeting would provide. Your meeting with Lodge need be no longer than required to permit the report to change hands and have appropriate press photographic coverage.

While desirable, I don't believe this is necessary for what will be only an interim report. Furthermore you had indicated you wished publicity for the appointment of five youth members of the Commission, on which Bob Finch and I have sent you a separate memorandum. If you see these young people it should be September 9 or 10, before the meeting of the Commission (and therefore before the interim report is ready, so the two events cannot be combined).² I see no reason for you to take time out twice in a five-day period for the UN Commission.

In any event, Lodge hopes that the report can be released by the White House Press Office no later than September 14 to serve as the basis for a number of meetings that the Commission is holding around the country and to permit him to discuss the report in depth at a speech he is scheduled to make to a distinguished UN Commission dinner in New York on the evening of the 14th.³ I see no problem in releasing the interim report based on the draft we have seen. I would of course check back with you if the final version had any troublesome elements.

*Recommendations:*⁴

1. That I receive the interim report from Cabot Lodge on your behalf on September 12, 13, or 14.

Approve

Disapprove, prefer to receive report personally

2. That you authorize the release of the report by the White House Press Office.

Approve

Disapprove

² President Nixon announced the appointment of an additional five youth members of the Commission on September 10. (*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September 14, 1970, pp. 1170-1171)

³ The Commission's interim report was released September 13. (*Ibid.*, September 21, 1970, p. 1237)

⁴ The President initialed his approval of both recommendations.

23. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, September 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Participation at the United Nations, and Your Reception of Visiting National Chieftains

In line with your instructions, we recommend the following scenario:

1. We will schedule just enough time in New York to permit you to make a speech to the General Assembly. We will schedule no meetings in New York with any of your opposite numbers.

2. We will invite all Chiefs of State and Heads of Government present in New York to come to Washington for a State Dinner on the evening of Saturday, October 24.

3. We will refer to you for final decision requests for private meetings with you from the more important Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. We will have these meetings in Washington either during the week of the UN ceremonies or in the days immediately thereafter. We will turn down, as gracefully as possible, requests from the lesser of your opposite numbers.

4. On the assumption you will attend the Al Smith dinner,² the morning of the 22nd is the most convenient time for your address to the General Assembly. With your approval of this memorandum, we will instruct Ambassador Yost to have your appearance scheduled for the morning of the 22nd.

Recommendation:

That you approve these arrangements.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action.

² The President wrote "Keep open?" above this sentence.

³ The President checked the approve option and added a handwritten note reading: "But make *no* commitments re appts—few as poss—*no* foreign min except Gromyko." Jeanne Davis, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, sent a memorandum to Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot, with the text of a telegram to all posts concerning the President's participation in the UN 25th anniversary delegation. Chiefs of State who would be present in New York were invited to the State dinner, but any other meetings with the President would be kept to the "absolute minimum." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV). The telegram was sent as telegram 162809, October 2. (Ibid.)

24. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Status Report on the Security Problem at the UN

State's Bill Macomber had a conference last Friday with Mayor Lindsay and most of the commissioners and top police brass of the City of New York. It was a rough meeting, and by no means resolved the problem. Lindsay did, however, say that New York City would meet its obligations to deal with threats which the New York City police evaluated as serious. Lindsay expressed surprise at being told that there was a "crisis of confidence" in the UN about police protection being extended to the threatened missions, and undertook to meet that problem. He was adamant, however, that the Federal Government is not meeting its share of the responsibility, that he will not compromise on "static guard posts", and that the New York City police will, themselves, make the assessment whether the threats are serious and how they should best be met.

As of now, the prospect is that the city will probably do at least somewhat better in meeting the immediate problem of the 13 threatened missions. How much better we will know in a day or so.

On the long range problem, no progress was made at all. John Dean is now at work on a memo to the President setting forth the problem and the options. He will send us a copy which I will send to you forthwith. Dean, like OMB, still feels strongly about the theology of this matter and I am not at all certain that his memo will adequately reflect what I believe to be the ultimate responsibility of the Federal Government for the protection of diplomatic missions at the UN.² In other words, I think that you may find it necessary to inject yourself in this matter before it is all over. For the moment, however, the immediate problem seems to have been eased and the wisest course for us now is probably to wait for Dean's memo before we decide what to do next.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information.

² Kissinger wrote in the margin: "That seems like a lifetime job. What a deadline." "October 12, 1970" is stamped below his note.

25. **Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, October 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Security Problem at the UN Worsens

Things have started turning bad again with our immediate security problem in New York. On October 6 the Palestine Liberation Office was bombed and a large number of Arab Ambassadors received identical anonymous letters stating that they would be assassinated regardless of USG efforts to protect them.

Like the shepherds in the biblical field, the Arabs are "sore afraid". The Tunisian Ambassador told one of our people that the traditional friendship of Tunisia for the U.S. prevented him from making a formal protest but that he hoped the "U.S. authorities would live up to their responsibilities." He added that he shared the opinion of his Arab colleagues that these incidents were "intolerable".

The Kuwaiti Ambassador (whose mission has already been bombed) has reacted to the death threat emotionally, and warned that the death or injury of any Arab official in New York would create a situation in which "there would be nothing that Arab governments could do to protect Americans in Arab lands."

The Ivory Coast Ambassador (whose mission was bombed on September 27) complained of the "sudden, unannounced and unexplained" removal of police protection from his mission and residence. He was in no wise mollified by our assurances that the police were undoubtedly continuing the investigation and had provided fixed police protection for five days instead of the "normal 24-hour period." The Saudi Arabian Ambassador told us that the U.S. "is in very deep trouble" over the bombings and threats.

Apparently the whole Arab group met on the morning of October 8 and decided to make an official protest to the Secretary General and to the U.S. mission. The protest will concentrate on three points:

1. What, if anything, has been done to apprehend and punish the wrongdoers;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the page Kissinger wrote: "Marshall—We *must* move on this. HK." Below his note is the stamped date "October 12, 1970."

2. What steps are the U.S. Government and New York City going to take henceforth to protect personnel and premises of UN missions; and

3. If the U.S. Government is unable or unwilling to protect the missions, the UN should consider moving its headquarters elsewhere.

I filled John Dean in on all this. He is hard at work on his recommendations to the President and promises to have them on the President's desk by the time of his Tuesday arrival.

26. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Contribution to the ILO Budget

Charles Yost was called in by Secretary General U Thant and General Assembly President Hambro on October 7 to express their deep alarm that the U.S. Congress has cut in half the assessed U.S. contribution to the budget of the International Labor Organization (ILO). They stated that our refusal "on political grounds" to pay our assessed contribution to an international organization puts us in the same position as the Russians and the French. They said that adoption by the U.S. of this position threatened the entire UN financial structure and the viability of the UN itself. They asked Yost to transmit on their behalf to you the strongest possible plea that some means be found as soon as possible for the U.S. to meet its full obligation to the ILO. The full text of the telegram from Yost is at Tab A.² The background on this matter is as follows.

In recent years, George Meany has become increasingly disenchanted with the International Labor Organization. His disenchantment has to do with the compromise of the ILO's tripartite nature (government-business-labor) in the interest of facilitating Soviet participation. Over the years, these attempts at accommodation have resulted, in fact, in some rather peculiar things. The straw that broke

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Telegram 2295 from USUN, October 7; attached but not printed. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, LAB 3-3 ILO.

the camel's back was the publication in the ILO magazine of a blatantly propagandistic piece about Soviet "trade unions", and the appointment of a Russian as an Assistant Director General of the ILO.

His cup running over, Meany had a great deal to say to Congressman Rooney's Subcommittee at the appropriation hearings for the ILO budget. Rooney fully shares Meany's distaste, and the result is the Congressional refusal to appropriate the second half of the annual U.S. contribution to the ILO.

We are therefore in the position of refusing to pay one half of our assessed contribution to a UN body.

Our unhappiness with the course of developments in the ILO does not receive much international sympathy. John Rooney's technique for whipping the ILO back into line is, of course, seen elsewhere as simple blackmail. UN-minded Americans are aghast at what we propose to do. George Meany, however, is quite happy with it, as is the Department of Labor. State is concerned, but not as much as one might expect in the circumstances.

I am convinced that nothing can be done without Meany's cooperation. I am told by the Department of Labor that Meany wants the bill to pass for its "shock treatment" value on the ILO. At some later time, Meany might be willing to ask his Congressional friends to ease up with a supplemental.

The theoretical possibility exists, of course, that a proper approach from the White House to Meany, promising vigorous action to rectify ILO's sins, might induce him to ask the Congress to vote the subscription. However, I do not think it will work, at the present time. Moreover, to some extent I think we will benefit from the Congressional action, so long as we appear to be its victims. Finally, I do not think the season is right for stirring up George Meany.

Therefore, in the absence of a strong recommendation from the Secretary of State that the international costs of letting this situation develop are too great to be borne, I do not propose that we take any action. I did, however, think you should know of this situation, which will doubtless get worse before it gets better.

27. **Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, October 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Security Problem at the UN

Whatever time I can get off from my protocol duties I spend on this problem. John Dean's memo to the President has still not gone forward. I have just gone over with him his latest draft—and have persuaded him to scrap it in its entirety, as inadequate unto the problem.

John has finally come all the way around and recognizes that now is the time to:

(1) Solve the immediate problem by the assignment to New York of the personnel required to maintain fixed posts at threatened missions, etc.

(2) Recognize that this is a permanent problem and that a permanent federal force capable of handling normal problems, and capable of expansion in abnormal situations, has to be in place in New York.

He has asked me to help him write his memo, which I am doing. He has scheduled a meeting for tomorrow morning with EPS and Secret Service personnel to work out the details.

We will need Justice on this but John, who is now as enthusiastic as he was previously dour, thinks he can deliver them. That will leave OMB still spouting theology to anyone who will listen.

I know you are impatient for action on this and I share your impatience fully. But I think, at last, we are going in the right direction, with all the allies that we need, and at full speed. I hope the bombers will adjust themselves to our pace.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. No classification marking. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of the page: "Good job, HK."

² The last sentence was added by hand.

28. **Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to Marshall Wright, John Holdridge, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff¹**

Washington, November 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Study of UN Membership Question

Dr. Kissinger wants to launch a review of our policy toward membership in the United Nations. He specifically called for a study on the entire universality question rather than merely the China question.

He would like to launch both an inter-agency effort and an in-house NSC study. On the former he asks that a NSSM be drafted, to be issued after the UN vote, and that this directive be phrased “neutrally.” He indicated that this study be assigned to the new China Policy Group (of which Holdridge and Kennedy are aware). However, this would seem to tilt the study toward the China question alone rather than the broader universality focus. Thus I suggest you give him the option of assigning the study to another body which would submit it to the Senior Review Group.

Dr. Kissinger also asked that Wright with Holdridge/Sonnenfeldt undertake a parallel in-house study of the UN membership question to insure a dispassionate look at these issues and to sharpen his own thinking as the bureaucracy study goes forward.

There are related questions which should be folded into the package for HAK such as suggestions on how to handle the public relations aspects of this review, how to deal with the academic community which has been flooding the Government with ideas, etc.

These studies are obviously very sensitive and, for now, should be known only to the addressees of this memorandum.

Please prepare a coordinated package consisting of the following for HAK’s approval:

- A NSSM on the membership question,
- A brief outline of what the NSC in-house study might address,
- Suggestions on how to handle the public relations aspects, dealings with the academic community, etc.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only.

29. **Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

ILO and UNESCO Studies

I had lunch today with Jay Lovestone and George Hildebrand, who is chairing the ILO study.

Lovestone, for reasons which never became clear despite extensive discussion, made it obvious that he is distressed at the way in which the ILO and UNESCO studies are being conducted. As nearly as I could understand, Lovestone thought that you personally would chair the studies and that the bureaucracy (notably including State Department) would not be given a chance to express its views or water down the studies. I tried, I do not think with success, to explain that the integrity of the studies is enhanced by the participation of all those that have an interest, and that we have no intention of permitting the studies to deteriorate into whitewash.

Both to Hildebrand's and my great surprise, Jay does not think that the AFL/CIO should express its views regarding the ILO. I am at a loss to explain this, unless he feels that he and Mr. Meany have gotten considerably out in front of what their organization will approve. In that connection, Jay was quite outspoken in expressing the view that the United States should *not* get out of the ILO, should not refuse to pay its assessment, but should, rather, go ahead and pay the dues but work with greater vigor to serve our own interests within the ILO. That is hardly a revolutionary position, and would not require the kind of thorough-going review which Lovestone stimulated in the first place.

We are of course going ahead with the review in any event and despite the moderate position which Jay is now taking, I have learned enough about the ILO to know that the study is thoroughly needed and long overdue.

Incidentally, the UNESCO study is now moving along nicely. Retired Ambassador Bob Woodward has been hired by State to honshu the whole operation and this should insure that it has the kind of consistent and authoritative leadership required.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information.

30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Priority Objectives at the UN: A Status Report

In your October 23 speech to the UN General Assembly, you singled out eight problem areas in which “it is in the world interest” for the UN to make substantial progress.² The General Assembly wound up its work December 17. I thought you would be interested to know to what extent progress was actually made there in the areas that you marked for special emphasis.

1. “. . . to avoid drifting into a widening division between have and have-not nations.” Your pledge that we would do our full and fair share in the matter of aid “in the spirit of the UN’s Second Development Decade” was a major boost to multilateralism. It helped to set the stage for adoption on the next day, by acclamation, of the Second Development Decade Strategy document. Our willingness to join in international reaffirmation of an aid “target” of 1% of GNP, although we avoided any commitment as to our own assistance, contributed significantly to the success of this effort in world-wide economic development cooperation.

2. “It is in the world interest for the United Nations not to be paralyzed in its most important function, that of keeping the peace.” Although we pressed hard for at least limited steps to improve peacekeeping machinery, the Assembly again failed to move forward and simply remanded the issue to its peacekeeping committee, which has made little headway in five years of effort. However, the fact that you marked peacekeeping as a US priority objective at the UN will strengthen the hand of our negotiators as we try during the coming year for an agreement, initially with the Soviets, on mutually acceptable peacekeeping ground rules.

3. “. . . that we cooperate in preserving and restoring our natural environment.” Further progress was made toward defining the goals of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment which is scheduled

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Limited Official Use. Attached memoranda indicate that this memorandum was sent under cover of a memorandum from Melvin Levine to Kissinger on December 29, and from Kissinger to the President on January 4, 1971.

² President Nixon’s address to the UN General Assembly is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970*, pp. 926–932.

to take place in Stockholm. One difficulty has been the suspicion of less developed countries that concern over the environment will inhibit their economic development. To help overcome this, the resolution passed by the General Assembly asked the Preparatory Committee of the Stockholm Conference to give special consideration to the economic development aspects of preserving and restoring the environment.

4. "*. . . for resources of the sea to be used for the benefit of all—and not to become a source of international conflict, pollution, and unbridled commercial rivalry.*" We formally proposed early convocation of a law-of-the-sea conference. This encountered opposition from countries that favor wide territorial seas (principally the Latin Americans) and those developing countries that fear they will not be prepared at an early date, but in the end the Assembly agreed to convene the conference in 1973. Much arduous work lies ahead in preparing for agreements at this conference, but a part of the groundwork was laid when the Assembly adopted a declaration of "principles" governing the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Those principles are consistent with those that you enunciated in your seabeds proposal last May.

5. "*. . . to ensure that the quantity of life does not impair the quality of life.*" Although the UN population program is now established and growing, some suspicions among less-developed countries were still evident in the fairly large number of abstentions on our proposal to designate 1974 as a World Population Year. The vote was 70–8–31. Among major LDC's, India, Indonesia and Egypt spoke in favor of population control, and Brazil against. Population policy was also made an integral part of the Second Development Strategy document.

6. "*. . . that the narcotics traffic be curbed.*" In line with your statement, the Economic and Social Council, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, approved an enlarged program of action, for immediate implementation, to deal with drug abuse and the illicit traffic; the establishment of a UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control; and the elaboration by the Secretary General of a plan for long-term action to fight drug addiction.

7. "*. . . to put a decisive end to sky piracy and the kidnapping and murder of diplomats.*" On November 25 the Assembly passed without opposition a strong anti-hijacking resolution on which we had worked closely with the principal co-sponsors. The resolution put further impetus behind the drafting of the hijacking convention which has just been completed at The Hague. Conventions on sabotage and sanctions are less far along. The General Assembly did not consider an item on kidnapping or terrorism against diplomats this year.

8. "*. . . to ensure that the human rights of Prisoners-of-War are not violated.*" The resolution which we sponsored, calling for compliance with the Geneva Convention and spelling out what needs to be done,

obtained 67 votes (including India and a fairly large number of Africans), with 30 voting against. The Communists made strenuous efforts to politicize the debate on this humanitarian issue but were placed on the defensive. As Ambassador Yost put it, the vote showed “that this treatment of prisoners weighs on the conscience of the world.”

William P. Rogers

31. Memorandum From Herbert Levin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

“Universality” of Membership in the U.N.

You asked for my views on this subject. These appear below. Universality of U.N. membership is also being dealt with in an internal NSC staff study² and NSSM 107.³

Universality has a lot of superficial appeal; it appears to be a common-sense answer to our Chirep difficulty. Further examination, however, suggests this is not necessarily the case.

The quickest way to spotlight the difficulties is by examining the fact that “universality” of U.N. membership is undefined and probably undefinable. If we favored such a broad policy, and it was accepted by the U.N., we would find ourselves contending with the entry into the U.N. of Sihanouk, the South Moluccas, the PRC, Rhodesia, etc., to say nothing of the difficulties which would arise in our relations with the Micro-states.

If we try to get agreement on “universality” as meaning just the divided states, we might end up with it applying only, for example, to Korea. This could happen if the Germans are not ready to move or if the Soviets use the veto against South Vietnam.

China is a *representation* question; the divided states are *membership* problems. Thus, while these questions are inter-related in many

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Not further identified.

³ Document 312.

ways, in actual handling they become quite different. The main point of difference is that whereas the divided states are agreed that they are divided, and might cautiously agree that someday they should be reunited, the two Chinese governments agree that China is not divided, and that the only question is to choose which is the "sole legitimate government of all China."

This leaves us with only three likely options on Chirep:

—To maintain something like our past position in foreknowledge of the likelihood of early defeat, or

—to move to some sort of dual representation for "one China," without linking to other states membership problems. There are also dangers for defeat for this position, though it holds out some possibility of preserving a U.N. position for the GRC while establishing U.S. policy in a more defensible and common-sense mold, or

—to define universality to meet our needs. This would bar expulsion of the GRC, not compel us to vote against Peking's participation and not get us involved in anything which would appear to be a "Two Chinas" maneuver. This would be most complex tactically since it would encompass a number of questions along with dual representation for China, but might have some appeal at the U.N.⁴

⁴ Kissinger highlighted this paragraph and wrote below it: "How do we do that? Please explain."

32. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Discontent of UN Members with Security in New York

As you know, we have had a new rash of security incidents at the UN. The Jewish Defense League program of harassing the Soviets was the most dramatic, but there have been others, such as a bomb planted in the UAR Mission and the telephone threat to the Hungarians.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information.

Added to these have been some relatively minor incidents. The Spanish Permanent Representative got a probably well-deserved punch in the nose from a garbage collector, and the Lithuanians demonstrated peacefully against the Soviet Mission.

These actions have brought to a sharp focus the unhappiness among UN diplomats in New York. (The crime rate has been increasing, housing has become increasingly expensive and hard to get, services have been deteriorating, etc.)

On January 19, at the UN Committee on Host Country Relations, USUN reported a “bitter denunciation of the US and New York as host city which was very strong even for this hostile forum.” Many of the speakers alluded to the possibility of moving the UN from New York, and the Mission comments that, “Although much of the invective at this meeting was obviously political, we must face the fact that concern over the security situation is widespread and legitimate, and that even the closest friends of the US Government do not believe enough is being done. We urge that a search be made for long-term remedies through new federal legislation, legal steps against militant groups, and any other administrative steps.”

The full USUN report is attached at Tab A.²

In fact, additional federal legislation is already being considered at State and Justice.

You will recall that last fall we faced an upsurge of discontent with security in New York. After much thrashing around, we handled that problem with the temporary assignment to New York of elements of the Executive Protective Services (all of which have since been withdrawn). We also agreed to support legislation authorizing an ex gratia payment to New York and are still negotiating with City officials over the amount.

There is always the danger that sooner or later a dramatic incident will occur, perhaps involving the loss of human life. This would exacerbate the existing sentiment to move the UN from New York.

While a wholesale migration of the UN does not seem to me to be an imminent danger, there is certainly a possibility that some elements of the UN might relocate elsewhere, as the UN Industrial Development Organization, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development have already done.

I have asked Mel Levine to stay current with the problem and with discussions within the bureaucracy to ameliorate it. Given the nature of Fun City, I think we can count on this problem getting worse before

² Telegram 174 from USUN, January 20; attached but not printed.

it gets better—and I think there would be much logical merit in biting this bullet before it gets enough momentum to knock our teeth out. I doubt, however, that we will do so.

33. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 3, 1971, 0106Z.

331. For the Under Secretary from Yost and Phillips.

Subj: Future Political Status of Micronesia.

1. We recognize that it is basic US policy objective to seek extension US sovereignty over Micronesia. We believe manner in which we seek achieve this objective will have crucial impact on our ability secure UN approval for termination of trust agreement, or acquiescence to any US-Micronesian agreement. We are consequently disturbed by some of options set forth in TTPI options paper.² Some of them would violate the letter and spirit of our obligations under the trust agreement and Article 76(b) of UN Charter itself.³ Other options may conform to a possible reading of these obligations but will be in conflict with way overwhelming majority of UN, including many Western states, interpret Charter. In short, self-determination to be saleable in UN must involve at least semblance of free choice. Whichever option we decide pursue, we believe it should envisage earliest possible termination of trust agreement (as recommended by Trusteeship Council last year). The present composition of T.C. is favorable to us. This situation can only change for worse if: 1) TTPI remains only reason for its continued existence after Australian trust over New Guinea is terminated; 2) Australia then ceases be member, and GRC is replaced by PRC.

2. Specifically options 1, 2 and 4 raise very serious difficulties. Option 1, if it amounted to a recognition that we must in any event

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² Not further identified.

³ Article 76(b) of the UN Charter required countries administering Trust Territories "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement."

improve our administration of territory would be acceptable as far as that goes, but can not be regarded as a long-term solution. It is not consistent with Charter, much less UNGA Res 1541 (XVII)³ or with friendly relations declaration which is properly regarded by virtually entire membership of UN as an authoritative interpretation of the right of all peoples to self determination.

3. Option 2 in addition to the defect of option 1 has two further defects of (a) having already been rejected; (b) purporting to be a final solution. We can confidently predict that if we try to palm anything like this off on the Security Council or even the TC we will face a political storm with wide-ranging and long lasting repercussions well beyond confines of UN. We would find few if any allies to support such actions even among Western countries.

4. Option 3 if accomplished via a UN supervised election or plebiscite which is accepted by the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants would be acceptable.

5. Option 4 is bound to be regarded as an attempt on our part to divide and conquer. We would be hard put to make a case that the division of British Cameroons at time of self-determination constituted a precedent. We would certainly be accused of deliberately seeking to create non self-sustaining entities in order to force them into a status of continued dependency.

6. Option 5, unless providing semblance of free choice, would not comport with the views of the overwhelming majority of us [UN?] as it will inevitably be reflected in SC. A future option for independence or for some sort of statehood would help make this option consistent with our obligations, and hence saleable.

7. Option 6 of course creates no difficulties from UN point of view. From foregoing it will be clear that options 6, 5 (if modified as suggested) and 3 would be most acceptable in UN, in that order. The other three options can only cause serious problems for us sooner or later.

Yost

³ Resolution 1541 (XVII) stated that member states were obligated under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter to transmit information about non-self-governing territories that they administered until these territories achieved self-government either by independence, free association with an independent state, or by integration with an independent state.

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia¹

Washington, May 13, 1971, 0139Z.

83983. Subject: Lodge Commission on UN.

1. Australian Emboff (Williams) asked Dept views on Lodge Commission Report on UN,² what official standing it had and what follow-up we planned.

2. Deptoff (IO-Pelcovits) explained that President's Commission was part of national effort at reappraisal of UN during 25th anniversary. It constituted useful fresh look at issues by prestigious group but represented views of private citizens with no official standing.

3. We have taken no official position on recommendations but will review them carefully, and expect to draw on them as source of ideas and proposals as we formulate policy. Many of Commission's recommendations are consonant with our policies and efforts on key issues, providing welcome public support in such areas as peacekeeping, ICJ reform, fiscal solvency, improved organizational procedures and need for improved international action on issues like narcotics abuse and preservation of environment. Others we will want to assess in terms of soundness, overall priorities, and capacity of international institutions to carry them out.

4. We agree with report that as more and more issues are handled through multilateral diplomacy stress should be put on improved organization and performance in UN system.

5. Williams said at this stage did not want single out specifics but believed Australia would support action for improved UN organization and performance, and raising quality of secretariat. He thought Canberra would also look favorably on recommendations for associate status to incoming microstates and for better screening of regional candidates for SC seats. Expressed interest in being apprised either in Washington or New York if we intended implement specific recommendations.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Nathan A. Pelcovits, cleared by Armitage and Martin, and approved by Pelcovits. Repeated to USUN.

² The Report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations was released on April 26, 1971. (*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 3, 1971, pp. 708-709)

35. Memorandum From Melvin Levine and Richard Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

U Thant Proposal to Convoke Leaders of US, Mainland China, USSR, UK and France

The attached cable (Tab A) reports U Thant's proposal to Secretary Rogers that Thant invite leaders of the US, PRC, USSR, France, and the UK to be present in Geneva during the week of September 6.²

If the President were willing to come, Thant would approach Chou-En-lai and then the others. If the President were unable to attend, Thant suggests a meeting at the Foreign Minister's level.

Secretary Rogers said he would check this out (presumably with the President) and notify Thant.

While we have not yet thought through the full implications of this proposal, some of the considerations it entails include the following: (1) What would be the effect on our UN Chirep position? (2) What would be the effect on our relations with Taipei? (3) With Peking? (4) Do we wish to see the UN—and U Thant—this deeply involved in this level of our diplomacy? (5) Would such a meeting provide an opportunity for useful discussions on Vietnam? (6) Should the President himself be involved in such a meeting?

We are not coming forward with recommendations in this memo. Since the State Department will presumably be raising the issue with us, we will be able to staff the question out more methodically. But since it is possible that Secretary Rogers may be raising the issue with you very shortly, we thought you should be aware that the problem exists.

Bill Hyland concurs.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis. Sent for urgent information.

² Telegram 1291 from USUN, May 17; attached but not printed.

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Participation in This Fall's UN General Assembly

The 1971 General Assembly session will be upon us in another month and a half, and it is time to consider the nature of your participation therein.

My instinct is that you should not plan on making a speech to the General Assembly this fall.

In the first place, you have spoken to each General Assembly session since your inauguration, and I think we should avoid cheapening the coin of your appearances by giving them the routine and ritual character of a yearly obligation.

Secondly, Chinese representation will be the dominant issue at this fall's session. Should you appear before the General Assembly and not make a forceful argument for retaining Taipei's seat, it would be interpreted as a sell-out of an old ally. On the other hand, a ringing and effective defense of Taipei's seat by you personally will hardly be helpful to our dialogue with Peking, whatever priority they actually attach to UN membership.

Finally, I would like to save your next appearance before the General Assembly until *after* your trip to Peking. There will, at that point, be tremendous interest in the international community, and the circumstances should be ideal for a General Assembly speech setting forth the kind of world you are working toward. Such a speech would not only have considerable potential impact on the international community, but should also have a great domestic impact in underlining your world leadership role and in wringing additional benefit from the Chinese initiative.

If you agree with this reasoning, I will convey to Secretary Rogers and George Bush your intention not to appear before the General Assembly this fall. We can, of course, arrange such an appearance on short notice if circumstances should change.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Sent for action. A covering memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger, dated July 22, bears Kissinger's handwritten note: "No memo to Pres. necessary. He will *not* speak at General Assembly (has said so to me). As for heads of state, you can make individual recommendations."

On a related matter, there will be a number of Chiefs of State/Heads of Government coming to the UN this fall, though nothing like the large group that came for last year's anniversary session. A number of them will undoubtedly want to see you, particularly in view of your Peking initiative. We will be making individual recommendations to you, but I think it would be a good idea, in the current atmosphere, for you to see as many as your schedule will allow. We would limit these calls to relatively brief office meetings and space them well apart.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to inform those concerned that you do not intend to speak to the General Assembly this fall.²

² Neither the approve or disapprove option is checked.

37. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Appointments with you for Foreign Chiefs of State coming to the 26th UN General Assembly

As of now, we have received seven specific requests to call upon you from foreign Chiefs of State/Heads of Government who are coming to the United States this fall in connection with the General Assembly. The Department of State and my staff have reviewed these requests. State recommends your seeing six; I believe that only four (including one you have already accepted) are justified in terms of the demands on your schedule.

In one case, where the visitor's schedule is already precise, we are asking for a specific time. For any of the others we now need only an

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note reads: "Urgent return to Jeanne Davis. Action by telephone 8/30/71." A covering memorandum from Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, to Executive Secretary Eliot is dated August 31.

agreement in principle so that we can reply to the requests. We will work out specific times later, and it should be possible to spread these appointments out over several months.

1. *President Ould Daddah—Mauritania.* Ould Daddah is this year's Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. As such, he has been instructed to explain African views on South Africa to the UN and to various Chiefs of State, including you. In view of the misunderstanding over the visit of last year's OAU Chairman, President Kaunda of Zambia, a failure to see Ould Daddah would almost certainly be interpreted as a deliberate slight to the OAU. Ould Daddah has asked for an appointment between September 28 and October 3.² I strongly recommend a 30-minute appointment.³

Approve

Disapprove

Date

Time

2. *Prime Minister Bandaranaike—Ceylon.* Whether Prime Minister Bandaranaike comes to the General Assembly will depend on whether she can see you. Ambassador Strausz-Hupe, who recommended against such an appointment last year, is encouraging a meeting this year. She is trying to establish a relationship with the US as an anchor at a time of instability in South Asia. While she has succumbed on a number of occasions to the temptation to take positions not in our interest, she has been rethinking her policy since our rapid response during her insurgency last spring. She has also asked the Soviet technicians who came then to leave. Ambassador Strausz-Hupe, conceding all her shortcomings, points out that he does not see a better leader on the horizon. As a secondary matter, he points out that she knows the leadership in Peking better than most Asian leaders. If she comes, it will be sometime in October. I strongly recommend a 30-minute appointment.

Approve

Disapprove

3. *Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma—Laos.* In view of the situation in Laos and Souvanna Phouma's yearly visit to the General Assembly,

² "October 3" was crossed out, and "September 30" added by hand.

³ All of the approve options are checked below.

this call has taken place almost every year. In view of the Indochina situation, I recommend a 30-minute meeting.

Approve

Disapprove

4. *President Maga—Dahomey.* Dahomey is a small but generally very helpful country both in her position on African issues and at the UN. Dahomey joined with us as a co-sponsor of the very helpful Prisoner of War Resolution passed by the General Assembly last fall. State believes this would be a good opportunity to acknowledge this kind of support. Maga is coming to the US on a private visit, primarily to encourage American private investment. His schedule is flexible and the meeting could be any time this fall. While seeing him would be a nice gesture, I do not believe the reasons are strong enough to justify putting him on your schedule. Thus I recommend *against* an appointment.

Approve (*not* seeing him)

No, will see him for 20 minutes

5. *President Tombalbaye—Chad.* Our relations with Chad are good and State recommends a brief courtesy call. I do *not* believe you need see him and recommend against an appointment.

Approve (*not* seeing him)

No, will see him for 20 minutes

6. *President Amin—Uganda.* Neither State nor I recommend this appointment. Amin took power in a military coup several months ago and so far, at least, has stirred up a great deal of difficulty with his neighbors. He is also certain to make a strong pitch for a great deal of military assistance which we are not interested in providing for a number of reasons including his open desire to use arms against his neighbors. Finally, two American citizens apparently were recently killed by Amin's undisciplined troops and it is inappropriate for you to agree to receive him while that matter is still in flux. I recommend that we inform Ugandan authorities that your schedule will not permit a meeting this fall.

Approve (*not* seeing him)

No, will see him for 20 minutes

7. *Prime Minister Razak—Malaysia.* You have already agreed to this meeting.⁴

⁴ "Oct 4 or 5" has been added by hand.

As of now we anticipate that only four other General Assembly visitors are likely to ask for meetings with you. They are New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake, Tunisian Prime Minister Nourira, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai of the Republic of China and Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo. We will not make specific recommendations on these appointments until such time as firm requests have been received.

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Progress Report Concerning United States Government Participation in UNESCO

In my memorandum to you of March 30, 1971 on "Assessment of and Department Policy Toward United States Government Participation in UNESCO"² I stated that I would submit to you, by December 1, 1971, a progress report.

Attached is that report.³

In preparing this report the Department has indicated the progress made in achieving the strategy objectives outlined in the March 30, 1971 memorandum, i.e.:

- 1) increase the number of Americans holding professional positions in UNESCO;
- 2) exercise greater influence in UNESCO policies and programs;
- 3) improve the quality of our delegations to conferences and meetings;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Confidential.

² Not printed. (Ibid., Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII) A May 3 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon summarized the Department's conclusions as follows: "We should stay in UNESCO. We should take steps to improve the quality of our participation in the organization. We should maintain our current financial contributions to UNESCO, but vigorously resist budgetary increases." The second page bears Nixon's handwritten response: "This sounds much too 'go along with things as they are but have a 7-point program to *appear* otherwise.' I want a *deliberate* policy of cutting up UNESCO at every opportunity when we can get away with it—foreign policy wise. Prepare new program to achieve this goal. The difference I have with whoever prepared this paper is that they *believe* in UNESCO. I do not."

³ Attached but not printed.

- 4) clearly establish United States policy and program positions for UNESCO;
- 5) utilize UNESCO more effectively to demonstrate American achievements;
- 6) advance the United States as an example of an open and free society and so counter Communist distortions;
- 7) strengthen the United States National Commission for UNESCO in order to capitalize on its potential for support of UNESCO programs.

Progress in keeping with the strategy objectives has occurred in the following areas:

- 1) all UNESCO-oriented offices in the Department have been consolidated in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to provide more effective and coordinated utilization of human and material resources;
- 2) under the leadership of the United States, the major Western contributors to UNESCO (the so-called Geneva Group) agreed on setting a ceiling for UNESCO's 1973–1974 budget beyond which they were not prepared to support the Director-General's budgetary request;
- 3) planning for closer harmonization of activities between the United States National Commission for UNESCO and the operational office in the Department is well under way, and will result in giving the Commission a more constructive role in furthering our interests in UNESCO;
- 4) frank and useful discussions were held with UNESCO's Deputy Director-General, an American citizen. He was put on notice that the United States would be seeking a reduction of its share of the assessed budget (currently 29.80%) and alerted to the programs of prime interest to the United States;
- 5) a series of fact-finding trips were taken to various countries in Asia, Africa and South America. 98 UNESCO projects were inspected and a critical evaluation of their worth and contribution to UNESCO's aims is being made;
- 6) American positions in UNESCO's Headquarters Staff increased from 84 on January 1, 1971, (12.5% of all professional posts) to 96 (13.8%) on November 15, 1971. During the same period, Americans in posts in field projects increased from 41 (4.7%) to 55 (5.3%);
- 7) the Department submitted a major paper to UNESCO as a part of the continuing effort to influence the Organization's future course. The paper stressed the need for examination and review of the value of UNESCO programs, the elimination of peripheral projects, the diversion of funds to areas of prime interest to this nation, and need for sound evaluation procedures. These points were stressed orally during the October 1971 meeting of UNESCO's Executive Board;
- 8) UNESCO convened and successfully concluded three major scientific conferences during the past eight months. Each was of significance to the United States scientific community and to the United States Government;
- 9) the United States Delegation to the recently-concluded Executive Board meeting of UNESCO, supported by eight co-sponsors, submitted a resolution calling attention to Soviet manipulation of texts of the Russian language edition of the UNESCO *Courier*, UNESCO's official monthly publication. Although action on the item was postponed

until the Executive Board's meeting in the Spring of 1972, the view was clearly expressed and the item will be vigorously pursued;

10) major newspaper and magazine editorials and news articles on UNESCO's 25th Anniversary Commemorative Ceremonies held in Paris on November 4-5 were highly favorable and reflected the reservoir of good will that exists around this country for UNESCO;

11) during the short period under review not all objectives were subject to progress due to certain uncontrollable external factors. Such an item is number three concerning delegations, inasmuch as there was no UNESCO General Conference during the review period.

I am convinced we are making progress in reaching our goals in UNESCO. Given additional time and steadfastness in our determination I know further advances will be achieved.

U Alexis Johnson⁴

⁴ Johnson signed for Rogers above Rogers' typed signature.

39. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 4, 1972, 0005Z.

7. Subj: Bush-Waldheim Conversation Jan 3.

1. Summary. Bush held wide-ranging one-hour conversation with SYG Waldheim Jan 3. Waldheim indicated his strong interest in early meeting with President, Secretary and Congressional leaders; his determination to be an active SYG and to tackle vigorously fiscal and administrative problems of UN; his willingness to have an American fill Bunche position; his interest in US role in ongoing UN humanitarian effort in East Bengal. End Summary.

2. Bush (accompanied by Bennett and Newlin) paid courtesy call on SYG Waldheim afternoon Jan 3 which developed, at SYG's initiative, into wide-ranging substantive discussion which threw considerable light on how Waldheim sees his new job.

3. Bush began by reiterating US congratulations on Waldheim's appointment. Visit was essentially courtesy call but he did want SYG

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

to know that US was willing to discuss UN financial problem whenever Waldheim wished. US was ready to participate in multilateral effort to solve problem but Soviets and others also had to do their share.

4. On another subject, Bush said he believed SYG had already indicated publicly that he expected US to nominate an American to replace Bunche and he could confirm that this was the US position.

5. Waldheim noted that many articles had appeared in press to effect that he would not be an active SYG. He assured Bush this would not be the case and pointed to his reputation as DirGen of Political Affairs and as FonMin. He was aware that prestige of UN was at low ebb, particularly in US, and that remedial steps must be taken. Bush said USG view of new SYG was as stated by him in GA and to press and that no high ranking US official had taken any other line. Waldheim said he aware of this and was grateful. (It obvious SYG deeply stung over press stories.)

6. SYG said unfortunate impression had been created that he had been the Soviet candidate and that US was cool toward him. In order to counter this impression he thought it very important to meet with the President, the Secretary and with Congressional leaders ASAP. He was willing to run risk of being criticized for calling on US officials first and he would take the line that it was only natural to call on host country leaders at earliest opportunity. Speaking personally, Bush said that he thought this suggestion made good sense and he would see what could be arranged.

7. On successor to Bunche, SYG said he had been somewhat surprised when U Thant informed him of impression US willing relinquish Bunche position in favor of Mathews' slot. He now aware that US interested in filling Bunche post. Guyer had just observed that had he been aware Rolz-Bennett's job consisted in left overs from the Bunche operation he would not have taken it. Had the US been interested in a switch then Urquhart could have been promoted to Guyer's deputy. Guyer also questioned whether one of superpowers should ideally have Bunche job.

8. Bush said that we thought highly of both Guyer and Urquhart but that we also believed an American should occupy the Bunche position. We would want to talk to SYG about how he envisages the job and would want to be sure that the person we nominate is not only qualified but an individual with whom SYG can work closely. In response to SYG's question, Bush said this was an official US position.

9. Waldheim said he would go along since it was accepted practice that this was an American position. He expressed warm appreciation for Bush's willingness to discuss qualifications and to be certain that individual eventually nominated would be acceptable personally to SYG.

10. On financial crisis, Waldheim said he had already broached matter with Malik and had stressed Sovs would have to help solve problem. Practical solution would have to be found which got around Sov views on legal issues involved. When Malik in a position to talk, he envisaged series of bilateral discussions between himself, Sovs, US and others in first instance to see if elements of solution could be found. He also planned to talk to Chinese about finances as well as personnel in the near future.

11. On the administrative side, Waldheim said he well aware that there was much duplication and that not all Secretariat personnel were fully employed. A UN inspector Bernard (French) had made a comprehensive survey and Waldheim said he would study it carefully. He said he would also welcome any US suggestions and would give them every consideration.

12. Waldheim confirmed that he would be reviewing UN humanitarian effort in East Bengal with Guyer, Henry and others Jan 6. He had impression US prepared assist through the UN but said that Sovs wished to contribute directly to Bangladesh. Bush took line para 6 State 232870.² US willing to share in international effort but UN should not assume we would play leading role or assume preponderant share of the costs. Bush said he would be discussing US views in greater detail with Guyer and Urquhart Jan 4.

Bush

² Not printed. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH)

40. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, January 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations on Monday, January 24, 1972, at 11:04-11:22 a.m.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, December 12, 1971-February 20, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Kissinger.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations
Secretary of State William Rogers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
George Bush, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations

[After some talk about Hungarian refugees in Austria, the conversation turned to the challenge facing the new Secretary General at the UN.]²

President: We have the same problems in the United States about support for the United Nations. It is part of the general problem we have now about American attitudes towards international affairs. My policy, as you know, is to maintain a constructive American role in the world.

Waldheim: I have always tackled jobs with energy. We must restore confidence in the UN. The recent events on the subcontinent show the need for this. Even your overture to China affects the UN. But there is no alternative to the United Nations. If the US interest in the UN flags, then China and the USSR will simply take over. American policy is helpful even on the Subcontinent. After all, your position was supported by 103 other countries.

With respect to the UN's own problems, we have now marked out a solution of the short-term problems. Countries should pay their contribution in January rather than in July as is now the case. If that is impossible, then can you pay in one lump sum.

² Brackets in the source text.

41. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Bush) to President Nixon¹

New York, June 27, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

SUBJECT

An Evaluation—The Nixon Administration and the United Nations

If most of the foreign ambassadors accredited to the UN and the UN Secretariat were polled, a UN critique of our work would go something like this:

Favorable

1. President has great grasp of world affairs.
2. President, through peace offer plus withdrawals, has clearly demonstrated he wants peace. This has turned sentiment around at the UN on the Vietnam question to some degree.
3. President has high marks for new China policy, Peking trip, Moscow summit.
4. President generally gets credit for trying to use UN on India-Pakistan war and for massive support in response to Secretary-General's plea on Bangladesh relief.

Unfavorable

1. General feeling that U.S. Government is becoming less supportive of UN.
2. 25 percent ceiling very unpopular.
3. Breaking of chrome sanctions on Rhodesia unpopular. Observers don't separate out congressional action from administrative action.
4. Middle East-Arab discontent with U.S. Government's inability to "deliver Israel"; an unhappy view of "Nothing can happen until after the election."
5. Standard complaints about lack of support on African issues etc.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential. A copy was sent to Secretary Rogers. An attached memorandum to Kissinger, also dated June 27, indicated that a copy was also sent to H. R. Haldeman.

Assessment by Ambassador Bush

The White House should be prepared to take the offense on the charge that we don't support the UN.

A. We have tried to use the UN on many political issues.

1. India–Pakistan—frustrated by Soviet veto
2. Vietnam—many initiatives in past—frustrated by Russian and now Chinese all-out opposition

B. We have shown major support for the UN in the area of refugees (\$119 million to date through the UN).

C. We recognize that things won't happen at the UN if the big powers don't agree, therefore let's not wring our hands about what it can't do. Let's support what it can do. The U.S. is doing this in the economic and social end.

D. With regard to finances, the fact that we want our contribution to be ceilinged at 25 percent is *not* a downgrading of the UN. We will continue to support old UN activities as they do the job and new ones that have promise such as the Environmental Fund. We feel we are right in supporting Waldheim in his plea for streamlining and efficiency. We know, and all others at the UN know too, that there are some programs that simply don't work. They must be improved or eliminated. The UN will not survive unless its supporters are *constructively critical*.

E. We should refer critics to Moscow communiqué language on support for the UN plus several helpful presidential foreign policy statements.

Action Recommendation—Presidential Action

Given the growing sentiment of "The U.S. is not willing to fully support the UN", I think one or a combination of the following ideas make sense.

A. Personal letter to Secretary General Waldheim (suggested in Bush letter to President dated June 19, 1972).²

² In Bush's letter to the President, he appraised Waldheim as being "basically pro-West, and basically inclined towards friendship with the United States of America." The draft letter read: "Dear Mr. Secretary General: Things have quieted down a bit since my Moscow trip and I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for your helpful comments issued at the conclusion of my visit there. I hope you share my views that the trip might make our common goal of world peace more attainable. Ambassador Bush has kept me informed of the consultations he has had with you on Vietnam as well as on other matters. I note that you, too, have been travelling extensively around the world to further the goals of the United Nations. We are most appreciative for all of this." (Ibid.) There is no record that such a letter was sent.

B. Presidential call on Secretary General when in New York plus visit to U.S. Mission across the street.

C. Possible presidential appearance at some U.N. Day function in October.

D. Invitation to Secretary General and UN permanent representatives to White House reception. President Johnson sent plane to New York and brought the Secretary-General and permanent representatives to the White House for such an affair. The best time would be just before the General Assembly in September.

E. Invitation to Secretary General, key Secretariat personnel, and members of the Security Council (15 nations) for visit with President on *Sequoia*.

F. Personal swearing-in of General Assembly delegation by President.

G. Presidential address to the 27th General Assembly in October stressing:

1. Summit meetings help reduce tensions which facilitates work at UN.

2. Summit meetings not at expense of our concern for developing countries—none care more about “third world” than the U.S.

3. Reference to Moscow communiqué—“strengthen the UN”.

I would be pleased to discuss this evaluation with any member of your staff.³

Respectfully,

George Bush

³ On August 30 Kissinger replied to Bush: “You can be sure that we will give careful attention to your recommendations although I am not optimistic that we will be able to fit UN appearances into the President’s busy fall schedule. On the more positive side, however, we will look for a suitable occasion to send a friendly Presidential letter to Secretary General Waldheim.” Kissinger added a handwritten note reading: “I usually answer letters faster than that. HK.” (Ibid.)

42. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹**

New York, July 26, 1972, 1810Z.

2624. Subj: Waldheim Visit to Moscow and Plans re China.

July 25. The Secretary General reviewed with me his Moscow trip saying that he was courteously received and that he had the distinct impression that the Russian leaders wanted to avoid confrontation with the United States at all cost. It is his judgment that the Middle East situation and Vietnam were second in importance to good relations with the United States Government. He got this distinct feeling from the high level leaders he met and lower echelon people as well.

He reviewed the UN financial situation with Moscow. He proposed an arrangement under which the Soviet Union would pay \$15 million towards the deficit and that the US Government would pay \$15 million towards the deficit. He now estimates the deficit that needs to be paid off at \$65 million. He figures that the balance (\$35 million) would come from other industrialized countries.

He discussed his forthcoming trip to China. He indicated that the Chinese wanted the trip to be sooner rather than later. He is now thinking of going in mid-August and said that the Chinese came over specifically to see him so that he would go early, well before the General Assembly session. He indicated that the Chinese wanted him to come via Thailand rather than on the route that would take him through Moscow. It is now his intention to go in mid-August, return to Austria, and then come back to the United Nations.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow.

43. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

Report on Implementation of Lodge Commission Recommendations on the United Nations²

The President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, chaired by Ambassador Lodge, last year made over ninety recommendations for improving the performance of the United Nations and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in international organizations. On the President's instruction the Department has been assessing the conclusions of the Lodge Commission to determine to what extent and how soon they can be acted upon.

During the past year we gave an interim accounting before a Congressional committee and recently briefed the Department's Advisory Committee on International Organizations on where we stand. At the urging of the Advisory Committee and because we believe the time opportune, we have prepared a report on the current status of action on the Commission's proposals. We describe what we have accomplished, obstacles we have encountered and promising areas for future action.

We propose to send copies to members of the Lodge Commission and the Advisory Committee, and will also make it available on request to nongovernmental organizations and the general public.

Here are the highlights:

1. The paramount value of the Lodge Commission's effort is that it focused public attention on the realities of the UN system. Accomplishments and possibilities for action through the UN are real but shortcomings must be corrected if we are to rely on international institutions in the coming years.

2. We agree with the Commission's position favoring reform rather than a basic restructuring of the UN system which we think is out of the question. We shall take advantage of opportunities and trends in the UN to press for specific reforms.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. No classification marking.

² The report, dated August 15, is attached but not printed.

3. While we may differ with the Commission on relative priorities and on the prospects for implementation, the philosophy and conclusions of the report are consonant with the outlook and approach the U.S. Government has taken toward international organizations and in many cases reflect policies and initiatives already being actively pursued. These include streamlining the General Assembly; accommodating microstates without swamping the membership rolls; putting new life into the Security Council and the World Court; putting the UN's financial and administrative house in order; providing better coordination of UN efforts in economic, social, and technical fields; strengthening peacekeeping; and channeling more aid through multilateral agencies. The Commission's thinking also parallels ours in urging that the UN system extend its reach further into social and humanitarian fields (population, drug abuse, disaster relief) and the frontiers opened by the new technologies.

4. During the past year we selected about a third of the Commission's recommendations as timely for action; some have already been accomplished. In particular, we made progress in (a) more effective policy coordination of economic, social and humanitarian activities and (b) drafting rules and building institutions to deal with global problems of population, drug abuse, aircraft hijacking, ocean resources and law of the seas, and environment.

5. On the other side of the ledger, we have found the going quite heavy in trying to follow through on certain recommendations. For example, despite our best efforts we made very little progress in streamlining General Assembly procedures, providing associate status for microstates, or stirring even a faint interest in reviving the World Court. Also, we have yet to get around the roadblock to workable and desirable peacekeeping arrangements, though we have recently circulated in the UN our ideas for peacekeeping ground rules which we had proposed more than two years ago in bilateral talks with the Soviet Delegation. Nor have we found a way to accommodate the legitimate demands of emerging world powers for more continuous seating in the Security Council.

6. The reason for the slow motion is that while there is a broad consensus on the conceptual level—that the UN should be reformed and its agenda and management modernized—there is only limited agreement at the political and programmatic levels. Another hurdle is that some important steps urged by the Commission require Congressional support (e.g. a substantially increased contribution to the UN Development Program) and compete with other international and domestic priorities.

7. Nevertheless, we believe there are still possibilities for action on additional recommendations which span a broad range of U.S. interests in the UN.

We believe this report will testify to the realistic and positive way we have responded to the work of the Lodge Commission.

Robert H. Miller

44. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 6, 1972, 1808Z.

3112. Subj: Korea in 27th GA.

1. In course conversation on variety of subjects Sept 5, SYG Waldheim told Ambs Bush and Bennett that subject of Korea had been raised by Chou En-lai during SYG's visit to Peking.

2. Chou had told Waldheim China believed Korean debate in 27th GA would be "healthful and helpful." When Waldheim expressed concern that polemic debate could interfere with progress of bilateral negotiations, Chou had asked "Why shouldn't North Korea have chance to express its views in New York?"

3. Amb Bush observed that Chinese did not seem to understand that Korean issue in 27th GA would not be mere replay of China issue in 26th GA. Waldheim agreed issue would not be replay. Bush asserted that after careful vote count, we had concluded that "votes" are there for deferment both in General Comite and, by larger margin, in GA.

4. Waldheim said that during his visit to Belgrade, Yugoslav UN PermRep Mojssov had asserted just the opposite about prospects for deferment, noting that Algerian resolution will have "forty sponsors." Waldheim was not clear on parliamentary procedures involved, but said he understood Yugoslavs expected separate vote on individual paragraphs in Algerian res. Yugoslavs expected two paragraphs on UN presence in Korea would fail but had expressed confidence they would "get North Koreans to New York".

5. Bush conceded that if Korean issue split into component parts, Mojssov's estimate in prospects might be nearer the mark. If Korean question to be debated, then there would undoubtedly be wide support for North Korean participation. Bennett suggested that North Koreans might try to torpedo current bilateral talks at right moment to influence

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 KOR N. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Seoul, Tokyo, London, Moscow, and Hong Kong.

course of issue in NY their way. While Waldheim was in Peking, Chinese had arranged that North Korean representatives (identities unspecified) visit SYG in his quarters. North Koreans had bluntly asked for his support of their position in NY. Waldheim said he had turned this request by suggesting to his visitors that they talk to South Koreans. North Koreans did not counter this suggestion.²

Bush

²In telegram 3111 from USUN, September 6, Bush reported that Waldheim had been surprised to hear Chou compare the Korean case with that of the two Germanies, and in effect support West Germany's position that intra-German relations should be settled before either state was admitted to the UN. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X)

45. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 7, 1972, 0105Z.

3122. Subj: SYG's Visit to Peking: Chinese World View.

1. SYG Waldheim discussed his recent visit to China with Ambs Bush and Bennett in some detail Sept 5. Waldheim had obviously found his trip interesting and personally stimulating. Waldheim generalized that Chinese had reflected bitter hostility toward USSR and a very positive attitude toward US. Waldheim had spent more than three hours with Chou En-lai, who had been forthcoming and even loquacious, and had also seen FonMin Chi Peng-tei. Latter did not seem to be very knowledgeable about foreign affairs. Vice Min Chiao Kwan-hua had been much more knowledgeable than FonMin Chi.

2. Whenever Soviets were mentioned, Chou En-lai spoke with indignation and made it very clear that USSR is "the enemy". Chinese had criticized US positions on Korea and Vietnam and Chou had spoken bitterly and almost obsessively of Dulles' snub to him in Geneva in 1954, but there had always been "friendly undertone" to Chinese references to US. In Great Hall of People, Chou had made point of saying "this is chair where President Nixon was sitting." At Great Wall of

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

China, escort had jocularly compared Waldheim's stair-climbing performance to that of Presidents Nixon and Pompidou.

3. In context of criticism of Soviet "abandonment of Leninist attitudes" and Soviet belligerency on Chinese borders and elsewhere, Chou En-lai had compared Soviets unfavorably with US. "Laird at least tells the truth about US military posture. Laird is sincere, better than the Russians." Chou had said China did not have economic resources to build major nuclear capability but asserted that in any case, China would never resort to first use of atomic weapons and was not afraid of atomic weapons. "We are big and are going underground, and so are not afraid." Chou seemed to attach a good deal of importance to China's "going underground".

4. Re international security arrangements, Chou had described World Disarmament Conference as "Soviet sham" which PRC could not support. Perhaps paradoxically, he had said that "disarmament should not be arranged in small committees" and had been critical of SALT and CCD. Latter efforts tended to preserve nuclear monopoly of super powers and to permit them to continue to improve such weaponry.

5. In viewing evolution in PRC relations with US, Chou had said that beginning of dialogue with US goes back to Hammarskjold visit to China in 1955. Chou took view that in his conversations with President Nixon, latter had "accepted one-China principle." There had been no Chinese reference to 1972 US elections except in context of discussion of Middle East prospects. Chinese had discussed Vietnam with Waldheim but had said absolutely nothing new. Chinese had reiterated all-out support of North Vietnamese.

6. Bush asked whether there had been any reference to prisoners of war, a subject to which USG very sensitive. Waldheim said Chinese had said nothing significant on this subject in Vietnam context. In other connections (e.g., Bangladesh) Chinese had reflected sense of their own virtuousness with respect to release of prisoners of war. (Waldheim noted in passing that Chiao Kwan-hua had been man who negotiated prompt release of South Korean prisoners of war at end of Korean conflict.) Chinese also recalled that after border hostilities with India, Chinese had returned not only their prisoners but also material that had been captured.

7. Chinese had been very positive in their attitude toward UN. They frankly revealed that they had not expected to be admitted to UN in 1972 and therefore had not had people trained and prepared to assume responsibility for conduct of UN responsibilities. They continue to be handicapped in this regard and would assume responsibilities in new areas of UN affairs only as they were able to prepare personnel to do competent job. Waldheim understood Vice Min Chiao would come to 27th GA and that Min Chi might also attend. Chinese had not

referred to US 25 percent UN assessment issue, but had asked what Soviet assessment percentage was and asserted unequivocally that PRC, as soon as it was able to, should pay 7 percent instead of the current 4 percent. In UN connection, Chinese had made it clear that they thought “super power” was bad word that should not be applied to China.

8. Chinese were hostile to India. “Behind India is always the Soviet Union.” Chou had been very upset about Bangladesh issue, which then active in SC. Turn of events in NY had made atmosphere in sub-continent worse than before, Chou held. He was resentful of way Russians were exploiting Bangladesh issue to embarrass PRC (Waldheim thought Chinese fully understood what Russians were up to) but assured Waldheim that Chinese veto threat not idle one (it was at this point that Waldheim had sent Sir Robert Jackson to see Mujib).

9. Waldheim implied that Chinese have particularly favorable attitudes toward French. General de Gaulle had been recalled most favorably by Chinese. Waldheim did not report any Chinese reference to British.

10. Dept repeat as appropriate.

Bush

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 3, 1972, 0038Z.

179962. Subject: Observer Status for GDR in Second Committee. Ref: USUN 3601.²

1. Following confirming Herz/Phillips telcon.

2. Our position on GDR observer status in any form at this GA prior to FRG–GDR inner-German agreement and Four-Power understanding on continued validity of Quadripartite rights³ rests on two

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis.

² In telegram 3601 from USUN, September 30, Bush described a telephone conversation that he had had with Waldheim on September 29. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had urged Waldheim to invite the German Democratic Republic to take part in the Second Committee’s discussion of environmental matters as an observer. Waldheim had been noncommittal. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 GER E)

³ Reference is to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed at Berlin, September 3, 1971. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 27, 1971, pp. 318–322)

essential points: (A) SYG invitation to any state to participate in committee work is without precedent; there are no grounds in UN procedures or past practice for granting such status and it is undesirable both from point of principle and precedent to depart from established practice (if necessary, you could point out that our willingness to work out arrangement for GDR presence at Stockholm is not comparable case as GDR would not have been present at invitation of a UN organization or official but at invitation either of Conference President or Swedish Government. This, had it been accepted would have carried no connotations for their relationship to GA); (B) We can command sufficient support to defeat any move putting issue to vote (we would, of course, expect FRG support on the issue if it came to vote).

3. We therefore conclude that if we clearly stand firm on this issue, it will not be posed prior to inner-German agreement, and you should therefore consult with Gehlhoff and then indicate to SYG at earliest opportunity that there has been no change in our position that any observer status for GDR in General Assembly context must await completion of inner-German agreement and related understanding among the Four Powers. In the meantime, we will maintain that GDR does not fulfill generally accepted criteria for UN observer status (membership in specialized agencies and recognition by majority of member states).

Irwin

Committee of 24

47. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 13, 1969, 2010Z.

748. Subj: Trip to Africa by Committee of 24.

1. Shaw (UK) told MisOff Mar. 11 UKUN had received word from London that UK has decided not to participate in Committee of 24 trip to Africa this year. UKUN had raised question with London few weeks ago when Committee Chairman Mestiri queried UKUN on its intentions re participation in trip, in connection with possible invitation by Mestiri for Committee to visit Tunisia (USUN 305).² Shaw said UK did not intend inform Mestiri or any other Committee member of UK decision for time being.

2. Committee has not formally decided to make Africa trip but general expectation is that there will be trip, probably to Tunisia, Zambia and Tanzania, in May, and next meeting of working group is expected to recommend Africa trip. Mestiri has not specifically queried us on our intentions but he has mentioned trip as foregone conclusion in course of our informal discussions with him. We have made point to Mestiri and to all others who have raised subject that we seriously question usefulness of Africa trip and that in any case, we consider trip by entire Committee unnecessary and wasteful in funds in terms of practical results and have suggested that trip by small sub-committee, representative of all groups, might be considered instead. Mestiri thought this idea was non-starter for this year but that it might be possibility for future.

3. As Dept aware, Mission's assessment of desirability of US participation in future Committee trips to Africa significantly influenced by experience of 1967 trip. That trip revealed that Committee's importance to bone fide African petitioners had diminished considerably and petitioners who were in one way or another persuaded to appear tended be purveyors of trumped-up anti-Western charges and noticeably susceptible to leading questions of anti-US Committee members. Trip turned out to be grand exercise in vituperation against Western

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

² In telegram 305, February 3, Yost reported that Shaw had said that Mestiri favored a short (about 10 days with two stops) trip by the Committee to Africa. One of the two stops would be in Tunis. (Ibid.)

countries by radical ASAFs and Soviets and, in absence of UK, all fire was directed at US. Although present chairman, unlike predecessor, would not be active participant in such hostile proceedings, we believe situation which US would encounter on trip this year would not be essentially different from that of 1967.

4. As noted above, we have repeatedly expressed our serious doubts over utility of African trip and these reservations continue with even greater force in light of Committee's work program this year. Committee has decided take up Rhodesia and Namibia as first items of business and it will, therefore, have completed its consideration of these major African interests (and quite possibly of Portuguese territories also) before getting to Africa. In these circumstances, most members of Committee privately seek justify trip only on grounds that Committee's on-the-spot presence would be manifestation of continuing UN interest in African problems.

5. Mission strongly believes US should this year join UK in deciding not to participate in Committee's trip to Africa. In explaining decision, we would reiterate our strong doubts over usefulness of trip, particularly in view of fact African problems will already have been considered, and we would recall excesses of 1967 trip. As a positive element, we would suggest dispatch of a small sub-group which could have contact with petitioners and host governments—ostensible reason for trip—as effectively as full Committee. While trip would probably be held without US and UK participation, absence of two leading Western states would clearly undermine prestige of operation, very likely diminish Committee's enthusiasm for trip, and might prove coup-de-grace to future trips. (Since such trips are expensive and, from US standpoint, produce negative results, this would be welcome development.) It is possible Italy and/or Norway might also decide not participate and in any case, absence of US and UK might well persuade Mestiri not to invite group to Tunisia. Most importantly, we believe US non-participation on trip would be desirable (and not unexpected) balance to decision remain on Committee for another year and would hopefully serve to encourage moderate forces in Committee by highlighting, in meaningful way, another aspect of Committee's performance with which we are dissatisfied.

Yost

48. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 19, 1969, 0034Z.

817. Committee of 24 Africa Trip. Ref: State 40540.²

1. We informed UK, Italy and Norway March 17 of US decision not to participate in Committee's Africa trip. Shaw (UK) said UK intended inform Mestiri of UK decision on trip by end of week and, therefore, he saw no reason why we should not proceed to tell Mestiri as soon as we wished.

2. Finger accordingly met with Mestiri late afternoon Mar. 17 and conveyed our decision. Mestiri said he very much regretted we had decided not participate; he had expected UK would not participate but had believed US would go on trip. He said he would have to inform Afro-Asian group and Committee working group of US decision but would like to think about how best use this info. When Finger suggested desirability of not informing Afro-Asians for few days in order avoid possible risk to SC negotiations re Namibia which now in progress, Mestiri readily agreed and said he would hold off until next week before informing Afro-Asians.

3. Mestiri then said that trip without US and UK would obviously be less effective, and he would like to avoid doing anything which would harm prestige of Committee and of UN. However, there was very strong sentiment in Committee for trip and Mestiri thought it would not be possible to put off trip this year. He said he had given considerable thought to matter of Africa trip and that his discouraging of trip last year was part of his strategy of trying to put increasingly long intervals of time between trips, i.e., two-year interval now, perhaps three-year interval next time.

4. Mestiri then suggested that it would be very useful, in this connection, if visiting missions could be arranged to other territories. This, he said, would help serve as deterrent to regular Africa trips by whole Committee and would enable Committee to divide into sub-groups to visit various territories, so that, for example, one group might visit Africa, another an American territory, and while still another might go to a British territory. Mestiri then mentioned desirability of visiting mis-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Capetown, London, and Pretoria.

² In telegram 40540, March 15, the Department concurred that participation in the Committee's African trip was not in U.S. interests, and authorized the Mission to inform Mestiri that the United States had serious reservations about the usefulness of the trip and would not participate in it. (Ibid.)

sion to US Virgin Islands, saying he thought it could be arranged that responsible group of Committee members could be chosen for such trips, with US having a say in selection. He said he has been generally encouraged by developments within Committee because moderate elements appeared to be showing more strength and radicals like Tanzania becoming increasingly isolated. He noted as case in point that Tanzania, although strongly opposed to Committee's undertaking study of small territories, had been unable to make its view prevail. Mestiri urged we give serious consideration to possibility of visiting mission to one of our territories and thought Virgin Islands might be easiest one from our point of view. He said that if we were to agree to such a visiting mission, he was confident that demand for visiting missions to other US territories could be held off for at least three years, adding that a lot can happen in three years, including possibility that such a mission could make important contribution to greater realism in Committee.

Yost

49. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-654

New York, April 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

1. Committee of 24
2. South Africa

At lunch with Finger today Issoufou Djermaakoye, the UN Under Secretary for Non-Self-Governing Territories, discussed following subjects:

1. *Committee of 24 Trip to Africa.* Djermaakoye said he had decided not to go to Africa with the Committee of 24 next month. His decision was prompted by the fact that the Committee will begin its work in Kinshasa. Since he recently was in Kinshasa for an OCAM meeting and delivered a statement on behalf of the Secretary General, he saw little point in going there again so soon. He has also been in Dar Es Salaam

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Seymour M. Finger. Also sent to Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, and Lusaka.

recently and that is another point on the itinerary of the Committee of 24 next month. Had the Committee decided to go first to Zambia, which was the first government to issue an invitation, he would have gone there at least for that portion of the trip. Djermakoye said he realized he might be criticized by some Africans on the grounds that his decision not to take the trip was influenced by the fact that the US and the UK were not going; nevertheless, he would stick to his decision for the reasons he had given.

Comment: The absence of the Under Secretary as well as the UK and the US, plus other information indicating that a number of prominent representatives on the Committee of 24 will not go to Africa, would appear to put a damper on the trip.

[Omitted here is discussion of maintaining a Chemical Bank branch at the UN Secretariat despite the Bank's ties with South Africa, and about African countries that continued to trade with South Africa.]

Yost

50. Editorial Note

The Committee of 24 held meetings in Kinshasa (May 4–8, 1969), Lusaka (May 9–16), and Dar es Salaam (May 17–23). At all three locations it heard from representatives of liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa, and the Portuguese territories in Africa. On May 22 it adopted a consensus statement on Namibia. The statement expressed concern at South African actions there; called “upon the governments concerned immediately to cease extending assistance and co-operation to South Africa;” and urged support for liberation movements, extension of the Geneva Conventions to “POWs,” and a Security Council meeting to determine steps to be taken after South Africa’s failure to comply with earlier Security Council resolutions. (Telegram 1531 from Dar es Salaam, May 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN) The final session on May 23 discussed the situation in Portugal’s African territories and approved a resolution of thanks to the Governments of Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia, and Tanzania. No other actions were taken by the Committee. (Telegram 1542 from Dar es Salaam, May 25; *ibid.*) Reports describing the Committee meetings are *ibid.*

51. **Telegram From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State¹**

Geneva, July 30, 1969, 1800Z.

2696. Subject: ECOSOC—Implementation Decolonialism Declaration—(Item 20).

1. Secretariat paper on this item circulated July 29 as report of President of Council. Summary follows:

A. President of Council held consultation with Chairman of Committee of 24 in Geneva July 17.

B. Chairman of Committee of 24 observed that Committee members appreciated serious effects by number of SA's and international institutions to find ways to implement declaration. Members also welcomed positive results flowing from offers of increased support to Southern African refugees by most members of UN system. Noted also that arrangements agreed at January 1969 inter-agency meeting convened by UNHCR were promising and that arrangements for working out increased assistance to refugees through UNHCR and OAU were progressing.

C. On other hand only few SA's and other international institutions have submitted concrete suggestions for best way to achieve speedy implementation of relevant resolutions in accordance GA Res. 2426 (XXIII).²

D. President and Chairman agreed that Council might invite SA's to participate fully in discussion at 47th session on further and coordinated implementation.

E. Chairman of Committee of 24 suggested SA's work out arrangements with OAU in order to facilitate formulation programmes of assistance as envisaged in operative para 3 of GA res. 2426 (XXIII) (Assistance to Liberation Movements).

F. UNHCR thinks arrangements for inter-agency cooperation should be strengthened and that SA's assume greater procedural flexibility in assisting refugees. ILO arrangements with UNHCR cited as example.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN.

² Resolution 2426 (XXIII), approved by the UN General Assembly on December 18, 1968, by a vote of 82 to 7 (U.S.), with 25 abstentions, called on specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the UN to cooperate in implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and particularly to provide assistance, with the cooperation of the OAU, to liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Portuguese African territories. It also called for the termination of IBRD loans and grants to Portugal and South Africa.

G. Chairman of Committee of 24 suggested (and President had no objection) that Council should consider inviting executive heads of SA's to bring to attention of SA's specific problems being encountered in giving effect to GA resolutions. Thus states members could take action under para 6 of GA res. 2426 (XXIII) to initiate changes required for speedy and full implementation. President added that executive heads might be asked to report results to SYG.

H. President and Chairman agreed that Council give continuing attention to question.

2. No talk as yet of any formal proposals or resolutions under this item. Expect debate, which begins in plenary July 31, to follow same pattern as last year, i.e., reports by SA's and recriminations by Africans and EE's. Del plans remain silent during debate unless it becomes necessary to respond specific attacks.

3. Del aware that US vote against GA res. 2426 (XXIII) principally because it sought to have IBRD and IMF perform functions prohibited by their statutes.

Tubby

52. Telegram From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 4, 1969, 1209Z.

2763. Subject: ECOSOC—Declaration on Colonialism (Item 20). Ref: Geneva 2696.²

1. Summary: Debate on implementation colonialism declaration by specialized agencies completed in extended Friday p.m. meeting of Council. SA's reported on their implementation of declaration and Africans and others chastized non-implementation of IBRD and IMF. Speeches were rambling and emotional, but Africans better prepared than last year, and it seems likely that resolution will emerge. End Summary.

2. Number of SA's reported on implementation during past year, most of which was already included in reports to Committee of 24

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN.

² Document 51.

(A/AC.109/333, July 3, 1969). UNESCO and ILO got good marks from African del's particularly for their willingness conclude agreements with OAU for assistance to liberation movements. This course of action was strongly recommended by several speakers to those who have "quibbled" about problems of not being able deal directly with administering powers. IMF and UNDP (neither of which spoke) came in for scolding for failure to make meaningful report to Committee of 24. Fund called "succinctly obstreperous" by Tanzania (Waldron-Ramsey) and "recalcitrant" by Upper Volta (Diallo) and Sierra Leone (Cole). Soviets and Congo (B) also blasted Fund for supporting South Africa to tune of \$62 million in 1968. IBRD was again favorite target, criticism reaching climax with charge by Congo (B) that it was "life insurance of imperialism." Bank wisely changed tactics from last year's session during which Bank engaged Africans in legal arguments on question of compliance with GA resolution. This year Bank spoke only of being willing consider seriously assistance to refugees. Tanzania asked if Bank willing to make agreements with OAU.

3. Waldron-Ramsey spoke for nearly an hour and had apparently coordinated his well organized presentation. His specific proposals were endorsed by most African del's, and they will probably appear in form of draft resolution during final week. Specific proposals were as follows:

A. ECOSOC should recommend that legislative bodies of SA's and other international institutions:

(1) Request following information from their executive director:

(A) History of GA "legislation" this issue;

(B) Implementation action taken;

(C) What implementing action can still be taken;

(D) What difficulties are encountered in executing GA resolutions or mandates of legislative bodies themselves.

(2) Establish small "watch-do" committee of 5 or 6 members for continuing surveillance of implementation, reporting back to parent bodies of difficulties encountered.

B. ECOSOC should also recommend that item remain on agenda ACC and CPC so that there can be continuing coordinated review. Waldron-Ramsey also suggested that legislative bodies of SA's and other institutions should "reaffirm" decision not to assist Portugal and South Africa since assistance is clearly being used to suppress legitimate desire for self-determination, although he did not make clear whether this latter point should be included in ECOSOC resolution.

4. There were fewer than usual attacks on policies of individual governments. UK came in for restrained criticism on SR, but did not reply during debate. Soviets confined their criticism exclusively to SA's. US mentioned only by Cuban observer (as helper of colonialists

and imperialists) and by Sierra Leone (for having recently concluded agreement with Portugal to mine diamonds in Portuguese territory).

5. Only non-Africans to speak were Soviets, Bulgarians (who initiated debate and took credit for giving birth to item in GA), India, and Jamaica.

6. Chairman announced that debate was closed on item, but that Council would take up on Thursday, August 7, any resolution that is tabled.

7. It seems likely that draft resolution containing Waldron-Ramsey recommendations (para 3 above) will be tabled. Also reasonable expect that more strident demands will be included, for example, would expect stress on cooperative arrangements with OAU (para 3, GA Res 2426 XXIII, para 7 of E/4712, reported refrel).

8. Any preliminary guidance on what US Del would be able support would be appreciated.

Tubby

53. Telegram From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 5, 1969, 1754Z.

2800. Subject: ECOSOC's Implementation of Colonialism Declaration (Item 20). Refs: A. Geneva 2797, B. Geneva 2696, C. Geneva 2763.²

1. Despite some rough edges lengthy draft resolution reported Ref. A seems on whole slightly more restrained than past efforts this subject. Comments on specific operative paras follow:

Para 2. Since our negative votes on GA Res 2311 (XXII) and GA Res 2426 (XXIII) were prompted largely by insistence on Bank and Fund's implementation of resolutions which are inconsistent with their own charters, assume we would oppose this para.

Para 3. Although most of recommendations in President's report seem unobjectionable, del notes that this would include suggestion

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to USUN.

² Telegram 2797, August 5, transmitted the text of the draft resolution. (Ibid.) Telegrams 2696 and 2763 are Documents 51 and 52.

para 1.E. Ref. B concerning arrangements with OAU envisaged para 3 of GA Res 2426 (XXIII).

Para 4. This was key point in many of statements made during general debate and Africans are undoubtedly intractable on this one.

Para 7. This is substantially same as proposal elaborated by Waldron-Ramsey (Tanzania) and supported by number of delegations during general debate (Ref. C). Subparagraph V, which he referred to in debate as “watchdog committee” seems superfluous at best although it does not specify that “machinery” must be committee of member states.

2. Preliminary reaction from Belgian Del off is that they will likely abstain on resolution as whole, probably voting no on paras 2 and 4 and perhaps 7 V if there is separate vote. He reports that French share this view and are also objecting to para 5 which brings UNDP into picture. UK Del off somewhat more negative and very preliminary reading suggests negative vote on resolution as whole. US Del will be meeting with several WEO dels Wednesday morning to discuss strategy and will report and make recommendations following that meeting. Schedule calls for resolution to come to floor on Thursday.

Tubby

54. Telegram From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 6, 1969, 1548Z.

2817. Subject: ECOSOC—Implementation of Colonialism Resolution (Item 20). Refs: A. Geneva 2797, B. Geneva 2800.²

1. Del off spoke with UK (Allen) Wednesday A.M. about draft resolution contained in Ref A. Allen also feels that on whole this draft is less objectionable than prior GA resolutions this subject. Given this premise it was agreed that it most unlikely that there will be any negative votes on resolution as whole by other delegations since other five negative votes on GA Res 2426 (XXIII) are not represented on ECOSOC. On looking over operative para Allen said they would undoubtedly

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to USUN.

² See Document 53 and footnote 2 thereto.

oppose paras 2 and 4 as inconsistent with their stand in past. Para 3 not completely acceptable since it incorporates objectionable reference to assistance to liberation movements (para 2 Ref B), but Allen thinks abstention (along with US) would be appropriate in circumstances. Allen has same problem mentioned para 1 Ref B with para 7 V but says that vote on this para or subparagraph would probably depend on whether they abstain or vote no on resolution as whole. On para 8 Allen pointed out that this paragraph could be objected to for legitimate organizational reasons, particularly involvement of CPC and joint meeting of CPC and APC, and again that final position would probably depend on overall position.

2. Allen and del off spoke with IBRD and IMF reps who were generally relaxed about draft resolution. They both felt that para 2 could be much worse and that it even implies recognition of fact that they have extended some cooperation. They both would feel more comfortable if there were no separate vote on para 2 which they feel would precipitate unwelcome harangue this point. US-UK abstention on resolution as whole would be quite satisfactory to them.

3. Belgian del off confirmed position reported Ref A, saying he now has instruction to abstain on resolution as whole and authority to vote no on paras 2, 4, 7 V if there is separate vote, with flexibility on paras 5 and 8.

4. Del off heard in corridors that several amendments will be offered by co-sponsors. In para 7, recommendation will be directed to SA's themselves rather than governing bodies or deliberative organs. In para 4, on suggestion of UNESCO, ILO and WHO will be added to list of "good guys."

5. In view foregoing and in order to further our efforts to minimize polarization and confrontation with LDC's, particularly Africans, del strongly recommends that we abstain. British are making similar recommendation so that in abstaining we would presumably be joining UK, other WEO and LA's (with possible exception Jamaica). On question separate vote on objectionable paras del would be inclined not to request it. We would note our objections in brief explanation of vote which would also indicate our support for positive aspect of resolution and would specifically call attention to fact that we are abstaining rather than voting against because of more constructive tone of resolution and because we sense attempt on part of co-sponsors to take into account known objections of other members.

6. Would also appreciate instructions in para by para vote in event someone calls for it. UK and Belgians have both indicated they do not intend to do so.

Tubby

55. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations¹**

Washington, August 6, 1969, 1935Z.

131120. Subj: ECOSOC—Declaration on Colonialism (Item 20). Ref: Geneva 2817.²

1. Dept concurs recommendation para 5 reftel that US abstain on res as whole and not request paragraph by paragraph vote.

2. Delegation may wish to incorporate following language, as appropriate, in any statement it may make.

a. The US Government believes that ECOSOC in coordinating the activities of the specialized agencies, may legitimately consider appropriate programs which contribute directly or indirectly to the exercise of the right of self-determination by dependent peoples.

b. The US Government opposes colonialism and is a strong advocate of self-determination for dependent peoples. At same time, we believe that UN's role in promoting self-determination must conform to actions which are consistent with the Charter and enjoy broad support among members.

c. The US has consistently advocated the view that actions undertaken by the specialized agencies and other UN-related organs must be guided by the constitutions of these agencies and their agreements with the UN.

d. In addition, the introduction of essentially political issues into the deliberations of technical bodies and the various specialized agencies can serve only to undermine effectiveness of those bodies as mechanisms for cooperation in technical fields among states of widely differing political systems and policies.

e. Most important, political actions of the kind contemplated by resolutions 2311 (XXII) and 2426 (XXIII) should come only after a determination by the Security Council that a threat to international peace and security exists. Although the Security Council has made such a finding regarding Southern Rhodesia, no such determination has been made in the case of South Africa or Portugal.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Norman Frisbie and Samuel R. Peale, approved by Elizabeth Ann Brown, and cleared by William Witman II and Richard D. Harding.

² Document 54.

3. Instructions on para by para vote and further recommendations on explanation of vote will be sent septel.³

Richardson

³ Telegram 131554 to Geneva, August 6, authorized the U.S. delegation to vote against paragraphs 2 and 4, to abstain on paragraphs 5, 6, 8, and 9, and to abstain on paragraphs 3 and 7 unless other Western European delegates wanted to vote against them. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN) The resolution was adopted on August 8 by a vote of 17–0, with 9 abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, United States, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom). There was no paragraph-by-paragraph vote. (Telegram 2868 from Geneva, August 8; *ibid.*)

56. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-2998

New York, December 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Committee of 24 and Colonial Issues

Under Secretary Djermakoye reported to Finger today that Ambassador German Nava Carillo of Venezuela would become the next Chairman of the Committee of 24. As a counterpart for African agreement to his chairmanship, Djermakoye expects the Latin Americans to support allocation of the seat vacated by Australia to Algeria. Previously, Barbados had been interested in replacing Australia but Djermakoye did not believe the Latin Americans would now contest the Algerian candidacy. For himself, he did not think Algerian membership in the Committee of 24 would be a bad thing. He thought he could moderate the Algerian viewpoint if they joined the Committee and believed they would be more dangerous outside the Committee than inside. *Comment:* Djermakoye may be overly sanguine about this ability to exercise influence on the Algerians. In fact, Algerian membership is likely to stir the Committee out of the apathy which has characterized it during 1969.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Finger, cleared by Sacksteder, and approved by Michael H. Newlin. Repeated to Canberra and Madrid.

Djermakoye expressed great satisfaction at the adoption of a resolution on Papua and New Guinea with the affirmative votes of Australia and the US. On the key amendment by Liberia (leaving the decision on membership of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea in the hands of the Trusteeship Council), Djermakoye said he had spent two hours persuading Abdel-Wahab (UAR) to accept the substance of the Liberian amendment. Abdel-Wahab had finally told him it was the Soviets who kept insisting on getting the Committee of 24 into the act of choosing a mission. Djermakoye was finally able, he said, to persuade the Africans not to go along with the Soviets. He argued strongly that Australia had a relatively good record compared to the administering authorities for the Southern African territories. Failure to acknowledge Australia's better performance, he argued, would be a mistake.

Djermakoye stated that the Africans were completely disillusioned with Spain. The Africans had noticed the abrupt change in Spanish voting patterns on colonial issues when Spain decided not to press the Gibraltar issue in the UN General Assembly. Consequently, they considered Spain cynical and hypocritical, and this would have an impact on their attitude on other issues in which Spain is involved.

Yost

57. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 13, 1970, 1702Z.

228. Subj: UN Comite of 24 Chairmanship. Ref: Caracas 720.²

1. Opening meeting of Comite of 24's 1970 session postponed to Feb 16 at request of Afro-Asian majority of Comite. Reason for delay is African group's inability to decide on chairmanship of Comite during coming session, and its desire avoid contested election. A number of African and Asian members of Comite, perhaps abetted by Soviets

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Caracas.

² In telegram 720, February 12, the Embassy in Caracas reported that the Venezuelan Government sought U.S. support for Nava Carillo's candidacy for chairman of the Committee. (Ibid.)

and their Bulgarian and Polish cohorts, reportedly decided during informal discussions and caucuses this past week to renege on understanding they had previously reached with Venezuela representative on Comite, Amb Nava Carillo. Alleged reasons for change in position as follows: 1) During past nine years since its establishment, Comite has been chaired by a permanent representative (Nava is Venezuela Deputy PermRep); 2) All previous chairmen have been Africans, and some of this group probably consider the Comite of 24 chairmanship theirs by "right"; 3) 1970 will mark 10th anniversary of Comite (and 25th of UN) with greater than usual attendance of African Chiefs of State at 25th GA; 4) Coming Comite session will have to consider plans for future, and will therefore take on greater significance than previous sessions. For these reasons, Africans alleged to believe that giving chairmanship to any other than African PermRep would represent downgrading of Comite.

2. Rumors emanating from Afro-Asian caucuses indicate some confusion and divisions. However there is persistent story that Africans seeking to promote candidacy of Sierra Leone despite fact that Sierra Leone currently serving on Security Council, and, with small permanent mission, would have difficulty effectively chairing Comite.

3. Venezuelan candidate contacted MisOff to say he was aware of Afro-Asian maneuvers but that LA group had decided to maintain his candidacy. Ecuador was inscribed at inaugural meeting to propose Venezuela, and Honduras agreed to second. Nava Carillo said that LA group refused to accept African argument that Comite of 24 was African preserve. Mission recommends that in event of contested election we cast our vote for Venezuela. But we should not lobby for Nava Carillo. Such efforts likely to be counter-productive rather than helpful in view of composition of Comite.³

Yost

³ On March 5 Nava Carillo withdrew his candidacy after learning that the Asian and African members of the Committee of 24 had decided to support Davidson Nicol of Sierra Leone as chairman. (Telegram 346 from USUN, March 5; *ibid.*)

58. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-834

New York, May 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

Committee of 24 Ad Hoc Group Africa Trip

At its 741st meeting on May 4, the Committee of 24 approved recommendations of its working group that an ad hoc group of representatives of the Committee make a trip to Africa. The trip will be undertaken in connection with preparations for the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The purpose of the trip is to establish contact with leaders of national liberation movements in Africa.

The ad hoc group will consist of the following: Chairman: Ambassador Davidson Nicol of Sierra Leone, Chairman of the Committee of 24; Rapporteur: Mr. S.M.S. Chadha of India, Rapporteur of the Committee of 24; and representatives of the following six delegations: Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Italy, Poland and Tunisia. The ad hoc group will be accompanied by a small number of Secretariat personnel. It is tentatively scheduled to depart from New York on May 24 with the following itinerary: Lusaka, two to three working days; Dar es Salaam, two to three working days; Addis Ababa, two working days; Algiers, two working days.

The Committee further approved a recommendation that in the interval before its departure, the ad hoc group contact the leaders of the national liberation movements involved and make appropriate arrangements with the governments concerned and with the Organization of African Unity. The addressees of this airgram will be informed by telegram of the exact composition of the ad hoc group and its final itinerary.

Comment: The U.S. Representative to the Special Committee of 24 concurred in the plans for this trip to Africa with some misgiving. However, the decision to limit the trip to eight members of the Committee and its duration to approximately two weeks was, in our view, the lesser of possible evils. There was sentiment among members of the Committee for a full fledged trip by the whole Committee to include

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Algiers, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, and Lusaka. Drafted by Sacksteder, cleared by Finger and E. C. Grigg, and approved by Newlin.

commemorative sessions at the seat of the OAU in this Tenth Anniversary year. Such a junket would have entailed the same kind of extensive staff support as previous African trips of the Committee at five or six times the cost of the proposed trip by the ad hoc group. The Mission will be interested to receive such reports on this trip and on the activities of its members as the addressees may be in a position to furnish.

Yost

59. Editorial Note

The Ad Hoc Group of representatives from the Committee of 24 traveled to Addis Ababa (May 28–30, 1970), Dar es Salaam (May 30–June 2), and Lusaka (June 3–5). The Group heard from representatives of the various African liberation movements and urged that the UN provide more active support for them. After arriving in Lusaka, Chairman Nicol told reporters that the Committee was working with UN agencies to establish hospitals and clinics in “liberated areas of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau,” while UN agencies and independent African states would be encouraged to train “nationals of countries under European domination” as doctors, teachers, and administrators. (Telegram 918 from Lusaka, June 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN) After the last meeting, the Embassy in Lusaka reported: “Sessions were brief, routine, and unexciting. Neither liberation movements reps nor delegates appeared to be very enthusiastic and GRZ seemed take little interest in proceedings.” (Telegram 935 from Lusaka, June 8; *ibid.*)

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 11, 1970, 2011Z.

149085. Subj: Joint Session Comite of 24, Comite on Apartheid and Council for Namibia. Ref: A. USUN 1868;² B. State 51370.³

1. Dept still not inclined participate in proposed joint session. Mission should approach Nicol and reiterate position essentially as in ref B. Mission should also point out increasingly cumbersome nature of proposed session, financial implications, obvious duplication with work of Fourth Comite, and particularly ill timing and inappropriateness of meeting during GA. Mission should use similar points as necessary in explaining position to Sanctions Committee and Namibia Subcomite and should discuss matter with UKUN and other friendlies on all three bodies, particularly re possibility their taking similar positions.

2. Dept still sees no need for or likely benefit from type of joint meeting described ref A. Fact it now proposed to invite two additional bodies only compounds duplication of Fourth Comite effort. Present timing, with GA and particularly Fourth Comite about commence sessions, makes duplication of effort all more apparent.

3. US membership on three out of five proposed comites does pose additional problem. However, point made ref B regarding limited functions of organs other than Comite of 24 equally valid for SC Sanctions Comite and Namibia Subcomite. As member these subcomites US has particular responsibility oppose extraneous activities not within terms of reference.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Samuel R. Peale; cleared by Norman Frisbie, Martin Jacobs, and Donald S. Spigler; and approved by Morris Rothenberg.

² In telegram 1868, September 10, USUN reported that, on the one hand, the proposed joint session of the Committee of 24, the Committee on Apartheid, and the Council for Namibia would only involve an exchange of views and was unlikely to produce any resolutions. On the other hand, the Security Council's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Namibia, its Sanctions Committee on Southern Rhodesia, and the UN Human Rights Commission would be invited to attend. This would pose difficulties since the United States was not represented on either the Council for Namibia or the Committee on Apartheid, and had voted against Resolution 2506 (XXIV) on apartheid. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 51370 to USUN, April 8, spelled out objections to the joint session: it seemed unnecessary when the Committee of 24 was giving adequate attention to southern Africa, and the proposal exceeded the terms of reference of the other bodies. It would be difficult for the United States to participate in a joint session since it was not a member of the Council for Namibia or the Committee on Apartheid, had abstained on the resolution establishing the former and voted against the resolution establishing the latter, and had voted against Resolution 2506 (XXIV), which had called for the joint session. (Ibid.)

4. Dept also notes with regard Comite of 24 that bureau acting very freely without meaningful consultations or debate. While such activity not inconsistent with normal character of Comite, Dept finds in it ample reason for not being bound by Committee decision.⁴

Rogers

⁴ Ambassador Finger explained to Nicol that the United States was not inclined to participate in the joint session for the reasons outlined. Nicol replied that he hoped that if one were held, the United States "might be present on a low-key basis," or else its absence would be misunderstood. (Telegram 1944 from USUN, September 16; *ibid.*)

61. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 8, 1970, 0001Z.

2309. Subj: 10th Anniversary Program of Action of Decolonization. Ref: USUN 2207 and 2276.²

1. WEO Group of Comite 4, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, US, UK, held informal meeting on 10th anniversary draft program of action prepared by Comite 24. In general, reaction among WEOs was unfavorable. None of dels present liked sweeping generalizations and found certain paras particularly objectionable. The general feeling was also that text represented culmination of Sov attempt force wedge between West and Africans.

2. Most dels stated they had no instructions, but New Zealand and UK stated that, as long as text remained unchanged, they had instructions vote against draft program of action. US del stated it too

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

² Telegram 2207, October 2, described meetings of the Committee of 24 that were held September 25, 28, and 30 to discuss the Draft Program of Action to commemorate the Committee's 10th anniversary. The draft proved unacceptable to the United States and many WEOs, which submitted an extensive list of amendments on September 30. The United States tabled its amendments informally after meeting that afternoon. (*Ibid.*) In telegram 2276, October 6, Yost reported that the President of the General Assembly and the chairmen of the Committee of 24 and the 25th Anniversary Committee had met on October 6 and agreed to discuss the 10th anniversary program on October 12. (*Ibid.*)

would vote against if text remained unchanged. Australia expected vote against text and has so recommended to Canberra. France, in arguing that text contained many paras which it could not support, thought it might vote against text, but had no instructions. Belgium Rep said he had not had time study text, but his personal reaction was to vote against. He was awaiting instructions. Austria, Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, while pointing out general unacceptability of draft program of action, thought they might be instructed abstain. Canada and Netherlands in particular said there was general reluctance of their governments to vote against res. Spanish Del said he had no instructions and would prefer not to comment.

3. Scandinavian Dels did not make any comment on text, but prior to meeting Muller (Finland) told MisOff that at first consultations among Scan Dels it generally agreed they would probably abstain on draft program of action. Italy announced it had instructions abstain.

4. During course of day, Oct 6, MisOff learned that Sovs were very concerned re possibility modifying draft program of action and have urged certain AF dels to ensure that program adopted as submitted to GA by Comite 24.

5. In evening, Oct 6, MisOff had occasion discuss 10th anniversary program of action with Tanzanian PermRep Salim and Chairman Tanzanian Del, Minister Babu. MisOff argued it necessary obtain program of action which would receive general acquiescence of GA and no negative votes. When asked what specific points US objected to, MisOff replied US could not agree that colonialism constituted a crime nor could it accept constitutionality of GA dictating to SC measures it should take concerning different territories. MisOff also said US could not accept sweeping generalizations made in program of action, particularly with respect to foreign economic interests. No distinction was made between the Southern Africa territories and other territories, and this was not acceptable to US. MisOff further stated purpose of US amendments had been to cooperate with ASAFs in effort secure general agreement and we regretted fact ASAFs did not adopt one of our amendments. MisOff said these same points had been made to Chairman Comite 24 when he consulted with us. Salim alleged points had not been transmitted to ASAF group and that, therefore, there had been a failure of communication between two groups. MisOff acknowledged this may have been the case, but urged Salim and Babu to see whether at this late hour it possible get generally acceptable text. Neither committed themselves, but did reply that there were several days before plenary would discuss program of action.

6. During WEO group mtg Oct 7, there had been no discussion of tactics to be followed in plenary.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in Africa¹

Washington, October 12, 1970, 2027Z.

167826. Reference: (a) State 167451,² (b) State 166107,³ (c) USUN 2367,⁴ (d) State 167419.⁵

Subject: Action Program on 10th Anniversary Decolonization Declaration.

1. For your background, following are key paras (condensed) of “Action Program” submitted by Committee of 24 to UNGA for vote possibly today or tomorrow:

Begin Summary:

3(a)—Member states shall do utmost promote in UN and international institutions and organizations within UN system, effective measures for full implementation of Declaration . . . including adoption by Security Council of effective measures against governments and regimes engaging in any form of repression colonial peoples which would seriously impede maintenance of international peace and security.

3(b)—Member states shall render all necessary moral and material assistance to peoples in colonial territories in struggle attain freedom and independence. . . .

3(c)ii—GA draws attention of SC to need continue giving special attention to problems of Southern Africa by adopting measures ensure full implementation Resolution 1514 (XV) and its own resolutions, and in particular:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Peter C. Walker, approved by Donald S. Spigler, and cleared by Samuel R. Peale. Also sent to Lourenco Marques and Luanda, and repeated to USUN.

² Telegram 167451, October 10, alerted all posts in Africa of the likelihood that the United States would have to vote against the Program of Action marking the 10th Anniversary of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 166107, October 8, described the Department’s objection to the Draft Declaration on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, particularly since paragraphs 6 and 7 singled out specific areas for censure while ignoring “other obvious examples of oppression and tyranny of which members and world community well aware.” (Ibid., UN 30)

⁴ Telegram 2367 from USUN, October 10, reported that proposed U.S. revisions received no support, even from the U.K. Delegation, and were adamantly opposed by African delegations. (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 167419, October 9, supplied a statement for use in the October 9 meeting of the Committee for the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations. (Ibid.) The text of the statement as delivered by Ambassador Finger is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 16, 1970, pp. 631–632.

—To widen scope of sanctions against illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia by declaring mandatory all measures in . . . Article 41 of the Charter;

—To impose sanctions on South Africa and Portugal whose governments have blatantly refused to carry out mandatory decisions of Security Council;

—To give urgent consideration . . . to promoting speedy elimination of colonialism, to . . . imposing fully and unconditionally, under international supervision, embargo on arms of all kinds to government of South Africa and illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia;

—To consider urgently adoption measures prevent supply of arms of all kinds to Portugal as these enable that country deny right of self-determination and independence to peoples of the territories under its domination. *End Summary.*

2. Re separate but inter-related problem of 25th Anniversary Declaration para 6 on Colonialism and para. 7 on Apartheid (see ref B.), US del agreed, after recording US objections to language paras. 6–7 (see refs C and D), to submission of whole declaration to Plenary.

3. Septel will follow re US explanation of vote on 10th Anniversary declaration and voting pattern.⁶

Rogers

⁶ Transmitted in telegram 167972 to all posts in Africa, October 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN) The General Assembly approved the Draft Program of Action on the 10th Anniversary of the Declaration on Decolonization on October 12, by a vote of 86 to 5, with 15 abstentions. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa voted against it. Ambassador Finger's statement in explanation of the U.S. vote is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 16, 1970, p. 635.

63. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 4, 1970, 2018Z.

3537. Subj: US Participation in Comite of 24. Ref: A) USUN 8082 Nov. 26, 1968; B) USUN 3486 Dec. 2, 1970.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–4. Confidential.

² Telegram 8082 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 436. In telegram 3486, December 3, Yost reported that Italy was considering withdrawing from the Committee of 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–4)

1. Two years ago the US delegation recommended that the US should leave the Comite of 24. We noted then that the Comite has produced absolutely no positive results, multiplies points of friction between the US and Afro-Asian group, and generally detracts from effectiveness and credibility of UN in whole colonial area (reftel A).

2. While Dept generally concurred with USUN reasoning, Secretary Rusk decided leaving Comite of 24 should not be a final act of an outgoing administration. USUN and Dept subsequently reasoned that it would be unwise for such departure to be first act of an incoming administration. Last January we reasoned that we should be patient for one more year, for two reasons: A) election of moderate and objective chairman, Amb Nicol of Sierra Leone; B) possibility US might have some influence on program of action to be worked out as part of Tenth Anniversary of Declaration against Colonialism.

3. Nicol has in fact been a good chairman, but Comite of 24 has sunk into general apathy interrupted by bursts of activity on proposals pressed by Soviets and radical Africans which emerge as its final product. We made extensive and genuine effort this year to reach agreement with moderates on a Program of Action which would be realistic and constructive in terms of working toward the end of colonialism. We were not successful in informal consultations because Tanzanians and Bulgarians, backed by Soviets and other radicals, rejected any attempt to modify Program of Action drafted principally by Tanzania and Bulgaria. Moderates either could not or would not stand up to them. We presented 15 amendments in Comite of 24 and explained them most carefully and in most conciliatory manner possible. Nevertheless all 15 amendments were rejected. Rejection much regretted by chairman, by Under Secretary Djermaakoye and SYG. Nevertheless Comite of 24 now has a Program of Action adopted by GA which virtually ensures it will continue to be unproductive and to detract from the effectiveness and credibility of UN in colonial area. I therefore believe that time has come for us to withdraw from membership on this Comite. I noted that Italy is doing so and UK, which has for ten years rejected even any thought of leaving Comite, is now seriously considering possibility.

4. I suggest our notice of withdrawal not be given to Pres of GA before last day of session. Alternatively we can write him in January. We would not want our notice of withdrawal to have repercussions on important issues such as seabeds and High Commissioner for Human Rights which currently before comites of GA.

5. We recognize that there will be some adverse reaction from some of our African and Asian friends when we announce our decision to leave. We believe this could be minimized by discussing with them in advance the reasons for our decision. We can point out to them

that our trial extension of our membership during past two years produced no evidence that there could be any material improvement in Comite's work. Furthermore, members of Comite are by now fully aware that it produces nothing of consequence and we doubt that their disappointment over our decision will be long lived. As for product of Comite it is not likely to get appreciably worse than it is now, whether we stay on or leave. In any case, we can participate on items involving US interests, as other non-members of Comite do. Moreover, we shall have an opportunity to participate in GA consideration of all these questions, and recent developments in Fourth Comite suggest that our chances of meaningful influence are better there than in Comite of 24—a point we can make in explaining our move to friendly Africans and Asians. Finally, scene of greatest interest to Africans on main colonial problems—Rhodesia, Namibia, and Portuguese territories—has been shifted to Security Council, where they can be discussed in a more serious fashion. (Italians citing forthcoming membership on Council as reason for leaving Comite of 24.)

Yost

64. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 19, 1970, 0007Z.

3747. Subj: UK Considering Withdrawal from Comite of 24.

1. UK PermRep Crowe mentioned possible UK withdrawal from Comite of 24 during discussion with MisOff of other changes in Comite. Amb. Crowe said FCO was considering UKUN suggestion that he be authorized withdraw from Comite, primarily on grounds that UK would not wish to remain associated with decolonization "program of action" approved by GA. UK Amb. said timing would be principal problem for his mission since he would want to announce decision before Comite next met, probably during latter part of January 1971. At same time, Crowe said his rep on Comite, Counselor Shaw, hoped Comite Chairman Nicol (Sierra Leone) would be able successfully conclude his negotiations for elimination of Assoc. States of West Indies

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to London.

from list of dependent territories subject to reporting requirements of Art. 73(E) of Charter. Shaw reportedly believes addition of Trinidad and Tobago to Comite will help Nicol achieve UK objective. Crowe enquired about US thinking on continued membership.

2. MisOff told UK Amb. Dept. was once more seriously considering question of withdrawal, and decision do so was distinct possibility. If such decision was reached, MisOff added, UKUN would be consulted prior to notification of Chairman and public announcement. Program of Action was major new contributing factor in US decision. MisOff expressed serious doubt that Nicol, with or without Trinidad's help, could bring off removal of Associated States from dependent territories list. Soviet bloc members and African extremists effectively control Comite, and would strenuously oppose deletion. Crowe said UKUN would keep USUN informed of British plans.

Yost

65. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 28, 1970, 1745Z.

209450. Subj: Withdrawal From Committee of 24. Ref: USUN 3537.²

1. Dept concurs in recommendation ref tel. Believes suggestion of letter to Pres of GA in early January more consistent with objectives not have repercussions on important issues and allow time prepare detailed guidance to field on announcement.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Samuel R. Peale; cleared by Morris Rothenberg, Daniel Goott, Margaret J. Tibbetts, Peter C. Walker, Assistant Secretary Newsom, Robert T. Curran, George N. Monsma, Louise McNutt, Heller (Interior), Assistant Secretary De Palma, and Alexander Haig; and approved by the Under Secretary. A December 24 memorandum from Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to Haig noted that “if our UN Mission and State both believe that withdrawing from the committee would have no serious adverse effect in the UN or elsewhere, it should not be an outlandishly hawkish action. Also, the cable has high level clearance—Irwin, De Palma, and Newsom—and we were prepared to take this step two years ago.” Lord expressed concern about whether withdrawing from a UN committee might set an unfavorable precedent should another nation, such as the Soviet Union, withdraw from a committee considered important by the United States. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 299, USUN, Vol. V)

² Document 63.

2. Mission may discuss with UKUN and Australian Mission this decision immediately with appropriate cautions as to intended timing of announcement. As for other Comite members, Dept believes selected ASAF's and others should be "informed" rather than consulted so as avoid problems which arose 1967/68 when nature US presentation of decision had appearance of consultations and allowed others talk us into giving Comite another chance. In all cases, except for UK and Australia, Dept believes notification or discussion should not take place until just prior date public announcement. Dept will also inform Puerto Rico.

3. Dept would appreciate Mission recommendations as to delegations, in addition to non-bloc members of Comite, which should be informed in advance. Dept also would appreciate Mission recommendations as to exact timing with particular view to presence in New York after end of GA of reps to whom info might be given.

4. Dept will wish coordinate further with Mission on nature of presentation to ASAF's and others both at UN and in field.

Rogers

66. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 29, 1970, 2234Z.

3803. Subj: Withdrawal From Committee of 24. Ref: A. State 209450, B. USUN 3747.²

1. Act. PolCouns informed Shaw (UK) of USG decision withdraw from Committee of 24. Recalling conversation with UK Amb Crowe reported reftel B, Shaw was told decision withdraw from Comite had been made. In accordance earlier undertaking UKUN was being informed confidentially in advance, among other reasons in view possible bearing this might have on FCO consideration of possible UK withdrawal from Committee. Shaw said this info would be of great interest to FCO which he understood was giving most serious consideration ever to question of continued UK participation in Comite. Shaw asked

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to London.

² Documents 65 and 64, respectively.

when withdrawal decision would be announced and was told this would probably be in approximately one week, i.e. by middle of week of Jan 4.

2. Referring to UKUN efforts to have West Indies Associated States deleted from list of non-self-governing territories, Shaw said he was now somewhat pessimistic re outcome. Principal problem according to Shaw lies in inability of Associated States premiers reaching agreement on formula proposed by Comite of 24 Chairman Davidson Nicol (Sierra Leone) to introduce some form of UN presence into territories for purpose verifying their self-governing status. Shaw does not believe Nicol has reached agreement with premiers despite meeting with Bradshaw at Georgetown Dec 18. Shaw anticipates Comite 24 chairmanship will next pass to former Comite VP Nava Carrillo (Venezuela) who is unlikely to have Nicol's interest settling this problem, both for reasons of Venezuelan policy and for personal reasons. Accordingly, Shaw implies that hope to work this out was no longer major reason for UK remaining member of Comite.

3. We do not expect be able see Australians until later this week due protracted Christmas closing of mission here. Mission recommendations requested para 3 reftel A will follow.³

Finger

³ In telegram 3812 from USUN, December 30, Finger recommended that, in addition to the United Kingdom and Australia, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Japan, and New Zealand, the chairmen of the African, Asian, and Latin American groups and Under Secretary-General Djermakoye should be notified. Fiji, Sweden, and Trinidad/Tobago would be advised of the reasons for the U.S. decision in view of their having agreed to join the Committee. Finger expected to approach these persons and delegations January 7 and 8, and to submit an official notification on January 11. He recommended that the letter to the Secretary-General not go into detail about the reasons for withdrawal, and that posts in Africa and Asia be supplied with guidance to answer any questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN)

67. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, January 5, 1971, 0120Z.

832. Subject: Withdrawal from UN Comite of 24 (Decolonization Comite). Ref: (A) State 167972 (notal),² (B) State 169085 (notal),³ (C) USUN 3812 (notal).⁴

1. USG has decided withdraw from membership on UN Comite of 24 and USUN plans notify GA Pres of this decision by letter on January 11. USUN has already informed UK and Australian UN Missions and will on Jan 7 & 8 notify other interested parties, including SYG, Comite Chairman Nicol (Sierra Leone), and UN reps of host govts of action addressees, i.e. non EE Comite members and others including administering powers.

2. For Action Addressees: London and Canberra may notify appropriate officials of USG decision immediately. Other posts may either use info below to respond to questions regarding US action or take initiative to bring matter to attention of host government in manner deemed appropriate. In latter case, posts should not approach local officials prior to Jan 8.

3. Info Addressees: Although Dept and USUN see no need notify host govt or UN reps prior public announcement, posts may, if deemed appropriate, notify appropriate officials of decision and reasons therefor as of date of announcement.

4. In discussing US withdrawal, you may draw on following reasons for our decision:

(a) Since establishment of Comite of 24 US has participated with hope it could make valid and constructive contribution to problems decolonization. We welcomed opportunity to work on these problems with others concerned and hoped our views would be given due consideration in framing serious and workable resolutions. However, as

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Peale, Peter C. Walker, and Frank R. Golino; cleared by Witman, Goott, McNutt, Geraldine Jenkins, Stanley D. Schiff, and Morris Rothenberg; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Brussels, Canberra, Caracas, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, The Hague, Kabul, Lisbon, London, Madrid, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Port-of-Spain, Quito, Rome, Stockholm, Tananarive, Tehran, Tokyo, Tunis, and Wellington; and repeated to Belgrade, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, USUN, and all other African and Latin American posts.

² See footnote 6, Document 62.

³ Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 66.

time has passed and as we have stated in Committee, we have had increasingly serious reservations with regard to method of operation as well as conclusions and actions of Committee. Only after consultations with Comite members in early 1968 did USG decide defer decision to withdraw from Comite at that time and instead seek, through frank statements of US views, acceptable changes in Comite performance. We have since reiterated these reservations. We have been increasingly concerned at Comite's apparent unwillingness to take US views into account, as in case action program on decolonization in which not single one of some twenty suggested changes submitted by US was reflected in any form in Comite drafting.

(b) Comite has consistently refused follow course pursued in other committees of consulting on proposed actions and resolutions in order to gain support necessary to insure consensus and effective implementation.

(c) Comite has increasingly advocated extreme and unworkable measures, condoning use of violence, which we unable support. This performance now reflected and in effect codified in unworkable program of action for 10th anniversary Colonialism Declaration which will serve as guideline for future operations of Comite.

(d) In view all these factors, after careful consideration over a considerable period of time, after repeated warnings to Comite and in light recent developments, USG has reluctantly decided that Comite has not allowed US to play constructive role and that goal of practical progress toward decolonization cannot be served by continued US presence on Comite. We have therefore notified appropriate UN authorities of our withdrawal.

5. Post should point out that USG will continue to meet UN Charter responsibilities regarding US territories including reporting on them and participating in Comite consideration of them, if invited. US will also continue active interest in problems of decolonization and unwavering endorsement of right of self-determination. US believes it will have ample opportunity to consider and hopefully contribute to progress on these issues through participation in GA (Fourth Comite) and SC consideration the issues.⁵

Johnson

⁵ Further guidance was transmitted to African posts in telegram 4222, January 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN)

68. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 9, 1971, 0137Z.

54. Subj: Withdrawal From the Committee of 24. Ref: State's 209450, State's 832.²

1. Pursuant instructions contained reftels and telcons with Dept, USUN informed dels of all addressee posts (except Tanzania which unable reach) plus Fiji as well as Chrmn of LA, Asian and AF groups re US decision withdraw from Comite 24, SYG informed through Under SYG Djermakoye. Reaction among WEO dels was generally congratulatory with statements that US move had been anticipated.

2. ASAF dels, while not expressing surprise at move, were concerned over effect US withdrawal would have on Comite and several wondered about future of Comite. Most of dels contacted wondered what UK would do in light of US withdrawal and they generally anticipated UK would soon follow. Some dels sought to get us to reconsider position but gave up when told decision already made.

3. LA's (Ecuador Chargé Sefilla-Borja and Venezuela Dep PermRep Nava Carillo) expressed regret over US action but said that his efforts reorganize Comite along more constructive lines if he is elected Pres [*Chairman*]. He admitted not being sanguine re prospects of breaking Communist-ASAF extremists control of Comite. In fact we hear Africans may renege on "deal" by which Amb Nicol (Sierra Leone) was elected Chrmn of Comite in 1970 at expense of Amb Nava in exchange for AF support for Venezuelan in 1971.

4. New members, Trinidad and Tobago and Fiji, called on by LA adviser who explained in detail past US experience with Comite, earlier misgivings about continued participation, and general and specific grounds for decision withdraw. Amb Solomon of T&T reacted aggressively, charging US withdrawal would be regretted as petulant reaction to failure have their own way and as disregard of will of majority. He said it would have been nobler to remain in Comite and work from within for its improvement. He said T&T decision join Comite in no way affected by US decision and was based exclusively on T&T belief Comite's cause was just and its work important to UN. However, he, Solomon, recognized US right act in what it considered its best

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Brussels, Canberra, Caracas, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, The Hague, Kabul, Lisbon, London, Madrid, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Port-of-Spain, Quito, Rome, Stockholm, Tananarive, Tehran, Tokyo, Tunis, and Wellington.

² Documents 65 and 67.

interests whether rightly or wrongly. Specifically said he supported Program of Action's endorsement of use of force as only way left to oppressed people of South Africa. Said US used force in SEAsia, and could hardly be critical of resort to such extreme measures by others. LA adviser refused Solomon's arguments and challenged premises on which these were based and interview ended amicably with an agreement to disagree.

5. Fiji Chargé Baker said decision join Comite would perhaps not have been made if they had known US planned withdraw. Fiji joined in hopes it could contribute to work to decolonization in smaller territories, particularly insular territories on basis their own experience of gradual progress to independence. He wondered whether US decision would influence UK do likewise and admitted Fiji mission had only consulted UKUN in general terms re desirability of joining Comite. Baker said Fiji naturally regretted US decision but, on basis explanation, understood our motives. He was told that Suva was being informed by AmConsul. He said Amb Sikivou returning Jan 9 with family and was invited to advise Amb to call Amb Finger next week if he had any additional questions.

6. Djermaakoye (Under SYG for Trusteeship and NSGT) expressed "profound regret and grave concern" at US decision. Withdrawal would "seriously undermine" Comite's ability carry out its task. However, it was abundantly clear above remarks pro-forma and US decision came as no surprise to him or, presumably, SYG.

7. USUN plans send formal ltr SYG as misfaxed from UNP Jan 11.

Yost

69. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 11, 1971, 1745Z.

56. Subj: UK Withdrawal From Comite of 24.

1. Shaw (UK) informed Finger January 9 that UKUN had received instructions inform SYG UK withdrawing from Comite of 24.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London.

² Telegram 113 from London, January 6, informed the Department that the U.K. Government was considering withdrawing from the Committee. (Ibid.)

2. UKUN submitting its letter of withdrawal to SYG 4 P.M. January 11.³ Shaw also said that UKUN did not want knowledge of UK's withdrawal from Comite to be public until letter submitted SYG.

3. Shaw further reported there would be stimulated question in Parliament January 12 in afternoon re UK's withdrawal from Comite. He expected as result of stimulated question information would not be in press until Wednesday, January 13.

4. In response to question from MisOff, Shaw said UKUN will be stating privately that it prepared consider possibility of participation in Comite's work on UK territories if invited, but will not commit itself to actual participation. Shaw expressed personal view that he felt once ties have been cut with Comite, UK should not participate at all in work of Comite, even when UK territories discussed in subcommittees. He did not know what final decision would be re this matter.

Yost

³ The U.K. note was transmitted to the Department in telegram 84 from USUN, January 13. (Ibid.)

70. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 12, 1971, 2350Z.

79. Subj: US Withdrawal From Comite of 24. Ref: USUN 054.²

1. Talk in UN corridors seems to be concentrating on US-UK withdrawals from C-24. General question has been what do these withdrawals do to the C-24. Press in general appears to have been caught off guard by announcements and SYG is reportedly not offering any comment to press re withdrawals. SYG's reasoning is that he did not comment on withdrawals of Italy, Norway and Honduras; and, consequently, does not propose to comment on US and UK withdrawals from Comite.

2. Moderate AF's are particularly concerned over US withdrawal. Tunisian, Malagasy, Senegalese, USSR, Ugandan, Ivory Coast and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

² Document 68.

Liberian Dels have commented to MisOff that they were very concerned over US withdrawal from Comite; and Francophone AF's in particular have privately called us quitters (*lacheurs*) for not being willing to withstand attacks. Moderate Francophones in particular have expressed serious concern over fact that US withdrawal from C-24 would give EE bloc and radicals free rein in Comite and thus undercut opportunities for moderates to counter effectively extreme views. When confronted with fact that US presence did not appear to have given much support to moderate views in Comite, moderate AF's implied that, while this may have been true, they generally felt they could count on US support for stands which went contrary to extreme views. US presence, they argued, had moral value; and, although they had frequently had to adhere to general Afro-Asian line, minority viewpoints were assured expression by US. They further argued that US should have consulted with them, rather than simply informed them of decision to withdraw from C-24. Most dels were not concerned over UK withdrawal from Comite. At same time, because of seeming simultaneity of announcement, most dels felt there had been collusion between US and UK.

3. Most ASAF dels expressed view that US, which had been in forefront of decolonization, was now no longer interested. USUN has sought to make it clear that US interest in decolonization has not diminished and that it will be following process of decolonization both in Fourth Comite of GA and when raised in SC. Some dels wondered whether Comite should continue in light of US-UK defections, but were of opinion that, despite these setbacks, Comite will still operate.

4. Interesting note, bloc countries caught completely by surprise and Niklessa (USSR) wondered if US planning to withdraw from other comites dealing with decolonization. Specifically, he referred to subcommittees of SC on Rhodesia and Namibia. MisOff stated that, as permanent SC members, there no inclination for US withdraw from SC subcomites and expressed view Niklessa conclusion slightly farfetched.

5. Reactions among ASAF's predictable. Some were caught by surprise, but did not appear to harbor any strong ill-will against US for its decision withdraw from C-24. It can be generally assumed that all have reported back to their governments re US decision. Nicol (Sierra Leone), who currently not in New York and who outgoing Chairman C-24, had instructed his del to approach USUN in order get US reconsider our decision. Having learnt, however, that US letter of withdrawal had already been transmitted to SYG, Sierra Leone Mission did not contact USUN in formal meeting, but expressed appreciation of Nicol for having been notified in advance of withdrawal.

71. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 11, 1971, 2355Z.

424. Subject: Comite of 24 Statements on US-UK Withdrawal.

1. Comite of 24 held its first meeting for 1971 and elected as Chairman Nava Carrillo (Venezuela) and as Vice Chairmen Jouejati (Syria) and Grinberg (Bulgaria) and as rapporteur Tadesse (Ethiopia).

2. In opening 1971 session, SYG expressed regret over departure of US and UK "which had served on Comite since it was first established and which had played a particularly useful role in the Comite owing to their position as administering powers". He further stated US-UK departure especially regretted because it meant Comite would be deprived of full-time participation of two administering powers which together were responsible for administration of majority of remaining dependent territories. SYG took due note of assurances given by USG re its continued adherence to its obligations under Charter and its readiness to attend meetings of Comite when latter discusses territories under its administration. He expressed hope UK would provide similar cooperation and expressed confidence that both countries would continue to cooperate fully in UN efforts bring speedy end to colonialism in all of its forms and manifestations.

3. Chairman Nava Carrillo in his thank-you speech expressed sorrow over US-UK withdrawal but took pleasure in noting US offer to participate in work of Comite when US territories under discussion. He expressed view, however, it would have been preferable for US-UK remain members. Vice Chairman Grinberg stated US-UK withdrawal should be interpreted as making work of Comite difficult and that there hardening of attitudes by administering powers. Other members of Comite expressed similar regrets over US-UK withdrawal.

4. Statements of first meeting on US-UK withdrawals from Comite tended to be relatively mild except for perhaps Grinberg's statement. Soviets, however, have not yet spoken and it can be presumed their comments may be much harsher.

Interesting to note that US willingness cooperate with Comite was emphasized in contrast with absence of UK statement of intentions. Indication of US willingness cooperate with Comite on its territories may have been reason for generally mild statements at opening meeting.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use.

72. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 7, 1971, 2349Z.

1512. Subj: Comite of 24 Visiting Missions. Ref: USUN 1483.²

1. At conclusion of discussion reported reftel, Comite 24 Chairman Nava Carillo referred to exchange of correspondence with US Mission re basic US position on question of visiting missions. This query is consequence of Comite's request that its Chairman consult with administering authorities to ascertain if they would be willing to receive Comite of 24 VM's to non-self-governing territories.

2. Amb Bennett and MisOff said there was no reason to suppose that US position with respect to VM's to its territories would change. US as administering authority furnished Comite of 24 extensive info on conditions in American Samoa, Guam and Virgin Islands. In addition to this Comite, through UN Secretariat, received newspapers and other printed material directly from territories where conditions were widely discussed in the free press. Finally there was no restriction on access to the territories by visitors. For these reasons US position would undoubtedly remain unchanged.

3. MisOff observed that as Comite of 24 was well aware, significant political development had taken place in Guam and Virgin Islands with the popular election of governors in November 1970. This, as US had pointed out during consideration of these territories by Comite in 1970 and 1969, constitute significant further step forward toward full internal self-government. MisOff remarked that it was possible USG might wish to ascertain views of governors of Guam and Virgin Islands on question of receiving a UN VM at some time in future. In final analysis, wishes of the people, best ascertained through their elected reps, would have to be given consideration by administering authority before it could change position it has been holding.

4. Nava Carillo said he was not under immediate pressure to report to Comite on this question but hoped USUN would explore with Dept possibility of consulting governors and elected reps in Guam and Virgin Islands with regard to this question. He said he would consider discussion with Bennett on this subject as preliminary only. He was

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

² Telegram 1483, June 4, described a discussion between Bennett and Nava Carillo concerning the admission of visiting UN missions to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (Ibid., POL 19 PACTT/UN)

urged not to place excessive hopes on possibility of a change in US position but assured that he would be advised promptly of Dept reaction to foregoing.

5. *Comment:* Our decision refuse permit Comite of 24 to accept Micronesia Senate's invitation for visit will irritate Committee but we are on sound Charter grounds in this refusal. We believe, however, that time is fast approaching when we should proceed with Act of Self-Determination in both Guam and Virgin Islands and thereafter cease reporting on these two territories. The elected governors and legislators should in our opinion be informed that US has taken its responsibilities under UN Charter seriously and would not want to blemish this record by failing to comply with letter and spirit of Charter. We therefore believe there is merit in USG obtaining views of governors on question of role which they envisage for UN with respect to attainment of self-determination. Should be made clear to governors that whether we like it or not UN will continue to insist on considering territories as NSGTs unless UN is associated in some manner in procedures leading to self-determination. Such association could be controlled by governors and USG to the extent that we could veto any members visiting missions of whom we disapprove and we could choose occasion for visit. Election period might be chosen, for example, or governors themselves might be able to suggest better occasion for visiting mission. We are aware that Guamanians in particular have strongly opposed UN "interference" in their affairs but believe it is in Guamanians' and Virgin Islanders' interest to play the game according to the rules and finish with obligations to the UN under Article 73E of Charter. Case of Cook Islands and Assoc. States of West Indies (ASWI) is pertinent in this connection. Cook Island Act Self-Determination took place with US presence and territory was removed from NSGT list. ASWI acted without including UN and GA has refused to accept act self-determination as valid, annually criticizing UK for failing to report on these territories.³

Bush

³ The Department replied on June 12 that Nava Carillo should be informed that the United States, not territorial governors, should decide whether to admit visiting UN missions to U.S. territories. Further steps toward full self-government might enable the eventual removal of at least Guam and the Virgin Islands from the UN's list of non-self-governing territories. (Telegram 104797 to USUN, June 12; *ibid.*, POL 19 UN)

73. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, June 24, 1971, 2200Z.

1694. Subj: Comite of 24 Visiting Missions. Ref: State 104797.²

1. Amb Bennett took opportunity of small luncheon for departing Chairman of Comite 24, Venezuelan Amb Designate to Addis Ababa and Cairo, Nava Carrillo, to convey instructions reftel concerning US position on question of visiting missions. Nava Carrillo did not appear in any way surprised by US response, and did not question Bennett assertion that there was no evidence people in American Samoa, Guam or Virgin Islands desired visit by a UN group at this time. Nava Carrillo did call attention to problems UK had brought on itself by failing to invite UN presence during Act of Self-Determination in West Indies Associated States. Bennett responded that Washington was well aware of this situation.

2. With respect to Comite of 24 participation in mixed Trusteeship Council mission to observe Papua-New Guinea elections in March–April 1972, Nava Carrillo volunteered that certain members of Comite were being “very difficult”. Although agreement had been reached that one East European and one Asian should be the non-members of TC on this mission, and although it looked as if Yugoslav likely to be EE rep, young Afghanistan First Secretary Aryubi (who is chairman of Pacific area sub-comite of Comite of 24) was insisting he should be Asian rep, although many members of Comite favored designation of a Fiji representative. Nava Carrillo made it plain that he considered Fiji more logical and sensible choice.

3. In parting, Nava Carrillo said he planned relinquish chairmanship of Comite of 24 July 9 in order to comply with his govt’s insistent orders that he proceed to his new post. In view of impending departure also of Bulgarian rep who is one of two vice chairmen, Comite will probably be chaired for balance current session by other vice chairman, Jouejati (Syrian Dep PermRep).

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

² See footnote 3, Document 72.

74. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 9, 1971, 0052Z.

3343. Subj: Comite 4²—Possible Observer Status for SWAPO in Comite.

1. Tohill (SA) informed MisOff October 8 that he had picked up rumor that ASAF's, particularly members of Council for Namibia, would be seeking to get observer status for SWAPO in Comite 4 this year. He interpreted various maneuvers by Egyptian Del re insuring separate discussion on Namibia as part of this ploy. Tohill asked MisOff what US planned to do and stated that he personally would not object to having SWAPO as observer, but felt that his government would request SA Del to withdraw from Comite 4 during discussion on Namibia.

2. In querying MisOff re US attitude on possible observer status of SWAPO, Tohill pointed out that such a move could present serious precedent in which PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) would also seek observer status, as would members representing groups from Portuguese territories. MisOff replied he unaware what US position would be on this matter, but pointed out that, in view UN legal situation re Namibia, it might be difficult to oppose observer status for SWAPO. MisOff further pointed out, in response to Tohill query re other Namibian organizations, that OAU recognizes SWAPO and that by implication, if not in fact, UN would also recognize SWAPO as only Namibian group to deal with.

3. USUN would appreciate ASAP any comments Department may have re US attitude toward accepting SWAPO as observer to Comite 4.³

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Pretoria.

² The Fourth, or Trusteeship, Committee of the General Assembly, was responsible for questions relating to non-self-governing territories.

³ On October 14 the Department expressed its opposition to granting observer status to SWAPO. In addition to the reasons stated, it would be improper for the UN to endorse one group (especially a group representing a single tribe) in the absence of the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Namibian people. The Department had no objection to SWAPO representatives appearing before the Fourth Committee under the procedures usually followed by outside groups. (Telegram 188050 to USUN, October 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN)

75. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 21, 1971, 1855Z.

5170. Subj: New Composition of Comite of 24.

1. At end of long meeting in plenary on Comite Four items, GA Pres announced appointment of two new members to Comite-24 and change of membership for one delegation.

2. New members of Comite-24 will be China and Indonesia, who presumably replace two of the WE countries which have left Comite. Poland has withdrawn from Comite and is to be replaced by Czechoslovakia.

3. Addition of China to Comite-24, as well as Indonesia, makes Comite become predominantly ASAF Comite with only Sweden representing West, although not terribly effectively, and EE's and LA's maintaining same number of seats in Comite. Comite can now be more likened to Apartheid Comite in terms of its composition.

4. Presence of China on Comite may not augur well for its future work. While Chinese have not participated in any of the colonial discussions in the GA, either in plenary or in Comite Four, their participation in Comite-24 will certainly serve as development ground for them for next year's GA discussion on colonial questions. In addition, it can be anticipated that Chinese will follow very militant line with respect to Southern African issues. Re issues dealing with territories in Pacific, Caribbean, and Atlantic, it can be expected the Chinese may seek to capitalize on US absence from Comite-24 by attempting get stronger reses on Guam and American Samoa in particular, as well as on TTPI. In this connection, they may try play up presence of military base in Guam at a time when interest in this has been relatively pro forma with not much discussion. Department should expect to provide essential rebuttal material to Chinese particularly on US territories, inasmuch as US does participate in discussion of American Samoa, Guam and Virgin Islands.

5. It entirely possible that presence of Chinese may further bring into focus Sino-Soviet differences with Chinese attempting introduce questions relating to "Soviet colonialism" and it possible that two powers will be vying against each other for leadership on colonial questions among third world dels. All in all, Comite-24 may suddenly be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

of interest with addition of China. Understand that Ethiopian and Iraqi reps of Comite-24 are ones who urged China serve on Comite.

6. Addition of Czechoslovakia to Comite is no surprise since over years they have demonstrated unusual interest in activities of Comite-24 to point of even serving as observers to Comite's trips around Africa.

Bush

76. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 21, 1972, 2247Z.

253. Subj: Comite of 24.

1. Comite-24 held first meeting of 1972 on January 21. After hearing from SYG, Comite elected Salim (Tanzania) as its chairman and Abdullah (Trinidad and Tobago) and Hulinsky (Czechoslovakia) as vice chairmen with Aryubi (Afghanistan) being elected as rapporteur.

2. In his maiden speech, Salim attacked the UK for what was going on in SR, as well as US for its violation of sanctions and its agreement on Azores with Portugal. He also said Comite must find practical means for helping liberation movements in African colonial territories. He welcomed China, Indonesia, Czechoslovakia to the Comite.

3. Chinese made mild pro forma statement in which they supported people of African colonial territories in their struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism.

4. *Comment:* Comite has decided to send its chairman to observe SC meeting in Africa. Understand that Congo has been named to replace Madagascar, but that there possibility it may not take seat until 27th GA because of question of whether pres of 26th GA can officially name it to Comite-24. Addition of Congo will bring strength of Comite to 23 with at least 12 of its members being on extremist side. Election of Salim will mean that Tanzania will have had seat for second time. While Salim not likely be as harsh and irresponsible as his predecessor, Malecela, there every likelihood that he will, however, be more

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Dar es Salaam.

prone to extremist positions for Comite. Three subcomites of Comite-24 have not yet been formed. This should probably take place at a subsequent meeting.

Phillips

77. **Telegram From the Embassy in Guinea to the Department of State¹**

Conakry, April 14, 1972, 1318Z.

470. Subj: Comite of 24. Ref Conakry 467.²

1. Summary: Comite of 24 and staff departed Conakry early morning Apr 14 by Air Guinea for Monrovia and connecting flight. Unprecedented direct Comite contact with PAIGC and its leaders, including first visit of a UN group to "liberated" territory, greatly enhanced PAIGC status. Comite resolution (reftel), adopted unanimously, gave PAIGC virtually everything it asked for and is likely to be followed by increased material and moral support in months to come. Following preliminary observations and impressions emerge from brief informal talks with cross-section of Comite of 24 and staff, colleagues and GOG officials. End Summary.

2. First, it is generally agreed visit was huge success for PAIGC which got virtually everything it wanted, e.g., recognition as "only and authentic" rep of the people of Guinea-Bissau and "request" to all states and UN to take this into account. According to UN staff official, GOG pushed harder than PAIGC for diplomatic recognition, going even beyond what UN understood OAU had asked for. Only PRC, Soviets and their friends voiced dissatisfaction with the resolution because it did not condemn NATO allies by name and strongly enough for assisting Portugal. However, in interest of obtaining unanimous agreement, Soviets and PRC sacrificed this point of substance.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USIA, Dakar, Lisbon, Monrovia, and USUN.

² Telegram 467 from Conakry, April 13, described a resolution unanimously adopted by the Committee of 24 that recognized the Liberation Movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) as the sole representative of the people of these territories and called on all UN member states, specialized agencies, and other organizations to render "all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence." (Ibid.)

3. As for diplomatic recognition, it appears PAIGC was principally interested in obtaining assurances it would be forthcoming; however, they reportedly want to control the timing, in harmony with OAU according to one UN staffer. Timing will depend upon conclusion of series of elections now in progress scheduled to culminate in proclamation in "about six months" of "national assembly."

4. In practical terms, PAIGC's enhanced popularity and diplomatic support is certain to lead to additional material assistance. UN specialized agencies will be under increasing pressure to help the PAIGC. Several countries, e.g. Sweden, noted increased contributions. Swedish rep expected its govt contribution for next year to go from \$2.4 million to \$3 million. PAIGC already receives \$900,000 which, Swedish del noted, being disproportionate to size of territory or number of people involved, was a tribute to PAIGC.

5. Perhaps most serious consequence of meetings for US is apparent unquestioning acceptance by all delegations that, without aid from its NATO allies, Portugal's policies of "domination and oppression" in Portuguese territories could not continue. Since US and NATO are virtually synonymous in people's minds, the US is clearly regarded as principal source of such support, even if not mentioned by name. Our argument that there is no proven case where Portugal has used either NATO or bilaterally-supplied arms in Afrik falls on deaf ears; inevitable counter argument is that by aiding Portugal militarily, or even economically, we liberate resources which latter can use in Africa. Interestingly, the subject of Vietnam, or US role there, was strikingly absent from discussions.

6. Conclusion. PAIGC has been given significant moral and promised important material support as a result of Comite meetings. Sec-Gen Amilcar Cabral's stature has been enormously enhanced. PAIGC and GOG pleas for more help for PAIGC were echoed by virtually all Comite members. One can only conclude that prospects for even wider support have been immeasurably strengthened.

Norland

78. **Airgram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State¹**

A-76

Lusaka, May 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

UN Decolonization Committee Meeting in Lusaka

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

From April 17 to 21 the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization met at Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka. The Zambian Government received the Committee warmly. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Timothy Kankasa gave a party for the Committee members and, later in the week, President Kaunda hosted a dinner for them. At the State House dinner, the President disclosed that on April 17 Portuguese airplanes had violated Zambian airspace near Chadiza in Eastern Province.

In his speech opening the Committee's hearings, Kankasa criticized NATO assistance to Portugal and attacked the import of Rhodesian chrome by the United States. In their appearance before the Committee, spokesmen of the national liberation movements urged that the UN specialized agencies grant them assistance for education and health care. At the conclusion of its stay in Lusaka, the Committee issued a communiqué containing resolutions condemning Portugal and calling on her to withdraw from her African territories.

Zambia's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs opened the Decolonization Committee's meeting in Lusaka with a speech on April 17. In his address, Kankasa said that Zambia stands side by side with Tanzania in her struggle against the racist regimes in southern Africa. Referring to Portugal's bombing of a Tanzanian village near the Mozambique border, he stated that "Zambia supports the Tanzanian peoples' refusal to bow down before Portugal's oppression." Kankasa also attacked members of NATO for their continued support of Portugal. He observed that "there appears to be growing a very dangerous trend to allow economic considerations to take the upper hand in decisions taken in some Western capitals." Kankasa asserted that the recent United States legislation to authorize the import of Rhodesian chrome

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Unclassified. Drafted by R. C. Reis and approved by Deputy Chief of Mission Arthur T. Tienken. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Lisbon, Pretoria, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, and USUN.

"was based on economic and selfish grounds." He termed the United States' violation of UN sanctions "unforgiveable."

Responding to Kankasa's speech, the Tanzanian Chairman of the Decolonization Committee, Salim Ahmed Salim, expressed the Committee's pleasure to be in Lusaka and outlined the week's agenda. Salim called attention to the visit of three Committee members to the "liberated areas" of Guinea-Bissau and said, "The mission has in fact dealt a decisive blow to the Portuguese propaganda machinery by bringing vividly to the attention of the international community the true situation in the territory and making it abundantly clear that the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands is both inevitable and imminent." In a Committee session later in the week Salim remarked that it would be "a step in the right direction, and a return to sanity" if the United States reimposed a bar on the import of Rhodesian chrome.

The first freedom group to appear before the Decolonization Committee was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Pascal Luvuala, a member of MPLA's central committee, repeated an invitation, extended earlier, to Committee members to visit the "liberated areas of Angola."

Luvuala said that the guerrilla conflict in Angola has turned into total war with 287 Portuguese killed in the last five months. He criticized Western nations for indirectly helping Portugal maintain its colonial wars through NATO. Luvuala asked the Committee to recognize the MPLA as the sole Angolan liberation movement and called for aid to MPLA-controlled areas in Angola from UN specialized agencies. Another MPLA member claimed in his testimony that Portuguese serving in Angola had been sent to the United States for "psycho-political propaganda training."

In his four hours before the Decolonization Committee, FRELIMO Vice President Marcellino dos Santos said that his organization had not been able to halt construction on the Cabora Bassa dam but was making it very costly. He claimed that 2900 Portuguese were killed in Mozambique in 1971. Like the MPLA spokesman, dos Santos asked the UN specialized agencies to grant the liberation movements aid for education and health care. The FRELIMO leader stated that the freedom fighters in Mozambique were willing to negotiate with the Portuguese provided that the Portuguese recognized the right of the Mozambican people to self-determination and independence. Dos Santos invited members of the UN committee to send observers to the liberated areas of Mozambique.

COREMO's President, Paulo Gumane, called on the UN Decolonization Committee to become more practical in passing and implementing its resolutions. He charged that active support from NATO

countries has enabled Portuguese settlers in Mozambique to step up efforts to build new military bases.

Calling on the UN to establish a special fund to support the armed struggle for Zimbabwe, Edward Ndhlovu, the Deputy National Secretary of ZAPU, rejected the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Such an agreement, he asserted, would be designed only to protect Britain's political and economic interests in Rhodesia.

In his statement to the Committee, SWAPO's Administrative Secretary, Moses Garoeb, accused Malawi and Lesotho of collaborating with South Africa and causing a setback for freedom in Africa. Garoeb alleged that soon after African workers in Namibia went on strike early this year, large numbers of laborers from Lesotho and Malawi were brought into the territory. Garoeb charged that South Africa broke the strike by mass intimidations, arrests, deportations, and internments of Namibian workers. The SWAPO official scoffed at UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's visit to Namibia, calling it "a guided tour organized by the South African Government." Garoeb asked the UN to give SWAPO financial aid, medicine, propaganda facilities, and scholarships. He noted that while he would like to see a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem, "the reality of the situation indicates that we are not going to have one."

At its final session, the Decolonization Committee issued a communiqué containing a number of resolutions passed during its week in Lusaka. The communiqué states that the Decolonization Committee resolved to consult with the OAU and the liberation movements concerned on sending UN missions to liberated areas in Angola and Mozambique. Another resolution calls on "all states and specialized agencies and other organizations within the UN system" to give the national liberation movements all necessary moral and material assistance. Portugal is condemned for its "repeated violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African states bordering its colonial territories, in particular for its recent act of aggression committed against Tanzania." The Committee called upon the Portuguese government "to cease forthwith all military operations and other repressive measures against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, and to withdraw . . . all its forces from these territories" in accord with previous UN resolutions. Another resolution urges other nations to stop all military aid and arms sales to Portugal and to discourage their nationals from doing business in the Portuguese territories. The final resolution draws the attention of the UN Security Council to the "explosive situation" in the Portuguese territories caused by Portugal's disregard of past UN resolutions. It urges the Security Council to take "further effective measures" to insure the compliance of Portugal with these resolutions.

The Zambian press gave the Decolonization Committee's visit thorough coverage. Each day the *Zambia Daily Mail* and *Times of Zambia* carried articles summarizing the previous day's testimony. On April 19 both newspapers printed photographs of members of the UN team which visited Guinea-Bissau looking at an "American made" bomb dropped in a village in Guinea-Bissau. In an editorial on April 22, the *Times of Zambia* said that the Committee has been criticized for not having freed any territories. The *Times* observed that while some criticism is justified, most is based on a misunderstanding of the Committee's mandate and the "severe obstacles placed in its way by members of NATO." The Committee's main task, the newspaper said, is to accelerate the decolonization process and to supplement the efforts of the liberation movements. "The freedom fighters must be made to understand that it is their responsibility to achieve it" (freedom). In his statement marking the close of the Decolonization Committee's meeting in Lusaka, Timothy Kankasa agreed with the *Times*. He said that the responsibility for delivering the final blow against colonial rule in Africa rested with the oppressed peoples themselves. "We do not want talking freedom fighters but fighting freedom fighters."

Troxel

79. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 19, 1972, 2233Z.

3355. Subj: Colonialism in GA: Item 23: National Liberation Movements.

1. Understand from reliable source in Secretariat that AF's are planning to seek priority for item 23 which is general item on colonialism. Item which normally discussed towards end of GA may now be discussed as early as October. Reason for AF desire have item 23 discussed early is in order to have it discussed when AF FonMins are in town.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

2. ALs understand there possibility AF's will seek have national liberation movements of Southern Africa and Guinea Bissau seated as observers during discussion of item 23 as well as during discussion of Southern Africa issues in Fourth Comite.

3. Department will recall that members of national liberation movements appeared before Fourth Comite as petitioners, but so far have not been invited to sit as observers in same capacity as OAU or observer nations. If there move in this direction, believe it will be necessary to seek legal advice of Secretariat on this matter. Main problem of course will be, if PAIGC accepted as observer, that there may be attempts to get it recognized as government in exile. Department's views requested.²

Bush

² The Department replied on September 25 that neither this telegram nor a letter from the Chairman of the Committee of 24 made clear what was envisioned by "observer" status. The Department was inclined to oppose granting observer status to groups other than well-recognized international organizations, and recommended that the Mission vote against granting that status if it implied officially recognizing them as representatives of the territories concerned. (Telegram 174972 to USUN, September 25; *ibid.*)

80. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 26, 1972, 1332Z.

3473. Subj: Comite Four: Invitation to National Liberation Movements To Sit in Observer Capacity. Ref: USUN 3355.²

1. At its first meeting September 25, Comite 4, after agreeing to take up Portuguese territories, SR and Namibia separately and in this order, discussed letter from chairman of Comite 24 requesting Comite 4 to allow reps of liberation movements to participate in observer capacity in examination of these questions. No action was taken on

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Priority.

² Document 79.

letter. Action expected take place September 27 at Comite 4's 10:30 meeting.

2. Re letter of chairman of Comite 24 (copy datafaxed UNP), South African and Portuguese reps protested granting observer status to liberation movements from Namibia and Port. Terrs. Portuguese rep requested legal opinion on this matter.

3. WE's on Comite in slight disarray on this item. UK has instructions to oppose granting observer status to reps of liberation movements, but at same time sees that, if there consensus, it would simply make reservations that only administering powers can determine who reps of territories should be. French, Italians, and Scans are perplexed as to what position to take. Scans in particular are troubled by stand taken by Sweden re PAIGC when Comite 24 met in Conakry this summer. French and Italians are undecided on whether they should vote against or abstain on recommendation from chairman of Comite 24.

4. After meeting, MisOff sought views of Tanaka (Secretariat) on chairman of Comite 24's letter. According Tanaka, reps of liberation movements would be those recognized by OAU. Status given them would be glorified status of petitioner, but would allow them to participate in debate. There would be no name plates indicating their affiliation. Reps would be in a reserved section of Comite hall. Tanaka also said that he had sought legal opinion and that Stavropoulos' office said that Comite was master of its own procedure and that any non-member could be invited in an observer capacity as long as he showed that he had a bona fide interest in the item under consideration. The granting of observer status would not confer any recognition on their status as either reps of the territories concerned or as a government. For these two latter points to occur, it would be necessary for Comite to adopt a res specifically changing status of individuals concerned. Reps would, however, be chosen in consultation with OAU and in fact national liberation movements represented would be those that are formally recognized by OAU. Understand from Tanaka that AF's accept this interpretation of granting of observer status to national liberation movement reps.

5. In light of these considerations and unless AF's do not seek put different interpretation on this question of granting observer status, US Del believes we can go along with granting observer status to these movements. Understand that there may be attempt to have consensus on matter. Believe, however, that in light of Portuguese and South African objections, matter may be pushed to vote. If there consensus, believe we could accept and perhaps make statement along lines outlined to MisOff by Tanaka. If there vote, believe US can support with similar statement. If on other hand there attempt to reinterpret

meaning of observer status, believe US should abstain, rather than vote against unless there appears be sufficient number of other dels outside of SA and Portugal voting against item. Request Dept's views soonest.³

Bush

³The Department advised that Bush should vote against the proposal and seek support from other Western countries on the grounds that there was no precedent for granting special status to non-governmental entities, that further examination of the implications was necessary, and that the groups in question already had been able to receive a full hearing as petitioners. (Telegram 176468 to USUN, September 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN) The Fourth Committee, however, voted on September 27 to grant observer status to representatives of national liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Portuguese territories. The vote was 78 to 13 (U.S.), with 16 abstentions. (Telegram 3515 from USUN, September 28; *ibid.*)

81. Editorial Note

The UN General Assembly held a series of plenary meetings between October 17 and November 2, 1972, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It adopted a series of resolutions on November 2. Resolution 2908 (XXVII) expressed concern that 12 years after the Declaration, “millions of persons still lived under conditions of ruthless colonialist and racist repression.” It reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggles for liberation of colonial peoples, particularly in Africa, and urged UN member states, agencies, and organizations to provide them with moral and material support and to withhold assistance to Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. Resolution 2909 (XXVII) called for a broader campaign of publicity on behalf of UN efforts to promote decolonization. Resolution 2910 (XXVII) requested that the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, convene an International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, to be held in Oslo in 1973. Resolution 2911 (XXVII) proclaimed the week beginning May 25, 1973, a Week of Solidarity with the Colonial Peoples of Southern Africa and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde Fighting for Freedom, Independence, and Equal Rights.

The United States voted against Resolution 2908 and abstained on the other three resolutions. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972*, pages 544–553; *U.S. Participation in the United Nations, 1972*, pages 182–183)

U.S. Position Papers and Assessments of General Assembly Sessions

82. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

Soviet Views on Issues of 24th UNGA

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations

Vorontsov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, invited me to lunch on August 7 at the Rive Gauche to discuss the pending General Assembly.

1. *Chinese Representation.* On the Chinese representation issue, he said he assumed there would be no real "fire" in the discussion this year and that the outcome would be pretty much like last year's. In this connection, he made some wry comments about recent U.S. statements looking to improved relations with Communist China and said these had not struck a happy note in Moscow in view of recent Chinese-Soviet border incidents. I pointed out that the U.S. statements were consistent with our long-term approach to the Chinese problem and were not calculated to take advantage of the heightened tension between the Soviet Union and China.

2. *Korea.* Vorontsov asked whether we foresaw the usual debate on Korea. I told him that some of our friends wonder whether it would be necessary this year to have the usual discussion on Korea and even suggested that perhaps it could be avoided. I said that we would, of course, consider that possibility but that a discussion could only be avoided if both sides cooperated. Vorontsov said he did not know Moscow's views but he too wondered whether it was necessary to press for any discussion of this question this year.

3. *Ministates.* In response to Vorontsov's request for an explanation of our approach to the question of ministates, I summarized briefly the U.S. position as it has been discussed in New York and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would look at the question in terms of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by De Palma.

its real interests and the interests of the U.N. and not merely in terms of scoring propaganda points with certain less-developed countries. Vorontsov thought that there was a genuine interest in this question in Moscow but felt that the Soviets would leave it to the U.S. to carry the brunt of the discussion.

4. *Disarmament.* Vorontsov then turned to disarmament questions and wondered what could be put before the General Assembly as an indication of progress in arms control and disarmament. He said that Foreign Minister Gromyko would want to have some “initiative” (he himself put the word in quotations) and disarmament might well be an area he would choose in his G.A. statement. Vorontsov, however, refused to speculate on what Gromyko might suggest other than to imply that something would have to be said in connection with the beginning of the Strategic Arms Talks and possibly on the seabeds arms control measure under discussion in the ENDC. He said he was certain that a date and place for SALT would soon be agreed upon and was awaiting word on this from Ambassador Dobrynin. (He said Dobrynin has been expected to return about the 15th, but the date had not yet been confirmed.)

When I expressed the view that the apparent unwillingness of the Soviet delegation to move from its original position in Geneva would make it impossible for ENDC to register much progress on the seabeds arms control treaty at this session, Vorontsov said that perhaps something could be done at the G.A. to bring our positions closer together. I agreed this was possible but reminded him of the joint interest I assumed both countries had in using the ENDC as a negotiating forum and hoped that some progress could be made there before the Assembly. He seemed to take it for granted that the Soviet position was negotiable as was that of the United States.

5. *Peacekeeping.* Finally, he alluded to the discussions on peacekeeping in New York. I said that we would be interested in some indication of a genuine Soviet interest to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping machinery. He said that this matter has attracted high level attention in Moscow, that the practical necessity of having a peacekeeping arrangement in mind in connection with a possible Middle East settlement might be an inducement to make progress in the talks in New York, but no progress could be made unless the United States was prepared to make a substantial accommodation to the Soviet position. I suggested that the prospect for progress would be enhanced if we both looked at the question in terms of the practical arrangements required to improve the efficiency of U.N. peacekeeping rather than in terms of past political developments and positions.

6. *Middle East.* In a brief aside regarding the Middle East talks initiated by Vorontsov’s statement that recent Israeli pronouncements were most unhelpful, I said I personally was still looking for some ev-

idence of Soviet willingness to lean on their friends. After asserting that the real question was the willingness of the U.S. to convince Israel to withdraw, Vorontsov said the USSR has put considerable pressure on the UAR and he thought that more pressure could be applied once the question of withdrawal is settled. I stressed the need for a firm and direct commitment by the Arabs to a permanent peace.

83. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs¹

Washington, undated.

24TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY—SCOPE AND MAJOR ISSUES

The 24th United Nations General Assembly, which opens on September 16, should not confront us with any new critical issues and—barring some additional major crises—should not differ substantially from recent Assemblies. It will deal with a familiar list of perennials and ongoing programs. Many key questions—Middle East, some aspects of disarmament, Asian regional security, Nigeria, and perhaps peacekeeping—will be discussed off stage but will be of major interest to the Assembly.

The atmosphere is somewhat better than last year when the invasion of Czechoslovakia underscored the UN's limitations in dealing with issues involving the vital interests of the superpowers. The President's policy of moving from confrontation to negotiation in superpower relations has been reassuring. Despite slow progress of the Paris negotiations, current US policies have reduced anxieties about Vietnam. The prospect of SALT talks—even with the disappointments of excessive expectations—will be welcomed in a body preoccupied with disarmament. The moon landing not only enhances US prestige, but has lifted spirits and raised hopes about man's ability to cope with problems of his environment.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential. Drafted in IO/NAP on September 10. An attached transmittal letter to Henry Kissinger signed by Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot is dated September 12. Airgram CA-4850, August 29, sent all posts a general assessment of the upcoming 24th session of the General Assembly and information on issues that might arise. Airgram CA-4891, September 2, identified for all posts the most significant economic, social, and human rights items on the provisional agenda, and airgram CA-5522, October 7, set out the items to be considered by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Committee Five). (All *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 3 GA)

The tone of recent Soviet utterances (and Moscow's preoccupation with China) presage a more muted East-West debate, though probably no Soviet concessions on hard issues. We see no sign that the Soviets want to rock the boat at this Assembly. Such initiatives as they may surface will probably be based on known Soviet positions, for example, banning chemical and biological warfare.

The underlying mood will be one of concern and deepening frustration that little progress has been made on key issues of interest to the smaller powers. Awareness that the poor and technologically backward societies are being left behind in the new era of technological achievement may lead to pressures in the Assembly for international arrangements that will protect their interests and give them a fair share of the potential benefits of outer space, seabeds and nuclear energy. Another main preoccupation will be whether the major developed powers are ready to make increased financial commitments to accelerate development during the second development decade. A third concern will be with working out an equitable balance of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers respecting disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy as related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There will be renewed efforts to move the West toward concrete support of African causes and hope for significant progress toward a Middle East settlement.

Attitudes toward the major powers are likely to be ambivalent. While wishing to avoid the tensions of the cold war and welcoming signs of major power cooperation, some of the smaller members resent what they consider to be big power collusion at their expense on certain aspects of disarmament, holding down UN budgets, inadequate development assistance, and a general neglect of their priorities.

Because the UN (especially the Security Council) cannot seem to secure "peace", and because the growing gap between the developed nations and the developing nations is increasingly evident in the UN setting, there is a corresponding tendency to look upon the UN primarily as a forum for pleading causes and bringing pressure to bear on the major powers.

The Assembly has not overcome the problems associated with its membership explosion. It is hampered by cumbersomeness and loquacity and by use of formal majorities to steamroller through unrealistic resolutions and vote programs with budgetary implications over the heads of major contributors on whom the organization must rely for effective action.

The policies and attitudes of the new United States Administration—toward the issues before the Assembly and toward strengthening the United Nations in general—will, of course, be watched with particular attention.

Middle East

The escalation of conflict and passions in the area, and the lack of significant progress in the Four Power and bilateral negotiations, have hardened Arab and Israeli positions and appear to have adversely affected the prospects of successful peacemaking. One or another aspect of the conflict has been before the Security Council almost continuously. The presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers and of the Middle Eastern States provides one of the remaining opportunities for making progress toward a peaceful settlement. If no progress is made, the Arabs may press for active consideration of the agenda item on the Middle East, which otherwise will probably not be discussed, with resultant polemics and extreme resolutions. The Arab refugee and human rights items will in any case almost certainly be marked by polemics which will not spare the United States.

Arms Control and Disarmament

The Assembly will again devote major attention to arms control issues. Key objectives for the United States are to build support for an approach to strategic arms talks and for the NPT, to deflect unhelpful constraints and criticisms on such issues as chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and to maintain the Assembly's support for the Disarmament Committee which we consider a more manageable forum than the Assembly for arms control negotiations. Evidence of substantive progress in Geneva on seabed arms control, coupled with the recent modest enlargement of the Committee and the prospective beginning of SALT talks, would help counter criticism about the restricted composition of the Geneva forum (and its dominance by the Big Two) as well as dissatisfaction with the slow progress in big power negotiations. In any event, there may be sentiment in the Assembly for calling a meeting of the 126-nation UN Disarmament Commission in 1970 which some countries see as a means of pressuring the superpowers to accelerate negotiation on nuclear as well as general disarmament, particularly in moving toward a comprehensive test ban and a ban on chemical and biological weapons. A possible Swedish or Soviet initiative on CBW could be troublesome for us.

Colonial-Racial Issues

These issues present increasing difficulties for us in the Assembly. The Afro-Asians are frustrated over the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to heed hortatory resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly on apartheid, Southern Africa and the Portuguese Territories, and disillusioned over the ineffectiveness of mandatory economic sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia. Given this mood, we can expect once again to find ourselves in a small minority of those opposing extreme Assembly resolutions calling on the

Security Council to impose sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, as well as for the use of force against the Rhodesian rebels.

In both the Assembly and the Council we have made it clear that we do not believe the application of mandatory sanctions to South Africa and Portugal would be effective or wise. However, our position is increasingly challenged as more Africans become disenchanting with the UN and seek a confrontation between members favoring political efforts and members inclined toward military liberation activities. As it becomes more difficult for us to demonstrate convincingly our disapproval of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa, United States interests in other parts of Africa are likely over time to be under increasing pressure. Confrontation with the Africans on this issue could also affect African support on other issues of concern to us.

Korea

A perennial East-West item, Korea, will occasion the usual polemics and resolutions. We had hoped this year to avoid the annual time-consuming wrangle over Korea by avoiding inscription on the agenda, but the USSR and other supporters of North Korea have now inscribed their items calling for the withdrawal of United Nations forces and the dissolution of the UN Commission for Korea. Despite the Assembly's weariness with the question and failure of many newer countries to appreciate the issue, we expect that with extensive lobbying the Assembly will again adopt resolutions that maintain South Korea's position.

Chinese Representation

Canadian and Italian moves toward recognition of Peking are not likely initially to alter the Assembly's basic arithmetic on Chinese representation, largely because of Communist China's unresponsive policies and a widespread feeling—specifically shared by the Soviets—that this is not a propitious time for change. While we are thus reasonably confident of defeating the annual attempt to substitute Peking for Taipei in the United Nations, we cannot rule out the possibility of embarrassing initiatives from some of our friends who are under domestic pressure and interested in testing the limits of current US policy for diplomatic, cultural and economic openings to Communist China. These possible initiatives, which would focus on the desirability of Communist China's admission rather than Nationalist China's expulsion, could present us with a most difficult situation.

UN Peacekeeping

Deep differences over future arrangements for peacekeeping remain unresolved and the deficit resulting from the Soviet-French refusal to pay their assessments for the Congo and Middle East opera-

tions unliquidated. In recent months some progress has been made in the peacekeeping committee (established by the Assembly in 1965) on guidelines for observer missions (as against those involving organized contingents), mainly as a result of quiet exchanges between us and the Soviets. The Assembly will thus be in a position to register some degree of progress and routinely continue the mandate of the peacekeeping committee. Further private US-Soviet exchanges will be required to determine whether progress can be made on arrangements involving military contingents and on the financial question.

Development Decade

We will be under pressure throughout the Assembly on our trade and aid policies, particularly our reluctance to commit ourselves at this stage to larger contributions to development. The focus will be Assembly discussion of plans for the Second Development Decade. The poor countries are increasingly frustrated at the inability or refusal of the major developed powers to speed economic solutions and suspect them of becoming less interested and less generous in helping the poor. The majority—not confined to the developing nations—is pressing for major new international commitments in both trade and aid before the decade starts.

Our view—shared by many of the other developed countries—is that the decade should be primarily a vehicle for better coordination of UN development efforts, more effective and sophisticated use of available and prospective resources (in terms of funds, human resources, and family planning) and generating public backing. Our difficulty is that while we have publicly favored an enlarged role for multilateral institutions (IBRD, regional development banks and an increase in our contribution to UNDP), our policies regarding the magnitude of our foreign aid in general and the question of tariff preferences are still under consideration.

Human Environment

One of the newest and most hopeful areas of UN cooperation is the field of human environment. Last year the Assembly broke new ground by expressing the concern of member states over the threat to the quality of the environment and decided to schedule an international conference on the subject in Stockholm in 1972. We have an opportunity at the 24th Assembly to suggest specific areas of international cooperation on such problems as urban planning, housing and community service, air pollution, water supply, and land utilization.

Budget

Partly as a result of pressures from the Big Four, the Secretary General's budget for 1970, which will be presented to the Assembly, has

been kept to \$164.1 million, about 6% over the 1969 appropriation. We consider this the tightest and the best budget in years. However, there will be strong pressures for additions from the developing countries, and because of the substantial reduction in surpluses from prior years, a greater proportion of the 1970 budget will have to be met from new assessments. As a result, the US contribution may be almost 10 percent higher than for 1969, or about \$45.5 million. We must therefore continue our efforts to effect economies wherever and however possible.

An additional concern this year is likely to be the drive to alter the UN percentage scale of assessments so as to give additional relief to the poor nations. We will have a tough time in defending the present assessment criteria, which include the principle of a ceiling of 30 percent on the largest assessment (the US). Any increase in our assessment percentage would provoke a strong Congressional reaction.

Of major importance to us will be Assembly consideration of a proposal by the Secretary General to expand the UN Headquarters facilities in New York at a cost of \$60 million. Approval of this measure is required if New York is to remain the focal point of UN activities and important elements of the Secretariat are not to be moved abroad. It is unlikely that the Assembly will approve the proposal and vote funds (\$15 million) for the expansion unless the United States is prepared to make some kind of a commitment to contribute a matching \$15 million.

Other

Among other items likely to be formally or informally considered during the Assembly, the following are of particular interest:

Microstates. In our efforts to check the extension of full membership to newly independent small entities, we initiated Security Council consideration of the microstates problem as a step toward Assembly discussion of some form of associate status for microstates. The Council appointed an expert committee of the whole to study the matter, leaving open the possibility of later inscribing such an item on the Assembly's agenda.

Nigeria will probably not be formally considered despite widespread concern about the civil war. There is little disposition to override the desire of the Africans and the Secretary General to keep the issue outside the UN except for cooperation on relief. The Assembly may provide openings to enlist the delegations in diplomatic efforts toward promoting a settlement and improving relief operations.

Seabeds. We want to marshal support for a set of principles and arrangements governing exploration and exploitation of the seabeds in the area beyond national jurisdiction. However, sentiment among the developing countries is swinging toward concentration on establish-

ing international machinery as a means of helping to ensure that they will participate in exploitation and obtain a just share of benefits. We hope the Assembly will not press important substantive seabeds issues to a vote, but refer them back to the 42-member Seabeds Committee.

Outer Space. The Assembly will have before it a report of the Outer Space Committee dealing with the still unnegotiated liability convention and with use of satellites for direct broadcast. With respect to satellite broadcasting, many countries fear that the space powers will misuse this technology for propaganda purposes, and call for international controls on program content. We understand their concerns, but believe these should be balanced against world interest in freedom of information. We expect the debate to be manageable, and that the Committee's mandate will be continued.

Human Rights. We will again support the proposal for establishing a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to spotlight human rights violations throughout the world and render assistance to states requesting it. The Soviets have opposed the idea because of the vulnerability of closed Communist societies to such exposure but we believe this proposal could materially improve protection of human rights throughout the world.

International Education Year (IEY). The Secretary General will report on preparations for observing the International Education Year in 1970. We expect a consensus that the IEY is primarily an occasion for action by the member states to improve and expand their educational systems.

Tourism. The less developed countries are pressing for establishment of a new intergovernmental tourism organization. The resumed session of ECOSOC this fall is expected to refer to the Assembly a report of the Secretary General on the constitutional, organizational and financial implications of establishing such an organization. We prefer to strengthen the International Union of Official Travel Organizations rather than establish a new organization.

Declaration on Social Progress and Development. We hope this General Assembly will complete an acceptable Declaration, extensively considered last year, intended to define the objectives of social development and the methods and means of achieving it. We hope to compromise a contentious Soviet proposal related to the Arab-Israeli dispute that compensation be made for economic and social damages "caused as a result of aggression and of illegal occupation of territory by the aggressor."

Youth. The General Assembly will consider a quite satisfactory report of the Secretary General on strengthening and coordinating existing programs of international action relating to youth which was considered by the recent session of ECOSOC.

We expect to have problems with a possible Soviet-Bulgarian proposal that the Assembly adopt a far-reaching “Declaration on Youth” covering economic, political, cultural and human rights and containing politically-slanted provisions.

84. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

State Department Paper on 24th UN General Assembly

Attached for your information is a State Department piece on the scope and major issues likely to arise in the United Nations General Assembly this fall.² Roger Morris canvassed the operators before the President’s UN speech and they found no egregious errors in this paper.

I see no reason to forward this to the President or for you to read it fully. Summarized below are the unsurprising major highlights.

General. There should be no new critical issues, barring unforeseen crises. The menu consists of traditional dishes. The general atmosphere should be better, thanks to a year’s blurring of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the President’s Vietnam initiatives and emphasis on negotiation over confrontation, and the prospects of SALT.

Soviets. Neither concessions on gut issues or major boat-rocking. A more muted East-West debate.

Smaller Powers. Deepening frustration over lack of progress on issues that concern them. They want the developed countries to share the technological fruits of the space/nuclear age, to help accelerate economic development in the third world, to be serious about disarmament. Given the UN’s peace-securing limitations, there is a growing tendency to regard it primarily as a forum to plead causes and exert pressures on the major powers.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on September 30.

² Document 83.

Membership Explosion. The Assembly is hampered by cumbersome, loquacity and the use of formal majorities to steamroller through unrealistic resolutions and vote programs with budgetary implications over the heads of major contributors on whom the organization must rely for effective action.

Middle East. The Security Council will undoubtedly have its share of crisis meetings and there will be traditional Arab refugee and human rights polemics. Any meaningful discussions on the Arab-Israeli problem will of course take place off stage.

Arms Control. This will be a major theme. We will attempt to maintain Assembly support of the Geneva Disarmament Committee as being a more manageable forum than the Assembly. Our task will be eased if a seabeds treaty looks likely and SALT talks begin. The Soviet (and other) initiatives on CBW could be the most troublesome for us.

Colonial-Racial Issues. We will once again find ourselves in a small minority opposing extreme Assembly resolutions calling on the Security Council to impose sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, as well as for the use of force against the Rhodesian rebels. (*Comment:* regardless of the merit of such resolutions or of our having influence in black Africa, I do believe that this Administration seriously underestimates the explosive impact that black-white African issues are likely to have on the American domestic scene in the 1970s. I think that once Vietnam winds down, our policy toward South Africa and company will be a major target of American blacks and youth.)

Korea. Once again on the agenda despite our efforts. With extensive lobbying we should defeat communist resolutions calling for withdrawal of UN forces and the dissolution of the UN Commission for Korea.

Chinese Representation. We are reasonably confident of defeating the annual attempt to substitute Peking for Taipei, but some of our friends might embarrass us with more subtle initiatives that seek to test the limits of this Administration's fresh China policy.

Other Issues. The more significant problems among those touched in the paper include: some limited progress with the Soviets on *UN peacekeeping* concepts; general pressure on us to liberalize our trade and aid policies in light of the *Second Development Decade*; UN cooperation in the field of *human environment* (a theme of the President's speech); the *UN budget* and expansion of the *Headquarters* in New York; and our initiative on checking the extension of full membership to *microstates*.

**85. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, October 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Political Committee Issues in General Assembly

In response to a suggestion of Mr. Winston Lord, the agenda items to be taken up in the First (Political) Committee of the General Assembly are listed below, together with an estimation of the dates between which they will be discussed and a brief assessment of the problems which they pose for the United States.

1. Soviet Omnibus Item on Strengthening International Security (October 10–24)

This is mainly a propaganda item in which the USSR is seeking to have the Assembly endorse Soviet formulations on a wide range of issues. It seems generally to be recognized as such by the General Assembly membership. We will attempt to dispose of the Soviet proposal in some way which avoids a vote at this Assembly session. No important policy questions are likely to arise.

2. Korean Invitation Item (October 27–28)

The issue is whether to invite both North and South Korea unconditionally to attend the substantive debate on the UN's role in Korea, or to condition the invitation to North Korea on Pyongyang's acceptance of UN jurisdiction in the question. We expect that, as in the past, our proposal for a conditional invitation will be adopted.

3. Seabeds Item (October 29–November 7)

We will endeavor to have the Committee, following a general discussion of the various issues involved in the Seabeds question (except arms limitation), refer the problem to the Seabeds Committee for further study. We expect no major issues to arise.

4. Korean Substantive Item (November 11–12)

We expect that the Committee will, as in the past, adopt the resolution which we favor reaffirming the UN's role and presence in South Korea, and defeat resolutions calling for the withdrawal of UN forces

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Confidential. According to an attached memorandum from Winston Lord, the memorandum was transmitted to Kissinger on October 24.

and for the dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

5. *Disarmament Items (November 12–December 12)*

There are two Agenda items on disarmament questions:

- a) a catchall which includes the report of the Conference of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and certain standard arms control issues such as comprehensive test ban, as well as problems related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy arising out of the NPT; and
- b) a special item on chemical and biological warfare.

The order in which these will be taken up is not yet agreed. This complex of issues will be the most difficult Committee I question for the US. The principal focus in the general disarmament item will be on the draft Seabeds Arms Control Treaty which will be submitted, whether entirely agreed as yet or not, in the report of the CCD. Here, as elsewhere in discussions under these items, there will be some criticism of the US and USSR for not proceeding with nuclear disarmament and for what some nations consider to be highhanded tactics in pressuring other forms of arms control through the CCD and the Assembly. There may be attempts to amend the Seabeds Treaty, and depending on the state of completion of the draft we will hope either to get Assembly endorsement of an acceptable draft or to have the issues referred back to the CCD.

The most troublesome problem is likely to be CBW. Particularly if our domestic policy review is not completed, or if completed does not satisfy the hopes of foreign governments for a cutback in these weapons, we may have to deal with far-going draft resolutions prohibiting the use of CBW, including tear gas and herbicides. Tactics in New York will have to be coordinated with the policy formulation process in Washington. We hope to have the various proposals regarding CBW referred back to the CCD for study.

6. *Outer Space Item (December 15–16)*

The principal substantive issue is the completion of the convention on liability for damage resulting from the launching of objects into outer space, which has been under negotiation for several years and may well not be ready for Assembly approval at this session. We also plan to introduce some specific proposals regarding resource survey satellites in following up the President's General Assembly speech. Neither subject will confront us with any major difficulty.

Robert L. Brown²

² Brown signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

86. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Highlights of the 24th United Nations General Assembly

At Tab A is a State Department message to all diplomatic posts which gives a useful rundown of the principal events of this fall's United Nations General Assembly session.² Following are the major highlights.

General. The three month session was relatively quiet with no particular issue dominant. It demonstrated once again both the UN's usefulness for public and private diplomacy and its limitations as a legislative body. A good deal of the attention was focussed on preparations for this year's 25th Anniversary. The Assembly was marked by a more muted East-West atmosphere, some quiet U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and a growing revolt of the smaller countries against the large, wealthy, nuclear nations.

*Your September Speech.*³ Your address served both to reaffirm American support for the world body and to lay out some concrete, non-ideological tasks on which there has already been some movement. The Assembly passed a resolution urging nations to take effective actions against air hijacking; encouraged the sharing of benefits on earth resource surveying techniques; established a Preparatory Commission for the 1972 International Conference on Environment in Stockholm; and spurred preparations for the Second Development Decade.

Seabeds, CBW and Disarmament. This was the most striking area of small nation rebellion against the superpowers. A resolution was adopted, over U.S. and Soviet opposition, providing for a moratorium on claims and *exploitation of seabeds* beyond national jurisdiction pending establishment of an international regime. The draft *seabeds disarmament* treaty was referred back to the Geneva disarmament talks, there being insufficient time to incorporate small power changes and obtain Assembly endorsement. A Mexican resolution passed (U.S. and Soviets abstained) welcoming *SALT* talks but calling for a preliminary moratorium on testing and development of new strategic systems. An omnibus *CBW* resolution, co-sponsored by the U.S., the Soviets and others,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Limited Official Use. Sent for information.

² Airgram CA-6802, December 22; attached but not printed.

³ See footnote 4, Document 12.

unanimously referred all action proposals, including a Soviet draft and the UK Biological Convention, back to Geneva. A Swedish resolution passed decisively (only the U.S., Australia and Portugal opposed with most Western Europeans abstaining) which intends to declare the use of tear gas and herbicides as contrary to international law under the Geneva Protocol.

New York Headquarters Expansion. We scored a major success in our effort to keep UN activities focussed in New York when the Assembly authorized the construction of an additional Secretariat office building in New York, provided an appropriate financial package can be assembled. This was made possible largely due to two of your recent decisions: your intention to request \$20 million in the FY 1971 budget for this project and your submission of the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities to the Senate. There is still great opposition to New York expansion from communist nations, Arabs, France and black Africans for several reasons, including the inconveniences and expenses of New York, the belief that social-economic units should be in Geneva, and straight politics.

25th Anniversary. For 1970 the Assembly decided upon a short commemorative General Assembly session culminating on October 24 and attended by many Heads of State; endorsed the convening of a World Youth Assembly for ten days in July in New York; and adopted various preparatory documents. (Secretary Rogers will soon be sending you his recommendations with regard to the UN's Anniversary, including a proposal that you appoint a Commission of outstanding private citizens to advise and publicize the U.S. role.)

Perennial Issues. There were few surprises on the major traditional questions. Our victory margin on *Chinese representation* was narrowed by six votes (the Albanian resolution was defeated 48-56 with 21 abstentions), with the Soviets playing a passive role. We maintained traditional margins on the *Korean questions*, including continuation of the UN role. There was some quiet progress with the Soviets in devising outlines for UN *peacekeeping* observer missions. *Southern Africa* and *colonialism* issues generally followed the pattern of recent years. The Assembly, including the U.S., welcomed the moderate Lusaka manifesto, in which the black Africans prefer non-violent solutions to southern African questions. In addition to the private *Middle East* talks, there was bitter public debate on refugees and Palestine, and concern over the fedayeen role in refugee camps served by UNRWA. There was generally constructive progress on the preparation for the Second Development Decade, including the Pearson Commission Report on foreign aid and a hard-hitting study by Sir Robert Jackson (Australia) on the UN's capacity in the *economic/social* field. *Human Rights* action included our focus on the plight of Vietnam POWs and movement toward establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

87. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 26, 1970, 2120Z.

533. Subj: 25th GA—Measures To Improve Assembly's Work Methods.

1. Department will recall that in document circulated last Dec. (A/7633), Canada proposed that 25th GA consider initiation of study GA workings and noted that one way pursue matter might be establish committee of three wise men to examine procedures and practices and report to 26th GA with any appropriate recommendations for improvements.

2. With reference this proposed initiative, USRep has received letter dated March 12 from Canadian PermRep indicating intention convene small informal group in near future to consider ideas for improving GA procedures, with broader consultations to be carried out later in an effort to secure general agreement on desirable modifications prior 25th GA. In addition Canada and US, small group is to include PermReps of Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden and UK.

3. In participating these discussions we propose take general position along following lines:

A. We regard 25th GA as highly appropriate occasion take action designed streamline procedures and practices in light extensive experience to date, with view maximizing GA's effectiveness, economizing on time and minimizing duplication and overlapping.

B. We tend believe that adoption initiative this direction likely be facilitated if proposed by middle and small powers, although we have no strong views on this and would ourselves be prepared co-sponsor if friendlies consider this would be helpful.

C. While extensive consultations in advance upcoming GA which Canadians have in mind may reveal widespread agreement on a few specific reform measures which could be readily adopted in 25th session, it seems impracticable for 25th GA itself undertake general review of procedures and arrangements and come up with worthwhile and generally acceptable reforms. Consequently, we believe that focus of initiative at 25th GA should relate to establishment of machinery to undertake review and report to 26th GA in 1971.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use.

D. We would favor having 25th GA establish working group as small as feasible but representative enough to offer prospect that group's recommendations can command adequate support in 26th GA. Therefore we would doubt advisability of confining group to three wise men. More practicable size likely approximate that of General Committee (namely 25) appointment of which might best be left to GA President following informal consultations as appropriate. (We would assume membership would include Big Four.)

E. It would seem appropriate for President 25th GA (presumably Hambro of Norway) to serve as chairman Committee on Procedural Reforms.

F. Also with view promoting general acceptability of Committee's conclusions, it would be appropriate for resolution this subject to provide that comments of governments should be solicited in advance Committee's meetings and taken into account in its deliberations.

4. If Dept. agreeable proceeding along foregoing lines, it may be useful at some point brief 25th Anniversary Presidential Commission on exercise and invite commission members to submit informally to Dept, in time to be factored into US submission to GA working group, any specific ideas they may have for improving GA operations.

5. Mission would appreciate comments ASAP on foregoing and, re para 3(C) above, any ideas Dept. may have on specific reforms which could be enacted by 25th GA.

Yost

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 2, 1970, 0036Z.

47868. Subj: 25th GA—Measures to Improve Assembly's Work Methods. Ref: USUN 533.²

1. Dept concurs it would be impractical for 25th GA itself undertake broad review of Assembly's work methods and therefore

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Virginia F. Hartley, cleared by John A. Armitage, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Document 87.

welcomes Canadian proposal for preliminary consultations looking toward general agreement on desirable modifications prior 25th GA.

2. If out of extensive consultations Canadians propose, widespread agreement develops on even a few specific reforms that could be adopted by 25th GA, or if these consultations indicate likelihood widespread agreement given more time for intensive study, Dept believes initiative at 25th GA to establish machinery for further review and report to 26th GA worthwhile. If, however, general reaction to Canadian initiative equivocal, then Dept doubts usefulness (on basis results from last committee on same subject (1962–63)) establishment Committee on GA Procedural Reforms since its chances of real accomplishment would be slight and the impact of its mere establishment, in Dept's view, minimal. Dept would therefore prefer reserve judgment with respect focus any initiative this matter at 25th GA pending outcome proposed consultations.

3. Otherwise Dept concurs in general position outlined para 3 reftel.

4. We would be interested in Mission's ideas re specific reforms that might be adopted by 25th GA, as Mission clearly in best position judge not only what is needed but what it is practical to attempt. Dept will also be interested in what surfaces as result Canadian consultations.

Rogers

89. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 16, 1970, 1803Z.

681. Measures To Improve GA Work Methods. (A) State 47868, (B) USUN 533,² (C) USUN 578.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use.

² Documents 87 and 88.

³ Telegram 578 from USUN reads: "In addition to points raised in reftel [USUN 533] we will of course press energetically for initial step of reallocating items relating to science and technology to new main comite of the GA as set forth in our note to SYG of 16 March pursuant to DepAir A-51." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA)

1. Improvement GA procedures and practices seems to us important enough to GA's effectiveness to warrant continuing effort this direction, and GA decision to undertake general and systematic review seven years after last such exercise, and in context UN's 25th anniversary, would be timely and desirable.

2. While we are not optimistic about outcome, neither do we think excessive pessimism is justified. Meager results from 1962-63 general review should not rule out new attempt seven-eight years later. Last review took place at inauspicious time, on heels of membership explosion which admitted large number new states constituting one-fifth of current membership. These new states have hopefully now had sufficient exposure to parliamentary procedure to make them appreciate need for reform and able contribute more usefully toward review. Moreover, many speakers 25th anniversary GA seem certain to refer to need for reforms and to advocate some specific measures, some good and some bad. In any case, if interest in reform is to grow and not evaporate, some kind of machinery should be provided to permit orderly consideration of suggestions put forward on occasion 25th GA.

3. Therefore, while we agree we should encourage friendlies to direct their pre-GA efforts toward securing agreement on few specific measures which could be adopted by 25th GA rather than exclusively on establishment of review machinery, we do not believe that we should reserve our position on latter nor make our support for it contingent upon agreement being reached or in early prospect on specific reforms.

4. Re para 4, Ref A, one specific reform which we propose press at 25th GA, and effectuate at that session if at all possible, is cited Ref C. As Dept. aware, this measure is directed toward rationalization of comite structure and provides for reallocation of (non-disarmament) agenda items on science and technology to single and possibly renamed main comite. We plan utilize occasion forthcoming friendlies' meeting being convened by Canada to solicit support for this reform and to invite suggestions as to how we might best proceed in GA.

5. Set forth below are additional suggestions for reforms, all aimed at single purpose of saving GA's time. We believe it would be worthwhile for 25th GA to adopt these reforms and would also plan mention them at friendlies' meeting. Whether these measures can attract necessary support would be revealed during course extensive pre-GA consultations of type Canadians have in mind. General acceptance of these and similar reform measures would be enhanced if put forward on limited basis, e.g., that they would be put into effect for two-year trial period only, beginning with 26th GA, and would be subject review 28th session. We propose so note to friendlies and to suggest that group focus on developing program of few measures for adoption 25th GA which might be put to others on this limited basis.

6. Such measures could include following:

A. Arrange for outgoing General Comite to meet shortly prior to new GA to formulate recommendations to new GA re such organizational matters as (I) meeting schedule, (II) establishment of deadline for closing speakers' list for general debate, (III) inclusion in agenda of items on provisional and supplementary agendas as well as "urgent and important" items proposed prior GA convening date pursuant Rule 15, (IV) allocation of items to committees and plenary, (V) closing date for 25th session. As part of this, General Comite would be enjoined, taking into account proposed closing date for session, to review agenda paying particular heed to possibility afforded by Rule 40 of recommending deferral items and their inclusion in provisional agenda of subsequent GA. To preserve original geographic balance, makeup of "old GC" would have to allow for substitutes for old GC members elected as individuals, i.e. pres and comite chairmen, in event latter unable attend. Substitutes should logically be reps of member states from which these officials were elected.

B. Establish "target" time limits of 40 minutes for general debate speeches and 15 minutes for plenary explanations of vote, with dels having option in both cases extend remarks in verbatim record up to maximum of 10 double-spaced pages.

7. Dept will recognize both of above arrangements as adaptations developed from our review of suggestions advanced by various govts. In connection 1962 general review of GA procedures and of time-saving innovations used by certain of SAs. Re latter, arrangement suggested in B above is adapted from procedure utilized with marked success by last three World Health Assemblies. Limited steps along foregoing lines would admittedly save only small amount GA's time. However, they should serve to start ball rolling in direction procedural reform and to set stage for general review and adoption more substantial measures at subsequent GA sessions, presumably on recommendation of review mechanism of kind described Ref B.

Yost

90. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

New York, June 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Content of U.S. Statement at Opening of the 25th General Assembly

Pursuant to our conversation last week,² I transmit herewith a list of subjects to be considered for inclusion in the U.S. statement in the G.A. general debate, probably September 17. It might be delivered by the President or, if he prefers to come to the U.N. later, by you. In the latter event the President might choose to address the Assembly during the “commemorative session” in the week ending October 24. He would then speak more briefly and in more general terms, but would perhaps wish to include some points of substance, perhaps reserved from among the items below.

There are no major surprises in this list, but it does cover—and includes some constructive proposals on—the major issues with which the U.S., as the world’s leading power, would be expected to comment in this forum. It is in keeping with the philosophy of the Nixon Doctrine that we will not shirk our world responsibilities but we do expect others to share the burden in a spirit of partnership. In addition to certain points which would be welcome to (and whose absence would be missed by) the majority in the U.N. audience, the list includes a number of points that the American public will recognize as serving our interests and our prestige as a world leader.

These suggestions have been worked out with IO and have Mr. De Palma’s concurrence.

Charles W. Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. A typed note on the memorandum indicates that it was received on June 24.

² No other record of this conversation has been found.

Attachment

SUGGESTED MAIN POINTS FOR THE U.S. STATEMENT AT OPENING OF THE 25TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Critical World Issues—Moving toward International Stability

1. Arms control—SALT and key issues at CCD
 2. Southeast Asia peace efforts
 3. Middle East peace effort
 4. Major concerns of Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America—brief mention
- } U.N. role in implementing settlements

Keeping Globe Habitable

1. *Securing the peace*—in context of Nixon Doctrine (less by ourselves, more in partnership)—devise more reliable peacekeeping methods to share security responsibilities effectively. Proposals in peacekeeping and peaceful settlement (e.g., better organization and financing of peacekeeping, U.S. logistical support, fact-finding/conciliation panels, ICJ reform).

2. *Sharing World's Resources and Benefits of Technology*

a. *Development Decade*—pronouncement re U.S. position on multilateral aid; need to improve performance of UN Development Program.

b. *Seabeds*—orderly and equitable exploitation, stress benefits to all nations from cooperative use (take account of U.S. economic and security interests).

c. *Cooperation in scientific/technological advances*—with stress on benefits to all, including America.

3. *Making World Safer*

a. Human rights—Genocide Convention, Southern Africa, spotlighting violations *everywhere* through Human Rights Commissioner.

b. Population—UN efforts in services and research.

c. Environment—monitoring pollution and safeguarding ecology.

d. Narcotics—World Plan of Action.

e. Measures against hijacking and diplomatic kidnappings.

Conclusion:

We need to do more through international institutions—let's make them effective.

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 1953Z.

152721. Subject: UNGA—Soviet Views.

1. Soviet Chargé Vorontsov called on Asst Secy De Palma Sept 16 to present routine résumé of Soviet views re 25th UNGA, along lines reported Wellington 2147.² He was able provide no info on Kosygin or Gromyko attendance at GA.³

2. Vorontsov said 25th anniversary declaration should be short and general in nature, stressing reiteration of Charter aims and principles. It should deal with ways to resolve major world problems and stress “main task” of UN—maintenance of peace. Following points should be covered: end of arms race and GCD [GDC]; implementation of GA declaration on non-intervention in internal affairs of states; completion of definition of aggression and agreement on measures to stop aggression; liquidation of colonialism in accordance GA anti-colonialism declaration; development of international cooperation in solving economic, scientific, technological, social and cultural problems; respect for human rights and dignity without discrimination.

3. Following described by Vorontsov as GA items of principal interest to Soviets:

a) Strengthening of international security. USSR hoped there would not be many conflicting resolutions on the Soviet-sponsored item. Soviets understood Western delts had developed draft but hoped “we would not fight” and would deal with item in “dignified” way.

b) CBW—Soviets would continue to fight for position taken at Geneva.

c) Seabeds—Soviets considered draft treaty completed at Geneva very important matter.

d) Colonial questions—Colonial powers must fully implement anti-colonialism declaration.

e) LOS—USSR-sponsored agenda item signified Soviet interests, which seemed to be pretty close to those of US.

4. De Palma responded that 25th anniversary declaration should be document that could be adopted by acclamation and must therefore

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by Betty-Jane Jones, cleared by G. Norman Anderson, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Moscow.

² Dated September 11. (Ibid.)

³ Foreign Minister Gromyko did attend the session and addressed the UN General Assembly on October 22. A summary of his address is in telegram 2632 from USUN, October 22. (Ibid.)

be even simpler than outlined by Vorontsov. While declaration per se perhaps not too important, it would be most unfortunate to try to achieve one and fail. He hoped Soviets would view matter in this light so that short, non-controversial declaration could be worked out in NY consultations. Similar considerations applicable to international security item. No one trying to deprive Soviets of credit for having taken initiative on this question, but if something generally acceptable to be achieved, Soviets could not insist on their original formulations. If they did, there could be no agreement. Western draft resolution covered many subjects in which Soviets interested in moderate and reasonable terms.

5. Extremely difficult tactical situation on LOS was being thrashed out in NY now, De Palma said. He agreed US and Soviet views on substance this subject quite close. On colonial questions, De Palma anticipated proposals would probably be cast in terms that would present problems.

6. On CBW De Palma noted US and USSR knew each other's positions. He hoped differences could be bridged, but emphasized US not prepared see one instrument covering both chemical and biological weapons. Some way of relating two aspects might be possible, such as concluding instrument covering biological weapons first and agreeing at same time to work toward instrument covering chemical weapons.

7. De Palma concluded with general comment that it would be very good if real gains could be achieved at 25th GA. However, even if this not possible, both US and Soviets should at least seek ways to minimize controversy. Otherwise there danger that GA would appear to be demonstration of futility of UN. This not in interest of either country. Vorontsov nodded assent.

8. In response Vorontsov query re possible new proposals, De Palma said there considerable talk in NY about possibility of action on hijacking. He noted US initiative in ICAO, however, and wondered what useful action GA could take now. Vorontsov commented practical measures such as announced by Pres Nixon were what was needed, not declarations.

Rogers

92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 1970.

SECRETARY'S PARTICIPATION IN UNGA

September, 1970

Overall Objectives

The overall purposes of your participation in the opening of the Twenty-Fifth session of the UN General Assembly are to engage in an exchange of views with Foreign Ministers and other high officials and to deliver the opening U.S. statement. The most important specific objective is to overcome the difficulties which developed over the cease-fire in the Middle East and to move the parties ahead into negotiations as soon as possible. There are also a number of significant specific objectives set out below which we wish to achieve with individual countries. Less important ones are included in individual country papers.

Specific Important Objectives

I. *The Middle East.*

A. *Arab-Israeli Negotiations.*

(1) The first objective (subject to modification in detail at the time) is to seek to restore the integrity of the cease-fire among the parties and to extend it, for three more months if possible, on the basis of agreement that the cease-fire includes (a) no introduction of new or improved weapons into the zone, and no replacement of heavy weapons of any sort; (b) no forward deployment of sites or weapons from present positions, and (c) no construction of new sites or installations or "hardening" of existing ones;

(2) The second objective is to persuade the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan and the UAR to open the agreed negotiations under Jarring before they leave the General Assembly, to make as much progress as possible, and to make arrangements for their continuation at the Foreign Minister level before they leave;

(3) With Jarring we will want you to urge that when negotiations are again underway he develop specific proposals himself and not confine himself to the role of an honest broker; and that he seek one or two aspects of the issue for early concentration;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Secret. An attached memorandum of transmittal from Martin F. Herz to Rogers is dated September 16. Rogers forwarded the paper to President Nixon on September 21.

(4) With the UK, France, the USSR and others as necessary we will want you to emphasize the central role of Jarring and discourage any moves to have the Four Powers or the Security Council take over a direct role;

(5) You should stress in your public statements, and directly to the parties, if the tactical situation on resuming negotiations makes it possible to do so, the necessity of each side moving from its maximum position in the course of negotiations.

B. Turkey.

(1) With Foreign Minister Caglayangil you should urge that the Government of Turkey fulfill this fall (in the upcoming session of the Turkish Assembly) its announced intention to pass licensing legislation to curb the illicit flow of opium.

(2) Assure him also that reductions in our Military Assistance Program are related to severe military budgetary restraints, especially with respect to Cambodia, and not to the opium situation (as some Turks believe).

C. India.

Urge the new Foreign Minister (Singh) to follow up recent improvements in Indo-U.S. relations with a more neutral stance on Southeast Asia.

II. Europe.

A. Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and a European Security Conference.

(1) Ask Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers to:

—Clarify the areas of Europe they expect to be included in a force reduction agreement, and whether the “foreign forces” they mention as being willing to discuss in their Budapest statement refers to Soviet as well as American and Canadian forces. Ask also whether they concur in reduction of “indigenous” forces as well, as included in NATO proposals.

—Indicate whether they are insisting on a Conference on European Security prior to discussions of MBFR, as the Pact statement implies. Note that it is an odd idea to suggest delaying a key security matter until after the security conference and that progress on MBFR might help contribute to assuring the success of such a Conference.

(2) Remind both Allied and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers that, in any case, we believe there should be concrete improvements in the situation in and around Berlin, including improved procedures on access, before we move to multilateral talks on a conference or series of conferences on European security and cooperation. Note that the German-Soviet Treaty is an encouraging factor but that its ultimate success is linked to a Berlin agreement.

B. *Troop Support.*

Thank our NATO allies, especially the UK and FRG (not France which is not involved), for their efforts to help ease the financial burden of keeping U.S. forces in Europe. Say that you hope they can develop more precise suggestions on this as soon as possible because it will affect our military budget planning. If asked how much we are hoping for, say we have no figure but that the costs incurred locally by our forces in Europe are about \$1 billion a year.

C. *European Community.*

(1) Reaffirm to West European Foreign Ministers that the U.S. continues to support the strengthening and enlargement of the Community, because of its long range values.

(2) Emphasize to Foreign Ministers of the European Community and the four applicants (UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) that we, nevertheless, expect them during the enlargement process to take fully into account the trading interests and GATT rights of the U.S.

(3) Stress that the United States opposes in principle the Community's preference arrangements that are not in accord with GATT provisions. They are strengthening protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and, in some cases, are adversely affecting American exports.

(4) State that Community high support prices for agriculture are harmful to the interest of the U.S. and other third countries and feed protectionist pressures in the U.S. We are concerned about resultant adverse trade effects if these high prices were extended to the new members.

III. *Africa.*

A. *Morocco and Tunisia.*

Assure Morocco and Tunisia that although reductions are to be expected in military and economic assistance for FY 1971 because of appropriations difficulties, our concern with their economic development and security remains undiminished and we still expect to contribute to them.

B. *Algeria.*

Note your satisfaction over some improvement in our contacts since your talk last year and reiterate our willingness to resume formal diplomatic relations without preconditions when they are ready to do so, noting lack of such relations will restrain American businessmen in the economic relations Algeria is seeking.

C. *Somalia.*

State that we would like to see our relations restored to the more friendly level of last year when they are ready to do so.

IV. *East Asia.*

A. *General.*

Take every opportunity to make clear that the Nixon Doctrine must be taken seriously in terms of seeking to have the countries of the region assume more responsibility for their own defense and development, but that it does not mean abrogation of U.S. defense commitments or a lessening U.S. interest in the region. On the contrary, it seeks to provide a sounder basis upon which the United States can maintain a presence, defend its interests and fulfill its commitments.

B. *Communist China.*

You should explain, if questioned, that we continue to seek a lessening of tensions in our relationships with Communist China. There is, however, no change in our position with respect to Communist China's membership in the UN, nor in our support for the membership of the GRC.

V. *Latin America.*

(1) Assure Latin American Foreign Ministers that recent appearances of protectionist sentiments in the U.S. will not divert us from the policies announced by the President in his October 1969 policy speech of support for generalized tariff preferences.

(2) Specifically, assure them that notwithstanding the Mills Bill, we will continue to assist them in developing U.S. as well as other developed country markets for their exports. (Asian countries may also need assurance that we are not headed toward protectionism.)

VI. *UN.*

A. *Seabeds.*

(1) *Seabed arms control item.*

Encourage maximum international support for the revised draft treaty barring weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds, which received strong backing from the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Urge that the treaty be endorsed by the current General Assembly with little or no change so it can be opened for signature early next year.

(2) *Seabed exploitation regime.*

Indicate to key LDC's (e.g. India) that our Draft Seabeds Convention deserves careful consideration as it opens up the prospect of a major, independent source of revenue for development. (Individual country papers will indicate where efforts are needed.)

B. *Representation Questions.*

(1) *Chinese Representation.* We will probably want you to speak to a few wavering countries (Jordan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, perhaps others)

to assure their continued support for the “important question” resolution on Chinese representation, and their “no” votes on the Albanian Resolution which would seat Communist China in the place of Nationalist China.

(2) *Cambodia*. You should speak to the Indonesian, Malaysian and Japanese Foreign Ministers about taking the lead in supporting the credentials of the Government of Cambodia if this should arise in the Assembly.

C. *Periodic Security Council Meeting*.

We do not expect that a closed meeting of the Security Council at Foreign Minister level as proposed by the Finns and approved by the Security Council this summer will take place in September because Foreign Minister Gromyko apparently will only come in October. When the meeting is held you should use the occasion to urge more rapid progress on agreed peacekeeping procedures and more frequent and effective use of available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We should seek to keep any communiqué from the meeting nominal in character.

D. *General Assembly Speech*.

(1) Proceeding from the President’s peace theme of last year, the speech should outline the foreign policy changes the Administration has made—emphasis on negotiations, the Nixon Doctrine, new emphasis on economic foreign policy, and international efforts to improve the “quality of life.”

(2) Within this framework the speech should also set out ideas toward future UN contributions in:

- (a) Peacekeeping (ground rules, standby forces, financing), and peacemaking;
- (b) Development of international law;
- (c) The Second United Nations Development Decade—stressing multilateral aid following the lines of the Peterson report; generalized preferences; and the reform of UNDP;
- (d) Our support for self-determination in Southern Africa;
- (e) UN efforts toward improving the quality of life, specifically on population, narcotics, the environment, and the sea.

(3) The speech should conclude with a Middle East section opening on hijacking and stressing the necessity of getting past the current problems on the cease-fire and on to the negotiations.

Likely Objectives of Others

I. *UN*.

You may come under pressure from a number of developing countries to support the Development Decade aid target of 1% of GNP. Your answer should be that we want to reverse recent declines in U.S.

governmental aid and realize ours is proportionately lower than a number of others. However, the bulk of all aid under the 1% figure is from non-governmental resources. These are unpredictable. Our governmental aid is also now under major review by the Congress and we will have to await the outcome.

II. *Europe.*

A. Western Europe Foreign Ministers of the smaller NATO powers may try to convince you that the FRG/USSR Treaty and progress on SALT are sufficient so that we should now agree to multilateral consultations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to bring about an early conference on European security. Western Foreign Ministers may also express concern over the Mills Bill and growing protectionism in the U.S.

B. *Warsaw Pact* Foreign Ministers may urge you to agree to an early conference on European Security without preconditions.

C. Harmel (Belgium) may seek your advice about his “two China” resolution. You should reiterate that we see no need for one as the vote seems likely to hold this year.

III. *Africa.*

A. On *Southern Africa*, some Foreign Ministers (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia) may ask for reassurance that we will stick to the South African and Portuguese arms embargoes and on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. They may try to put you under pressure to agree to the further sanctions on South Africa adopted by the Security Council and to persuade the UK not to resume arms sales of any type. You should reply that we have carried out the sanctions resolutions more strictly than most major powers and that we will continue to observe the sanctions. On broadened sanctions you should note that the failure of Africans to insist that all countries obey the existing sanctions equally was already causing us trouble. Rather than broadening sanctions we think the focus should be on securing better compliance with those measures on which there has been general agreement.

B. *Mauritania* may press for appointment of a resident U.S. Ambassador instead of an Ambassador also accredited to Senegal. You should say that you will look into the question again.

IV. *East Asia.*

A. *China* will seek maximum U.S. support for its position on the representation issue, including a U.S. “no” vote and active opposition to the Belgian two-China proposal if it is submitted. You should say that we have urged the Belgians not to submit it. If they do it is clear that it will not get the necessary votes. We now doubt it will go in, but if it does our delegations will be in immediate touch on how to han-

dle the situation. Observe that it is in fact surprising that such a proposal has never been put before the Assembly.

B. *Korea*, in addition to seeking maximum U.S. support for its position on the Korean representation issue, will probably try to get assurances that we will not further reduce our forces in Korea until ROK forces' modernization is completed. They may also seek assurances of U.S. support, going beyond our Defense Treaty, in the case of attack against them.

You should assure them of full support on the GA item. On the bilateral relationship you should say there is no possibility of us expanding on the Treaty, that we have proven our attitude by fighting in their defense, and that raising the issue will only cause North Korea to assume there may be a doubt—to the detriment of us both. On force reductions say we believe reductions and modernization should both proceed but have made no decisions on reduction beyond the 20,000 we have told them about.

V. *Latin America*.

A. Some Latin American Foreign Ministers may seek reassurance that we regard our Latin American relationship as "special" and that the President's promises for "action for progress" will result in positive U.S. policies in trade, economic assistance and technology transfer.

B. More specifically with respect to trade, they—as well as other LDC's—will express concern with protectionist trends in the U.S. and press for broad and prompt implementation of our pledges to provide greater access for their exports. You can assure them we intend to press ahead toward this goal.

93. **Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts**¹

CA-6431

Washington, December 30, 1970, 2:06 p.m.

SUBJECT

25th UN General Assembly—Agenda Items in the Economic, Social, and Human Rights Fields

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by the IO/OES Staff and approved by Joel M. Fisher. Also sent to USUN, Montreal for ICAO, Paris for UNESCO and OECD, Rome for FODAG, Vienna for IAEA and UNIDO, and Geneva.

REF

CA-4583, August 29, 1970²

This airgram, sent to the field for informational purposes only, identifies each economic, social and human rights item which appeared on the agenda of the 25th session of the UN General Assembly (A/8000, July 17, 1970) and briefly describes what action was taken either in Committee II (economic and financial); Committee III (social, humanitarian and cultural); or at the Plenary session of the General Assembly.

UN Volunteers (Item 12)

With only the Sovbloc, Mali and Madagascar (the latter because it thought the issue not sufficiently clear) abstaining, the GA adopted 91(US)-0-12 the resolution establishing the United Nations Volunteers. The new organization becomes effective January 1, 1971.

The first year holds several major problems for the UNV, among them the recruiting, training and utilization of volunteers from around the world.

Financially the organization's non-administrative costs must be met by voluntary contributions. The US will probably make a modest contribution. Current plans call for less than 200 volunteers by the end of 1971. UNV's will be used in conjunction with UNDP development projects around the world with the approval of the host countries involved. The US Peace Corps hopes to direct qualified American volunteers into this newest UN organization.

a. Fifteen Members Elected to Industrial Development Board of UNIDO (Item 18)

The 25th General Assembly elected 15 members to the IDB, the principal organ of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, for a three year term beginning January 1, 1971. In accordance with GA Resolution 2152 (XXI) which established UNIDO, candidate-countries were elected from the four geographic groups. The following countries were elected to serve on the 45-member Board:

Group A—Africa and Asia: Algeria, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and UAR

Group B—Developed Countries: Austria, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland

Group C—Latin America: Argentina and Costa Rica

Group D—Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and USSR.

² This airgram identified for the posts the most significant economic, social, and human rights items on the provisional agenda of the 25th General Assembly. (Ibid.)

b. UNIDO Pledging Conference

Sixty governments pledged the equivalent of \$1.8 million, largely in non-convertible currencies, to UNIDO at its third annual pledging conference during the 25th General Assembly. This represents an increase of ten in the number of countries pledging and an increase of approximately \$300,000 in the amount pledged over 1969 participation and pledges. As in previous years, a U.S. representative attended the Conference in order to demonstrate our support for UNIDO, but we did not pledge. Our representative made a statement noting that the U.S. pledge for industrial sector development as well as other sectors of economic development is through the UNDP. Funds pledged at this Conference are used to finance a part of UNIDO's program activities while administrative costs are part of the regular UN assessed budget.

Report of the Trade and Development Board (Item 38)

The report of the Trade and Development Board on the third part of its Ninth Session and the first part of its Tenth Session led to consideration of three draft resolutions. The first approved UNCTAD's work in the establishment of a system of preferences and called for the continuation of the group responsible for the system. This resolution was never tabled but the U.S. and some other developed countries would have opposed the establishment of permanent institutional machinery in the UNCTAD for this purpose. In our view the Committee on Manufactures should be responsible for further work on preferences.

Another resolution set April–May 1972 as the date for the Third Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development but left open the site. The same resolution called for a consideration by the Conference of a structural reform of UNCTAD which would make the organization a more effective means of pressure on the developing countries. The United States and some other major donors voted against these provisions of the resolution and abstained on the resolution as a whole.

A third resolution took note of the establishment by the Tenth Session of the Trade and Development Board of an inter-governmental group on the transfer of technology. The last paragraph of this resolution is ambiguous but could be interpreted as an endorsement of an increase in the UNCTAD budget to support this group. Because the United States believes that the additional costs of this group should be met by reducing expenditures of a low priority, we abstained on the paragraph, as did the UK and Japan among others, but voted for the resolution as a whole.

Report of the Industrial Development Board of UNIDO (Item 39(a))

The GA noted the report of the fourth session of the Industrial Development Board (IDB), the policy formulating body of UNIDO. The

main issue was the question of convening a special meeting of all members of UNIDO in 1971 as requested by the IDB. The General Assembly decided without extensive debate to convene a "Special International Conference of UNIDO at the highest possible level of governmental representation, to be held in Vienna . . . from June 1–8, 1971 . . ." Although the U.S. has reservations as to the necessity of such a Conference, we voted in favor of it. The Conference will provide the first opportunity in UNIDO's four year existence for its entire membership to meet. (All members of the UN, specialized agencies and the IAEA are members of UNIDO.) The Conference's provisional agenda is as follows:

- I. Long-range strategy and orientation of UNIDO's activities,
- II. The organizational structure of UNIDO,
- III. Questions of UNIDO's financing.

In the general debate on the report of the IDB most developing countries continued their urgings that UNIDO be granted greater autonomy and increased financial resources. In general, the U.S. opposes greater autonomy, such as specialized agency status for UNIDO, and we question the need for greater financial and manpower resources until such time as the Organization consolidates its program after a period of rapid growth during the past three years.

*Confirmation of the Appointment of the Executive Director of UNIDO
(Item 39(b))*

The UN Secretary General reappointed Mr. Abdel-Rahman (UAR) as Executive Director of UNIDO for a term of two years ending December 31, 1972. The normal term of office for this position is four years and in shortening this term the Secretary General noted that he "had in mind the consideration that his own term is due to expire December 31, 1971," and he did not wish to commit his successor for a long period of time. Abdel-Rahman's appointment was confirmed by the General Assembly, with the U.S. voting in favor.

Operational Activities for Development (Item 40)

Upon the recommendation of the Second Committee, the General Assembly approved without objection two resolutions concerning the United Nations Development Program. The first, a resolution recommended by the Economic and Social Council, provides for implementation, commencing January 1, 1971, of the provisions of the consensus statement drawn up by the UNDP Governing Council at its 10th Session in June 1970. In the second resolution the Assembly noted with appreciation the reports of the Governing Council on its 9th and 10th sessions.

Also under Item 40, the Secretary-General announced extension for one year, beginning January 1, 1971, of the term of office of the UNDP Administrator, Paul G. Hoffman.

The consensus statement comprises UNDP reforms which include: the adoption of a United Nations Development Cooperation Cycle, a process which features country programming in order to fully coordinate UNDP assistance with the recipient countries' own development plans; a new financial system designed to provide improved financial control and budget planning as well as fuller utilization of resources; reorganization of the UNDP at both headquarters and field levels, with greater delegation of authority to the UNDP Administrator and to the Resident Representatives in order to expedite the decision-making process; assignment to the Administrator of responsibility for all aspects of the implementation of UNDP-funded projects; and recognition of the central coordinating role of the Resident Representatives with respect to all other development assistance programs undertaken by agencies in the UN system.

Although the consensus statement is a far from perfect document, we consider it a workable basis on which to reorganize and revitalise the UNDP. We are pleased, therefore, that in the General Assembly there were no objections or amendments which might have unraveled the fragile agreement reached by the Governing Council. At its 11th session in January, the Governing Council will consider the recommendations of the Administrator for implementation of the consensus statement.

UN Capital Development Fund (Item 42)

The General Assembly created the Capital Development Fund (CDF) in 1966 to make grants and soft loans to developing countries. The US Government opposed its establishment because we believe that the World Bank Group and the regional development banks suffice to provide development finance. Consistent with our opposition to the CDF, we have not participated in the Fund's pledging conferences.

The 25th GA adopted by a large majority a resolution on the CDF opposed by the United States and almost all other developed countries. Principally, it (1) requests the Governing Council of the UNDP to consider "all possibilities for reaching the objectives of the UN Capital Development Fund, including the desirability and feasibility of providing CDF follow-up investment projects in country programmes" and (2) requests the Secretary General to invite member states to "contribute separately, but at the same pledging conference, to the UNDP and CDF."

The US strongly opposes the use of UNDP funds for capital development projects. We consider that funds contributed to UNDP should be used exclusively for technical assistance and pre-investment projects designed to open the way for capital investment. These projects could lead to investment by the private sector or by public sector organizations such as the World Bank Group or the regional development banks

whose specific mandate it is to provide these funds. It is our position that a clear separation should be maintained between all aspects of the UNDP and the CDF. During the debate on this issue in the Second Committee of the UN the US Representative noted that a joint UNDP/CDF pledging conference would not improve the acceptability of the CDF, but would tend to jeopardize the support of the developed countries for the UNDP.

At its fourth pledging conference on 29 October 1970, 26 nations pledged the equivalent of \$954,612, largely in non-convertible currency, to the Fund. This amount was less than the \$1.3 million pledged at each of the first two pledging conferences, but approximately \$180,000 greater than the amount pledged by 26 countries in 1969. As in the past, the U.S. and most other major donors did not attend this conference.

UN DD-II (Item 43)

The most significant act of the General Assembly in the economic and social field was the adoption by the General Assembly on October 24, the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, of the strategy for the Second UN Development Decade (the 1970's). The strategy sets an overall goal of at least 6% annual average rate of growth for the Decade, outlines policy measures to achieve this goal that cover virtually all economic and social matters, and establishes a mechanism to review progress and suggests the necessary adjustments in policies and goals. The details, background and major issues involved in the strategy are explained in *Current Economic Developments*, issue number 6, dated December 15, 1970, page 12.

UN Conference on Problems of the Human Environment (Item 44)

Further progress was made toward defining the goals of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment scheduled to take place in Stockholm in June of that year. The GA approved a resolution calling upon the Secretary General to hold two sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 1971; one in February in Geneva and the other in September in New York. The resolution also asked the Preparatory Committee in preparing for the Conference that it consider the economic development aspects of preserving and restoring the environment particularly as it concerns developing countries.

Maurice F. Strong, former President of the Canadian International Development Agency, was designated Secretary General for the Stockholm Conference.

UN University (Item 45)

Without debate or amendment the UNGA adopted the resolution Committee II had approved on the "Question of the Establishment of an International University" by vote of 94(US)-0-11 (UK, Uganda,

Sovbloc). The resolution calls for UNESCO to study the feasibility of a United Nations University and for the SYG to establish "in due course" . . . "a panel of experts" to assist him in "his further consultations" on this subject. The SYG is directed to submit his report on this subject at the 26th UNGA.

Our prime concern during the debate of this item was that the "panel of experts" and the UNESCO study not take place simultaneously and thus be duplicative in both substance and effort. We hope that the "panel of experts" will therefore be appointed after the UNESCO study is completed.

We have directed USUN to indicate to the UN that the USG will not participate as a member of the "panel of experts" in order to maintain maximum flexibility on this subject.

Creation of the Post of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Item 47)

The United States attached high importance to a full discussion of this item so that a substantive decision could be reached at the 25th GA. We, together with other supporters, worked actively in Committee and behind the scenes to assure that adequate time would be allotted to the subject. The leading opponents of the item, the USSR and its supporters, worked actively throughout the entire session to frustrate discussion of the item. An unusually large amount of time was spent on other items on the Third Committee's agenda. When the Committee finally reached the High Commissioner item a number of procedural delaying maneuvers were carried out with the active connivance of the Committee chairman, who was from Romania. These procedural tactics together with the obvious filibustering of the opponents made possible only a token discussion of the substance of the matter. Because the time was exhausted and because many delegations did not desire to push such a farreaching proposal to its conclusion without full consideration there developed majority sentiment to put off the final decision until the next session. A motion advanced by Ceylon to adjourn the debate on the item was adopted by a vote of 54-38(US)-15. Because of the depth of feeling on the part of the opponents and taking account as well of the widespread hesitations expressed by many other delegations who were willing to explore the idea we feel that our own position must be carefully reviewed. We intend to consider not only the tactics to pursue at the next General Assembly but also possible substantive modifications of the proposal which should make it more widely attractive.

Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (Item 48)

The focal point for this item was intended to be a final report issued by the Secretary-General dealing with possible means for

improving application of existing humanitarian conventions relating to armed conflicts or proposals for the development of new ones. In fact the very long debate which took place focused upon a number of separate resolutions highlighting various aspects of the general subject of human rights in armed conflicts. The United States together with 11 other co-sponsors proposed a resolution calling for better application of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and endorsing the continuing efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to secure effective application of the Convention. Our draft resolution was strenuously opposed by the Soviet Union and its supporters who attempted to characterize our initiative as a political move designed to gain support for one side in the Vietnam conflict. A gratifyingly large majority, however, supported our initiative as one of promoting the observance of the basic human rights of prisoners of war in any conflict anywhere.

The United States sponsored resolution was adopted in the Third Committee by a vote of 60(US)–16–34. The resolution was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 67(US)–30–20. Other resolutions adopted under the same item were (a) one initiated by the Government of France dealing with protection of journalists engaged on dangerous missions in areas of armed conflict, (b) a resolution proposed by Norway setting forth basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, (c) a procedural resolution initiated by the Delegation of the United Kingdom transmitting the Secretary-General's reports to the Special Expert Conference to be convened by the ICRC in May 1971 and deciding to consider the question further at the next GA session. A final resolution was proposed by India, Sudan and the USSR condemning the actions of countries which engage in aggressive wars. The United States voted for all of the resolutions except the last. We abstained on this one because of certain paragraphs contained therein which asserted misleading interpretations of certain existing conventions dealing with the humanitarian law of armed conflicts.

Housing, Building and Planning (Item 49)

This was the fourth year that the housing item was on the GA agenda. The Third Committee reached it at the very end of the session and allotted only time enough to consider a 26-power resolution, sponsored mostly by developing countries. The US could support its substantive content which covered all aspects of housing, building and planning, including human settlements and the environment, but could not accept the invitation to developed countries . . . to provide increased technical and financial assistance to developing countries during the 1970's and the strengthening of the Center for Housing, Building and Planning as a matter of high priority. The US co-sponsored an amendment with Australia, Japan and the UK to make this language

more acceptable but it failed on all four votes by a large margin. The resolution was passed 79-0-9(US).

Question of the Elderly and the Aged (Item 53)

This item was not reached on the Third Committee agenda. It was decided to defer it to the 26th GA, at which time it would be given high priority and appropriate consideration.

Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Item 55)

Debate under this item focused principally upon two aspects, namely the forthcoming International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination which has been proclaimed for 1971, and measures for effectively combating racial discrimination and the policies of apartheid and segregation in Southern Africa. The debate followed traditional lines with universal support being expressed for the need to pursue with special diligence measures to combat racism and racial discrimination during the International Year. There was a renewal of discussion which has taken place at previous sessions of the GA upon the policies of apartheid being pursued by the Government of South Africa, and upon conditions in Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories, with widespread displeasure being expressed on the part of most African delegations at the slow pace of progress in improving conditions in Southern Africa. Dissatisfaction was also expressed with the allegedly insufficient amount of support being given on the part of Western countries to measures designed to bring about improvements. The Third Committee adopted three resolutions under this item. A 26 power Afro-Asian resolution encompassing the major African frustrations with the pace of progress in combating apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa and containing fourteen operative paragraphs of condemnations, urgings and requests was proposed. Principally because of its extravagant criticism of the policies of the United Kingdom and its calls for complete termination of all relations with the Government of South Africa, the United States voted against this resolution. The resolution was adopted in Third Committee by a vote of 75-12(US)-22. It was subsequently adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 71-10(US)-11. The US supported the other two resolutions under this item. One, proposed by the Delegation of Finland, welcomed the establishment of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination which began functioning in 1969 pursuant to the United Nations Racial Discrimination Convention. The resolution, which urged full support for the new Committee, was adopted unanimously. A third resolution presented by Brazil, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Uruguay contained a number of operative paragraphs condemning racial discrimination and encouraging efforts through the United Nations and the Specialized

Agencies to combat the evil. This latter resolution was adopted in the Third Committee by a vote of 49(US)–47–16. In plenary the vote was 49(US)–33–10. The large negative vote against this resolution reflected the dissatisfaction on the part of many members with the comparatively calm reasonableness of its operative paragraphs.

Other Items

Having devoted an unusually large amount of time to the first four items on its agenda the Third Committee reached the last week of the session with little time left to deal with several remaining important items. The items on Freedom of Information and on Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance were, among a number of others, deferred to be taken up at the next session.

Youth (Item 57)

Following deliberations lasting 2½ weeks Committee III adopted a resolution titled “Youth, Its Education in the Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Its Problems and Needs, and Its Participation in National Development” 98(US)–0–4. The Item proved to be highly political.

The resolution calls for SYG to “consult with governments and specialized agencies concerned on the possibility of convening, in future, world youth assemblies.” This paragraph and its implications were carefully considered by the USG, because of the problems inherent in holding a World Youth Assembly, before we voted in favor of its adoption.

Paragraphs which we opposed included operative paragraph nine calling for youth to support “in every way possible” liberation movements of certain people. Also objectionable was preambular paragraph three, introduced by Mongolia, speaking of current “armed conflicts” and “acts of aggression” which were injurious “particularly (to) young people.”

We feel it undesirable that this resolution, and its wholesale incorporation of tendentious political doctrines and propaganda, should be presented to the youth of the world as the result of the UNGA’s discussion of the topic of youth. Certainly it is hoped that Western acquiescence will not be taken as encouragement to the production of similar propagandist and irrelevant resolutions in the future.

Narcotics (Item 60)

The UNGA passed two resolutions dealing with technical assistance in the field of narcotics. It endorsed (106(US)–0–8(EEs)) an ECOSOC resolution creating a UN Fund for Drug Abuse as part of an action program of multilateral activity against illicit narcotics. (President Nixon strongly endorsed the Fund in his speech before the UNGA and we have announced an initial contribution of \$2 million, subject

to congressional approval.) A second resolution, unanimously approved, noted the dangers resulting from the growth of narcotics addiction and called upon governments to enact adequate legislation providing severe penalties against those engaged in illicit trade and trafficking of narcotics.

Rogers

94. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to President Nixon¹

New York, January 4, 1971.

With the closing of the 25th General Assembly, the number of problems immediately facing the United Nations and the United States Mission has declined. Nevertheless in the month ahead there may be significant developments on the Middle East, Chinese representation, seabeds, peacekeeping, UNDP, ECOSOC, Second Development Decade and budgetary matters. Some stir may be created by the United States decision to withdraw from the Committee of 24 on Colonialism. The problem of the security of United Nations Missions in New York, and particularly of the Soviet establishments here, will undoubtedly become more serious in the months to come.

1. Security of UN Missions in New York

The most serious aspect of the New York security problem concerns the Soviet Mission and other establishments (Amtorg, Aeroflot, Intourist) here. The problem was aggravated during the holiday season by protests over the Leningrad trials. Almost daily violent incidents perpetrated by the militant Jewish Defense League are already becoming a serious aggravation in US-USSR relations, and there have been threats of assassinations or kidnappings which if carried out could have disastrous effects. We have been in constant contact with New York City authorities and are studying additional preventive measures that can be taken, such as a court injunction against the Jewish Defense League.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret.

2. *Middle East*

With the reactivation of the Jarring talks, we may expect increased pressure from the USSR supported by France and the UK for Four Power preparation of guidelines for a settlement. Prime Minister Meir, in her December 29 speech to the Knesset, reiterated the strong Israeli opposition to increased activity by the Four as unwarranted interference in the negotiations under Jarring. In the Four Power talks on December 9 and December 21, I repeated the United States position that while the Four, collectively or individually, would be able to play a more useful role in assisting Jarring and the parties once talks were resumed, the preparation by the Four of a detailed blueprint for peace would be counterproductive. I also noted our view that the general subject of guarantees for a peaceful settlement might well be usefully discussed by the Four, after talks have resumed, although our Government has not yet taken a final decision on the question.

The Secretary General is required to report to the Security Council on the progress of the Jarring Mission by January 5. We have urged both U Thant and Jarring to avoid criticism of Israel's delay in returning to the Jarring talks in the report. We hope that it will be possible to avoid a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the report which can be circulated as a Council document. If the Arabs insist that the Council meet, we hope the discussion can be kept pro forma in nature. We would point out that discussion of substance could endanger Jarring's efforts.

3. *Chinese Representation*

There may be a move to challenge the Chinese credentials at the first Security Council meeting of 1971, predicated on the fact that the General Assembly has for the first time mustered a simple majority in favor of admission of Peking and expulsion of Taiwan. We are consulting on tactics with potential supporters on the Council.

During January, consultations on tactics concerning the Chinese representation item at the next General Assembly will intensify. Those who have supported the United States position on China in the past will be pressing us for a decision on how to proceed in 1971.

4. *Peacekeeping*

We continue to believe that one of the most important tasks before the United Nations is the strengthening of the organization's capabilities in the field of peacekeeping. Six months of painstaking bilateral negotiations on this subject with the Soviet Mission appeared to have narrowed the gap substantially; in late June we gave the Soviets a Working Paper, reflecting the negotiations, which offered a practical modus operandi for the key questions of establishment and control of UN peacekeeping operations. Despite promises of a detailed and

considered reply, none has been received to date. Although the General Assembly took no specific action at this session, a large number of delegations stressed the urgent need for agreement on measures to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping and the resolution adopted reflected this view; consequently, the Soviets are under pressure to move forward. We will press bilaterally for their reaction to our June proposals.

5. *Withdrawal from Committee of 24*

This Committee of 24 members was established for the purpose of implementing a so-called "Declaration" on the granting of independence to colonial peoples which the General Assembly adopted in 1960. For some time now the United States has felt that the Committee of 24 has produced absolutely no positive results, multiplies points of friction between the United States and the Afro-Asian group and generally detracts from the effectiveness and credibility of the United Nations in the entire colonial area. This year the Committee again acted irresponsibly, adopting an "action program" condoning violence in order to achieve independence from colonial rule and riding roughshod over proposals and amendments offered by the United States and other Western members of the Committee. Australia and Italy have already withdrawn from the Committee; Norway resigned after two years. The United States is going to withdraw in January, and the United Kingdom may decide to follow suit.

Our move will no doubt give rise to charges that we have changed our policy towards Africa, but those familiar with the United Nations understand that the irresponsible actions of the Committee are bringing about its collapse. We shall take pains both at the United Nations and in African capitals to seek similar understanding by the Governments concerned.

6. *Law of the Sea and Seabeds*

In a major advance towards the objectives set by you in May, the General Assembly adopted resolutions in its waning hours setting forth principles to govern exploitation of the seabeds beyond national jurisdiction and convening a conference on Law of the Sea in 1973. Preparatory work for the conference begins in March 1971 in Geneva and January and February will be occupied with intensive consultations and planning looking towards this preparatory conference.

7. *United Nations Development Program (UNDP)*

The "consensus" adopted by the Governing Council of the UNDP as the basis for UNDP's reorganization and shift to country programming, was adopted by the General Assembly last month. Now the reorganization must be carried out and this will require our continuing

attention for many months. Moreover, there are a number of issues from Sir Robert Jackson's Capacity Study related to reorganization which have not yet been discussed by governments—these will be taken up at the session of the Governing Council in January.

The most troublesome, delicate and potentially disrupting aspect of UNDP reorganization, however, continues to be the question of Mr. Paul Hoffman's successor. The Secretary General, in the course of the General Assembly, extended Mr. Hoffman's appointment for an additional year through December 31, 1971. In our letter to the Secretary General agreeing with his decision to extend the Hoffman appointment, we indicated that we would want his successor to be an American and that we would shortly be submitting names for consideration.

It now appears that Mr. Hoffman has construed our position as making him a "lame duck" and he does not seem willing to acknowledge that it is necessary for the United States Government to seek a successor now in order to insure that we have a first rate candidate, and to reassure those countries who increasingly fear that we are not taking the question of succession with the seriousness it deserves. Additional pressure is exerted on the issue of succession by the increasing disposition of many important contributors to conclude that meaningful reorganization of UNDP is no longer possible with the present Administrator and his senior colleagues.

8. Economic and Social Council and the Second Development Decade

The continuing and fundamental issue before the Economic and Social Council is the question of the respective roles of the Economic and Social Council and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the United Nations development system and, extended, the international development system—in other words, which of these organizations shall have the primary task of overall coordination and synthesis of development efforts within the United Nations system and, eventually, outside of the United Nations system as well.

The immediate task before us is the interest in reorganizing the Economic and Social Council to make it more generally acceptable to both developed countries and developing countries, and the development of a review and appraisal system for the Second Development Decade as a vehicle for surveillance of development progress as well as rationalizing the organization of international development efforts. Informal discussions concerning reorganization of the Economic and Social Council have already been started and we will participate in these continuing discussions with deep interest. There is a close relationship, not widely understood or appreciated, between these discussions and review and appraisal, since we feel strongly that the Economic and Social Council should have the principal responsibility for

this function. Pursuant to a General Assembly resolution, the Secretary General is required to submit a report to the Economic and Social Council this summer outlining the details of a system of overall appraisal.

Decisions as to how the Secretary General will undertake this report will have to be made in the course of the next month. Many feel that the quality and substance of this report, or its lack thereof—along with the role of the Economic and Social Council—will have an irrevocable impact on multilateral assistance and the international development system, and is in a sense a watershed for the Economic and Social Council and multilateralism.

9. *United Nations Administrative and Budgetary Problems*

A. *United Nations Deficit Problem.* At my urging, the Secretary General told the General Assembly at its closing Plenary session that he would devote special and priority attention during the coming year to finding a solution to the United Nations financial deficit problem, and that he had enlisted the good offices of outgoing Assembly President Edvard Hambro (Norway) to assist in this effort.

B. *United Nations Headquarters Expansion in New York.* The General Assembly voted to appropriate two million dollars as the first installment of a total of twenty-five million dollars which the United Nations has decided to appropriate over a ten year period towards the eighty million dollar cost of constructing an extension to the Headquarters building complex in New York. This money cannot be spent unless and until there is favorable congressional action to appropriate twenty million dollars in the form of a Federal grant towards the construction costs. After authorization by both Houses of Congress the matter is now before the Appropriations Committee. (The balance of the construction costs are assured from New York City, the United Nations Development Program, and the United Nations Children's Fund.) It is essential that construction is underway at an early date to ensure that the rise in the cost of labor and materials do not exceed the total authorized for construction.

C. *Professional Salary Scales of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies.* The General Assembly approved, over United States opposition, an 8% professional salary increase for the United Nations, effective July 1, 1971. (The United States delegation was instrumental in deferring the effective date of the increase from January 1 to July 1, with a resulting saving of 4.4 million dollars in 1971. However, we failed to obtain a majority for our proposal to limit the increase to 5%.) The Assembly also decided to establish an Expert Committee representing 11 member states, including the United States, to review the United Nations salary system, and decided additionally that there would be no further increase in base professional salary scales until the review had been completed and its results approved by the General Assembly.

D. *United Nations Budget*. Experience during the past few years has demonstrated that the United States must keep constant pressure on the Secretary General during the course of each year to ensure that the annual United Nations budgets are as low as possible, consistent with our policy objectives. It was primarily as a result of my approaches during the spring and summer of 1970 that the Secretary General announced in October, 1970 that he intended to reduce the anticipated budget requirements for 1971, then estimated at two-hundred million dollars, by an amount of about seven million dollars, primarily by “freezing” the Manning Table for 1971 at the 1970 level.

Charles W. Yost

95. Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

CA-1085

Washington, March 4, 1971, 4:13 p.m.

SUBJECT

UN: Appraisal of Second Committee (Economic and Financial) at 25th General Assembly

REF

CA-6431, December 30, 1970²

Introduction: This airgram appraises the actions of the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) of the 25th General Assembly. It is based on the impressions and reports of the U.S. Delegation and officers in the Department who followed events daily.

The Second Committee is a committee of the whole which meets concurrently with the General Assembly from September to December, is responsible for economic and financial items on the agenda of the General Assembly, and which negotiates and adopts resolutions on those items and transmits them, for final action, to the plenary of the General Assembly. Usually, the final vote in the GA follows the pattern set by Committee II.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by P. T. Dunn, Thomas W. M. Smith, and J. Koehring; cleared by John W. McDonald; and approved by Ward P. Allen. Sent to USUN, Geneva, Paris for OECD, Montreal for ICAO, Rome for FODAG, Vienna for IAEA, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, London, and Santiago.

² Document 93.

The schedule of Committee II varied this year from the normal because the first month of the session—mid-September to mid-October—was entirely devoted to the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade. This important document was adopted by the Committee on October 16 and by the twenty-fifth commemorative session of the General Assembly on October 24 (see *Current Economic Developments*, Issue No. 6, December 15, 1970).

Summary of Accomplishments: In drawing up a balance sheet of successes and failures for U.S. policy objectives in the Second Committee during the 25th General Assembly, the pluses far outweigh the minuses. Unquestionably, the greatest achievement was the adoption of the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade. Although the strategy did not fully satisfy anyone, the compromise and degree of consensus achieved was far greater than could have been expected before the final negotiations during the General Assembly. A major factor explaining this successful outcome was the willingness of the moderate LDC's, such as India, to take the leadership in conducting the negotiations on behalf of all the LDC's.

Next in importance was the approval by the GA of the resolution containing a consensus statement on the capacity of the UN Development Program which had been carefully negotiated at the June 1970 meeting of the UNDP Governing Council. The passage of this consensus without significant amendment was in keeping with the U.S. objective of ensuring that the ground gained toward the reorganization of the UNDP along the lines recommended in the Jackson Capacity Study not be lost.

The adoption without amendment of the resolution recommended by the 49th ECOSOC establishing the United Nations Volunteers was another significant success.

Other items which we consider culminated in negotiated texts of resolutions consistent with our aims were those on UNITAR, UNIDO, the International University, multilateral food aid, edible proteins, review and appraisal of the Strategy for the Second Development Decade, unified approach to economic and social planning for development, and the World Population Year.

The two UNCTAD resolutions—on transfer of technology and on UNCTAD III—can be considered as a draw between the DC's and the LDC's. The improvement of the two texts from the original drafts due to intensive informal negotiations was gratifying to us, when one considers the distance between the objectives of the LDC cosponsors and our own. The Romanian resolution on the role of modern science and technology in the development of nations, while leaving much to be desired as to substance, was in the end acceptable to us.

The clearly negative resolutions were those on the Capital Development Fund, the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament,

and the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. We voted against these or abstained.

Principal Features of Session: The session was marked by the following significant features:

1. *Increasing Confrontation between DC's and LDC's.*

To a greater extent than in previous sessions of the Committee, debate and negotiation of issues were influenced by DC–LDC confrontations. There are a number of reasons for this, none of them sufficient in themselves, but each contributing to the overall effect.

A. There were many issues on which LDC's and DC's would normally have opposing interests. The most important of these, and the one that set the tone of the whole session, was the long opening debate on the Strategy.

B. Some of the most important issues before the Committee had originally been exhaustively debated in UNCTAD, where the group system tends to institutionalize LDC–DC differences. The most important of these were the trade and financial sections of the Strategy, the transfer of technology in UNCTAD, and UNCTAD III.

C. Some of the most important of the LDC's were represented by delegations with long experience in Geneva and of UNCTAD. They tended to be able, well informed and among the leaders of the LDC's. Among the most significant were Chile (Cubillos), Philippines (Brillantes), Brazil (Frazao and Barthel-Rosa).

D. The positions of the major DC's on many significant economic items may have encouraged the LDC's to take a hard line. In particular the hard, sometimes negative line the US was obliged to follow on many items made us a target and stiffened the attitude of the LDC's.

In contrast, the more supple and less principled positions of some Western Europeans, France and Italy in particular, enabled them to create a better image while maintaining the substance of their positions. They were, however, undoubtedly helped by the generally conservative positions of the US.

E. The growing trend among delegations, both DC and LDC, to develop experts in various aspects of developmental matters and to send them around the world to UN and related conferences became more apparent during the 25th GA. This factor is particularly true in the case of the Soviets, the French, and the more active LDC's, such as the Indians, Brazilians, Chileans. Having the same delegates debate the same issue as it runs through UNCTAD, the Regional Commissions, ECOSOC and the General Assembly, gives these delegations an extra advantage on technical issues, which the majority do not enjoy.

2. *Decline of Western Caucus.*

The Western European and Others (WEO) group lost by the end of the Session a great deal of the cohesion and unity it had previously,

such as when Soviet opposition to FRG membership on the Preparatory Committee for the Second UN Development Decade rallied this group in 1968.

In 1970 there was an evident lack of will and of leadership among the WEO's. The absence also of a strong US position perhaps contributed. The WEO Caucus did function, albeit not too effectively, during the early part of the Session during the DD-II negotiations.

3. *Polarization of Approach to Neutral Issues.*

The increasing intransigence of the LDC's, ably led by a few outspoken members, and the weakness of the WEO's, contributed to a polarized approach to some items in which many DC's and LDC's usually find themselves on the same side. The most significant of these were in the fields of population and environment. Even the debates and negotiations of resolutions of such non-controversial subjects as edible proteins, multilateral food aid, and the international university became polarized along DC/LDC lines.

In the case of the *UN Conference on the Human Environment*, the trend is particularly disturbing. What had been up to now a feeling of apathy on the part of most LDC's toward the Conference and toward the subject of environment in general, is clearly evolving into hardened opposition to UN involvement in the environment, based on the premise that it is a diversion, on the part of the DC's, from what the LDC's consider the only valid activity of the UN in the economic and social field, namely, development assistance to the LDC's. This line, which up to a few months ago, was limited primarily to Brazil and Chile, is rapidly gaining support. This can best be illustrated by the last-minute introduction of an amendment sponsored by Brazil and Chile to interject a controversial note in a resolution already unbalanced to reflect the concerns of the LDC's. The ability of a few LDC's to marshal solid support from other LDC's on a question such as the environment on the grounds that any steps taken in the international arena to foster concern about our environment will per se result in a slowing down of the economic development of the third world is a disturbing trend, to say the least.

4. *Population.*

A somewhat surprising exception to the trend toward hardening of the opposition by LDC's concerns UN population control activities. A complex mix of factors explains the LDC positions on this issue. The ECOSOC resolution declaring 1974 World Population Year was, it is true, watered down in successive versions in response to statements by Latin American and a sizeable number of African states. The LDC's were vocal in their opposition and did account for a large share of the 31 abstentions accorded this resolution in Plenary.

However, the voting strength of the majority favoring UN involvement in population programs has been increasing since 1962,

when UN assistance for population programs was first discussed. Among Asian LDC's, notable converts include Iran, post-Sukarno Indonesia, and the Philippines; in South America—Jamaica and possibly Panama. The Latin American and African countries, which voted against technical assistance in 1962, abstained in 1970.

Among these LDC's, changes in attitudes have been mainly due to the clearer perception of their individual demographic difficulties and some acquiescence to the mainstream of LDC opinion.

Such special factors as the influence of the Vatican were probably more important than the trend toward polarization in explaining LDC opposition to this resolution. The Roman Catholic Church, particularly with leftist support in individual countries, appears to be in position to influence some governments in Latin America on the birth control issue; especially when government's assessment of the need and value of population control finds no overriding urgency in the *present* situation.

However, as the Brazilian delegate told us, one objective of the LDC's in watering down the ECOSOC resolution was to show that actions of the ECOSOC endorsing decisions of technical bodies (i.e., Population Council) could be distorted by the combined power of the LDC's in the General Assembly.

5. *Effect of Reorganizations in the UN.*

Part of the explanation for the harder line of the LDC's may be owing to some substantial changes in the organization of the economic side of the UN that are clearly in the offing, although their outlines are not yet distinct. The three most likely changes to take place are:

A. The establishment of a mechanism to review and appraise worldwide progress under the Strategy for the Second Development Decade (which started January 1, 1971), and to make recommendations as to adjustments in policy measures or goals or both. The outline provided in the Strategy is sketchy, and leaves open the question of specific roles for each part of the UN system. While the principal responsibility is given to ECOSOC, in which DC's have a relatively strong voice, the more militant LDC's clearly wish UNCTAD to play the decisive role.

B. Closely linked with this were proposals to reform ECOSOC either through expansion of some of its committees or the establishment of stronger committees in order to make it a more effective instrument in its role as the principal coordinator and director of the economic and social side of the UN.

C. Changes in the UNDP designed to increase the capacity of the UN system effectively to provide more assistance to the LDC's.

These impending changes may appear to some LDC's as opportunities to increase the influence of organizations in which they are dominant, and to demonstrate the desirability of clearly defining the problems with which these organizations deal in a way that makes the LDC interest clear. At the twenty-fifth GA the LDC's may have been

motivated, in part, by the desire to create a basis for influencing the future of these changes.

Outlook for the Future: It seems likely that the trends outlined above will continue to be important in future sessions of Committee II. It is also true that the US, as the principal economic power in the world with responsibilities that touch on every facet of international relations, will not make substantial changes in its fundamental policies solely in order to improve its image in the UN. We might however be able to improve the way in which US policies are presented, and to rally more support for some of them by:

1. Paying closer attention to the effect of all US policies in the UN.
2. Strengthening the US Delegation, in part, by seconding officers from Washington either for the whole session or for specific items.
3. Seeking to strengthen the WEO group and get it to play a more responsible role.
4. Carefully preparing ahead of time joint DC/LDC positions on some items of mutual interest in order to break the appearance of uniform DC/LDC divisions.
5. Seeking ways to support and work with the least developed and in particular by supporting their demands for assistance from the other LDC's.
6. Making more use of bilateral diplomatic channels to explain our views on items in the UN well in advance of consideration of the item in question, and explore the views of LDC's.

We would welcome comments or suggestions by addressees.

Rogers

96. Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

CA-3760

Washington, August 12, 1971, 11:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

26th United Nations General Assembly—Agenda Items in the Political,
Economic-Social, and Administrative Fields

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by the IO/UNP staff, John W. McDonald, and Richard V. Hennes; cleared by Armitage, McDonald, Ernest L. Kerley, William A. Helseth, Monsma, Oliver S. Crosby, Goott, Walker, McNutt, and W. Beverly Carter; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to all posts except the following to which it was repeated: Bern, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Khartoum, Moscow, Prague, Saigon, Seoul, Sofia, Warsaw, USUN, USOECD Paris, USNATO Brussels, Geneva, and USEC Brussels.

REFS

(a) CA 4584 dtd August 29, 1970²

(b) CA 6368 dtd December 23, 1970³

This airgram provides the basis for exchanges of views on key issues with foreign ministry officials prior to the departure of host government delegations for the 26th UN General Assembly, which opens on September 21. Contrary to the procedure suggested last year, the information is to be used for oral presentation and the Department is not requesting that written papers be passed to host governments. These discussions should be used, as appropriate, to enlist support for US positions and to determine the positions and likely initiatives of others. Information on host government attitudes should be reported telegraphically to the Department, with USUN included in all cases as an info addressee.

Background information on developments during last year's General Assembly (25th Session) will be found in the Department's airgram assessing the 25th GA (Ref (b)). The roll-call voting record of the host government is contained in a Department of State (IO) Document "Roll Call Votes at the 25th Session of the General Assembly," which was transmitted separately.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

General Assessment

The 26th UNGA could well be a turbulent one. Activity and debate on the Chinese Representation issue will be even more intense than usual as the moment of decision is seen to be approaching. This issue and the problem of selecting a new Secretary-General could well dominate the session. Also, if no progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute seems perceptible and/or tensions in the area rise markedly, a major debate on the Middle East could ensue and surcharge the parliamentary scene. The situations in Cyprus and India/Pakistan, fraught with danger of conflict, could also lead to heated debates. Perennial cold war themes should be somewhat muted although we can expect the Soviets to attack propaganda targets of opportunity, making common cause as usual with the African-Asian majority on colonial issues.

On the positive side there seems a good possibility that the UNGA will support a fundamental reform in the organization and procedures of ECOSOC and a completed draft convention on liability for falling space objects. Also, an agreed draft convention prohibiting bacteriological warfare agents may be presented for Assembly approval.

² Not printed.

³ This airgram was an appraisal of the 25th UN General Assembly. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 30)

Little headway has been made on the effort launched at last year's 25th Anniversary GA to overhaul and streamline the GA's procedures. The study committee will report only modest progress. Another discouraging report will be made by the Committee studying ways to improve peacekeeping procedures, there having been no change in the obstructive Soviet position.

1. Secretary-General's Succession

We accept U Thant's repeated statements that he is not available for reappointment and believe it is time for all UN members to come to grips with the problem of choosing his successor.

U Thant's term as UN Secretary-General ends December 31, 1971. A successor must be appointed by the 26th GA, acting on the recommendation of the Security Council. Obviously, not only to gain appointment but also to be able to function effectively, any Secretary-General must be acceptable to UN members generally, as well as to the five permanent members of the Security Council.

We have taken no firm position on any individual to succeed U Thant and have little indication of the views of other UN members on this problem. We place great emphasis on the need to find someone having not only outstanding qualifications as a statesman but also the managerial talent required to weld the Secretariat into an effective organization and to attack the UN's serious financial problems. In our view, a candidate's character, integrity and ability far outweigh any regional considerations. We hope the host government's delegation shares our views on the qualifications required of an SYG and will be prepared to help gain a consensus in favor of a candidate best meeting them. It is a disservice to the UN to persist in the hope that U Thant may be persuaded to stay on for a certain period. Failure to choose a new Secretary General this year will only weaken the UN.

There are at present three announced candidates: Jakobson, Finland's UN Representative; Amerasinghe, Ceylon's UN Representative; and Endalkatchew Makonnen, former Ethiopian UN Representative. Former Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim, now Austria's UN Representative, has also let it be known that he is available. Others, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Aga Khan, have also been discussed as possible candidates, and "dark horses" may yet emerge.

2. Chinese Representation

Our objective is to see the People's Republic of China seated under conditions which do not involve denial of representation to the Republic

of China. The legal argumentation on both sides promises to be conflicting, but we regard the issue as primarily political and pragmatic. Seating of the PRC is necessary and desirable. Ejection of the ROC would be a grave matter, something that would be very difficult to undo. That is why we regard any such move as an “Important Question” requiring a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. As we see it both the PRC and the ROC are realities. The UN should deal with realities, not try to impose the views of one party on the other. *The conflicting claims of the PRC and ROC would not be prejudiced by the seating of the PRC under the terms of the kind of resolution we have in mind.*

We can expect a certain amount of acrimony during the maneuvering and debate, but do not intend to contribute to it—although we will work hard to win acceptance for our proposed solution. The important thing is that for the first time it isn’t necessary for any country to accept the either/or approach of the Albanian resolution. The UN will not make progress toward the ideal of universality if it now deprives of representation a government that effectively governs some 14 million people. Countries that find they cannot support us on this issue could still make a valuable contribution by not pressing contrary views.

3. Middle East

Three agenda items on the Middle East (“the Middle East”, UNRWA, and alleged Israeli practices in the occupied territories) will provide potential platforms for debate on Arab-Israeli issues. Pressures for an all-out debate, its tone and the nature of comments about US policies in the Middle East will depend largely on whether discernible progress has been made on an interim settlement or other aspects of Arab-Israeli negotiations. There may be pressures for resolutions going beyond those of last year calling for extension of the standstill/cease-fire, for unconditional resumption of peace talks under Jarring, and condemnation of alleged Israeli practices in the occupied territories. *We would prefer as little Assembly discussion as possible; if a resolution related to Security Council Resolution 242 and the Jarring Mission is proposed, we will want to have it worded in a way which does not undermine our efforts to promote a settlement acceptable to the parties.*

The UNRWA debate will ostensibly focus on the plight of refugees, the precarious financial situation of the Agency, and the renewal of UNRWA’s three year mandate (which expires June 20, 1972). We expect no problem with respect to GA endorsement of UNRWA’s ongoing activities, but believe that mounting UNRWA deficits will require some cutbacks in its program unless other countries increase their contributions.

4. African Items⁴

a. Namibia (South West Africa)

An OAU delegation will present the African view on Namibia early in the General Assembly and plans to call for a special meeting of the Security Council. *We fully appreciate the importance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice upholding the UN's termination of South Africa's mandate on Namibia and are examining possible constructive responses to it; we hope others will do likewise and avoid the temptation to see the opinion as an invitation to press for extreme, unworkable measures.*

The Court decided that General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), October 28, 1966, had validly terminated South Africa's mandate in Namibia. The Court determined that South Africa is obligated to withdraw and that UN Member States are under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's continued presence and to refrain from giving any support to South Africa relating to its occupation of Namibia. Subject to further definition by the Security Council, the Court considered that Member States have an obligation to abstain from entering into treaty, diplomatic, or economic relations with South Africa which would imply recognition of the legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia.

We are studying what actions the opinion may require as well as other policy initiatives. We can already state, however, that the Court has not called for—and we cannot support—such drastic actions as mandatory sanctions against South Africa or the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. We hope the Africans understand that concentration on such extreme measures will not contribute to a resolution of the Namibia problem and will dissipate the opportunity provided by the Court's opinion to seek more constructive and practical actions from the world community. (See also Item 9 on the International Court of Justice.)

b. Portuguese Territory Issue in the ECA

We will strongly oppose a proposal that the General Assembly approve the official designation of "liberation movement" leaders as the representatives of Portugal's African territories on the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

FYI. The ECA has been maneuvering for several years to have "liberation movement" leaders fill the seats of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea at its meetings. These territories have been associate members of the ECA since 1963, and in 1969 the ECA decided to

⁴ Telegram 150235 to all African posts, August 17, sent a summary of "selected points of interest" to those posts. (Ibid., UN 3 GA)

ask the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to determine who should represent them. The OAU nominated the “liberation movement” leaders in 1970 and the ECA passed their names to ECOSOC for referral to the General Assembly. At its July 1971 session, ECOSOC agreed to transmit the names of these nominees to the General Assembly for possible approval at its 26th Session. End FYI. Our position will be that *acceptance of the nominations would be contrary to the Charter and the practice of the United Nations. It would in fact create a most dangerous precedent which could be exploited by dissidents in other parts of the world.*

The United States recognizes that Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea are associate members of the ECA. We hold, however, that the designation of their representatives must be left to the administering power—Portugal. We are guided by an unchallenged legal opinion of August 5, 1964, from the Office of the Legal Counsel of the UN which states that under international law the external representation of dependent territories is the responsibility of the state administering the territories and responsible for their international relations.

Although we abstained (instead of opposing) in ECOSOC when the ECA representation issue was considered, we and others viewed the question not as one of approving the nominations, but only of transmitting them to the General Assembly. We did, moreover, express our opposition to the ECA nominations in statements both in committee and the plenary. FYI. Our abstention was also based on a consideration of other issues being considered in ECOSOC. End FYI.

In opposing approval of the OAU nominees, we will need to enlist considerably more support than has been shown. *We believe that a meaningful approach can be made to almost every country on this issue on the grounds of the dangerous precedent the Assembly would set if it (1) overruled a still valid UN legal opinion and (2) endorsed the legality of any dissident group’s effort to become the official representatives of a territory.* FYI. To gain the needed votes on purely legal grounds will probably prove difficult; our chances to carry this issue would be much improved if Portugal could see fit to designate representatives from these territories. End FYI.

c. Political Issues in UN Specialized Agencies

We will be taking a hard look at the terms of any General Assembly resolution which dumps political issues in the laps of the UN specialized agencies, and hope others can be persuaded to join us in preventing further politicizing of these bodies. Political activity undermines the work of the agencies and possibly the support of states for them.

The meetings of many UN specialized agencies in 1971 were marked by a high degree of political activity, particularly on African issues. This followed resolutions in the last two General Assembly ses-

sions (2555 (XXIV) and 2704 (XXV)) calling on the specialized agencies to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Among the more objectionable things the specialized agencies have been asked to consider are discontinuing "collaboration" with Portugal and South Africa; examining the possibility of inviting "liberation movement" leaders in African colonial territories to participate in the agencies' meetings (cf. preceding item); and giving assistance to people "struggling for their liberation from colonial rule". The issue is on the General Assembly agenda this year and may result in even more extreme proposals.

Pressing such proposals in the Specialized Agencies can only interfere with the implementation of their responsibilities for exchange of information, setting standards and providing assistance to developing countries.

5. Effectiveness of the Security Council

We strongly believe that *all UN members should be concerned that the Security Council conduct its business in a deliberate and serious manner commensurate with its responsibilities*. By the terms of the Charter the Security Council has been given a most important role to play in maintaining international peace and security. All members, particularly the less powerful members, should be able to turn to the Security Council if and when they consider their territorial integrity or independence threatened and expect that the Security Council will consider their case seriously and take appropriate action. This in turn places a duty on all UN members not to take lightly a decision to appeal to the Security Council, to cooperate so that the Security Council can determine its own actions in full consciousness of its responsibilities, and especially to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its efforts to investigate thoroughly and to arrive at independent assessment of the situation before it acts.

In some cases there have been grounds to believe that appeals to the Security Council may have been made in large measure for domestic political purposes and that some members were not prepared to cooperate with Security Council missions investigating the situation. In our view it is not in the interest of any UN member for the Security Council to permit its prestige and authority to be degraded in this manner.

We have also become increasingly *concerned over the disposition of regions, FYI particularly Africa and Asia End FYI, to rotate their SC seats among the members of the region without regard to the influence of these members both within and outside the region or to the competence and stature of their likely representatives on the Council*. We believe that in proposing candidacies for the Security Council greater attention must be given to Article 23(1) of the UN Charter which states that due regard should be specially paid to the contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and security.

We recognize that we cannot expect any region consistently to ignore the desires of their weaker, less influential members for that recognition considered inherent in election to the Council. However, we hope the regions will come to recognize their own stake in the calibre of the Council and the prestige accruing to the region itself when it has outstanding representation on the Council. For example, Asian prestige is almost certain to be enhanced next year with Japan and India in the two Asian SC seats, and the Latin Americans have sought from the beginning in their own regional self-interest to have one of their two SC seats always occupied by one of their middle-sized or larger members.

We have not ourselves reached any conclusions about how regions might best be encouraged to recognize their own interest in the stature of the Council and in the calibre of regional representation thereon. We are, however, giving this problem our active attention and would therefore be most interested in the thinking of other member states in this regard.

6. Measures to Strengthen the Economic and Social Council

The most widely discussed item at the last ECOSOC session concerned measures to strengthen the Council itself. At the close of the session the Council approved a 15-nation (US) resolution (17-7-3) calling for ECOSOC enlargement and the establishment of two new standing committees for science and technology and review and appraisal of the Second Development Decade. The most far-reaching of these recommendations calls for enlargement of the Council from 27 to 54 members. ECOSOC was enlarged from 18 to 27 members in 1965 but was still considered too small by many developing countries. Although the US took the initiative as a co-sponsor of the resolution, we sought to ensure that prior to any such enlargement ECOSOC would take immediate steps to retain jurisdiction over vital economic and social issues which are clearly within its competence. We also emphasized that such enlargement is envisaged only in order to strengthen the work of the Council and is not in any way designed to encourage the enlargement of other UN bodies, particularly the Security Council. The resolution will now come before the General Assembly. Creation and enlargement of ECOSOC committees can be accomplished by decision of ECOSOC without GA approval. *Council enlargement, however, requires not only approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly but also ratification by two-thirds of the UN membership, including all five permanent members of the Security Council.*

7. Disaster Relief Coordinator

The Economic and Social Council during its summer session in Geneva adopted a resolution (25-0-2) calling on the United Nations Secretary-General to appoint a Disaster Relief Coordinator to mobilize,

direct and coordinate relief activities of various organizations of the UN system in response to requests for disaster assistance from stricken states. The Coordinator is to have a small permanent office in the UN which will be the focal point in the UN system for disaster relief matters. *If the General Assembly approves this initiative, which we support, the coordination office could become operational by the beginning of next year.* The necessity for a central UN disaster relief office has received additional impetus as a result of the large scale assistance in response to the two recent disasters in East Pakistan provided by the UN, the specialized agencies, voluntary agencies and donor countries.

8. UN Financial Problem

We expect the SYG will address a special message to the 26th GA concerning the UN deficit situation and prospects for its solution. According to Secretariat sources, the UN faces an impending liquidity crisis, possibly by early 1972, if the present situation is allowed to persist. In late May Ambassador Hambro of Norway, who had volunteered his good offices in this matter after serving as President of the 25th GA, circulated a suggested solution to all permanent missions in New York. To date there has been little official reaction by UN members. *The U.S. position on this subject is well known: No over-all solution is possible until the major delinquents (U.S.S.R., other East European members and France) assert their willingness to contribute a sizable cash contribution (about \$50 million). This same point was made, though in more veiled terms, by Ambassador Hambro in his memorandum. Once the delinquent members make their contributions, we are prepared to pitch in with other members toward eliminating the deficit altogether.*

9. The International Court of Justice

a. Decision on Namibia

We are pleased with the conclusions in the operative paragraph of the Court's opinion on Namibia (Item 4a). In reaching these conclusions, however, the Court adopted a wider view of the powers of the Security Council under articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter than we have generally accepted. It has been our view that the decisions of the Security Council which are binding are those taken under Chapter VII of the Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression), whereas the Court has reasoned that other actions taken under the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security as defined in Article 24 may also be binding on UN members under Article 25. The Court's reasoning gives us problems and *we anticipate that in voting in the Security Council to accept the decision we will make the point that the Council is passing only on the Court's conclusions and not on any of the specific reasoning underlying those conclusions.*

b. *Role of the Court*

We urged last year that an extensive review of the International Court of Justice be undertaken, and as a result the Secretary-General circulated a questionnaire seeking the opinions of member-states on a variety of issues concerning the Court. *We think that this year the General Assembly should appoint an ad hoc committee to study the report of the Secretary-General on the results of his questionnaire and to make further recommendations on strengthening the role of the Court. We will support, and may introduce, a resolution to that end.*

10. *Seabeds—Law of the Sea*

We think it of the highest importance that the 26th General Assembly adhere to the 1973 date set by the 25th General Assembly and call upon the Seabed Committee (acting as a Preparatory Committee for the Conference) to proceed with all possible speed towards drafting treaty articles on outstanding oceans questions. The increasing accessibility of ocean resources, and the danger of more conflicting jurisdictional claims, point up the urgent need to avoid delay in achieving international agreement on these issues.

11. *Stockholm Conference on the Environment*

The UNGA will consider a report of the Secretary-General on the UN Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm in June 1972. We expect that GA consideration of the Secretary-General's report will be pro forma and non-substantive. *The sticky issue will be the question of invitations, particularly with respect to East Germany. Guidance on the invitation issue will be provided in a separate message.*

12. *Outer Space*

On June 29, after three years of difficult negotiations, the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee adopted a draft Convention on liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space. *We support this draft, believe that it is the best obtainable under existing circumstances (e.g., the Soviet position) and that the GA should approve it despite the preference expressed by a few states for stricter provisions on the claims commission and on the extent of compensation.*

The Soviets have submitted a draft Lunar Treaty for consideration during the 26th GA. While we are unsure of their motivation in proposing a treaty which adds very little to the substance of present space law, we are still reviewing it and will be interested in the views of others.

13. *Human Rights*

a. *High Commissioner for Human Rights*

The United States will oppose attempts at further delay of discussion of the proposal to establish a new post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, which was first presented in 1965. The High Commissioner would be an

official at the level of an Under-Secretary who would provide advice and assistance to the Secretary-General and UN organs concerned with human rights. In addition, he would be empowered to give assistance on human rights problems to states requesting it.

The proposal has received the endorsement of the Commission on Human Rights and of ECOSOC but at each GA session since 1967 its consideration has been postponed. We are prepared to discuss clarifying amendments to the proposal which will make it more attractive to more states, so long as the essential degree of independence and objectivity for the High Commissioner is preserved.

b. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict

Last year, discussion of the item on respect for human rights in armed conflict occupied a major portion of the Third Committee's time and five resolutions were adopted by the GA, including one dealing with humane treatment of prisoners of war which was co-sponsored by the U.S. Since the last UNGA, the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva has begun the process of updating and supplementing the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. Since we consider that expert forum far preferable to the more political UNGA committees, *we hope to limit UN action at the 26th GA to endorsement of ICRC activities*, avoiding either the adoption of additional substantive resolutions, which could prejudice the work of the ICRC forum, or the institution of unnecessary and potentially damaging parallel activities in the UN. If other governments express interest in introducing such resolutions, we would discourage them from doing so.

14. *Korea*

If this item is again inscribed for consideration by the Assembly, *we plan to work for the defeat of resolutions calling for the dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea*. We hope that friendly governments will support us in the voting on the various segments of the Korean item. Information on tactical handling of this item will be sent in a separate message.

15. *Strengthening International Security*

A Soviet item on "Strengthening International Security" is on the agenda. Our position, expressed during last year's debate on this issue, is that the United Nations should be concerned with taking concrete actions to strengthen international security—making better use of and improving existing procedures and machinery for peacekeeping and peaceful settlement of disputes; resolving the peacekeeping financial deficit and establishing a sound basis for future financing. We see no benefit in debate just on generalities. Thus *we hope to achieve the*

minimum possible discussion of the item and to resist the preparation of a resolution on the matter.

16. 1973 Planning Estimate

As a means of establishing long-term planning in the UN, the Committee of 14 in 1966 proposed, and the General Assembly in resolution 2370 (XXII) provided, that the Secretary-General should each year prepare a “planning estimate for the United Nations regular budget estimates for the second succeeding budgetary period.” Twice this procedure has been postponed due to fears of some Member States, especially the less developed, that it would inhibit the growth of UN activities.

The US has strongly supported the planning estimate procedure in the belief that the information would be helpful to Member States, would set the framework within which the SYG could develop the next year’s program of work, and would contribute to more rational determination of priorities among competing programs, improve selectivity—and assist in controlling the growth of the UN budget. We thus believe that there should be no further delay in instituting the planning estimate procedure. We think the General Assembly at its 26th Session should establish such an estimate for the 1973 budget.

There is a further and urgent reason for a 1973 planning estimate. We understand that UN cash liquidity position is becoming critical (Item 8). At the same time it seems probable the 1972 UN regular budget will increase substantially. We believe public opinion in the US and in other countries would find it hard to understand how the UN, at a time when it may be unable to meet its payroll, could contemplate a greatly increased budget for the next year. We thus regard the 1973 planning estimate exercise as one that should put the UN under some constraint to show that it is seriously attempting to live within its means and devote its resources to the most pressing problems facing the organization.

17. Reactivating the Committee of Fourteen

At the 25th General Assembly, the US proposed a resolution, co-sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, USSR, UAR and UK, to reactivate the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies (Committee of 14) with a broad mandate to study ways of improving financial, budgetary and administrative practices of the UN system including the Specialized Agencies. Action was deferred to the 26th General Assembly.

Our feeling now is that last year’s proposal was too ambitious. At this session we will seek reactivation of the Committee to deal only with two inter-related problems in the UN itself, although the Committee should be free to make any study it believed appropriate. These problems are:

(1) means of establishing an effective planning, programming, and budgeting system, as called for in 1966 by the original Committee and subsequently by a number of other bodies such as the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU); and (2) means of instituting improved procedures within the UN for evaluating the Organization's performance in implementing previously agreed activities.

We believe that if the expert and prestigious body which produced such successful results in 1966 can be gotten to take a careful look at some aspects of the present situation, it would recommend courses of action to strengthen both the internal management of the UN and control over its activities by Member States.

Rogers

97. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen)¹

Washington, September 3, 1971.

The Secretary's Speech to the UNGA

There are four topics which we would suggest for inclusion in the Secretary's statement, one of which—narcotics—is not peculiar to our area.

We believe the Secretary should give major emphasis to South Asia—to underline the dangers of war in the area, but especially to focus attention on the humanitarian problem in India and East Pakistan, to underline the UN role of leadership in dealing with these problems and to provide vigorous support to the Secretary-General's appeal for contributions and support from the world community.

We think the statement should include the following points—a) the threat to peace poses dangers not only to India and Pakistan but to the world community, b) the threat of famine in East Pakistan and the problem posed by the influx of refugees into India must also concern the international community, c) the international community, and India

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Unclassified. Drafted by Stanley D. Schiff on September 3 and concurred in by Alfred L. Atherton and Anthony C. E. Quanton. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Speech given and points used per Passage 1/25/72." See footnote 2, Document 100.

and Pakistan, have a responsibility for ensuring the peace, for averting famine and relieving human misery, d) we look to the UN to continue asserting vigorous leadership and coordination of efforts to deal with the food situation in East Pakistan and refugee relief in India. We intend continuing our support for these efforts. e) We recognize that the political problems in Pakistan must be resolved by the Pakistanis themselves, f) we trust both India and Pakistan will avoid actions which can increase tensions and will also be alert to the opportunities for dealing with the refugee problem so as to reduce tensions.

In general, the Middle East section of the Secretary's UNGA speech should be consistent with our present emphasis on quiet diplomacy and should avoid arousing undue expectations of early dramatic progress. While this is not the occasion for launching new public policy initiatives on the Middle East, it is an opportunity to adumbrate some of our concepts with respect to an interim Suez Canal agreement and to shift the focus to that effort and to the idea of a step-by-step approach, away from the idea of a quantum jump to an overall peace.

The speech should (a) recall what has been accomplished (with special emphasis on the ceasefire); (b) stress the importance of a Canal agreement as a practical first step toward peace; (c) register some impatience with the negativism of both sides and call for some risk-taking by the parties; and (d) urge that the UN contribute to the process of moving toward peace by avoiding both unproductive polemics and any attempts to shift the focus from negotiations by the parties themselves to new UN prescriptions on the substance of a peace settlement.

We believe it would be desirable to get some mention of narcotics into the statement—with the emphasis on the growing international nature of the problem and the need for concerted international action to deal with it. If the subject can be worked into the statement, we would like the Secretary to commend Turkey publicly for its decision to eliminate production in 1972, for this example of international good citizenship and as an example which others should emulate.

Lastly, if possible, a sentence or two welcoming new members of the UN—Bhutan, Bahrein and probably Qatar.

We would prefer to give you draft language for the South Asia and Middle East portions of the statement and will get them to you next week.

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 17, 1971, 1:23 p.m.

171037. Subject: Pruning 26th GA Agenda. Ref: USUN 2626.²

1. Dept concurs in your suggestions for deferral or merger of agenda items (reftel) except for proposal to merge items 48 and 49. We believe these two items should remain separate both in terms of their consideration and in terms of substance. With regard to item 55, suggest this be referred directly to ECOSOC and its social commission. In addition, suggest you seek elimination of following items:

a. Item 24 (report on peaceful uses of atomic energy): We are puzzled why Secretariat decided to include agenda item on this report. In our view report should simply have been circulated to members who could then comment upon it either in General Debate or under IAEA item (15). If it is not possible to delete this item, it should be bracketed with item 15.

b. Item 29b (safeguarding of new processes of uranium enrichment): If this item cannot be deleted, it should be bracketed with item 15.

c. Item 32 (implementation of results of conference of non-nuclear weapons states): GA has discussed this item for several years and there is nothing new before it to consider.

d. Item 39 (UNSCEAR report) and item 47d (UN volunteer program): Reports should simply be circulated and agenda items deleted. Item 46 (UNITAR) is similar item. While we could support its removal from agenda, believe we should not initiate action to drop it since UNITAR Executive Director Adebo wishes use GA platform to elicit financial support and could enlist wide AF backing.

e. Item 56 (world social situation): Since neither ECOSOC nor GA requested inclusion of agenda item on this subject, report should simply be circulated.

2. Bracketing of items:

a. Item 12 (ECOSOC report): Chapter on economic and social consequences of arms race should be bracketed with item 35 to avoid two discussions on same issue.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3-1. Confidential. Drafted by B. J. Schrage and Betty Gough; cleared by Armitage, Pelcovits, Kent, Jacques Reinstein, Kathleen Bell, Barth, and Ernest L. Kerley; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Telegram 2626, September 10, suggested items to be deferred or merged with other items on the agenda of the 26th General Assembly. (Ibid.)

b. Item 33 (international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes): Should be bracketed with item 15.

3. Referral to committees:

a. Item 12 (ECOSOC report): Chapter on question of enlargement of Council should be referred directly to plenary. Chapter on economic and social consequences of arms race could be referred to Committee 1 or 2 if it is bracketed with item 35 but only to Committee 2 if it is not.

b. Item 28 (rationalization of GA procedures): Should be referred to Committee 6, which is logical place for changes in rules to be discussed.

c. Item 35: Could be discussed in Committee 1 or 2. (See para 3a above.)

4. We recognize that only very limited time is available to undertake consultations with other General Committee members on above but believe it would be useful to consult with as many as possible before we formally make our proposals.

Rogers

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 21, 1971, 2149Z.

173644. Subject: Pruning of 26th GA Agenda. Ref: USUN 2769.²

1. Dept supports retention of agenda items 54 (freedom of information) and 64 (High Commissioner for Human Rights) but can agree to postpone item 90 (international school) per Soviet suggestion ref tel.

2. After further consideration of item 55 (elderly and aged), Dept has decided that while we could support postponement and referral of this item to ECOSOC and its Social Commission, we do not wish to propose this ourselves. FYI: There will be a White House Conference on elderly and aged in November 1971. While we see no positive advantage for this conference in keeping item 55 on agenda, believe it would be inopportune for us to propose postponement at this time. End FYI.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3–1. Confidential. Drafted by Schrage; cleared by Armitage, O'Connor, and Kerrigan; and approved by Herz.

² Telegram 2769 from USUN, September 14, discussed items that the U.S. and Soviet delegations had proposed postponing or deleting from the agenda of the 26th General Assembly. (Ibid.)

100. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 5, 1971, 0002Z.

3140. Subj: Reactions to Secretary's General Debate Speech.²

1. Summary. Reactions to Secy's speech are highly favorable with overwhelming majority lauding it as major substantive statement on principal international issues, deserving of careful study. Soviets pleased over reference to goal of cooperation in US-Sov relations but are somewhat reserved on ME. High level Egyptian comment has been unavailable. Both India and Pakistan call speech balanced. In general, speech has been praised by Africans, LAs and Europeans. Even those who oppose US position on Chirep compliment Secy on powerful presentation of US case. A French national in the Secretariat commented that it was a good speech which should win US friends. End Summary.

2. Malik (USSR) was pleased with section on US-Sov relations while taking usual Sov line on ME that US concentrating everything on interim settlement thereby blocking efforts of Jarring and the Four. Soviets, immediately after speech, were reserved with "we'll have to read it again" line. Later they were more forthcoming saying that it was a "peace speech." In particular Chuchukin used the line to several that it was "conciliatory" and Sovs were "pleased." Ovinnikov was particularly struck with ME point one that neither side can expect to achieve complete agreement on terms of overall settlement as part of interim agreement.

3. Ionescu (Romania) found speech positive and particularly encouraging re US-Sov relations.

4. Tekoah (Israel) was guarded but noted emphasis on interim agreement was consistent with Eban's speech.

5. Jamieson (UK) said it was a singularly effective speech. This opinion shared by Ruggiero (Italy).

6. Waldheim (Austria) thought speech "very forceful." On Chirep, until now some members felt US trying to save face for ROC. This no longer the case and any lingering doubts as to US seriousness put to rest.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and to the Interests Section in Cairo.

² Secretary Rogers' address to the UN General Assembly on October 4 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1971, pp. 437-444.

7. Mojsov (Yugo) on Chirep said speech was a very forceful presentation but it raised a false issue (expulsion). Mojsov convinced we are serious “the lines are drawn for battle.”

8. Jakobson (Finland) very favorably impressed, particularly by US-Sov section. He appreciated sentence on successor to U Thant. Said speech contained so much substance on so many issues that it would require careful study.

9. Both Sen (India) and Shahi (Pakistan) commented that speech was clear and balanced. Naturally Indians would have preferred greater stress on political settlement in EP and Paks less, but in general their reactions were decidedly favorable.

10. Although both FonMin and Mohammed Riad were present for speech, neither could be reached afterwards. Kassem (Egypt) reportedly thought speech not specific enough on withdrawal. Teymour (Egypt) thought Secy’s remarks “good” and “balanced.” He liked ME point on statement Canal agreement would merely be step toward complete and full implementation of Res 242.

11. Toukan (Jordan) thought speech, especially on ME “balanced.”

12. Latin Americans all seem to be pleased based on very positive comments from Reps of Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

13. Bayulken (Turkey) singled out ME portion saying it very clear and laid out current situation. On Chirep, Bayulken indicated his doubts as to possibility of US success remained unchanged.

14. Farah (Somalia) and OAU Rep very pleased over acceptance of ICJ decision on Namibia.

15. Jarring expressed great appreciation for way his mission was treated in speech. He also said he thought substance on ME was excellent.

16. Czech Rep said speech was very constructive and well balanced—only thing he regretted was skepticism shown re world disarmament conference.

Bush

101. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-1915

New York, December 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Third Committee—Evaluation

Summary

The Third Committee turned in a mixed, but essentially satisfactory performance during the 26th General Assembly. Most noteworthy accomplishments were in the areas of disaster relief; refugees; human rights in armed conflict; narcotics; UNICEF. Less than satisfactory performance was noted on agenda items concerning the world social situation; racial discrimination; self-determination; and town-twinning. The most glaring failure was inadequate attention devoted to the item on creation of a post of High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) and deferral to the 28th session of the General Assembly. The atmosphere was more restrained than last year although there were exchanges between the Arabs and Israelis; Pakistan and India; the US and USSR on politically sensitive issues; and between the US and certain African countries concerning policies in southern Africa. Seven members or alternates of the US Delegation participated in the committee at one point or another. All made major contributions to the excellent performance by the Delegation in the committee. *End Summary.*

The Third Committee turned in a mixed, but essentially satisfactory performance during the 26th GA. Most noteworthy accomplishments were in the areas of disaster relief; refugees; human rights in armed conflict; narcotics; UNICEF. Less than satisfactory performance was noted on agenda items concerning the world social situation; racial discrimination; self-determination; and town-twinning. The most glaring failure was inadequate attention devoted to the item on creation of a post of High Commissioner for Human Rights and deferral to the 28th session of the GA.

The committee has traditionally been noted for wide ranging and highly political debate. This continued to be the case during the 26th GA on such emotional issues as racial discrimination, self-determination, and the HCHR. On the other hand, delegates exhibited a high degree of statesmanship in the discussion of disaster relief, refugees, human rights in armed conflict, UNICEF, and narcotics.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Drafted December 21 by Arthur M. Stillman and approved by Bernard Zagorin.

On balance, the atmosphere in the committee was more restrained than last year largely because of prior agreement on the agenda which avoided prolonged procedural debates. The filibuster technique was employed again by the EEs and Arabs in order to avoid or to minimize discussion of the contentious item of the HCHR. This maneuver was successful and the item was not considered until the last week of the session. The proponents of the HCHR, recognizing that they had been outmaneuvered, did not seek to press it to a vote.

The Arabs and Israelis traded exchanges on several occasions but they were more restrained than in previous years. The EEs and Cuba were the only delegations to attack US Vietnam policies and racial discrimination in the US although a number of African countries were critical of US policies in southern Africa. The US delegation took a harder line this year on Soviet repression, including treatment of the Jewish minority.

The US was represented in the committee at various times by Congressman Derwinski, Mr. Moynihan, Admiral Shepard, Mr. Fletcher, Mrs. O'Donnell and Ambassadors Bennett and Zagorin. This policy of assigning delegates to specific items proved to be more effective than the former practice of assigning one delegate full time to the committee. The delegates appreciated the variety of exposure to items of particular interest and they brought fresh and imaginative approaches to the committee. The impact on other delegations was highly favorable since they were impressed by the special attention and importance given by the US delegation to each item. The Mission is convinced that its delegation made an excellent impression in the committee and that individual performances by members of the delegation were outstanding.

Comment on specific agenda items follows:

[Omitted here are comments on action on disaster relief, refugees, world social situation, racial discrimination, self-determination, human rights in armed conflict, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Nazism and racial intolerance, war criminals, elderly and aged, UNICEF, Declaration on Rights of the Mentally Retarded, drug abuse control, capital punishment, town twinning, status of the International Human Rights Convention, and items deferred.]

Bush

102. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts¹

A-677

Washington, January 21, 1972, 9:06 a.m.

SUBJECT

26th United Nations General Assembly—An Assessment

General Appraisal

Three events held the spotlight at the 26th General Assembly (Sept. 21–Dec. 22, 1971):

- the entry of the People's Republic of China;
- the overwhelming majority for a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops in the Indo-Pakistan war when the Security Council was prevented from acting by Soviet vetoes;
- and major power agreement in the final days of the session on the election of a new Secretary General.

The achievement record was mixed. Gains were made in UN efforts to cope with world-wide economic, social and technical problems: ECOSOC machinery to coordinate economic development and scientific activity was strengthened; a new post of Disaster Relief Coordinator was established to mobilize, direct and coordinate relief activities in emergencies; agreements were endorsed on outer space liability and biological warfare; and preparations were advanced for conferences on human environment and law of the seas.

At the same time, little headway was made on improving the UN's institutional capacity for effective action. The election of Kurt Waldheim, former Austrian Foreign Minister and long-time permanent representative to the UN, as Secretary General served to focus on the need for fundamental reforms in the UN's structure and functioning. The financial crisis and the pressing need for administrative reform are the two primary tasks facing him. While he was not generally regarded as the strongest candidate, we expect that the new SYG will display initiative and administrative talent in coming to grips with institutional problems. His record suggests he will be a prudent activist in seeking to promote agreed solutions to political problems.

Entry of the Peoples Republic of China focussed attention on the realignments that were taking place in the UN. The presence of the PRC will in theory make it possible for the UN to deal with a number

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Pelcovits and the IO Staff; cleared by Herz, Rothenberg, Hennes, McDonald, Walker, McNutt, and Chase; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

of problems heretofore considered beyond its reach. In practice, however, reaching big power accommodations may become more complex because of the acrimonious Sino-Soviet rivalry. North-South issues, both colonial and economic, continue to be major preoccupations of the UN. And, with the organization heading for near-universality, problems relating to the timing of membership of the divided states (the two Germanies in particular) and of accommodating microstates will also need more attention.

China and Shift in Political Balance

The question of Chinese representation and the arrival early in November of the PRC delegation set the dominant political tone. Although we suffered a painful defeat in the voting and deeply regret the exclusion of the Republic of China, we regard the seating of the PRC in the UN as the recognition of a political reality and an opportunity to bring this major power into international councils. Expulsion of the ROC created a possible damaging precedent, and by denying representation to 14 million people in Taiwan it ran counter to the movement for inclusiveness of all peoples.

The PRC delegation did not play an active role on many issues before the UN, apparently preferring first to become familiar with Assembly politics and procedure. From the start, however, it challenged UN "domination" by the US and USSR and imported the Sino-Soviet feud into the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC. The PRC staked out its claim to leadership of the Third World against the "superpowers" among whose numbers it said it did not want to be counted. Nevertheless, it was apparent in the debate on the World Disarmament Conference and in the Indo-Pakistan conflict that the PRC showed concern for its great power interests. The strident propaganda exchanges between the PRC and the USSR did not sit well with many third world countries some of whom feared that big power polemics might distract attention from their problems.

UNGA as a Political Forum

The annual session has become an important arena for diplomatic talks on a vast range of world and bilateral problems. The Secretary of State held an extended series of diplomatic exchanges with more than 80 Foreign Ministers and special envoys. Apart from explaining US policy on Chinese representation, the Secretary's address to the Assembly on October 4 ranged over key world issues, notably US-Soviet relations and progress on arms control negotiations, and the conditions for peaceful settlement of the Indo-Pakistan and Middle East disputes.

With respect to institutional problems of the UN, the Secretary stressed the need to select an outstanding successor to U Thant as SYG,

and to arrest the deterioration in the UN's financial position. As the UN becomes a more universal body, he noted in his address, "it will be better able to deal with the lengthening list of global issues confronting it—in conciliating political differences, in reducing the world's armaments, in curbing the epidemic spread of narcotics addiction, in protecting the environment, in assuring the exploitation of the oceans for the benefit of mankind."

The effectiveness and credibility of the General Assembly continued to suffer from the politics of confrontation and the tendency of members to place group solidarity above the need for realistic consensus. Sheer numbers remains a problem. UN membership rose to 132 during the 26th session with the admission of five new states—Bhutan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. No serious consideration was given to our proposal that associate status be offered to future applicants who do not have the resources to discharge their responsibilities as voting members. The anomaly whereby an ever larger majority of members can prescribe paper solutions and vote budgets without necessarily having the support of the few on whom the UN relies for implementing action and for resources will thus continue to sap the organization's credibility and effectiveness.

Institutional and Financial Ills

This session failed signally to move on the procedural, administrative and financial reforms which had been identified as crucial during the appraisal undertaken in conjunction with the 25th anniversary session the previous year. Despite US initiatives to promote substantial reforms in General Assembly procedures, organization, and voting, so as to speed up sessions, improve operating effectiveness and promote more responsible decision-making, very limited progress was made in the 31-member Special Committee on Rationalization of Procedures appointed by the previous session. However, implementing a recommendation of the Joint Inspection Unit and the committee, the Assembly reduced documentation by 15 percent and made a corresponding reduction in the budget.

Failure to move on revitalizing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was disappointing. Opposition of the Soviets and French and the apathy of many led the Assembly once again to postpone the action we favored to create a special committee for a full-scale review of the role of the ICJ in the international system.

UN's Financial Plight. The financial situation deteriorated further during 1971. The Assembly failed to face up to the serious liquidity crisis which has brought the organization to the verge of bankruptcy. We made clear that we would help in finding a solution if others helped substantially as well, and that what is most needed is assurance of adequate contributions from those whose withholding of

past assessments brought on the financial crisis. A long-range solution should also aim at eliminating or adjusting those budget items that are creating further arrearages. The Assembly handed the problem to a 15-member committee for study, even though the UN Controller had predicted that the UN would run out of funds no later than May or June of 1972.

The US delegation stressed that the UN must live within its means at a time when it was on the verge of bankruptcy, and that new activities should be financed out of savings derived from eliminating or postponing activities of lower priority. We worked for maximum savings in the budget and achieved a measure of success. (Our original estimate of the budget level was \$218 million as compared to the \$213.1 million finally voted.) This 1972 expenditure budget exceeded that for 1971 by about \$21 million, an increase of 10.9%. We considered this rise unjustified particularly in the light of the UN's financial condition and abstained in the final vote as we had the previous year.

Burden-sharing: US Assessment. On December 22, the US Delegate reiterated to the Assembly the announcement made early in December by the Department that in the interest of more equitable burden-sharing and the principle that a world organization should not be overly dependent on any one member, the US intended to seek a reduction of the US rate of assessment from its present 31.52% to 25%. We will try to achieve this reduction expeditiously and as new members are brought in with a consequent reallocation of assessment shares. This objective is being sought as a matter of principle, not in retaliation for any policy or decision taken by the UN majority which ran counter to the US position.

Peacemaking: Indo-Pakistan Conflict and Middle East

Perhaps the gravest shortcoming in 1971 was in the UN's role as peacemaker. In the India-Pakistan crisis, however, the General Assembly showed its utility. Early attempts by U Thant to persuade the permanent members of the Security Council to address the crisis over East Pakistan had foundered mainly on Soviet objections. In December, following the outbreak of hostilities the US had brought the dispute before the Council but repeated Soviet vetoes blocked action. On December 7, the General Assembly, acting under the Uniting for Peace procedure, recommended by an overwhelming majority (104–10–11) a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops to their own territories and the creation of conditions for voluntary return of refugees. The vote showed the strong sentiment in the United Nations against the use of military force to divide a member state.

(The Security Council belatedly adopted a resolution endorsing a ceasefire and pointing toward withdrawal of troops, political accommodation, and humanitarian relief under UN auspices.)

Assembly debate on the Middle East was of relatively low intensity, being overshadowed by the concurrent Indo-Pakistan crisis. The resolution, adopted by 79-7-36(US), essentially reaffirmed the mandate of Ambassador Jarring based on Security Council resolution 242 and called on Israel to respond positively to Jarring's memorandum of February 1971 (which, *inter alia*, involved a prior commitment of Israeli withdrawal to the former international border between Egypt and the British mandate of Palestine) in order to renew the negotiations under his auspices. We abstained on the grounds that the GA resolution altered the careful balance of Security Council resolution 242 and because the text could have been better designed to enhance the climate for serious negotiations. Neither the resolution nor the US abstention seems to have had an adverse effect on the prospects for participation by either side in such negotiations.

Peacekeeping. During 1971 our efforts to reach an understanding, initially with the Soviets, on reliable and effective means to conduct and finance peacekeeping proved unavailing. We had submitted certain suggestions to the Soviets early in 1970, hoping to find a basis for agreement. The long-delayed Soviet response, in mid-1971, continued to insist that Permanent Members of the Security Council must achieve unanimity at every stage of a peacekeeping operation, including direct control over operational matters. Our position continues to be that to assure flexibility and efficiency the SYG should retain executive latitude while consulting with a committee of the full Council. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which had been trying to complete groundrules for the conduct of observer missions, marked time. Nor was any progress made on advance preparations for peacekeeping operations, such as earmarking and training troops and observers. The 26th session renewed the mandate of the committee and called for more frequent progress reports, but there is no sign that the impasse can be broken in 1972, especially as the entry on the scene of the PRC introduces a new variable.

Other Political and Security Issues

On a number of political and security issues that preoccupied the session, the US found itself playing a defensive role. By and large we succeeded in containing what we considered damaging or undesirable actions.

World Disarmament Conference. The Soviet proposal for a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) was recast to conform with amendments sponsored by Mexico and Sweden intended to save face for the Soviets when the PRC opposed the Soviet formula. The Swedes feared that an open Soviet defeat might have harmful ramifications in the entire disarmament field. The resolution was amended to call only for the "consideration" of a World Disarmament Conference, a formula we could support.

Indian Ocean Peace Zone and other Arms Control Issues. We abstained on the Ceylonese resolution for virtual prohibition of arms in the Indian Ocean when the sponsors refused to amend it. On the resolution as a whole abstentions almost equalled affirmative votes (61–0–55). On the key operative paragraphs abstentions actually outnumbered affirmative votes, indicating that a more moderate approach is favored by the majority. The US also abstained on sweeping resolutions to end nuclear tests and for a moratorium on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In both cases we consider more discussion and negotiation on verification to be essential before such restraints would be viable and add to international security.

Colonial and African Issues. We were often in a small minority of those opposing or abstaining on resolutions which proposed extreme and unworkable measures to combat colonial and racial policies in Southern Africa. Thus, we voted against those resolutions on Portuguese Territories, Rhodesia, and apartheid in South Africa which contained provisions for mandatory enforcement action by the Security Council or contemplated solutions by force. Because the matter was still under consideration by the US Government, we did not participate in the vote on a resolution expressing grave concern at the decision of the US Congress which would allow importation of Rhodesian chrome ore despite the mandatory provisions of Security Council sanctions resolutions. We abstained on a resolution rejecting British settlement proposals on Rhodesia on the grounds that the Assembly should not prejudge the views of the Rhodesian people on acceptability of the proposals. On the other hand, we supported recommendations for practical goals to counter apartheid in South Africa. Secretary Rogers affirmed US acceptance of the ICJ advisory opinion which recognized the illegality of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia and urged states to discharge their responsibilities toward Namibia accordingly. He observed that the opinion was consistent with US support of practical and peaceful means to achieve self-determination and end racial discrimination.

Strengthening International Security. Western countries did not succeed in side-tracking a substantive resolution on this Soviet item. We pointed out that realistic progress in strengthening international security could only be achieved by concrete measures rather than hortatory declarations. In the end, changes in the resolution to reflect third world concerns and postponement of the vote till late in the session reduced Soviet propaganda gains.

Korea. The Korean item, which has been the occasion for East-West acrimony, was deferred to the next session, mainly because of the bilateral talks being held at Panmunjom between Red Cross representatives of North and South Korea.

Security of UN Missions. The Soviet-Arab drive for a harsh resolution on the security problem faced by certain UN missions in the United States was blunted. The resolution adopted sets up a committee on host country relations whose form and composition give some promise of dealing with the problem in a temperate manner.

Treaty Law: Outer Space and Prohibition of Biological Weapons

The 26th Assembly was noteworthy for endorsing new conventions on outer space liability and on prohibiting biological weapons. Eight years of difficult negotiation in the UN Outer Space Committee culminated in agreement on an Outer Space Liability Convention covering the liability of space powers for damage and loss caused by falling objects. Even more important was the convention for the prohibition of biological weapons which the General Assembly, by an overwhelming vote of 110-0-1(France), commended to members for signature and ratification. The PRC delegate, though seated, did not vote and was recorded as absent. A companion resolution called on the Conference of the Committee for Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations on measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Reform of ECOSOC. On the economic and social side, the key accomplishment in 1971 was the strengthening of ECOSOC to assure its primacy in review and appraisal of the Second Development Decade and in the application of science and technology. This recognizes ECOSOC's role as the intergovernmental organ for achieving coordination of economic, social and technical activities throughout the UN system. The General Assembly, by a vote of 105-2(UK, France)-15(Soviet bloc), endorsed a plan which the US had initiated at the summer session of ECOSOC, which included enlargement of the Council from 27 to 54 (so as to broaden representation) and establishment of standing committees to deal with the application of science and technology and to review and appraise progress in implementing the goals of the Second Development Decade. Enlarging ECOSOC requires an amendment to the Charter ratified by two-thirds of the membership, including all five permanent members of the Security Council. Enlargement is aimed at rekindling third world confidence in ECOSOC as the central organ to achieve UN economic and social objectives. Asians and Africans pressed hard at the 26th session for a redistribution of seats in their favor and were partially satisfied; however, this issue may be raised again.

Disaster Relief Coordinator. In response to another US initiative, the United Nations greatly strengthened its capability to respond to requests for aid from countries struck by natural or other disasters. Starting early in 1972 the newly appointed UN Disaster Relief Coordinator will have wide powers to mobilize, direct and coordinate relief activities in cases of natural disaster and other emergency situations.

Several large humanitarian relief operations undertaken by UN agencies in East Pakistan and Peru demonstrated both the value of multilateral efforts and the need for their speedy mobilization and coordination.

Conferences on Environment and Oceans. The Assembly made progress in preparations for major international conferences on the preservation of the human environment (Stockholm, June 1972) and on the law of the sea (LOS), scheduled for 1973 to fix boundaries and establish rules for sharing the benefits of the seabed. A Soviet effort to postpone the environment conference unless the GDR participated with voting status was rejected, but the issue of GDR participation will continue to be troublesome. Timetables of preparatory work for both conferences were approved. An expanded Seabeds Committee will hold two sessions in 1972 in preparation for the LOS conference. We are pleased at the results so far which move us closer to the President's goal of creating a rational new international law for oceans.

Other Assembly Actions: Narcotics, humanitarian aid, human rights

US policies were reinforced in the areas of narcotics control, humanitarian aid, and human rights in armed conflict. Resolutions were adopted urging support for the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control and requesting UN Specialized Agencies to provide assistance to developing countries to combat illicit production and traffic in narcotic drugs; calling on governments and international agencies to support humanitarian aid to Pakistan refugees in India and relief requirements in East Pakistan, programs to which the US had made the major contributions; and calling for observance of rules contained in conventions governing human rights in armed conflict.

The US pressed for observance of human rights during armed conflict in accordance with existing instruments, mainly the Geneva Conventions (to which 130 nations are parties), calling for humane treatment of prisoners of war and war victims. We underscored our unremitting concern for implementation of these rights on behalf of our POWs held by North Vietnam. We were disappointed that the Assembly again failed to act on creating a post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, deferring the matter for two years to the 28th session. The Assembly also stalled action on elimination of religious intolerance.

North-South Differences on Trade and Monetary Matters. Charges that rich nations failed to take their trade and monetary concerns into account led to a demand by the LDCs that UNCTAD negotiate on such matters. This move was successfully countered, but resolutions were adopted highly critical of world trade and monetary practices, demanding that all restrictive measures imposed as a result of the financial crisis be lifted and that "all interested countries" participate in the creation of a new international monetary system. Some of the criticism

was disarmed by the Washington agreement of the Group of Ten at the end of December on a framework for exchange rate adjustments, by US lifting of the import surtax, and by the Administration's announcement that it would introduce legislation in the next Congressional session on a generalized system of preferences for LDCs. In addition, the US supported key resolutions sponsored by the LDCs on "transfer of technology" to under-developed economies and rescheduling of debts. Unresolved differences on trade, aid and monetary matters will remain chronic problems and are bound to be pressed by developing nations at the world conference on trade and aid (UNCTAD III) to be held in April 1972.

Rogers

103. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 11, 1972, 2200Z.

2481. Subj: Review of 27th GA Prospects With Soviet PermRep.

1. Amb Bush toured horizon with Soviet PermRep Malik over lunch July 11. On Korea, Middle East, SIS and World Disarmament Conference nothing new emerged.

2. When asked what "additional" items would arise in 27th GA, Malik emphatically responded "admission of two Germanies to UN membership." He gave no hints re strategy or tactics.

3. Ambassador Bush took occasion to seek Malik's understanding and support on 25 percent financial contribution by US. Malik expressed no sympathy, but seemed to show comprehension of fact that effect on future of UN of eventual US contribution reduction would in part be function of way in which other major powers in UN responded to US action. He had earlier predicted that reduction in US contribution to 25 percent would be damaging body blow to world organization.

4. Malik said he going to Moscow later this week for month's leave.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow and Bonn.

104. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 19, 1972, 1710Z.

2551. Subj: Exchange of Views on 27th GA With PRC Amb Huang.

1. In casual conversation with PRC Ambassador Huang some weeks ago, I raised possibility of meeting informally with him, as I do with many other PermReps, to discuss forthcoming GA. I said I did not visualize that each side would be pressing the other for positions on each issue but rather that the exchange would be a general one, touching, however, on both issues and procedures. Huang reacted with considerable enthusiasm. I suggested I might give him a call after I returned from Geneva about mid-July. He seemed very pleased.

2. I have arranged to get together with him for a chat on July 25. I anticipate that we inevitably will be touching on such obvious issues as UN financing and that Korea and African issues, etc., also will come up. Although, as I indicated to Huang, I do not expect intensive mutual probing on issues, this session will offer an opportunity to get across to him points of particular interest to us.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential.

105. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 4, 1972, 2337Z.

2742. Subj: 27th UNGA: Pruning of Provisional Agenda. Ref: USUN 2735.²

1. We met informally with Western members of 27th GA's General Committee (Belgium, Canada, France, Iceland, New Zealand, UK

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use.

² Telegram 2735 from USUN, August 4, discussed placement of the World Disarmament Conference on the provisional agenda of the 27th UN General Assembly. (Ibid., DEF 18–3)

plus Japan) August 3 for preliminary exchange of views on pruning provisional agenda of 27th GA. We agreed USUN would approach Soviets on bilateral basis regarding agenda as was done last year. Members of group, most of whom uninstructed, expressed wish to meet again in late August or early September.

2. Highlights of discussion of specific items on provisional agenda (see A/8750 of July 15, 1972) follow:

(A) Item 21 (mechanical voting): Group agreed item should be given routine consideration in 5th Comite rather than special attention in plenary.

(B) Item 23 (colonialism): UK and Canada felt consideration of item in plenary was losing significance and attempt to allocate item to 4th Comite would unnecessarily stir up African delis in General Committee, whose support we will want for deferment of Korean items.

(C) Item 24 (World Disarmament Conference): Comments on WDC reported reftel.

(D) Item 25 (Conference of Non-Nuclear States): All agreed item should be combined with Item 15 (report of IAEA).

(E) Item 33 (Indian Ocean): Belgians understand that Ceylonese have begun lobbying effort in capitals seeking new ideas on item and that Malaysians intend to bring item up at nonaligned meeting in Georgetown; Belgians see no harm in trying for deferment but doubt co-sponsors would agree to defer item.

(F) Item 34 (strengthening international security): Group (including Japan) agreed it might be tactically useful for us to tell Soviets we favored deferment of SIS.

(G) Item 40 (effects of atomic radiation): Group saw little hope for deferment because major report is being prepared by Secretariat for presentation to 27th GA; French specifically favor retention of item.

(H) Item 49 (UN university): Japanese del is anxious to have item considered by 27th GA.

(I) Item 50 (human rights in armed conflict): USUN noted that further discussion of human rights aspect in 3rd Comite seemed unnecessary and suggested moving item to 6th Comite; others were silent.

(J) Item 41 (racial discrimination): USUN favored moving sub-item (D) on apartheid to 6th Comite; French believe draft convention on apartheid should stay in 3rd Comite.

(K) Item 53 (ideologies and practices based on terror): French were unsure of degree of Soviet support for this item; USUN understands nonaligned will support it.

(L) Item 54 (war crimes): French favor this item.

(M) Item 56 (youth): USUN felt detailed consideration of item was premature; Iceland and UK agreed. French reserved their position.

(N) Item 59 (freedom of information): French reserved their position; Canada thought attempt to defer would be met with lengthy arguments from Philippines (who originated item) and others.

(O) Item 60 (human rights and science): USUN saw possibility of deferment; French were interested in keeping item.

(P) Item 61 (religious intolerance): USUN pointed out item had been on agenda for many years and might well be deferred; others agreed.

(Q) Item 85 (UN School): Belgium and New Zealand felt item should be deferred; French and Japanese thought many would be interested in retaining it.

(R) Items 93 and 94 (use of “all states” formula): With US, UK and Japan leading the way, group agreed we should seek deferment.

(S) Item 95 (amendment to ICJ structure); Group agreed to seek deferment of this item.

3. Group decided to save for next meeting detailed discussion of financial items, Korean items, WDC and SIS.

Bush

106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts¹

Washington, August 15, 1972, 2219Z.

148408. Subject: Key Issues at 27th United Nations General Assembly.

I. General Assessment

1. 27th UNGA opening September 19 not likely to have issues as dramatic as Chirep and Indo-Pak fighting last year. Our main focus will be on our efforts to obtain agreement for reduction in our rate of assessment from 31.52 per cent to 25 per cent. We will also be seeking (1) postponement of debate on Korean question and (2) strengthening of UN machinery for economic development, population and environmental questions. Disarmament issues, particularly World Disarmament Conference (WDC), and Seabeds Conference (subject of septel

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential; Routine. Drafted by the IO/UNP staff; approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma, and cleared by Chase, Goott, Monsma, Walker, McNutt, McDonald, Armitage, and Hennes. Repeated to USUN, Paris for OECD, Geneva, and Brussels for USEC and USNATO.

next month) will probably consume considerable time. Middle East situation likely to be raised but in what form and substance not yet clear.

2. Our request for reduced assessment may lead some to believe US downgrading UN. This is not USG's policy. Popular image of UN in US has been tarnished, partly as result its inability to handle important issues of peace and security and partly because of its tendency to eschew balanced effort to solve difficult problems in favor of rhetorical endorsement of positions popular with voting majorities. However, US strongly desires to see UN strengthened and its debates, documents and decisions made responsive to the need for effective international cooperation on problems of broad concern. In this connection, posts should discreetly convey our strong hope that one-sided polemics will be avoided and the Assembly's efforts concentrated instead on restoring confidence of the world at large, including the US, that the UN can not only debate the issues but get things done.

3. Following paragraphs summarize issues of major interest to US and the outcome US hopes to attain. You should draw on these points in discussions with host govt officials and enlist their support, as well as determine their positions and likely initiatives. Please cable reports to Dept with USUN as info addressee. Background info on 26th GA session contained in airgram A-677,² while voting record of host govt contained in IO document transmitted separately.³

II. 25 Per Cent Assessment

1. We will mount major effort at 27th GA to reduce US rate of assessment in UN from 31.52 per cent to 25 per cent, both by applying assessments of new members and by incremental additions within 1974-76 scale of assessments. We anticipate heavy resistance from other members, but in view high level of USG and public interest we must make this matter of highest priority in forthcoming GA. Posts should await separate instruction before approaching govts on this question.

III. Korea

1. Instructions re USG support for postponement sent State 137863.⁴ If Korean item is not postponed, divisive and polemical debate could occur over UN (and US) role in Korea and between two Koreas which would reduce prospects of further progress in improvement of relations between South and North Korea. Best contribution UNGA can make is to avoid such debate and let both sides work out own problems together.

² Document 102.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Not found.

IV. World Disarmament Conference

1. USG continues view WDC with skepticism. WDC would be unwieldy, propagandistic forum which could prejudice further serious bilateral efforts such as continuing SALT talks. It would certainly impair work of Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which has successfully negotiated important multilateral arms control and disarmament measures. CCD's regional representation affords a forum for countries of all regions to have their views set forth and considered. Furthermore, WDC is wholly unnecessary since UNGA, which annually discusses disarmament matters, is virtually universal forum now and likely soon to include all nations wanting to join. US will oppose holding or setting a date for WDC as well as establishment of any preparatory machinery to arrange for conference. We could accept a resolution stating view that a WDC could play role in disarmament process at an appropriate unspecified time.

V. Middle East

1. There have been indications that Egypt may wish to raise ME question again in UNGA but it is uncertain whether issue will arise and, if so, what form resolution might take. We do not know at this point what negotiations may be in play when GA meets but, in light past experience, we strongly believe debate would exacerbate tensions and differences in area and one-sided resolution which would likely emerge would harm any prospects of movement by parties themselves on whom success of any negotiations primarily depends.

VI. Germany in UN

1. Question of FRG/GDR entry into UN is not on agenda but Sovs and other EEs could make effort to gain observer status for GDR or otherwise seek to enhance GDR standing in UN. We will join with UK, France, and FRG to oppose such moves in line with policy that UN entry for both Germanies should be preceded by satisfactory *modus vivendi* between FRG and GDR and by a quadripartite declaration or statement that Four Power rights and responsibilities will not be affected by UN entry. Premature consideration of FRG/GDR membership or GDR observer status would prejudice chances for success in inter-German negotiations which are important element in peace and security in Europe. GDR does not qualify for observer status as it is not a member of a UN specialized agency and is not generally recognized by UN members.

VII. Southern Rhodesia

1. African and Communist nations may seek to have US condemned for importing strategic materials from SR under Byrd Amendment. We see no valid reason to single out USG as our imports from Rhodesia constitute no more than 2 or 3 per cent of total Rhodesian exports. Passage of resolution unwarrantedly condemning US would ad-

versely affect support of UN by US public and Congress. Those interested in upholding sanctions would be much better advised to focus attention on violations by others who are taking over 95 per cent of Rhodesian exports. (If asked to name others, you should say that official UN trade statistics available to UN Sanctions Committee indicate generally who they are.)

VIII. Protection of Diplomats

1. US strongly supports draft articles of the International Law Commission on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons. We believe the GA should request governments to submit observations on ILC draft articles looking towards a diplomatic conference to adopt them in 1974. Separate but related item is protection of diplomats in New York City. We do not wish stimulate discussion this item, but posts may note US cooperates fully with new committee on relations with host country and that we currently seeking additional legislation (which may be passed by time GA meets) to improve ability of Federal Government to deal with problem.

IX. Human Rights in Armed Conflict

1. Item this year features report by group of "expert" consultants to SYG on napalm and other incendiary weapons and their possible use which was designed by sponsors to embarrass the US. USG opposes any moves by GA to control use of napalm and similar weapons on grounds such proposals should be taken up in disarmament forum such as CCD where it can be given more expert and less polemical attention. SYG will also report on expert conference held under ICRC auspices in May 1972 to develop additional protocols to 1949 Geneva Conventions. USG has been seeking inclusion in these protocols of more effective measures for implementation of Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. USG strongly supports these efforts and hopes GA will again endorse them without initiating competing drafting efforts.

X. Financial and Administrative Problems

1. US fully supports SYG's program of austerity measures and his efforts to match income and expenditures. We support SYG's policy of keeping CY 73 budget as close as possible to CY 72 levels as well as his view that new programs are not precluded, but must be accommodated within resources freed by completion of prior tasks or assignment of lower priority to continuing ones.

2. Soviets remain intransigent about efforts to find solution to larger problem of UN deficit. French contributions have removed France from annual list of defaulters (although France's old Congo arrears remain) but PRC may withhold at even higher current levels than did French.

XI. UN Conference on the Human Environment

1. GA will consider SYG's report on Stockholm Conference. US will work to endorse plan of action adopted by the conference and in particular approve conference's draft resolution recommending establishment of:

(A) A small environment unit within the UN to be headed by a director-general for the environment;

(B) A 54-member governing council for UN environment programs;

(C) An environment fund to be supported by voluntary contributions and administered by the executive director under advice of the Governing Council; and

(D) An environmental coordinating board to insure cooperation and coordination among all UN agencies involved in environment programs. US will strongly resist any proposals for amendment to the conference report.

XII. UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)

1. Created in 1967 and sustained primarily by US voluntary contributions, UNFPA finances technical assistance projects in developing countries on all aspects of population problems. SYG's report to 27th GA should clarify administrative status of UNFPA and strengthen its central coordinating role. USG supports moves to make UNFPA the central funding, coordinating, and programming mechanism in the UN family for technical assistance in this field, to bring it into closer relationship with UNDP and place it under direction of UNDP Government Council. We expect report of SYG requested at 26th UNGA will contribute to these objectives.

XIII. UN University

1. Feasibility study completed by UNESCO and supplemented by SYG panel of experts has failed to answer what we consider are essential questions relating to role, organization, operation and financing of proposed UNU. In addition, current proposals imply compulsory rather than voluntary financial contributions. USG cannot support proposals to establish such an institution for which no clear need is demonstrated and at a time when national universities need all the financial help possible.

XIV. Economic Commission for Western Asia

1. A Lebanese proposal to establish an economic commission for Western Asia will probably come before the General Assembly when it considers the report of ECOSOC. At the July ECOSOC, Lebanon introduced a resolution to establish another regional commission with its membership limited to Arab States (Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen (San'a), Yemen (Aden), Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates). By the terms of the resolution, Israel would not become a member unless admitted by ECOSOC upon the

recommendation of the new commission. Israel has objected to this provision. ECOSOC decided to postpone a decision until its meeting in October. If the matter is brought to a vote, the United States will oppose the present text because it would exclude a UN member that is a part of the region. Such a policy of excluding UN members from UN bodies and activities would cause much controversy, and hinder UN work in many fields. Pending time when an economic commission for Western Asia can be established on a non-discriminatory basis, we believe Arab States should continue to rely on existing UN Economic and Social office in Beirut.

XV. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

1. We expect criticism of developed countries including US in connection GA consideration of report on UNCTAD III conference. UNCTAD Secretary General's report on conference gives some support to complaints about lack of action on primary commodities and rescheduling debt of developing countries. US intends emphasize positive aspects of conference including action already taken on key resolutions including (1) implementing provision of resolution on international monetary situation by recent establishment by IMF Board of Governors of Committee of 20 including 9 developing countries to deal with international monetary reform; (2) preparations for multilateral trade negotiations in 1973 as called for in resolution on subject, within framework of GATT including coordination of activities of Secretary General of UNCTAD and Director General of GATT to assist developing countries and (3) action to assist least developed countries in line with UNCTAD resolution, including allocation of additional UNDP funds for their projects. Further action on about 50 UNCTAD resolutions will require carrying through programs in UN system and by sovereign governments, a process that will take years.

Rogers

107. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 26, 1972, 2230Z.

3484. Subj: Gromyko speech to 27th GA.

1. Summary. Gromyko's September 26 speech seemed designed to show Third World that basic Soviet policy vis-à-vis US had not changed despite recent encouraging developments in US-USSR relations. Gromyko hit harder at US policy in Vietnam than last year. He pointedly spoke of USSR-French relations before discussing US-USSR relations. Otherwise, he was specifically critical of Palestinian involvement in Munich tragedy² and said USSR as matter of principle opposed acts of terrorism and meaningless violence. His treatment of other foreign policy themes was routine. Much of speech was devoted to new Soviet item on non-use of force, reported septel. End summary.

2. US-Soviet Relations. Gromyko downplayed significance of US-Soviet relations by first praising development of Soviet-French relations. He then characterized May summit as start in process of reshaping US-USSR relations and noted USSR attached great significance to its relations with US. Broadening of cooperation between two countries was "beginning to become reality" although political and ideological disagreements of principle would remain. Gromyko added that improvement in US-USSR relations would harm no other state.

3. SALT talks were discussed in later part of speech. Gromyko noted US-USSR understanding that those states possessing greatest destructive capacity had special obligation to limit arms race and promote disarmament. Agreement on strategic arms was important step; two sides agreed to continue negotiations.

4. Vietnam. Gromyko's treatment of Vietnam was more lengthy and hard-hitting than last year. He stressed alleged gap between US words and deeds, charging that despite many declarations about pulling out of Vietnam US was expanding acts of war and their cruelty and inhumanity. In reality, US policy was aimed at eliminating provisional revolutionary government and at preserving puppet Saigon administration as sole legitimate authority in SVN. Real state of affairs was that two systems of authority and two armies as well as other political forces existed in SVN. Therefore necessary to set up provisional

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Moscow, Brussels for USNATO, London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Saigon, Tel Aviv, Beirut, and the Interests Section in Cairo.

² Reference is to the murder of 11 Israeli athletes by Black September terrorists on September 5 during the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany.

government in SVN on tripartite basis to deal with all matters in "transitional period" and organize general elections on truly free and democratic lines.

5. Middle East. Gromyko called for withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories, announced USSR's support for legitimate demands of Arab countries, for Jarring Mission and for just struggle of Arab people of Palestine. He added, however, that it impossible to condone acts of terrorism committed by certain elements in Palestinian movement which led in particular to recent tragic events in Munich. Such criminal acts dealt blow to national interests of Palestinians and were used by Israeli criminals to cover their bandit-like policy against Arab peoples.

6. In addition to criticizing Munich tragedy, Gromyko stated that USSR as matter of principle opposed acts of terrorism which disrupted diplomatic activity of states and normal course of international contacts and meetings. Also opposed acts of violence which served no positive ends and caused loss of human life.

7. Other topics. Gromyko spoke briefly on CSCE as means of replacing military blocs with collective security and made brief plug for ensuring security in Asia. He gave standard pitch on importance of holding WDC, value of SIS item, Moon Treaty and DBS satellite item. He made brief reference to earliest possible admission of GDR and FRG and strongly opposed Charter review. Finally, he criticized those in UN who categorized states (i.e., USSR) according to size, population or wealth. Except for such veiled references, he did not discuss PRC.

Bush

108. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 20, 1972, 0143Z.

5635. Subj: SYG Waldheim on 27th GA.

1. In conversation with Amb Bush Dec 10, SYG Waldheim took somewhat philosophical view of 27th GA. He lamented that press in US, Europe and virtually everywhere else was taking very negative

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Limited Official Use.

view of accomplishments of 27th GA, calling it dull. Waldheim thought this was unfair. Dullness of session was in large part a function of détente which had reduced incidence of verbal fireworks.

2. Waldheim said he was of course disappointed that his terrorism initiative had not borne more fruit. However, it was not fault of UN organization that this and other “failures” had occurred. If world community had attempted to deal with terrorism or other unresolved problems outside context of UN, same cast of characters would have been involved. Identifying Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq as particularly difficult to deal with on terrorism (he mentioned consulting them before announcing his terrorism initiative), he saw no reason to suppose that they would have been easier to deal with outside UN.

Bush

109. Memorandum From the Director of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Moore) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)¹

Washington, December 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

The GA Concludes Its Session

Viewed from a narrow EA standpoint, the 27th GA was, in many ways, a success. Korea was postponed without too much difficulty; Khmer credentials did not prove to be the problem we had once anticipated and the question of Charter revision with its implications for Japanese Security Council aspirations was kept alive. Our relationships with the Chinese were surprisingly good and our two delegations established a very useful working relationship. We were, of course, on opposite sides of many of the chief issues before the Assembly, but this disagreement on substance was remarkably free of bilateral rancor. Indeed the Chinese, even when the opportunity was there, generally avoided clashing directly with us and turned instead on the Soviets.

Viewed over-all, however, the Assembly this year was not a good one for the US. While we were successful on the important matter of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by McNutt. The memorandum is stamped “Mr. Green has seen.”

our assessment, and on many other less visible issues, our defeat on the terrorism question was a severe one, particularly in public relations terms. Moreover, we were increasingly on the losing side of many questions—trade issues, colonial questions, disarmament matters—and sometimes cast a lone negative vote or voted in the company of only a few others. There was, moreover, evidence of a greater cohesiveness in bloc voting on many issues with the blocs usually opposing our viewpoint.

These problems are not new—we have been losing on a number of votes for years—but the extent of our isolation was much more marked this year. Some of our difficulty may stem from a misperception of where our true interests lie. Our losing fight over the location of the headquarters of the environment organization is a case in point. There are thus a number of places where an adjustment in our own philosophy might be of immense help. But the problem is deeper than can be met with changes in our position on one or another issue. We have fundamental disagreements on many questions with the great majority of UN members and these cannot be easily adjusted. IO will be looking into this problem in the year ahead but obviously there are rough waters ahead for us in New York.

We will be commenting in more detail on the session in a later memorandum, but we do want to take this occasion to note the outstanding job done by Tom Bleha as the EA Regional Adviser with our Delegation. He put much thought and effort into his assignment and he established excellent working relationships with the EA Delegations in New York. Moreover, he must be credited with much of the success we had in bringing so many EA states to our side on the assessment issue.

Special Meetings of the Security Council

110. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 3, 1970, 1913Z.

317. Subj: Periodic SC Meetings.

1. Amb Jakobson (Finland) called on Amb Yost March 2 to present Finnish initiative for strengthening UN peacekeeping machinery by having SC hold periodic meetings under Article 28 of UN Charter.² Jakobson left Yost a paper explaining in detail what his govt has in mind (copy pouched UNP–Mrs. Hartley)³ and said that he hoped idea could be adopted in conjunction with twenty-fifth anniversary of UN. Crux of Finnish idea is that meetings should be regular and periodic (twice a year), at FonMin level (unless individual SC members should decide designate someone else), closed in nature with no resolutions up for consideration, and possibly with SYG leading off meetings by giving report on major world problems. In this way SC members could meet without fanfare discreetly to exchange views on major issues without intention to adopt any specific resolution. Even if highly controversial issues such as ME, Vietnam or Biafra are included in discussion, SC members could exchange views without fear of acrimonious public debate which often deters holding SC meeting under present circumstances. This would be especially valuable to non-permanent members of SC and to improving their relations with and understanding of positions of perm members, and serve to strengthen position of SYG as well as SC.

2. Jakobson said he would be consulting all SC members during next ten days. He has already seen SYG who had very favorable reaction and Malik (USSR) who, according to Jakobson, had no specific reaction. (Jakobson noted that this idea was incorporated in res on strengthening international peace and security adopted at USSR initiative by 24th UNGA. He said his govt wishes they had thought of it first but that they worked with USSR to keep it in res as finally adopted.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Helsinki, London, Moscow, Paris, and Brussels for USNATO.

² Article 28 of the UN Charter authorized periodic meetings of the Security Council in which member states could be represented by either a member of their governments or by some other specially designated representative.

³ Not found.

3. Amb Yost said we would study very interesting Finnish proposal, consult Dept and give Jakobson reply.

4. *Comment:* While this procedure if adopted could hardly be expected to solve intractable international security problems, it seems to me desirable, and potentially significant step toward reviving and reenergizing UN. I recommend we encourage Finns to proceed.

Recent trend has been to keep most difficult and dangerous problems out of SC, unless and until they explode in our faces, because public debate is often counterproductive and agreement among major powers on concrete action rarely attainable. SC therefore tends to deal only with secondary problems and in eyes of world opinion seems increasingly irrelevant.

Periodic closed meetings attended by FonMins and commencing with broad-brush report by SYG would provide at least limited opportunity for discussion major security problems in UN framework, which might pave the way for subsequent concrete action in some cases. Fact meetings were closed would reduce incentive for polemics and fact they were at regular intervals would reduce exaggerated expectations.

First such meeting might take place during FonMins visits to NY for GA opening and 25th anniversary would constitute logical occasion for commencing new procedure.

Yost

111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 5, 1970, 2158Z.

32664. Subj: Periodic SC Meetings. Ref: USUN 317.²

1. We agree we should give renewed consideration to idea of periodic SC meetings under Article 28 as proposed by Jakobson and you may so inform him.

2. You should also point out, however, that problems which have prevented implementation this idea in past must still be taken into

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Drafted by Assistant Secretary Samuel De Palma and Virginia F. Hartley, cleared by John A. Armitage and Robert L. Brown, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Helsinki, London, Moscow, Paris, and Brussels for USNATO.

² Document 110.

account. Thus, while meetings at regular intervals would reduce exaggerated expectations and help assure that such meetings actually held and not just endorsed in principle, fixed dates could at times prove politically and otherwise inconvenient. Non-substantive aspect this problem might be alleviated if it generally accepted one of two annual periodic meetings might be composed of “specially designated” representatives under Article 28(2) rather than Foreign Ministers. Absence of agenda, which seems inherent in conception and could be an advantage, also introduces element of uncertainty and leaves wide initiative to SYG, which might or might not be desirable depending on international climate and SYG incumbent. Present composition of SC points up further difficulty. Meeting of present group of Foreign Ministers will inevitably put focus on Big Four, which, depending on circumstances at time each meeting, could be advantage or disadvantage. Finally, it may not be advisable to focus on “strengthening peacekeeping” as objective of periodic meetings since term “peacekeeping” has come to have rather specific connotations and its use here may lead to exaggerated expectations.

Rogers

112. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 27, 1970, 2300Z.

554. Subj: Periodic Meetings of SC. Ref: State 32664; USUN 511.²

1. Yost told Jakobson (Finland) Mar 26 that US in principle sees constructive opportunities in Finnish suggestion for periodic meetings of SC while mentioning caveats ref Deptel. Jakobson was most appreciative. He is still awaiting replies from other perm members and has

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Helsinki, and Brussels for USNATO.

² Telegram 32664 is printed as Document 111. In telegram 511 from USUN, March 25, Yost reported that although he was aware of the possible complications, he did not wish to seem too negative about a proposal envisaged by the Charter. “In general, periodic SC meetings of character Finns propose seem to me one way of moving UN back, at least marginally, onto center of world stage and thus making it more available and useful for objectives we have in mind.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC) The Department concurred in the Finnish draft consensus statement on May 1. (Telegram 66492 to USUN; *ibid.*)

had positive response from most non-perms. He would like to have SC agree on suggested course prior to mid-June.

2. Re level of attendance, Jakobson readily agreed that "specially designated representatives" (perhaps PermReps) would probably attend spring meetings and that attendance of FonMins at fall meetings would not be problem since they would be scheduled in connection with opening of GA.

3. As to fixed dates, Jakobson argued that great merit of Finnish proposal was that it would provide for regular exchanges of views. Perhaps initial meetings would not be particularly fruitful but it highly desirable institute periodic get-togethers.

4. Jakobson well aware of problem of current unsatisfactory composition of SC. He observed that situation would probably improve if position and prestige of Council enhanced through periodic meetings.

5. Jakobson also recognized problem SYG's report might present difficulties but thought, on the whole, this would be manageable.

6. Re "strengthening peacekeeping," Jakobson acknowledged that he did not intend for SC to take over other work currently in train.

7. Finns currently thinking, assuming other SC members go along with proposal, that best means of recording agreement on subject as well as on ground rules would be summing up by SC Pres. (For reasons of modesty Jakobson would prefer not do this while he in chair in April.) Jakobson believes strongly that meetings should be private and that they, as a rule, should not seek to adopt reses. He also opposed to attendance by non-SC members.

8. Concerning reactions of others, Jakobson reports Sovs hope to have preliminary reaction in near future. (He agreed with Yost that Sovs can hardly take any stance other than positive one since similar proposal included in Sov "strengthening international security" initiative at 24th UNGA.)

9. UK reply in preparation. French have indicated their reply may take a while.

10. Reaction from most non-perms, including Poles, has been positive so far. Tomeh (Syria) is only del to sound skeptical note.

Yost

113. Editorial Note

Ilkka Pastinen, Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland, presented a list of suggestions regarding the conduct of a special Security Council meeting to U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative William B. Buffum on August 11, 1970. These included holding the meeting in late September and focusing the agenda on “review of the international situation” and “strengthening of international security, with particular regard to UN’s capacity to act effectively for maintenance of international peace and security.” The meeting, the Finns believed, would likely involve three or four sessions held over two days, to be followed by a final communiqué. (Telegram 1629 from USUN, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC)

The Department agreed with Buffum that the meeting should be held at the beginning of the General Assembly session so that it would not conflict with either commemoration of the UN’s 25th anniversary or visits by heads of state or government. It also warned that Secretary Rogers might not have time to attend more than two sessions. (Telegram 131940 to USUN, August 13; *ibid.*) The Department initially agreed to a September 22 date, but the schedules of the Soviet, French, and British Foreign Ministers led to the meeting being rescheduled to October 21. (Telegram 135110 to USUN, August 19, telegram 2363 from USUN, October 10, and telegram 108843 to USUN, October 13; all *ibid.*)

114. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 22, 1970, 2157Z.

Secto 53/2647. Subj: First Periodic SC Meeting Under Art 28.2.

1. Summary. “Historic” first periodic meeting under Art 28.2 held in private Oct 21. Meeting held at FonMin level with exception Burundi, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Syria. At conclusion of meeting, SC adopted communiqué (septel).² Three African members reserved their

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Bogota, Bujumbura, Freetown, Helsinki, Kathmandu, London, Lusaka, Madrid, Managua, Moscow, Paris, Taipei, Warsaw, Lisbon, Amman, Beirut, Phnom Penh, Pretoria, Saigon, Tel Aviv, Vientiane, and the Interests Section in Cairo.

² UN doc. S/PV.1555; transmitted in telegram 2639 from USUN, October 22. (*Ibid.*)

position on para dealing with Africa on grounds it not strong enough. Syrian Rep attached ambiguous statement to communiqué that GOS position was reflected in statement he made during meeting. Secretary gave most substantive speech of meeting in which he covered ME, Indo-China and made specific proposals for improving work of SC in field of peaceful settlement. Most speakers endorsed periodic meetings as useful at least in principle; many speakers critical of present state SC and its resolutions. Major topics covered by most speakers: Middle East, with heavy emphasis on Res 242; Southeast Asia, with emphasis inability or difficulty of SC to solve problems of area; Southern Africa, with stress on need implement existing SC resolutions; disarmament, SALT cited as hopeful sign but several pleaded for real progress on GCD; peacekeeping, absence regular orderly procedure deplored; peacemaking, SC must head off crises rather than react to them. End summary.

2. US (Rogers)

A. Middle East. Stressed 242 as common ground; noted undertaking by Israel and Arabs from US initiative which must not be lost; Israeli agreement to "withdraw" and accept less than direct talks (at first); UAR and Jordan commitment to seek peaceful solution and acceptance Israel's existence. Way must be found to correct situation which has led to obstacles in path of talks under Jarring. Palestinians are new factor in area and when/if "they speak with peace" then they should be involved in final settlement.

B. Southeast Asia. Difficult for UN to find a role to date. "As warfare draws to close" UN may find role in helping rebuild economies etc.; we are ready to stop shooting now and negotiate withdrawal of all US troops. Urged constructive response to President's Oct 7 proposals which are not "take it or leave it offer".

C. Problems of self-determination in Africa and Germany and Berlin are also of great importance but time precludes discussion all problems.

D. SC and pacific settlement disputes. SC has not successfully averted trouble since 1950's; endorsed Brazil's recent suggestion for SC committee to study pacific settlement. Encouraged greater use of ICJ, perhaps at first on secondary matters to create precedent and habit.

E. SC periodic meetings. US not convinced of utility of automatic scheduling but prepared entertain views of others.

3. USSR (Gromyko)

A. Middle East. Discussed in context inability SC always to function effectively. Trouble with Res 242 was that "aggressor did not heed it."

B. Southern Africa. Discussed same context and failure of parties condemned by reses to heed SC requests.

C. Disarmament. SC has done nothing to halt “mountains and mountains of arms” which grow every day; it has done nothing because of policies of “certain states.”

D. SC. USSR has “always” favored periodic meetings; SC is “highest political body” in world on issues of war and peace. It has not always been effective because it is divided between those who favor stable peace and those who do not. There is nothing wrong with Charter; problem is policy of those states who hinder SC’s effectiveness. USSR believes SC is “up to the task” of changing policy of “those states” who have prevented it from being effective.

4. SYG’s tour d’horizon. Covered ME, SEA, disarmament, peace-keeping (especially financing and debt servicing), Southern Africa and need for SC to use Art 34 investigatory and fact-finding powers.

5. UK (Douglas-Home). Sharp, biting attack (aimed rather pointedly at Africans) on tendency SC to place weight on words and form, not deed and substance. Cyprus cited as UN success (of sorts) and ME as area SC ought to be able to help. Much of UK comment on SC’s ineffectiveness parallel to USSR’s comment.

6. Zambia (Mwaanga). Statement was short, hastily drafted, well done rebuttal to UK, accepting UK challenge by calling for implementation all existing SC reses on Southern Africa and a moratorium on further debate or reses that subject.

7. Others spoke with varying degrees eloquence and brevity. Syria adopted ambiguous attitude on communiqué and quietly added last line to communiqué that its views had been presented to SC in meeting itself; following Zambia’s lead, Burundi and Sierra Leone “reserved” position on Southern African para in communiqué, stating in meeting it not strong enough.

8. Meeting lasted three-and-one-half hours. Foreign Ministers of all but three Africans and Syria present. (By end of meeting all Big Four FonMins had been replaced by PermReps.)

9. France (Schumann) made generalized appeal for greater role for SC, using its powers under Charter to recommend solutions to disputes and, if need be, take decisions. Schumann said this not popular view but alternative was probable collapse of United Nations. He referred to need for implementation of SC Res 242 but qualified it by saying he not making any categorical recommendation, but SC should “not reject any possible Charter action. . . .”

Rogers

115. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 29, 1971, 2313Z.

280. Re: Periodic SC Meetings.

During SC luncheon today SYG raised the question for general discussion of next periodic SC meeting at FonMin level. He said he assumed that there would be such a meeting in October when most FonMins are attending GA but question is whether there should also be a meeting in April or May. He was inclined to think that there should.

Belgian Amb noted that further question arises as to what should be on the agenda if the meeting is held. Sir Colin Crowe added that there would be no point in holding a meeting unless there were important subjects the Ministers wished to discuss. French Amb suggested that there is still a third point to be decided, that is, the place of the meeting.²

It was agreed that the reps would raise the question with their govts and discuss it further at next monthly SC luncheon which will be held at my residence on Feb 25.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential.

² On February 23 the Department concurred with the British view, but felt a review of the situation might be in order in April or May, and that any periodic Security Council meeting should be held in New York. (Telegram 30007 to USUN, February 23; *ibid.*)

116. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 14, 1971, 0030Z.

926. Subj: Periodic Meetings of the SC.

1. At briefing of non-perms by SC Pres April 13 (septel),² Farah (Somalia) asked President to undertake consultations on date of next

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

² No other record of this briefing was found.

periodic meeting. Noting that not all FonMins had been able to stay for entire meeting last October, Farah suggested it be held either in August or September but in any case before GA opens Sept 21.

2. Kulaga (Poland) noted it might be difficult to set date without knowing what would be on the agenda. It unrealistic to expect FonMins to come to N.Y. just to listen to fourteen other speeches on general international situation. Japanese rep noted that Japan would be President of SC in September and if meeting to be held then it would be desirable to know ASAP.

3. *Comment:* Recommend we respond that we are willing, if other members so inclined, to consider a second periodic meeting but only in late September or early October when FonMins normally in N.Y. for general debate. Moreover, we must agree on agenda and communiqué in advance as was case of last year. It is premature to take definite decision either on a meeting or a date at this time.³

4. We informed Weir (UK) of above and he recommending similar line to London.

Bush

³ The Department concurred that it was too early to decide whether there would be enough possible agenda items to make a periodic Security Council meeting worth holding at that time. (Telegram 65875 to USUN, April 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC)

117. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Bush) to President Nixon¹

New York, June 7, 1971.

PROGRESS REPORT ON SUGGESTION ABOUT MOVING
UN AROUND

1. The Secretary General publicly endorsed the concept of Security Council meetings abroad from time to time.

2. Friday the French Ambassador, the President of the Security Council in July, told me he would like to schedule the July meeting (to deal with Oman) in Geneva—Progress!

3. There is resistance at some layers in the UN for having General Assembly Meetings abroad, namely due to cost, old habits, inconvenience of New York-based people, etc. I'll keep plugging away at it. If they can hold Olympics around the world, they ought to be able to hold General Assembly Meetings.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. No classification marking. "The President has seen" is stamped on the memorandum. Attached memoranda indicate that this memorandum was sent to the National Security Council on June 9, to Kissinger on June 17, and to President Nixon on June 21. Another memorandum, dated June 11, noted that Marshall Wright had said that Bush's report was a personal opinion. Although Wright had no objection to the Security Council meeting elsewhere, there would be logistical and budgetary problems in moving General Assembly meetings. Kissinger initialed his approval of a covering memorandum to the President, June 21, recommending a favorable response to holding Security Council meetings abroad but less so for General Assembly meetings. The June 21 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon is stamped "The President has seen," and bears a handwritten note from Nixon reading: "Good. Keep it up!"

118. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 17, 1971, 2353Z.

4312. Subj: New GA Agenda Item Re Convening SC Meetings in Africa.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa.

1. Thirty-six African dets circulated letter and explanatory memorandum requesting urgent conclusion of “cooperation between UN and OAU, convening of meeting of SC in an African capital” (copy mis-faxed UNP). General Committee of GA scheduled take up item Nov 18 at 10 AM.

2. In event UK, France, Belgium and other friendlies on SC decide to go along with inscription, we would propose to do likewise. After the vote we propose, unless Dept sees objection, to make following brief points:

A) Rule 5 of rules of procedure envisages that a proposal may be made, and the SC decide, to meet at another place than UNHQ. We are on record, in principle, in favoring occasional meetings of UN bodies outside of New York.

B) This being said, US does not favor meetings of SC in areas of tension. SC is charged, under Charter, with maintenance of international peace and security, and its deliberations must take place in as calm an atmosphere as possible. To hold meetings of SC in capitals of countries which have active items before the Council, would, in our view, not contribute to a severe [*serene?*] atmosphere.

C) Obviously in considering this new item full account must be taken of its financial implications. It is no secret that UN is literally on verge of bankruptcy and at a time when the organization is having difficulties paying salaries of members of Secretariat, new expenditure must be weighed carefully.

D) Lastly, there are some operational problems. SC is supposed to be able to meet at any hour of day or night should circumstances require it. Moreover, some delegations might experience difficulties communicating rapidly and securely with their capitals depending on where it was decided to hold the meeting.

3. Understand British and Belgian dets have similar reservations. Also understand French may not oppose inscription of item, but when item discussed may raise similar objection re financial situation.

4. Strulak (Poland) informed MisOff that SC Pres Kulaga (Poland) during conversation on other matters (septel)² with Bush had forgotten mention that three AF's on SC had approached him re getting consensus from SC members on SC meeting in Africa Jan or Feb 1972. According Strulak, AF SC members wanted SC meeting to be held in Dakar and/or Lusaka during that period. Topic for discussion would be 1) apartheid, 2) Southern Rhodesia, and 3) Portuguese Territories. Namibia would be discussed subject to action taken in NY. AF's took line that Bush had earlier proposed meetings outside of NY. AF's also

² Telegram 4316 from USUN, November 17. (Ibid., POL PORT-SENEG)

said Senegalese and Zambians were willing to defray some of costs such as paying for accommodations and transport. According Strulak, they also willing interrupt meetings on Southern Africa if other urgent business so requires.

5. AF's apparently got preliminary financial estimate from Secretariat of \$500,000 if trip took place. They have asked for alternative estimates which would trim off some of fat. When asked whether *démarche* was in conjunction with GA item, AF's did not make correlation.

6. Strulak said that both Sovs and British were cautious in reply to meetings in Africa. MisOff saw difficulties, particularly from financial side, but promised seek guidance. Would appreciate instructions ASAP Nov 18.

Bush

119. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 4, 1972, 1819Z.

9. Subj: SC Meeting in Africa. Ref: State 225987;² USUN 5242;³ USUN 5254.⁴

1. USUN has received informal note from SC Pres Farah (Somalia) informing us that he intends to begin consultations on issue of request of OAU re holding of meetings of SC in an African capital beginning January 6 am.

2. Department will recall that Farah had raised question of SC meeting in Africa during SC debate on SR and had at one point insisted on early SC decision. No decision, however, had been taken in waning hours of 1971. In addition, Department will recall that Crowe (UK) has suggested possibility of recommending that SC create subcomite to study question in detail. Understand that once consultations begun UKUN will formally make suggestion to SC Pres.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa.

² Dated December 15, 1971. (Ibid.)

³ Dated December 29, 1971. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD/UN)

⁴ Dated December 30, 1971. (Ibid., UN 3 SC)

3. Understand that Secretariat has prepared two estimates relating specifically to SC meeting in Senegal. Estimates based on fact that Secretariat has sent a team to Dakar to study situation for approximately a week. Estimates, however, will not surface unless somebody specifically requests detailed estimates. Understand that one estimate is for about \$100,000, which would include absence of summary records and other services normally provided for when SC meets; and other totalling \$250,000, which would take into account having verbatim or at least summary records.

4. USUN considers that UK suggestion for subcomite to study proposed trip is valid. Believe therefore we should support this move if it proposed. In addition, assume instructions contained Deptel still valid for purposes of consultations with Farah. Would appreciate any additional guidance Department may have.⁵

Bush

⁵ On January 5 the Department advised Bush that proponents of a Security Council meeting in Africa should carefully study the financial and logistical problems as well as timing. The OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa seemed to be the most appropriate site for a meeting. The Mission should support formation of a subcommittee to study the meeting unless the idea would isolate the United States. (Telegram 2022 to USUN, January 5; *ibid.*)

120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, January 11, 1972, 2217Z.

5336. Subj: SC Meeting in Africa. Ref: A. USUN 42;² B. USUN 63;³ C. USUN 83;⁴ D. USUN 84; E. USUN 85.⁵

1. At January 11 Council meeting Mission may express agreement in principle to SC meeting in Africa, subject to subcommittee agreement on arrangements, finances, location, agenda, etc. We concur with suggestion para 10, Ref B, that Council should operate by consensus in planning meeting. Mission should maintain position that host country and/or OAU defray substantial portion of meeting costs, and that all UN members (including for example Portugal and South Africa) who desire to do so be able to attend with host country agreement in advance. Regular SC rules should apply. We firmly believe meeting should not exceed five working days at outside (Council should not be away from headquarters and from Secretariat services for longer than that during current Middle East and South Asian tension). We also agree to Mission making proposal para 14 Ref C re General Debate on African questions.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by David C. Halsted and H. J. Feldman; cleared by Morris Rothenberg, Peter C. Walker, Donald S. Spigler, and David D. Newsom; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Lusaka, Conakry, Dakar, Kinshasa, London, and Paris.

² Telegram 42 from USUN, January 6, described meetings with the Belgian, Argentine, and Japanese Delegations about Ambassador Farah's proposal for a Security Council meeting in Africa. Belgian Deputy Permanent Representative Michel Van Ussel said that Farah proposed to have the Security Council meet January 23 in Addis Ababa to discuss the Rhodesian situation, sanctions against Rhodesia, Namibia, the arms embargo against South Africa, apartheid, and the situation in the Portuguese territories. (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 63 from USUN, January 8, Bush reported that Farah had contacted 12 Security Council members, and only the United Kingdom had objected to a meeting in Africa. Farah intended to call a Security Council meeting on January 11, and hoped that the Council would agree in principle to the meeting and would form a subcommittee to study the details. He was less specific than before about a venue and the agenda. (Ibid.)

⁴ In telegram 83 from USUN, January 11, Bush reported on a January 10 meeting of WEO and LA members of the Security Council. Participants agreed to a British proposal that the meeting take place "as early as practicable in 1972" rather than in the "early part of 1972." Agreement in principle about the meeting would depend on whether the subcommittee could reach an agreement on the agenda, location, timing, and financial and practical arrangements. (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 84 from USUN, January 11, outlined Farah's draft statement regarding the Security Council meeting in Africa. Telegram 85 from USUN, January 11, transmitted the text of Farah's draft consensus statement. (Both *ibid.*)

2. Paragraphs which follow give Dept's preliminary views on other aspects of meeting in Africa. We would appreciate receiving as soon as practicable Mission comment and recommendations, particularly with regard to desirable agenda and overall US stance.

3. On balance since it likely be difficult to delay meeting for more than few months, we favor it being held at reasonably early date, e.g., end of January or early February, (particularly before Rhodesian situation again comes to boiling point and before Soviet SC Presidency in March) provided of course there is agreement on modalities. While it probably would gain us little to indicate that we favor discussion of certain African issues and would prefer to avoid discussion of others, perhaps we can exert some influence over agenda by concentrating on question of duration of meeting and insisting it be kept to five working days or less. We also would like to have Africans' reaction to proposal that meeting be devoted primarily to hearing views of UN member countries from region and other interested members on the situation in Africa, as suggested para 14 Ref C.

4. While we can understand that Farah and Africans see little point in meeting given over to enunciation of platitudes and pious hopes, by same token we can see no advantage in holding series of acrimonious debates which would simply highlight disagreements. We would prefer meeting that would enhance image of UN both in eyes of Africans and of US public and Congress. We would hope there could be agreement that energies should be focussed on undertaking serious and useful outcome. Mission should make this clear to Farah in particular.

5. Action Requested: Appreciate reftels, particularly full report contained Ref C. Assuming agreement on meeting per para 1, we would appreciate specific recommendations on US posture and role, identification of which initiatives (if any) we should push on our own, advice on whether to counter with our own proposals or negotiate on their drafts if presented with obviously unacceptable resolutions, etc. We would also wish to have more information as to how African Council members aside from Farah view meeting, and would like to know whether they see meeting as opportunity to force confrontations through resolutions which they know in advance will be unacceptable to Western members. If Africans indeed do plan to force issues, we would like to know soonest and have Mission recommendations as to best countering tactics.

Rogers

121. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 12, 1972, 0004Z.

104. Subj: SC Meeting in Africa.

1. SC met Jan 11 to discuss possible meeting in Africa. At outset of meeting Farah read what he said was majority consensus resulting from his consultations. Consensus was along lines of USUN's 85 (NOTAL).²

2. In general SC members agreed in principle to hold meeting in Africa and agreed that sub-comite of Council should be established. In summing up discussions SC Pres Farah announced general consensus that SC accedes in principle to request of OAU to hold SC meeting in Africa. Second, it was agreed that period for meeting would be between Jan 20 and Feb 20, 1972 and thirdly, SC agreed to have comite of whole entitled "SC committee on Council meetings away from headquarters", which would discuss modalities of meeting in Africa primarily but would be responsible for laying down general guidelines for possible SC meetings elsewhere. Comite will conduct its business in closed sessions, will have summary records, and will consider political, legal and financial implications of trip. First meeting of comite will be Jan 12 at 10:30 at which will be also present Secretariat representatives of conference services, legal dept, political and financial depts. Comite is to have its report ready for discussion by SC Jan 17.³

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Unclassified. Repeated to Conakry, Addis Ababa, Dakar, and Lusaka.

² See footnote 5, Document 120.

³ In telegram 6642 to USUN, January 13, the Department advised USUN to "let other friendly delegations take lead in voicing conditions or qualifications." Addis Ababa remained the preferred venue, the meeting should precede an OAU Council meeting scheduled for February 14, and expenses must come from the existing budget. Telegrams 120 and 141 from USUN, January 13 and 14, described the first subcommittee meetings, which discussed procedural, logistical, and financial requirements of a special session. Telegram 142 from USUN, January 14, described a strategy meeting of WEO members concerning the agenda. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC)

122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, January 22, 1972.

12683. Reference: State 011003; State 177449; State 184606.² Subject: Security Council Meeting in Africa.

1. Security Council decided January 19 hold session in Addis Ababa beginning January 28 and ending February 4.³ Agenda item agreed on is “Consideration of Questions Relating to Africa with which SC is Currently Seized and Implementation of Council’s Relevant Resolutions”. It was not possible for SC working group to arrive at agreed consensus statement or general resolution to be adopted at end of meeting and substantive questions have been deferred until Addis session.

2. In Council and fifteen-member working group meetings, Soviet Union made numerous lengthy propagandistic and anti-Western speeches, clearly signalling its intention to use meeting to flog Western members of Security Council. (We presume Soviets will also attack NATO for its support of Portugal.) China also made similar statements, though somewhat more reserved and generalized. Guinea and Sudan made clear that purpose of meetings in their view was to dramatize the lack of UN action on African issues and put the finger on Western nations for alleged non-implementation of Security Council resolutions on such matters as “Portuguese colonialism”, Rhodesia and sanctions, South Africa arms embargo and SAG refusal to withdraw from Namibia. France was quite frank in expressing its reservations concerning not only financial costs but also questionable political results. French delegate pointedly referred to widespread feeling regarding alleged “UN impotence”, which could be heightened by Africa meeting of SC. UK took low key approach and did not even speak at last Security Council meeting. US delegate emphasized concern over UN financial situation and reserved right to oppose future meetings away from New York, for budgetary reasons. (Also stated he was pleased

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Donald S. Spigler, Rothenberg, and Thomas G. Martin; and approved by C. Robert Moore. The time of transmission is not legible. Sent to all African posts and repeated to Lisbon, London, Moscow, Paris, USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques.

² These three telegrams transmitted guidances to U.S. posts in Africa concerning U.S. assistance to Portugal, the extension of the Azores bases agreement, and the defeat of a Senate attempt to repeal the Byrd amendment authorizing the purchase of Rhodesian chrome. (Ibid., DEF 15–4 PORT–US, DEF 2–5 US, and INCO CHROME 17 US–RHOD, respectively)

³ The final meeting of the subcommittee on January 18 was described in telegram 191 from USUN, January 18. (Ibid., UN 3 SC)

that estimated cost of proposed meeting only one-third of \$500 thousand amount originally mentioned in press.)

3. For your information, estimated cost of meeting to UN is about \$106 thousand, much of which attributable to transportation for approximately 120 UN Secretariat staff. Ethiopian government has stated it will pay for substantial amount of local costs including hotel rooms for UN officials and local transportation, as well as providing conference facilities.

4. On substantive side, we expect that Africans as well as Soviet and Chinese delegations will concentrate on "non-implementation" issue, especially with regard to Rhodesia (no independence before majority rule), Rhodesian sanctions, Portuguese denial of self-determination, and breaches of (non-mandatory) UN embargo on arms to SA. We believe that US record is basically better than that of certain other Council members and we will be prepared to defend it. Undoubtedly there will be attacks on the Byrd amendment and on US aid to Portugal particularly in context of recent Azores Agreement.

5. Regarding latter you should be prepared to draw on State 011003, January 20 and previous messages referred to therein in discussions with host governments. Regarding Byrd amendment we will send you further guidance as necessary. In the meantime, you should continue to draw on State 177449, September 24 and State 184606, November 3. We suggest you use above guidance on both subjects if raised by host governments or if appropriate occasion arises (e.g., discussions of SC meeting in Africa).

Rogers

123. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, February 9, 1972, 0052Z.

22646. Subj: Security Council Meeting in Addis Ababa. Ref: Nairobi 641 NOTAL.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and Halsted; cleared by Spigler, Martin, John C. Griffiths, and Winthrop G. Brown; and approved by Moore. Sent to all posts in Africa and repeated to Belgrade, Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Lisbon, London, Moscow, Panama City, Paris, and Tokyo.

² Telegram 641 from Nairobi, February 7, summarized the voting on the five resolutions adopted by the Security Council. (Ibid.)

1. Summary. Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa achieved relatively balanced outcome considering deadline Council working against and tense atmosphere in which regional concerns were focus of attention. More radical Africans, stimulated by intercessions of liberation group leaders and egged on by Sov and PRC dels, dominated early stages of meeting and pressed for extreme resolutions. Western representatives achieved reasonably well coordinated position opposing extreme passages and by end of session, less radical Africans regained influence and agreed to substantial modifications of five resolutions tabled. US was able to support three: two resolutions on Namibia (one of which offers some slight hope in new approach calling for SYG to contact SAG and other parties involved in Namibian issue) and resolution on Apartheid. US abstained on overly one-sided Portuguese res passed by SC 9–0–6 and on Rhodesian res which prejudged Pearce Commission findings and was vetoed by UK. US abstentions do not appear to have upset Africans overly and our overall African relations emerged from meeting in relatively good state of repair. During voting in final session PRC del stated SC should condemn US and other countries violating Rhodesian sanctions and noted that reses on Portuguese Territories and Apartheid failed condemn US and UK which support colonialist regimes. End summary.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 2–4; for text see the first 3 paragraphs of Document 124.]

5. Staging SC meeting in Africa probably served as safety valve and demonstrated to Africans that their concerns receive careful consideration in Council. However, working against deadline in atmosphere where regional concerns were focus of attention clearly generated additional pressures on us and like-minded friends.

6. Specific resolutions:

a) Namibia: There were two resolutions: (1) with our support Argentina sought and obtained priority for constructive res that offers some slight hope by new approach. It invites SYG in consultation with SC group (Argentina, Yugoslavia, Somalia) to initiate contacts with South Africa and other parties “with a view to establishing the necessary conditions” which would enable Namibians “to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.” The resolution passed 14–0–0, China not voting. (2) Other resolution reiterated old formulae, terming SA presence in Namibia illegal and condemning South Africa for violation of UN resolutions. It passed 13–0–2 (UK and France). Earlier version which sought to involve the five permanent members in administration of Namibia and to move Council toward invocation of mandatory sanctions was withdrawn.

b) Rhodesia: Under Western pressure res was substantially modified but still prejudged Pearce Commission, called for it to desist from

implementing its proposals, and demanded immediate convocation of constitutional conference in Rhodesia. UK almost secured sufficient abstentions to defeat this res. This would have been in return for their agreement not to veto second res which called for SYG and President of SC to visit London to present points of view voiced in SC. Unfortunately, British instructions arrived too late, and Argentina was unwilling to be swing vote after it had incurred displeasure of Soviets and Africans by its helpful efforts on Namibia. The resolution then had to be vetoed by UK; 9-1(UK)-5(US, France, Belgium, Italy and Japan). One sidelight: we came under direct attack from the People's Republic of China for violating the SC sanctions through the Byrd amendment.

c) Portuguese Territories. The resolution was one-sided and went further than 1965 Security Council resolution but not further than several General Assembly resolutions. Provisions new to the Council but not to General Assembly recognized legitimacy of struggle of liberation movements in Portuguese territories for self-determination and independence and called on Portugal to "cease immediately its colonial wars in Africa." It narrowly escaped defeat by abstentions when Japan went along after Africans accepted a Japanese-proposed modification. The vote was 9-0-6(US, UK, France, Belgium, Italy and Argentina).

d) Apartheid: Final resolution was essentially a reiteration of previous resolutions, condemning South African policy and urging strict compliance with arms embargo against South Africa. It was adopted by vote of 14-0-1(France).

6. PRC del put forward standard PRC line on AF issues which resulted in strong statements, particularly at end of meeting, complaining about weakness of reses and obstructionist attitude of "certain big powers." PRC del stated on SR res that SC should condemn both Smith regime and UK as well as US and other countries violating sanctions. In wrap up statement PRC del said reses on Portuguese territories and Apartheid failed condemn US and UK which support colonialist regimes.

Rogers

124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Security Council Meeting in Africa

By and large we did reasonably well in achieving a relatively balanced outcome at the eight-day Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa. In the spotlight of African popular attention, stimulated by the intercessions of numerous liberation movement leaders and egged on by the Soviet and Chinese representatives, the more radical African representatives dominated the early stages of the meeting and pressed hard for extreme resolutions. However, this movement was checked in large part as the session wore on.

The Western powers were able to agree on well-coordinated opposition to extreme formulations and by the last days of the session the radical Africans lost control of the operations. Substantial modifications were made in the resolutions and we were able to support three of them: two on Namibia and one on apartheid. In accordance with our agreement with the British, we abstained on the Rhodesian resolution (vetoed by the UK) for two main reasons: (1) it prejudged the Pearce Commission's findings and (2) called for an immediate constitutional conference. We also abstained on the Portuguese territories resolution because it remained too one-sided even after excision of portions implying recognition of the liberation movements as representatives of the peoples concerned.

Exchanges with some African delegations were on occasion pointed and almost sharp, but we believe we emerged with our overall African relations in a reasonable state of repair. The Africans ex-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential. An attached memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, dated February 15, summarized Secretary Rogers' report and added: "It is also worth mentioning that there was rather widespread American press criticism of the cost of holding the meeting in Addis at a time when the UN is nearly bankrupt." The memorandum is stamped "The President has seen" and bears a marginal note reading "I agree—Don't press for any more." On February 22 Marshall Wright of the NSC Staff sent a memo to Haig that read: "I think the President's feeling on this subject should be conveyed to State as guidance." On February 24 Haig sent a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State that informed him that the President had seen Secretary Rogers' report on the Security Council meeting in Africa and had taken note of Rogers' concerns and of public criticism of the cost of the meeting. "He therefore instructs that we attempt to avoid further such meetings." (Ibid.)

pected our abstention on the Rhodesian resolution. Although they had hoped we would go along with the modified resolution on the Portuguese territories, the Africans were not unduly upset by our abstention. The Portuguese expressed appreciation for our abstention. We stayed in close touch with the British on the Rhodesian resolution, and the UK has expressed appreciation for our support.

All in all, staging the Security Council meeting in Africa probably served as a safety valve and demonstrated to the Africans that their concerns receive careful consideration in the Council. However, working against a deadline in the atmosphere where regional concerns are the focus of attention clearly generates additional pressures on us and like-minded friends. We will want to consider carefully before we agree to further meetings in other regions. In this connection, it is noteworthy that Panama has intimated its interest in having a Council meeting there on the U.S.-Panama dispute over the Canal Zone.

William P. Rogers

125. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas-Home¹

Washington, March 8, 1972.

Dear Alec:

Your letter on meetings of the Security Council away from New York was waiting for me on my return from China.²

I agree that the Council meeting in Addis Ababa was essentially a repeat performance of previous meetings in New York on southern African issues. The speeches in the early part of the week were probably more extreme and critical of Western countries than usual and the resolutions posed essentially the same chronic problems. We saw some benefit in the Argentine resolution which set the stage for the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and possibly some utility in the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and concurred in by Newsom, Meyer, and Hillenbrand.

² In his February 23 letter, Douglas-Home commented on the Security Council meeting in Africa and expressed his concern about holding more such meetings away from New York. (Ibid.)

meeting as a safety-valve for venting African emotions. We had not been aware that communications difficulties had posed substantial problems for you, and that is certainly a significant and additional negative element to be considered.

As you know, we had tended to see some merit in the principle of Council meetings outside of New York under certain conditions. But, as you point out, when additional costs are to be incurred, if communications are likely to be inadequate, and if regional tensions could be aggravated rather than eased, serious reservations regarding such meetings are in order.

We certainly would not see advantage in having an early meeting of the Council in Panama City.

We share your judgment that we may not face new proposals for other meetings away from New York for a year or so. Should others propose a meeting under unpromising conditions, we would certainly wish to consult closely with you and the French to see what we could do usefully to resist the proposals.

I will be interested to hear what reaction you get from Schumann.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Bill

126. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Posts¹

Washington, August 10, 1972, 2331Z.

145743. Subject: Possible SC Meeting in Panama.

1. At SC meeting in Addis last January, Panamanian UN Representative Boyd expressed Panama's interest in having SC meet in "capital of Panama," and in general context of "colonialism" brought up US presence in Canal Zone. Last February British FonMin wrote the Secretary and French FonMin suggesting US, UK, and France join in opposing future SC meetings outside New York on grounds (1) such

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Routine; Exdis. Drafted by Hartley; cleared by Armitage, Hurwitch, Robert T. Burns, Karl D. Ackerman, Horwitz, George N. Monsma, and Fessenden; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to London and USUN.

meetings tend increase tensions in area concerned, (2) nothing accomplished Addis that could not have been equally well accomplished New York, (3) additional expenditure involved was not warranted given UN's financial straits, and (4) SC meetings outside New York apt present administrative and communications difficulties. In reply, Secretary said while we saw some merit in principle in such meetings, serious reservations are definitely in order when meeting would occur under unpromising conditions.² French FonMin also expressed reservations with respect SC meetings outside New York. However, permanent SC members have no veto over procedural decisions of this character.

2. Recently USUN informed by UKUN of report Boyd now in Panama urging Panama invite SC meet there next year. British are considering low-key efforts through their LA missions to encourage LAs to view with great caution any initiative by Panama of this nature. UKUN thinks Panama might seek OAS support such as was given Addis meeting by OAU. Article 28(3) of UN Charter provides SC may meet at such places other than headquarters "as in its judgment will best facilitate its work."

3. Dept sees no advantage in early SC meeting in Panama. There are no agenda items of particular LA interest currently being considered by SC. However, meeting in Panama could lead to discussion of US presence in Canal Zone, a matter which Panama brought before SC in 1964 and which remains on SC agenda, as do various Cuban complaints directed against US. (Beginning with the Iranian question in 1946, almost every item the Security Council has ever considered remains on its agenda; items are seldom removed.) Dept considers SC meetings outside New York in absence clearly demonstrated advantages not only unjustified under charter criterion for such meetings but also unjustified expense in view of UN's financial crisis.

4. Dept will inform Embassy if UK decides proceed with efforts at persuasion it is considering making with LAs. If it does, Embassy should keep in touch with British counterpart re results such efforts. In meantime Embassy should report promptly anything it may hear with respect possible Panama initiative for SC meeting there, but should not of course raise subject. If asked how US would regard such proposal, Embassy should indicate that it will seek instructions but in general US believes desirability SC meetings outside New York must be judged on case by case basis to determine whether there are such clear advantages in holding meeting outside New York as to outweigh any possible danger of increasing, rather than decreasing, tensions in

² See Document 125.

area, operational and communications difficulties involved, and additional expense incurred, particularly in view UN's present financial problems. It difficult see how SC's work on any of problems with which it currently occupied would be facilitated by meeting in Panama.

Rogers

127. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 30, 1972, 2148Z.

3035. Subj: Possible SC Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 145743.²

1. In course tour of horizon with Amb Phillips Aug 29, Sir Colin Crowe (UK) confirmed rumor that floated last week in NY to effect that India had traded promise of support for SC meeting in Panama for Panama's support (which proved determinative) in preventing further delay in SC consideration of Bangladesh UN membership application. Sir Colin had this directly from Indian Amb Sen. Sir Colin asked if he were correct in assumption US would be opposed to such venue for SC meeting.

2. Amb Phillips confirmed US distaste for meeting in Panama. He drew on guidance contained reftel, emphasizing particular concern about out of town meetings on subjects of local or regional concern when such meetings might tend to increase rather than decrease tensions.

3. Sir Colin's report provides clear evidence Panamanians still actively pursuing idea of SC meeting in Panama, clearly with view to pressing issue of US presence in Canal Zone. We must also assume that meeting-in-Panama has become goal of Govt of Panama and not merely hobby-horse of Panamanian PermRep Boyd. We understand that special Pakistan Ambassador who saw Panamanian FonMin afternoon of Aug 24 believed he had persuaded FonMin to vote for delay on Bangladesh issue following day. Yet Boyd told USUN source his FonMin had reaffirmed instructions to vote against delay early Aug 25.

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to London, New Delhi, and Panama City.

² Document 126.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 22, 1972, 2330Z.

17416. Subject: Possible SC Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 145743, USUN 3297, Panama 4232.²

1. In view evidence of increasing Panamanian interest and activity with respect possible SC meeting in Panama contained reftels, Dept believes time has come for US make clear its opposition such meeting to other SC members on selective basis. Moreover, if outcome SC elections is as expected, Panama would hold SC Presidency in March. While Rule 20 SC Provisional Rules of Procedure provides for President disqualifying himself where UN member he represents is directly concerned in question under consideration, it leaves this to his discretion. Should he decide to disqualify himself, Panamanian President could still complicate matters for US before doing so, for example, in connection with adoption of agenda, and under same rule he would be succeeded by Peru, which also unlikely be helpful US in this context.

2. USUN should therefore sound out those SC members it believes might be persuaded resist idea of SC meeting away from headquarters at this time on general grounds of a) additional expense of such meetings which, in our view, should be avoided during this period of financial crisis for UN and b) unavoidable operational and communications difficulties involved.

3. Where SC members appear responsive, USUN should then indicate with specific reference possible meeting in Panama, that we fail see how SC's work on any of problems currently occupying it would be facilitated by meeting in Panama. There are no agenda items of particular LA interest currently being considered by SC and in our view meetings away from headquarters in absence clearly demonstrated advantages unjustified under Charter criterion for such meetings (Article 28(3)). Moreover, meeting in Panama could serve to increase, rather than decrease, tensions in area by encouraging reactivation of old items that continue on SC agenda.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Routine. Drafted by Hartley; cleared by Monsma, Hurwitch, Walker, Chase, Armitage, Bell, Goott, McNutt, and Willis; and approved by Herz. Repeated to Panama City, Paris, and London.

² Telegram 145743 is Document 126. Telegram 3297 from USUN, September 15, and telegram 4232 from Panama City, September 19, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC and OAS 3, respectively.

4. Before approaching other SC members, USUN should seek cooperation of British and French in this endeavor in view earlier US-UK exchanges on this matter and Dept's understanding French also have reservations re SC meetings away from headquarters.

Rogers

129. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama

The possibility of a Panamanian attempt to arrange a Security Council meeting in Panama in March 1973 has become more real. We are moving to discourage and if necessary defeat any such move, but our success is not assured.

On September 15 Panama's Permanent UN Representative Aquilino E. Boyd publicly stated his government was giving "serious consideration" to inviting the Security Council to meet in Panama in order to focus attention on the "problem of the Panama Canal".

We heard in late July that Boyd might be pushing the idea of having a Security Council meeting in Panama, and at that time we asked our Latin American embassies to report on the subject and to discourage the idea if it was being discussed. Now, in view of the clearer indications of Panamanian intent we are moving more actively to discourage the move, and have suggested that Secretary Rogers raise this matter with Douglas-Home and Schumann in New York. We anticipate they will join us in opposing a Panama Security Council meeting. You will recall that Sir Alec wrote Secretary Rogers in February emphatically opposing future Security Council meetings away from headquarters. Schumann expressed general agreement in correspondence with the British.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Drafted September 25 by Hartley and Armitage and cleared by Bell, Monsma, and Herz.

We are asking our UN Mission to consult and to seek support also from other Security Council members (in addition to the UK and French) to resist any Panamanian invitation. The Mission is to point out that meetings away from New York incur unnecessary expense and entail operational and communication difficulties, and that the Council's work on current problems would not be facilitated by a meeting in Panama. There are no current Latin American items, although there are inactive items technically on the agenda which could be reactivated at a meeting in Panama.

We would need seven negative votes or abstentions to defeat a Panamanian proposal. As Panama is likely to pursue its proposal in the "colonial" context, we probably cannot expect support in any vote from the Soviets, the eastern Europeans, the People's Republic of China, India or the three Africans—nor, of course, from Panama. We could probably count on the support of the Belgians, Italians and hopefully the Japanese, in addition to the UK and France. Argentina, which may have the swing vote, would find it difficult not to go along with Panama.

Our situation will be still less favorable if the matter is precipitated in the Council in 1973 where the membership will undergo some changes: Peru will replace Argentina, Austria replace Italy and Indonesia replace Japan. What we must hope is that the firm opposition of three of the permanent members, supported by two or more other members of influence, will be sufficient to prevent the idea of the Security Council meeting in Panama from coming to a vote.

RW Mueller²

² Mueller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

130. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1972, 2143Z.

3620. Dept pass ARA and SC member capitals as desired. Subj: Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama. Refs: (A) USUN 3587,² (B) USUN 3598,³ (C) USUN 3544,⁴ (D) USUN 3525,⁵ (E) Panama 4410,⁶ (F) Panama 4450,⁷ (G) State 179271.⁸

1. As USUN reporting shows Panamanian PermRep Boyd obviously believes, with some reason, he has made significant progress in garnering support for SC meeting in Panama in March 1973.

2. Boyd's role in SC has been almost exclusively aimed at this objective since Panama joined SC in January 1972. In his first statement before SC and in most since, he has raised Canal question either directly or in reference to racial and other discrimination in Canal Zone. Specifically Boyd had openly stated that his frequent support for African initiatives on Southern Africa and decolonization resolutions is aimed at getting African support for SC meeting in Panama.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Panama City.

² Telegram 3587 from USUN, September 29, described a luncheon meeting between Bush and Panamanian Permanent Representative Boyd the day before. Bush said the cost of any meeting had to be carefully considered, and meetings should not be held "to bring special pressure to bear on a specific issue." Boyd replied that Panama expected to be "very generous" with expenses. He also hoped that a special Security Council meeting in Panama "would favorably mould public opinion in the US on the Canal issue," but was vague about other agenda items. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 3598 from USUN, September 30, described a meeting with members of the Japanese UN Mission, who had told Bush that they had not yet been approached by Boyd about the special meeting in Panama. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegram 3544 from USUN, September 28, mentioned that Boyd had told Deputy Representative W. Tapley Bennett that French Foreign Minister Schumann had expressed full support for a Security Council meeting in Panama. (Ibid.)

⁵ In telegram 3525 from USUN, September 28, Bush mentioned that British Permanent Representative Crowe said that the Panamanian initiative had the support of 11 Security Council members. Any effort to reverse the trend "would necessarily include high-level démarches in capitals of West European SC members and at LA capitals," and was unlikely to succeed. (Ibid.)

⁶ In telegram 4410 from Panama City, September 28, Ambassador Robert M. Sayre announced Panama's formal request for U.S. support for holding a Security Council meeting in Panama in March 1973. (Ibid.)

⁷ Telegram 4450 from Panama City, September 30, analyzed President Torrijos' efforts to use a Security Council meeting in Panama to focus world attention on the Panama Canal situation. (Ibid., POL 33–3 CZ)

⁸ In telegram 179271, October 2, the Department concurred in Ambassador Sayre's analysis of President Torrijos' "game plan" and reported that efforts would be made to "slow, if not halt, its momentum." (Ibid.)

3. Our assessment of present situation is that, with present SC composition US, UK, Belgium and Italy would oppose. Should no action be taken before 1973 we would expect Australia as replacement for one we oppose. Although French Mission here and UN Director Leprette surprised at Schumann statement of support during LA dinner we assume that French position may be pretty much established. (French privately had reservations about Addis meeting but these were never expressed publicly.) We would expect all others, including Austria, in 1973, to support. Nevertheless we are not convinced that all positions, even those of LAs, are completely firm as yet. Furthermore, most supporters have not given thought to agenda and political considerations of Panama meeting.

4. USUN 3587 indicates our standing criteria for SC meetings away from headquarters. Argentine PermRep Ortiz has advised us the financial and administrative arguments against the meeting will not be very useful, presumably with LAs, but substantive reasoning could be effective.

5. Boyd has stated to us that Panama's objective is to discuss the Canal and have favorable impact on US public opinion. He should know, however, just how little play SC meeting in Panama will probably get in US media unless there is violence—physical or oratorical—which, from Panama's point of view, would probably have adverse effect on US public opinion.

6. Meeting in Panama is not entirely analogous to that of meeting in Addis Ababa.

7. Invitation: OAU extended invitation which endorsed by GA with recommendation to SC to act favorably. Therefore there is no precedent for response to invitation by single state although we assume OAS could be persuaded follow OAU example.

8. Agenda: In case of Addis meeting there was plethora African items on existing SC agenda but SC committee on meetings away from headquarters put together catchall agenda item called consideration of questions relating to Africa with which SC is currently seized and implementation of its relevant resolutions. Substituting LA for Africa—as Boyd has suggested—would have grave implications since only LA items falling into this category are Cuban questions (1960 and 1962), Haitian complaints about Dominican Republic and US policy in Dominican Republic 1965 (Soviet initiative). The Canal is specifically on the agenda, Item 60, as a result of letter to SC President from Panamanian PermRep of January 10, 1964 as result incidents in Panama and the Zone.

9. We believe not even Panamanians would wish to reopen Cuban or Dominican Republic items. If they to invoke only Item 60 we would have strong argument—for what it would be worth—for not holding

meeting in area concerned and thus subject SC to local tensions and undesirable pressures. Therefore we suspect they likely draw up general item, not specifically including the Canal, which did not get SC into morass of past LA items which could degenerate into debate not about Canal but cold war questions. Conceivably Cuba and, possibly, Chile would attempt to have item include situations which subjects of dispute with US.

10. Our initial recommendations for opposing meetings would be:

(a) There is no item currently under discussion concerning LA before the SC.

(b) If agenda Item 60 (Panama Canal) is to be basis for meeting, Panama would be least desirable locus.

(c) We unaware of any urgent issues which require meeting away from headquarters.

(d) OAS as regional organization is forum for issues of current importance.

(e) UN finances, already badly strained, would again be subject to unusual drain without corresponding substantive benefits to UN, SC, Panama or others.

(f) SC would be lending itself to exploitation for advantage of one member which not in interest of UN. Furthermore, as seems likely, SC will again put itself in position of failing to make real contribution to resolution of political disputes.

11. Obviously it would serve to defuse Panamanian initiative if progress could be made toward settlement of the Canal question but Embassy Panama's reporting leads us to believe that Panama's game plan is to reinforce its bargaining position by use of SC meeting. Presumably interim progress in this regard would require significant and unacceptable USG concessions on Canal at a time when ball is in Panamanian court.

12. If our analysis is correct and if we decide make major effort on this issue we believe suitably tailored approaches will be necessary at ARA posts and most SC member capitals. Even if we unable head off SC meeting in Panama—as we suspect—our lobbying added to kinds of action Embassy Panama has suggested in reftel (F) could help keep meeting within tolerable limits and thus assure least possible damage to our position and to the image of the UN.

13. As first step suggest Embassy Paris be requested get interpretation Schumann's remarks here as reported USUN 3544 which should be repeated to Paris.

Bush

131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 3, 1972, 2141Z.

180523. Subject: Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama. Ref: A. USUN 3544, B. USUN 3587, C. USUN 3620.²

1. Dept appreciates thorough analysis and recommendation in USUN 3620. While it appears that Boyd has made considerable progress in eliciting acquiescence of number, perhaps a majority, of SC members to SC meeting in Panama, we doubt that he has the firm support of all of them and are determined to counter this initiative and prevent abuse of the SC to bring pressure on US. Schumann's apparent expression of support for this idea was particularly unhelpful and is subject of separate message. In any case we doubt Panama has firm support of eleven SC members as Boyd claims.

2. Time has clearly come when our views in opposition to meeting in Panama should be made forcefully known to all other Perm Reps and known in still more emphatic terms to Panama's representative.

3. We believe Boyd may have given us useful ammunition in his bare-faced admission that purpose of holding SC meeting in Panama would be to put pressure ("favorably mould") public opinion on bilateral issue now under negotiation between US and Panama. His difficulty in replying to Amb. Bush's queries regarding agenda for projected meeting also provides additional grounds for inducing second thoughts among SC members concerning wisdom and appropriateness of such meeting.

4. You should make clear to PermReps of both current SC members and those who will take seats in 1973 that we are emphatically opposed to Panamanian proposal which we consider inappropriate, improper and unsupportable. We leave it to you to tailor individual approaches as you consider best, but you should center your fire on point that US and Panama are engaged in continuing negotiations on question of Canal Zone and that it is inadmissible that SC meetings should be moved to particular locality for express purpose of generating pressure on specific issue, especially one under negotiation. Every SC member should be made aware that precedent of locating SC meeting to influence bilateral negotiations or bilateral issues could plague

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Armitage and Herz, cleared by Bell, and approved by Herz. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Vienna, Canberra, Moscow, New Delhi, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Conakry, Panama City, Buenos Aires, Lima, Nairobi, Tokyo, and Djakarta.

² See Document 130 and footnotes 2 and 4 thereto.

that member, too, in the future. We believe this last point should give pause even to USSR and India.

5. As for African members, it might be pointed out to them that there is a vast difference between the Addis Ababa meeting, which was held in response to initiative by a regional organization, and proposed meeting in Panama which is the initiative of an individual country (even if others in the region feel constrained to support it). As you have suggested, would also be useful that Addis Ababa meeting constitutes no valid precedent might also be explained to others where appropriate.

6. As you have suggested, would also be useful to make following additional points:

A. SC is not currently seized with matters of particular concern to Latin American countries, hence there are no grounds for agenda appropriate to meeting in Panama. If old agenda items are brought up, your point that they suggest “cold war” debate on inactive issues as far as SC concerned should be telling.

B. OAS is active regional organization which first addresses issues of particular importance to LA's, and OAS has not expressed need or desire for SC to treat Latin American issues at this time.

C. SC agreement to Panama meeting would derogate from its prestige and stature by thus lending itself to exploitation for advantage of one member and encouraging other countries to do the same. It would be particularly reprehensible if Panama were to use its Presidency of the Council in March 1973 to get SC to meet in its capital in order to further interests of SC President by exerting pressure on another SC member.

D. Additional strain on shaky UN finances is unwarranted by any commensurate benefit and unjustified at time when efforts are being directed to improving UN financial situation.

7. As for Boyd himself, you can now put US opposition to his proposal in stronger terms. You should leave him in no doubt that we consider his initiative an unjustifiable perversion of SC not grounded in its Charter purposes and that we regard it as inadmissible for Panama to attempt to manipulate SC procedures as propaganda exercise aimed at US public. You should repeat to him that in our view his initiative would backfire as it would be transparent to US people and be resented as pressure tactic. It appears that you found vulnerable chink when you pressed him on agenda, and additional emphasis on this point would be useful, also to let him know that we believe we have cogent argument with other SC members.

8. When we have reactions of PermReps to our approach, we will consider desirability of follow-up approaches in capitals.

Rogers

132. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 5, 1972, 1715Z.

9489. Subj: Possible SC Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 181194.²

1. I called on Sir Alec Douglas-Home today to enlist British help in blocking the Panamanian initiative to hold an SC meeting in Panama in March 1973, and to urge him to approach Schumann to discourage French support of this initiative. Sir Alec jestingly asked in effect "Why should I help you? I didn't get any help in blocking the SC meeting at Addis Ababa and I warned Bill Rogers that something like the Panamanian move might be the result."³ But he then quickly added "Of course we'll help and do what we can." Sir Alec observed that there was no telling where this kind of thing might end—next there might even be a move to hold SC meetings in Cuba or Ireland. There was every argument against holding SC meetings in trouble spots to suit members with grievances against other members.

2. Sir Alec said British would lobby the French, Australians and Austrians. He also indicated British might work on the Indians who he thought should be able to see undesirable implications of Panamanian initiative. At same time he expressed some doubt that he would be able to stop the Panamanians. The best and probably only course of action in Sir Alec's opinion was to try to beat the Panamanians by lining up the necessary votes in the Security Council against their proposal.

3. Sir Alec indicated that he was puzzled by Schumann's stand on the meeting. The British had supposed the French had reservations about SC meetings away from headquarters. He wondered whether Schumann might not have been carried away at the Latin American dinner.

Annenberg

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Panama City, and USUN.

² In telegram 181194, October 4, the Department called on Ambassador Annenberg to remind Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home of his agreement with Secretary Rogers to consult about ways to resist proposals for Security Council meetings away from the UN Headquarters. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 125 and footnote 2 thereto.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, October 5, 1972, 2014Z.

18969. Subject: Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama. Ref State 181193.²

1. Have just returned (accompanied by Pol Couns) from talking with Schumann re possible SC meeting in Panama. Schumann had a notetaker on his side. I asked him directly how committed he was. He replied "completely." He said that at his dinner for Latin Americans, "all of them" asked him if France was prepared to support meeting in Panama, to which he replied "If all of you ask, why should France refuse?"

2. Explaining you had intended raise matter with him directly, I went on and pointed out how seriously we viewed the matter of having the SC meet in a country with which we were having active negotiations and whose Permanent Representative stated that the purpose of having this meeting in Panama was to focus public attention in the US on the Canal issue. Schumann was completely stunned, stating that he had thought that Panama and the US were on the best possible terms and he had no idea we "had any trouble" with them. He immediately said "I must disentangle myself from myself. I have been uncautious and it will take time." I also told him that if the French were having delicate negotiations with one of their former colonies such as Morocco and some country suggested that the SC meet in Rabat, they would find it as unpalatable as we find facing a possible meeting in Panama.

3. Schumann was clearly upset, stating that he had had several excellent visits with you as well as a visit with the President and Dr. Kissinger. He stated that relations between our two countries have never been better and that he was extremely sorry that he had been so "uncautious." He then stated that the Latin Americans at the dinner had cited the Addis Ababa meeting as the precedent for having the meeting in Panama. We of course pointed out to him *inter alia* that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN, London, Moscow, and Panama City.

² In telegram 181193 to Paris, October 4, the Department advised Ambassador Watson that Rogers had intended to discuss the Panamanian initiative with Schumann in New York, and urged him to arrange a meeting to explain U.S. objections to Security Council meetings away from headquarters. "Major powers must be concerned with precedent that would be established if country having an issue with one of them were to use its fortuitous membership on the SC, and its presidency of the Council in a particular month, to move that forum to a locality from which it can bring pressure to bear on a permanent member. This a point that we also intend to make to the USSR." (Ibid.)

there had been active African matters on the SC agenda and it was the OAU that issued the invitation, not a single country. He went on to say that he had been against Addis Ababa meeting because of the precedents, and that the USG was very serious in seeking French support to prevent SC meeting in Panama.

4. I took the liberty of suggesting various means for Schumann to reverse his position, along lines refuels, and he told me he would think it over and be in touch. If I don't hear from him soon, I will contact him again early next week, unless you suggest otherwise.

5. *Comment:* In all my dealings with Schumann I have never seen him so visibly shaken, concerned and apologetic.

Watson

134. Aide-Mémoire From the Embassy in France to the Government of France¹

Paris, October 5, 1972.

The Government of the United States hopes that the Government of France will use its influence among members of the UN Security Council to discourage the campaign to have the Security Council meet in Panama. That campaign aims at convening a meeting in Panama City next March, when the representative of Panama is scheduled to preside over the Security Council.

While asserting that the meeting would not be aimed against the United States Government, the Permanent Representative of Panama to the United Nations has informed us that the purpose of holding a meeting in Panama would be to focus the attention of public opinion, specifically in the United States, on the issues involved in the current negotiations between the United States and Panama concerning the Panama canal. The United States Government considers that it is inadmissible that the meetings of the Security Council should be moved to a particular locality for the express purpose of generating pressure on a specific issue especially one which is under active negotiation. The

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. No classification marking. The text printed here is a copy transmitted to the Department as an attachment to airgram A-863, October 10, which reported that Watson delivered the aide-mémoire to Schumann on October 5.

precedent of locating a Security Council meeting to influence bilateral negotiations or bilateral issues could in the future plague any and every member of the Council, whether permanent or not.

We believe that permanent members of the Security Council have special responsibility in this matter because of the influence they exercise in the Security Council and because opposition from permanent Security Council members would be given particular weight in a matter of this kind. The major powers must be concerned with the precedent that would be established if a country having an issue with one of them were to use its temporary membership on the Security Council and its presidency of the Council in a particular month, to move that forum to a locality from which it can bring pressure to bear on a permanent member.

Technically a vote on the location of a Security Council meeting is a procedural one; therefore under Article 27 of the UN Charter not subject to veto and requiring the affirmative votes of only 9 out of the 15 members. In fact, however, we believe the Security Council would hesitate to go against the serious reservations of several permanent members in matters of this importance.

It has been argued that there is a precedent for holding a Security Council meeting away from UN Headquarters. The United States Government does not believe that the Security Council's previous meeting in Addis Ababa is analogous to the proposed meeting in Panama. In the former case, the appropriate regional organization, the Organization of African Unity, extended the invitation to meet in Addis Ababa which was endorsed by the General Assembly with a recommendation for the Security Council to act favorably; therefore there is no precedent for a response to an invitation by a single state to convene a meeting on its territory. Furthermore in the case of the meeting in Addis Ababa there were several African items on the existing active agenda of the Security Council, whereas there are no Latin American items currently scheduled to be discussed by the Council.

Under Article 28 (3) of the United Nations Charter, "The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work." The United States Government trusts the Government of France will agree that there is no issue presently or prospectively before the Security Council for which a meeting in Panama will best facilitate the Council's work.

The Governments of France and the United States have been in agreement on the importance of limiting expenditures by the United Nations to those expenses which are essential. The United Nations budget is already badly strained and we hope that the Government of France will urge other members of the Security Council to give care-

ful consideration to the unusual financial drain which is involved in holding any United Nations meeting away from the seat of the organization.

The Governments of the United States and France have also been in agreement that the Security Council should address itself primarily to matters of urgency and matters on which the Council can be expected to contribute significantly. It is also widely agreed that the Council should be able to convene instantly with excellent communications available to all the Embassies of member states should a crisis arise. These two principles also would militate strongly against holding a meeting of the Council in Panama without any apparent corresponding advantages.

The United States Government hopes the Government of France will consider its position concerning a Security Council meeting in Panama in the light of the above points and would be willing to concert with the United States Government on the best means of discouraging this effort.

135. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 6, 1972, 2200Z.

3735. Subject: Possible S.C. Meeting in Panama.

At Iranian lunch yesterday, I had individual discussions re above subject with Nakagawa (Japan), McIntyre (Australia) and Boyd (Panama).

1. I described the US position to Nakagawa. He seemed sympathetic in spite of fact that Boyd had told me that Nakagawa made commitment to him to have mtg in Panama. Nakagawa suggested best way to avert mtg was to have some visible progress underway before spring on Panama Canal bilateral talks. Nakagawa immediately understood our reservations about trying to solve bilateral problems by bringing pressure to bear on question through *démarche* of SC mtg in area. I said, "Today it's Panama; tomorrow it may be some other international

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Panama, Canberra, London, and Tokyo.

dispute between two countries.” He nodded vigorously and seemed anxious to help US find a way out.

2. McIntyre is totally in accord with our views, I am convinced, and will help US in any way we desire.

3. When I talked with Boyd, it was almost a re-hash of my two previous conversations with him on this subject. I told him that we now had firm instructions and that I wanted to do him the courtesy of notifying him immediately. He seemed concerned but immediately repeated that he had a great deal of support for the meeting being held in Panama.

After repeating the entire litany in support of our position, I made a personal observation, telling Boyd very forcefully and very directly that if he thought he was going to influence President Nixon or American public opinion through this device, he was simply misjudging our political process. I told him he was going about it just backwards. I offered to convey this to anyone in his govt, should he feel this would be helpful.

He made some very flattering comments about our own personal relationship in the presence of Amb McIntyre and insisted that he would always “keep the door open” and stay in close touch.

Comment: Boyd appears to be uncomfortable about all of this. I think he is really worried about the Marxists, should the Canal issue not be resolved. (He whispered and pointed once or twice at Amb. Malik (USSR) and the Cuban Ambassador, who were sitting across from us, indicating we must “avoid that kind of thing”.) I will stay in close touch with Boyd and try to keep the climate right for continuing discussions.

Bush

136. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama

Subsequent to our memorandum of September 25² a number of developments made more difficult—and urgent—our task of preventing a Security Council meeting in Panama which would unhelpfully focus on the Canal Zone. We have now made clear to Security Council members our strong opposition to such a meeting and believe we have induced some second thoughts concerning its desirability. However, to be successful we will have to persuade Panama and/or Security Council members to back away from the issue; if the matter were pressed to a vote now, it is unlikely that we could win. However, the issue may be joined only in 1973—when the composition of the Council will be still less favorable to us. Panama is scheduled to preside over the SC in March, 1973.

Panama's hard campaigning on the "colonialism" aspects of such a meeting succeeded in making the non-European SC members wary about opposing a meeting and elicited considerable support. Two particular developments strengthened Panama's position: Unexpectedly French Foreign Minister Schumann at a dinner for Latin American representatives September 26 gave a public endorsement to the SC meeting in Panama. And it appears that Panama may have obtained Indian assurance of support in return for Panama's support of the Indian position on the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations.

On October 5 Embassy Paris under instructions made a forceful approach to Schumann explaining our objections to the SC meeting in Panama and stressing the seriousness with which we regard the matter. After having said at first that he was "completely" committed to the meeting, Schumann was taken aback by our representation, stating that he had misunderstood the situation and concluding, "I must disentangle myself from myself. I have been uncautious and it will take time."³ We also weighed in with Douglas-Home who indicated that he

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by Bell and Herz.

² Presumably a reference to Document 129, which was drafted on September 25.

³ See Document 133.

would remind Schumann of their previous correspondence on the subject and urge him to oppose the SC meeting in Panama.⁴

In New York we have had repeated conversations with Panamanian Permanent Representative Boyd, emphasizing that we regard it as inadmissible for Panama to attempt to manipulate SC procedures as a propaganda exercise aimed at the U.S. public, asserting that this initiative would backfire in the United States and underlining the pertinence of the fact that there are no Latin American issues currently being considered by the Security Council.⁵ Ambassador Jova made a somewhat similar approach to Panamanian OAS Ambassador Pitty in Washington stressing that the attempt to stage an SC meeting in Panama would hinder the prospects of constructive bilateral progress on the Canal question. Ambassador Finch, as the President's Personal Representative, is to make this point also to the Panamanians in general terms at the inaugural ceremonies October 11 if the issue is raised with him.

Our Mission in New York has conveyed our opposition to the Panamanian SC meeting to present and prospective SC members—except the People's Republic of China whom we are still trying to see. With the exception of the European SC members (and French and Austrian attitudes are still equivocal) SC members are inclined to favor the meeting in principle and indicate they would find it difficult not to go along if the issue is pressed to a vote.⁶ However, our point that there are no Latin American matters currently before the Security Council together with our strong opposition seems to be striking home even with the Soviet and African delegations.

We intend to concentrate on finding a "way out" that will induce wavering SC members, Argentina and other sympathetic Latin American countries to persuade Panama to withdraw its proposal. However, we do not wish to provoke Torrijos into a polemical reaction and, hence, will not initiate or encourage discussion of the substance of U.S.-Panamanian positions or differences in the Canal Zone negotiations. Nonetheless, we can and will stress that we have recently reiterated to the Panamanians (by means of a confidential letter from the President to Torrijos) our desire to resume negotiations, and that we are prepared to be forthcoming and flexible in them. We will utilize any helpful signals that Ambassador Finch may receive from General Torrijos in this regard. We will, of course, also continue our efforts to bring the French around.

⁴ See Document 132.

⁵ See Document 135.

⁶ Opinions of Security Council members were summarized in telegram 3772 from USUN, October 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC)

We are not yet prepared to have a confrontation with Torrijos. But we are making clear the extent and rationale of our opposition to an SC meeting in Panama to Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack as we are unsure how accurately or fully Boyd has reported our position to him.

Richard W. Mueller⁷

⁷ Mueller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama¹

Washington, October 16, 1972, 2246Z.

188714. Subj: Proposed Security Council Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 186768.²

For the Ambassador.

1. We have prepared following message for you to deliver to Foreign Minister Tack, in the event you have no objection, by means of a confidential letter under your signature. By that format we seek to avoid the formality of a diplomatic note, and hope Tack will appreciate the effort to be informal on this subject. We seek also to try to preclude his rushing to the press with it, characterizing the message as an unacceptable ultimatum. Finally we seek to assure that, having a written message, Tack will feel constrained to show it to Torrijos, rather than to brief him orally—and probably inaccurately—on the substance of the message.

2. Should Tack demand a formal communication, you may say plainly that the interests of both parties indicate the need for informality and that we cannot provide such a communication.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Bell; cleared by Herz, Armitage, Finn, Crimmins, Ward, and Hurwitch; and approved by Charles A. Meyer. Repeated to USUN.

² Telegram 186768, October 12, advised USUN to "tailor our representations to others in manner best designed to suggest 'way out' which sympathetic Latin American delegations and, hopefully, other SC members can use to persuade Panama to withdraw its proposal." Points to be made were that a special meeting might hamper negotiations in progress concerning the future status of the Canal, that there were no Latin American issues currently under Security Council consideration, that reviving earlier Latin American issues would revive cold war divisions, and that current Latin American issues were better suited to consideration by the OAS. (Ibid.)

3. "Personal and confidential. Dear Mr. Minister,
4. "I write to you privately, on instructions from my government, to supplement the personal and confidential letter from President Nixon to General Torrijos delivered recently by Ambassador Finch. I write also to supplement the letter I delivered to you recently from Ambassador Anderson.
5. "The subject, Mr. Minister, is the proposal of the Government of Panama to hold a meeting of the Security Council in Panama City next March.
6. "First let me say that my government appreciates the straightforwardness with which the Government of Panama has dealt with us on this proposal. Your Representative at the United Nations has candidly made known to us, as he has made known to the Representatives of other governments, that the Panamanian Government desires to use such a meeting, although perhaps not officially, as a forum in which to place before the world the views of Panama on the Panama Canal issues, and to engender support for its position throughout the world and particularly in the United States.
7. "Moreover, you yourself—knowing from the outset of our opposition to the proposal on a variety of grounds—were good enough to seek our views, our reconsideration of the matter, and our ultimate support.
8. "My government wishes to return this notable courtesy, Mr. Minister, by being equally straightforward.
9. "Your government has now received reiterations from the very highest level of the United States Government, in writing and in personal conversation, that we are ready at any time to pursue treaty negotiations—indeed, that we are anxious to pursue them, and that we are in a position to be flexible at the negotiating table. We wait only the presentation of a new set of negotiating positions from the Government of Panama in response to the most recent set of negotiating positions of the United States, laid before you many months ago.
10. "Your government has also received, Mr. Minister, an expression of hope at the highest level of the United States Government that a climate may be maintained in which we can quietly and constructively resolve the differences long existing as a result of the Panama Canal Treaty relationship and, more generally, in which we can quietly and constructively conduct our bilateral business. I believe I am not mistaken in my recollection from earlier conversations with you and General Torrijos that an informal understanding exists on the desirability of maintaining such a climate. I believe also that I am not mistaken in recognizing several distinct manifestations of that understanding on the part of your government in the last week or so. That recognition is a source of gratification to my government.

11. "Given the longstanding readiness of the United States to pursue negotiations, and given what we take to be a mutual interest in maintaining an agreeable climate for the conduct of our affairs, it has been difficult from the outset for my government to comprehend the purpose of the Panamanian Government in proposing this meeting. I should add, Mr. Minister, that the other governments with which the United States has been routinely consulting on this proposal, simultaneously with the routine consultations of the Panamanian Government, may well have some similar difficulty. Understanding as they do from your representative at the United Nations that Panama seeks to expose its views on the Panama Canal issues and to collect support for them, those governments might well ask, "Is this not a matter of a purely bilateral problem, clearly susceptible of a peaceful resolution once the parties involved can once again pursue actively the negotiations?"

12. "Now that President Nixon has delivered to General Torrijos his personal words on our readiness to negotiate and to work with your government in maintaining an agreeable climate, my government would find it more difficult still to comprehend the purpose of the government of Panama were it to persist in its proposal for such a meeting. That is particularly so, Mr. Minister, as a result of Ambassador Finch's feeling that he and General Torrijos agreed specifically that a mutually satisfactory treaty relationship could not be negotiated through the world press.

13. "What my government has no difficulty in comprehending, Mr. Minister, is that a Security Council meeting in Panama City could result in the creation of a climate—in your country, my own, and in the international community—so antipathetic to the goal of mutual understanding and trust that my government's ability to negotiate outstanding treaty issues in a forthcoming and flexible way might well be restricted.

14. "To elaborate, I can predict that the American people and the American Congress would view such a meeting as an effort to generate external pressure on the United States, and would deeply resent that effort. I can also predict that they would view it as casting doubt on the good faith of Panama in the attempt to negotiate away the differences between us. The President of the United States could not ignore such sentiments.

15. "I could elaborate also on other reservations of my government to the proposal, but I am certain you have heard of them from your representative at the United Nations. You may also have heard of them, through your representative, from other members of the United Nations. They are aware, to cite only one reservation, that the Security Council is not currently considering any matters relating in particular to Latin America, so that there is no appropriate basis for an agenda

suited to a meeting in Latin America. I believe it fair to state that these reservations have a persuasive quality among United Nations members, including those on the Security Council.

16. "In the spirit in which you sought my government's reconsideration of the Panamanian proposal, my government now asks for Panama's reconsideration. We have two thoughts. One is that a meeting in Panama City would impair, perhaps seriously, the prospects for an improved relationship between us. The other is that the Government of Panama may in the exercise of its sovereignty and wisdom choose to seize upon the reaffirmations of my President as an instrumentality helpful to the prestige of Panama in deciding to pursue, not a provocative course, but rather the peaceful and constructive one of negotiation.

17. "I close this private message to you, Mr. Minister, by putting myself at your disposal to continue our straightforward exchange on this subject should you wish to do so."

Rogers

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State¹

Panama City, October 17, 1972, 1645Z.

4700. Subj: Proposed Security Council Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 188714² and Panama 4410.³

1) Summary: Reply to Panamanian Foreign Minister should respond in kind to his informal and oral request to me of September 28 for support of Secretary of State. If informal written communication deemed essential so message conveyed correctly to Torrijos, communication could take form of talking points which I could leave with Tack. Action requested: Approval of modification of approach and talking points.

2) Both Tack and Torrijos are thin-skinned and may react strongly and adversely to letter which contains veiled ultimatum (paragraph 14) that U.S. will call off treaty negotiations if Panama presses for SC meeting in Panama.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Immediate.

² Document 137.

³ See footnote 6, Document 130.

3) I also have other problems with draft:

A) It makes no reference to Tack's oral request to me of September 28 for response from Secretary of State.

B) Although it purports to be personal and private letter from me it is replete with "my government." Nor is it my style and both Tack and Torrijos will readily recognize that it is not.

C) It mixes overall US-Panamanian relations which are excellent with Canal Zone-Panamanian relations which are unsatisfactory. We have tried over years to keep two issues separate by naming separate team of Ambassadors to deal with treaty. Treaty issues color all our relations and in final analysis will overwhelm them unless we can resolve issues. But we should continue the effort to keep them separate and maintain best possible relations despite treaty issues.

D) Finally it tends to foreclose President's options to make personal approach later to Panamanian President by having me say now what President will do and by inviting Panamanians to publish President's letter (para 16).

4) I recommend that I call on Foreign Minister to present US reaction informally and as friend to his informal request for support on SC meeting. As overall reaction I could tell him quite frankly that I doubt Ambassador Boyd has thought through the damage proposal for SC meeting in Panama would do to United Nations and to US-Panamanian relations. I would make the points in the letter and leave the points in Spanish and English.

Sayre

139. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, October 18, 1972, 1652Z.

19905. Subject: SC Meeting in Panama. Ref: Paris 19729.²

1. In conversation October 18 on unrelated subjects, Quai Director American Affairs told PolCouns that instructions on possible SC

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN and Panama City.

² Telegram 19729 from Paris, October 17, described an earlier meeting in which the same points were made. (Ibid.)

meeting in Panama were sent to French Embassy Washington on October 17.

2. Essence of message to French Embassy is:

A) Schumann feels he cannot renege on his commitment to Latin Americans to support Latin American initiative to hold SC meeting in Panama. (French working level had not briefed Schumann on possible SC meeting in Panama prior to his September dinner with Latin Americans since “idea had been germinating for about eight months and US reps had not made a particular issue of it.”)

B) Ever since Ambassador’s representation to Schumann on October 5 (Paris 18969),³ French reps in New York and elsewhere have been under strict instructions not to “proselytize” on behalf of Panamanian proposal. French will continue to maintain this “discreet” position.

3. PolCouns commented that while he could appreciate FonMin’s difficulty in renegeing on his commitment to Latin Americans, something more than apparent neutrality of French position was needed in the circumstances. Speaking personally, PolCouns asked Quai Director whether he could consider instructing French reps, without renegeing on Schumann’s promise, to attempt persuade Latin Americans of wisdom in the circumstances of not pressing issue to a vote. Without committing himself, Quai Director said he would look into this possibility.

Watson

³ Document 133.

140. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 24, 1972, 1559Z.

4091. Subj: SC Meeting in Panama.

1. Panamanian PermRep Boyd told Amb Bush at lunch Oct 23 that since Panamanian elections he has been notified he will remain as PermRep and told to continue pressing for SC meeting in Panama. Boyd plans to return to Panama Nov 4 to work out specifics of invita-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Panama City.

tion to Council to meet in Panama including drafting of agenda item and arranging for physical facilities (e.g., translation facilities). One decision to be made in Panama is whether to issue invitation to present SC membership or wait for new Council.

2. Amb Bush reiterated US opposition to meeting. Subsequently Bush had occasion to share Boyd's comments with Italian and UK PermReps. Vinci (Italy) said he had told Boyd present Council not able to bind its successors and thus invitation to present Council would be meaningless. Crowe (UK) reiterated his strong reservations about meeting which include concern about possibility of public demonstrations during meeting.

3. Later in day, Boyd approached Amb Phillips on same subject. He showed Phillips draft "comprehensive" agenda item which referred to problems of LA area without specifying them or identifying any particular focus for SC effort. When Phillips commented on vagueness of language, Boyd asked us to help him improve it. Somewhat nervously and awkwardly, Boyd implied that meeting in Panama was inevitable and that US ought, in its own interest, to come along gracefully and help make exercise fruitful or at least painless. Phillips rejoined that Boyd was putting cart before horse in attempting to invent agenda for meeting that should only take place if appropriate pre-existing agenda items, among other circumstances, made meeting desirable. Boyd reiterated his claim that "most SC members" favored meeting and once again asserted he was doing USG a favor in pressing for meeting that would "condition US public opinion" for fruitful negotiations on Canal issue. (Boyd readily admitted that Canal issue was real point of meeting, and seemed completely nonplussed when Phillips suggested that Boyd ought to bring this intent out into open in NY.)

4. Phillips reiterated US firm opposition to meeting and emphatically told Boyd he was dead wrong in judgment meeting could have beneficial effect on US public opinion. In course of conversation, Phillips also told Boyd that latter seemed to us to be over-estimating level of enthusiasm for meeting in Panama among SC membership and prospective membership.

5. *Comment:* USUN has encouraged Boyd to be open and frank re possible SC meeting in Panama and has made clear its intention to continue to deal frankly with him in context of good personal and official relations between US and Panamanian Dels in NY. We shall continue efforts to induce susceptible present and prospective SC members to attempt discourage Boyd. However, Boyd may have already passed his personal "point of no return", as he has privately asserted he would "lose his credibility" with nationalist regime in Panama should he back down. (Amb Sayre may wish to have heart-to-heart talk with Boyd on latter's return to Panama.) USUN continues to feel that meeting in

Panama under present circumstances would be unfortunate from every point of view and recommends that Dept explore possibility for steps outside UN context to forestall irreversible commitment to meeting by Govt of Panama. In this connection, we have been counseled by two well-disposed LA reps here that at this point private message from "highest level of USG" to Torrijos only possible way to reverse Panamanian momentum. These same LA reps point out, moreover, that little time remains as once Panamanian initiative becomes public knowledge in LA, media pressures will force virtually all LA govts to support initiative.

Bush

141. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, November 1, 1972, 0057Z.

198256. Subj: Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama.

1. We continue to be seriously concerned at prospect of SC meeting in Panama not only, and not even primarily, because of effect such meeting may have on our negotiations with Panama but because of damaging implications for the UN and for the hemisphere generally. We believe it is time that these implications be explained more widely to selected governments so that they can better determine where their own interests lie in this matter.²

2. It is clear to us that if Panamanian proposal were formally made in SC today it would pass; and it is likely that in 1973, when composition of SC is still less favorable to us, it would be even more apt to pass. We have thus decided that our efforts should not be concentrated on mobilizing blocking 7 votes in SC, which is a losing proposition and one that could only antagonize Latin Americans, but that we must try to persuade others that it is in their interest to dissuade Panama. At a

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Routine. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Hurwitch, Rodger P. Davies, Fessenden, Robert W. Moore, and Claude G. Ross; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to USUN, Paris, Canberra, Vienna, Tokyo, Jakarta, Brussels, Rome, Mogadiscio, Conakry, Nairobi, Belgrade, New Delhi, and Khartoum; and repeated to Buenos Aires, Caracas, Bogota, Montevideo, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua, Brasilia, London, Moscow, and Geneva.

² These points were also mentioned in telegrams 4212 and 4213 from USUN, both October 28. (Ibid.)

minimum, the cumulative effect of doubts expressed by others about the wisdom of the idea would improve the chances of our bilateral efforts to get Panama to drop it. Such doubts could be expressed even by SC members that are already pledged to support the Panamanian proposal if it is put forward, and by non-members of SC that have an interest in effective functioning of the SC.

3. For reasons having to do with current state of US-Panama relations which also involve other issues, we do not at this time wish to generate diplomatic campaign in Latin American capitals. USUN should however continue its work on LA delegations, but LA addressee posts may use contents this telegram to make points only if question of Panama SC meeting is raised with them.

4. Leaving aside the bilateral question of the Panama Canal, we think there are persuasive reasons why a meeting in Panama would be undesirable:

A. Meeting is not in interest of effective functioning of Security Council. Charter provides SC shall be organized so as to be able to function continuously in order to be immediately available in case of emergency. Of 15 SC members, only six have resident representatives in Panama. SC reps of other SC members would be seriously handicapped in communicating with their respective governments. This would not just inconvenience them and their govts but could create very serious problems in event of crisis in another area requiring immediate SC consideration and action.

B. No Latin American issues are currently under SC consideration. While an agenda could be contrived under some vague heading, there are legitimate doubts whether this would be proper. Moreover, others could use such precedent in the future to the detriment of the prestige of the SC and for mischievous purposes. If it is said that LA situation could be discussed only in general terms, the answer is that it is not feasible to confine SC discussion to generalities. In practice, specific regional issues are bound to be debated. This would amount to artificial stimulation of debate on subjects not requiring SC attention at this time.

C. There is also general question (more applicable to LA countries) whether it is wise for UN attention to be focused on LA issues in apparent circumvention of the OAS which is existing forum best qualified to discuss them, at least in initial stages. Would not precedent created by airing of LA issues in UN erode status and prestige of OAS and plague that organization at a later time in conflict situations that cannot yet be foreseen? (Note: This is not an argument to be pressed since if Panama asked for OAS endorsement it would probably receive it; but the general argument is valid and should give LA's concern.)

D. While there are no active LA issues on the SC agenda, there are dormant LA issues still formally on the agenda from meetings of past years and these could be raised by any SC member. We cannot believe that their discussion (e.g., the Cuban issue) would be fruitful at this time. If revived, they would probably lead to bitter debate involving US, USSR and PRC which would bring the cold war to Latin America and in which divisions among LA's, too, would be emphasized. (LA countries not on SC, including Cuba and Chile, would of course be entitled to participate in debate on Latin American issues.) We fail to see how this would be to advantage of the UN, or indeed of the majority of LA countries.

E. It is not certain that Panama wishes to use meeting in its capital to focus attention on the Canal issues. While this is what Panamanian Rep in New York freely states, the Panamanian Foreign Minister has told us that purpose is only to enhance the prestige of their country and that they do not intend to press the Canal issue themselves. This raises question whether enhancement of prestige of a SC member is adequate ground for the Council to be moved from headquarters. On other hand, we do not really believe that meeting held in Panama could fail to involve the Canal issue, which is currently under bilateral negotiation, even if host govt wished to avoid discussion. Host govt could easily lose control of this matter to other govts intent on roiling the waters.

F. Whether or not Panama wishes to use the SC venue to influence bilateral negotiations, we thus have general question whether meeting should be held in a capital where bilateral negotiations are bound to be affected. Would this not establish damaging precedent? Many SC members (especially LA republics) have bilateral problems of one kind or another with neighboring countries. It is hard to tell what future SC members might use fortuitous fact that they were on the Council to generate (wittingly or unwittingly) pressure against another country.

G. In short, and leaving aside the aspect of effect of SC meeting in Panama on US-Panama relations, it seems to us that venue would not be beneficial to Panama or the UN itself. In absence of concrete LA issues to debate, discussion would degenerate into broad and general statements along lines of GA debate speeches. If attention were focused on regional issues, debate would be divisive and would produce unhelpful resolution in which outside powers would manipulate Latin American issues that do not need to be discussed. In either case result would not be conducive either to prestige or efficacy of the Security Council whose potential role in preserving world peace should not be downgraded.

5. It is along foregoing lines that we wish action addressee posts, unless they perceive objection, to talk to host govts at appropriately

high level. (We can assume that NY Reps of all present and prospective UN members have already been approached by Panamanians.) It should be noted that we are not lobbying for votes. What we are hoping is that SC members, even those who feel they would have to vote for Panama venue in a showdown, will recommend to Panama that it avoid bringing the matter to a head—or that such countries would at a minimum express their misgivings to Panama. To the extent that USUN can get LA's to weigh in in New York, this is by no means discouraged.

6. There remains of course the aspect of US-Panamanian relations and, specifically, the Canal issue. We do not wish to place any emphasis on that aspect, but when asked posts can state that in our opinion there are prospects for a negotiated solution; we are optimistic about early resumption of the negotiations; and we intend to be flexible and have so told the Panamanians. Our ability to continue flexible and forthcoming posture in negotiations could, however, be seriously jeopardized by an atmosphere of confrontation created by SC discussion of the Canal issue.

7. *For New Delhi.* We appreciate that India is probably not only committed to Panama meeting but unwilling even to voice misgivings to Panama, but leave it to your discretion if our views might be outlined to GOI.

8. *For Mogadiscio, Conakry and Khartoum.* We realize that host govts are unlikely to be helpful and leave to your discretion how far to go in pressing our points. Should the point be made, however, that Africans have already had their SC meeting and it only fair that LA's have one too, you can point out that Addis SC meeting was in response to OAU initiative, that there were active African issues on SC agenda, and that meeting produced evidence of regional unity on those issues. All of these elements are lacking in case of Panama.

Rogers

142. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 8, 1972, 1752Z.

21373. Subj: Possible Security Council Meeting in Panama. Ref: State 198256.²

1. While meeting with Quai SecGen Alphand this afternoon on other subjects (septels), I took occasion to discuss a possible Security Council meeting in Panama. Alphand told me that GOF was in a real bind on this matter, since FonMin Schumann did in fact say “yes” when he was in New York to a request that France support such a meeting.

2. Drawing on reftel, particularly para 4 and its sub-paragraphs, I made case why a meeting in Panama would be undesirable. I explained that we were not lobbying for votes and said what we were hoping for was that France and other Security Council members would recommend that Panama avoid bringing matter to head—or as a minimum express serious misgivings to Panama.

3. During ensuing discussion Alphand wondered aloud whether USG would agree to holding an SC meeting in some other Latin American country besides Panama. He allowed that many of the points I had made would apply elsewhere in L.A. as well but, on other hand, he was seeking some solution that would be accommodating to US and still give Schumann a way out with the L.A.’s. He said he did not know whether Schumann would buy idea, but he thought it was worth exploring if we were amenable. He said France might be able to take a position of supporting such a meeting as a recognition of importance of L.A. with site being elsewhere than Panama. He indicated such a meeting would probably best be held in South American country (he mentioned only Brazil) and that if Panama were not chosen, an SC meeting in Central America, Caribbean or Mexico would probably not be ideal alternate.

4. I explained that Panama initiative was not analogous to earlier SC meeting in Africa and said I did not know whether US would be receptive to his thought about another L.A. location. I promised to sound Department out on this and let him know our reaction.³

Kubisch

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to USUN.

² Document 141.

³ The next day, the Embassy reported that Schumann would not oppose a Security Council meeting elsewhere in Latin America, but felt that he could not advocate another site or reverse France’s commitment to support a meeting in Panama. (Telegram 21434 from Paris, November 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC)

143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, November 10, 1972, 0024Z.

204953. Subject: Possible SC Meeting in Panama. Ref: Paris 21373, 21434.²

1. Appropriate agenda to justify SC meeting any place in LA at this time lacking, not just in case proposed Panama meeting. Therefore while meeting elsewhere in LA might be preferable from US standpoint in strictly bilateral context, from hemispheric standpoint and in UN context, it would present most of same hazards in present circumstances, and would not therefore obviate principal causes of US concern. Moreover, Dept has detected no enthusiasm among LAs generally for SC meeting in their region. While they may be prepared to go along with Panama's desire as evidence hemispheric solidarity, from same standpoint in Dept's view they would be most unlikely wish challenge Panama as site for meeting. Dept therefore does not believe Alphand's suggestion offers practical "out".

2. Alphand's question seems to have been put in desire to find some way to transfer Schumann's commitment to LA's to vote for Panama to some other LA location that would still fulfill the spirit of Schumann's commitment. Please point out to him that at this time we are not so much concerned about France's eventual vote as we are about what France says to Panama. If, without reneging on what Schumann had said to the LA's, France could point out to Panama (not in New York but preferably in Paris or Panama) that it has doubts about the wisdom of holding SC meeting in Panama, that would be helpful action at this time.³

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Routine. Drafted by Herz and Hartley; cleared by Armitage, Fessenden, and Hurwitch; and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN.

² Document 142 and footnote 3 thereto.

³ Chargé Kubisch reported that he had discussed the matter, and Alphand had agreed to raise the matter with Schumann. (Telegram 21607 from Paris, November 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 SC)

144. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 28, 1972, 0001Z.

5027. IO pls repeat present and prospective SC member capitals as appropriate.

Subj: SC meeting in Panama.

1. Panamanian Amb Boyd, who apparently returned unheralded over week-end,² distributed to SC members Nov 27 copy of letter from Panamanian Foreign Affairs Minister Tack to SYG dated Nov 23, informing him that GOP proceeding with plans to invite SC to hold meeting in Panama March 15–21, 1973, and that Panama considering formal invitation to SC during December 1972. Text of letter follows:

2. "I have the honour to inform you that the Govt of Panama is proceeding with its plans to invite the SC to hold its meetings away from headquarters in Latin America. My country would be honoured if it were accepted as the venue for such meetings.

In view of the fact that the great majority of the members of the Council have responded favourably to the preliminary inquiry carried out by our Permanent Representative, we have tentatively considered that the period Wednesday 15 to Tuesday 21 March 1973 would be appropriate and we are studying the political, legal and financial implications which these meetings would have for Panama in order to reach a decision on the presentation of our formal invitation during December 1972.

The Republic of Panama attributes the greatest importance to your visit and the visit of the Security Council to our territory, because it is our hope that, through 'preventive diplomacy', international peace and security will be strengthened and formulas will be found for cooperation and good understanding among our peoples.

I take this opportunity of reiterating, sir, the assurances of my highest consideration."

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Panama City.

² Boyd had left for consultations on November 5. Before his departure, he told a U.S. Mission officer that he had the support of all Security Council members except the United States, Britain, and Australia. Although not discussing the Canal issue "would be like going to church and then not praying," Boyd said he would avoid rhetoric that might complicate negotiations about the Canal. (Telegram 4407 from USUN, November 6; *ibid.*)

145. **Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State**¹

Panama City, December 7, 1972, 2208Z.

5601. Subject: SC Meeting in Panama.

1. At close treaty negotiating sessions December 6, Foreign Minister took Country Director aside to say he wished "put the permanent lid" on any thought that Panama might withdraw from its position. "We will have it," he said, "and you might as well accommodate yourselves to the idea. We will not harass you, and we will not tolerate harassment of you. No matter what Boyd has said, speaking wishfully rather than authoritatively, we want only to increase our international prestige, which is poor. We hope you will come, but if you do not, well, the meeting will still be held. Please get that message across to Washington."

2. Queried on whether Minister's position might be subject to change were United States and Panama to find themselves in midst of full, serious negotiations in late February–March, Tack replied "Not one centimeter, to repeat, we seek only to give a new luster to our image, and the Canal negotiations have nothing whatever to do with the meeting, nor will we allow them to."

3. Other GOP officials have made point in last ten days of suggesting to Country Director that USG and Panama can handle this meeting together so that both will benefit. They even suggested joint planning.

Sayre

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN.

146. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 27, 1972, 2311Z.

5687. Subj: SC Meeting in Panama.

1. While Amb. Boyd told us just before departing for Panama that GOP has not made final decision on whether to invite SC to Panama in March, we believe it prudent to assume for planning purposes that he will return with instructions to proceed with invitation, and will do so via letter to Council and to SYG in January.²

2. Our latest reading is that Panama has eleven firm votes in favor of meeting: her own plus USSR, Yugoslavia, PRC, France, India, Peru, Indonesia and three Africans, as well as probably support of Austria. While Australians earlier this year had voiced unhappiness with meeting, on basis shifts in Australian voting patterns in UN since Labor govt took office, we believe Australia will finally decide side with majority.

3. Amb Boyd recently told MisOff he plans to make “non contentious” request for meeting by suggesting SC consider agenda item “strengthening of peace and security in the world with particular reference to the region” (read Latin America) and by avoiding any reference in invitation to Canal or bilateral relations with US. Boyd said he assumed US would publicly express opposition to meeting by restating arguments which have already appeared in US press—downgrading of Council’s emergency functions, SC members’ lack of communications with their capitals while in Panama, no active LA item on agenda, etc. Boyd hoped US would confine itself to public statement of reservations about meeting’s effect on SC and would not either mention bilateral problems or attempt to pressure SC members in their capitals to switch votes already committed to him. Boyd again assured MisOff that GOP wants to work with USG to “keep meeting in hand” and expressed “personal wish” that US “accept inevitable with good grace.”

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Panama City.

² On January 9, 1973, the Panamanian Government invited the Security Council to meet in Panama City March 15–21, 1973. The Security Council decided to accept the invitation in principle on January 16, and to ask the Committee on Council Meetings Away From Headquarters to submit a report and recommendations about the proposed meeting. The Security Council unanimously approved the Committee’s report and recommendations in Resolution 325 (1973) on January 26.

4. Although Boyd has told Amb. Schaufele he has spoken to Cubans and can prevent extreme Cuban rhetoric, we maintain our skepticism about GOP's ability to keep lid on meeting and fully share Dept's doubts about where it can be pointed in constructive direction. We believe we should put our reservations on the record. Nevertheless we see little to be gained by casting possibly only vote against meeting in Council (British may decide to abstain). Therefore we recommend we be authorized to abstain. Furthermore, we believe that we can cement currently excellent working relationship which now exists between USUN and Amb. Boyd by informing him in advance of our vote. We may well need his help in Panama in obtaining advance information on positions to be taken by other LAs as well as GOP.

5. We would have opportunity later to address various nuts-and-bolts aspects of meeting in SC comite. Meanwhile, we shall be urging SC members, including those which would vote in favor of Panamanian proposal, to put their reservations on record.

Schaufele

UN Finances and Reduction of the U.S. Assessment

147. Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

CA-2230

Washington, April 15, 1969, 2:44 p.m.

SUBJECT

United Nations CY 1970 Budget and CY 1971 Planning Estimate

Ambassador Yost and his British and French colleagues have informed the UN Secretary-General that the three powers, concerned with the rapid increase in the UN budget in recent years, consider that the UN now requires a period of time to review and consolidate existing UN staff and organization. Convinced that budgetary increases for 1970 should be restricted to that amount necessary to maintain the UN at its 1969 level, the three powers consider that any program increases that may be required in 1969, 1970 and for the most part in 1971, should be accommodated by organizational, manpower utilization or other economies resulting from improved management and from retrenchments elsewhere.

It may be anticipated that this effort on the part of the three governments to exert a restraining influence on future UN budget increases will result in adverse reaction from some governments, particularly among the less-developed countries. Accordingly it is in the interest of the effort that its disclosure be avoided insofar and for so long as possible.

For your background information and guidance the text of the three-power memorandum follows:

Memorandum from the Representatives of
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
on
THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET FOR 1970 AND 1971

The three members have noted with concern the growth of the budget in recent years. Moreover, the total of the original submissions plus large additions to them in the form of amendments and supplementary estimates has made review of the budget complex and nearly unmanageable.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10. Confidential. Drafted by Edward W. Lawrence, cleared by Pierre Graham, and approved by Louis E. Frechtling. Sent to the Mission in Geneva, Addis Ababa, Santiago, Rome (FODAG), Paris (UNESCO), Montreal (ICAO), Bangkok (RED), and Vienna (IAEA/UNIDO), and repeated to USUN.

The three members have the opportunity—and frequently take it—to state their views on these matters in the Fifth Committee. By that time, however, the Secretary-General has necessarily become committed to the draft budget presented to the Assembly, and even if he accepts any reductions which the ACABQ may recommend, these tend to be offset by additions made during the course of the Assembly. The three powers therefore consider it desirable to give the Secretary-General the benefit of their thinking at this formative stage on the maximum budget levels which should be provided by the General Assembly for 1970 and 1971.

The last few years have seen a rapid growth in the level of the U.N. budget. In 1969 alone, the increase was over 10%. It is the considered view of the three powers that the United Nations now requires a period of time to review and consolidate existing United Nations staff and organization. They consider that any program increases that may be required in 1969, 1970 and for the most part of 1971, should be accommodated by organizational, manpower utilization or other economies resulting from improved management and retrenchments elsewhere.

After discussion among themselves they have reached the conclusion that—without materially affecting important programs—it should be possible to contain expenditures within a total of 161 million dollars gross in 1970 and 169 million dollars gross in 1971. These figures do not include the amounts which may be required if UNCTAD III is held in 1971, and any additional amounts required for construction in Geneva and New York.

The three members also consider that after these amounts have been approved by the General Assembly they should not be increased during the course of the year by supplementary estimates.

In arriving at these figures, the three members have not sought to quantify individual sections of the budget since they wish to leave the Secretary General the maximum discretion to weigh the many and varied demands on the budget. But they have taken account of the main developments which they foresee. They have not, for example, overlooked such factors as the so-called mandatory increases, the extra cost in subsequent years of staff recruited in 1969, and the cost of expanding accommodation and training facilities. On the other hand, the three members took into account their belief that the desk-by-desk survey of staff, the need for which was agreed unanimously by the Fifth Committee, should produce sizeable economies and that it would be unwise to expand the staff of the Secretariat beyond the 1969 level, while that survey is under way.

They also believe that the recommendations of the Committee of Fourteen, and more recently of the Committee of Seven, to tighten financial control—particularly with respect to unforeseen and

extraordinary expenses—and to achieve economies with respect to conference services and documentation, provide the Secretary General with a unique opportunity. Moreover, if the earlier representations of the major contributors about the potential for savings in the 1969 budget bear fruit, then the Secretary General will, of course, have even more room for maneuver within the figures to which the three members now subscribe.

Rogers

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 20, 1969, 1059Z.

124877. FODAG, IAEA, ICAO, IMCO, UNESCO.

Subject: Appropriation for Assessed Contributions to International Organizations Fiscal Year 1970.

1. Appropriation bill for State and other agencies passed by House July 24 provides full amount requested (\$130 million) for assessed contributions to international organizations but requires that at least \$2.5 million be paid in form of U.S.-owned excess currencies.

2. Dept. will propose to Senate deletion of proviso for contribution of \$2.5 million in excess currencies, noting that USG has through missions recently explored possibilities for contributing excess currencies. At present only prospects reported are \$10,000 to UNESCO and \$10,000 to ICAO as part of Calendar Year 1969 contribution and \$6,000 to Colombo Plan Council (Ceylon). In preparation for Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, Dept. requests addressees to make further inquiries as appropriate with Secretariats and report by August 4.

3. At present U.S. excess currencies are those of Burma, Ceylon, Guinea, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Tunisia, UAR (Egypt), and Yugoslavia. Near excess currencies are those of Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Sudan.

Richardson

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 10–4. Unclassified. Drafted by Sidney S. Cummins and Frechtling; cleared by Graham, Richard W. Murray, and Russell P. Whitener; and approved by Frechtling. Also sent to the Mission in Geneva, Montreal, London, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.

149. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 25, 1969, 2119Z.

2501. UN Budget 1970: ACABQ Action.

1. After careful item by item review of entire budget, US member ACABQ forced to conclude that budget as submitted by SYG is most complete, tightest, and best reasoned budget submitted in last 8 years. SYG has, in US member's opinion, responded fully to USUN's repeated formal and informal pressures for holding budget down: our representations about acceptable level of budget for 1970 were substantially carried into print; and SYG—mainly due to ingeniousness and toughness of Controller Turner—has managed to reluctantly swallow further large (considering tightness of budget) ACABQ cut. Moreover, he has promised to hold further add-ons to minimum (\$0.9 million) which, frankly, will be extremely difficult level to keep within.

2. Examples of super-human toughness include actions on UNIDO, ECA and OPI. UNIDO staff additions were lapsed by some 52.5 percent (80 percent for professionals), including last minute cut of over \$200,000 by SYG which Abdel Rahman loudly shouts violates pledge of SYG to him (earlier reported) to not make further reductions in "an already emasculated amount." Of an ECA approved work program calling for additions of over \$2.0 million to budget, SYG plans to submit only \$43,000 as an add-on for 1970. Internal "review and appraisal" by new head of OPI (Hamid) called for an increase in personnel and operating expenses in 1970 of \$0.9 million and further sums spread over next 3 years of \$1.7 million for radio and television—of which \$0.5 million wld have been in 1970—none of which was allowed for [in] 1970 under SYG's tight budget policy. (Note: SYG has, moreover, agreed to conduct further "independent, but internal" review of entire OPI review and appraisal before submitting his recommendations to GA for action.)

3. Even though SYG reduced by over two-thirds requests for positions made to him, sizeable personnel increases have still been requested for 1970, summarized as follows:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10. Limited Official Use. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva.

Additional Positions Requested, 1970

	Professional	General Service, Local and Manual	Total
Established posts	31	43	74
Provisional staffing requirements	100	134	234
Total	131	177	308

Recap: Related to 1969 Request
Section 3

Restoration of reductions in 1969	52	77	129	166
Additional requests in 1970	28	33	61	142
Total	80	110	190	308

Permanent posts requested are for situations (library, HICOM for Refugees, and Geneva conference staff) where there seemed to be little alternative to granting most of them. With respect to provisional posts, \$1,335,500 credit was requested for both salaries and common staff costs. (This amount was further reduced by advisory comite by \$197,000.) Moreover, SYG has requested this credit and advisory comite agreed with express understanding: that all presently authorized posts, including vacancies, will be fully utilized first; that provisional staffing requirement request is merely indication of maximum number of posts, by office, which SYG wld be prepared to allocate if he satisfies himself of need after survey; and that SYG will administer manning table on consolidated basis. (Note: It appears that by working informally with UN Controller we may have succeeded in getting SYG pledge of sounder manpower administration program, than one on which we were soundly defeated at last GA. LDC's bound to react adversely, but probably go along in final analysis.)

Budget Summary Data

4. Original budget estimates as submitted by SYG for 1970 totalled \$164.1 million. SYG estimates that additions before end GA will bring this total to \$165.0 million. ACABQ decrease from original estimates is \$1.3 million (\$1,256,600), a reduction of original estimates to \$162.9 million which, if SYG add-ons correct, wld bring budget appropriations for 1970 to about \$163.8 million. (Note: These figures exclude any new amounts for construction at Santiago and Headquarters, but only minor amounts likely be needed in 1970 in any event.)

5. Income estimates for 1970, as revised by ACABQ, total \$28.7 million, which assuming \$163.8 million figure above is correct for finally authorized expenditures, wld result in assessment budget of \$135.1 million. U.S. assessment budget wld, of course, be on basis of this figure, plus \$18,928,000 for staff assessment income, or \$154.0 million total. (*Comment:* For purpose of computing US appropriation request, amount of our bond repayment for 1970 plus our share of "surplus" wld be deducted. Total bond repayments for 1970 are estimated at \$8,738.00, surplus at \$700,127, of which \$252,443 wld be applied to respective shares of tax equalization fund.)

6. Comparing 1969 appropriation (\$154.9) with ACABQ allowances on 1970 original estimates (\$162.9) this is increase of \$8.0 million, or 5.2 percent. Of this amount, over \$6.0 million (or some 4 percent) is for "unavoidable" costs, mainly for higher salaries, wages, and other costs, plus annualization of personnel increases granted for 1969. The "program increase" is remaining \$2.0 million (or some 1.2 percent).

7. Another benchmark comparison can be made with "4-power" figure we had proposed to give to SYG, namely \$162.2 million (which also excluded construction). (Note: \$161.0 compromise figure to bring USSR aboard was never truly realistic or viable figure, since it wld have required program reductions.) Dept will recall \$162.2 million included 1 percent program increase; however, our estimates were low on cost of "unavoidables", or SYG's original estimate figures wld be roughly in line. To this must be added about \$0.9 million SYG expects to submit during GA.

8. For US appropriation purposes, there two key additional facts which affect amount to be requested from Congress. 1969 total surplus available for credit (from 1967) was \$3,280,256, whereas 1970 surplus (from 1968) is only \$700,127. In addition, SYG currently estimates 1969 supplementaries at \$2.3 million, although he qualifies this based on past experience by saying "it wld not be unreasonable to expect a final year-end position which wld reflect a shortfall of something less." Both of these increase our congressional request, although, taken year by year, real increase in UN budget for 1970 over 1969 wld be lesser percent than reflected in para 6.

9. In opinion of US member ACABQ, possibility of effecting any further reduction in 1970 budget not within realm possibility. In fact, US be extremely lucky if this budget can be held in view expected strong reaction to big-4 initiative; trouble Abdel Rahman likely stir up; anticipated concern of LDC's to highly-lapsed, provisional post concept tied to manpower survey; and tightness of budget per se.

Buffum

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 29, 1969, 2032Z.

165086. Subject: U.S. Position on UN Budgets for 1970 and 1971. Ref: (A) USUN 1385,² (B) USUN 2748,³ (C) USUN 2753,⁴ (D) London 6906.⁵

1. In light of U.S. budgetary objectives, and particularly, growing Congressional discontent with ever increasing U.S. assessments, upward spiral of international organizations' budgets including that of UN is problem which, if not alleviated or contained, threatens to produce situation which could seriously affect our relations with these organizations. Provision in the appropriations bill passed by House requiring \$2.5 million of U.S. contribution to be made in excess currencies is signal not to be ignored. In this situation, despite progress made to date, we must continue our efforts to hold down budget allocations and effect economies wherever feasible. To do so is not only important from viewpoint of our future relations with organizations but also makes good sense in terms of strengthening effectiveness and efficiency of organizations themselves.

2. Taking into account SYG initial estimates amounting to \$164.1 million, ACABQ recommended reductions of \$1.3 million and probable add-ons of \$2.2 million. We foresee 1970 expenditure budget of \$165.0 million for 1970, an increase of about \$10 million or 6.5 percent over last year's expenditure budget. Owing to decrease in offsetting income and adjustments including, particularly, a greatly reduced amount available in 1968 surplus account as opposed to amount available last year in 1967 surplus account, amount assessed against members in 1970 will increase by \$13.3 million or 9.3 percent over comparable 1969 figure (1969 assessment—\$143.2 million; 1970 projected assessment—\$156.5 million).

3. Although we are well aware that projected increase in expenditure budget of 6.5 percent is low as compared with previous years

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 10. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Edward W. Lawrence; cleared by Ralph S. Roberts, Paul W. Jones, Fox (BOB), and John W. McDonald; and approved by Ward P. Allen. Repeated to London, Vienna for IAEA, and the Mission in Geneva.

² Dated May 8. (Ibid.)

³ Dated August 22. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegram 2753, August 22, asked for U.S. budgetary objectives before the Four-Power representatives met to discuss the next UN budget. (Ibid., UN 10–1)

⁵ Dated August 29. (Ibid., UN 10)

(1969 increase over 1968 was 10.3 percent), increase in amount we must request from Congress estimated at \$4.2 million or 10.2 percent over last year will pose very real problem for U.S. at a period when Executive Branch is making every effort economize and in view of sentiment of Congress against rapid increase in costs represented by our contributions to international organizations.

4. Initial estimates for 1970, SYG foreword to these estimates and line of thinking expressed by Turner regarding 1971 planning levels (Ref B) all appear reflect atmosphere of improved budgetary restraint, achievement of which was main purpose of Four Power approach. Although SYG estimates even as reduced by ACABQ recommendations exceed target figure of \$161 million set by Four Powers, and further add-ons must be anticipated, approach has apparently been effective in relation to Secretariat and may even have limited restraining influence on the program formulating bodies. Moreover \$161 million target figure was based on somewhat inadequate information.

5. We agree that we are not tied to other three governments for or against any particular budget level for 1970 (Ref C). However we are persuaded that fundamental element in whatever success approach has enjoyed to date has been image of Big Four solidarity, and that it desirable continue convey strong sense of concern of four major contributors re need for economical budgetary approach. In furthering measures proposed (Ref A) believe you should also endeavor bring Western Group and other like-minded delegations into picture.

6. We agree that SYG has made what appears to be brave effort to curtail expansive tendencies of commissions and subordinate bodies and merits commendation by U.S. delegation for this endeavor. However, in light overall need for greatest possible savings and in interest of maintaining atmosphere of economy and good management, not just as one or two year phenomenon, but as continuing feature of UN growth and development, we must persevere in our efforts to seek cost reductions wherever they may be found and to avoid supporting excessive increases.

7. As we pointed out in our last year's communication on 1969 budget (State 261339),⁶ we are fully cognizant of problem posed by efforts to make reductions below those recommended by ACABQ. On one hand, going beyond ACABQ recommended may tend to emphasize non-aligned nature of ACABQ as group of experts and thus strengthen general acceptance of its recommendations. On other hand if developed countries start criticizing or rejecting ACABQ's recommendations, it might not be long before LDCs do same. Therefore U.S. will support ACABQ's recommendations for 1970 as basic point of

⁶ Dated October 24, 1968. (Ibid.)

position while taking advantage of realistic opportunities for further reductions consistent with ACABQ viewpoints.

8. We remain convinced that savings are to be found in area of conferences and documentation and we should make every effort seek adoption of recommendations of Committee of Seven as best way to achieve this end.

9. Certainly in discussions with other three caution must be exercised to avoid compromising our ultimate freedom of decision. In final analysis U.S. position may be influenced by number of factors not yet known or evaluated including amount and nature of additions, 1971 planning estimate, Assembly action on report of Contributions Committee, negotiations with respect to Headquarters expansion and possibly other issues. Therefore you may adhere closely to position contained in paragraph 3 of (Ref C) except that you should avoid any indication of how we might vote for budget above \$161 million level.

10. Subject to outcome of initial talk with UK, you are authorized use above views as basis for Big Four discussions.

11. Regarding 1971 planning estimates you should discuss with other three measures which might be taken to insure these be kept within acceptable limits, indicating we wish defer decision about possible approach to SYG until we have clearer indications his thinking this regard and are able assess likely Fifth Committee action on 1970 estimates.

Richardson

151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 17, 1969, 2038Z.

3645. Subj: UN Scale of Assessments.

1. Yesterday Da Mota (Brazil–Chairman Fifth Comite) asked to meet with MisOff to discuss action to be taken by Fifth Comite on report of Comite on Contributions.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 8–4. Confidential.

2. Da Mota produced draft res, which he asked MisOff examine, saying he could not presently give him copy. Draft res contained fol important paras:

(A) Preambular para quoting from Para 38 of report Comite on Contributions to effect that Comite noted "that in the light of other directives of the Assembly, further reductions in the assessment of the largest contributor from 31.57 percent to reach the level of 30 percent prescribed under its present terms of reference may not be appropriate in the present circumstances."

(B) Operative para directing Comite on Contributions to increase maximum allowances for low per capita income countries from 50 percent to 60 percent.

(C) Operative para authorizing Comite on Contributions to increase percentage assessment of highest contributor if it found this necessary to enable it make other necessary adjustments in scale.

3. Da Mota stated that operative para C had been proposed by someone other than himself and he believed there was chance secure deletion this para if US could support balance of res.

4. MisOff informed Da Mota that draft res was totally unacceptable even if para C deleted. Restated US position it would oppose any res which affected its present ceiling position, including right of US have its contribution reduced to 30 percent. Da Mota replied that, assuming para C deleted from draft res, it would not affect ceiling position of US since it would result in no increase in US percentage and further would have no effect on possible decrease in US percentage since there was no real possibility that either Comite on Contributions or Fifth Comite would support any further decrease in US contribution percentage at this time. He believed that realistically US should be happy if it could avoid having its percentage increased.

5. MisOff also stressed danger that res would inevitably result in reduction of floor percentage below .04 percent. Da Mota said that he did not believe that this was case and there was no movement at present time for decrease in floor percentage. He added, if and when such decrease occurred, resulting impact would have be absorbed completely by countries other than low per capita income countries.

6. At conclusion discussion, Da Mota said he was sorry US could not accept his suggestion because he was certain that draft res would be tabled and thought it very likely would contain para C, which he personally was willing delete. He also stated we should recognize he personally would not participate in handling draft res since as Chairman Fifth Comite it would be inappropriate for him be involved.

7. In course of discussion Da Mota mentioned Mexico and Pakistan as two other countries involved with Brazil in this effort. Accordingly, MisOff spoke to Shahi (Pakistan) re matter and pointed out

serious situation which would arise if res tabled along lines that produced by Da Mota. Shahi said Yunus (Pak) had asked for authority co-sponsor res “in order to isolate us” but that Shahi had instructed him not to co-sponsor. Later Yunus informed MisOff Shahi had merely instructed him not to co-sponsor at present time but to await developments.

8. MisOff also spoke to Amjad Ali (India–Chairman of Comite on Contributions) re matter and informed him of US views. Ali professed ignorance of proposed draft res but commented he realized proposal of low per capita income countries would affect contribution highest contributor.

Yost

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 21, 1969, 2305Z.

178547. Subject: UN Scale of Assessments. Ref: USUN’s 3338,² 3534,³ 3511⁴ and 3645.⁵

1. Developments with respect to forthcoming Fifth Committee consideration of Contributions Committee report and increasing prospects of effort to eliminate or alter ceiling concept and to raise U.S. assessment, (reftels) bring us to conclusion that intervention by U.S. PermRep directly with PermReps of key missions in New York may be necessary.

2. We share USUN unwillingness to accept deal such as offered by Da Mota and reported USUN 3645. We unable to see how decision to increase allowance for low capita income from 50 to 60%, as proposed by para. 23c of Committee report can fail to lead to increased U.S. assessment, particularly in light of paras. 23d and 38 of report. In absence of assurance that a workable alternative can be developed which would stand good chance of success, we convinced we must

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 8–4. Confidential. Drafted by Edward W. Lawrence, cleared by Ward P. Allen and Frechtling, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Dated October 1. (Ibid.)

³ Dated October 10. (Ibid.)

⁴ Dated October 9. (Ibid.)

⁵ Document 151.

continue (para 4 of USUN 3511) concert with other major contributors in position that there should be no change in Committee's guidelines and no increase in allowances for low per capita income.

3. As pointed out in position paper SD/A.5.626 an increase in U.S. assessment rate would be completely unacceptable to both Executive and Legislative Branches. Taking into account provisions in current appropriations bill requiring \$2.5 million of U.S. contribution be made in excess currencies, it not unrealistic to foresee more serious stricture placed on future contributions, particularly if U.S. is increasingly taxed by international organizations not only on basis higher budgets but also through higher proportionate share of assessments.

4. In addition to high level approaches by USUN, we would appreciate Mission's comments as to usefulness and possible nature of approach through U.S. Embassies to key countries. Also we prepared call in representatives here if considered desirable.

Rogers

153. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 22, 1969, 2216Z.

3719. Subj: Scale of Assessments. Ref: USUN 3716.²

1. We were informed by Meyer Picon (Mexico) he expected draft res which would direct Comite on Contributions increase maximum reduction for low per capita income countries from 50 percent to 60 percent would be sponsored by six LDC dels having reps on Comite on Contributions plus Mexico.

2. Accordingly, yesterday we approached reps of Dem Rep of Congo, Iran, and Peru, and they agreed withhold sponsorship, at least for time being. We had received similar assurances earlier from Pakistan.

3. This afternoon Buffum saw Fakhreddine (Sudan), explained strength of US opposition to opening up assessment issue, and urged he not sponsor res. Fakhreddine said he was sorry but had already agreed both sponsor and introduce res. He added he understood countries mentioned above would also sponsor. When we informed him our

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10-4. Confidential.

² Telegram 3716, October 22, transmitted the text of the draft resolution. (Ibid.)

understanding of position Congo, Iran, Pakistan, and Peru, Fakhredine said that, if this true, he would have to reassess position because he did not wish to be only one of three sponsors. Said he would look into situation and hoped meet with us tomorrow.

4. It clear our best tactic is attempt avoid tabling draft res, and accordingly we will discuss matter with reps Brazil and Mexico.

5. Hope tomorrow be able make judgment whether Dept should go to capitals re this matter.

6. GADel liaison officers have been briefed re this matter and will attempt convince potential beneficiaries of LDC res to go along with “no change” policy and will also attempt sell this policy to floor countries.

7. Yesterday both France and USSR expressed concern that LDC draft res had now dropped para which would authorize increase in US percentage contribution. They said they suspected US prepared make “deal” with LDCs to protect its ceiling. Threatened that, if US did not succeed in avoiding tabling or in defeating LDC res, they would denounce US “deal” with LDCs and would propose increase in US assessment percentage. Viaud (France) also stated such result would mean end of further cooperation between US and France on administrative and budgetary questions.

8. MisOff told reps of France and USSR that US Del doing its best to prevent any change in criteria for establishing scale of assessments and did not appreciate threats re this matter. Said he saw no evidence that France and USSR were making efforts to defeat LDC res and that they were apparently quite content that US assume responsibility for defeat of res. French and USSR reps appeared convinced of sincerity US position as result Congressman Fascell’s general debate statement in Fifth Comite and agreed they would work to secure votes against LDC res.

9. In conversations with French and USSR reps, it appeared be their position that, even if LDC res defeated, US would have expect no reduction at all in its contribution in immediate future. MisOff said this was not consistent with 1957 res and would not be accepted by US. Will try arrange four-power mtg this entire subject tomorrow in order be certain uniformity of views on part all four.

Yost

154. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 24, 1969, 2328Z.

3774. Subject: UN Scale of Assessments.

1. Yost has informed Perm Reps of Brazil, Mexico and Peru of US position this matter with fol results.

2. Brazil noncommittal but said would look into matter.

3. Mexico and Peru said would not cosponsor res providing additional maximum reduction for low per capita income countries but would probably vote for it if tabled.

4. Faura (Peru) informed Da Mota (Brazil) of Peruvian decision not cosponsor and found Da Mota quite depressed at present situation. Faura said he did not believe Peru would have vote for res if tabled.

5. Shahi (Pakistan) informed MisOff his del would not cosponsor and he would endeavor convince Da Mota not table res.

6. Sadry (Iran) said Vakil seeking instructions and had suggested to FonOff Iranian Del vote for res if tabled since it would save Iran money. Sadry felt certain Iran would not cosponsor.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10-4. Confidential.

155. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 28, 1969, 0001Z.

3788. Subj: UN Scale of Assessments.

1. MisOff informed by Da Mota (Brazil) today that he has decided not to introduce res calling for increased reduction for low per capita income countries. He said, as result of US approaches and pressure, his potential cosponsors had decided not to join him in such res and that he had "lost enthusiasm" for it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 10-4. Confidential.

2. We, Soviets, and some WEs plan speak on item tomorrow or Wed in favor continuation existing guidelines and against further reduction for low per capita income countries. Copy of draft US statement pouched Hennes (OIA) tonight.

3. There remains problem of how to dispose of item. We discussed this at mtg with WEs this afternoon, and consensus was we should settle for Comite decision “noting report of Comite on Contributions” and for para in Fifth Comite report reflecting views stated in debate. It was considered this course of action preferable to tabling draft res reflecting our views, which might draw unacceptable amendments which would be difficult to defeat.

4. Would appreciate Dept’s comments soonest since we may have take final action on item as early as tomorrow afternoon.²

Yost

² The Department replied later that day that it agreed with the Western European consensus. “Objective should be that statement in Fifth Committee report not change in any way existing General Assembly guidelines to Committee on Contributions.” (Telegram 182186 to USUN, October 28; *ibid.*)

156. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 6, 1969, 2355Z.

4029. Subj: UN Scale of Assessments.

1. There now appears the general agreement in Comite re two final paras of report to be made by Fifth Comite on item 78—scale of assessments for apportionment of expenses of UN: report of Comite on Contributions. Text of these paras, including Mexican amendments proposed this morning, telephoned Hennes/OIA today. Pursuant Allen/Bender telecon, US Del will vote for these paras.

2. This morning additional proposed “decision” para circulated by Dels of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom. Purpose this para is to have it mentioned in report along with other proposals and to balance earlier twelve-power proposal. Like other pro-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 10–4. Confidential.

posals, it will not be put to vote. Text four-power proposal also telephoned Hennes/OIA today.

3. After four-power proposal formally introduced tomorrow morning, US Del will make statement indicating that proposal in accord with US views. US Del will state further that it remains position of US that existing guidelines, including ceiling principle, should be maintained and respected.²

Yost

² The Department replied that USUN should support the text proposed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and should make every effort to have the U.S. position on a ceiling reflected in the Fifth Committee report. (Telegram 188134 to USUN, November 6; *ibid.*)

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 2, 1970, 1550Z.

47999. Subject: U.S. Position on UN Budget for CY 1971. Ref: USUN 483.²

1. At April 2 Four Power meeting (USUN 483) you should indicate that we intend approach SYG on '71 budget and will wish to exchange information concerning it with other delegations in hope they will take similar positions with SYG. However, we believe concerted approaches are unnecessary and prefer concept of individual approaches by concerned and responsible delegations, including but not necessarily limited to major donors, rather than joint Four Power effort.

2. You should see SYG soonest, explain present USG and Congressional concern at rate of growth of UN budget and express strong hope that any increase in initial estimates for 1971 be limited to what is absolutely essential. You should point to possibility of proposals for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-1. Confidential. Drafted by Edward W. Lawrence; cleared by Ward P. Allen, Joseph F. Donelan, Louis E. Frechtling, and Strait (BOB); and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Vienna and the Mission in Geneva.

² Telegram 483, March 20, mentioned, among other things, that the Soviet representative at a Big Four meeting proposed that the Permanent Representatives of the Big Four should inform the Secretary-General that the 1969 Four-Power note set a \$169 million budget ceiling for 1971. (*Ibid.*)

new initiatives at next GA resulting from 25th Anniversary and Second Development Decade, which may well call for some budgetary increases, and to need to forego expansion of organization and staff pending delineation such initiatives and their financial implications.

3. Re possible post increases for 1971, you should express strong hope that these be kept to absolute minimum for reasons mentioned in paragraph 2 above. They should be limited to those additional posts specifically recommended by manpower survey which hopefully will be offset by reductions which we assume will also be forthcoming from survey for those parts of Secretariat it finds overstaffed. You should take position that results of manpower survey should be fully and strictly applied so that Member Governments have confidence that there exists a satisfactory basis for further development of Organization. You should express view that SYG will be in much better position to assess real needs of Organization in terms of additional posts after he takes into account decisions of next GA and after entire manpower survey has been completed.

4. You should point out that, apart from any post increases as discussed in paragraph 3, we would foresee a 1971 budget submission by SYG which would provide for only a minimum of increases. We believe that SYG should limit such increases to following:

(a) about 5 per cent (\$8.4 million) increase for higher wages and prices in 1971 and for full funding in 1971 of 1970 provisional posts, but we believe a portion of price and wage increases can and should be absorbed;

(b) \$3.0 million for construction costs in Geneva and New York;

(c) \$0.5 million for UN International School; and

(d) \$2.0 million for non-recurring conference costs. Should UNCTAD III be deferred until 1972, these conference costs could be reduced to \$1.0 million. Moreover we would hope SYG will be able to recommend the elimination or reduction of obsolete or low priority activities the savings from which would offset in part some of the increases above.

5. Following four power discussion you should inform other like-minded and responsible delegations of our position in such detail and in accordance with such schedule as you think appropriate and you should urge those found to be sympathetic to our viewpoint to make similar though not necessarily identical approaches to SYG in support this general concept.

6. In support this approach we agree that USUN officers should work closely with Controller and his staff on continuing basis to make certain that they take fully into account all reasonable possibilities for holding 1971 estimate to minimum (including for example reductions in documentation costs).

Rogers

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 18, 1970, 0331Z.

57999. Subject: Committee on Contributions.

1. We agree with Ambassador Finger's intention to seek reduction in U.S. percentage contribution during forthcoming session Committee on Contributions. We compute average U.S. reduction each three year period since adoption of 30 percent-ceiling-resolution 1137(XII) at 0.44 percent. Negotiated reduction half-way between that figure and no increase would be 0.22 percent, which coincidentally is average U.S. reduction achieved over last two scales, those adopted in 1964 and 1967. In view of strong sentiment in Fifth Committee last year in favor of increasing relief to certain developing countries, we would be very satisfied if Ambassador Finger could obtain Contributions Committee recommendation of U.S. reduction of at least 0.22 percent for 1971-73 scale and if U.S. Delegation to 25th General Assembly could get such a recommendation adopted.

2. The U.S. strongly opposes the position taken by some members of Contributions Committee last year that a reduction in the U.S. assessment "may not be appropriate in the present circumstances." Moreover under no circumstances could U.S. agree to any increase whatsoever over its present 31.57 percent figure. Not only would such an increase be intolerable in terms of its jeopardizing ceiling principle and increasing our contribution to the United Nations, but percentage increase would be adopted by Specialized Agencies to raise U.S. contributions to those organizations also.

3. Despite expert nature of Committee, we are prepared consider supporting in capitals foregoing positions taken by Ambassador Finger whenever Mission so recommends.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential. Drafted by Richard V. Hennes; cleared by Frechtling, Fox, and Donelan; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

159. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons)¹

Washington, June 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Congressional Action on Administration's UN Requests

I am passing along to you a copy of a memorandum to the President from Ambassador Yost in New York, who expresses concern over the fate of two Administration bills in Congress in support of the UN.² One is the requested \$100 million appropriation for the UN Development Program (the UN's principal organ for multilateral economic aid) and the second is the requested \$20 million authorization and appropriation for the US share of financing the expansion of the UN headquarters in New York. Ambassador Yost asks for White House assistance, including the President's personal intervention, to obtain early favorable action on both these measures.

I agree with Ambassador Yost that these measures are important. Since this is the UN's 25th anniversary year, and since the President will likely want to participate in celebrations that will be going on in New York this September, this would be an inopportune time for the US to show signs of flagging in its support for the UN. Also, U Thant will be the President's guest at a dinner at the White House on July 10 in honor of the 25th anniversary of the UN Charter, and it might be helpful if there were at least some indication of the President's continued concern for the UN by then.

The UNDP appropriation request is the major item in one account (International Organizations and Programs) of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act. The House cut the total foreign aid request by \$537 million and this particular account by more than \$37 million. This means that the U.S. contribution to UNDP could be little more than \$62 million. Compared to last year's contribution of \$86 million, this reduction would threaten the credibility of the President's announced commitment to increased multilateralism by appearing to indicate a serious decline in U.S. support for UN development efforts. Thus it is important that some action be taken, but this must be considered in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV. Confidential. A June 19 memorandum from Lord and Rodman to Kissinger indicates that they drafted the memorandum to Timmons as well as the response to Yost. (Ibid.)

² Yost's June 12 memorandum to the President is attached but not printed.

the broader context of strategy on the foreign aid appropriation bill as a whole. If an expression of Presidential concern (including mention of the UNDP) seems appropriate, it probably would be most effective at the time of the Senate–House conference, since the McGee appropriations subcommittee will likely restore the full amount for the UNDP. Conceivably, the amount could be raised further. For now, I believe that the forthcoming foreign aid message, which will probably include special mention of UNDP, should be enough.

On the UN headquarters bill, the only action so far has been a favorable report on the authorization from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This bill is now taking on some importance internationally: There are strong pressures within the UN to shift major portions of the UN Secretariat to Geneva, and there is danger that the absence of an assured US contribution by the time of the General Assembly session this autumn will undermine support within the UN for expansion in New York. Ambassador Yost believes that such movement away from New York would seriously reduce US influence over UN operations. Even if the plan is not abandoned, further delay in making our contribution means escalating construction costs.

You may know that the President was skeptical last fall about the desirability of taking any risks for the headquarters bill. In the meantime, however, he has cited it in his Foreign Policy Report as an example of America's support of the UN. In view of the Thant dinner and the UN anniversary activities, the President does have a stake in showing his continuing interest in the bill.

These items may not be of the highest priority on your agenda, but perhaps this information will be helpful to you.

I am informing Ambassador Yost that I have passed his memorandum on to you.³

³ Kissinger's response to Yost is dated June 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV)

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 8, 1970, 2042Z.

108379. Subject: UN Deficit. Ref: USUN 1360.²

Mission authorized inform SYG as follows:

(a) We consider it essential that serious efforts to solve deficit problem be initiated at earliest possible opportunity but at same time wish to avoid premature effort that might prove abortive during 25th GA.

(b) We favor attempt achieve overall solution of deficit problem in order avoid accumulation new or additional deficit in near future.

(c) We believe that solution must be one considered to be in interest of organization as whole; accordingly, it can be arrived at only if vast majority of member states prepared support.

(d) We willing participate in effort arrive at solution and, if the other principal powers, especially the Soviet Union and France, prove willing to make significant and commensurate contributions, we would consider appropriate contribution to solution. Nature and level our contribution would depend upon nature of proposed solution, willingness other member states to contribute, and Congressional approval.

(e) We believe best approach to negotiation of solution is to have forthcoming GA appoint outstanding individual having confidence all parties to conduct negotiations looking to agreed solution by the 26th GA.

(f) We suggest that appropriate negotiator might be next Pres of GA, viz. Hambro (Norway), after next GA session has been completed. We, of course, are open to any other suggestions SYG may wish make re individuals who might serve as negotiator.

(g) If SYG agrees Hambro would be appropriate negotiator, believe would be helpful if he (SYG) made such recommendation to GA. If SYG prefers, Scandinavian group might be persuaded make such proposal to GA.³

Johnson

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10. Confidential. Drafted by Lawrence; cleared by Nathan A. Pelcovits, Allen, and Frechtling; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² In telegram 1360, June 30, Yost outlined what he intended to ask Thant; for example, whether he intended to explore possible Soviet contributions to reduce the UN deficit during a forthcoming visit to Moscow. Yost also suggested that the General Assembly appoint an “outstanding individual having confidence all parties to conduct negotiations.” (Ibid.)

³ On July 9 Yost discussed the proposal in this paragraph with Thant, who agreed to consider it. (Telegram 1446 from USUN, July 10; *ibid.*)

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 20, 1970, 0108Z.

172334. Subject: US Position on 1971 Budget.

1. SYG's October 5 address to Fifth Committee on 1971 budget must be commended for courage and forthrightness.² Seems apparent from his remarks that earlier approaches of U.S. and other major contributors made significant impression on SYG. We support in full his recommendations for reductions in budget.

2. Stringent U.S. budgetary policies require that we seek maximum possible reductions. Moreover growing Congressional disenchantment with international organizations a matter of record. \$2.5 million excess currency requirement FY 1970 and 1971 appropriations may presage strong Congressional reaction to sharp increase in UN assessment associated with budget level now forecast. Although reduction in appropriation for ILO resulted from other than budgetary considerations, precedent of these Congressional actions should not be overlooked.

3. U.S. cannot accept \$200 million budget. We applaud and support SYG's proposals for \$7 million reduction in budget by acceptance ACABQ reductions, cutting back on new construction and freezing staff at authorized 1970 level. Result of such reductions would bring budget down to about \$193 million according SYG's calculations. However we believe there are other areas of budget where further cuts can be effected. Immediate goal is to bring budget down to \$188-\$190 million without impairing essential UN programs.

4. As heretofore, U.S. will support ACABQ recommendations for reductions in initial and revised budget estimates. Although we wish avoid undercutting of ACABQ recommendations, we would seize upon ACABQ observations or comments which may provide basis for further budget reductions.

5. Prime target for cut, in addition reductions proposed by SYG and ACABQ, is proposed 8% pay raise which SYG supports. As indicated CA-5259³ we do not support 8% figure particularly in view of anomalies apparent in ICSAB study. If raise held to 5% a further \$3.3

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Confidential. Drafted by Patrick T. O'Connor; cleared by Allen, Paul W. Jones, Frechtling, John W. McDonald, Fox, and Richard W. Murray; and approved by Allen. Repeated to Vienna and the Mission in Geneva.

² Printed in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 73, document A/C.5/1309.

³ Dated October 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10)

million could be cut from budget. If cut to 5% fails, we will send further instructions.

6. Second goal is to maximize absorption within existing appropriations of costs resulting from inflation and/or new and expanded programs plus reduction of conferences and documentation expenditures for a further saving of \$1.5 million.

7. Progress made in reducing documentation should be commended but redoubling of effort in this direction imperative. Convinced that progress in reducing documentation can be met only on basis Draconian measures, US Del should propose reduction of \$1.0 million in appropriations for this purpose. One particularly soft spot is \$700,000 item for documentation for 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment. A further proportionate reduction should be absorbed in area of conference services. Recommended increase of \$522,000 for temporary assistance for augmented Geneva meetings schedule and 26th GA appears excessive and should be questioned. Schedule of conferences and meetings should be stretched out so bodies meet less frequently, not only for purpose of economy, but, even more importantly, to enable both secretariat and member states to prepare adequately for each session. Greater recourse should be made to approval of measures by mail poll or consultation with resident delegations as means of reducing agendas and duration and frequency of meetings. A more pointed effort is needed on part of substantive committees to restrict number of conferences held away from headquarters. U.S. should oppose reconstituting Committee on Conferences unless it can be given adequate authority to be effective and its terms of reference so written as to ensure that its basic purpose is to reduce the number, frequency, duration and costs of conferences.

8. The prospect of UN budget bordering on \$200 million dramatically underscores need for strictest economies and for review and reorganization of budgetary and programming procedures. Proposals for budget reform which SYG will present to GA should receive careful attention. In addition possibility should be explored of reconstituting Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine Finances of UN and Specialized Agencies (Committee of 14) and charging it with responsibility for recommending ways in which greater order can be introduced in terms of establishment of priorities, program budgeting, and coordination with other UN agencies and programs, as well as establishment of more comprehensive means of inspection and evaluation of UN system. (This proposal to be discussed in greater detail under Agenda Item 80.)

9. US Del should strongly emphasize importance of manpower survey and of adherence to AMS recommendations as integral part of effort to restore confidence in UN. Believing that SYG and staff must give fullest cooperation to ACABQ in its inquiries re budgetary im-

plications of surveys, we welcome Oct. 8 announcement of USYG Stark that SYG will provide Committee with full report on personnel policy recommended by AMS manpower survey.

10. US Del may support ACABQ recommended draft resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures, which would continue same procedure for such expenditures as follows in past.

11. As heretofore, US Del should consult with members Big Four and other like-minded delegations to extent possible to seek concerted action for budgetary restraint.

Irwin

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 28, 1971, 2134Z.

73021. Subject: U.S. Assessment Rate in UN. Ref: USUN 887.²

1. We agree that present circumstances not propitious for launching campaign to reduce U.S. assessment rate in UN to 25 percent. Nor do we intend at this time to publicize ultimate desirability of reducing U.S. assessment rate in specialized agencies to 25 percent and below. Nevertheless we may face need to comment on recommendation of Lodge Commission that, while affirming its intention to maintain and increase its total contribution to the UN, the U.S. seek over a period of years to reduce its share of the assessed UN budget to 25 percent. Commission has linked U.S. reduction to redistribution of responsibilities as new UN members with sizable assessment rates (e.g., Federal Republic of Germany) come in.

2. If queried about Commission's recommendation you may respond: We understand the Commission to be talking about a future goal. While we want to study the particulars and have no present plan to obtain a UN assessment reduction to a specific level, the US will of course expect a significant reduction in its assessment rate as new members are admitted. Mission can explain that this is exactly what U.S. is

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential. Drafted by Hennes and Pelcovits, cleared by Allen and Robert L. Yoder, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Dated April 7. (Ibid., AV 3 ICAO)

doing in ICAO in effort to get fair U.S. share of reductions in assessment rates resulting from Soviet adherence. If ICAO discussions become known in New York, Mission can further note that reduction U.S. is presently seeking in ICAO is to vicinity of 26.5 percent.³

3. While we recognize difficulties, we have concluded that our long range goal should be to bring U.S. assessment rate closer to what is appropriate to organizations based on sovereign equality where more weight should be given to considerations other than capacity to pay in determining assessments. Situation of obligatory assessment differs from that involving voluntary contributions (to UNDP for example) where capacity of donors is key consideration in judging equitable shares. Without taking explicit stand now, request you carefully refrain from endorsing principle of capacity-to-pay as overriding element in establishing assessment rates. We should in future stress that other criteria need to be taken more into account. These criteria could be expected to include special responsibilities and privileges of permanent members of Security Council and special advantages pertaining to host governments, as well as basic concept that in organization of ostensible equals, membership dues should proceed in first instance from this very equality.

Irwin

³ The United States had taken the position that all ICAO member states should share the costs proportionally as new members were admitted. When the ICAO Assembly held its 18th regular triennial session in Vienna (June 15–July 7, 1971), it agreed to reduce the U.S. assessment to 28.75 percent rather than 26.85 percent. (*U.S. Participation in the UN, 1972*, p. 158)

163. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-727

New York, May 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Report of the Committee on Contributions

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Seymour M. Finger.

Summary—The UN Committee on Contributions met at United Nations Headquarters from 20 to 30 April 1971. Inasmuch as the scale for three years was established last year, this session was a relatively light one. Efforts were made by da Mota (Brazil) and Meyer Picon (Mexico) to discuss a revision of principles concerning the scale of assessments; however, these efforts were successfully resisted by a majority of the Members, principally from the developed countries. Instead, the Committee asked the Secretariat to provide improved data on the impact of price changes on the calculation of national income and on the ability of countries to secure foreign exchange.

Four copies of the Report are attached.² *End of Summary*

In general, this session of the Committee was not very controversial. The actual substantive work was completed in four days, after which the Secretariat and a Drafting Group took the first three days of the following week to prepare the Draft Report, which was then approved by the Committee on Thursday, except for a decision on the date and place of the next session. That final decision was taken at a one-hour meeting on the morning of Friday, April 30.

Da Mota and Meyer Picon made a strong effort to have the Committee discuss at this session changes in the criteria or principles governing the establishment of the scale. They were particularly interested in changes which would benefit the countries with a low per capita income. Their efforts were resisted by Zakharov (USSR), Viaud (France), Rhodes (UK), Naito (Japan) and Zodda (Italy). Conscious of Zakharov's position that any change in the criteria or principles would mean that he and the Soviet Union would oppose the US ceiling instead of supporting it, Finger also urged that no action be taken at this session to consider changing these criteria or principles. Da Mota and Meyer Picon then went along.

The issue of the implications of changes in price levels and exchange rates for the determination of relative capacities to pay was a delicate one. (Paragraph 20 of the Report.) The Soviet bloc countries have in general followed a policy of price stability; consequently Zakharov and Raczkowski (Poland) have consistently opposed any change from the calculation of national income in current prices. Other Members, however, felt that it is unfair to use national income statistics which contain a substantial measure of inflation as a basis for calculating the scale, thus providing a benefit for countries whose national income is stated at relatively stable prices. Finger felt this was a sensitive issue, bearing in mind the need of Soviet support for the US ceiling; however, he did join with the majority in pressing for

² Attached but not printed.

better data so as to neutralize the impact of differences in changes of price levels.

This thrust was aided by a note from the Netherlands, which had argued that the increase in its assessment had been too high because the degree of inflation in the Netherlands had not been taken into account sufficiently. In fact, this was not so. The Committee did make allowances for inflation as it considered the scale of assessments last year, and the assessment of the Netherlands is not out of proportion to that of other European countries in similar circumstances. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the improved data to be provided by the Secretariat for next year's session will enable the Committee to neutralize the impact of differences in changes of price levels in a more systematic way. Zakharov reluctantly went along with this consensus.

The Committee also requested improved data on debt burdens, so that it may take into account "in a more systematic way" the factor of the ability of Members to secure foreign currency. (Paragraph 21.) The Committee considered requests by Pakistan and Rumania for relief in their level of assessments because of the natural disasters which had stricken their countries. (Paragraphs 10–15.) While sympathizing with their plight and considering that the impact of such disasters on national income should be reflected on the next scale—1974–76—the Committee felt that it was not able to recommend any revision in the scale adopted by the General Assembly, in response to the two appeals submitted to it. This decision will have the incidental benefit of reducing the US assessment very slightly, from 31.52 to 31.50, in 1972. The reduction will be *de facto* in 1972 but, based on past practice, will be officially recognized in the next scale. More important than this slight reduction is the retention of the practice. If countries like the Federal Republic of Germany should be admitted, the practice of giving the United States one-third of the benefit would result in a reduction of several percentage points in the US assessment.

The most controversial point involved the acceptance by the Secretary General of currency other than US dollars. (Paragraph 24.) The Secretary General submitted a report outlining the sums that had been accepted in such currencies. He then referred to a paragraph in the Report of the Fifth Committee, reading as follows:

"In the context of the factor regarding the ability of Member States to secure foreign currency, and taking into account resolution 2291 (XXII), the Committee recommends that the needs of the Organization in currencies other than the US dollar should be met by giving priority for payments in non-US currencies to the countries whose currencies they may be."

A problem had arisen in the case of Indian and Pakistani rupees, although the sums involved were not large. The Secretary General interpreted this paragraph of the Fifth Committee's Report to mean that

a Member State should be entitled to pay up to its total contribution in its own currency if the needs of the Organization in that currency as established by the Secretary General so allowed. This position was supported by da Mota, Meyer Picon, Fakhreddine (Sudan) and Idzumbuir (Congo K). The Members from developed countries, and especially Finger, argued strongly that, while a Member State should be entitled to pay in its own currency a substantial portion of the amount required by the United Nations in that currency, payment of contributions in currency other than dollars was a special privilege which should be available to other Member States as well.

Finger considered it important to fight on this issue because of the provision in US legislation requiring that the US pay 2.5 million dollars of its annual assessment in certain foreign currencies that the US holds. He attempted to delete all reference to the issue from the Report on the grounds that the discussion was merely a private consultation with the UN Controller and the Committee had not been asked by the General Assembly to express its views on the paragraph. This position received firm support from Viaud, Zakharov and Gibson. Finally, however, a compromise was worked out under which no suggestion was made that the General Assembly should pronounce itself on this issue but the difference in views would be mentioned in the Report.

The Committee decided that its next session should be held from 23 May to 9 June 1972 in Geneva. Several members were involved in other UN meetings which would have made it impossible for them to meet in New York at that time and it proved to be virtually impossible to find another date convenient to all Members. Ironically, Zodda argued strongly for New York next Spring. (He has a daughter living in Westchester and likes to visit her once a year.) The Secretariat estimated that the additional cost of meeting in Geneva rather than New York would be a maximum of \$8800 for a two-weeks session and \$9800 for three weeks.

This sum would be reduced if some Members did not request reimbursement because they had official business in Geneva anyway. Viaud indicated that he would plan not to request reimbursement since he will have to be in Geneva for a meeting of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program. Furthermore, the Report stated clearly in its final paragraph that this decision to meet outside New York was of an exceptional nature, resulting from the schedules and commitments of Members.

Bush

164. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 13, 1971, 2205Z.

1254. Subj: US Assessment Rate in UN. Ref: (A) State 073021, (B) USUN 887.²

1. We appreciate consideration Department has given to USUN 887. As we understand it, Department wishes first of all to reduce US percentage in UN assessment scale. We, of course, agree with this objective, but believe it would be useful to clarify certain points so as to be sure we are on the same wave length.

2. While we agree that capacity to pay should not be sole criterion and we might agree it should not be “overriding”—depending on how latter term is defined—it is important to recognize impossibility of convincing vast majority of member states that there is anything unjust or immoral in relating assessment percentages broadly to relative capacity to pay. As Department is aware, principle that assessments should be based “broadly” on relative capacity to pay as reflected in national income figure goes back to UN Preparatory Commission and was approved at first session of GA. Principle has been implemented flexibly and has not been considered an “overriding element” in establishing assessment rates. For example, there is ceiling principle, which protects US significantly from paying strictly on basis of relative capacity to pay, and inter alia there is floor principle, which does relate to element of “equality of membership” and requires many small member states to pay significantly more than their relative capacity to pay would call for.

3. Over past 25 years the principles governing scale of assessments have evolved into delicately balanced structure, and we have been fighting very hard to prevent any serious tampering with these principles. Consequently, while we agree fully that US should take necessary action to get its fair share in any redistribution of financial responsibilities as new UN members with sizeable assessments come in (e.g., Federal Republic of Germany), we feel our strategy and tactics must be carefully planned and, indeed, include some advance consultation with UK, France and Soviets. This is particularly important because Big Four collaboration in New York in last few years has become one of our most effective instruments in restraining growth of UN budget and in maintaining ceiling on US assessment. If we play our

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential.

² See Document 162 and footnote 2 thereto.

cards right entry of two Germanies could bring US assessment down three points to about 28.5. Eventually this might decline even further as comparative changes in net national income and admission of other new members have their impact on scale. In our view, however, Department and Mission should avoid any endorsement of 25 percent target lest we build future serious problems for our relations with Congress.

4. Suggested criteria of (A) "special responsibilities of permanent members of SC and (B) special advantages pertaining to host governments" might be useful in explanations to Congress and would have great appeal to Japan and Italy, whose national income puts them in same league with UK and France. But these criteria, especially (A), would be bitterly contested by UK, France and Soviets, thus threatening Big Four cooperation which has been so important in restraining budget and protecting US ceiling. Moreover, if US should give respectability to these new criteria and two Germanies are then admitted to UN, these criteria are likely to be used to argue against any further reduction in US percentage which we otherwise might have been able secure if ceiling principle alone were in picture.

5. We assume Department agrees any effort to increase floor-percentage will be overwhelmingly defeated and will make more difficult our efforts in Security Council committee to restrain admission of microstates. Further, any effort to increase floor percentage, which in case of many states requires them pay more than their relative capacity to pay, will almost certainly be answered by attempt to remove present ceiling on US contribution percentage and might well result in a lower floor.

Bush

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, August 27, 1971, 0110Z.

157561. Subject: UN Budget for CY 1972.

1. Department gravely concerned about US projected overall increase of \$27.5 million in assessed contributions to international

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by O'Connor; cleared by McDonald, Winthrop Southworth, Hennes, and Oscar H. Nielson; and approved by George von Peterffy. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and Vienna.

organizations to be funded from FY 1973 Federal budget. Increase of this magnitude scarcely in keeping with measures USG taking to put own economy in order.

2. With regard to our estimated \$214 million UN budget for CY 1972 we consider following areas as being particularly susceptible to meaningful reductions:

a) Documentation—JIU report on documentation (A/8319) indicates saving of \$4.5 million can be achieved without loss of significant information to Organization. Continuing our initiative begun last year we should press for full reduction this amount.

b) Development Advisory Teams (UNDATS)—We unalterably opposed to separate line item funding for advisory teams resulting in automatic \$1.8 million increase in Part VI of budget. We oppose any increase in Part VI over present level. Prefer UNDATS funding be transferred to Section 3 of budget with Part VI being reduced by amount of transfer.

c) Office of Public Information (OPI)—SYG intends to ask GA for \$0.5 million for modernization of OPI. In view distressed UN financial situation we feel this low priority item should be deferred.

d) Headquarters Expansion—Since it appears highly unlikely Congress will reverse itself on this issue, believe it pointless exercise to add \$1 million more to \$2 million authorized but unused in 1971 budget. We should support removal of the \$1 million item pending reappraisal of situation.

e) UNIDO—According Vienna 4635² UNIDO intends submit revised budget estimate totalling \$14.7 million, including revaluation costs, for 1972—an increase of over 20% above 1971. Magnitude of increase unconscionable and unacceptable. Consonant with position taken by USRep in meetings with Vienna GG, believe total \$2.5 million increase requested should be cut by at least 50%.

3. Above items involve potential saving of \$9.1 million. We recognize however that efforts will also have to be made to counter additions that are either presently unpredictable or that may result from dollar float (State 154557)³ or from failure to defeat further General Service wage increase.

4. Would appreciate Mission's comments and suggestions soonest.

Rogers

² Dated August 13. (Ibid.)

³ Dated August 21. (Ibid.)

166. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 15, 1971, 1417Z.

2668. Subject: Cash Crisis in the UN.

Summary: UN faced with serious financial crisis to extent that likely unable meet end of Sept payroll unless it receives contribution payments presently not foreseen. While UN attempting obtain accelerated contributions from other member states, these not likely provide needed cash. Consequently, UN requested US make accelerated payment on \$26 million balance owed for 1971 assessment, which already appropriated by Congress. I urge Dept expedite \$13 million payment now scheduled for about Oct 1 so that this amount available to UN by Sept 29. While this will not resolve financial problem, it will avoid placing onus on us if UN can't meet its obligations, and place it on those in arrears where rightly belongs. End summary.

1. UN now faced with extremely serious crisis since cash not available to meet current obligations. USUN advised mid-day Sept 14 to Sept 15 payroll (about \$2.5 million bimonthly) could not be fully met unless contributions to regular budget forthcoming from delinquent member states. However, this crisis averted when Controller (Turner) in violation existing rules, withheld \$2 million payment to UN pension fund, which was due Sept 10.

2. According to Ziehl (Deputy UN Controller), UN will not be able meet next payroll (Sept 30), necessary pension fund payment, and other obligations (many of which already being deferred) without sizeable payments of contributions prior that date. Expected contributions of others during remainder this month small, but Controller pressing for maximum payments. Anticipating new financial crisis, Turner informed USUN recently that, in absence of cash, UN might be forced introduce arbitrary restriction on program and other expenditures in order to preserve cash to meet commitments already made. However, did not believe SYG would consider doing this without GA approval. Turner described UN as "technically bankrupt," and has so informed SYG.

3. Since UN working capital fund depleted, as Dept aware, only recourse of UN to meet obligations pending receipt of contributions is to (a) borrow from trust funds with interest (Controller has drawn these down to maximum except for non-drawal on UNDP); (b) cut back expenditures (however, SYG cannot transfer funds between budget

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Confidential; Immediate.

sections without approval of ACABQ; or (c) obtain accelerated contributions from delinquent member states. Although US made \$26 million payment in Jul against 1971 assessment, similar amount remains to be paid. As Dept aware, UN Financial Rule 5.4 states that assessments on member states “due and payable in full within thirty days” of receipt of SYG’s communication informing them of assessments for budget most recently approved by GA (1971 SYG communication sent Jan 12, and full payment due at latest end Feb). UN recognizes delay in US payments due in part to FY/CY difference, but because of present situation has requested US pay balance of assessment more rapidly than now scheduled (i.e., one-half early Oct, and remaining one-half early Dec) in order avert expected new crisis end Sept.

4. If next UN payroll can’t be met, since US has not fulfilled its 1971 obligation under Rule 5.4 and owes more than any other member states on 1971 assessment, will almost certainly receive major share blame along with other delinquents and can anticipate broad negative press coverage, outcry from Secretariat members (especially Americans) if not paid salaries, possible accelerated “job action” by staff, and general unhealthy UN atmosphere 26th GA, when major items of interest to US (e.g., ChiRep, disaster relief, narcotics, ECOSOC reform, etc.) being considered.

5. Consequently, I strongly urge Dept expedite payment one-half balance owed by US (approximately \$13 million) on 1971 assessment so that (a) we can inform UN within seven days of intention US Govt to pay in time for UN meet Sept 30 payroll, and (b) check be transmitted by Dept to reach UN prior to Sept 29. Furthermore, I urge Dept expedite payment balance US assessment so no onus can be placed on US in any situation where UN unable meet its financial obligations.

6. Obviously, accelerated US payments cannot correct cause of UN financial crisis, but it can remove stigma from US and place blame where it rightly belongs on members in arrears (especially USSR and France). Indications are that Hambro unable to effectively deal with deficit problem, and SYG expects to return it to 26th GA. Turner has recommended to SYG that he inform GA that, in absence solution by end of year, he or next SYG would have to take steps to cut back on programs so that actual ongoing expenditures of UN be trimmed to availability of cash flow rather than based on approved budget section levels. He expects SYG to make such statement to Fifth Comite early in GA. Such a stringency measure applied in US Govt, and might have salutary effect in UN, and certainly we should support it. However, our support will be much more meaningful and effective if our own assessments are fully paid up.

7. I would appreciate Dept’s views soonest re what austerity measures we might urge UN to take once US assessment is paid in full.

Bush

167. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 16, 1971, 1957Z.

2690. Subj: UN Budget for CY 1972. Refs: A. State 157561, B. State 154557,² C. State 160825, D. USUN 2509, E. USUN 2532, F. USUN 2593, G. USUN 2035, H. Vienna 5627, I. USUN 2638.³

Summary: Serious and reasonably successful efforts already have been made by USUN and Dept during year to limit level of UN budget for 1972. All possible efforts to achieve this objective, consistent with US interests in political, economic and social activities of UN, will continue to be made, but it is unrealistic to expect that necessary two-thirds majority of UN member states will support further substantial reductions in budget level. End summary.

1. USUN fully appreciates and shares Dept's concern at prospective UN budget level for 1972. However, in assessing possibilities of reducing presently foreseen level, we must take into account, (a) developments which have already taken place this year, (b) our own objectives in political, economic and social areas, and (c) views of other UN members.

2. As Dept aware, USUN has been actively engaged throughout year in attempting make certain budget level for 1972 be held to lowest possible figure consistent with US interests. Amb Bush discussed this on number of occasions with SYG, latest instance being July 27, 1971, and stressed importance of holding budget level to minimum (reftel G). Further, USUN arranged for Turner (UN Controller) to visit Dept last Feb to hold detailed discussions with Ass't Sec DePalma and staff re 1972 budget. USUN has also held discussions in NY with Missions USSR, UK and France to persuade them to make approaches to SYG re need for maximum restraint in 1972 budget estimates. (These Missions each made one approach to SYG but failed follow up with second approach despite USUN's efforts to persuade them to do so.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Limited Official Use.

² See Document 165 and footnote 3 thereto.

³ Telegram 160825 is dated September 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 17-1) Telegrams 2509 and 2532 from USUN are dated September 2 and 3, respectively. (Ibid., UN 10) Telegram 2593 from USUN is dated September 9. (Ibid., UN 13) Telegram 2035 from USUN is dated July 28. (Ibid., UN 10-1) Telegram 5627 from Vienna is dated September 13. (Ibid., INCO 10 UN) Telegram 2638 from USUN is dated September 9. (Ibid., COMMERCE DEPT)

3. When viewed in total context, efforts of USUN and Dept have borne considerable fruit, as evidenced by record. When Turner visited Dept in Feb, he presented preliminary initial estimates representing what he considered to be austerity budget. Those initial estimates amounted to \$211.5 million—an increase of about 10.3 per cent over 1971 appropriation level of \$192.1 million. As result discussions in Wash and subsequent pressure from USUN and Missions USSR, UK and France in NY, Turner reduced initial estimate to level of \$207.7 million, representing an 8.1 per cent increase over 1971 appropriation level, and this is figure which SYG has formally presented to GA. SYG pointed out in foreword to initial estimates that, of total increase of 8.1 per cent, only 1.3 per cent represented an expansion of existing resources and the balance of increase represented increased cost of maintaining 1971 establishment, rate and wage increases, and other unavoidable increases relating primarily to construction program.

4. In its report on 1972 initial estimates, ACABQ (of which USUN officer a member) recommended they be reduced by \$2.4 million to level of \$205.3 million which represents increase of 6.9 per cent above 1971 appropriation level.

5. Above record shld demonstrate that whatever might have been considered “water” in SYG initial estimates has been squeezed out and that these initial estimates retain almost no capacity to absorb additional expenditures. Action taken by SYG was largely in response to US pressure.

6. SYG, when presenting his initial estimates for 1972 to ACABQ, informed Comite that he foresaw potential revised estimates which wld call for an addition to 1972 budget of about \$7.3 million (i.e., an additional increase in budget level of about 3.8 per cent). These revised estimates wld relate to items which cld not be costed in initial estimates such as decisions taken in late spring re UNIDO programs, 1971 decisions of ECOSOC (spring and summer sessions) and its subsidiary bodies, effect of revaluation of Austrian and Swiss currencies, etc. A number of items in this total have since been adjusted—some upward such as UNIDO, some downward, such as losses on exchange resulting from revaluation of Swiss and Austrian currencies, and there have been some additions, deletions, and changes due to recent ECOSOC decisions—however, total remains approximately same. In addition, ECOSOC decided to add \$1.8 million for advisory services to Part VI of budget. Further, can expect SYG to submit revised estimates (a) in amount of about \$1.5 million to cover new posts in Secretariat, many of which are recommended by Administrative Management Service (AMS), and (b) roughly \$0.5 million to meet increased costs in 1972 for electronic data processing as reported reftel F. An additional \$1 million likely to be required as result dollar float beyond \$3 million earlier estimated by SYG for revaluation of Swiss and Austrian currencies.

7. Result in minimum 1972 budget estimates which can be forecast at present likely to total around \$218 million, with other add-ons possible. Most of add-ons to \$205.3 million revised base (para 4 above) result of either (a) increased costs to UN which could not be anticipated and over which SYG has minimal control, or (b) actions by various UN governmental bodies over which almost no control possible by SYG. Inability of SYG to exercise greater control is caused by and reflection of present program and budget "system" in UN.

8. Should be recognized that none of proposed revised estimates has yet been scrutinized by ACABQ, which is likely to recommend at least some reductions in them to 5th Comite.

9. We have carefully considered views set forth in reftel A re potential savings in light of foregoing, and our comments are fol:

[Omitted here are USUN's comments on specific budget reductions.]

10. As in past, US Del will press hard for any potential reductions 1972 budget which appear to be in our interest. We must remember, however, to be successful this effort US Dels must avoid, to greatest extent possible, supporting creating of new Comites or Secretariat units, convening of new conferences, and calling for new studies and reports by Secretariat. We assume Dept's position paper for GA will fully take this essential fact into account. In this connection must recognize that in past US has supported majority of GA reses calling for reports by SYG and various UN bodies and that we are now paying price in budgetary increases.

11. To assist US Del in securing budgetary reductions USUN urges Dept make concerted effort to identify programs reflected in SYG budget estimates which marginal and/or nonessential, and which not in interest of US Govt. While this exercise difficult in absence of program budget in UN, USUN believes this approach to budgeting has some chance of restraining and/or directing growth. Programs thus identified would provide US Del needed info to consult with other dels and to focus discussion in GA. Also this would provide clear guidance to US Del in various comites, especially 2nd and 3rd, when considering and acting on program proposals before 5th Comite takes up budget estimates and cost implications.

Bush

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 17, 1971, 0120Z.

171034. Subject: Cash Crisis in the UN. Ref: USUN 2668, dated 9–15–71.²

1. In recognition emergency situation, we prepared, as an exceptional measure, make additional payment \$13 million prior September 29 which is ahead of normal schedule first week in October. It is clear that onus of responsibility for financial crisis rests with others since US within normal schedule under which UN has traditionally geared its fiscal operations.

2. Unable make firm commitment with respect final payment \$13 million at this time but will act sympathetically in accordance with situation as it exists later in year.

3. In any event imperative we reserve portion of final installment for payment in form of “US owned” excess currencies. Even though FY 1972 Appropriation Act does not contain same legislative requirement as previous years failure to do as well will only convince Congress that the only way to attain adequate usage is through legislative action. End result could be restoration of limitation on use of funds and consequent inability meet our assessments in full. Important UN inform us how much we should reserve out of \$13 million for “US owned” excess currencies for period now through end of 1972 but chargeable to C.Y. 1971 assessment.

4. Additional comments relating Para 7 will be forthcoming but in any event we believe UN austerity measures should occur before another crisis.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sidney S. Cummings and O'Connor; cleared by Hennes, Oscar H. Nielson, and George von Peterffy; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Document 166.

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 21, 1971, 0042Z.

173125. Ref: USUN 2668.² Subject: Austerity Measures for UN.

Following are possible austerity measures which UN might take to avoid bankruptcy of which SYG has warned (A/8401/ADD.1).³

1. UN could gear expenditures to its *actual* cash flow rather than to the level of the approved expenditure budget with the goal of balancing cash inflow and outflow. A cash flow system would negate the effects of the Franco-Soviet withholdings and force the SYG to determine priorities. Admittedly, the system would operate in a jerky fashion initially because of the lax payment habits of the members. It would be up to the SYG to orchestrate payments so as to avoid this. If members want programs they can either pay their bills or do without. (Concept would somewhat resemble US system in that budget level would amount to authorization while actual cash receipt would be like appropriation level.)

2. The switchover to a cash flow system would entail some immediate retrenchment. Some measures which the Organization might take to achieve this goal within 90 days are:

a. Postponement of purchases of new equipment except where the item to be replaced is defunct.

b. A stretch-out on the payments schedule of bills due to suppliers and to governments for participation in UN activities.

c. A freeze on all but essential staff travel to include postponement of home leave.

d. A reduction of communications; telegrams and long distance calls would require approval from central control units with the overall expense level tied to some past base period.

e. A freeze on the hiring of new permanent and provisional staff. All positions now vacant or which become vacant will remain so. Temporary assistance for the 26th GA would be held to the level allowed for the 25th GA.

f. A temporary lay-off to extent contracts permit of personnel whose activities are not essential to the 26th GA.

g. An immediate 10% cut-back in documentation by reducing the number of documents which are automatically sent to members, e.g.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Confidential. Drafted by O'Connor, cleared by Hennes and Edward B. Persons, and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

² Document 166.

³ For text, see Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson (eds.), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume VIII: U Thant, 1968-1971* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 639-640.

instead of receiving 175 copies of all series, the U.S. would receive 157. Marginally useful documentation, e.g. staff announcements, would be reduced to the level of actual need.

h. Postponement of meetings and conferences except those declared absolutely essential by the SYG. Consideration might also be given to shortening the 26th GA through the elimination of some ceremonial appearances and postponement of debate on all but the most urgent items.

i. Indefinite postponement of all new program initiatives, including those passed by the 26th GA, until there is cash available to fund them. Programs in being should be audited to determine which could be eliminated or cut back to free up cash for new ventures.

j. The SYG should propose eliminating technical assistance in Part VI from the budget since these amounts can be funded through the UNDP without financial strain to that organization.

3. In addition to consideration foregoing austerity measures would appreciate Mission's views on what U.S. initiatives involving budgetary add-ons might be dropped as U.S. positions for 26th GA.

4. Using measures similar to those suggested above ILO has since August 1970 has been able to effect (real and projected) savings of \$6.8 million in approved 1970–71 biennium budget of \$62.9 million. If same 10.8% savings rate applied to projected \$218 million UN budget result would be saving of \$23.5 million.⁴

Rogers

⁴ Telegram 177011 to the Missions to ECA, ECAFE, UNCTAD, ECLA, and UNIDO, September 25, requested the Missions to review their budgets to determine specific reductions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10)

170. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 5, 1971, 1552Z.

3150. Subject: UN Deficit.

Summary: Four-Power mtg held PM Oct 1 under Hambro auspices to discuss UN deficit. French said willing make voluntary contribution of \$3.9 million toward current UN deficit. USSR stated it prepared contribute towards deficit of \$31.9 million, which was minimum deficit

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10. Confidential.

figure found by Comite of 14 in 1965; however, would announce contribution only after learning what US would contribute. UK took passive position since previously made voluntary contribution of about \$9.5 million. Bush pointed out figure of \$31.9 million was only minimum estimate of deficit arrived at six years ago and it pointless consider dealing with it alone since this would not solve UN financial problem. Much of mtg taken up by intransigent restatement of Sov position. Mtg concluded with Ambs Bush and Malik agreeing meet privately in near future to discuss their respective positions. Hambro, chairman, requested no public announcement be made of mtg.

1. Four-Power (UK, France, USSR, US) mtg held afternoon Oct 1 at Norwegian Mission to discuss means of dealing with UN deficit. Mtg chaired by Amb Hambro (Norway) with Ambs above perm UN Missions present, accompanied by advisers. Turner (UN Controller) also present. While no mtg agenda, Hambro opened discussions drawing on his earlier aide-mémoire.

2. In introductory remarks, Hambro mentioned "encouraging" reaction from most UN members contacted by him but that solution to problem "hinged on attitude of great powers." Said problem was two-fold, i.e., necessity to deal with present deficit and, secondly, take steps to ensure that causes of deficit were dealt with in order to avoid same problem in future. Pointed out that intention was not to discuss "matters of principle" to which various member states subscribed, but to deal with real problem, recognizing "political solution" was necessary.

3. France said without recognizing any debt but as political gesture to meet SYG appeal it willing contribute \$3.9 million, which was "important sum" mentioned by Fon Min Schumann at recent press conf. Explained that this amount arrived at by applying 7.5 per cent against current deficit of \$52.3 million, which lower figure used in para 4 of Hambro aide-mémoire. Emphasized this percentage above current UN assessment of 6 per cent. Said, if all govts acted in similar manner, deficit problem could be solved. During subsequent discussion, French resisted making commitment as to whether this amount first step of contribution or total amount it willing contribute; French said not interested in knowing against which part of deficit UN would apply this voluntary contribution.

4. UK took generally passive position on basis it had earlier made contribution of about \$9.5 million and felt UK had done its part.

5. Most of mtg taken up by Amb Malik, who repeatedly argued and restated Sov position. In nutshell, Sovs under instruction to contribute against \$31.9 million, which was lower figure for current deficit included in report of Comite of Fourteen (A/6289) to 21st GA. Malik refused to recognize Comite of Fourteen higher figure of \$53.3 million as having any validity, even when explanation provided by Turner.

Also, Malik would not accept Hambro's conclusion that current deficit today is \$52.3 million as minimum and \$69.9 million as maximum, nor willing consider amount of \$119.4 million remaining to amortize UN bonds. Malik argued must first resolve \$31.9 million deficit (which existed at 30 Sept 1965) and, if US announced amount it willing contribute against this deficit, USSR would follow and make known its voluntary contribution. Only after this deficit (\$31.9 million) resolved was USSR willing to discuss other aspects of deficit problem. This two-phase approach of Sovs could result in voluntary contribution by them against \$31.9 million deficit as first step with no commitment to make further contribution as second phase. Significant to note figures used by Sovs were lower ones included in both Comite of Fourteen report and Hambro's aide-mémoire.

6. Amb Bush took strong exception to Sov approach and emphasized essential to deal with total UN deficit problem, including amortization of UN bonds, since to do otherwise would be rejecting reality and not result in solution to problem. When pressed by Malik for amount US would contribute against \$31.9 million figure he used, Bush replied, if Soviets insisted on limiting consideration of problem only to this amount, US would contribute "zero." Went on to emphasize that US willing consider making substantial contribution but only within context of solution to total UN deficit problem—past, present and future, including amortization of UN bonds. Malik stated and restated original position with arguments that \$31.9 million deficit only amount GA had agreed to, juridically valid, etc. These arguments rebutted by Bush to no avail.

7. In attempting restate various positions and arrive at negotiating point, Hambro who took positive and constructive position throughout meeting, reiterated need to deal with total deficit problem along lines his aide-mémoire, at which point Malik accused Hambro of being a "good spokesman for the US." Hambro rejected this charge outright as offensive and unfair.

8. Mtg concluded with Hambro suggesting private consultations between Bush/Malik in order hopefully to resolve impasse. Suggested that subsequently Four Powers should meet again as follow-up to this initial discussion. Both Bush and Malik agreed, and mtg will be scheduled at earliest possible date. Hambro also suggested no public announcement be made of Friday's mtg. Before mtg concluded, Bush asked whether French \$3.9 million voluntary contribution was total amount France willing contribute and against what base this would apply. French evasive, responding this amount "nothing more nothing less" than a voluntary contribution. Bush replied it may be necessary for him to meet privately also with French at later date.

9. USUN analysis of mtg is, while there some possibility of future useful discussions among Four Powers, Sovs and French, especially

former, will be as difficult as ever to deal with on this subject. Sov approach looks like "dusted off" position of 1966 without updating to account for present reality. Appears both want US to "buy a pig in a poke," i.e., agree to a minimal voluntary contribution from both and leave to trust their willingness to make further contributions. While this totally unacceptable to US rep, as long as there willingness on part USSR and France to continue discussions, he believes US should participate actively under Hambro's auspices.

10. Would appreciate views of Dept soonest.²

Bush

²No reply to this telegram has been found.

171. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 19, 1971, 0259Z.

4361. Subj: Indebtedness of "China."

1. Summary: Efforts solve UN deficit likely be seriously complicated by indebtedness left by ROC when expelled from UN and unlikelihood PRC will agree to assume these obligations. Malik (USSR) told Hambro (Norway), who in turn passed to Bush, that presence PRC required for any further discussions UN deficit which would have to be held under UN rather than Hambro auspices. Deficit problem expected to be returned to GA in near future where question PRC/ROC financial obligations be aired. USUN seeks Dept. guidance soonest. End summary.

2. As Dept. aware, when ROC expelled by GA it left \$30.2 million assessed contributions outstanding computed as of Oct. 31, OQOQM broken down this was \$6.3 million on 1971 regular budget, \$11.9 million prior year's regular budget, \$5.3 million UNEF and \$6.7 million ONUC.

3. With PRC assuming seat of "China," the question of obligations of PRC and prior actions of ROC in UN is complex matter with political, legal and financial ramifications. Assuming that change in representation of China was simply matter of one govt. succeeding

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Taipei, and Tokyo.

another, one could assert that PRC as successor govt. would be responsible for obligations of ROC. Legal precedent is that in most circumstances successor govt. succeeds to rights and obligations of its predecessor. However, in present circumstances PRC claims it is a successor state and not successor govt. Consequently, if it is assumed that present situation is one of state succession rather than govt. successor then legal picture becomes more cloudy. Nevertheless one could argue that PRC would be responsible for obligations of ROC.

4. Since Oct. 1949 PRC has asserted that it was wrongly deprived of its right of representation and participation in UN. In this situation, to attempt to hold PRC responsible for obligations incurred during period which it contends it was wrongly treated and legally denied rights could be interpreted as "taxation without representation."

5. Question is further complicated by Article 19 UN Charter since if ROC obligations are transferred to PRC, latter could be subject to sanction provisions unless payment made prior to 27th GA. Since PRC represented this GA we can assume it would meet fully assessments under 1972 regular budget. However, if PRC not held to ROC obligation \$18.2 million indebtedness under regular budget would be added to already untenable UN deficit situation.

6. Question of financial obligations of PRC is one which we probably will be confronted this GA. Most likely forum will be when problem of UN deficit discussed following assumed failure of Hambro efforts. We expect Hambro to report failure to SYG early next week and expect SYG subsequently will report this to GA. Probably in turn 5th Comite will be given this problem at least initially. Lively debate could ensue and in this eventuality USUN must be prepared.

7. Options open to US include: First, pressing PRC to assume ROC indebtedness but PRC doing so appears most unlikely and could result in (a) creating an unresolvable legal problem and impediment to our relations with PRC; (b) inflaming public opinion in US against PRC and UN unnecessarily; (c) our losing in this attempt and (d) thus further eroding provisions Article 19 of Charter.

Second, our accepting PRC refusal to assume obligations and adding \$18.2 million indebtedness of ROC to present UN indebtedness of nearly \$190 million. This would make solution of UN deficit problem more difficult than at present and it would increase our expected contribution even if solution could be found calling for shared assumption by all member states and US were to participate.

Third, try to defer question of ROC indebtedness and PRC obligation and call for an in depth study of total UN financial problem. This not overly appealing because it would be once again delaying in membership facing up to single most serious problem now confronting organization. It would have advantage, however, of giving US more time

to negotiate behind scenes, including possibility of SYG obtaining one time substantial voluntary contribution from PRC.

Fourth, attempt to deal with overall UN deficit and to highlight PRC/ROC problem. However, this wld be all but impossible because ROC and/or PRC wld have to be included as major defaulters. Assuming PRC wld not assume ROC obligations, we wld then be in difficult position of having part of onus being put on ROC which only recently we characterized as responsible member of UN which fulfilled its Charter obligations. Other defaulters certain to capitalize on this with net effect likely to be at minimum pointing out inconsistency in US policy, and at maximum US be accused of hypocrisy and subject to further vilification.

8. Malik called Hambro yesterday in response to previous Hambro note to Perm Reps US, USSR, UK and France for follow-up meeting November 19 to discuss Hambro proposal. Hambro in turn called Bush to report substance of Malik call which is as follows: (a) no decision can be taken on deficit problem without PRC; (b) consideration deficit problem will require decision on how to treat indebtedness of ROC; (c) rather than private meetings under Hambro auspices, future meeting should be held under UN auspices with PRC present and simultaneous translation in both Russian and Chinese provided.

9. Malik will not attend meeting. However, Hambro still wishes other PermReps meet with him afternoon November 19 in order be able to report to SYG.

10. Request Department's guidance soonest.

Bush

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 23, 1971, 1815Z.

212454. Subject: UN Financial Situation. Ref: USUN 4361.²

1. Malik's action reported reftel in dragging PRC and Chinese arrearages into UN financial problem seems to us a fair indication that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Secret. Drafted by Hennes; cleared by Perry, O'Connor, McNutt, Winthrop Brown, von Peterffy, Kerley, and Armitage; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Moscow, Taipei, and Tokyo.

² Document 171.

the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies are not about to make the kind of massive voluntary contribution (say \$40 million) which would make at least feasible the kind of over-all solution envisaged by Hambro. Rather it is likely that Soviets are attempting to becloud the issue so that when the UN runs out of money in the next few weeks or months the finger of blame is deflected as much as possible from the U.S.S.R.

2. If an over-all solution to UN finances is not possible the problem remains what to do about the real present liquidity crisis. This crisis in its simplest terms is a matter of the UN's spending more than it takes in. This cash problem could be solved either if the UN were to take in more money or spend less. Because the old arrearages and recent short-falls in contributions from Members both stem in great part from positions of principle on the part of the Soviet bloc and the French, it is unlikely that appreciable revenue will be derived from this source. The best that could be hoped is that the Soviet bloc could be pressured to make up for regular budget withholdings since 1963 (roughly \$26 million) by a voluntary contribution like that made last month by the French. Alternatively the UN could estimate its cash income and spend only at that rate. This could be done by cancellation of programs, by not filling vacancies, by not holding conferences, by cancelling document runs, and the rest of the austerity measures set forth in State 17325 (Notal).³

3. To maximize pressure on Soviets we have been exploring means of thwarting Soviet maneuver of dragging Red Chinese herring across UN financial problem. In this connection we suggest that United Nations Controller follow up on Stavropolous inquiry (USUN 4407)⁴ and ask PRC representatives what their intentions are regarding the Chinese debt, particularly regarding the regular budget arrearages of more than \$18 million. If debt is disavowed by PRC and no possibility whatever of a compensating voluntary PRC contribution emerges, we believe UN Secretariat should accord ROC the courtesy of ascertaining either directly or through an appropriate intermediary the intentions of the ROC toward payment at least of its regular budget arrearages up to the time of expulsion. If as indicated reftel, there then appears to be no practical possibility of getting the UN to ascribe the Chinese arrearages to the PRC and no way at all of getting either the PRC or the ROC to pay them, we would like your views on possibility that UN membership could be induced to forgive ROC arrearages of \$30.2 million. For tactical reasons, we assume initiative would have to come

³ The reference should be to telegram 173125, Document 169.

⁴ Dated November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 22–2 CHICOM)

from Group of 77 which has interested itself in UN financial problem (USUN 4340 NOTAL)⁵ or LDC body with equivalent clout. ROC forgiveness would have to be done very carefully so as not to encourage forgiveness of arrearages of other members; perhaps through GA resolution keyed to unique conditions under which ROC departed organization. Example might be: "in view of circumstances under which representatives of ROC left organization, the General Assembly has decided to cancel the indebtedness incurred by those representatives in the name of China."

4. Were UN to pursue "forgiveness" initiative we would have to be sure that United States was in no way associated with an effort that relieved PRC of any fiscal responsibilities.

Rogers

⁵ Dated November 18. (Ibid., UN 10)

173. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 30, 1971, 1958Z.

4640. From: Congressman Edward J. Derwinski.

1. I am of the opinion that there is a lack of coordination at the Departmental level on actions to be taken in various committees of the 26th General Assembly.

2. For example, instructions are to push the austerity line at every opportunity in the Fifth Committee. This we have done. Yet the US is pushing hard for the creation of new posts, such as High Commissioner for Disaster Relief which, if approved, would increase annual expenditures significantly. This lack of consistency is also manifested in the situation where the US is pushing for a High Commissioner for Human Rights but not prepared to appropriate sufficient funds to support the office. A third example is in the International Court of Justice where we are pushing for an Ad Hoc Commission on the Role of the International Court of Justice, which will increase costs to begin with, then turn around and vote against an increase in salary for the Justices.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Unclassified.

3. Other examples of the lack of consistency are US efforts to increase UN activities in an effort to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, increases in program dealing with human environment, etc., which will undoubtedly result in additional expenditures.

4. While we try to hold the budget to lower levels than those proposed by the Secretary General, and in some cases at the 1970 level, we propose programs which will include additional expenditures elsewhere. This is making us look ridiculous in the Fifth Committee, where we have been accused of talking “out of both sides of our mouths.” The criticism is justified. As a result we are creating a “credibility gap” in the Fifth Committee.

5. It is also my considered judgment that we should discontinue trying to establish a record of opposition in the Fifth Committee and adopt a more flexible policy. I have reiterated the need for austerity to where these protestations have reached the point of diminishing returns. The record has been established and in my opinion we should stop pushing this line. We do not have to vote for a particular program if there is an unacceptable increase in expenditures but neither do we have to quibble over every item in the budget.

6. I might add that there is not sufficient support in the Fifth Committee or in the General Assembly for our position to prevail. We do not have the votes and it is politically and psychologically harmful to our prestige to be on the losing side on every issue. One Chinese disaster is enough.

Bush

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 2, 1971, 0953Z.

217350. Subject: UN Budgetary Position. Ref: USUN 4640.² For Congressman Derwinski.

1. We can assure you there is no lack of coordination here on items mentioned reftel. On other hand, we are quite aware of some incon-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hennes and Assistant Secretary De Palma; cleared by Southworth, Kathleen Bell, Nielson, Kathryn N. Folger, and von Peterffy; and approved by De Palma.

² Document 173.

sistency between general instruction to press for austerity in Fifth Committee and certain specific instructions for other committees that do entail new or higher costs. We should however seek to minimize any inconsistency between positions taken by U.S. Dels on specific agenda items throughout the various GA Committees.

2. Between our initiative on Disaster Relief coordination and our general posture of budgetary stringency, any inconsistency is more apparent than real. Because UN has had no organized focal point for disaster relief activities, reaction to each emergency has up to now been improvised; result has been wasted motion, higher start-up and phase-out costs, and above all lack of control over relief-need data so that considerable sums voluntarily contributed by governments (including U.S.) were wasted. Need for Coordinator has been increasingly evident (glaringly so in dealing with early phase East Pakistan situation) and we took initiative not only to meet the need but also to head off probable initiatives from other quarters which to our certain knowledge would have been coupled with establishment of a substantial relief fund which we think unwise. In short, we believe Disaster Relief Coordinator should save money in long run, particularly if set up with minimal staff to be augmented as we proposed by short-term personnel on detail for each major emergency.

3. As for Human Rights Commissioner, hope you will consult Mrs. Hauser on background and significance this proposal. We consider Secretariat cost estimate very considerably inflated and would not support it.

4. Our interest in commission to review role of International Court of Justice derives from effort to revitalize ICJ which has never achieved role envisaged in its statute. We have not felt we could support pay raise for 15 judges but are prepared to consider your views on this.

5. We fully agree with your point that it is difficult to reduce the UN budget to tolerable levels and at the same time advance initiatives like those you have cited in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram. We would agree that such initiatives should be pared to those clearly and demonstrably serving United States interests. In our view, the programs we ourselves have proposed do just that.

6. Although restraining our initiatives to their absolute budgetary minimum is sound policy, we do not believe that the United States, as the major contributor paying more than 30% of the UN budget, should totally stifle its interest in programs it favors. By the same token the United States as the major contributor should do its best to oppose those initiatives put forward by others with which the U.S. does not agree, but for which it would have to pay its very substantial share. Our over-all posture is zero net program increase which means we wish to add those programs we consider important to the United States and

offset such additions by attempting to defeat those programs of which we do not approve. Moreover, if austerity measures are voted, we would expect them to apply in some measure to our initiatives as well.

7. Realistically, of course, we recognize we do not have the votes to defeat many budgetary expenditures of which we disapprove. This does not lead us to conclude, however, that we should refrain from vigorously opposing and voting against such expenditures. If the UN membership and the UN Secretariat are politically realistic they will recognize a negative vote by the major contributor on a major item as a signal to be disregarded by the Organization at its peril. It is very likely that, for the first time, the United States this year will vote against the UN budget as a whole. We will want to discuss this with US Del. Such a negative vote might appear unwarrantedly capricious if it were not predicated upon a solid record of U.S. preferences and positions established in the deliberations of the Fifth Committee.

8. A U.S. posture of austerity in the Fifth Committee is all the more important at a time when the UN liquidity crisis is about to break. The UN would look very foolish to U.S. public opinion if it continued to vote expansionary budgets while threatened with insufficient cash to meet its payroll. Moreover, a UN policy of budget-levels-as-usual will not win the degree of world concern with the UN's financial plight that could pressure the Soviet bloc to make payments sufficient to restore the UN's fiscal viability.

9. For the above reasons we are very interested that the U.S. Delegation continue to give the kind of signals in the Fifth Committee that will tell the UN Secretariat and the UN membership exactly how the United States Government views the 1972 UN budget. We are especially interested in forwarding the austerity measures proposed in State 173125³ and in pressing the savings on the Office of Public Information, on documentation, and on currency movements alluded to in State 183457.⁴ Above all, we would wish a maximum effort to redistribute Part VI and move technical assistance out of the assessed budget (State 183457, State 205127⁵). We doubt if we can tolerate indefinitely a situation in which U.S. aid can be involuntarily allocated and increased by the votes of the recipients. We prefer to allocate our aid through UNDP, Congress willing.

Rogers

³ Document 169.

⁴ Dated October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10)

⁵ Dated November 14. (Ibid.)

175. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 8, 1971, 1446Z.

4847. From Congressman Derwinski. Ref: USUN 4640, State 217350.² Subj: UN Budgeting Policies.

1. Received Department's totally unacceptable reply to reftel. It is based upon the same sort of reasoning that prompted my original message. The Departmental instructions that the USDel make a maximum effort to redistribute Part VI and move technical assistance out of the assessed budget is not only ridiculous but it is also horrible strategy. There is not the slightest chance that we can succeed in removing Part VI from the budget since this is a matter to which the LDC's attach great political importance. As justified as it may seem to those sitting in Washington for the US to push such a step would be disastrous to our posture in the Fifth Committee and in the United Nations, and would be self-defeating. We are pushing programs that require as much support as we can muster. To turn the LDC's against us unnecessarily by attacking the technical assistance program would weaken our position not strengthen it.

2. It is particularly ridiculous to launch a so-called "maximum effort" in the last two weeks of the Assembly when absolutely no ground work has been laid for such an effort by the Department in any force. It is true that in ECOSOC and in the Second Committee we have opposed any increase in Part VI and have mentioned undesirability of financial technical assistance from regular budget but we have not proposed in either of these policy bodies that Part VI be removed from the budget.

3. It is true that in our basic instructions for Committee Five the Department indicated that insofar as was possible "to encourage redistribution of all Part VI items which can be funded from other sources (UNDP, other sections of budget, narcotics fund, etc . . .)." However, the instruction went on to say that: "Mindful that various proposals now afloat might increase level of Part VI by up to \$3.8 million, USDel should make vigorous effort to prevent all such increases including \$1.8 million budget add-on for advisory services (perhaps by transferring costs to voluntary funds)." We have had nothing further to suggest any specific steps we should take to have programs now funded

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Limited Official Use; Priority; Exdis.

² Documents 173 and 174.

from Part VI financed from voluntary funds, and clearly Committee Five cannot determine what programs should be picked up by the voluntarily financed organizations such as UNDP.

4. In the past we have never in Committee Five objected to the inclusion of Part VI in the budget. However, such an objection has been made each year by the USSR and other Bloc countries that refuse to contribute in dollars to Part VI. The Soviet Bloc withholding is one of the causes of the UN deficit. We have felt that one of our bargaining counters in an effort to induce the USSR and the delinquent countries to make a contribution towards the deficit was the possibility of removing Part VI from the budget. If we now advocate such a removal ourselves without any compensation by the USSR, we will have removed one of the few elements we have to induce a Soviet contribution. It does not make sense to do this, particularly when any effort we might mount will surely be a losing one.

5. This is an issue on which we could expect support only from the Soviet Bloc. I feel certain that not a single WEO country would vote with us. This would not be a new development, however, the US and the USSR seem to be engaged in a duet in the Fifth Committee and I find myself dancing to the same tune as my Soviet colleague. In my opinion it does our image absolutely no good to be voting with the Russians on every issue and especially when it is in opposition to programs which are supported by an overwhelming majority of the Committee.

6. In the Fifth Committee, unlike the others, there is a possibility for a trade off, providing the US Delegate to that committee is able to negotiate. This is not possible under present circumstances and we are constantly in a minority, losing everything, when with a little flexibility we might be able to muster a majority on major items.³

Bush

³ In a reply to Derwinski, Assistant Secretary De Palma wrote that he hoped to discuss the UN budget crisis with him on December 10. "Meanwhile we understand need for Del to have flexibility to negotiate for such trade offs as are possible if in Del's judgment our preferred position is non-negotiable. I would only point out that on many budget issues, particularly major ones such as Part VI of budget, our objective has been to set stage for continuing negotiations this matter which we know is not negotiable at this session, particularly in view likely outcome Congressional action on our contribution to UNDP." (Telegram 221450 to USUN, December 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10)

176. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 10, 1972, 2253Z.

491. Subj: SYG Press Remarks on UN Financial and Personnel Problems.

1. SYG Waldheim gave optimistic reply to question about UN financial problems during press conference Feb 10.² He indicated solution had been found for "short range" problem (i.e., financial obligations for 1972) in that number of countries had responded to his appeal for advance contributions.

2. He expressed pleasure at understanding for this problem shown by President Nixon and Secretary Rogers during his recent visit to Washington. He noted he had no commitment from USG and that complications existed because of timing of US fiscal year. US administration had promised to give matter careful consideration.

3. On long range financial problems he said only that he had "found understanding" during meeting Feb 9 with chairman of Comite of 15.

4. Asked about rumored restructuring of top level of Secretariat, Waldheim said number of contracts would expire at end of March so question was under active consideration and decisions would be made soon. He planned to appoint woman to high position; did not intend to institute post of Deputy Under SYG. He said he was in contact with USG about replacement for Bunche but no decision had yet been made.

5. FYI. In our view, Waldheim's statement considerably over-optimistic. Although several member states have agreed to advance somewhat date of assessment payments, we see as yet no real progress toward dealing with either the cash crisis or the deficit problem of UN. In fact, Waldheim's adviser, Bertrand, told us yesterday he believed that for this year Waldheim would have to rely on borrowing from UNDP funds to meet his financial commitments. So far as Comite of Fifteen concerned, there have been only two mtgs thus far, and Comite has not yet started to deal with substance of matter.

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Confidential. Repeated to Kinshasa for Ambassador Bush who was there February 11-13 during a visit to eight African countries after a meeting of the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa.

² No further report on this press conference was found.

177. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 2, 1972, 0114Z.

757. Subj: Proposed Reduction of US Assessment Percentage to 25 Per Cent.

Summary: Discussions in New York indicated that proposed US effort to secure reduction of assessment percentage to 25 per cent will be strongly resisted and faces serious danger of embarrassing defeat. Action requested: (1) that Department inform USUN its thinking and planning this matter, and (2) that Department consider exploratory approach to capitals in order to assess chances of success and determine tactics to be followed.

1. During the past week Whalley (UK) and Matheson (Canada) have discussed with MisOffs the announced US intention to seek a reduction in its UN assessment percentage to 25 per cent. They have asked whether we seriously intended to propose such a decision by the GA at its next session.

2. When MisOffs stated their belief that the Dept would seek a GA decision at the next session which would reduce the US assessment percentage to 25 per cent, both Whalley and Matheson expressed disbelief. Whalley said Dept must be aware from fairly recent confrontation re ICAO scale of assessments that UK Govt would strongly oppose such an Assembly decision. They both said that they did not believe that more than a handful of member states could be persuaded to vote for such a decision.

3. When MisOffs spoke to Dept's strongly held view that US assessment percentage above 25 per cent could no longer be justified and that it was in interest of UN that no one member state pay more than 25 per cent, both Whalley and Matheson said that while they understood the US position, they could not accept it. They both said that their govts had equally strong views that capacity to pay was the proper basis for assessments and that they believed that they were both already over-assessed in relation to the US. Accordingly, they said their govts simply could not accept the idea that they abandon their own valid interests simply because the US felt it should pay no more than 25 per cent. Even when MisOffs related reduction of US percentage to admission of new members, Whalley and Matheson said that they believed their govts would not accept the proposition that the US should obtain the maximum benefit from the admission of the two Germanies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential.

4. In view of foregoing, would appreciate Dept's advise re

(a) what specific action does Dept propose at next GA. (This will be earliest opportunity to raise matter since Committee on Contributions not competent to deal with it.) If we intend to link it to admission of new members and specifically to admission of two Germanies? Do we intend to seek a reduction immediately, or on fixed dates, or do we have in mind a reduction in principle effective over a period of years as new members may be admitted?

(b) Does Dept intend to make an all-out fight on this issue, regardless of odds against our being successful and political consequences if we are defeated?

(c) Has thought been given to possible impact of our proposed reduction on other major contributors such as USSR, France, Japan, China, and UK, who will necessarily be adversely effected by any reduction we might achieve? Can we propose action which adversely affects other major contributors and then expect them to work with us on other issues of interest to us?

(d) Does Dept intend to go to capitals on this issue and, if so, when?

5. In our view, this is such a serious issue, and danger of suffering embarrassing defeat so great, that we recommend Dept go to capitals as soon as possible in effort to make our case and establish what our chances of success. Result of such a canvass should help US determine not only whether to proceed but also what approach is most likely to have chance of success.

6. If Dept decides to approach capitals, should be aware of a new and growing problem in relating reduction in US percentage to 25 per cent to admission of two Germanies. In attempting find solution to UN deficit problem, some UN delegates now discussing question of whether possible solution might be to carry assessment percentage of newly admitted Germanies outside regular scale of assessments for several years and to devote contributions of two Germanies during those years to replenishment of UN working capital fund. If this line of thinking gains further adherents, then there will be even greater reluctance than was earlier anticipated to accept proposition that assessment percentages of the newly admitted Germanies should be devoted primarily to reducing the assessment percentage of the US. Of course might be possible combine two approaches, using contributions of Germanies first to rebuild WCF and thereafter to reduce US percentage.

7. Would appreciate Dept's guidance at early date.

Bush

178. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 21, 1972, 1923Z.

1437. Subj: Anticipated Effort by LDCs To Recommend Changes in UN Assessment Principles. Ref: USUN A/727 (1971).²

Summary: USUN anticipates new efforts by LDCs in Comite on Contributions and GA to secure larger reductions in assessment percentages for low per capita income countries. In view past history this question, USUN anticipates these efforts will significantly increase difficulty of securing reduction of US percentage to 25 per cent.

1. Dept will recall that during last several years many LDCs have sought change in UN assessment principles which would provide larger reduction for low per capita income countries. It was only with greatest difficulty that we were able to defeat this effort in Fifth Comite three years ago. The effort was repeated last spring in Comite on Contributors (see ref air) and was defeated there by nationals of major contributors, including Finger (US).

2. At its 1971 session the Comite on Contributions agreed to examine at its session in May 1972 the possible effects on scale of assessments of suggested variations in low per capita income allowance formula (see para 22 of A/8411).³ Secretary of Comite has now informed us she anticipates some LDC members of Comite at May mtg will renew efforts of last year to secure recommendation to GA that larger reductions be provided for low per capita income countries. When such efforts were defeated in Comite last year, the argument which was made by nationals of major contributors and which prevailed was that scale of assessments was delicately balanced structure and that no changes in assessment principles should be recommended. Given announced intention of US to alter ceiling assessment principle, US national on Comite cannot take same line as was taken last year. His only plausible argument would appear to be that assessment principles are matters of policy which should be dealt with only by GA and that it inappropriate for Comite on Contributions to recommend changes. However, given decision by Comite last year to consider possible variations in low per capita income allowance formula, it will be very difficult to argue successfully that Comite is not competent to make recommendations re this matter.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential.

² Document 163.

³ Dated March 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4)

3. It probable that in Comite on Contributions and in GA this fall we are going to be faced with determined argument by LDCs that, since US is proposing change in contribution ceiling for highest contributor, they are equally entitled to propose changes for low per capita income countries. Indeed, it not unlikely that in GA effort will be made by some LDCs to extract support from US for reductions for low per capita income countries by making this price for support by them of our reduction to 25 per cent. We will then have to decide whether it is worth paying this price or whether we can produce other trade-offs which will attract LDC votes.

4. Should matters develop as anticipated, then we will probably be faced with situation like that of three years ago when Soviet and French reps informed us that, if US supported additional reductions for low per capita income countries or indeed if US was unable to prevent GA approval of such reductions, then USSR and France would propose removal of ceiling on US assessed contribution. At that GA session we were able persuade LDCs to drop their demand for larger reductions in their assessments by arguing that any change in assessment principles would probably make major contributors unwilling to participate through voluntary contributions in solution of UN deficit problem. If at forthcoming GA LDCs press for further reductions for low per capita income countries and we support or do not oppose, then on that basis alone and apart from other considerations USSR and France may propose removal of ceiling on US contribution, and other developed countries may well oppose any reduction in US assessment percentage.

5. Foregoing makes it clear that, because of our need for LDC votes to secure our reduction to 25 per cent, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to retain any kind of "united front" with other major contributors in Comite on Contributions or in Fifth Comite on matters relating to UN assessment scale; and this split between US and other developed countries is likely to carry over to other administrative and budgetary matters.

6. The latest development indicates clearly that our task of securing reduction in US assessment percentage is likely be even more complex and difficult than earlier anticipated, and Dept will wish take it into account in developing our overall strategy and in consulting with both LDCs and DCs.

Bush

179. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 6, 1972, 0016Z.

1661. Subj: UN Financial Problems—Bush–Waldheim Meeting May 5.

1. Summary: Amb Bush had seventy minute in depth discussion with SYG and his senior advisors May 5 on certain UN financial matters SYG had raised with Bennett April 28. Reduction in US contribution to 25 percent, UNROD, US proposals in salary review committee were main topics covered. Bush reiterated US determination to work by negotiation toward reduction of US budgetary contribution to 25 percent as well as to narrow differential between total compensation paid UN personnel in NY and US civil service scales. SYG at length explained political and morale problems US actions causing him. End Summary.

2. Amb Bush accompanied by Newlin called on SYG to discuss certain financial problems SYG raised with Amb Bennett April 28. Contrary to his usual practice, SYG called in USYG Morse, Hennig and finally Narasimhan. Discussion was extremely frank on both sides.

3. Bush expressed pleasure that through combined efforts of USG and US House Foreign Affairs Committee in considering State authorization had voted not to reduce contributions appropriation or to legislate US contribution of 25 percent. Margin was narrow but we would continue to work on problem to see that recommendation not overturned on House floor. Bush and Department also in touch with Senate leadership.

4. SYG expressed appreciation. At same time, he stated he did not agree with statements attributed to U Thant and Narasimhan made before Waldheim was elected that US share should be reduced in absence of funds from other quarters. Unless amount of reduction could be made up by monies from other contributors, US reduction to 25 percent would be “disastrous.” When two Germanies admitted this would be new situation promising opportunity for relief but at present US policy created uneasiness among membership. Moreover, this stimulated anti-UN forces in Congress. SYG spoke with heat about members who professed support for UN but at same time would not provide resources so UN could function properly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis.

5. Bush closed this part of conversation by stressing US policy was to work toward announced goal of 25 percent through due process and negotiation and he required assistance of SYG in efforts to fend off attempts to legislate unilateral US reduction. SYG again expressed appreciation for efforts of Bush, DePalma and others.

6. Bush next took up salary review committee. SYG had told Bennett US pressing for UN salary reduction of 10 percent. There was obviously some misunderstanding here. US not proposing cut in present salaries, but proposing gradually to narrow differential between compensation paid UN personnel assigned to UNHQ and amounts paid for equivalent work in US civil service.

7. After lengthy technical discussion in which Narasimhan joined in, SYG admitted US was not, as he had stated previously, proposing immediate salary cuts. Rather, effect over few years as cost of living goes up and post allowances remain same would be to narrow differential between UN/US total emoluments from average of 25 percent to 15 percent. SYG said this would cause tremendous morale problems in Secretariat. Even more serious, it would make it impossible to recruit competent Secretariat officials from Western Europe. Recognized US made special arrangements for Americans overseas (i.e., "salary topping") working for UN as did Soviets. SYG then at great length explained difficulty of recruiting personnel from Western Europe. UN had to depend on skilled personnel from missions and in almost all cases such personnel already less well compensated by UN than when they provided diplomatic allowances in missions. Consequently, only nationalities who would want to work for UN would be Soviets and Africans since they would be attracted by UN salary scales. SYG expressed serious concern that it thus would become increasingly difficult to recruit Americans for UN in N.Y.

8. Bush stressed that he and Dept. had difficulty obtaining support for UN in Congress and therefore it necessary to eliminate reasons for criticism of UN. Congress found it especially hard to understand why UN personnel assigned to N.Y. paid 25 percent more than highest paid civil servants in the world. Bush repeatedly emphasized that present circumstances required austerity measures in UN. US and other member states had taken such internal measures and UN would have to see what it could do.

9. Narasimhan observed US proposals would depart from concepts of last 25 years and would risk breaking up UN common salary system. In confidence, Narasimhan provided us with circular letter to members of CCAQ from Secretary Salary Review Comite reporting on progress of comite to date (pouched IO/Hennes).

10. On UNROD Bush and SYG had relatively brief discussion over lack of US funds for use in clearing of Chittagong harbor which had

resulted in Soviets being asked by Mujib to do the job. SYG said he thought US had contributed millions but he was astonished when Hagen (UNROD) told him this was all in commodities and services and there no cash available to UN for this purpose. By time situation brought to attention SYG and alternate funds located, Mujib had lost patience with UN and approached Soviets who agreed to take on task. Bush said he not aware of this problem in time. On other hand, US had contributed aid to UN which was some 80 percent of total UN effort and such criticism did not sit well with USG. SYG admitted UN had been at fault for not raising problem earlier.

11. On administrative side, SYG assured Bush he did not intend to separate office of personnel from office of USYG, admin and management, retaining status quo for arrival of Davidson (new USYG/AM).

Bush

180. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 31, 1972, 2339Z.

2001. Subj: Waldheim's Concern Over US Support for UN.

1. When Bush briefed SYG May 31 on current status of administration's efforts to avoid having Congress legislate US contribution of 25 percent, SYG expressed appreciation for executive branch's endeavors.

2. Waldheim then expressed his concern over negative effect caused by the debate in the House and Senate on this question. Waldheim said if US were to cease its support for UN, this would be the beginning of the end for the organization. He understood why US might view UN differently than in its early days when it had only 55 members and Western powers had majority. However, world and organization was different place and UN had useful role to play. It would be a tragedy if organization whose Charter drafted in San Francisco and whose headquarters in US were to become ineffective through lack of US support.

3. Bush then briefly outlined main complaints against UN he heard on Capitol Hill. While there was a real problem vis-à-vis public

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis.

opinion in the US, Bush pledged that he would do everything possible to maintain US support.

Bush

181. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 26, 1972, 2155Z.

2341. Subj: UN Financial Situation—Role of US.

1. In private 30-minute conversation with SYG Jun 24 before SC mtg began, SYG passed along his "great concern" about US role in UN financing. Referring to *New York Times* ltr (Jun 24 edition) by A.R. Arasteh, former UNITAR consultant, SYG pointed out that he was trying and was succeeding in making improvements in organization. He cited Davidson, Jackson, and Morse appointments as evidence of bringing able, strong men to Secretariat. He wondered if critics realized how hard he was trying to improve the UN.

2. SYG mentioned next year's budget increase would be held to 5 percent.

3. SYG wondered about deficit. He has gone to Malik (USSR) in last 24 hours and urged more forthcoming attitude in Moscow on deficit. Malik, while objecting to US desire to limit budget contribution to 25 percent, said USSR would be ready to pay the same amount to the deficit as the US. USSR unwilling to go first lest this be interpreted as guilt in causing deficit in first place.

4. SYG asked me if any way we could give him ltr before his Moscow trip about US Govt willingness to solve deficit by matching USSR contribution.

5. I told SYG this not possible because of immediate battle we were waging to get satisfactory Congressional action re current UN appropriation. I stressed that we must face appropriations problem which will be disposed of soon before raising specifics on deficit. What we don't need now is to get UN deficit problem stirred into Congressional debate on UN operating budget.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential.

6. SYG is clearly disturbed, citing numbers of Democrats normally UN supporters who voted against Hruska amendment.² I told him all these votes should not be considered anti-UN.

7. I emphasized that mood in US re UN is to streamline, eliminate waste, increase efficiency, but to continue support. I further emphasized great difficulty in supporting increases in UN budget while USG's own budget in significant deficit position.

8. If we do not get Senate version of appropriation bill adopted by conference, there will be an anguished wail of considerable duration emanating from 38th floor at UN.

Bush

² On June 15 the Senate approved an amendment sponsored by Senator Roman L. Hruska (R-Nebraska) to the Department of State Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1973. The amendment, which was approved by a vote of 39 to 28, stated that the U.S. share of the UN budget would be limited to 25 percent as of December 31, 1973. (*Congressional Record*, 92nd Congress, Second Session, p. 21086)

182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 28, 1972, 2218Z.

137514. Subject: Twenty-five Percent Assessment Ceiling.

1. Draft aide-mémoire misfaxed Bender to Hennes July 24 approved with minor amendments (text follows in para. 6).

2. We agree consideration should be given to addition of summary of U.S. resolution (or full text) after Congress acts on 25 percent ceiling.

3. We will provide Spanish and French translations of aide-mémoire.

4. We are using "pre-General Assembly program in support of a 25 percent assessment ceiling" misfaxed Southworth to Stottlemeyer July 11 as basic outline for our activities. Believe "twenty-five action plan" sent Hennes by Stottlemeyer July 19 memo can be helpful as implementation guide.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Unclassified. Drafted by Southworth; cleared by Bailey, Hennes, Kerley, and Armitage; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma.

5. Instructions to field concerning an initial approach to foreign governments and presentation of aide-mémoire, along with background information, now being drafted and will be discussed with Mission ASAP.

6. Aide-mémoire text follows.

The United States Government will seek the establishment by the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session of a new ceiling on the rate of contribution of the member state bearing the highest assessment to the regular budget of the United Nations, namely, the United States.

The establishment of such a ceiling is consistent with United Nations practice. As early as 1948 the General Assembly, which then consisted of 58 member states, recognized "that in normal times no one member state should contribute more than one-third of the ordinary expenses of the United Nations for any one year." The one-third ceiling was reflected in the scale of assessments in 1954. The ceiling was reduced to 30 percent by the General Assembly in 1957, when the membership of the organization had increased to 82 states.

Since the first scale of assessments was established in 1946, the primary though not the sole criterion in determining the scale has been that it should be based broadly on member states' relative "capacity to pay." However, as indicated above, it has been recognized that adjustments must be made to accommodate a changing United Nations. Moreover, from the beginning it has been considered undesirable for any single member state to assume a financial responsibility which is overly disproportionate in relation to other members. Thus, in the first scale of assessments the rate of assessment of the highest contributor, the United States, was established in 1946 at 39.89 percent, although this percentage was below the estimated relative capacity to pay of the United States. The United States, which argued that the maximum contributor should be assessed no more than 25 percent, indicated its dissatisfaction with the 39.89 percent assessment but accepted it as a temporary measure because of the economic dislocations resulting from the Second World War. The United States made it clear that in an organization of sovereign equals, factors other than capacity to pay would have to be considered in determining assessments for the administrative budget and, further, that excessive reliance on the contribution of one member did not serve the interests of the organization.

Subsequently, as the temporary economic dislocations resulting from the war disappeared and a far more broadly based organization evolved, further adjustments were made in the scale of assessments so that eventually the United States assessment percentage was reduced to its present level of 31.52 percent, or 1.52 percentage points above the ceiling established by the General Assembly in 1957.

In view of the fact that an additional 50 states have become members of the United Nations since 1957 and significant additions to the

membership are anticipated, the United States believes that a further adjustment in the maximum percentage assessed against any one member state in the United Nations is both necessary and desirable. The position maintained by the United States and a number of other member states in 1946, that it is unhealthy for a world-wide organization to be excessively dependent upon the financial contribution of any one member state, continues to be reflected strongly in American public opinion. The view is widely held in the United States that in a virtually universal organization of sovereign equal states, the total membership must share its financial responsibilities more equitably.

It should be noted that since the founding of the United Nations, as witnessed by its financial and other support, the United States has consistently met its obligations as a member state and participated actively in the evolution and growth of the organization. In 1971 alone the contributions of the United States to all United Nations activities approached one-half billion dollars, including humanitarian relief, or almost 38 percent of total resources made available by all contributors. The United States to date has contributed more than four billion dollars to the United Nations system, with 1.2 billion dollars of this amount going to pay assessments for the regular budgets of organizations in the United Nations system. This record demonstrates continued United States support for a more effective and strengthened United Nations, including its intention to maintain United States voluntary contributions at a high level.

Accordingly, it is the position of the United States, which was announced by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly at the twenty-sixth session last year, that the United States assessment percentage should be reduced to no more than 25 percent. If, as the United States hopes, the reduction can be accomplished in the context of the admission of new members, necessary revisions in the assessments of a few members reflecting their comparative economic growth, and without altering the minimum rate of assessment, it will not be necessary to raise the assessment of any present member as a result of establishing the maximum rate at 25 percent. The United States Government urges all member states to support a resolution to this effect.²

Rogers

² Bush replied on July 31 that he concurred in substance with the aide-mémoire and he intended to present it to Waldheim on August 2. (Telegram 2679 from USUN, July 31; *ibid.*) The Department replied on August 1 that Bush might remind Waldheim that in 1946, Secretary-General Trygve Lie had supported a U.S. proposal that there be an upper limit for major contributors, since it was not in the UN's interest to be dependent on the contribution of any one member. At that time, the U.S. proposal had been for a 25 percent ceiling. (Telegram 139266 to USUN, August 1; *ibid.*)

183. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 3, 1972, 0102Z.

2722. Subj: 25 Percent Financial Contribution.

1. Amb Bush delivered to SYG Waldheim Aug 2 courtesy copy of aide-mémoire on 25 percent issue which Dept has planned to deliver in capitals to all UN members within next few days.

2. Amb Bush reviewed full range of arguments in support of USG position, stressing that as SYG knew our concern is long-standing one which should not be regarded by anyone as related in any way to subjects discussed between SYG and Bush during previous week.

3. Inter alia Bush emphasized: fact issue dated from inception of UN; Senator Vandenberg had taken position no member state should pay more than 25 percent at first session of UNGA; Trygve Lie had also declared before Fifth Committee in 1946 that it in best interest of UN not to be too dependent on any one state; that total USG contributions to UN system was considerably in excess of 31.52 percent; that US case rested on philosophy of concern for welfare of UN rather than lowered evaluation of worth of UN; that our negotiating approach was intended to avoid causing any other member to be obliged to contribute more than present rate of assessment; and finally US comprehension of problems our position presented for UNSYG, notwithstanding which we hoped SYG would see his way clear to give support to our position.

4. Waldheim replied that he appreciated opportunity to hear our views. "I am not happy of course that US is cutting down." Waldheim said he was particularly pleased that we planned to negotiate the matter, as UN membership had been disturbed by possibility that US might unilaterally reduce its contribution.

5. Revealing some comprehension of status of consideration this question by US Congress, Waldheim said "Real question is date." If, for example, US contribution reduced retroactively, it would be disastrous for UN.

6. Bush replied that we very much desired to handle matter in manner that would avoid creating undue financial problems. If 27th GA puts through resolution establishing new ceiling at 25 percent, we would hope UN Comite for Contributions would be able next spring to effect reduction in US assessment. Waldheim nodded his satisfaction.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential; Exdis.

7. Waldheim said his most immediate concern was with timing of delivery of US aide-mémoire to UN membership. He hoped we would wait at least until next week, the longer the better. He felt it most important that no one be allowed to interpret our circulation of this note as sequel to last week's spat between USG and UNSYG. Bush assured him that US would resist tie-in to "last week" in every way it could. He undertook to urge Washington to delay delivery of aide-mémoire at least until next week but pointed out that US faces difficult campaign to sell its position and must initiate that campaign fairly soon.

8. *Comment:* Amb Bush believes Waldheim's point is valid one and should be respected to extent possible. He also hopes that instructions for delivery of aide-mémoire can include explanation to US Embassies on this sensitive point, and arm our representatives to refute any implication that we motivated by pique at Waldheim.²

Bush

² The Department replied on August 4 that it concurred with Bush's recommendation, and that the U.S. aide-mémoire to UN member states would not be distributed until the week of August 14. (Telegram 141601, August 4; *ibid.*) On August 16 the Department sent the aide-mémoire to most overseas posts with instructions to present it to the governments of all UN members. (Airgram A-8349, August 16; *ibid.*, UN 3 GA)

184. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 23, 1972, 1625Z.

2940. Subj: Reduction of US Assessment Percentage to 25 Per Cent.

1. During conversation yesterday with Phillips re US proposal to reduce its assessment percentage to 25 per cent, Crowe (UK) raised fol matter with respect to which we require Dept's guidance.

2. In discussing with Phillips potential support of US proposal, Crowe asked what US position would be if developing countries paying floor percentage of .04 per cent or paying percentage which reflected reductions based on low per capita income, offered to support US proposal if, in turn US supported lowering of floor percentage and/or granting of greater reductions for low per capita income. Impact of such a lowering of floor percentage or granting of greater reductions for low

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential.

per capita income would fall entirely upon developed countries such as UK, which were already paying at a rate higher than that called for by their relative capacity to pay. Accordingly, those countries could not be expected to understand any US agreement to such actions.

3. Phillips avoided answering Crowe's question directly, saying we had no indication that issues referred to by Crowe were likely to arise and that we would try to avoid this occurring.

4. Crowe, who was accompanied by Whalley (UK national on UN Contributions Comite), said that they considered it not at all unlikely that these issues would arise, pointing out that there had already been a determined attempt in Comite on Contributions and in GA to secure greater reductions for low per capita income countries and that there had been mention from time to time of possibly lowering the floor percentage. However, Crowe did not press Phillips further on matter.

5. Dept will recall that fears expressed by Crowe are same as those mentioned to US several years ago by French and Russians in GA when they said they would make an all-out fight against US ceiling if we went along with developing countries on greater reductions for low per capita income or on reducing the floor percentage.

6. Dept is aware that, at last session of Comite on Contributions in May of this year, Comite agreed that changes in low per capita income formula would be justified but deferred action on changing formula until next Comite session.

7. Would appreciate Dept's advice as to how to respond to questions raised by Crowe if these are repeated by him or others.

Phillips

185. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 2, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Efforts to Reduce our United Nations Assessment

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential. Drafted by Hennes and cleared by Assistant Secretary De Palma, von Peterffy, and Southworth. A copy was sent to Stottlemeyer at USUN.

The following responds to Mrs. Davis' memorandum of August 29 on the above subject.²

We have begun intensive efforts to reduce the U.S. rate of assessment in the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies to 25%. We have instructed our posts in capitals of UN member states to request support for the U.S. position in the General Assembly this fall. We have complemented these démarches with approaches both to the permanent missions in New York and to Secretariat officials of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies and have called in selected Embassy representatives in Washington. The levels at which contacts have already been made have been those customarily utilized for issues on which we are planning to pursue a strong initiative at the General Assembly. The Secretary will no doubt be discussing the matter in his conversations in New York at the outset of the General Assembly.

Thus far the results of our approaches have been inconclusive. We had not expected an early favorable reaction because what we are in effect asking other members to do is to pay more so that the United States may pay less.

A recurrent note in most reactions to date is one of dismay at what is regarded as further evidence that the U.S. is downgrading the UN. Many have asked what we plan to do about voluntary contributions, particularly the UN Development Program. A few have not only expressed understanding for our proposal but gone on to say that they believe it is in the best interest of the UN.

Initial reactions of the Scandinavian members have encouraged us to hope that they will be willing to provide some of the leadership toward establishing a new UN ceiling rate of 25%. They would be doing this in our judgment in an attempt to save the United Nations from the consequences of a U.S. short-fall in meeting our assessed contributions.

Gibson Lanpher³

² In this August 29 memorandum the NSC requested information about the U.S. campaign to negotiate a reduction in its UN assessment, especially the level of foreign officials to be approached and the arguments that were expected to be most persuasive. The NSC requested periodic reports, with the first one due by September 5. (Ibid.)

³ Lanpher signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

186. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, September 11, 1972, 1949Z.

165200. Subject: Reduction of U.S. Assessment Rate in UN. Ref: State A-8349, State 148408.²

1. Replies to reair have raised questions how US assessment rate can be reduced without an offsetting increase in rates of other members. Following background information may be utilized in discussions with host governments on this subject.

2. The language of our General Assembly resolution will be explicit on the point that no present UN member's assessment rate is to be increased as a result of the US proposal. The offsetting 6.52 percentage points needed to bring our assessment rate down to 25 percent could come from two sources: percentage points brought in by new members and percentage points derived from the relative economic growth of present members.

3. Regarding new members, only the admission of the FRG and the GDR could substantially offset the reduction in the US assessment. The estimated assessment rates for each would be 6.80 percent and 2.00 percent respectively. However, USG does not intend to alter its position that entry of the GDR into UN cannot take place unless and until two conditions outlined in para VI of reftel have been met satisfactorily and the FRG is in a position, through authorization of the Bundestag, to apply for UN membership. We cannot predict when West and East Germany might enter UN since these complex issues must still be satisfactorily resolved within a sensitive political framework. (FYI—hopefully during 1973—end FYI.)

4. Regarding assessment rate increases due to relative economic growth, this point refers to increases that some members would receive in any event as a consequence of their economic progress in comparison with other members. It is an established procedure for Committee on Contributions to calculate such increases (which would occur with or without a reduction in the US assessment rate), and redistribute offsetting reductions.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bailey; cleared by Hennes, Walker, Bennett, von Peterffy, Chase, Kimball, Monsma, Daniel Goott, and Sutterlin; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Manama, Muscat, Nouakchott, Sanaa, and Suva and repeated to USUN, Bern, Berlin, Bonn, Saigon, and Seoul.

² Regarding A-8349, see footnote 2, Document 183. Telegram 148408 is not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA)

5. What is implied in the above two methods of obtaining offsetting percentage points is that, while no member's rate will be increased as a consequence of our proposal, some countries will forego a pro rata reduction that they might have otherwise received. The United States position is that the first 6.52 offsetting percentage points that become available from either source be applied toward reducing our assessment rate to 25 percent; any additional available points may be redistributed among membership according to present procedures. Note that almost 70 countries paying the minimum assessment rate of 0.04 percent will not be affected at all, in that they would not receive any reductions from their minimum assessment rate in any case.

6. If the General Assembly adopts our resolution lowering maximum assessment rate to 25 percent, Committee on Contributions will follow GA instructions in computing a new scale of assessments to go into effect in 1974. If significant new members are not admitted before new scale goes into effect, then obviously we will not be able to receive needed percentage points. Then, if Congress does not appropriate contributions above 25 percent level the US will fall into arrears in its legal obligation to the UN.

7. A favorable UNGA response to US proposal will be extremely helpful in seeking appropriations for both assessed and voluntary contributions. If our proposal is rejected, and if Congress decides not to appropriate sufficient funds to meet our assessment, we will have to expect that Congress might also act to reduce our voluntary contributions, which we would like to maintain at a generous level.

Rogers

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 12, 1972, 2256Z.

166575. Subject: Reduction of U.S. Assessment Rate in UN.

1. We believe that consultations on 25 percent issue have reached stage where we can usefully begin discussions of draft resolution with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Everts; cleared by Hennes, Nielson, Bailey, and Kimball; and approved by von Peterffy.

appropriate delegations. For example, Mission may wish to discuss with Japanese and Canadians during upcoming bilateral talks. We would be receptive to suggestions towards improving acceptability of resolution.

2. Draft resolution as informally agreed to by Mission and Department is as follows: "The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, 238 (III) of 18 November 1948, 665 (VII) of 5 December 1952, and 1137 (XII) of 14 October 1957, regarding the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among its members and the fixing of the maximum contribution of any one member state,

Noting that, when it was decided by the General Assembly in 1957 that, in principle, the maximum contribution of any one member state to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations should not exceed 30 percent of the total, the United Nations consisted of eighty-two member states,

Noting further that since the General Assembly decision of 1957, fifty states have been admitted to membership in the United Nations,

Recalling that since the General Assembly decision of 1957 there has been a reduction in the percentage contribution of the state paying the maximum contribution from 33.33 percent to 31.52 percent,

Decides that:

1. The maximum contribution of any one member state to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 25 percent of the total;

2. The Committee on Contributions shall implement operative paragraph 1 in preparing scales of assessment for 1974 and subsequent years by reducing the percentage contribution of the member state paying the maximum contribution by an amount equivalent to (a) the percentage contributions of any newly admitted member states no later than the year following their admission and (b) the increase in the percentage contributions of member states with per capita incomes over dollars one thousand resulting from increases in their net national incomes, until the percentage contribution of the member state paying the maximum contribution shall have been reduced to 25 percent;

3. The percentage contribution of member states shall not, in any case, be increased as a consequence of the present resolution."

Rogers

188. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, September 15, 1972, 0116Z.

3271. Subj: Reduction of US Assessment Rate at UN: Soviet Views.

1. Amb Bush explained US view of 25 percent issue to Soviet PermRep Malik during exchange of views on 27th GA Sept 13. Bush hoped Soviets would understand US position and at least not work against us, if SMUN could not support US.

2. Malik was noncommittal regarding exact Soviet position, although he did not think US goal was easy to justify. US status as world's most powerful economy was obvious, and most dels viewed assessment as hinging on capacity to pay. US timing was wrong, attention of UN was now focused on deficit, and US policy of seeking reduction in assessment would be interpreted as adding to deficit problem. And US argument about having too much political influence in UN because of high assessment rate was not convincing. Everyone knew US influence had diminished.

3. Bush explained that US initiative on assessment rate had nothing to do with deficit problem, that ability to pay was certainly one criterion but so was degree of financial, not political, dependence of UN upon one country.

4. *Comment:* Relative mildness of Malik's comments gives some hope Soviets will be content to take low profile on 25 percent issue. In any case, despite his negative noises Malik stopped short of saying USSR would oppose or work against us on this issue.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow.

189. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Efforts to Reduce our United Nations Assessment

We have been conducting a vigorous campaign since our last report on September 2 to obtain the support of other countries for our 25 percent assessment rate proposal. All UN member states have been approached in their capitals and in New York and we have made a number of selective *démarches* here in Washington. USUN has been pressing the Permanent Delegations for support and Ambassador Bush personally has taken a strong hand in this effort.²

The replies to date have been as favorable as could be expected, considering that this is not a proposal which other countries would be expected to welcome with much enthusiasm. The great majority of member states remain uncommitted, but our Mission in New York believes that at this juncture we might have support from about 25 countries. One disappointment is that no country has yet indicated a willingness to assume the leadership in pressing our case before the UNGA. Moreover, some usually friendly powers (e.g. the United Kingdom and Spain) have developed rather firm and reasoned negative positions which may influence others against our proposal.

Our evaluation of responses thus far indicates that many less developed countries remain convinced, despite our assurances to the contrary, that a reduction of the U.S. assessment rate will result in increased assessments for them. There also continues to be a general concern that this proposal indicates a lessening of U.S. interest in and support for the UN and foreshadows a reduction of our voluntary contributions to the organization. We have pointed out that an unfavorable UNGA response to our proposal could result in Congressional action reducing our voluntary contributions from their present generous level.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential.

² Telegrams 3379 and 3382 from USUN, September 21, reported on Ambassador Bush's meetings with selected South American and African delegations to outline the U.S. position. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4)

As the General Assembly gets fully underway next week, our Delegation intends to enlist the active support of friendly delegations in an intensified effort to win the votes of the undecided.

R.H. Miller³

³ Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

190. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 3, 1972, 2021Z.

3638. Subj: Reduction in US Assessment.

Based on reporting on contacts in capitals, Wash and NY, Mission has prepared initial status report on member states' position on this item.² While in some instances our assessment is based on hard info, in others it is only indicative since more precise info is not available at this time. Our assessment is as follows:

1. American Republics (24 countries): 5 yes, 3 no, 16 unknown
2. Europe and Canada (17 countries): 7 yes, 3 no, 7 unknown
3. Near and Middle East (25 countries): 5 yes, 5 no, 15 unknown
4. Far East (14 countries): 4 yes, 1 no, 9 unknown
5. Eastern Europe (10 countries): 0 yes, 10 no, 0 unknown
6. Africa (41 countries): 1 yes, 4 no, 36 unknown

Totals excluding US are: 23 yes, 26 no, and 83 unknown. Of the 23 yes we have 8 firm commitments (Dom Rep, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Iran, and Israel).

Our most serious problem relates to Africa, with 36 out of 41 total countries in unknown category. Since African vote will be critical in determining outcome on this issue and fact that many reports from African capitals indicate that individual country positions will be taken only after caucusing in NY, we are focusing our attention in particular on African reps. Our contacts to date also indicate that African

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential; Immediate.

² A second status report, dated October 9, gave an overall estimate of 36 in favor, 27 against, and 69 undecided. The breakdown for African countries was 3 in favor, 5 against, and 33 undecided. (Telegram 3762 from USUN, October 9; *ibid.*)

members grossly misunderstand our position and will require full scale education effort.

We understand that Secretary Rogers will be hosting lunch for African dels at noon Oct 4. Given above situation, we wld hope that Secretary wld make special effort during course of this luncheon to seek understanding from and support of African members.

We also suggest Dept consider further démarches in African capitals. Of 41 total African countries, South Africa is alone in yes category; Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan in no category.

Bush

191. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 17, 1972, 2311Z.

3944. Subj: Special Comite on Financial Situation of UN.

Summary: Comite of 15 held 17th mtg Oct 11 to consider draft interim report for later submission to GA. Comite treated to lengthy interpretation of history by Sov Perm Rep Malik, including charge that US had "done nothing" to help resolve problem and, in fact, would be contributing to problem by attempting to reduce its assessment to 25 percent. US rep (Schaufele) rebutted Malik's statement. US Del intends to set record straight when item comes before Fifth Comite.

1. Comite held 17th mtg Oct 11 to consider draft interim report (A/AC.155/R.17) to be submitted to GA at current session. Report drafted by UNSec, with personal input by Amb Algard, was immediately opened for comment by chairman. All members present except PRC.

2. For next half hour, Comite treated to interpretation of history by Sov Perm Rep Malik. His position, stated in stern and uncompromising manner, not only rejected proposals previously agreed to by twelve members, but would require report to be completely rewritten because it lacked objectivity. On latter point Algard took strong exception, saying that, as chairman, he had attempted to reflect Comite proceedings and proposals previously agreed to in Comite.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential.

3. Malik opened with fact that UN presently in difficult financial situation, but then added this due solely to ONUC and UNEF operations carried out “under UN flag” and in “violation of UN Charter.” He argued that these were illegitimate activities, as were Korean items and UN bonds. Consequently, he said that, because of illegal character of these activities, USSR and others were justified in withholding payments. On question of technical assistance in UN regular budget, Malik said its inclusion was contrary to “accepted standards” and, in order to “comply with spirit and letter of Charter,” it had to be removed so that regular budget be limited solely to UN administrative costs.

4. According to Malik, USSR had agreed in 1965–1966 to participate in efforts to find solution to financial problems of UN on two conditions: (1) all member states must participate, and (2) US must declare first its intention to make voluntary contribution and announce amount of its contribution. Since then, he said, US had maintained “total silence” and done “absolutely nothing” to solve problem, which was in total disregard of consensus. Malik next turned to strong criticism of US for attempting to reduce its assessment rate at time when UN was in serious financial condition. In so doing, he said, US was acting irresponsibly since, rather than reducing its assessment, US should be paying much more based on its capacity to pay. If US intended unilaterally to reduce its assessment, he wondered what would prevent other member states from doing likewise. If they did, Malik said financial integrity of UN would be destroyed, and possibility would be greatly increased of UN following in footsteps of League of Nations, etc.—for which US would be responsible.

5. US (Schaufele) responded immediately to Malik’s assertions, saying US had hoped Comite had gone beyond point of political rhetoric and was well on its way toward progress in finding solution to deficit problem; however, unfortunately, this stage had not been reached, as witnessed by remarks of Sov Rep. Schaufele made these additional points:

(A) 1965–1966 consensus did not include condition that US be first to announce voluntary contribution;

(B) Rather than maintaining “total silence,” US had stated continuously that, “if comprehensive solution found, US would not be found wanting”;

(C) Questions relating to UN peacekeeping should be discussed in Comite of 33 and kept out of this Comite;

(D) Similarly, this Comite was not forum to discuss question of UN scale of assessments since item would be dealt with fully in Fifth Comite;

(E) Pointed out that US contributing more than 38 percent of total to UN activities and said US would welcome USSR contributing at same level;

(F) Stressed that, rather than giving his interpretation of history, Malik could do Comite and membership as a whole real service if he would answer directly question of whether or not USSR intended, and in what way, to help resolve financial problem.

6. Our rebuttal brought forth another statement by Malik, in which he argued that historical facts re UN activities must be respected and, quoting Tolstoy, said "I cannot be silent" in establishing clear record of reasons for UN financial problem. Furthermore, with US capacity to pay of 38 percent and proposed new ceiling on US of 25 percent, he repeated that "If US can justify reducing its assessment, why can't others follow?" Unlike US, many would have a justifiable case. By implication, he put USSR in latter category, saying USSR was a "poor country" in relation to US, had suffered through two hundred years of aggression and destruction, which took heavy toll including twenty million lives alone lost in World War II.

7. Ghana (Cleland) directed two-part question to Malik. First, he asked whether USSR would agree to transfer of technical assistance from regular budget to UNDP; and second, whether, in making this transfer, USSR agreed that voluntary contributions must be in same amount as included in regular budget and paid in convertible currencies. Malik answered first point in affirmative, but on latter said it was "sovereign right" of contributors to determine currencies in which they would make voluntary contributions. Rather than answering whether USSR would contribute, Malik made lengthy comment on tremendous effort USSR had made in providing funds to LDCs to assist them in their development.

8. India and Brazil, commenting on proposal that technical assistance be transferred from regular budget, said this was not acceptable to them since important matter of principle was involved which required UN itself to include small amount of technical assistance in its regular budget.

9. Canada, Japan, UK, and France also spoke, expressing regret that Comite's proposals previously agreed to were not acceptable. French Rep said "I deeply resent" fact that Comite, which heretofore had been characterized by spirit of compromise and determination to find solution, had now become subjected to political rhetoric. Nigerian Rep said that, on basis of what he had heard today, Comite of 15 for all practical purposes was "finished."

10. Chairman announced that number of drafting changes suggested by reps would be incorporated in report and redraft be provided members by Oct 19. Said he would call another mtg of Comite a week or so after redrafted report circulated. Added that his intention was to submit interim report to GA at present session, have Fifth Comite discuss report, and on basis of this discussion determine what

new elements, if any, surfaced for consideration by Comite of 15 before drafting final report to GA.

11. Following mtg Schaufele and MisOff discussed situation briefly with Algard. Latter said that, while he would make some drafting changes, he was determined that report would reflect Comite proceedings and agreed proposals while at same time show without question where responsibility lay for lack of further progress.

12. *Comment:* During period since Comite mtg, MisOffs have been told informally by number other Comite members that they disappointed and angered over position taken by Malik. However, some appeared be uncertain about 1965–1966 consensus, in particular Malik's assertion that there was agreement on US making first move by announcing what it intended to do to help resolve financial problem. US del intends to set record straight when item comes before Fifth Comite.

Bush

192. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 27, 1972, 0212Z.

4171. Subj: Reduction US Assessment.

1. Political Counselor and MisOff, at our request, called on Georg Hennig (Austrian) who personal assistant and confidant of SYG. We led off with brief explanation of our 25 per cent policy, emphasizing that this priority issue for USG; USUN, Dept and American Embassies making all-out effort on question; pointing out political implications within US of success and failure in this endeavor; and stressing fact that if UNGA does not act favorably on our proposal, real loser will be UN and its membership. Hennig replied he had closely followed issue and was aware of basic points in our position. Said that SYG had continuing personal interest in question but had taken every precaution to ensure that he not take any action which in any way would be detrimental to our position. Hennig added, however, that SYG under strong pressure from some members to speak out against US proposal, but he assured us that SYG would continue to take totally neutral stand.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential.

SYG hoped not to have to address question at all, as non-comittal or intrinsically neutral statement sure to be interpreted negatively.

2. Hennig asked our assessment of situation and added that, from his viewpoint, many members, particularly Africans, did not understand US proposal. On questioning by PolCouns and MisOff about what additionally we could do, Hennig offered following:

(A) Since Africans probably held swing vote on this issue, US might consider working through OAU and especially its reps in New York.

(B) For European members, pressure had to be brought in capitals on both Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry officials.

(C) A concerted effort with Africans reps (including OAU reps) in New York, who often lack instructions and possess wide latitude, should bear fruit. Hennig offered that he would provide specifics of our discussion to SYG at earliest opportunity because of above-mentioned personal interest of SYG in subject.

3. Hennig said SYG, as well as himself, were appreciative of fact that US was attempting to reduce its assessment by working within Charter and established UN procedures. He next asked if new members (two Germanies) not admitted to UN in near future what effect this would have on achieving our assessment reduction. Hennig added, however, that this question somewhat hypothetical since in his opinion two Germanies were almost sure to apply for membership unless there is internal change within West German Government. We provided Hennig with copy our draft resolution and called particular attention to operative para. 2 which explicitly states that US assessment of 25 per cent would be reached "as soon as practicable"; however, if conditions to permit US reduction do not materialize by end of 1973, US could, having obtained prior UNGA adoption of our res, conceivably seek additional time from Congress. While we were hopeful but could not predict whether Congressional understanding would be forthcoming, we could say with some certainty that without approval for our res Congress likely to appropriate only at 25 per cent level which would result in significant dollar shortfall for UN CY 1974 budget. Hennig replied latter would be disastrous for UN and expressed strong hope that this turn of events would not become a reality. He clearly recognized, he said, separation of powers within USG, and fact that such unilateral action was neither intent nor desire of present administration.

4. Hennig queried us again on our assessment of voting within UNGA "if question brought to a vote today." We replied that during past weeks, more and more member states were responding favorably to support our res but that critical factor would be African members. By excluding Africans, which for most part uncommitted, we added our belief that we could carry our res. Hennig said he was hopeful our voting assessment was correct, and next asked what steps we were taking to obtain African support.

5. Re latter question, we said from Amb Bush on down USUN was mobilized to explain our position to and seek support of all dels and to this end were focusing in particular on the uncommitted dels which largely LDC's. Agreeing with Hennig that this was a political issue, we added that above anything else it was receiving priority attention from full US Del, including our working UN corridors in concerted effort on other dels. Hennig said he was glad to learn this since it demonstrated importance of issue, as well as fact that we were attempting to achieve our policy objective within existing UN institutional framework. He cautioned, however, to be alert to last minute African bloc voting on this question since at present "Africans were caucusing on practically every issue" within UN; he added that this was being led by OAU reps who could be found in every chamber and UN corridor. Hennig suggested that we consider whether USG had anything to offer OAU in return for African support on 25 per cent issue.

6. At conclusion, Hennig said he was deeply appreciative of our taking time to fill him in on this question and reiterated his intention to take up matter with SYG Waldheim. As we left, Hennig asked PolCouns whether "there was anything new to report from Paris." After not being given any direct response, Hennig asked that Waldheim be informed of any new developments by Amb Bush before SYG read about them in newspaper. PolCouns said he would convey message to Bush, to which Hennig replied this would be appreciated. Discussion was concluded on that note.

Bush

193. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 30, 1972, 1622Z.

4222. Subj: Reduction in US Assessment to 25 Percent.

1. US Del now has agreement of Chairman Fifth Comite that consideration of scale of assessments item under which US will present 25 percent proposal will commence on or about Nov 15. Comite consideration of interim report of Special Comite on UN Financial Situation will follow scale of assessments item.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential.

2. On basis of consultations here and reports from Wash and capitals, I am convinced time has now arrived for all-out effort to secure favorable GA action on our 25 percent proposal. I am optimistic that we can win on this issue but only if we make concerted effort at this juncture.

3. I consider it especially important that Asst Secretaries of State for geographic areas now mobilize their resources in support of our efforts here. I am convinced that, if we are to secure the necessary votes, we must make approaches within bilateral framework as well as UN context in order fully to convey importance we attach to this issue.

4. Areas causing us most concern are: first, Africa; second, Latin America; third, Near and Middle East, and then balance of Asia. Since these are areas composed largely of LDCs which are particularly interested in and dependent upon UN developmental activities, should be possible to convince most countries those areas that best hope for continued US support for such activities lies in success of US 25 percent proposal; if we fail, prospects are less than bright for continued US high-level support on which UN activities have been dependent. Particularly in the case of countries assessed at the floor rate (0.04 percent), we should be able to demonstrate conclusively that they cannot possibly be hurt by US proposal since they will not be affected by it in any way. Only way in which they could possibly lose in this effort would be if the US proposal were defeated and, as a result, levels of US voluntary financial support for UN developmental activities were endangered.

5. Dept best judge of cases in which approach recommended above can be limited to consultations with Wash Ambassadors or should at this stage include further démarches in capitals. In regard to latter Dept may wish request posts to make maximum use of contacts in Finance Ministries as well as formal approaches to Foreign Ministries. In case of many, perhaps most, LDCs, we believe Wash démarches may be more effective than efforts in capitals, unless latter made at Ambassadorial/Presidential level, in transmitting message of how important issue is to USG, UN system and LDCs, and in conveying adequate understanding of full range of political considerations underlying our position.

6. I would appreciate reporting on urgent basis re results of effort recommended above so that we can coordinate our activities here, and would hope that renewed calls for démarches in capitals and Washington would (1) be tailored to the individual country's special circumstances to the extent possible and (2) be coordinated with USUN.²

Bush

² The Department replied on November 2 that it had been canvassing on a desk-by-desk basis to find out which approaches would be most effective, with particular emphasis on the African area. Bush was asked to identify countries that should be concentrated on as the situation developed. (Telegram 199261 to USUN, November 2; *ibid.*)

194. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs¹

Washington, undated.

U.S. EFFORT TO REDUCE ITS UN ASSESSMENT RATE

In two weeks we expect the UN debate to begin on the U.S. proposal to reduce its assessment rate to 25 percent. Although we have lobbied in New York, in capitals and in Washington over the past two and one-half months, we still do not have a clear picture of how the voting will go. The last count from our Mission in New York showed a favorable ratio of about 4–3 as against the better than 2–1 ratio we require for safety. A large number of members are still uncommitted and it is apparent that they are finding the decision difficult and wish to delay it as long as possible.

Certain objections to our proposal have been raised rather frequently: 1) the U.S. attempt to lower the level of its assessed contributions is simply the first step toward a lowering of the over-all level of U.S. support for the UN system, including the voluntary contributions to the UN Development Program; 2) the U.S. has been paying well below its relative capacity to pay and a further reduction would be economically unfair; 3) the U.S. proposal is an ill-considered act of retaliation against the UN actions of which it disapproved; and 4) the U.S. already profits substantially in its net balance of payments from the presence of the United Nations in New York, even after its contributions to the United Nations have been included in the balance. There has also been some question about the actual intensity of top-level U.S. interest in the success of the U.S. proposal. Some countries have expressed disbelief in the U.S. position that a reduction of the U.S. assessment rate would not cause the rates of others to rise and many members have charged that the U.S. proposal would unfavorably affect the UN deficit or lower the UN budget level.

On our part, we have stressed the political argument that it is inherently inequitable in a nearly universal organization of sovereign states, each having one vote, for the assessed contribution of one state to be grossly disproportionate to that of others. We have pointed out that the Congress is convinced of the validity of this argument and has legislated to that effect. We have warned that the United States will

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Limited Official Use. The drafters of the paper are not identified. A covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger is dated November 2.

have to go into arrears in its payments beginning in 1974 if the U.S. proposal for a reduction does not become effective by that time.

Surprisingly, we have done somewhat better than expected with the Western European states, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Although these are major contributors, who will in many cases be denied reductions in their own contributions as a result of the U.S. proposal, we are reasonably sure of the support of most, with the notable and damaging exception of the United Kingdom. We have also done reasonably well with the American Republics and the Asian members but have done no better than break even with African and Middle Eastern countries. As of October 30, 42 out of 66 African and Middle Eastern countries were still uncommitted. The Eastern European bloc is at present solidly opposed to our proposal; we are continuing to work on the Soviet Union as the sole key to that group.

In conclusion, although the results thus far show a favorable trend, only about a dozen countries are firmly committed to our proposal and more than 60 have reserved their position. Accordingly, the Mission and our geographical bureaus are intensifying efforts to assure a favorable outcome.

195. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, November 3, 1972, 0121Z.

200130. Subj: Reduction of U.S. Assessment Rate in UN. Ref: State A-8349, State 165200.²

1. During past two and one-half months we have conducted intensive campaign to obtain support from UN member states for our proposal to reduce United States' assessment rate in United Nations to 25 percent. Focus of our campaign has of course been in New York but posts have provided much appreciated assistance for this priority effort.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Everts; cleared by Hennes, Walker, McNutt, Chase, Monsma, and Rendall; and approved by von Peterffy. Sent to Manama, Nouakchott, and Sanaa and repeated to USUN, Brussels (NATO), Bern, Berlin, Bonn, Saigon, Taipei, Dacca, Vienna (IAEA), Paris (OECD), and Suva.

² For airgram A-8349, see footnote 2, Document 183. Telegram 165200 is Document 186.

2. We expect assessment rate issue will be debated beginning November 15 and brought to vote in UNGA Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee and in plenary session of General Assembly within following week. While we do not have clear picture at this time how voting will go, recent developments indicate that if we can maintain momentum of our campaign during these final two weeks, we will be able to obtain necessary majority in Fifth Committee and two-thirds majority in General Assembly. (Latter majority will be necessary if, as we expect, proposal is considered important question under Article 18–2 of UN Charter.) However, we must intensify efforts 1) to win over uncommitted and wavering member states to vote affirmatively, 2) to neutralize or convert opponents to abstentions or better and 3) insure that those who have promised support deliver it and do not reverse themselves at last moment. USUN's most recent vote count indicates 40 countries are either firmly in our camp or likely support us, 30 are indicating opposition and 62 are more or less uncommitted.

3. In the lobbying process thus far, certain strengths and alleged weaknesses of the U.S. proposal have received particular attention. Accordingly, although the essentials of the argument remain as stated in the referenced messages, we are providing the following highlights for use in the continuing efforts of posts to advance the U.S. proposal. They can be of assistance in carrying out separate instructions many posts will be receiving on approaches desired during the period preceding and during the critical discussion in the General Assembly.

4. Following are key arguments for U.S. proposal:

(A) Present U.S. legislation requires that no money be appropriated for U.S. payments to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies at more than a 25 percent assessment level after December 1973. It is not the intention of the United States Government to violate its international obligations but it will have no alternative but to go into arrears if the U.S. proposal for a reduction does not become effective by that time.

(B) No UN member's assessment rate will be raised as a result of the U.S. proposal for a 25 percent ceiling. A key paragraph of our resolution will explicitly state: "The percentage contribution of member states shall not, in any case, be increased as a consequence of the present resolution."

(C) An unfavorable vote on the reduction of the U.S. assessment could result in Congress reducing our voluntary contributions to the UN which we would like to maintain at a generous level. Thus, all developing countries stand to be significant losers if we are unsuccessful in our effort to reduce our rate of assessment.

5. Posts may hear economic arguments against our proposal that emphasize either the capacity to pay factor in determining assessments or the profits that accrue to the United States from the presence of the United Nations in New York. It is true that on the basis of a strict capacity to pay, the United States' rate of assessment would be higher

than its present 31.52. It is also true that the United States benefits economically from the UN's presence in New York. For these reasons we have justified our position on political and not economic grounds. To these arguments, posts should respond as follows:

(A) Political equity requires that in an organization of sovereign and equal states approaching universality of membership, an extreme disparity between contribution levels must be reduced.

(B) Prudence and political realism dictate that it is unhealthy for an international organization to be unduly dependent on one contributor for financial support.

6. Posts also may wish to stress that our proposal does not reflect a lessening of U.S. interest in the United Nations. We want the UN to perform its mission with greater effectiveness and with a more equitable sharing of responsibilities. To that end we want to maintain our substantial level of contributions to voluntary programs.

7. Action requested: Posts should take every opportunity to advance U.S. proposal that promises to be productive. Specific instructions to many individual posts have or will be forthcoming.

Rogers

196. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 13, 1972, 2300Z.

4599. Dept pass action priority to all diplomatic posts. Subj: Reduction in U.S. Assessment.

1. USUN formally submitted U.S. draft resolution on subject to UN Sect this morning in preparation for discussion in UNGA Fifth Committee later this week. Text will be distributed as UN document within next day or two and thus available to all delegations.

2. If Department concurs, we believe posts may find it useful to provide texts to governments to which accredited as part of continuing effort in capitals to obtain support for U.S. proposal.

3. Text of draft resolution which will be considered under Agenda Item 77 on scale of assessments to the UN follows.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Limited Official Use.

“The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, 238 (III) of 18 November 1948, 665 (VII) of 5 December 1952, and 1137 (XII) of 14 October 1957, regarding the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among its members and the fixing of the maximum contribution of any one member state,

Affirming that the capacity of member states to contribute towards the payment of the ordinary expenses of the United Nations is a fundamental criterion on which scales of assessment are based,

Noting that, when it was decided by the General Assembly in 1957 that, in principle, the maximum contribution of any one member state to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations should not exceed 30 per cent of the total, the United Nations consisted of eighty-two member states,

Noting further that since the General Assembly decision of 1957, fifty states have been admitted to membership in the United Nations,

Recalling that since the General Assembly decision of 1957 there has been a reduction in the percentage contribution of the state paying the maximum contribution from 33.33 per cent to 31.52 per cent,

Decides that:

1. As a matter of principle, the maximum contribution of any one member state to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 25 per cent of the total;

2. In preparing scales of assessment for future years, the Committee on Contributions shall implement operative paragraph 1 as soon as practicable so as to reduce to 25 per cent the percentage contribution of the member state paying the maximum contribution, utilizing for this purpose to the extent necessary;

(A) The percentage contributions of any newly admitted member states immediately upon their admission, and

(B) The normal triennial increase in the percentage contributions of member states resulting from increases in their national incomes;

3. Notwithstanding operative paragraph 2 above, the percentage contribution of member states shall not, in any case, be increased as a consequence of the present resolution.”

Bush

197. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 16, 1972, 0100Z.

4704. For the Legal Adviser and Assistant Secretary DePalma. Subj: Legal Aspects of 25 Percent—Action Message.

1. DeOff followed up AM conversation with Sloan of UN Legal Office (reported septel)² with discussion with UN Legal Counsel late 15 Nov. Stavropoulos took distinctly harmful position that "Of course your resolution involves a 'budgetary question' within the meaning of Article 18(2)" and therefore would require a 2/3 vote for adoption by plenary. DeOff noted that, were Stavropoulos to take this position, he might by his own hand bring about a crisis in US relations with the UN. He replied he understands the importance that Washington places on 25 percent but said he cannot, for political reasons, advise Trepczynski that the law is what he, Stavropoulos, thinks the law is not. He asked expressly specifically that the Legal Adviser be told that, if he is to be of assistance, Stavropoulos must be given a paper by the US that seeks to establish that our narrow interpretation of "budgetary" to include only immediate appropriations or expenditure questions is correct. He would consider with the greatest care such a paper. He said Sloan and his staff were trying to produce the arguments "for you" but had not yet done so.

2. Stavropoulos argued that, were it not for the US resolution, prospective contributions to the UN budget by the two German states would redound to the benefit of other members, their budgetary contributions being lessened thereby. DeOff pointed out this would not in any event be the case with the large majority of members whose contributions are at the 0.04 percent floor; even following Stavropoulos' argument, the U.S. resolution would not as to these members involve a "budgetary question". Moreover, DeOff argued, the recent practice of the UN showed that, off-again-on-again US contrary arguments notwithstanding, the GA had pretty consistently interpreted "budgetary question" narrowly to include only appropriations or expenditure proposals, which were not involved in our resolution. Indeed, a broader interpretation would have meant that practically every action proposed by the 5th Committee would require a 2/3 vote, which had certainly not been the case in practice. Stavropoulos repeated sev-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

² Document 198.

eral times that our proposal involves questions of “income” for many members and must therefore be a “budgetary question”.

3. Comment action requested: (A) We hope that reiteration of importance of 25 percent to whole character of US attitude may have stopped Stavropoulos from discussing his view with other delegations, at least for the moment. (B) Request that Department prepare a paper that can be given Stavropoulos on the 18(2) question.

4. Discussion with Stavropoulos will be reported septel Thurs AM.

Bush

198. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 16, 1972, 1405Z.

4718. Subj: Legal Aspects of 25 Percent. Ref: USUN 4704.²

1. DelOff called on Blaine Sloan, Director of UN General Legal Division 15 Nov, to discuss various legal issues in connection with 25 percent. DelOff reviewed importance US attributes to this effort and significance of success in terms of meaningful US relationship with the UN.

2. Sloan agreed that approval by the Fifth Comite of the US proposal requires only a simple majority, citing Rule 127 of the Rules of Procedure: the problem, he said, was in plenary. DelOff noted that what would most concern US would be a ruling by Trepczynski that the US proposal would require two-thirds for adoption because, under Charter Art 18(2), it concerns a “budgetary question”. This would be wrong in view of the GA’s practice to apply the term “budgetary question” to the narrowly delimited area of appropriations proposals. A contrary ruling by the President would place US in an extremely difficult position because, given the prestige and authority of the chair, it might not be possible to put together a simple majority to overturn his ruling. By contrast, we were not so concerned about an unfriendly effort to seek a ruling by the Assembly itself that the question should be regarded as “important” under Art. 18(3); if we have the strong majority we

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.

² Document 197.

expect on the 25 percent issue, we should also have a majority willing to vote against and defeat such a proposal.

3. Sloan said he agreed with the view that recent Assembly practice is to treat "budgetary question" narrowly. He said, however, that he was obliged to point to the fact that the US itself has argued for a far wider application of "budgetary question", as for example in the decision to establish the capital development fund and many other cases; he also cited the dictum in the records of the 1957 GA following the vote that the proposal had been adopted because it had received "the required two-thirds majority." (A/PV.705, P. 335) DelOff noted that out of the whole practice of the Assembly this one instance was the only one of a contrary character; as Sloan had observed, we considered it to be an erroneous dictum.

4. DelOff explained we would like the Legal Counsel (Stavropoulos) to discuss the matter with Trepczynski at an appropriate time and advise that, assuming a question were raised from the floor of the plenary, the proper course would be for Trepczynski to rule that the res adopted by the Fifth Comite on 25 percent does not involve "a budgetary question" and that consequently only a simple majority is required for its adoption by the Assembly. In response to a question, DelOff replied that the USSR is opposed to the 25 percent effort but added that the Soviets are not, to our knowledge, working actively against us and their opposition is thus somewhat restrained in character. Sloan said that in view of Trepczynski's allegiances, it might well be that Trepczynski would decline to rule on the question whether the two-thirds majority requirement of Art 18(2) applied and might instead put the question to the Assembly for decision (by majority vote). DelOff said this would not be good enough; we and the Secretary-General have always taken the position that presiding officers are obliged to fulfill their responsibilities by making rulings where the matter is clear. We reiterated that we would like the Secretariat to try to the best of its ability to convince Trepczynski of the rectitude of the position that Art. 18(2) is not applicable. Sloan said he would review the matter and would discuss it with Stavropoulos. DelOff commented that we, too, are looking further into the history of the matter.

Bush

199. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 18, 1972, 1535Z.

4805. Subject: Reaction to US 25 Percent Presentation November 16.

1. Reaction to Senator McGee's presentation of US position and draft res on 25 percent assessment in 5th Comite November 16 has been positive and favorable, as has been reaction to Amb Bush's reply to Soviet intervention. Soviet statement, however, apparently did have troublesome impact.

2. Many delegates, including some representing countries which are still in unknown or undecided categories, volunteered that statement helped to clarify our proposal and they welcomed its public expression of the reassurances which USUN Ambassadors and MisOffs have been giving privately during their extensive consultations on the issue. The Soviet performance, on the other hand, took many by surprise, as the Soviets apparently had not been making any noticeably strong effort with other delegations against the US initiative. Several wondered why the Soviets had been so eager to jump into the fray, particularly because of their widely-perceived vulnerability on their "capacity to pay" argument. Although one or two delegates commented that the subsequent discussion was more "emotional" than the normal restrained tenor of 5th Comite exchanges, there was widespread expression of unmistakable pleasure that Amb Bush had replied to the Soviets so forcefully and had called them tellingly on their "capacity to pay" posturing.

3. There is no question that the US presentation was well-received and was considered enlightening and helpful, even by those who have not yet firmed up their positions. Despite its transparency, the Soviet speech, and the subsequent lobbying effort, had obvious and possibly serious damaging effects by raising points and provoking concern along lines already present in some delegates' minds—concern which had been fertilized to some extent at last week's meeting of the 77. Some of the Africans especially seemed to be vulnerable some fall-out effect from the Soviet speech. For example, Rwanda subsequently seemed wobbly in its support. We learned from a Libyan delegate that the Soviets, in their efforts to increase doubts, were asking other delegations privately what they would do if, should the US proposal be adopted, the Soviets announced that they were unwilling to pay beyond 12 percent.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

200. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 18, 1972, 2200Z.

4816. Subj: Reduction of US Contribution to 25 Percent.

1. Summary: Canada made strong statement in support US res to reduce UN contribution to 25 percent. Brazil and Czechoslovakia spoke in opposition. Brazil introduced res which would request Comite on Contributions to change elements of low per capita income allowance in scale of assessments. End summary.

2. Fifth Comite resumed debate on scale assessments Nov 18 after one day hiatus. Brazil (Da Mota) led off debate with strong and persuasive statement opposing US res. After acknowledging distinguished US record of financial support UN system he keyed argumentation to capacity to pay principle and effect of reduction US assessment in UN on scale of assessments specialized agencies. Capacity to pay is mainstay assessment scale and should be protected he argued. Stated ceiling, in principle, of 30 per cent and US assessment of 31.52 per cent has resulted in other member states shouldering difference between over 38 percent US should pay and actual assessment; lowering ceiling to 25 per cent will present further inequity. Believed it unfair other countries pay more per capita than US; if US proposal adopted about eight other countries should have lower assessments because of per capita ceiling, noted scale of assessments adopted with concurrence US each time since ceiling, in principle, lowered to 30 per cent in 1957. Re impact specialized agencies, he stated no secret US expects entry two Germanys to offset US reduction in UN. West Germany, already member specialized agencies in which US contribution exceeds 25 per cent, asked how offset US reduction in those agencies. Believed time inopportune lower US assessments in view financial difficulties UN. Announced will vote against res if put to vote and suggested proposal be deferred until after entry new states at which time could be reviewed in concrete manner.

3. Czechoslovakia in opposing US res hammered at capacity to pay principle. Cited positions Canada and UK at first GA at which Canada believed if ceiling placed on US assessment ceiling also should be placed on contributions all members who would be assessed at higher per capita rate, and UK considered it dangerous depart from capacity to pay principle at 12th GA. Quoted Neylon at same GA as

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Unclassified. Repeated to Brasilia, Ottawa, Prague, and Manila.

stating countries whose assessments less than capacity to pay getting permanent rebate. Argued US has not presented any justification for ceiling figure of 25 per cent as compared some other figure. Czech didn't believe richest country should profit most from entry new states, especially since would put burden on developing countries with lower per capita income. Rehashed financial benefits to US of location UN in New York.

4. Canada (Amb Rae) gave strong support US proposal and urged other delegations do likewise. Believed reduction US assessment realistic, desirable, and in best interests organization. Reduction would assure continued viability of organization in world today, he stated. Noted McGee pledge there no diminution US support of UN and provision in res that assessment rate of no state be increased because of US reduction.

5. Philippines took no stand on US res but reserved right speak later. Urged progressive lowering of scale for low per capita income countries. Stated disastrous floods have affected ability Philippines to contribute to UN and will inhibit economic growth. Said floods more devastating than damage during WWII.

6. Brazil introduced res (A/C.5/L.1092) with fourteen co-sponsors which requests Comite on Contributions to change elements of low per capita income allowances formula to adjust it to changing world economic conditions. In explanation, stated co-sponsors requesting partial restoration of situation provided for by 1946 GA when low per capita income formula established, but leaving Comite on Contributions to determine what adjustments required.

Bush

201. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 20, 1972, 0341Z.

4857. Subj: 25 Percent Issue and Deficit.

I had a discussion with the SYG and George Davidson (Secretariat) on above subject on Nov. 18. The SYG requested an assessment from me on the 25 percent issue, stating he would like to be of as much quiet help on this item as possible. He sees this matter as one of extreme

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential; Limdis.

importance to the UN, and, given the feeling in the US, he thinks that the US Govt must be successful if the UN is to move towards a final solution of the deficit. I filled him in on the general assessment, stating that I thought we could and would win in the 5th Comite, but that we must not have an adverse ruling regarding the "important question" aspects of the case when the matter went to plenary.

The SYG is genuinely concerned about the deficit and is struggling to find an answer. He specifically requested a ltr. from the US Govt—not to be made public—that he can use to get the USSR off dead center. He feels that a general or specific amount—letter, saying we will contribute "x" dollars if the USSR will, is all that is needed at this point to get the USSR to commit itself. He again reviewed for me his talks in Moscow, where he got the feeling that they would help, but came away without a firm commitment.

Davidson discussed the Liberian proposal, which provides for the SYG to set up a special fund. It would not be stipulated that this fund is to be used for solving the deficit, but the SYG stated that of course this is what he would use the fund for. The Secretariat plans to get behind the Liberian proposal, encouraging countries such as United Arab Emirates and Qatar, which have already stated they will contribute, to back the Liberians. Japan has also assured the SYG of their help, the SYG having asked them for \$10 million.

The SYG visualizes the res originating in the 5th Comite but being acted upon in this session by the plenary. As to specific plans for solving the deficit, Davidson and the SYG feel that each perm member of the SC might give \$15 million, giving credit of course to those that have made voluntary contributions before (France, for example). Davidson and the SYG both said they wld help as much as poss on the 25 percent issue, recognizing that a US defeat on this issue will complicate any chance to solve the deficit.

SYG mentioned that the Poles had been very helpful in agreeing that the SYG not have to pass out to members the \$4-\$6 million in savings. The USSR had been saying any such savings would have to be passed on to member states, thus making the deficit even worse.

Action requested: The deficit problem is a real one. The US Govt must help if it is going to be solved. If we contribute a total of \$14 million, this will be more than offset by moneys that are owing to the US Govt at this time (estimated \$15.5 million). I hope that this matter can be given top-level Dept consideration in order to comply in some form with the SYG's requested letter. I recognize the political difficulties here, but at some point we will have to bite the bullet, and if we can make a deal where we put in no net cash and in fact will get back a small amount which is uncollectible as of today, I think we should try to close the deal.

Bush

202. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 21, 1972, 0200Z.

4846. Subj: Reduction in US Assessment.

1. At our request Ambassador Phillips, acting for Ambassador Bush, met November 20 with PRC Perm Rep Huang Hua to discuss 25 percent issue. Meeting took place in PRC office in UN Conference building. Accompanying Huang were PRC Fifth Comite rep Hsing Sung-yi and interpreter Mrs. Shih Yen-hua. MisOffs Stottlemeyer and Bleha accompanied Phillips.

2. Explaining that Amb Bush had personally wished to make 25 percent presentation to Huang now that issue being discussed in Fifth Comite, Phillips recalled that two-tier arrangement of UN assessments (capacity to pay and limit on maximum contributor) in effect since inception of organization. He said that issue was political as well as financial, noting in passing Chinese sensitivity to political dependence issue. He outlined importance USG attaches to 25 percent issue and expressed belief that favorable UN handling of US res would permit continuing generous US voluntary support for UN programs. He said we now have firm commitments of support for 25 percent res from more than 50 UN members, but we expect a close vote and, therefore, hope that China would be able to abstain rather than oppose us.

3. Huang replied that they had read our documents and, as result of Phillips' presentation, they had clearer understanding of US position. He said that Chinese would study matter further, adding that perhaps something could be worked out during the normal tri-annual reassessment process. He agreed with Phillips' point that matter was basically political. Perhaps, he said, some "middle way" could be found.

4. Phillips asked whether "middle way" meant halfway between 31.5 percent and 25 percent. When Huang nodded, Phillips said he could hold out no hope on this score. Referring to Congressional sentiment, he added that, if US draft res were to fail, Congress might be tempted to slash our voluntary contributions to UN system.

5. Huang stated that PRC cannot support US draft res and pointed out that not much money involved in any event. Noting that Congress had already taken firm position on 25 percent, Huang said China would prefer to handle matter through normal UN financial processes.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong.

6. Phillips agreed only \$13 million at stake but stressed importance of principle involved. Admitting that Congress had acted on matter recently, he recalled February 1972 Presidential policy statement in support of 25 percent in response to earlier recommendation of Lodge Commission. He also stressed intent of US to negotiate within UN context to achieve Presidential policy. Phillips concluded with request for Chinese abstention or, at very least, Chinese decision not to lead crusade against US.

7. Smiling, Huang promised they would study matter and mentioned again desirability of "middle way."

8. *Comment:* While it far from certain that China will abstain on 25 percent, we believe that Chinese now better understand context of issue, which may lead them to temper their statements and actions. If so, we will have realized our purpose in talking again with them.

Bush

203. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 21, 1972, 0406Z.

4860. Subj: Reduction in US Assessment.

Summary: Ten reps spoke Nov 20 in UNGA 5th Comite on US draft res (A/C.5/L.1091). Three expressed support, 3 opposed, and 4 waffled.

1. Yugo kicked off debate with long elliptical defense of capacity to pay principle quoting Mexican, Canadian and UK interventions in defense of same during 1946 debate in UNGA on assessment question. Said "despite welcomed US voluntary support of UNDP, Yugo del cannot support US initiative."

2. Ghana (Cleland) called for additional time to study US proposal since doubtful that implications on US and other dels of draft res had been fully studied. Referring to Lodge Commission recommendation that reduction in US assessment to 25 percent be achieved over number of years, asked whether US del prepared to consider postponement.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Accra, Belgrade, Buenos Aires, Colombo, Jidda, Lagos, Monrovia, Port-au-Prince, and Santo Domingo.

Citing rumored US disenchantment with UN, particularly after PRC admission during 26th session GA, wondered whether submission draft res at this GA might confirm these apprehensions. Proposed whole issue of ceiling be referred to Contributions Comite for study and report to 28th GA. Believed US del shld not find it difficult to accept this proposal for delay, since US willing to wait for admission of two Germanys to UN to apply reduction.

3. Cuba (Rodriguez) made strong defense of capacity to pay principle, and questioned concept of ceiling on major contribution. Added that ceiling on maximum has brought about situation in which during past 15 years other countries have absorbed part of US share (used figure of 7 per cent being absorbed by other members each year), stated that with increases of GNP over past years all countries paying more to UN regular budget except one (US). Repeated arguments made during general debate in Comite that US deriving great economic advantage from UN being located in US. Said economic benefit to US averages \$1 billion on gross yearly, and \$700 million net. (FYI—Cuban figures up from \$600 million two weeks ago.) Concluded that his del wld cast categorical no on US res.

4. Liberia (Morris) gave eloquent and forceful defense of US multilateral assistance since World War II. Questioned whether any member in chamber cld with clear conscience question US generosity. Rather than horde gold bullion in Fort Knox, said US had transformed it into international medium of exchange permitting expansion of world trade during past half century which had effect of binding world together. Re economic benefits to US, said those received from UN expenditures in US “pale in comparison with good accomplished.” Tracing US draft res to 1946 Vandenberg position, expressed firm support for US.

5. Haitian rep, in announcing support for US proposal, also stressed continuity of 25 percent goal since 1946.

6. Argentina (De Prat Gay) cited recent increase in liquidity among industrialized countries and increased ability to pay. In low key said GOA was opposed to US res. Wld support Brazilian res (A/C.5/L.1092) calling for increased budget to low per capita income members.

7. Sri Lanka opened by expressing appreciation for what US had done since World War II for developing countries, including his own. Added “when history of 20th century written this will be recorded as outstanding contribution to betterment of the world as whole.” However, had number of difficulties with US proposal, especially it violating capacity to pay criterion. Nevertheless, his del was prepared to accept in principle ceiling reduction to 25 per cent; cld not support this being done immediately; but shld be carried out progressively in accordance with existing criteria. Also concerned that use of points provided by new members wld preclude downward revision for less

affluent countries. Said cld not support proposal in toto and requested para-by-para vote of US draft res in separate vote. Sri Lanka wld vote for subpara (a) against subpara (b) and abstain on subpara (c).

8. Nigerian member tied US proposal to failure of US to achieve its objectives when China question voted at 26th GA. Also concerned that US action now was sign of diminution of US interest in UN, including US use of veto for first time on an African issue (Rhodesia). Suggested US furnish Contributions Comite with appropriate info for detailed study of question at later date.

9. Dominican Republic (Dipp-Gomez) enthusiastically supported US proposal, noting that it provided opportunity for UN to establish its financial independence.

10. Saudi Arabia (Baroody), after consulting with US rep, made long and impassioned plea to Comite to "face the facts" of reality. On question, UN had been jolted by recent action of US Congress, but for UN reps to vote against US res wld have no salutary effect on US Congress; on contrary, it might cause vindictiveness by Congress. Speaking to all dels, but especially small members, attempted to reduce US proposal to its simplest terms, i.e., request by US to reduce its current contribution to UN by \$13.5 million from total amount contributed of \$400 plus million; members must make choice between former reduction and likely further reduction against other \$400 million. Queried: "What will have been gained by opposing US resolution?" Losers wld be all members, especially LDC's who need UN. Recalled that US Congress had reduced US payment to ILO. Saying he was "not pitching for US", Baroody emphasized he was simply facing realities even though he didn't like it. He pleaded against hasty action on part of members to vote against US res. At this point, Baroody took radical turn and drifted off into polemics re need for spending retrenchment policy in UN, freeze on UN budget in real currency for 8 to 10 years, a halt to proliferation of UN bodies, etc. Concluded by calling on US rep to consider phasing [in] over time 6.5 per cent assessment reduction; if not possible asked US to find funds from USG "reserves" in order to circumvent Congressional action. Baroody said he had not yet decided how he wld vote.

Bush

204. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 23, 1972, 0214Z.

4941. Subj: Reduction in US Assessment.

1. While support for US position seems to be gaining generally as we approach likely Nov. 28–29 Fifth Cmte vote,² support among ASEAN nations remains uncertain. Those leaning in our favor (Malaysia and Thailand) apparently do not yet have firm instructions; those non-committal thus far (Indonesia and Singapore) show strong tendencies toward abstention; and, unhappiest of all, our firm commitment of support from the Philippines shows signs of erosion.

2. Our latest country-by-country information is as follows. Thai Amb Anand told DelOff Nov. 20 that they remain likely to support US but final RTG decision not yet taken; this indicates to us that favorable Thai UN del recommendation not yet acted upon in Bangkok. Indonesian Fifth Cmte rep (Gontha) recently told Canadians his del would abstain on issue. Malaysian Counsellor Kamil told MisOff Nov. 21 that GOM UN del inclined to favor voting for US proposal, but would not have firm position for two or three days. Canadians tell us that they have heard indirectly that Singapore will abstain, although Singapore continues to express “sympathy” for our proposal to US directly; we intend yet another approach here. Philippine Fifth Cmte rep told MisOff Nov. 22 that it now uncertain that GOP can support US despite firm assurance support given Amb Bush by General Romulo last month; needless to say we intend prompt Bush follow-up here. Finally, we have word that ASEAN dels met recently to discuss 25 percent and reportedly only Phils had firm instructions to support US at that time.

3. In this situation, we strongly recommend that one final top level approach be made in info addressee capitals unless there is overriding objection or unless, after careful consideration, it is thought that further approach would be counter-productive.

4. While approach will obviously have to be tailored carefully to country involved, info addressees may find it helpful to draw on following points in event approach is made: A) continuing high importance USG (and Congress) attaches to this issue; B) expectation of a roll

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Singapore.

² The vote in the Fifth Committee was rescheduled, first to November 30 and then to December 1. (Telegram 5140 from USUN, November 29, and telegram 217720 to USUN, November 30; both *ibid.*)

call vote which will, of course, be matter of public record; C) increasing support for US proposal on worldwide basis (latest best case estimate shows 55 favorable with additional 10 leaning in favor); D) impressive support among Asian nations, including Australia, Fiji, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos, New Zealand and Philippines (we trust); E) elaboration (to extent believed effective) of possible unhappy consequences of failure of US res to carry; F) possibility that later UNGA plenary consideration will require two-thirds majority making it essential that we have every possible favorable vote.

5. Indonesia is obviously a special case given fact that top leadership now in Europe. We recommend that approach be made in Europe if at all possible, but would of course defer to Dept's final decision.

Bush

205. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 25, 1972, 0145Z.

4981. Subj: Legal Aspects of 25 Percent.

1. On 24 Nov Sloan asked DelOff whether there were any new developments on 25 percent following DelOff's earlier conversation with Stavropoulos. DelOff described US world-wide efforts to secure appropriate vote in Fifth Committee and said we hope to be able to review with Stavropoulos and Sloan legal aspects in detail next week.

2. Sloan said he and Stavropoulos are troubled by the impact of our contention that 25 percent would not require 2/3 in plenary on a hypothetical LDC move at a future session to raise DC assessments by simple majority. DelOff replied this would be entirely different case involving raising a member's assessment against its will. By contrast, our 25 percent proposal involves no increase in any member's assessment; in fact, L.1091 expressly states that reduction can take effect only as additional percentage points become available. Sloan said that one could as well argue that since our proposal entails denying prospective reductions in assessments of various members, it does involve an in-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential; Limdis.

crease in assessments. DelOff countered that this would not in any event be the case for the approximately 70 members whose assessments are at the 0.04 floor; at least as to them the 25 percent proposal involves no denial of prospective benefits whatever.

Bush

206. Editorial Note

The Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee of the UN General Assembly approved the U.S. resolution lowering the maximum assessment rate for any member state to 25 percent on December 1, 1972. The vote was 67 in favor (U.S.), 30 against, 32 abstentions, and 3 absent. (Telegram 5235 from USUN, December 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4)

207. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 5, 1972, 2358Z.

5267. Subject: Legal Aspects of 25 Percent.

1. Fifth Comite chairman and Japanese DepPermRep Ogiso told Sen McGee recently US should not, without further action, assume that Japan would follow US lead in plenary to effect that resolution reducing assessment to 25 percent requires simple majority. Subsequently Japanese MisOff Yamada explained that Japanese del here could go along with US view on simple majority so long as no question is raised in plenary. If, however, GA President or some delegation raises question, he is unsure Japanese would be able to support because they wish to “make the most of the 2/3 requirement.” Since admission of two Germanies would entitle Japan to a reduction in its assessment were it not for the US resolution, they would consider our text as a “budget-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 10–4. Confidential; Limdis; Priority.

ary question" within the meaning of Art 18(2). Yamada said he thought the relinquishment of prospective reductions was as "important" a matter as UN appropriation actions of the sort traditionally considered to involve "budgetary questions."

2. USUN MisOff had private dinner conversation with Polish Legal Adviser Wyzner 29 Nov; Wyzner is serving as Trepczynski's Parliamentary adviser. Wyzner raised question of majority required for adoption of US proposal and said he thought "the better legal argument" would be that US text requires a 2/3 vote in plenary and he was certain the President would be asked so to rule. He thought Trepczynski would not want to make a ruling that would seriously antagonize position of one side or another, however.

3. At 5th Committee meeting 30 Nov, Barbados PermRep Waldron-Ramsey asserted that 2/3 would be required. No further discussion at that meeting.

4. Sloan, Stavropoulos' Deputy, says he thinks Stavropoulos remains of the view that US resolutions, requires 2/3 vote.

5. On 30 Nov Legal Adviser Stevenson indicated to Stavropoulos importance US attributes to 25 percent effort. Stavropoulos said that Trepczynski could be expected, were the question raised in plenary, to turn to Stavropoulos for advice. He said that he continued to think that the better legal argument was to require 2/3. He said that if the US were in a different position, we might well be arguing that 2/3 was necessary. Nevertheless, he had not yet conclusively made up his mind.

6. Australian Fifth Comite rep (Butler) just advised MisOff of receipt instructions from Canberra re requirement for two-thirds vote in plenary.

7. Mission plans to convene meeting of friendly dels to discuss this question, seek views, and solicit support for our res in plenary.

8. Appreciate Dept comments soonest.

Bush

208. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 6, 1972, 2118Z.

5350. For the Secretary from Bush. Subject: Reduction in US Assessment.

1. We were successful in 5th Comite in obtaining approval of our res on this subject, but we need to improve our support for UNGA plenary. Since two-thirds vote may be required in plenary, it is essential that we: (A) Hold firm 67 dels that voted for our res in comite; (B) move some of 32 abstentions into affirmative category; and (C) move some of those that voted negative to abstention and, if possible, to affirmative. We are cranking up here with this objective in mind and on a selective basis suggesting that approaches be made in capitals.

2. We must not be overconfident even to slightest degree re plenary vote. On contrary, we must make every effort possible within next week to garner maximum amount of support for our res in plenary.

3. To that end I suggest you send following cable to all diplomatic posts:²

For the Ambassador from the Secretary

As you are aware, UNGA 5th Comite on Dec 1 favorably approved long-sought USG objective of reducing maximum assessment for UN regular budget to 25 percent. This success, I am convinced, resulted in good measure from high degree of coordination and cooperation, at many levels, among USUN, Embassies and Dept. Our success to date is highly gratifying to me, as I am sure it is to all of you. However, we are not home free yet since our resolution must still be acted upon favorably by plenary, in a vote that we now hope to have, at latest, on Dec 13. We may be faced in plenary with a requirement for a two-thirds vote (of those voting either yes or no). Our 5th Comite margin exceeds two-thirds by only two votes. We must now work toward insuring that Comite supporters stick with us in plenary and toward improving votes of those dels that either abstained or voted negatively in Comite. This is essential particularly in view of the fact that experience shows that some unpredictable changes will occur.

Prior to plenary vote, USUN will be following up on selective basis with dels in effort to maximize plenary margin. In some instances

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

² Sent as telegram 222289 on December 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA)

posts will be asked to make further démarches in capitals to supplement USUN's efforts. If opportunities occur where posts have received no specific follow-up direction, you may be able to consolidate or improve position of host govt. I would caution, however, against any approach that might appear to be gratuitous double-check, that would give rise to negative reconsideration in NY or capitals, or that would be interpreted as excessive pressure by USG. It is important therefore that you exercise particular discretion in making uninstructed contacts in capitals.

Your continued responsiveness to tactical situation in NY will be essential to final vote on this issue. There is no doubt that outcome will be crucial for our future relationship with UN.

Bush

209. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 7, 1972, 0219Z.

5381. Subj: Legal Aspects of 25 Percent. Ref: USUN 5267,² USUN 5312.³

1. For a variety of reasons we think it wise to plan on a 2/3 majority being required in the plenary when our 25 percent resolution is put to the vote. These include the following:

(A) The US has traditionally sought to apply as broadly as is reasonable the protecting provision in Charter Art. 18(2) requiring a 2/3 vote for "budgetary questions." In 1962 the Department told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that scale of assessments questions must be approved by 2/3 vote in the plenary.

(B) UN Legal Counsel Stavropoulos has consistently maintained that our 25 percent resolution requires such a majority. We must plan on his informing GA President Trepczynski who, in response to what seems an almost inevitable request by the USSR or Tanzania, will likely rule that this majority is required or put the matter to the Assembly for a decision.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

² Document 207.

³ Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4)

(C) Such friends as Austria, Australia and Japan have told us of their concern over the possible consequences of the GA proceeding on the basis that a simple majority suffices. They apparently fear a future effort to raise their assessed shares and believe a simple-majority ruling or determination in the 25 percent case could imperil their ability to argue that their assessments can be changed only with a 2/3 vote. They have remained worried even in the face of our explanation that cases can be distinguished and that a simple majority can be defended for our resolution since it expressly denies the possibility of raising any member state's assessment.

(D) Given the Trepczynski Presidency, the best we could hope for would be that when the procedural question were raised, he would put it to the GA for decision. In order to carry a simple-majority-only proposition, we would have had to have lobbied and lobbied hard. Not only would the result be unpredictable but such corridor work might well detract from our basic lobbying task of getting support on 25 percent.

(E) We must recognize that certain of those who voted with us in Fifth Committee did so only because they were instructed to do so. They might welcome the development of any procedural dispute that might "create a new situation" in which they would change their votes adversely and take the risk of arguing with their foreign offices that a change was justified by unforeseen events.

2. Against this background we spoke to Under Secretaries Morse and Stavropoulos to say we would not object were Stavropoulos to inform Trepczynski of Stavropoulos' opinion that under the better legal view, a 2/3 vote, is needed.⁴ Morse said he thought we could not count on winning a battle over simple-majority-only and are right to concentrate on the substance of the matter. Stavropoulos said he was gratified; he took our point that the optimum handling of the matter might be for Trepczynski to rule, if asked to do so, that 2/3 is required. He agreed to keep in touch on scenarios. (We also went over the same ground with Stavropoulos' deputy, Sloan, who had earlier been very helpful on this issue.)

3. We are informing Amb Nakagawa in confidence that, in part because of strong Japanese views, we are prepared not to object to a 2/3 ruling. We are telling others, such as Saudi Arabia, that since a 2/3 vote "may be required," we simply must have their support.

⁴ Stavropoulos' statement to the December 13 Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly before the vote was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-1802 from USUN, December 18. (Ibid.)

4. Since we fear that open US espousal of application of the 2/3 rule might dissuade Trepczynski from so ruling and instead put the matter to the GA, we are at this point continuing to tell our friends that 2/3 "may be required." In a day or two we will tell them we have decided, in view of the many concerns involved, not to object to such a ruling.

Bush

210. Editorial Note

The UN General Assembly approved Resolution 2961B (XXVII) lowering the maximum contribution of any member state to ordinary UN expenses to 25 percent on December 13, 1972, by a vote of 81 in favor, 27 against, with 22 abstaining and 2 absent. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972* (New York, 1975), pages 712 and 717)

Secretary-General Succession

211. Editorial Note

On September 1, 1966, Secretary-General U Thant announced that he did not intend to seek a second term. He later agreed to serve until the end of the current session of the General Assembly. On December 2, however, he agreed to accept a second term after having been re-elected unanimously by the Security Council and the General Assembly. (Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson (eds.), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume VII: U Thant, 1965–1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pages 286–310)

During a press conference on January 18, 1971, Thant announced that he had “no intention whatsoever of serving beyond the present term.” He had not changed his opinion that a Secretary-General should not serve for more than one term. When he had agreed to serve a second term in 1966, he had already decided that it would be his last term. (Ibid., *Volume VIII: U Thant, 1968–1971*, page 540)

Even before this date, the U.S. Mission observed that other countries were showing an interest in who might succeed U Thant. On July 8, 1970, U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost reported that Panamanian Representative Aquilino Boyd, Chairman of the Latin American Group at the UN, was seeking support for a Latin American candidate; Mexican Representative Francisco Cuevas Cancino was a possibility. On July 17 the Department advised Yost not to become involved in the succession question. (Telegram 1423 from USUN, July 8, 1970, and telegram 114488 to USUN, July 17, 1970; both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 298, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IV)

212. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 20, 1971, 0030Z.

986. Subj: Successor to SYG.

1. Finnish PermRep Jakobson called on Bush April 19 to fill us in on his campaign to succeed U Thant.

2. Jakobson reported on his extensive trip to Asia. He had been well received everywhere and Indonesian FonMin Malik agreed that there was little prospect Asians could unite behind Asian candidate. Amerasinghe of Ceylon did not have strong backing.

3. Same situation obtained with Africans. Jakobson estimated there virtually no chance AFs could unite behind Makonnen.

4. LA's seemed bereft of candidates as well. He admitted that if LA's could unite behind a strong candidate that such a challenge would be formidable.

5. When asked about Waldheim, Jakobson noted he currently running for President of Austria. If, as anticipated, he not elected then he would maintain his candidacy.

6. Bush asked about attitude of Soviets. Jakobson said as long as there chance U Thant could be drafted then Soviets will not endorse another candidate since he probably their preferred choice.

7. When asked about attitude of Arabs, Jakobson said there had been no Arab group position. He noted Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco had rejected any religious criteria and he thought this helpful. GOF had denied press reports Mrs. Jakobson was Zionist.

8. To above we would add recent conversation Pol Couns had with Swiss Chargé. Latter estimated Jakobson's chances of succeeding U Thant were dead. Both Arabs and Soviets were opposed. When Swiss questioned Arabs they were told Soviets were against Jakobson. Soviets, in turn, said Arabs opposed. Swiss concluded Arabs did not wish to state real reason—objection on religious grounds—neither did Soviets—Jakobson's views on Finnish neutrality—so each cited the other. Swiss Chargé's canvass of other groups tallied with Jakobson's above. He concluded, "U Thant was not the first candidate but he will be the final one."

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta, Helsinki, London, and Moscow.

213. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 10, 1971, 1300Z.

1196. For the Secretary. Subj: Successor to U Thant.

1. I have reluctantly concluded that our preferred candidate, Jakobson, cannot be elected because of Sov and Arab opposition and because of current Afro-Asian preference for U Thant. I am persuaded that unless we move promptly: to decide on an alternative candidate who has a chance of being elected, and to eliminate the possibility that U Thant could be drafted again, we will wind up at the 26th GA with U Thant reelected to a full five year term.

2. Malik on several occasions has raised the succession problem with me. Although I have been non-committal, he has confirmed what Timerbayev told us at the SALT talks—Jakobson is definitely not acceptable to the Sovs. Malik was less blunt with me in stating the Sov position, rather he noted Arab opposition to Jakobson and the preference of Francophone Africans for U Thant. However, we have other reliable reports of clear Sov opposition to Jakobson and their present preference for U Thant, views which they are making known to other dels. At present, Jakobson is building his campaign on the premise that he is the only candidate acceptable to the PRC, a tactic which we do not believe will work.

3. We have not approached the Arabs directly on this matter for obvious reasons. When the subject arises, Arabs usually say Jakobson is unacceptable but are not precise as to reason. They note Sov opposition to Jakobson and some are effusive in their praise for U Thant. At least in New York they are inhibited from revealing the true basis for their opposition which is religious prejudice.

4. Although U Thant has repeatedly stated his intention not to serve beyond his present term he has carefully not closed the door on a possible draft. There are reliable stories that some of his close associates on the 38th floor have been at pains to point out the liabilities of other announced candidates. Moreover, at a luncheon organized by De Pinies of Spain at which Malik, several Africans and some LA's were present, and in response to OCAM approach (USUN 1044)² the SYG

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the White House for Kissinger.

² Telegram 1044 summarized a motion made at the Heads of State Conference of the Central African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Organization (OCAM), at Fort-Lamy, Chad, on January 28, 1971, which congratulated Secretary-General Thant "for his untiring action in favor of peace and justice in world and notably for his initiatives toward underprivileged countries," and expressed the hope that he would remain in office in order to continue his work. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

did not adopt a clearcut stand when hope expressed for his continued service after 1971. Few doubt that he is available for a draft if not covertly pursuing one.

5. I think I should point out that this support for Thant is not so much positive as it is a combination of essentially negative factors: (A) the Sovs and the Arabs for different reasons do not like Jakobson, (B) many Africans do not want another European yet they cannot unite behind Makonnen or another African and U Thant's strong views on apartheid and colonialism are appreciated by them, (C) LA's have not been able to come up with outstanding candidate of their own.

6. I am personally convinced that another term for U Thant would be unfortunate for the UN. If absolutely necessary, we could probably live with his substantive differences with us on such issues as Indochina. However, his lack of interest or ability in administering and coordinating something as complex and important as the UN system is, in my judgment, a disqualifying disability. Among other things, he has taken no effective action to help meet the UN's desperate financial plight nor has he attracted and utilized strong lieutenants.

7. Therefore, I believe we must promptly:

(A) Find an acceptable and electable alternative to Jakobson and U Thant. In doing so, we must take into account the possibility that the PRC will be in the SC and in a position to cast a vote when the new SYG is elected.

(B) Consult with others to obtain geographically balanced core of active support for the alternative.

(C) Inform Thant frankly that we have taken him at his word when he said he had no intention of serving beyond his current term and that we are actively seeking an acceptable alternative. In this process we would make it clear that we would not under any circumstances support him for a third term. (In order to provide an incentive, I believe we should generate an attractive employment offer for Thant here in New York. I would be happy to help on such a project.)

(D) At the appropriate time, we should have a frank talk with the Sovs, make our position on Thant clear, and try to agree on a successor.

8. As to alternatives, Amerasinghe of Ceylon is the only active candidate who now appears to have both the necessary qualifications and the possibility of obtaining widespread support. He has overcome a major hurdle in obtaining his government's endorsement. Our experience with him on the seabeds committee has been good. He is an activist chairman who has maintained the respect of all. He is not anti-Western or anti-US and has been willing in the past to take our views into account. His background as a Ceylonese civil servant and permanent sec of the Finance Ministry has given him experience in the field of management and administration where U Thant is notably weak. In addition, he is not European which is a major asset in task of winning

the support of the Afro-Asian majority. Although he is fundamentally conservative, he is the nominee of a leftist govt which has good relations with the Sovs and the PRC.

9. If for any reason we should not wish to back Amerasinghe, there is no dearth of capable men who might be induced to run. Other possibilities include:

(A) Adam Malik of Indonesia who will be president of the 26th GA. (While the FDVS would not be happy about Malik they are interested in improving their relations with Indonesia. Unfortunately, Malik does not have a reputation as an outstanding administrator.)

(B) Gunnar Jarring of Sweden. (Given Afro-Asian sensibilities, there is doubt that any European could get the necessary support.)

(C) Former President Frei of Chile. Here the difficulty might be in getting the support of Allende. However, were he to do so, the Sovs would have a hard time opposing him because he is a LA.)

(D) Majid Rahnema, former Iranian Minister of Science, scientific research and advance training. (Iranians are willing to run Rahnema provided his prospects are good. We might keep him in mind as a dark horse.)

(E) Former Mexican FonMin Carillo Flores. (It is not known whether Carillo Flores could obtain the backing of President Echeverria. If he could, he would be a strong candidate.)

(F) Prince Sadruddin Khan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (Prince Sadruddin has done an excellent job, but he is largely untested in the political field.)

10. I would appreciate your views on the above.

Bush

214. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (De Palma) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

U Thant's Decision to Retire

The attached message reporting Ambassador Bush's talk with U Thant May 25² appears to provide all the clarification we need re-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by De Palma.

² Telegram 1378 from USUN, May 25; attached but not printed.

garding the Secretary General's intentions. While he did not say he would refuse to be drafted he did state unequivocally that his decision to retire at the end of this term is "final". He made the same statement May 25 to a conference of non-governmental organizations in New York. Accordingly, I see no need for another approach to U Thant as we were contemplating in the message which was sent to the White House for clearance. That message has been recalled.

I do, however, believe we should promptly get the word out that we are satisfied the rumors about U Thant's availability for another term are without foundation. After the usual expressions of appreciation for his period of service, we could indicate that we are convinced it will be necessary to face up to the question of a successor this fall, that there are a number of qualified candidates and others who may yet become available and that we shall have to begin looking seriously at their prospects for election.

In response to questions about our choice, we would state that we have made no decision but that, while it will be difficult, we feel it should be possible to reach agreement in the first instance among the Permanent Members on a worthy and strong successor.

I have agreed to see Henry Tanner of the *New York Times* Thursday, May 27. I do not know what he wants to discuss other than "UN matters". If you agree, I could steer the conversation toward this question and, on background, make the points indicated above.

I also suggest that Ambassador Bush be authorized to inform the UK and French Permanent Representatives of his talk with U Thant and of our intention to undertake a serious study of the qualifications and prospects of possible successors. He could state that we will want to consult them closely in due time regarding tactics for dealing with the Soviets on this matter.

*Recommendations:*³

1. That I be authorized along the above lines to discuss with Henry Tanner our interest in a successor to U Thant.
2. That Ambassador Bush be authorized to discuss this matter along the same lines with the UK and French Representatives.

³ Rogers initialed his approval of both recommendations on May 26. Authorization for Bush to discuss the succession question with the British and French Representatives was sent to him in telegram 93937 to USUN, May 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI)

215. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Successor to U Thant

Attached is a cable reporting George Bush's discussion with U Thant to which I referred in my memo to you of yesterday.²

This is as flat a disclaimer from U Thant as we can possibly want, and it was reinforced by an equally unequivocal and public statement to the NGO group yesterday.³ There is, therefore, no need whatever for us further to probe the sincerity of his non-candidacy.

State has, therefore, put before Secretary Rogers the opening steps of an action campaign by us looking toward the selection of a new Secretary General. It involves primarily consultation with the British and French (including discussions as to how and when to approach the Russians on this issue), and an active examination of the merits of the various possible candidates.

As I assume you are aware, there is very strong sentiment in State in favor of Jakobson. There has, however, been no commitment to him. Moreover, it is agreed by all that open support for his candidacy at this point would hurt rather than help his candidacy.

I am told that Secretary Rogers may raise this matter with the President tomorrow.⁴ I have also had a call from Cabot Lodge in which he expressed the conviction that the time has come for us to get vigorously into the business [of] selecting a successor. Without pushing the point hard, Lodge expressed the view that Jakobson not only would be a good candidate but, Lodge thought, a feasible one. Lodge asked

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger's handwritten note in the margin reads: "Jakobson looks alright to me."

² Telegram 1378 from USUN, May 25, is attached but not printed. In his May 25 memorandum to Kissinger, Wright noted that Bush's report superseded a telegram of instructions that was being drafted for Bush. (Ibid.)

³ Not found.

⁴ Secretary of State Rogers met with President Nixon on May 27 between 2:42 and 4:09 p.m. No record of this meeting has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

me to pass on to you his feelings on this matter, and he hoped you would make them known to the President.

I will, inevitably, get caught up in all this. Therefore, if you have any particular views on this matter or any instructions by which you wish me to be guided, we should chat about it.

216. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 3, 1971, 2324Z.

1480. Subj: Successor to U Thant—Consultation With UK and French Reps. Ref: State 093937.²

1. UK Chargé Jamieson, accompanied by Weston, called on Phillips June 2 for exchange of views on Secretary-Generalship. Similar discussion held June 3 with French Deputy De La Gorce. British and French concur time has come for Four to commence giving thought to question of a successor, and Jamieson and De La Gorce indicated Four Power ME talks "tea-break" would, in their view, furnish most suitable arena for initial discussion with Soviets. Phillips briefed British and French on Thant's statement to Bush, and told them USG has concluded this must be accepted at face value and that way is now open for active consideration of acceptable successor.

2. Jamieson reported that Parsons (FCO) had talked with French in London on question of Secretary-Generalship. French in London vague on Quai's position, and Parsons gave impression matter has not been given much consideration in Paris. Jamieson gave Phillips copy of a list, compiled originally in NY and revised in London by Parsons, of candidates for SYG. Listed are three declared candidates: Jakobson, Makonnen and Amerasinghe, plus large number of "other names mentioned," classified as "possible" and "impossible." Qualification pertains to individual's chance of being elected rather than to his personal qualities, although in some cases these factors coincide. The "possibles" include four Asians, seven West Europeans (four Swedes and three Finns), one EE, one African and eight LA's. The "impossible" include six Asians, five West Europeans, one EE, three Africans and seven LA's. Jamieson

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Paris.

² See footnote 3, Document 214.

observed even this long list not all inclusive and necessarily subjective. Phillips said a number of the listing would obviously give us trouble, i.e., Mme. Myrdal. It was agreed that for purpose of further discussion such list would have to be pared down drastically.

3. Commenting on most active individual candidates, Jamieson and Weston had following to say:

Jakobson: They were afraid Soviets had some definite reason for objecting to him, perhaps related to positions taken in past by Jakobson on Soviet-Finnish relations. British think Soviets likely to pursue every possible avenue to try block Jakobson;

Makonnen: His candidacy not doing well even in Africa and UK opposes him as they would any AF candidate;

Amerasinghe: His candidacy just beginning to roll and he may prove to be dark horse in this race;

Waldheim: British oppose him, consider him lightweight and add he not only a European but does not even have support in European group.

4. Jamieson suggested further consultations between our missions and contacts with French, leading to a sounding out of Soviets at a future Four-Power meeting. Jamieson specifically suggested Four-Power meeting due take place in two or three weeks with Bush as host. Phillips and Jamieson agreed sound out French as first step toward this objective, meanwhile reporting to our capitals and obtaining instructions.

5. When De La Gorce came in June 3 to discuss other matters with Phillips, latter raised Thant's succession. After briefing him on Bush/Thant conversation, Phillips inquired if French had given consideration to this question. De La Gorce appeared uninformed of his govt's position. This confirms Jamieson's report that when he spoke to De La Gorce last week about this subject, he found latter uninformed and not greatly interested. De La Gorce said Kosciusko-Morizet was thinking of asking Malik June 4, at conclusion of Four-Power meeting, if he would be prepared at some future date to begin discussion with French, UK and US of Thant's succession question. French idea is to plant the seed at this time and permit Malik to seek instructions from Moscow. When MisOff briefed Weston on meeting with De La Gorce, latter said UKUN had been further considering question of discussing potential candidates with Soviets as had been suggested on June 2. British fear, and we inclined to agree, that Soviets might like nothing better than to get list of names acceptable to Western Big Three which they could then methodically undermine in UN corridors during coming weeks. Would appear better, therefore, to obtain commitment from Malik of willingness to discuss this subject before we go into specifics and even then to proceed with extreme caution.

Bush

217. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 4, 1971, 2310Z.

1499. Subj: USSR Attitude on SYG question. Ref: USUN 1480.²

1. Kosciusko-Morizet declined to raise with Malik question of discussing informally possible candidates for SYG, alleging lack of instructions from Paris. Therefore, UK Chargé Jamieson asked Malik after June 4 Four Power talk what Malik would think of the four discussing question informally at break during next meeting June 24. Malik rejected idea as premature. Jamieson and Phillips pointed out to Malik that there was new element which perhaps called for early examination of question. U Thant has now made it clear in several public statements and in private conversation with Bush that he does not intend serve past expiration of his present term. Malik still refused, saying that it too soon and Moscow has not yet had time to consider matter. Perhaps in August.

2. Phillips subsequently raised matter with Lessiovski of UN Secretariat who said that Malik could never have agreed discuss matter without authorization from Moscow. Moreover, question not that urgent since Lessiovski of opinion U Thant merely playing clever game and really desires be drafted next fall. (*Comment:* Urquhart of UN Sec believes U Thant genuinely does not wish to continue past present term and is presently opposed to idea of draft. Lessiovski told UK last week he thought U Thant through as candidate for draft. Therefore we do not take too seriously his statement to Phillips.)

3. In view of negative attitude of USSR and equivocal attitude of French we and UKUN believe it would be preferable confine to US and UK for present any detailed discussion of potential successor to U Thant. Unless such discussions very tightly held, they could leak with damaging effect to other members of UN.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Paris.

² Document 216.

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 16, 1971, 2105Z.

107205. Subj: Succession of U Thant.

1. Amb Waldheim called on Acting Assistant Secretary Herz (IO) June 15 to review prospects for his possible candidacy for UN Secretary Generalship. He said while he has assurance of complete and active support of Austrian Government it had been his feeling that it would be mistake to put forward formal candidacy since agreement among SC members should grow up as consensus, as had been case with Lie, Hammarskjold and U Thant.

2. Herz said that while US has not decided on how to proceed, it would seem that situation different from that of previous vacancies. We believe U Thant genuinely does not wish to serve. Soviets and others seem to doubt this. As long as there are no active candidacies (other than that of Jakobson) situation might arise where there simply aren't enough candidates from whom to choose. Herz noted that Amerasinghe and Makonnen candidacies seem at dead center. Although we do not credit the reports that Jakobson has Soviets and/or Arabs against him, his prospects are also not clear at present time.

3. Waldheim said Austrians have made it known obliquely in several capitals that he might be available as candidate. Several Foreign Ministries had inquired whether he would put forward formal candidacy, among them Japan and Australia, also Diallo Telli of OAU. He said he had touched upon his possible availability in talks with PermReps in New York and had concluded there is interesting symmetry among US and USSR positions in that each does not wish to have it known whom it favors, for fear that the other would oppose. Waldheim also reported that Kosciusco-Morizet (France) had told him that while his country had not made up its mind he could state categorically that France would not vote for any candidate for SYG who does not speak French. Waldheim added he speaks French fluently and expressed doubts that same can be said about Jakobson.

4. On June 16 Waldheim also called on Counselor Pedersen, making most of same points. He said he was having lunch with UN press correspondents on June 29 and would answer questions by affirming his availability, with Austrian Govt support, if member states were to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Confidential. Repeated to Vienna. Drafted by Herz and Counselor Richard F. Pedersen and approved by Herz.

seek his services; but he would not be, at that time in any case, a "candidate". Waldheim said Austrian Govt was now circularizing a number of posts to let them know of his availability and of Govt backing.² Pedersen reiterated that USG had not taken any decisions, that we took U Thant's desire to retire as being serious, and that we were actively interested in encouraging attention of states to question of agreeing on new SYG. Said he thought Waldheim's approach seemed sensible, that it was important for Govts to know Austrian Govt supported him, and that decision on formal "candidacy" could only be made by him on basis tactical considerations in New York.

5. Waldheim said his impression of Soviet position was that they still seemed to prefer U Thant but had not come to any conclusion as to whom else they would prefer when convinced U Thant not available. He said U Thant had told him firmly that he did not want another term. He had also said one or two year extension not acceptable, as such term would put SYG in weak position.

Rogers

² On July 21 the Austrian Embassy in Washington sent an aide-mémoire to the U.S. Government concerning Waldheim's willingness to serve as UN Secretary-General. (Ibid.)

219. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 18, 1971, 2305Z.

1654. Subj: Successor to U Thant.

1. Finnish PermRep Jakobson, who has just returned from Helsinki, called on Bush June 17 to bring him up to date on his campaign to succeed U Thant.

2. Arabs. Jakobson reported on results special emissary sent to Maghreb capitals. Reaction had been uniformly favorable and all three govts had dissociated themselves from action of Arab group reported to have taken place in NY. All three denied their reps had taken part in Arab group meeting on basis of authorization and indicated they

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Helsinki.

would not join in future efforts of this kind since they considered them to be inimical to Arab interests. There was no Arab position on successor to Thant and there not likely to be one. Algeria had been most forthcoming and had indicated GOA might be prepared support Jakobson. Reactions similar to those of Maghreb countries had also come from Finnish Embassies in Jordan and Lebanon. Emissary sent to OAU meeting would stop in Cairo but best Finns could hope for is UAR neutrality. (This is in line with our assessment USUN 1530.)²

3. Africa. Jakobson reported President Kekkonen had sent letters to Kaunda, Nyeyere and Senghor. Response had been sympathetic and GOF confident OAU would not adopt appeal to U Thant to accept another term.

4. LA's. Special Finn emissary now making rounds of certain LA capitals and Jakobson will report results when known.

5. Basically, Jakobson said, picture pretty much same as when he and Bush last talked (USUN 1256).³ Idea that U Thant wants to be drafted persists even among "disinterested" dels. In response to question, Jakobson said it would be helpful if US were to emphasize importance of change. Although many dels believed change was necessary, they also believed if Thant wanted another term he could have it. Bush said rather than stressing US wants change, we should perhaps adopt posture there will be change and this will help stimulate serious consideration of other candidates. Jakobson agreed.

6. Soviets. Jakobson said Sovs posture was it too early to take position on various candidates. This was legitimate answer since in a sense it was too early. In his view, Sov first preference was U Thant who they hoped would be drafted. When time for decision came, Jakobson believed Sovs would support him. Kekkonen had raised question with Sovs in February and if they had objections they could have said so.

7. French. Jakobson said French position similar to Sovs. While they would prefer another term for U Thant they could never oppose a qualified Finnish candidate. On the whole, Jakobson thought French were passive as were British.

8. Bush briefed Jakobson on his May 24 talk with Thant (USUN 1378)⁴ and said SYG understood US felt free to consider other candidates.

² Telegram 1530 from USUN described meetings with members of the Algerian and Lebanese Missions, who were noncommittal toward Jakobson's candidacy but said that the Arab states preferred either a second term for U Thant or H.S. Amerasinghe's candidacy. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

³ Dated May 13. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI)

⁴ In telegram 1378 from USUN, May 25, Bush reported that U Thant had assured him that he would not be a candidate for another term, and had said as much on two recent occasions. (Ibid., Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI)

9. *Comment:* Unfortunately USUN 1626 crossed State 108833 as reported USUN 1626,⁵ we are attracted to names on working level UK list as well as order of preference with exception of Guyer.

We concur with Dept's strategy para 7 State 108833. Our object should be to work closely with UK to encourage others to think seriously about choosing new SYG. It would help if US and UK were now to be more outspoken in their conviction U Thant's decision final and we actively considering various possible successors with view to electing successor at 26th GA. Without endorsing any particular candidate, we should seek to create political climate which excludes possible draft of Thant. To this end, believe we should actively work on attractive employment offer to Thant and seek his acceptance prior to 26th GA.

Sovs have recently muted their assertions Jakobson unacceptable to Arabs. We agree Jakobson is current front runner and given Finnish efforts with Arabs latter may ultimately be effectively neutralized. Jakobson still has lot of work to do with Asians, Africans and LA's. There is big gap between sympathy or non-opposition and declared support. Should latter materialize on meaningful scale, Jakobson stands chance of maneuvering Sovs and French into acquiescence.

For reasons previously reported, we believe both Adam Malik of Indonesia and former Pres Frei of Chile would be outstanding candidates if they would be interested in running. (Assessment of Embassies Djakarta and Santiago would be welcome.)

There have been indications that, in event U Thant not available, Ceylonese PermRep Amerasinghe is second choice of Arabs. Fact that he is Asian, has strong administrative background, and is basically pro-West, yet nominee of left-leaning developing country are assets that make him second strongest current candidate. We must bear in mind that there is considerable resistance beneath surface to another European SYG. Waldheim of Austria is definitely dark horse at this stage. We also concur chances of Makonnen of Ethiopia appear to be nil.

Bush

⁵ Telegram 1626 from USUN, June 17, reported on a meeting on June 16 in which U.S. and British Mission officers discussed potential candidates for Secretary-General. (Ibid., Vol. VII) Telegram 108833 to USUN, June 18, proposed that Bush follow up on his informal consultations with his British counterpart about the search for a new Secretary-General. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

220. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 29, 1971, 2238Z.

1747. Subj: Bush–Makonnen Talk June 28.

1. Ethiopian candidate for SYG Endalkachew Makonnen called on Bush June 28. Makonnen said one did not campaign for office of SYG as in other contests and that he had made it clear he was candidate only in event U Thant not available for another term.

2. Bush said he was very pleased to make Makonnen's acquaintance. As result U Thant's confirmation that he did not intend to serve beyond his present term, Bush said he had informed SYG that US took him at his word and that we actively considering qualified replacement. We had not decided in favor of any candidate at this stage. Makonnen said this was wise since if US were to come out in favor of a particular candidate too soon this could be a liability.

3. Makonnen said he had been very pleased at action of OAU. President had noted Makonnen was only announced African candidate and stated he was certain this fact would be taken into account within spirit of African solidarity when time for election came. Makonnen said he did not wish to have formal OAU endorsement since he did not wish to appear to be regional candidate. On other hand, President's statement meant that there would be no other African candidate.

4. In reply to question, Makonnen said some African Moslem states had certain reservations because of Ethiopia's ties with Israel. However, he did not think this would be serious problem. Soviets were somewhat cool because of close relations between US and Ethiopia but here again Makonnen did not think this would be serious liability.

5. Makonnen raised possibility of meeting Secretary with whom he served on South West Africa committee. Bush explained, while he was certain Secretary would be happy to see his former colleague, such a step could be misconstrued. Makonnen readily agreed. Bush suggested he see Asst Secretaries De Palma and Newsom and Makonnen said he would be most happy to do [so] and requested appointments for July 2.²

Bennett

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa.

² A memorandum of conversation of Makonnen's meeting with Assistant Secretary De Palma is *ibid.*

221. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, July 2, 1971, 2049Z.

119761. Subj: Successor to U Thant.

1. FYI. Dept concerned that despite U Thant's recent reiteration of earlier statement he not candidate for reappointment, there still is disposition to question finality Thant's decision and assume he would, as in 1966, respond to draft. Many UN members therefore appear inclined take easiest way out and not address themselves to question of suitable successor. This situation raises possibility that opportunity may go by default to appoint well qualified successor who would bring to crucial and difficult SYG post greater vigor and administrative/managerial ability than U Thant has demonstrated. End FYI.

2. We do not wish to make any formal approach to governments at this time but we do want to encourage others to accept as fact need to find successor to U Thant and to stimulate them to active consideration of problem. As informal occasion arises to raise subject with official of responsible level or to respond to queries, you should draw on following to discuss SYG question:

(a) US has good reason to take at face value U Thant's statements to press on January 18 and June 3 and to conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on May 25 that his decision not to be candidate for reappointment is final (his term expires at end 1971). It is our understanding that he has taken this line also with delegates who are pressing him to allow himself to be drafted.

(b) US has so far taken no firm position on successor to U Thant, and we have little indication of views of other UN members. However, we believe time has come to search for best qualified candidate. Obviously, to be successful candidate must be acceptable to UN membership generally and to five permanent members of Security Council, and development of necessary consensus takes time and active effort. If such consensus is to develop over next few months, other UN mem-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Armitage and Hartley; cleared in draft by Ambassador Bush; cleared by Daniel Goott, William Witman, Masters, Curran, B.A. Poole, Assistant Secretary Sisco, and Pedersen; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to Abidjan, Accra, Amman, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Bogota, Brussels, Bucharest, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Dakar, Djakarta, Dublin, Freetown, The Hague, Islamabad, Kinshasa, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Managua, Manila, Mexico City, Monrovia, Nairobi, New Delhi, Ottawa, Rabat, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Tokyo, Tunis, and Wellington. Repeated to London and USUN.

bers will have to begin soon to give serious consideration to question of finding best qualified successor.

(c) We also place great stress on need for SYG with outstanding qualifications as statesman and with managerial talent to weld Secretariat into effective organization and to attack UN's serious financial problems. We view candidate's ability as far outweighing any regional consideration.

(d) We are aware of only three announced candidates. (1) Most active is Max Jakobson who has endorsement of Scandinavian countries and for whom soundings have been taken with number of governments. Some question of Arab attitudes toward him have been raised, but as far as we know no formal objections have yet been voiced. He appears to enjoy considerable degree of respect among UN colleagues as effective mediator and conciliator. He has had long experience in UN matters and has been Finland's permanent representative since 1965.

(2) Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe (Ceylon) has recently been endorsed by his Government but we do not know how many other governments, either Asian or other, have been approached on his behalf.² Amerasinghe is career civil servant who has served as permanent secretary in Ministry of Finance and External Affairs, High Commissioner to India and since 1967 as Ceylon Permanent Representative to the UN. He has handled competently the thorny chore of Chairman of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed.

(3) Endalkachew Makonnen has been Ethiopian Minister of Communications since 1969 and was Ethiopian Permanent Representative to UN 1966–1969. He has the endorsement of his government but we are not aware of official representations on his behalf. President of OAU summit meeting noted Makonnen candidacy but summit did not endorse it.

(4) Former Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim, recently defeated in his bid for Austrian Presidency, and now Austria's UN rep, while not a formal candidate has let it be known he would be available for SYG post.

(e) Among others whose names have surfaced as possible SYG is UN High Commissioner for Refugees Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (Iran) who has also served with UNESCO. Dept has as yet no basis to weigh measure of his support. We also believe it possible Latin American candidate could yet develop.

² Amerasinghe announced that he was not a candidate for UN Secretary-General on July 6. (Telegram 2010 from Colombo, July 9; *ibid.*)

(f) If host government official volunteers any views Dept would be interested.

3. *For Kuala Lumpur:* You should reply to MFA inquiry reported Kuala Lumpur 2241³ above lines, adding that Dept gratified know GOM currently considering its position this matter and would appreciate being kept informed GOM thinking as it develops.

4. *For London:* You should inform FonOff that we are doing this to stimulate other governments to become more actively concerned with SYG problem.

Rogers

³ Dated June 18. (Ibid., UN 8-1)

222. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Max Jakobson, Candidate to Succeed U Thant as UN Secretary General

I lunched yesterday with Max Jakobson and Cabot Lodge. As you know, Jakobson is the Finnish Representative to the United Nations and an active candidate to succeed U Thant. I thought you would be interested in the following items that came out of the conversation:

1. Jakobson says that at the recent Scandinavian Foreign Ministers Conference there was unanimous agreement to give his candidacy vigorous support. Significantly, the Swedes went along without any reservations whatever. This appears to mean that the Soviet effort to float Gunnar Jarring's candidacy has come to naught.

2. Jakobson says he considers it positive that Peking favors his candidacy. He said that in the last month or so Peking officials have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger's handwritten note in the margin reads: "Marshall—Let's do what is possible to get rid of Thant. HK"

expressed to three foreign ambassadors (French, Canadian, and one other) the expectation that Jakobson would be acceptable. Jakobson said this squared with earlier indications from Peking. He added, however, that Peking consistently takes the position that until such time as it occupies a seat in the United Nations no commitment or firm expression of Chinese policy is possible. According to Jakobson, the Chinese have also given clear indications that they do not want U Thant's term extended.

3. Jakobson is convinced, and so is Finnish President Kekkonen, that the Soviets will not take their opposition to his candidacy to the point of a veto. Kekkonen discussed the Jakobson candidacy with Kosygin and Brezhnev earlier this year, and in August with the new Soviet Ambassador to Finland. The Finns attach importance to the fact that on neither occasion did the Soviets seize the clear opportunity to express overt, much less inflexible, opposition to Jakobson. Jakobson believes that the Soviets will continue to try to defeat his candidacy, but that if it comes to the point where only a veto will prevent his success, the Soviets will acquiesce. Jakobson believes that the Soviet opposition to him is based more upon bilateral considerations, and general Soviet concern for Finland as a model for Eastern European states seeking a more independent position, than upon personal considerations.

Jakobson thinks that the way of advancing his candidacy is to try to get one or more non-permanent members of the Security Council to precipitate consideration of the succession to U Thant. In that connection he thinks it would not be premature for us discreetly to encourage Belgium, Japan, Italy, and Argentina to think along those lines. Jakobson believes that when the Big Four get around to meeting on the succession question, it would be best if France were the country to put forward his name. He says that possibility is being actively pursued with the French Government.

Jakobson believes that if Communist China enters the UN before the succession matter is taken up, it will help his candidacy. He is not certain of the effect upon his candidacy of a U.S. victory on Chirep, but is worried that this might encourage an extension of U Thant's term on the argument that the succession matter should not be settled until the PRC has taken its seat. Incidentally, Jakobson professes to be completely certain that Peking will refuse to come to the UN while Taipei is represented there.

Comment:

I liked Jakobson. He is against us on the Chirep issue, and does not try to soften that fact. He is obviously a man of strength and conviction and could, I believe, be counted upon to give some much needed purposeful direction to the UN if he succeeds U Thant.

I do, however, continue to be concerned at the failure of the international community to come to grips with the problem of selecting a successor for U Thant. I very much fear that unless we can get some momentum into this, the end result will be an extension for U Thant, whether or not he really wants it. I will be talking to George Bush and Sam DePalma about this.²

² A meeting on September 9 between Jakobson and Bush is described in telegram 2627 from USUN, September 10. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 22, 1971, 0117Z.

173993. Subj: Succession to U Thant. Ref: Santiago 4854.²

1. Chilean Ambassador Letelier called on Asst Sec Meyer and Acting Asst Sec Herz (IO) Sept 21 to inform us that Chile is putting forward candidacy of Felipe Herrera Lane as candidate for SYG. He said Chile is approaching LA's and US at this stage with purpose of establishing Herrera as Latin American rather than Chilean candidate.

2. Letelier said GOC had been canvassing selected LA's quietly for some time on general question of Chile putting forward a candidate, envisaging alternatives of Herrera, Santa Cruz and Valdez. He said responses had been sufficiently encouraging with respect to Herrera that last Friday GOC decided to launch more widespread and official initiative. Specifically, GOC is asking our reaction to "idea of regional candidate, idea of a Chilean and idea of Herrera."

3. Meyer said that without reference to any country or individual, his bureau would welcome the idea of a Latin American candidate. Herz broadened this by saying we welcome all nominations of qualified candidates and certainly will give candidacy of Herrera all due consideration. However, our general position is that most important is that next SYG be well qualified and that regional considerations should be secondary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Confidential. Drafted by Herz, cleared in draft by Assistant Secretary Charles A. Meyer, cleared by Fisher, and approved by Herz. Repeated to Santiago and London.

² Dated September 20. (Ibid.)

4. Herz asked when GOC expects to have results of its current canvass, and Letelier said he thought it would be in about one week. He agreed to let us know of LA endorsements received. Herz explained we are not in a position to encourage hopes of endorsement of any candidate at this time. As is usual with major powers, we will proceed more slowly than many other members to define our position or choice of candidate.³

Rogers

³ Herrera's candidacy was formally announced at the United Nations on September 28. (Airgram A-1453, September 28; *ibid.*)

224. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 5, 1971, 0003Z.

3132. Subj: Successor to U Thant.

1. Summary. It is now accepted that U Thant is serious about his decision to retire and that even Sovs have come to this conclusion. It is also widely believed that even though Sovs have now accepted fact that their first choice is not available, they either have not decided on an alternative or if they have they are not prepared to discuss the matter with us at this stage. Jakobson of Finland remains the front runner. Chile is very active on behalf of Herrera and his candidacy is rapidly gaining support among Latin Americans. Jarring's name frequently mentioned by some Arabs and some Africans. Other declared and non-declared candidacies are not prospering, although Waldheim remains ready move in if Jakobson collapses. End summary.

2. Based on discussions with a number of key dels, it is now widely accepted that Gromyko arrived with instructions to press U Thant hard to accept a third term. Firmness of SYG's negative response appears to have taken Sovs aback. Presumably they will now begin to assess alternatives and will look about for successor who, in their view, would be most likely to fulfill their ideal, e.g., an administrative official who sees his role as limited to carrying out decisions of SC and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.

GA and who is careful to avoid political initiatives. It is assumed Sovs will keep options open for immediate future but that they will be prepared to discuss successor with US prior to end of 26th GA Dec 21.

3. Jakobson remains front runner. He is generally regarded as most capable candidate under discussion, and he has public backing of Nordic countries as well as tacit support of UK. Sovs have not excluded possibility that they ultimately might acquiesce in his appointment. Arabs as a group have not taken a unified public decision against him, although several are known to oppose him because of his Jewish faith. Jakobson says he has reason to believe Peking supports him and further believes it would not be possible for Sovs to formally veto a Finn in SC.

4. Within last few days, Chile has launched a campaign on behalf of Herrera. Even some conservative (Nicaragua, for example) Latin Americans who could be expected to take a reserved attitude toward a candidate sponsored by Allende govt, are enthusiastic at thought a Latin American would succeed U Thant. LA group endorsement, once acquired, [for] Herrera could lead rapidly to support among other LDCs. Chilean campaign theme is that Afro-Asian bloc has "veto" of its own in GA and Bloc could and will "veto" Jakobson regardless favorable SC action. Assume Chileans will push this line vigorously at late Oct Ministerial level meeting of "77" (now nearly 100) non-aligned in Lima.

5. Some dels suspect Sovs may settle on Waldheim of Austria as man closest to their ideal. On other hand, Waldheim is generally regarded as lacking sufficient stature and drive to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, if Jakobson cannot make it, Sovs and others might turn to Waldheim.

6. Jarring remains most frequently discussed dark horse, usually in terms two-year interim appointment, because of his age. There no indication he seeking post or that Swedes' support for Jakobson diminished by rumors of support for Jarring.

7. It is rumored that Peru is willing to sponsor its PermRep De Cuellar but at present he does not appear to be a formal candidate.

8. Amerasinghe of Ceylon apparently has taken himself out of race.

9. Makkonen of Ethiopia does not appear to have a chance of obtaining backing of Africans particularly now that Masmoudi of Tunisia has emerged as an additional if undeclared African candidate.

10. Until recently Mexico not interested in fielding a candidate although names of Carrillo Flores, Garcia Robles and Cuevas Cancino had been occasionally mentioned, especially Garcia Robles. Now appears Pres Echeverria may tout his predecessor during former's upcoming UN visit.

11. *Comment:* We need to define our position quickly on Herrera. If for any reason we do not wish to see him chosen, we should take steps to prevent LA group endorsement, perhaps via Brazilian Govt. Once endorsed by entire group, we would not wish to pay price of offending our hemisphere neighbors by opposing their choice. We also cannot count on Sovs to bail us out. When asked if Sovs could conceivably take an LA, one key Sov official said probably not, unless he were Chilean or Mexican.

12. Many dels are looking over shoulders to Peking. Jakobson's belief that PRC supports him is significant factor in his favor, but Peking may be more attracted by a Chilean with GOC support, adding further urgency for us to move.

13. French remain adamant on having SYG who speaks French. They are unlikely actually veto a candidate agreed upon by USSR and US, but they could cause problems and may have to be handled with care.

Bush

225. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, October 20, 1971, 1622Z.

198753. Subject: SYG—Candidacy of Herrera. For the Ambassador.

1. FYI. From a number of recent indications we have strong impression that candidacy of Felipe Herrera (Chile) has picked up momentum recently, with number of apparently firm commitments from LA countries including Argentina, and with few if any LA's ready to demur or dissent. We believe there exists a real possibility that a LA consensus or near-consensus could be achieved during meeting of Latin Americans in New York next week. LA's may also pick up support of Afro-Asians at current Lima Conference.

2. We have been ostensibly neutral on Herrera candidacy while it appeared doubtful that he could obtain broad LA support, but it now

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Secret; Exdis; Priority. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Crimmins, Flanigan, and Miller; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Sent to Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, Managua, San Jose, Tegucigalpa, and USUN.

becomes necessary that we show our hand carefully but somewhat more clearly. Fact is that we regard Herrera as generally unappealing candidate for number of reasons including his erratic and self-serving performance in the IDB and the implications of a Chilean acceding to post of SYG at this particular juncture. End FYI.

3. *For action posts in LA.* You should seek early opportunity to see FonMin and tell him that we have been watching Herrera candidacy and wonder if Latin America does not have others to propose who would have greater stature as leaders and statesmen. While we recognize that Herrera has many fine qualities, they do not appear to measure up to those of the best that Latin America could offer, and we would find it difficult to support him for SYG. You may add, likewise in deep confidence, that another factor is that for obvious reasons which FonMin will understand we would find it difficult at this time to support a candidate sponsored by the Chilean Government. You may note that we have the definite impression that the GOC purpose in advancing the candidacy is to enhance its prestige and respectability.

4. *For USUN:* As opportunities arise in discussions with trusted LA delegates in New York, you should express view that it would be helpful if there were an outstanding Latin American candidate. If reference is made by others to Herrera, you should ask whether in their view he measures up to the best LA has to offer. We do not wish to say outright that we would oppose Herrera, but you should not discourage any impression that we are unenthusiastic about him.

5. USUN should also tell UK what we are doing, and that we think it desirable to take action prior to the Latin American caucus which may take place sometime during week of November 1. British also have assets in Latin America and may wish to reinforce what we are doing. You should also explain to Jakobson how we see the situation and encourage him to use whatever influence Scandinavians can exert among the Latins to try to counter the Herrera boom.

Irwin

226. Memorandum From Marshall Wright and Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

Successor for U Thant

State is concerned that the candidacy of Felipe Herrera of Chile is gaining momentum. He is not a particularly attractive figure, from the US point of view. He was somewhat self-serving as President of the Inter-American Development Bank and a poor manager to boot. These personal considerations are enough to disqualify him. The fact that he is being actively pushed by the Chilean Government has a double aspect. First, it is, of course, an additional reason for being against him since Herrera's election would give further respectability and influence to the Allende Government. But, second, it makes it difficult for us to focus other people on his lack of qualifications, for our opposition will be deemed to rest on his Chilean nationality.

Herrera is very popular with the Latins, both because of the personal and financial patronage he was able to dispense as head of the IDB, and because he is considered a "developmentalist". Moreover, Latin pride in having a regional contender for the UN SYG post is an important factor which may outweigh any concerns they may have about the fact that he is Allende's candidate. There is therefore a serious possibility that the Latins may unite around Herrera and induce other LDC's—for example, at the Group of 77 meeting in Lima—to form a bloc around Herrera as a Third World candidate.

A Latin American caucus is meeting in New York this week. In an attempt to prevent the crystallization of a firm consensus behind Herrera, State is instructing approaches to key LA Foreign Ministers. Our Ambassadors will question Herrera's stature, ask if LA does not have better candidates, and say that the US would have difficulty supporting a candidate sponsored by the Chilean Government. USUN will also throw cold water on Herrera with trusted LA delegates, though somewhat less explicitly. We will also keep the British and Max Jakobson informed and encourage them to discreetly further the cause. Hopefully,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger's handwritten note in the margin reads: "Unless this strategy crystallizes another Latin candidate. HK."

these steps will be carried out with some subtlety and discretion, since there are risks that US opposition to Herrera would be resented and gain sympathy for him.

We fully agree that some action should be taken to prevent a Latin-LDC consensus from forming around Herrera, and, in fact, we helped stimulate State to move. While risks are involved, we think the dangers of inaction—and letting his boomlet grow—are substantially greater.

227. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 3, 1971, 0056Z.

3999. For the Secretary from Ambassador Bush. Subj: SYG Candidacy of Herrera.

1. Based on recent conversation with friendly LAs here, including Costa Rican chairman of LA group, I have concluded that Chile is on the verge of obtaining the endorsement of the Latin American group for Felipe Herrera's candidacy. Even our natural allies on this subject are being pulled in the direction of supporting Herrera out of pride at the thought of a Latin American SYG. Some don't like it but will go along.

2. This project is picking up so much steam that it is my considered judgment we should face the issue squarely now. Our dilemma can only get worse. Accordingly, I recommend that I be authorized to inform the PermRep of Chile, in response to his written request for support, the US would be happy to see a well-qualified Latin American as SYG. I do not happen to know Mr. Herrera personally, but I think honesty requires me to say that, given the current status of US-Chilean relations, there is no way in which the US could support a Chilean for the post of SYG.

3. *Comment:* Such a line will, of course, produce an adverse reaction. However, in my judgment, it is preferable to having to come out against Herrera or another Chilean (Valdez, Santa Cruz) at a somewhat later stage after formal LA group endorsement. This matter is urgent. The Dept may have other alternative ways to suggest to obtain the desired result. However in my view the above-mentioned course is the best. We might also be prepared to state that we would be happy to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Secret; Exdis.

consider other qualified LA aspirants such as Guyer (Argentina), Cuevas Cancino (Mexico) or Perez de Cuellar (Peru).

4. Chile will be upset, but some other LAs will sigh with relief.

5. UK PermRep Colin Crowe in informal talk Nov 2 also believes above is best course at this date.

Bush

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 4, 1971, 2228Z.

201677. Subject: SYG Candidacy of Herrera. Ref: USUN 3999.²

1. We agree Latin Group likely become solidly committed to Herrera and that unless we spike his candidacy now cost to us will increase. You should accordingly immediately inform orally PermReps of Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua that US regretfully cannot support Herrera and that out of consideration for Herrera, whom we hold in high regard, we have felt it advisable to convey our decision without delay. You may say that we believe SYG should be someone with more direct UN experience. We are actively considering current SYG candidacies with this as a major consideration. As far as Chile itself is concerned we have noted that it has already obtained a number of important positions and honors recently in UN System.

2. Request you not allude to status US-Chilean relations as reason. Chile and others will naturally assume this to be the case but we do not wish to enable them to attribute it to us because such quotation could more easily be exploited against us.

3. We understand Chilean PermRep and Herrera have asked to see you Nov 5 p.m. We leave it to your discretion how much of above you wish to convey to them. Suggest you also inform promptly UK and Venezuelan PermReps. You may add, with Latins with whom you have already discussed Herrera candidacy, that Chile has already

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Assistant Secretary De Palma; cleared by Crimmins, Pedersen, Armitage, and Executive Secretary Eliot; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, Managua, San Jose, Santiago, and Tegucigalpa.

² Document 227.

obtained more than its share of honors in UN system (e.g., Horowitz, Secretary PAHO; Valdez, Deputy Administrator UNDP; Santa Cruz, President FAO Council 1970-71 and President FAO 25th Anniversary meeting; 2 Resident Representatives; Garcia, President LA Region for WMO. Santiago is site of ECLA and Economic Research Institute for LA. UNICEF, UNDP, UPU, UNCTAD and PAHO bodies have met in Santiago since 1969). If asked whether we would consider some other Latin American, you may reiterate we believe it would be good to have outstanding Latin candidate, but you should avoid naming any because we do not wish to imply we would support another specific Latin American in present circumstances.³

For Santiago: Upon receipt confirmation that Chilean UN Del has been informed, we will provide guidance for your use if queried by FonOff.

Rogers

³ Bush replied that this telegram reached him too late to contact other Permanent Representatives before attending a Cabinet meeting in Washington. He agreed that prompt action should be taken to stop the Herrera candidacy. He had been impressed by Latin American leaders who said that the United States could be anti-Allende without appearing to be anti-Herrera. Bush therefore repeated his recommendation in telegram 3999 that Chile be informed that the United States could not, under the present circumstances, support a Chilean candidate for UN Secretary-General. (Telegram 4055 from USUN, November 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 5, 1971, 1843Z.

202225. For Amb. Bush from Secretary. Subj: SYG Candidacy of Herrera. Ref: USUN 4055.²

I agree with your observation that an anti-Herrera posture would be likely to cause us difficulty with other Latin Americans owing to his general popularity with them. At same time a directly anti-Chilean posture would cause adverse political reactions from a substantial part of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pedersen; cleared by Assistant Secretary De Palma, Crimmins, and Eliot; and approved by Secretary Rogers.

² See footnote 3, Document 228.

Latin America. Our objective must be to make it clear that Chile's candidate cannot succeed before it acquires further head of steam but at same time to minimize political repercussions in Latin America that may develop from this decision either as result of overtly anti-Chilean or an anti-Herrera position.

We thus do not want to say directly to Chileans that our opposition is based on current status of US-Chile relations; direct statement of this sort could unnecessarily be exploited by Chile among many segments of public opinion in Latin America. If others draw conclusion that this is our fundamental reason, as they undoubtedly will, that would give us considerably less difficulty.

Whatever we say in our initial reply, it is also clear that our opposition will become publicly known and a matter of contention. Easiest position to take would be that we cannot support Herrera because we favor another candidate (Jakobson). However because overt support of Jakobson would have negative impact on his chances we do not wish to do this. We do not believe on other hand that we will be able to stand for long on position before press or even other diplomats of simply being unable to support him without adducing any reasons. Fact that Chile has already received number of UN posts and other high honors is acceptable and politically uncontentious reason for not supporting Chilean candidacy. It may be that this would be enough. Additionally uncontentious reason which was designed not to be anti-Herrera but pro other candidates, however, would be that one of our considerations is desirability of direct UN experience.

Reason we suggested you speak to Argentines, Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans before you saw Chile also was to assure that word reached Chilean Del prior to your appointment so as to lessen somewhat direct confrontation aspects that might stem from response initially to them. We hope you can still do this.

I would leave it to your own discretion as to how much you wish to say to Chileans or others about reasons at this point, with the above objectives in mind. Formula of saying we "cannot support Chile's proposal re SYG suggestion" is also satisfactory. Our assumption has been that Latin American group is half actively and half passively in support of Herrera and that we face difficult problem with Latin Americans as a whole. Our objective in talking to committee members should therefore be to seek to avoid their coming to us with a group position, to which we would have to take exception.

We anticipate we may receive press queries as our position seeps out to the press. If asked, you should limit reply to statement confirming that we have expressed our reservations regarding Chilean candidacy and decline all further comment on grounds it would not be helpful in present circumstances.

Rogers

230. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 6, 1971, 0220Z.

4079. Subj: SYG Candidacy of Herrera.

1. Summary: Acting in accordance with scenario agreed to by Dept, Bush late afternoon Nov 5 informed Herrera, who was accompanied by Chilean PermRep Diaz Casanueva, that US cannot support Chile's proposal re SYG succession. Chileans did not appear very surprised. Herrera sought to draw connection between US decision on his candidacy and problem of copper companies, saying this would unfortunately be viewed in Chile as "first direct political consequence of disagreement on economic issue." Bush said this might be Herrera's conclusion, but that it was not what he had said or implied. End summary.

2. Final Dept instructions concerning Herrera SYG candidacy were received during General Comite mtg which did not end until 6:15 PM on inscription of item on protection of diplomatic missions. On receipt instructions, Bush arranged to re-schedule mtg with Chilean PermRep originally set for 5:30, and to meet briefly beforehand with Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua Ambs (LA SC members and LA group Pres respectively). Attempt was made to see Chilean Amb alone, but he arrived with Herrera in tow.

3. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), when informed of our decision to tell Chileans that we could not support their proposal, said this came as no surprise to him. He said his own instructions had been to individually support Herrera, as result of Argentine desire to maintain best possible relations with Chile, and due to Pres Lanusse's decision to respond positively to a request he received from Allende. However, Ortiz said, he had opposed suggestion that LA group "endorse" Herrera's or any other candidacy as improper and dangerous precedent. Ortiz noted that when LA group met to discuss Herrera candidacy about half expressed active support, other half reserved their positions, although some of these were believed sympathetic. Ortiz welcomed US decision to level with Chileans right away, before additional support for Herrera developed, and US was faced with possible necessity to veto. On other hand, he urged that US make it known that inability to support this particular candidacy did not constitute opposition to any

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Asuncion, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, San Jose, Santiago, and Tegucigalpa.

and all LA candidates, predicting that Chileans would seek to portray US attitude as 1) anti-Chilean, and 2) anti-Latin American. Bush assured Ortiz that this was not case, and that he believed there had to be other strong candidates from Latin America whom Security Council should have opportunity to consider.

4. Bush subsequently conferred briefly with Sevilla-Sacasa (Nicaragua) and with Molina (Costa Rica), neither of whom was in slightest surprised by news. In fact they seemed almost elated that US was going to get them [*out?*] of position of unenthusiastic support for Herrera. Sevilla-Sacasa had clearly been prepared for this development by phone call from Pres Somoza (Managua 2547).² Both agreed that US decision to inform Chileans promptly was wise and thought this would help avoid misunderstandings.

5. Diaz Casanueva and Herrera arrived at USUN at 6:45, Pol Couns and LA adviser were present during thirty-five minute mtg. After introductory courtesies, Bush told Chileans that he believed in and hoped they would appreciate frankness. Bush said USG had given most careful consideration to the matter and had come to the irrevocable conclusion that it could not support Chile's proposal re SYG succession. Bush said that he did not wish to enter into details of basis for this decision, but that it had not been arrived at lightly. Bush said although this was, unfortunately, first personal meeting with Herrera, he felt they knew each other from the many mutual friends they had. We were well aware of the high regard in which Herrera was held not only in the US, but throughout Latin America. Herrera asked if he understood correctly that US was not opposed to him personally, and Bush assured him that this was indeed the case.

6. Diaz (who took very little part in conversation), asked if it could therefore be deduced that US decision was based on Herrera's Chilean nationality and patronage, and on US discontent with recent developments in Chile. Bush replied that he wished to make it very very clear that we were not making any connections between any issues on which the US and Chilean Governments disagreed, and a decision which concerned the United Nations. Bush said that of course we would not be so naive as to pretend that recent Chilean actions affecting US investments had not had significant, and understandably adverse, effects on US public opinion. And USG, as a democracy, could not be indifferent to such public opinion. Bush asked what were views of Chilean people, as opposed perhaps to government. American people, he said, were not anti-Chilean, and respected right of these, or any other people, to freely decide for themselves their form of government. Were Chilean people now anti-American?

² Dated November 3. (Ibid.)

7. Herrea answered. He said Chilean people continued to hold Americans in high regard. At same time, Chilean people believed in their own government and in its efforts to reform their society to make it better. The people approve of the GOC's decisions with respect to nation's resources, and copper was the principal resource. Herrera noted that constitutional amendment permitting expropriation was unanimously adopted by "Congress" which was not even controlled by Allende regime. Herrera said that unfortunately he thought USG had tended to characterize everything Chile was doing as unfriendly, and anti-American, because of the understandable discontent of the copper companies, their stockholders, and taxpayers who faced possibility of having to make up the losses. Herrera noted that this was not first time US had adopted negative view of an entire country because it disagreed with some of its policies. Bush said he wished that he could agree copper expropriation was only issue which divided us, and asked if Herrera had read some of statements that Chilean representatives had made in UN? Herrera said he had not, because he had not been following UN deliberations closely. Bush recommended he do so.

8. Herrera then said that in context of this conversation he felt he had to make some observation about likely reaction in Chile to US decision not to support him. He said situation would have been same were it some other Chilean than he. Herrera believed that Chilean public would interpret this as direct consequence of US discontent with copper situation. He added that this would, in fact, be considered as first political consequence of a disagreement on purely economic issue. Some would view it as a US political sanction against a country which believed it was only exercising its rights. Bush said that if such were conclusion which GOC attempted to draw, it would be most unfortunate. This might be Herrera's conclusion, but it was not what Bush had either said or implied.

9. As discussion drew to close, both Diaz Casanueva and Herrera thanked Bush for his candor in explaining US position to them. Much as they regretted hearing it, they said, they appreciated being told and being told promptly. Bush in turn said he regretted that his first meeting with Herrera proved to be occasion for transmission of understandably unwelcome news, and appreciated spirit in which news had been received. He said that he was convinced USG was searching for ways to improve our relations with Chile, and hoped that this decision would not set back this objective.³

Bush

³ The Department elaborated on its reasons for rejecting Herrera's candidacy in circular telegram 204711 to all posts in the American Republics, November 10. (Ibid.)

231. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

New UN Secretary General

We are at the point of decision on a successor for U Thant. His latest illness has put an end to the talk about an extension for him. We have told the Latinos that we are not going to accept Herrera. The consultations between the Permanent Security Council members have, in fact, already begun—and will formally begin within the next few days.

Finland's Jakobson is State's candidate. Unless they are instructed otherwise, everything they do from here on in will be directed toward his selection. Is that what we want?

I know privately that George Bush is not enamored of Jakobson. Nor am I. In view of his rock hard attitude on Chirep and the fact that he is, to a considerable extent, presenting himself as the PRC candidate, I wonder if he really deserves our unalloyed support.

I am not suggesting that we should try to sink him, or even that we stall if the other Permanent Security Council members reach a consensus upon him. But why should we be cooperating so faithfully? So far I know, Waldheim would be at least as acceptable to us as Jakobson. And if neither of them made it, Sadruddin Aga Khan might emerge as a compromise, and I should think that would be altogether to our liking. Finally, if the Latinos do come up (as they might) with a good man, ought we not to at least be in the posture of being able to give him serious consideration?

It seems clear that the Soviets don't want Jakobson, but also don't want to be forced to say so. There may, in that situation, be the makings of an agreement on some other candidate.

In short, it is my instinct that we ought to pull back on this one and play it very cool until we have at least had the first round of consultations. I am, however, deterred from pushing this view because I have a suspicion that you want Jakobson. If that suspicion is correct, so be it. If it is incorrect we should have a conversation right away

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for action.

about the U.S. approach to the problem of finding a successor for U Thant.

Let State take the lead.

Come see me.²

² Neither option is checked. Kissinger's handwritten note at the end of the memorandum reads: "I have no interest in Jakobson. I am against Herrera. I would prefer Sadruddin Khan."

232. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 19, 1971, 0201Z.

4349. Subj: SYG Succession—Herrera Candidacy. Ref: USUN 4319.²

1. Meeting with Diaz Casanueva (Chile) cited para 6 reftel³ took place in UN corridors before Nov 18 AM meeting of General Comite. Chilean MisOff Carrasco was with Casanueva and LA adviser with Bush. Bush said he appreciated frank telecon with Diaz Casanueva last night and welcomed opportunity to discuss matter further. Bush recalled his personal desire expressed at Nov 5 meeting with Herrera present to do everything in his power to maintain open, cordial and frank contacts with Chilean Perm Rep in hope that through such candid dialogue the two could contribute to betterment of US-Chilean relations. Diaz Casanueva said he fully reciprocated these views and wished to assure Bush that nothing in statement of the Govt of Chile concerning proposal of Herrera for SYG was in any way meant to be personally critical of Bush.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Santiago, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, San Jose, and Caracas.

² Telegram 4319 from USUN described a meeting of Latin American representatives on November 17 in which Chilean Representative Diaz Casanueva read a statement denouncing the U.S. "preemptive veto" of Herrera's candidacy and Bush's undiplomatic behavior. Venezuelan Representative Andres Aguilar assured Bush that most other Latin American representatives accepted his explanation. (Ibid.)

³ In this paragraph, Bush noted that he hoped to have a personal talk with Diaz Casanueva in order to build a "personal relationship where problems are frankly discussed."

2. Bush said he was happy to hear this but that such a conclusion was difficult to draw from terminology employed in statement, particularly charges in final para that “groundlessness of US position, undiplomatic behavior evidenced in this matter”, etc., justify GOC’s decision to continue lending support to Herrera proposal. Diaz Casanueva said Bush misunderstood meaning of this accusation which was not at him but at a govt (the US) which had decided to publicly embarrass a distinguished individual for whom it professed high regard by announcing a US position publicly, when nothing was said about such an announcement during an ostensibly private and privileged conversation. Diaz Casanueva contended that Chilean statement was made necessary by this breach of accepted practice which could only furthermore be interpreted as a deliberate discrimination against Herrera because of his Chilean nationality. Bush expressed his astonishment at this conclusion, saying US authorities in NY and Wash had made no announcement concerning Herrera candidacy. They had only reacted when forced to do so by press queries motivated by widespread rumors in UN corridors, and presumably elsewhere, that US had “vetoed” Herrera. Diaz Casanueva also took issue with Bush having informed Argentine, Costa Rican and Nicaraguan Ambs of US decision. Bush said he had informed them as they were members of so-called working group for Herrera candidacy and LA group Pres and SC members. This was intended only as courtesy and not to embarrass Herrera or Chilean Govt. Diaz Casanueva said this was unfortunate because one or more of them had evidently made the information public “as was to be expected.”

3. Going back to language of statement Diaz Casanueva said it was nothing but factual summary of developments, which, out of consideration for US side, avoided any reference to discussion of the copper problem or to Bush’s complaints about tone of Chilean UN speeches. Bush recalled that such mention would have been highly inappropriate since Bush had at the time made it clear US decision re SYG proposal was not related to US-Chilean differences over copper mines or to Chilean Del’s attitudes at the UN. Bush observed that statement also failed to mention that both Diaz Casanueva and Herrera had welcomed Bush’s frankness on Nov 5 and had thanked him for it. Bush was forced to terminate meeting on somewhat inconclusive basis when he was called into General Comite.

4. Diaz Casanueva asked LA adviser to remain for further discussion. Although remaining seemingly affable, Diaz Casanueva took harder tone in defending Chilean statement. He argued impropriety of US making known a decision which constituted interference in affairs of LA group. He claimed SC members should not make their position on candidatures known until SC was actually seized of question. He reiterated complaint that US had deliberately torpedoed the

LA candidate by its announced non-support. LA adviser replied that it had been made abundantly clear US only made its position known to Chileans and those designated to work with them out of consideration for Herrera and in belief our LA friends would prefer not to be misled. Notion that SC members, and particularly permanent members, could not discuss candidacies outside of SC was manifestly untenable. Finally, US spokesman had not taken initiative to make US position public but had been compelled to respond to queries. Diaz Casanueva then recalled Herrera's remarks on evening of Nov 5 that US decision re his candidacy would be interpreted in Chile as the US "first political reprisal against Chile for our differences in the economic field" and said this was indeed the case. LA adviser reminded Diaz Casanueva that in response to this remark of Herrera Bush had expressed hope such an unwarranted conclusion would not be arrived at and that these words had been Herrera's and not Bush's. USG had sought to make it clear it is anxious to pursue every avenue that could lead to better relations and that our candid explanation of our position on Chile proposal re the SYG succession was part of this effort. Both Chileans smiled and acknowledged US officials had tried to draw such a distinction but that the general public in Chile and elsewhere were not gullible. They interpreted our action as retaliation pure and simple.

5. Later during morning Bush saw LA group Pres Molina and told him of his conversation with Chilean Amb. Molina said that during LA group meeting Nov 17 Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina) and others had made clear that US position on Herrera was not a rejection of all LA candidates and was not consequently anti-LA. Molina added "don't worry about this, everyone understands why you had to do what you did."

6. Subsequently, Chilean Amb's wife (who sits in Third Comite) told Bush that Chilean letter was not intended as personal attack on him and that the LA Pres, Costa Rica's Amb Molina was to blame for making US decision public. Bush said he was surprised because first public mention we had seen was in press report from Buenos Aires. She insisted this was not the case saying with great self-assurance that it was Costa Rica who had put out the story.

Bush

233. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, November 23, 1971, 0202Z.

4444. SYG Succession—Herrera Candidacy.

1. During luncheon with MisOffs PermReps Espinosa (Colombia) and Molina (Costa Rica) raised question of SYG succession, and Herrera candidacy as one aspect of this question. Espinosa did most of speaking, using measured, detached tone throughout. Both PermReps said question was now most urgent, and, while most members of UN realized issue had first to be resolved by five permanent members of SC and then by SC as a whole, it was of burning interest to all members. Insofar as LA group was concerned, Herrera candidacy, and its apparent progress until it was shot down by US, had encouraged widespread hopes of seeing a Latin American in the job. Espinosa said that he was personally good friend of Herrera's, as was his president, and he considered Herrera well qualified to hold the job. However, he could understand that under present circumstances US would not be able to support a candidate put forward by Chilean Govt, particularly at very moment when Chileans were entertaining Castro. Molina said Espinosa had exactly explained his own views.

2. Espinosa went on to say that US should anticipate continued Chilean efforts to press Herrera candidacy. Chileans would redouble their efforts to secure Sov and PRC support for him, in hope that US would finally have to veto or accept him if all other candidates run into either Sov or PRC opposition. Espinosa thought that US would be well advised to consider putting together list of alternative LA candidates, and he said we should not have any trouble finding ten or even twenty names of distinguished Latinos whom we could offer for SC consideration. This would demonstrate validity of our claim that our attitude on Herrera candidacy was not manifestation of an anti-LA attitude.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bogota, San Jose, and Santiago.

234. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 30, 1971.

SUBJECT

Succession to U Thant

Attached is a cable, initialed by Secretary Rogers, for which State is seeking clearance.² It instructs USUN to begin a round of consultations looking toward the selection of a new Secretary General. We would first approach the Soviets for a general discussion of candidates intended primarily to do three things: (1) ascertain the Soviet attitude toward Jakobson, (2) indicate that Herrera is not acceptable to us, and (3) get Soviet agreement to intensive bilateral consultations among the five permanent members in an effort to reach agreement before the General Assembly adjourns.

If this goes reasonably well, we would then have the UK or the Norwegians convey to the Chinese delegate our general position and our readiness to discuss the SYG succession directly with the Chinese.

Simultaneously we would start informal talks with friendly non-permanent Security Council members such as Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and Nicaragua.

The whole purpose of this approach is to get the succession matter off dead center, and to push the Jakobson candidacy to a point where the Soviets or the French (who are also luke warm, at best, on Jakobson) must either fish or cut bait. We would not, however, express direct support of Jakobson.

Despite my misgivings on Jakobson, I think we should clear this cable. We do need to settle the succession matter, and it is now languishing. If Jakobson is acceptable to the other permanent members, then he should be acceptable to us. If he is not acceptable to the other permanent members then it is high time for us and others to get on with the job of finding an alternative.

As to the PRC aspect of the consultations, this cable does not commit us to anything and you will have an opportunity to shape our ap-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum bears the handwritten note: "OBE."

² Attached but not printed.

proach to the PRC as you see fit before this scenario would bring us into the initial contact with them.

Recommendation:

That you clear the attached cable.³

³ Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked.

235. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 1, 1971, 0122Z.

4657. Subj: SYG Succession: Ramphal Candidacy. Ref: USUN 4564.²

1. Guyanan Perm Rep Talbot called on Bush Nov 30 to deliver S.S. Ramphal's curriculum vitae and report on his meetings with other four permanent members of SC.

2. Talbot said he had discussed Ramphal's availability for post of SYG with the other SC members along lines of his discussion with Bush (reftel). PRC Perm Rep Huang Hua said PRC was completely uncommitted on this question at this time, but Talbot had definite impression Chinese were giving thought to the question of SYG succession. Malik (USSR) said he would be glad to add Ramphal's name to list of ten or so names currently being talked about. Malik noted, however, there was no U (for U Thant) on this list. Malik reportedly voiced opinion Thant might accept interim reappointment. UK Del allegedly received suggestion of Ramphal's name with interest. Talbot did not report any French reaction.

3. Bush said Malik was being consistent in continuing to talk about Thant staying on. Unfortunately, Soviets continue to be evasive despite fact time was getting short. Bush said he was personally pleased to add

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Georgetown.

² Telegram 4564 from USUN described a November 26 meeting between Bush and Talbot, in which Talbot first mentioned that S.S. Ramphal was a candidate for Secretary-General. Talbot planned to approach other Permanent Members and requested that his meeting with Bush be considered "exploratory and confidential" until further notice. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

Ramphal's name to list of potential candidates. He told Talbot he would forward curriculum vitae to Dept and assured Talbot he would carefully consider Ramphal's qualifications.

4. Copy curriculum vitae pouched Dept attention IO.³ Available biographic information on Ramphal requested.

Bush

³ Not found.

236. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 2, 1971, 0111Z.

4688. Subject: Successor to U Thant—Bush/Malik Mtg Dec 1.

1. Summary. In meeting with Soviet PermRep Malik, latter confirmed USSR opposed to Jakobson, still advocated five-power appeal to U Thant to accept interim appointment, agreed US and USSR should approach France with a view to arranging five power meeting to discuss candidates.

2. As follow-up to talk USUN 4654² Malik had lunch with Bush Dec 1. Issraelyan and Newlin present. Most of meeting devoted to getting Soviets to agree to procedure for consultations among five permanent members of SC.

3. Bush said he had been reflecting on Malik's cryptic remark Nov 30 that the US horse was just as dead as the Soviet horse (i.e. Thant). Malik said, "Your white horse is dead, I don't know about your dark horse since I don't know who he is." When further sparring established beyond doubt Soviets referring to Jakobson, Bush denied that Jakobson was the US candidate. There were numerous well qualified candidates and Jakobson was among them; however, it was not true that the US was pushing him.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Nodis; Noforn.

² In telegram 4654, December 1, Bush reported that Malik had met with Thant on November 30 in an effort to persuade him to continue to serve for an interim period. (Ibid.)

4. When Bush inquired why the Soviets were opposed to Jakobson (at one point when Jakobson's name was mentioned Malik drew a large X in the air) Issraelyan said he was opposed by an important group in the UN. We pointed out that we were unaware that the Arabs, as a group, had taken a formal position. Malik asserted this was the case.

5. Bush then suggested procedure whereby five would meet without publicity. Each could submit list of names. All five lists would then be amalgamated into a master list. Copies of master list would then be distributed to each of five and names unacceptable to any del would have line drawn through them. Host would then take marked lists and make new master list containing only names of those who were acceptable to all five. This would begin process of weeding out clearly unacceptable candidates without putting the onus on any delegation for striking off a name. After list reduced to manageable size five could go on to express preference.

6. At first Malik and Issraelyan did not understand suggested procedure. They agreed five should meet. However, each of five should put forward one candidate for consideration. Malik said he would propose U Thant. (After above procedure was explained twice, Soviets gave impression they might consider it.)

7. Bush made clear idea of interim appointment for U Thant was non-starter. U Thant had definitively taken himself out of the race and was ill with a bleeding ulcer. US believed time had come for a change and we took him at his word that he would retire. We would not join in any appeal that he stay on.

8. Bush and Malik finally agreed that they would jointly approach Kosciusko-Morizet (France) and suggest that he seek to arrange unpublicized five power meeting for purpose of discussing candidates. Malik said Sovs had proposed bilateral meeting to PRC but had received no reply.

9. Bush later reported above to Crowe (UK) who had seen Malik as well as PRC (septel). UK informed Soviets that they considered Jakobson best qualified. Malik did not go as far with Crowe as to declare Jakobson a "dead horse"; he took line it was difficult to support someone who was opposed by an important group. UK agreed with approach to French but doubted that PRC would agree to meet with the four.

10. *Comment:* Bush will approach Kosciusko-Morizet at SC meeting Dec 2. From initial comments of PRC we doubt that they will agree to attend five power meeting. If they refuse, four could then meet quietly to seek to reach agreement while at same time setting up some procedure for bilateral talks with PRC. We understand Mwaanga as current chairman of African group will approach all of five permanent members to urge that they get on with consultations on new SYG.

Bush

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 4, 1971, 1649Z.

219420. From the Secretary for Ambassador Bush. Subj: Successor to U Thant. Ref: (A) USUN 4688, (B) USUN 4713, (C) USUN 4743.²

1. Your general approach to the Five-Power meeting on Dec 6 as per ref C is approved. You should attempt to treat this as preliminary exchange of views on qualifications we are interested in and of information we have on various candidates, so that we have better feel of positions of other perm members before we go further. This may be difficult in view of idea of lists suggested as per refs A and B, but you might say that any formal procedure at this stage risks depriving the Five of fruitful interchange of views that should benefit the selection process. We would prefer not to proceed with elimination approach as we fear it would result in most of strongest candidates being eliminated early.

2. We agree with you that Jakobson's candidacy is in trouble but we are not yet certain that Sovs will declare themselves to be directly against him. We wish to prevent Soviets from simply hiding behind supposed Arab positions and to compel them either to assume public onus for having blackballed him or to back away. Until they do come out directly against him you should continue to seek to keep him in forefront without directly endorsing him.

3. Agree with your proposed strategy in para 3 of ref C re U Thant.³ We should continue to point out why in our view he is simply not available. By treating him as a non-candidate, you should try to remove justification for Soviet blackballing the man they believe to be our candidate.

4. As for desirable qualifications of the next SYG, you might say we think he should

A) Have personal capacity to handle political requirements of position;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Herz and Pedersen, cleared by Robert H. Miller, and approved by Secretary Rogers.

² Telegram 4688 is Document 236. Telegram 4713 from USUN described a meeting among Bush, Crowe, and Kosciusko-Morizet in which the latter was asked to arrange an informal meeting of representatives of the Permanent Members in order to limit the field of candidates. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3) In telegram 4743 from USUN, Bush informed the Department that Kosciusko-Morizet had offered to host the Five-Power meeting at this residence on December 6 at 10 a.m. (Ibid.)

³ This paragraph expressed the hope that the meeting would rule out any prospect of an interim appointment for U Thant.

B) Possess administrative and leadership qualities needed to assert control over secretariat activities, personnel and UN financial problem;

C) Have considerable UN experience;

D) Be chosen on basis personal capabilities and contributions, not on basis regional candidacies or rotation. (We interpret this last point to mean that neither a European nor an Asian should be excluded from consideration because those continents have furnished previous SYG's);

E) Be elected for full term in order to begin dealing effectively with crisis of confidence afflicting UN.

5. When names of candidates are discussed, you can say we have heard of six serious candidacies: Amerasinghe, Herrera, Jakobson, Makonnen, Sadruddin Aga Khan and Waldheim. Masmoudi, Terence, Djermaakoye, Jarring, Strong, and more recently Ramphal, have also been referred to, but we do not regard them as candidates. Of the candidates we understand the situation to be:

A) Amerasinghe. Good UN experience as Ceylonese Permanent Rep and doing a good job as chairman of the Seabeds Committee. However, he seems to have attracted little support in Asia or elsewhere and does not seem to be a leading candidate.

B) Herrera. As we have already indicated directly to Chile, we could not support his candidacy, though we have good regard for him personally and had been instrumental in his election to IDB. We believe possibility exists that some outstanding Latin American candidate may yet emerge.

C) Jakobson. The first and most active candidate. Highly respected in the UN. From a neutral European country and therefore presumably politically acceptable. Has a good combination of UN experience and administrative qualities. Rumored to be objected to by some Arabs but none have told us so and we are confident there is no agreed Arab view. Probably has wider personal support than any other candidate.

D) Makonnen. Experienced in UN, having been on SC during 1967–8; also twice Cabinet Minister in Ethiopia. Personally well liked. Seems to have attracted little support in Africa or elsewhere.

E) Sadruddin Aga Khan. Not an active candidate, but clearly interested. We believe he has done an excellent job as High Commissioner for Refugees. He has attractive personal qualities. His general acceptability and support are not known.

F) Waldheim. Experienced as Permanent Rep to UN twice, as Austrian Foreign Minister, and almost President of Austria. From a neutral European country and therefore presumably politically acceptable. His name does not appear to have aroused either discernable support or opposition.

G) Of others mentioned, we have following info: It is not clear what support Masmoudi, Terence and Djermakoye have, but their names have not generated any appreciable interest. Strong has many attractive qualities, but we have no reason to believe he is really a candidate and he has little UN political experience. We have reason to believe Jarring is not interested, even for short period. Ramphal has just recently been mentioned and we have no views.

6. Foregoing might be used at the meeting to elicit views of others and to encourage discussion of candidacies on the basis of their relative merits. When you come to Jakobson you should of course try to avoid saying anything that could make the Soviets lock themselves into a negative position. In this connection the line you took with Malik as per para 4 ref A was exactly right. If burden can be placed on Soviets to prove that Arab "group" (rather than one group of some Arabs) opposes Jakobson, the argument will be on a plane where Soviets would have to assume the onus themselves.

7. Following are preliminary comments, for your own information, on contingency if Jakobson is knocked out of the race and will have to try to steer discussions in favor of one or two other candidates.

A) Agree with para 4 A ref C that Sadruddin could make relatively appealing candidate from our point of view although he is untried in political position. Believe he may be regarded as Western-oriented and as such unlikely to attract Soviet and Chinese support. Indians may also present problem, though we do not know.

B) Waldheim has no opponents. This is his greatest asset as potential fallback, but from our point of view also his greatest liability as SYG since he is unlikely to take actions that would make him enemies. However we could live with him and he would be better than any Afro-Asians now apparent with possible exception of Sadruddin.

C) We think Mexicans probably would not make Carillo Flores available, though we would be willing to make a try if situation makes this desirable. We would not like Garcia Robles and believe Cuevas would not be strong SYG.

D) Agree that Hambro's nationality militates against him, although he would be high on our list if there were any possibility.

E) As for Guyer, while we recognize he has done a good job on East Pakistan relief we have impression that he is not cool under pressure and doubt whether he is experienced enough for SYG position. Would appreciate your pouching us personality profile that would allow more reasoned assessment of his strong and weak points.

Rogers

238. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 7, 1971, 0612Z.

4812. Subj: SYG.

1. Summary. First Five Power meeting to consider successor to U Thant took place at French residence Dec 6. Malik (USSR) proposed U Thant be elected to new full term or be asked to stay on for one or two years. He not attracted to names on list and one candidate opposed by regional group. Crowe (UK) said U Thant had repeatedly stated his intention to retire even before his health collapsed, UK took him at his word, and it would be wrong to ask him to stay on against his will. Moreover, lame duck interim SYG could not tackle vigorously UN's budgetary and administrative problems. Bush said US views closely paralleled UK's. Huang Hua (PRC) said his del still consulting as many UN dels as possible in order to ascertain their views. He recognized five perm members of SC have special responsibilities under the Charter but their views are not absolute and they must be careful not to have their decision challenged. Huang Hua said he willing to continue Five Power consultations as well as to enter into bilateral consultations with other four on this question. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) noted there no agreement among Five on Soviet suggestion concerning U Thant. Five agreed to let press know they had held meeting on SYG question but would not reveal date and place of next meeting or answer questions as to what was discussed. For atmospheric of Sino-Soviet relations, see septel. End Summary.

2. At invitation French PermRep Kosciusko-Morizet (K-M), five perm members of SC, each accompanied by one adviser, met at French residence 10:00 AM Dec 6 to initiate informal private consultations on successor to U Thant. Huang Hua was accompanied only by young French-speaking interpreter. K-M and Malik also had interpreters present (in addition to respective advisers) and Chinese interpreter's French was translated into English by French interpreter. Group met around dining table with Malik, Bush, Crowe and Huang Hua clockwise around K-M.

3. K-M asked if any del wished to make a proposal. After short silence he said in bilateral discussions idea had been expressed that U Thant might extend for one or two years as interim solution. If this not possible, then there would have to be election of new SYG to full term.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis. "Eyes Only" was added by hand.

K-M asked if there were comments. When no one volunteered he invited Malik, immediately on his left, to speak.

4. Malik said there was widespread sentiment that U Thant continue either for full or interim term. USSR was flexible and could accept either alternative. If interim solution adopted, he proposed Five literally begin immediately to consult on successor so that by time interim appointment expired, there would be agreement on new SYG. Although it would be immodest to say he knew views of all 131 members and of other four perm members, Sovs had concluded overwhelming majority favored such a solution.

5. Two views prevailed: (A) U Thant was well known and there was no opposition to his continuation; (B) none of other candidates on the preliminary list elicited general enthusiasm. As for health, not even those present around table were free from ailments and it naive to expect U Thant to be 100 percent fit as an astronaut. Drafters of Charter made mistake in not providing for two week vacation for SYG. Malik felt silent majority of UN would support annual vacation for SYG which would enable him to recuperate from his heavy schedule.

6. Some spread rumors U Thant not strong in dealing with deficit and administrative problems. This was unfair. SYG had heavy schedule dealing with major world problems and administrative and fiscal burdens fell to subordinates. From beginning UN in these two fields had been dominated by British and US so before criticism levelled at U Thant, these two countries should engage in self-criticism. In sum, Malik supported K-M's considerations concerning U Thant.

7. K-M then said he did not intend to follow any rigid order of speakers and asked if anyone wished to take floor. Crowe then spoke. Since Malik raised U Thant, this matter should be settled straight away. After 10 years on the job, there was no doubt he was loved, wise and experienced. In January, May, July and September he had said with increasing emphasis that he would not run again. UK took his words at face value. Ten years in such a taxing job was as much as one man could stand. It would not be right to force him to continue against his will. Moreover, he had had two collapses this year and was suffering and weak.

8. As for interim solution, U Thant would be a lame duck as in fact he has been for some time. As such, he would not be in position to deal effectively with staggering budgetary and administrative problems or plan for long term. Although SYG is a political figure, he is also chief administrative officer and is forced to spend a great deal of time on finances and administration. It was not fair to U Thant or to UN not to take him at his word. There was list of present and possible candidates and it would be possible to find well-qualified successor from among them.

9. Bush said US views were well known and paralleled UK's. U Thant told Bush personally that he did not want to continue and US convinced this is the case. US sensed mood among other members that it was time to get on with appointment of new SYG. Many smaller members are so concerned that they are considering submitting GA res urging Five to get on with the job. US strongly supported position of UK. Bush hoped at next meeting the Five could get on with discharging their Charter responsibilities. He also hoped discussions would be kept in confidence.

10. Huang Hua said this was first time PRC taking part in UN work. There were many things Chinese del did not know well. After their arrival, they were contacted by several delegations who gave their views on new SYG. PRC then began to consult certain others dels to hear their opinions. Basically, if the 5 perm members have a decisive voice, this right to speak is not absolute. Five should be very prudent in this respect, otherwise their right to speak would be faced with challenges.

11. Chinese del desired have contacts with many other dels on this subject. During contacts thus far, Chinese del did not commit themselves or take any stand. PRC would also like to know the views of the other 4 since they are more knowledgeable about the work of the SYG and which candidate could best do the job.

12. The Chinese del agreed to continue informal, private, Five-Power consultations. PRC was also disposed, Huang Hua said, to have bilateral contacts with other four permanent members.

13. K-M, summing up, said there was a divergence of views among the Five concerning U Thant. For the moment, there was no decision. (Malik interjected there was no final decision.)

14. It was agreed to hold next meeting Thursday, December 9, at 9:30 am at French Mission. It was agreed Five would make public fact that they had held their first meeting. It was further agreed they would not reveal date and place of next meeting and would restrict contents of meeting on strict need to know. Five agreed they would not brief any other party.

15. Malik then said if US and UK were opposed to U Thant, they should propose another candidate. Names of candidates already in the field did not inspire widespread enthusiasm and it should be remembered a large regional group was opposed to one candidate.

Bush

239. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 10, 1971, 0344Z.

4895. SYG.

1. Summary. At second meeting of the Five Dec 9 progress was made when U Thant and Herrera eliminated as candidates. Malik pressed hard to have Five approach U Thant to enquire, if permanent members asked him to stay on for interim period, would he accept. UK and US declined join such an appeal on basis U Thant's clear position and state of his health. PRC rep said based on wide consultations his del believed number of dels were not in agreement U Thant should be asked to accept interim appointment. Soviet and French Reps said they would report foregoing to their govts. PRC said it would be in position support Herrera and asked about US position. Bush confirmed US had informed Chile it not in position support Herrera. Bush urged other dels to state views on specific names when asked as he had done on Herrera. Five agreed they would refuse all public comment on meetings other than to confirm that consultations were continuing. Next meeting 9:15 AM Dec 13. End summary.

2. Participants and procedural arrangements same as at first meeting (USUN 4812).² First 45 minutes taken up with long complaint by Malik over squib in *New York Times* reporting that the Five had held their first meeting to discuss successor to U Thant. Malik said his del favored continuation of U Thant's term as did overwhelming majority of UN members. Therefore for US to inform press that Five were discussing successor was distortion of Soviet position similar to leaks which had occurred during Four Power talks on ME.

3. Bush denied US had violated agreement reached at previous meeting. Five had agreed to announce that their first meeting on SYG item had taken place and had committed themselves not to reveal what took place in meeting. Eleven months ago U Thant said he would not stay on and US thought meeting was to agree on new SYG.

4. Malik then went on at length how U Thant had sent up trial balloon in January but UK and US hate him so they launched campaign to compel him to reiterate his intention to retire. If Five came to conclusion U Thant should continue for six to twelve months he was certain SYG would agree.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Nodis.

² Document 238.

5. Crowe (UK) spoke next and denied UK and US hate U Thant. He repeated UK position on U Thant given at previous meeting and said since U Thant doesn't want to stay on Five should not ask him to do so. Crowe then handed around informal list of candidates (Amersinghe, Cuevas Cancino, Djermakoye, Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring, Makonnen, Manescu, Rahnema, Ramphal, Garcia Robles, Sadruddin, Terence, Waldheim). UK thought there were a number of capable candidates and that Jakobson was well qualified. Crowe proposed Five go through names and give views as to which ones any participant did not like or did not regard as a serious candidate.

6. Bush said he had heard name of Guyer which could be added to list on understanding this was not by way of US sponsorship.

7. Malik said only two names before group were U Thant and Jakobson. He supported Kosciusko-Morizet's suggestion at previous meeting on requesting U Thant to remain if Anglo-Saxons would agree. Huang Hua asked if Kosciusko-Morizet had officially proposed U Thant at December 6 meeting. Kosciusko-Morizet replied he had not. Soviets he said, thought U Thant candidature possible and best solution might be to ask him. France was not opposed to a U Thant candidacy.

8. Huang Hua then reiterated PRC's position on proper role of the Five vis-à-vis the general membership using almost verbatim the same language he used at the first meeting. During consultations with others, PRC had not committed itself to any candidate whatsoever. PRC had heard US was opposed to Herrera and of course question of extension of U Thant had come up. In opinion PRC, Five should be extremely cautious whether in taking steps in favor of U Thant or against Herrera, otherwise they might have regrets.

9. Huang Hua summed up PRC views as follows: (A) Quite a few dels were not in agreement with renewal or prolongation of U Thant's mandate because he had held post for ten years and impression would be created successor could not be agreed upon; (B) some favor a European candidate. Since post twice held by Europeans, it might be advisable successor come neither from Europe nor Asia. However, this was not simple geographic question. Herrera was an example. If this candidate qualified, PRC would take geography into consideration.

10. Bush noted Malik at previous meeting had said one candidate opposed by a regional group. Which candidate did he mean? Malik replied he had mentioned no name.

11. Crowe agreed with Huang Hua's remarks on U Thant. He urged Five discuss candidates with view eliminating unacceptable or non-serious candidates. Otherwise, SC meeting should be called and voting should begin.

12. Kosciusko-Morizet said there two possibilities. Five could approach U Thant as Malik suggested. Second possibility would be to

accept fact some participants took position in no case could they accept U Thant extension.

13. Malik said if Five could not reach consensus as in past, then there should be alternative procedure. USSR believed overwhelming majority wanted U Thant to remain. Should this be put to vote in GA? Should Five wash their hands of problem? Even if GA passed res each participant could veto in SC. Among Africans and Asians no one defended geographic approach. Perhaps only way would be to have vote in GA.

14. Huang Hua said PRC did not put geographic considerations first and foremost. Qualities of candidate had to be taken into account. This did not prevent Five from taking account views of some members who favored geographic concept. Huang Hua said if Malik made official proposal to have GA vote he would consider it. In meantime, five permanent members should consult other delegations and in this way consensus of Five would better satisfy general membership.

15. Huang Hua noted time was limited but Five should try to reach desired consensus. If one were to extend U Thant, this would disappoint others who waiting for solution. In event Five did not reach agreement soon, question of special GA would arise. Special GA not worthwhile even for economic reasons. As for Herrera, even though US had expressed different views, could group consider them definite? Could Herrera still be taken into consideration? Many attach importance to this candidacy and PRC would be able to support idea of Herrera's candidacy.

16. Kosciusko-Morizet said all agreed it desirable to avoid resumed GA. On geographic question, there did not seem to be major differences. SYG should be person best qualified. On procedure, Five should continue consultations in order to reach a consensus which would be backed by SC and GA.

17. Crowe agreed on need for consensus. Perhaps names of U Thant, Jakobson, and Herrera should be sent to SC where secret ballots would be cast in closed session. Trygve Lie had been extended by GA in 1950 but this not good procedure.

18. Bush then gave US criteria for SYG in para 4 State 219420.³ We too opposed resumed GA. If Five deadlock, next move should be to SC and not GA. Bush asked if he replied to Huang Hua's question on Herrera would others be prepared to answer questions about candidates.

19. Malik said without clarification of positions of other four on his proposal for approach to U Thant to see if he would be willing to extend for six months, Five could not progress. Perhaps Kosciusko-Morizet could ask SYG. Of course, if US, UK and PRC reject proposal he would advise USSR.

³ Document 237.

20. Crowe and Bush said they were not prepared to have U Thant or anyone else serve for six months.

21. Kosciusko-Morizet said one point had been settled. On question whether Five could agree continuation of U Thant was excluded, UK and US replied “yes” and PRC replied many dels considered extension not advisable.

22. Malik said three resolutely opposed to U Thant. How should Five now proceed in view of fact at least 90 members were in favor of U Thant extending.

23. Kosciusko-Morizet said France did not have instructions on any one candidate and was very open. He would report today’s development and maybe later he could be more precise. Next time perhaps those candidates who stood no real chance could be eliminated from the list without revealing who eliminated them. Five could then consider names remaining.

24. Crowe supported this idea and said perhaps group should forward two or three names to SC.

25. Malik recalled PRC statement it not committed to any candidate. Did the PRC support Herrera?

26. Huang Hua replied PRC in favor of Herrera candidacy and presented it to consideration of other four.

27. Bush said he would reply to earlier question and he hoped next time others would also answer questions on candidates. Before PRC del arrived, US informed Chile privately US not able support Herrera’s candidacy. This came out in Latin American press and we confirmed it. Malik said only thing wrong was that decision appeared in the press.

28. Five then agreed they would limit comment to press to “consultations are going on.” Five agreed to respond with no comment to all enquiries about frequency, place of meetings and to all request for information about discussions themselves.

29. Next meeting 9:15 A.M. December 13.

Bush

240. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 11, 1971, 0026Z.

4929. Subj: Manescu Candidacy for SYG. Summary: Bogdan (Romania) informed De Palma Manescu candidacy not yet official pending reaction Five powers. PRC was non-committal while Sovs had evaded direct reply. He personally doubted time had yet arrived when Manescu could be viewed as realistic candidate but asked for official US reaction. End summary.

1. At lunch Dec 10 Amb Bogdan (Romania) informed De Palma that Manescu candidacy is not yet official and that his govt is engaged in active consultations to ascertain prospects before deciding whether to make it official. He said that very informal soundings undertaken some weeks ago had revealed certain interest in a Manescu bid but that his govt is now confining its approaches to five permanent members. PRC has commented favorably but without any commitment and Sovs evaded reaction by saying they still hoped U Thant might stay on. He did not know if UK and French had yet been approached.

2. When asked if he personally felt international situation had evolved sufficiently to make Manescu candidacy realistic, Bogdan replied he doubted it, but the very fact that candidacy could be given objective consideration was significant. He said Sovs probably not inclined "reward" Manescu just now, but that socialist countries as a whole would avoid appearing to blackball him.

3. Bogdan added that, in his personal view, Sovs would have to regard possibility of Manescu in SYG office as advantageous to them, citing as example fact that "such a SYG could not have spoken out as much as U Thant did on Czech affair." But, he added, Sovs may weigh other factors as well.

4. After citing qualities US thinks important for any SYG, De Palma said US is not actually committed to any candidate although we have naturally formed certain impressions about qualities of previously known candidates. Bogdan interjected he knew US could not support Herrera and was favorably disposed toward Jakobson. De Palma added that he personally felt that mere floating of a Manescu candidacy was an indication of favorable trend in international affairs even if it should develop that time had not yet come when it could be pressed to successful result.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bucharest.

5. In conclusion, De Palma said that, given value US attaches to its good relations with Romania, we would want to give careful consideration to Romanian approach. He asked if in fact Romania wished to have official US reply now or preferred to take further soundings first. After some hesitation, Bogdan replied he thought official US reaction would be appreciated even if it went no further than De Palma's personal remarks. De Palma undertook to provide reaction as soon as possible.

Bush

241. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 14, 1971, 0539Z.

4998. SYG Succession: Ramphal Availability. Ref: USUN 4657.²

1. Min State Ramphal called on Bush Dec 13 to discuss SYG succession. Ramphal was accompanied by Perm Rep Talbot and Guyana Amb to Venezuela Anne Jardim. LA adviser present.

2. Bush referred to meetings with Talbot, said Ramphal enjoyed high regard of some influential Americans and had impressive qualifications and asked if initial contacts by Talbot had led GOG and Ramphal to consider more formal candidacy. Ramphal said he wished explain background leading to decision by GOG to make him available for SYG position. Ramphal said suggestion initially made to him eighteen months ago by former Irish ForMin Sean McBride who also suggested possibility to PriMin Burnham. McBride and Burnham recommended that Ramphal availability be made known at some appropriate time close to end of Thant's term. When repeated declarations of intentions to retire made Thant's intentions clear, Burnham authorized quiet approaches concerning Ramphal's availability, beginning with calls on SC perm members. PriMin Burnham had also contacted a cross section of heads of state and government mainly in nonaligned world. All of these approaches resulted in varying degrees of encouragement for a Ramphal candidacy.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Georgetown.

² Document 235.

3. On basis foregoing reactions Ramphal was urged to come to New York and make himself known to SC members and others. He has already met with PRC (Huang Hua) who reiterated well-known view they would not be party to secret deal by big powers but wished to discuss SYG succession with entire SC membership and others. Ramphal said Huang Hua seemed interested though noncommittal re his aspirations. Of SC perm members, French have been most reserved to date. Ramphal approaching SC non-perms, notably LAs, Africans and Italians, and he is going to approach such nonaligneds as Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Yugoslavia and India to make them all aware he is available.

4. Ramphal asked Bush for US views on succession. Bush said we had been convinced for months Thant wished retire and had been urging others to give matter serious consideration. Bush said US was open-minded concerning various candidates and "known candidates" among whom we believed there were several excellent potential SYGs. Bush said US did not share views of Sovs and French that Thant should be pressed to stay on on interim basis and did not believe Thant wished do so.

5. Ramphal raised Herrera candidacy by saying he had gained impression in speaking to PRC that they "liked" Herrera and were to some extent likely be influenced by Chilean attitude. Huang Hua had hinted that Chilean endorsement of his name would be a factor in PRC's deciding to support Ramphal. Ramphal had sounded out Chileans re Herrera and thought they were still thinking of him as a serious candidate. Guyanese assured Bush they were not going to try to obtain LA group endorsement, saying they were well aware selection of SYG could not be object of group rivalries.

6. At conclusion of meeting Bush urged Guyanese to remain in contact with him and told Ramphal he would henceforth assume latter's name was among those SC should seriously consider in reaching its decision. Ramphal said he was not intending to make his position publicly known but he recognized that as his contacts with dels multiply chances of the press beginning to speculate on his intentions were becoming greater. Bush said he did not think such press speculation, which was inevitable, would be in any way harmful.

Bush

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 16, 1971, 1601Z.

226040. Subj: SYG. Ref: USUN 5067.²

1. At Five Power meeting Dec. 16 you should endeavor to bring group to agree to submit no more than three names to SC. You should head group off from any discussion of order in which names would be listed or procedure to be used in SC in deciding order in which names would be put to vote and reserve your position on this matter.

2. You should work to assure that the three names sent to SC include Jakobson and Sadruddin unless latter is expressly ruled out by Soviets or PRC. Your comment at last meeting that Waldheim appeared qualified will be helpful in protecting our relationship with him should he be elected, and you should continue to take similar position. You should express reservation if anyone attempts summarize views on Waldheim to effect he appears have support of at least four permanent members. In that case you might say it is more accurate to say he is among top three candidates.

3. You should find opportunity refer to Soviet statements that Jakobson is opposed by "large and important group" and say that we have solid evidence to the contrary. Our information is that (A) Arab group has taken no position as such; (B) that we are satisfied that opposition of several members this group is at least balanced by support several others of group have expressed for Jakobson. Suggest you not again press Soviets to indicate whether they have ruled him out and concentrate instead on seeing to it that his name is among those presented to Council.

4. Suggest you seek to assure that names put before SC include Jakobson, Sadruddin and Waldheim. You should if at all possible head off inclusion Herrera by reiterating US view and seek UK support to exclude him. You should try to avoid Jarring on grounds he is not a candidate but not oppose inclusion Jarring if others insist. We see no point in including any other names and hope you can arrange with UK and France to keep others from being listed.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Assistant Secretary De Palma, cleared by Pedersen and Miller, and approved by Secretary Rogers.

² Telegram 5067 from USUN described the December 15 meeting of the Five. No decision was reached, and the next meeting was scheduled for December 16 at 9:30 a.m. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3)

5. We would welcome your views, and those of UK and French, on tactics or procedures to avoid Waldheim's name being put to vote first in SC.

Rogers

243. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 17, 1971, 0655Z.

5116. Subj: SYG.

1. Summary: Five Power meeting Dec 16 decided to send list of six names to private meeting of SC for secret balloting at 3:20 PM Friday, Dec 17. List consists of: Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring, Sadruddin, U Thant, Waldheim. Although US made clear our position on Herrera had not changed, PRC and USSR insisted that he be on list. PRC said its second choice was Jakobson. Both USSR and PRC objected to Sadruddin on grounds he is a prince. On Waldheim, Bush made it clear that, while no formal objections had been raised, he was not first choice of anyone. End summary.

2. Malik again announced Soviet support for Jarring and Waldheim. He pressed Chinese to react to latter name. Huang Hua eventually said that he had met Waldheim only yesterday. Chinese maintained their support for Herrera because he widely supported in LA. However, as second choice PRC could support Jakobson since he enjoyed support many African and Asian dels.

3. Kosciusko-Morizet said Chilean PermRep had advised him that if Herrera vetoed Chile would propose Valdes. K-M noted Valdes had reputation as excellent administrator.

4. Malik returned to his theme that no objection had been expressed concerning Waldheim by four dels at previous meeting and he pressed for PRC comment, Huang Hua asked for confirmation that four other participants had expressed no objection to Waldheim. Bush said Waldheim's candidacy in UN had not aroused enthusiasm neither had it encountered significant objection. He believed it was necessary to include names of candidates about whom we had positive feelings.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Nodis.

5. K-M agreed saying it not enough to have a candidate against whom there no objection. A candidate for SYG should also have something in his favor. K-M thought Waldheim should be a reserve candidate. Crowe (UK) noted Waldheim was not first candidate of anyone around the table and objected to consensus on non-objectionable candidate.

6. Bush asked if there was any reaction to name of Sadruddin? Huang Hua said because he is a prince some dels don't like him. In this respect he was not referring specifically to Soviets. Malik observed USSR and PRC had same attitude on this question.

7. Bush said US had tried to be frank on question of Herrera's candidacy. However, if other dels felt strongly about him US would not try to keep his name from being included on the list of serious candidates.

8. It was finally agreed K-M should submit list of six names para 1 to SYG and to Pres SC with request for private meeting of SC afternoon Dec 17. Request would be made for secret ballot with different colored slips for perms and non-perms. Each name on list would be voted on separately but results would be announced only after voting had taken place on all names on the list to eliminate alphabetical advantage or disadvantage. Object of first ballot would be limited to seeing which candidate or candidates vetoed.

9. Next stage would permit non-perms to add any names they wished to the list. If names added, above procedure would be repeated. When list reduced to candidates certain not to be vetoed, balloting for election would begin with candidate receiving highest number of votes to be declared SC nominee. If there a tie, balloting on two names would be repeated.

10. *Comment:* We will need flexibility in voting. We and UK believe we should vote "yes" on Jakobson and Sadruddin in first round. Either US or UK vote "no" on U Thant if he appears likely to garner nine votes. Abstain on the remainder unless soundings show likelihood of nine votes coupled with no veto. In latter case either we or UK or both vote "no."

11. If Soviets veto Jakobson, we will try to organize support for Sadruddin. However, if Sadruddin vetoed, we will have to decide on a further fallback. In any case, we will need instructions should Soviets or another del insist on inclusion of Valdes.²

12. Latest report is that U Thant will request his name not be on the list. Finns assure us Jarring will make similar request before the vote.

Bush

² Later in the day, Rogers advised Bush to seek an agreement on a preferential first ballot. Rogers recommended voting for either Jakobson or Sadruddin, against Herrera, Thant, or Jarring, and abstaining on Waldheim. (Telegram 226945 to USUN, December 17; *ibid.*)

244. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 18, 1971, 0112Z.

5149. Subj: SYG—Five Power Meeting Dec 18.

1. Summary: Five-Power meeting on SYG Dec 18 decided recommend vote by SC on four candidates who obtained seven or more SC votes Dec 17 (Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring, Waldheim), plus five others (Djermakoye, Ortiz de Rosas, Ramphal, Terence, Valdes), plus additional candidates who may be nominated by non-perms. Five decided recommend to SYG and SC Pres (A) one-by-one votes with results revealed only after all names voted on, (B) proceed to third ballot if more than one nominee gets nine votes without veto. French del consulting with SC Pres and non-perms over weekend. Non-perms Saturday added Rahnema to list and Terence asked name be deleted. In related development, Chinese told Finns they would continue veto Waldheim until end. End summary.

2. Five Powers held hour and half meeting at French Mission Dec 18 to prepare for SC balloting on SYG Dec 20.

3. Kosciusko-Morizet opened meeting by stressing need to avoid repeating long procedural wrangle and misunderstandings of previous day's SC meeting. Suggested voting on candidates one by one, announcing results immediately after balloting on each name. First to receive nine votes without veto would be elected. Malik and Crowe initially agreed, former on grounds this would enable more selective use of veto.

4. After abortive K-M suggestion that Five attempt agree on one name, Huang Hua suggested retention of seven candidates of previous day's SC meeting with some additions. K-M agreed this had advantages but suggested first explore other possibilities. Bush recommended elimination of those obtaining only few votes at Friday's meeting, otherwise that meeting meaningless. Suggested at least listing top four and only then perhaps others in vote-rank order. Crowe and Huang agree. Malik supported Huang's proposal that all seven be retained at same time as agreeing with Bush that Five should recognize that some among seven hopeless. Malik urged re-introduce seven names plus others proposed either by perm members or non-perms. Malik also urged adoption of lottery system (Ortiz de Rosas suggestion) to establish voting order.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

5. Bush again pressed for vote-rank order list to which new names would be added. Also noted advisability of listing African, perhaps Terence.

6. K-M said if Five listed Dec 17's four top names (Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring and Waldheim), they should also name others (perhaps Amerasinghe, Guyer, Ortiz de Rosas, Ramphal, Terence and Valdes). This followed by discussion among Five of possibility of first voting on entirely new list (excluding Dec 17's slate), taking those with seven or more votes, adding to Dec 17's four and then voting on new list. Malik then endorsed Bush's earlier suggestion that rather than just repeating vote on Dec 17's four, vote should be on list including new names as well as four. Recommended drawing lots for vote order.

7. Problem of criticism by non-perms raised several times during meeting. Malik, as K-M had done earlier, stressed need to avoid vulnerability to non-perms' criticism. During meeting, Huang also underlined need for Five to be able give satisfactory explanations to non-perms.

8. K-M raised possibility that non-perms would object to Five attempting impose rule that nominees must obtain seven votes to keep names alive. Huang pointed out that at SC meeting two dels had suggested that all names with less than nine votes be eliminated, but he added his agreement on four-name procedure. Malik, however, was convinced that Five could defend procedure that eliminated names that had little support. Five then agreed retain only four of seven considered by SC Dec 17, but with acknowledgement that non-perms could re-introduce others.

9. K-M, who shifted ground repeatedly during meeting, said he would have preferred procedure under which SC at next meeting would start with new names, and vote on these; if any obtained nine votes without veto he would be elected, if none elected, then vote would be on old list again, beginning with Waldheim. Crowe and Malik agreed this had advantages, but Malik worried Five would look bad if unable to indicate any opinion on candidates. Thus, Five must come to SC with list. Also, if basic slate not concluded now, Sov del would be without sufficient instructions and would be obliged on Mon to veto or abstain on newly-announced candidates. Five, he said, must agree on four names plus others. Non-perms will understand principle that seven votes indicates popularity. Furthermore, any SC member can propose new names. Malik recalled confusion of Friday's SC meeting, urged (A) that K-M inform SC Pres Taylor-Kamara of Five's conclusions; (B) that SC Pres convene or otherwise inform non-perms to give them chance obtain instructions in advance of SC vote. All foregoing, Malik said, is wholly defensible.

10. In summarizing Malik's proposal, K-M said results would be announced after vote on each name. Bush strongly questioned

procedure, stating US del favored announcing only when voting on list completed. Malik countered that Bush's procedure would only lead to repeat of Friday's confusion. Malik also said his own procedure would enable perm members to be more selective with veto. After Bush again argued for voting through list before announcement, Huang Hua expressed agreement. Malik and Huang then engaged in low-keyed exchange on subject, climaxed by Malik's flat statement that Bush-Huang procedure would violate UN Charter and SC rules of procedure and some country would require Bush and Huang to defend before ICJ. K-M laid Malik allegation of illegality to rest, pointing out that SC is master of own procedures. He ended up supporting Bush and Huang. With continued negative noises from Malik, others concurred. Agreed also that if two on list obtain nine votes without veto, SC would proceed to third ballot.

11. Prior to above exchange, Bush, pursuant telcons with Dept and discussion with Jakobson, suggested possibility of open ballot revealing who cast vetoes (stating that non-perms might press for this). Suggestion was immediately and firmly opposed.

12. For names to be added to basic four, others agreed to Ramphal (Crowe's suggestion), Valdes (K-M) and Ortiz de Rosas (K-M). After Bush repeated suggestion that African should be included, Five agreed to add Djermakoye (K-M) and Terence (Crowe). Crowe raised possibility of adding Makonnen, but others objected on grounds this would re-open all names previously dropped.

13. Following further discussion of means of preparing SC Pres as thoroughly as possible before meeting and of avoiding confusion from lack of time to obtain voting instructions, K-M summarized agreement that he would inform SYG and SC Pres that:

(A) Five agreed vote Mon on list of nine (Djermakoye, Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring, Ortiz de Rosas, Ramphal, Terence, Valdes, Waldheim), plus any names added by non-perms over weekend or on Mon.²

(B) Non-perms would be informed ASAP, inviting additional nominations.

(C) Voting procedure: (I) One by one but with results announced only at end, (II) if more than one candidate obtained nine or more votes without veto names would be carried over to third ballot, (III) names would be listed alphabetically (although K-M noted that under circumstances order not significant).

14. Atmosphere of meeting. As foregoing indicates, meeting included virtually no discussion of attitudes toward individual candidates and most time spent on procedures. Although differences on pro-

² Later that day, Bush was instructed to vote for Jakobson, Waldheim, or de Rosas and against Herrera or Valdez. (Telegram 227770 to USUN, December 18; *ibid.*)

cedure frequently expressed, there no sharp exchanges (with mild exception of Malik's rather forced scolding of US–UK references to “small powers”) and Huang and Malik even occasionally noted that they in agreement.

15. Late in afternoon, French Rep telephoned us to state that some non-perms (French MisOff said did not know which) had added name of Rahnema of Iran). In second call, French informed us that Terence, after expressing appreciation for having his name on list, asked that name be deleted.

16. Finns informed us also today that Chinese state that they would continue to veto Waldheim until very end.

Bush

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 20, 1971, 1823Z.

227889. Subj: SYG. Ref: A. State 227770, B. USUN 5149.²

1. On further reflection, and in light of ref B, we think it will be safer for us to abstain on Ramphal, vote no on all candidates other than Jakobson, Waldheim, and Ortiz. There are too many unknowns in the equation and it is possible that unless we veto, Rahnema, for instance, might just squeak by with nine positive votes. We cannot be certain that others among Five will vote against him.

2. After this trial heat, it seems to us that we should accept voting on individual candidates, with results announced after each vote, even if you are unable to obtain order of voting that is most desirable from our point of view. Any candidate receiving nine votes (without veto) would be nominated, but it would be understood that otherwise top candidates could still be reconsidered.

3. You might also after the voting approach Malik and tell him we are puzzled by continued Soviet veto of Jakobson since it would seem that Finnish SYG could be attractive to him. You would of course

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Pederesen, Assistant Secretary De Palma, and Fry; and approved by the Acting Secretary.

² See Document 244 and footnote 2 thereto.

counter the allegation that Arabs are against him by pointing out that Arabs are far from united and some important Arab countries either favor him or have said they can live with him. Purpose of this approach would be to smoke out Soviets whether they intend to veto Jakobson indefinitely.

4. As for Cuevas Cancino, while he is Western-oriented and even pro-American (in contrast to Garcia Robles) we think he would make a weak Secretary General and certainly less acceptable to us from that point of view than Ortiz or Waldheim, so would not wish to see him encouraged at this point.

Irwin

246. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 21, 1971, 0250Z.

5157. Subj: SYG—SC Second Ballot December 20. Ref: (A) USUN 5149; (B) State 227889.²

1. SC met for second round of balloting on SYG afternoon December 20. SC Pres Taylor-Kamara announced procedure as recommended by Five December 13 and list of nine candidates as reported reftel A, with addition of Amerasinghe (latter proposed by Japan at Amerasinghe's request, according to Japanese del).

2. SC voted one by one on separate ballots through list of ten candidates. Results announced at end as follows:

Amerasinghe (4-6-5); Djermakoye (5-8-2);
Herrera (7-6-2); Jakobson (9-5 (including one veto)-1);
Jarring (7-4-4); Ortiz de Rozas (10-3 (one veto)-2);
Rahnema (3-8-4); Ramphal (3-7-5);
Valdes (7-5-3); Waldheim (11-2 (one veto)-2).

We voted per instructions reftel B.

3. SC Pres required to announce negative votes by permanent members only in those cases where candidates obtained at least nine votes. However, we subsequently learned authoritatively that each of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² Documents 244 and 245.

ten candidates had at least one negative permanent member vote; in some cases, there were as many as four.

4. Following SC Pres's request for guidance from SC members on next steps, Kosciusko-Morizet, supported by Malik, recommended 24 hours adjournment to permit consultations and new instructions. Bush was alone in urging one hour suspension prior to third round of balloting. After confused discussion of need to prime GA Pres for GA meeting on SYG Wednesday morning, SC agreed to adjourn SC until 5 PM Tuesday.

5. Five permanent members to meet 9:30 AM Tuesday.

6. Finns and Norwegians (Algaard) tell us they have firm assurances that PRC will continue to veto Waldheim to the bitter end.

7. However, prior to SC meeting Waldheim told Bush Austrians had spoken to Chinese in Peking and were assured that, although PRC felt obliged in first instance to support third world candidate (Herrera), if their preferred candidate could not be elected they would be prepared to support Waldheim on a later ballot. PRC FonOff said this position would be conveyed to PRC del, but that communications with Huang Hua were sometimes slow.

8. After the meeting Miglioulo (Italy) told us in confidence that Huang Hua had taken essentially the same line in a conversation with him. Miglioulo regretted fact that another vote had not been taken December 20 since it was his impression PRC would have removed veto against Waldheim.

9. UK del believes Ortiz de Rozas would make better SYG than Waldheim and is considering how to bring pressure to bear on Sovs to choose between Jakobson and Ortiz. UK believes K-M wishes to play kingmaker role and hopes French will work on Sovs, perhaps in addition to Syria and Somalia who presumably also support Ortiz de Rozas.

10. At Five Power meeting 9:30 AM December 21, we believe we should take position three candidates, no more no less, who obtained nine or more votes should be resubmitted. Sovs may, for tactical reasons, insist on inclusion of Jarring but believe we should resist. PRC might insist on Herrera and K-M on Valdes in which case list cannot be kept to three names but we should make valiant effort. Sovs will make much of the fact that Waldheim in two meetings has proved to be the front runner and has only one veto against him which should now be dropped so that will of majority is not frustrated, etc. At this point it will be interesting to see whether Finns/Norwegians or Austrians/Italians have best information on PRC intentions. (To date: Algaard has proven to be most accurate forecaster of PRC positions.) If PRC yields on Waldheim then he is clearly the next SYG.

11. On other hand, if PRC sticks to its line that geographic consideration should be taken into account and indicates support for

Ortiz in addition to Jakobson, then there is a possibility that Sovs could be brought to swallow Ortiz de Rozas.

12. Finns here naturally are in a state. They profess dismay that US and UK "let them down" by voting for Waldheim and Ortiz. In spite of repeated probes at all levels, we have not revealed to them how we voted. Nevertheless, their analysis, obtained through the Secretariat, is as follows:

Waldheim—four perm members voted yes; PRC vetoed
 Ortiz—four perm members voted yes; USSR vetoed
 Jakobson—three perm members voted yes; USSR vetoed; French abstained
 Jarring—three perm members voted yes; PRC and one unknown vetoed.

13. Finns are worried that we will make deal with Sovs and PRC at the expense of Jakobson.

14. Pursuant State 227889, after SC meeting Bush had private talk with Malik. Latter reiterated his "your beloved child is dead" theme.

15. Incidentally, French were furious when reproached by Finns for their suspected negative vote on December 17. French swear they abstained and Finns now accept this.

Bush

247. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 22, 1971, 0356Z.

5191. Subj: SYG.

1. Summary. In spite of firm assurances by Finns and Norwegians that PRC would continue to veto Waldheim indefinitely, SC voted to recommend him to GA on first ballot Dec 21 by vote of 11-1-3 (US, UK). Ortiz de Rozas was runner up with 12-3 (Soviet veto)-0. Jakobson received 9-5 (Soviet veto)-1. End summary.

2. At Five-Power meeting early Dec 21, Bush and Crowe (UK) advocated top three candidates who received nine or more votes be re-submitted to SC. We insisted all three candidates be considered on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

equal footing and expressed preference for Jakobson. Bush also made point that we thought composition of SC did not necessarily reflect strength of Jakobson in GA. Malik advocated all candidates who received seven or more votes be re-submitted. Huang Hua favored re-submission of "LA candidates" Herrera and Valdes. Kosciusko-Morizet said he could go either way.

3. During lone discussion Malik observed it did not matter much which candidates submitted or which procedure followed because results would be the same as previous ballots. Group finally decided send list of six candidates who obtained seven or more votes Dec 20 (Herrera, Jakobson, Jarring, Ortiz de Rozas, Valdes, Waldheim). First ballot would be same procedure as previous meeting (secret ballot with results announced after voting completed on all six). If no one recommended, next ballot would be by candidates in order of votes received and would have votes announced after voting completed on each candidate.

4. After above meeting adjourned, substance of Hillenbrand telephone call from Bermuda received instructing US to take action to be certain Waldheim not elected during voting Dec 21. On return to the Mission, Bush received telephone call from Sir Colin Crowe informing us that the Secretary and Sir Alec Douglas Home had agreed in above sense. Crowe noted that, US and UK, having voted for Waldheim Dec 20 could not now cast veto without fact becoming known. However, US and UK could switch to abstain if we were reasonably certain PRC would veto. This would reduce or hold down Waldheim vote and put Ortiz de Rozas ahead. It would also ensure Ortiz would be voted on first in second round. Bush then talked directly with the Secretary who agreed we should coordinate tactics with UK and Jakobson.

5. We next talked to Pastinen (Finland) and Algaard (Norway) who assured us that they had held long meeting with Huang Hua after Five-Power meeting reported above. Chinese reportedly gave them unequivocal assurances that they would continue to veto both Waldheim and Jarring indefinitely. Pursuant first Bush telcon with Secretary, Bush called Jakobson who confirmed this was Chinese position. Jakobson said "there is no question about it—the Chinese will veto Waldheim all the way through."

6. Bush agreed with Crowe that under these circumstances we would recommend that both of us abstain on Waldheim on first and second round. If no agreement reached at end of second ballot we would seek third round with vote by show of hands. (Suggestion was made UK ascertain PRC views directly but Crowe thought approach by him to Huang Hua would only arouse suspicion.) This position endorsed in second Bush telcon with the Secretary.

7. Just prior to SC meeting Bush encountered Algaard (Norway) who again stated in categorical terms that PRC would definitely continue

to veto Waldheim. We also ascertained that Japan and Nicaragua would continue to vote for Jakobson and Bush urged Ortiz de Rozas to do likewise but latter was noncommittal.

8. When vote was read out we were surprised to learn that the one negative vote had not been that of a permanent member and, consequently, Waldheim had obtained the required majority. (If we and UK had maintained vote of previous day he would have obtained 13–1–1 on victory ballot.)

9. After the meeting Bush placed call to Waldheim but switchboard of Austrian Mission was jammed. Bush then conveyed congratulations to Mrs. Waldheim. Condolences were sent to Jakobson. Ortiz took defeat in stride and thanked Bush warmly for strong US support.

10. Malik circulating story that LA (Herrera, Valdes) would have been elected had it not been for intransigence of US. We are pointing out that it pity that the LA with the most votes (Ortiz who received 12 yes votes) was blocked by Soviet veto.

11. Miglioulo (Italy) told us after the vote that he was convinced Soviets would never have accepted Jakobson or Ortiz. If PRC had been equally adamant on Waldheim, it would have been necessary to look elsewhere (e.g. Jarring).

12. *Comment:* Italian and UK dels have been critical of Finnish campaign tactics which they consider, through design or overeagerness, to have resulted in inaccurate Finnish statements concerning positions of alleged supporters. Whatever the faults, if any, of Jakobson campaign, Finns by putting well-qualified candidate in the field early and maintaining him to the end helped ensure that Soviet first choice, U Thant, would not be re-elected.

Bush

Appointment of UN Development Program Administrator

248. Memorandum From Michael J. Deutch to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (De Palma)¹

Washington, October 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

UNDP

1. In the course of my private consulting engineering practice and various missions for the International Lending Institutions and *UNDP*, I had the opportunity to observe the potential and the weaknesses of UNDP. Paul Hoffman's advanced age, the probable departure of at least one US deputy and of the talented French assistant director may result in an attempt by the Indians or Pakistanis to take over the Directorship of UNDP.

2. With US-AID in disarray and multilateral project development being limited to the borrowing resources of IBRD, the USG would be well advised to insist that a talented American—preferably well known to the President—promptly replace Mr. Hoffman and attempt to stream-line UNDP, reorient its priorities towards areas where US management and technology can be applied realistically and efficiently. Some of the statistical, administrative and long-term research of UNDP duplicate those of UN's technical departments and the specialized international organizations—UNDP could shed those easily.

3. UNDP has its own resources and is *relatively* immune to the political pull and haul of the Secretariat; its rejuvenation would be acceptable at this time. From the point of view of the SG, there is much to be done to bolster the regional project planning in such fields as improving power utilization, fuel supply, exploration for natural resources, food technology, etc.

US bilateral aid will have to keep a low profile and multilateral project financing on a large scale may have to await liquidity im-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. No classification marking. An attached memorandum of acknowledgment from De Palma is also dated October 7. In an attached memorandum dated October 24, Winston Lord of the NSC staff called on Fred Bergsten and Marshall Wright to prepare a memorandum for Kissinger about the role of the UNDP, its strengths and weaknesses, the succession question, and recommended actions.

provement in the middle '70's. This Administration could accomplish much in the post-Vietnam period through the channel of a revitalized UNDP if a younger and talented man from the administration's ranks promptly took hold of UNDP and proceeded to stream-line it.

4. Being privy to the table of organization and the varied activities of UNDP I am convinced that it is an appropriate vehicle for the Administration's participation in selective development planning during the next couple of years (when we may have to pull in our horns in the vast complex of international organizations, until multilateral aid is sufficiently funded by others, and still may wish to have some accomplishment in the most viable areas). Last but not least even for post-war Indochina, UNDP may be more readily useful than ADB. There are other "vital trouble spots" where a competently—and discreetly—US directed UNDP may be very useful.

If and when a decision is taken I would like to brief the new director general in technical detail.

M.J.D.²

² Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

249. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

UNDP Job

I talked to Fred Bergsten in an effort to solicit some additional ideas for the UNDP position. As you know, Marshall Wright was pushing Graham Martin. Fred Bergsten said that Anthony M. Solomon is the most highly qualified candidate, but unfortunately he was a member of the last Administration for a short period and is a Democrat. Fred also mentioned the possibility of David Rockefeller (who I think will turn it down) or Chuck Percy (who I think will suspect he is being

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. No classification marking.

offered the job so that we can replace him with a more Senatorial candidate. This ploy might be much too obvious and I also think Percy might be a troublesome appointment in any event.)

My own instinct suggests that we might absorb some of our better Congressional or Gubernatorial losers, perhaps even Bush of Texas who seems to be an outstanding fellow with a considerable potential future as a Republican leader. Another possibility might be a defeated candidate such as Ray Broderick of Pennsylvania who is an excellent lawyer and outstanding individual. Appointments of this kind favor a high degree of background, but I have yet to see one of these jobs that requires more than solid philosophical views and firm loyalty as well as ingrained intelligence.

If you would like, I can ask Flemming to come up with a good candidate although I suspect he would tend toward political hacks.²

² Kissinger checked the “Yes” option, and drew a line from the end of the first sentence to the bottom of the page, where he added the handwritten note: “*Pres likes Rudolf Petersen.*”

250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

The Problem of Paul Hoffman and the UNDP

The UNDP (United Nations Development Program) is the UN instrument for handling multilateral economic assistance to developing countries. Its health and vigor, therefore, is of great potential importance to us as we multilateralize our development assistance, although it is now much less important than the World Bank and some other international financial institutions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A handwritten note reads: “Orig. ret’d to Wright—11/25.” An attached covering memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger, dated November 17, recommended Graham Martin for the position, and was submitted with another memorandum from Peter Flanigan to President Nixon, dated November 20, that reported that Senator Percy might be persuaded to take the post if he were assured that another Republican from Illinois would be appointed to fill his Senate seat.

Paul Hoffman has been the head of the UNDP since it was founded. He is now 79 years old, and there has been widespread hope that Hoffman would step down gracefully and in glory when his term ends in December.

Hoffman is determined, however, to stay on until he has completed the important reorganization of UNDP now afoot and Secretary General U Thant has informed us that he will shortly reappoint Hoffman for another one-year term.

Hoffman's reappointment will be the source of general disappointment, but nobody wants to end his long public service on a sour note. His reappointment will therefore probably be accepted without overt opposition.

However, the maneuvering to replace Hoffman is already well underway. Deputy UN Secretary General Narasimhan hungers for the job, and is moving actively and deftly to line up support. Narasimhan is a devious character, and if he succeeded Hoffman, it would be a grievous blow to US interests.

If we are going to go multilateral with our aid, it is essential that the head of the UNDP continue to be an American in order to facilitate Congressional support for the program. It is, however, by no means certain that we will succeed. The Secretary General has complete discretion to name the UNDP Chief, and there will be considerable international sentiment for naming someone other than an American.

To get our candidate appointed, we will need broad international support. To get that support, we will have to have a candidate of stature and proven administrative ability. He will not only need to be overwhelmingly qualified, but to be internationally recognized as such. A lesser-known figure, however deserving and competent, would probably not make it, and the job would go to a non-American, possibly Narasimhan.

On the other hand, if we put forward now a well qualified American candidate we should be able to obtain U Thant's support and to discourage other candidacies. Finally, the next few months will see basic decisions taken on the reorganization of the UNDP and the filling of some key executive positions therein. It is obviously desirable that Hoffman's replacement be identified so that he can work with Hoffman in making these decisions.

In short, there is an overwhelming need to select without delay the man we want to succeed Paul Hoffman.

I have two candidates to suggest for your consideration.

1. *Anthony Solomon*. Solomon is young (about 50), extremely vigorous, a first-class administrator, businessman, and economist. He is now President of the International Investment Corporation for Yugoslavia, a World Bank-sponsored consortium of US and European

firms promoting private foreign investment in Yugoslavia, and was outstanding as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in the previous Administration. He is a self-made millionaire, and a tough, no-nonsense operator who earned an excellent reputation on Capitol Hill which would stand him in good stead in seeking Congressional appropriations for the UNDP. Solomon also stands very high with the US business community, both because of his own background and because he negotiated the voluntary restraint agreements on steel imports in 1968. Solomon is a nominal Democrat, but not active, nor has he engaged in activities or taken positions that would make his political affiliation a problem.²

2. *Charles Percy.* Senator Percy would certainly be a surprise candidate, and I offer his name very tentatively for your consideration. He has the right kind of image (young, vigorous, sympathetic to developing countries), and his administrative experience in business and knowledge of Capitol Hill would be relevant to two of the UNDP's major needs. He would, in addition, have the kind of "high visibility" which is desirable in a UNDP Administrator. I have, of course, no idea whether Percy would have any interest in leaving the Senate for this job, or whether you would be interested in the legislative implications of his departure. Peter Flanigan, however, agreed that the idea should be broached to you, and will be sending you a separate memo on the subject.

Whomever you select, it is important that he be selected soon and that we proceed without delay to insure his successful candidacy. I am for Anthony Solomon.

Recommendation:

1. That you authorize us to put Anthony Solomon forward as the official US candidate to replace Paul Hoffman as Administrator of the UNDP.
2. Prefer to sound out Percy
3. Give me more names³

² An attached but not printed memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten to Kissinger, dated November 18, recommended Solomon for the post. Another attached memorandum, from Marshall Wright to Kissinger, dated November 19, expressed doubts about whether Solomon had the stature or international reputation for the post and about submitting the nomination of even a nominal Democrat to President Nixon.

³ None of the options is checked.

**251. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost)
to Secretary of State Rogers¹**

New York, January 12, 1971.

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter in regard to the tenure of the UNDP Administrator which the Secretary General handed me personally yesterday. This is of course a reply to my letter of December 1, a copy of which is also enclosed and which under instructions from the Department I informed him that we would be submitting the names of one or more qualified nominees to succeed Paul Hoffman.²

I believe that the Secretary General's letter stems from the fact that Paul has been disturbed by our intention to nominate his successor in the near future. U Thant told me yesterday that it is his understanding that Paul does not intend to ask for a further extension after this year and indeed that he is still inclined to retire in August or September. On the other hand, he is disturbed that discussion of his early departure and of a successor in the near future will put him in the lame duck category and lessen his ability to carry forward over coming months the reforms which the Jackson Report and the UNDP Governing Council have recommended.

We should, I agree, take account of Paul's sensibilities and not do anything which would jeopardize the success of his work during the next 6 or 8 months. On the other hand, I continue to believe that we should proceed rapidly in our search for a successor who would hopefully meet the criteria laid down in the second numbered paragraph of U Thant's letter and whose availability could be discussed informally with the Secretary General at any time. We could decide later when it might be appropriate to put the nomination forward formally.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Yost³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Confidential.

² Both letters are attached but not printed. The Secretary-General's January 11 letter expressed his concern that an announcement regarding a successor to Paul Hoffman might affect his efforts to restructure the UNDP. Yost's letter acknowledged an earlier letter of November 6, 1970, in which U Thant expressed his intention to offer Hoffman an extension of his term of office for one year, effective January 1, 1971.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, January 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Mr. Paul Hoffman's Request for an Appointment with You

Recommendation:

I recommend that you see Mr. Hoffman, Administrator of the United Nations Development Program, in order to stress that the selection of a well-qualified American successor is of crucial importance to U.S. interests and to U.S. support for the UN Development Program.

You may wish to point out that we have delayed proposing a successor while awaiting his decision about another term. Since we now understand he may retire by July 1971, you hope to be in a position to propose a successor soon with whom Mr. Hoffman would be able to discuss personnel and organizational problems and thereby facilitate the transition.

You may want to make clear that the United States greatly values the outstanding contribution he has made as Administrator.

Discussion:

We understand that Mr. Hoffman is seeking an appointment with you and may protest any action to propose his successor while he is still in office.

Ambassadors Phillips and Olds of our Mission to the United Nations called on Mr. Hoffman December 11 under instructions from the Department to discuss several matters, including the campaign undertaken by C. V. Narasimhan (Indian member of the Secretariat who serves simultaneously as Hoffman's deputy and U Thant's Chef de Cabinet and who possesses an inordinate vanity and appetite for power) to insure that he succeeds Hoffman. Phillips and Olds pointed out we have solid evidence that Narasimhan has been soliciting support for his candidacy in Europe and the Far East, and that he has also been recommending appointments in UNDP which would provide him with a power base in the organization.

Hoffman was greatly distressed at this overt discussion of his succession and seemed disturbed by the report of Narasimhan's tactics.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Confidential.

Hoffman indicated he was unhappy that the U.S. Government was talking about his successor at this time and said it would be extremely unfortunate for the UNDP if the selection of his successor was pursued before he was ready to retire.

Mr. Hoffman's intentions about his own future with the UNDP are still unknown. His contract has been renewed by U Thant until January 1, 1972, but, although he has never informed us directly of his intentions we have been told that the Secretary General understands Hoffman plans to retire in July 1971. He has indicated that he would like to be succeeded by David Morse, former head of the ILO, on an interim basis at some time in the future. We oppose Morse because of his age and his specialized agency orientation, which the UNDP must counter if it is to achieve the effectiveness we and other major donors desire.

Hoffman's advanced age (79) and the major role of UNDP in multilateral economic development make it essential that a capable successor take over the Program at an early date. His sensitivity on the subject of his retirement has made this problem worse. The growing resentment among other delegations on the UNDP Governing Council at the elderly "set-in-their-ways" leadership of UNDP may soon reach such proportions as to lead to their public repudiation of Mr. Hoffman, despite their admiration for the outstanding job he has done over the years in developing the UNDP. Such resentment might also lead to suggestions for the appointment of a non-American as Administrator, even though most major donors believe an American should hold the post.

It is also possible that Hoffman might resign immediately in pique if he feels he is being badly treated. His resignation now would probably result in the appointment of Narasimhan as Acting Administrator and his use of the next six to twelve months to stack UNDP with his own men.

William P. Rogers

253. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Problem of Paul Hoffman and the UNDP

The UNDP (United Nations Development Program) is the UN instrument for handling multilateral economic assistance to developing countries. Its health and vigor, therefore, is of great potential importance to us, although it is now much less important than the World Bank, and some other international financial institutions.

Paul Hoffman has been the head of the UNDP since it was founded. He is now 79 years old, and there had been widespread hope that Hoffman would step down gracefully and in glory when his term ended in December.

Hoffman is determined, however, to stay on until he has completed the important reorganization of UNDP now afoot and Secretary General U Thant has reappointed Hoffman for another one-year term. (There is, however, hope that Hoffman will step down in July or August.)

Hoffman's reappointment is the source of general disappointment, but will be accepted without overt opposition in view of the fact that nobody wants to end his long public service on a sour note.

Hoffman is very sensitive about being replaced, and is irritated at the speculation as to his probable successor. There is, of course, no way to stop such speculation, and we cannot, in our own interests, any longer delay the process of tying down the job for an American successor.

The maneuvering to replace Hoffman is already well underway. Deputy UN Secretary General Narasimhan hungers for the job, and is moving actively and deftly to line up support. Narasimhan is a devious character, and if he succeeded Hoffman, it would be a grievous blow to U.S. interests.

If we are going to go multilateral with our aid, it is essential that the head of the UNDP continue to be an American in order to facilitate Congressional support for the program. It is, however, by no means certain that we will succeed. The Secretary General has complete discretion

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. "The President has seen" is stamped on the memorandum.

to name the UNDP Chief, and there will be considerable international sentiment for naming someone other than an American.

To get our candidate appointed, we will need broad international support. To get that support, we will have to have a candidate of stature and proven administrative ability. He will not only need to be overwhelmingly qualified, but to be internationally recognized as such. A lesser-known figure, however deserving and competent, would probably not make it, and the job would go to a non-American, possibly Narasimhan.

On the other hand, if we start now, we should be able to obtain U Thant's support and that of other leading nations in the UNDP. Both U Thant and the British have indicated that they will support a qualified American candidate—but both have stressed the word "qualified". The next month or so will see basic decisions taken on the reorganization of the UNDP and the filling of some key executive positions therein. It is obviously desirable that Hoffman's replacement be identified so that he can work with Hoffman in making these decisions.

In short, there is an overwhelming need to select without delay the man we want to succeed Paul Hoffman.

I have four names to suggest for your consideration. We have no idea of the availability of the last three.

1. *Graham Martin*. Martin has had extensive experience in the development work starting with the Federal Security Administration in pre-World War II days and including significant roles in the Marshall Plan, the U.S. Economic Assistance Program, and the Alliance for Progress. In Thailand, he did an outstanding job of tailoring our AID program to outside sources of assistance and in stimulating widespread interest in Southeast Asia regionalism. Martin knows international organizations (he was our Ambassador to the European Office of the UN and U.S. Representative to the 21st Conference of the International Red Cross) and his various activities should insure widespread international sympathy for his candidacy. Martin is the kind of person who could bend the UNDP to his will and make the thing begin to function well. In short, I think he could win the job—and I think he could do the job.

The only argument against Martin is that he has an important task in Rome. However, it will be easier to find someone to do Rome than to find someone equally qualified for the UNDP. Martin is interested in the UNDP job and would take it gladly if—but only if—you preferred to have him there rather than in Rome. Martin and McNamara have had their troubles in the past, but I think we can count upon that personality conflict resolving itself into "creative tension".

2. *Rudy Peterson*. Peterson's fatherhood of the study recommending the multilateralization of American economic aid would make him a logical and sympathetic candidate for this job.

3. *Franklin Murphy*. Murphy's administrative experience and reputation as a person who enjoys your personal confidence should make him a viable candidate.

4. *Tom Killefer*. Killefer is now an executive with Chrysler, and was previously Vice President of the Export Import Bank and U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Bank. His experiences, therefore, directly relate to the UNDP function. He is by far the youngest of the names we are suggesting, an asset in view of the present dissatisfaction with Hoffman. Maury Stans' office has checked Killefer out and gives him high marks both on political and professional grounds.

Whoever we select, it is essential that we consult with U Thant and our allies quietly on the selection before we make any public announcements. U Thant and the British have specifically asked for such consultations. Others expect it. If we meet these expectations, it will greatly enhance the likelihood of our candidate's success.

George Bush vigorously concurs with this memo. I am attaching at Tab A a brief note from George to a member of my staff which shows the importance and the urgency with which he views this problem.² Peter Flanigan also concurs.

Recommendation:

That you indicate which, if any, of the above names you wish us to approach to determine their availability for the UNDP job.³

Martin

Murphy

Peterson

Killefer

² In this January 28 note to Marshall Wright, attached but not printed, Bush endorsed Kissinger's memorandum, but expressed misgivings about Peterson's age. Bush recognized the need for "a vigorous new administrator" and for a tactful handling of Hoffman's replacement, and expressed his willingness to sit in on any meeting between Nixon and Hoffman.

³ Handwritten numbers on the names below indicate that Nixon's choices, in order of preference, were Peterson, Killefer, Martin, and Murphy.

254. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

The U.N. Development Fund

I sent you a memorandum (attached at Tab A) on January 27th,² recommending replacements for Paul Hoffman as director of the U.N. Development Program.

At George Bush's request, Peter Flanigan had several conversations with Mr. Andrew Overby, plus a meeting in Washington, to discuss his possible interest in replacing Hoffman. At the meeting in Washington with Overby, Marshall Wright of my staff was present. Overby is obviously well-qualified for this position. Currently a vice president in charge of international affairs for the First Boston Corporation, he was an Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury from 1952 to 1957, during which time he was also U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank, and the U.S. Executive Director of the International Finance Corporation.

While no offer has been made to Overby, he is currently considering whether he would be willing to replace Hoffman if the offer were forthcoming. In light of this fact, would you wish to reorder your list of priorities as to candidates for this post?

Your previous ordering was:

1. Rudy Peterson
2. Tom Killefer
3. Graham Martin
4. Franklin Murphy

Action:

Make Overby number

Not interested in Overby³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. No classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped note reads: "The President has seen."

² Document 253.

³ Neither option is checked, and Nixon wrote: "What is his attitude toward RN—I think he is rather dull from my recollection." A memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, dated March 12, noted that Peter Flanigan had described Overby as "pompous if not dull." Nixon's handwritten notes on that memorandum struck out the names of Graham Martin and Franklin Murphy, reducing his choices to Rudy Peterson and Tom Killefer, in that order. He indicated that he did not wish to consider Overby for the position. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI)

255. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Replacement for Paul Hoffman at the UNDP

The President has chosen Rudy Peterson and Tom Killefer in that order. So far as I am aware, Secretary Rogers is not aware of the President's decision. Rogers has shown considerable interest in this matter. I suggest you inform him without delay of the President's choices.

We also need to find out if Peterson or Killefer will take the job. There is great doubt that Peterson will, and probably none unless the approach is a high level one. Therefore, Peter Flanigan suggests that you have Peterson in and that the two of you offer him the job on behalf of the President.

An alternative would be to have either Secretary Rogers or George Bush do so, or to have Peter make the offer alone.

In any event, Peterson should be approached without delay, and Killefer in turn if Peterson turns it down.

Unless you are personally interested in this, which I doubt, I suggest you ask Secretary Rogers to do this job.

Recommendation:

1. That you inform Rogers that the President wants Rudy Peterson or Tom Killefer as Hoffman's successor at the UNDP.
2. That you ask Rogers to find out if either will accept the nomination.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action. An attached March 27 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger contains notes that indicate that Kissinger agreed to call Rogers and Flanigan, which was done by April 1.

256. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Talking Points with Rudy Peterson

Secretary Rogers has spoken to Rudy Peterson, your first choice to replace Paul Hoffman as Head of the UN Development Program.² Peterson is reported to be on the verge of a decision. George Bush recommends that you call Peterson urging him to accept.³ I agree. Your personal intervention at this point could well be decisive.

I believe your efforts should be concentrated in getting him to accept the UN position. You should know, however, that Rudy is also attracted by the possibility that you might ask him to be the Coordinator of Development Assistance proposed in the foreign aid reform legislation which you just submitted to Congress. No one has suggested the notion to him—in fact, no one has done any systematic thought about any of the new jobs in the new structure—but Rudy is aware that he is an obvious candidate for the position of Coordinator.

If you decide to call Rudy, you might make the following points:
—The job is one to which you attach the highest importance.

—We want to rely increasingly on multilateral institutions for our aid efforts, as Rudy's Task Force itself recommended, but these institutions must be capable of handling the job. (You might note that you have just submitted the foreign aid reform legislation based on last year's report of Rudy's Task Force, and again thank him for coming up with such a new and imaginative approach.)

—The UNDP is central to this effort in the technical assistance area. It is currently undergoing encouraging reform and reorganization. This makes it especially crucial that we have a strong hand at the helm at this time.

—You believe Peterson is just the man, and would give him your full backing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VI. No classification marking. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen."

² Secretary Rogers called Rudolph Peterson in California on March 30 at 3:18 p.m., and Peterson returned the call at 5:45 p.m. on April 12. (Private Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books)

³ An attached memorandum from Bush to H. R. Haldeman, April 19, is not printed.

—If he agrees, we will move ahead. This will still entail getting U Thant’s agreement to appoint him and Paul Hoffman’s willingness to step aside. But we think we can do these things.⁴

⁴ Nixon’s handwritten note at the end of the memorandum reads: “No—He must take it if he wants it—I shall not urge him—or anyone else on this position.”

257. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 18, 1971, 2208Z.

1653. Subj: Successor to Paul Hoffman.

1. U Thant told Amb. Bush June 17 that Paul Hoffman had indicated willingness to retire around end of the year. SYG also stated he would be willing to consider favorably Rudolph Peterson should US nominate him as successor.

2. Bush reviewed with SYG very confidential talk he had with Hoffman. Although Hoffman indicated willingness to retire late December–early January, Hoffman did not want word of this decision to become public for time being in order that he not be considered lame duck. Hoffman thinking about Oct 1 announcement. Bush reported Hoffman’s view that David Morse should be appointed Acting UNDP Administrator for one year. Hoffman aware of possibility US might nominate Peterson but takes position Peterson could serve as Morse’s deputy for a year while learning job.

3. Bush had called McNamara and apprised him of situation. McNamara had opposed idea of interim appointment and had strongly backed Peterson. With McNamara’s concurrence, this view had been given to Hoffman in late May.

4. Pursuant to June 18 Secretary–Bush telcon, Bush is arranging U Thant–Peterson lunch early next week.

5. Lunch arranged for Peterson and SYG Monday, September 21, 12 noon. SYG insisted Bush be present.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential; Exdis.

258. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Rudy Peterson, Friday, August 6, 1971, 10:30 a.m.²

After a number of conversations with Secretary Rogers, Peterson has agreed to be the American candidate to succeed Paul Hoffman as Administrator of the UNDP. U Thant makes the actual appointment, but both he and the other governments concerned seem amenable to the Peterson candidacy. George Bush, Secretary Connally, and I will be present in addition to Peterson. There should be no photo opportunity.

Talking Points

1. Tell Peterson that you consider the UNDP job an important and difficult one, and are grateful to him for his willingness to take it on.

2. Assure him of your continued strong support for the idea of channeling more U.S. assistance into international development institutions.

3. For this to work, however, it is essential to make these institutions more efficient, for otherwise the Congress is simply not going to go along with the multilateral idea.

4. The UNDP has the key role in improving the efficiency of multilateral economic assistance.

5. Ask Peterson and Bush if they foresee any difficulties from U Thant or other countries in getting Peterson named as Paul Hoffman's successor.

6. Tell Peterson you understand that Hoffman may want to serve until the end of the year. Ask Peterson and Bush what their views are on the timing of the Peterson nomination.

7. Reiterate your full support for Peterson and your appreciation of his willingness to undertake this task.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen."

² The President met with Peterson, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, Bush, and Haig at the White House on August 6 from 11:06 to 11:38 p.m. concerning Peterson's appointment as Paul Hoffman's successor. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) No further record of this meeting has been found.

259. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 8, 1971, 1246Z.

2573. Subject: UNDP.

1. MisOff called on various senior officials UNDP this AM for purpose of taking reading on state of program implementation and reaction SYG's intention replace Hoffman.

2. It is clear that Hoffman believes he was pressured in announcing timing his resignation by leak to *Washington Post* day after his luncheon discussion with U Thant. FYI. Hoffman formally announced his resignation to senior UNDP staff on Sept 1 to be effective Jan 15.

3. CV Narasimhan has announced his intention take over as full-time deputy effective Jan 1, 1972.

4. Consensus is that Narasimhan expects recommend restructuring HQs to Peterson for submission June 1972 session SC. Speculation is that he will propose combination bureau coordination with present set-up under Stephane Hessel and propose Hessel for combined post.

5. David Morse has informally indicated that if requested he would be willing continue his work with Technical Advisory Panel.

6. There is feeling that many of better people are angling for reassignment to staff of new ASYG Paul-Marc Henry in Disaster Coordination. Feeling is that most eminent shift could be Stig Anderson now on detail to OTC if his personal problems can be worked out.

7. While US access project proposals not jeopardized pro tem, it is generally felt that program implementation at field level largely moving forward on basis of past momentum. Moreover, fluctuations in currency exchanges make it very difficult to rely upon expenditure levels for reasonable guesstimate of implementation rate.

8. One does not escape feeling that many eyes remain focussed upon action, intention, and indeed wishes, of USG in period of transformation. Obviously, many fervently hope that new administrator will enter on duty with new spark of energy, positive sense of direction, and enough fresh talent to personally give new impetus to organization where morale, perspective, and sense of mission require precisely that.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential; Exdis.

9. In answer to Amb. Bush's direct question at lunch, U Thant stated that to best of his knowledge there was no "flak" or unfavorable reaction to Peterson nomination.

Bush

260. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 15, 1971, 1600Z.

2669. Subj: UNDP—Future of Narasimhan. Ref: USUN 2573.²

1. Kittani (protect) advised MisOff that SG told him Narasimhan may not devote full time to UNDP commencing January. There is strong possibility he may be asked to remain on 38th floor until end of 1972 in order permit new SYG have benefit continuity.

2. Kittani said this indication had startled senior officials who attributed SYG's view to "static" in UNDP and rumors that Narasimhan not as wholly acceptable UNDP Administrator-designate as he himself had been confidentially reporting.

3. Kittani also indicated that significant voices insisting that no great powers should be members immediate cabinet new SYG. Alternatively it is being suggested that great powers be given responsibility for operation of "major departments," e.g. administration and management, economic and social affairs, etc., on theory that SYG no longer requires representatives these governments to have available continuing advice and/or counsel in re their positions.

4. FYI. If this development is correct USUN sees considerable credibility in earlier rumors that Kittani very respectable and formidable possibility for either post Deputy Administrator UNDP or Executive Secretary of UNIDO.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential; Exdis.

² Document 259.

261. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Paul Hoffman, Tuesday, September 21, 1971, 11:45 a.m.²

Hoffman has been reluctant to retire as Chief of the UN Development Program despite the clear limitations which his 80 years impose on his effectiveness. We have, therefore, delayed this meeting until Rudy Peterson was established as his successor. Hoffman now seems reconciled to his retirement, which has been announced by U Thant to take effect January 15, 1972.³ Colonel Richard Kennedy will attend the meeting. There will be no photo opportunity.

Points Hoffman will raise—The importance to the Free World of strengthening the UN's economic and social functions. He will recommend that you press Congress for the full \$100 million we have asked for the UNDP. (For the last two years Congress has cut the request back to \$86 million each year. This year's final action is still pending.)

Suggest you be sympathetic with Hoffman, but non-committal on the \$100 million. (OMB Director Shultz is recommending a substantial reduction in our contribution to UNDP, in view of the limited number of other places in which cuts might be made in the foreign aid element of our new economic policy.)⁴

Points you can make

—Thank Hoffman for his long and outstanding service to the country and the international community.

—Indicate that you hope he will be willing to come down again around the end of the year for a more formal recognition of his superb services to the country.

—Say how happy you are to have found, in Rudy Peterson, a worthy successor to carry on Hoffman's great work.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential. Sent for action. "The President has seen" is stamped on the memorandum.

² The meeting was held at the White House between 11:48 a.m. and 12:14 p.m. No further record of the meeting has been found. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

³ The UN General Assembly confirmed Rudolph Peterson's appointment as Administrator of the UN Development Program on December 14, 1971. Paul Hoffman retired as Administrator on January 15, 1972.

⁴ Nixon wrote "OK" in the margin next to this paragraph.

—Restate your view that multilateral institutions should increasingly be used for US assistance, if they show the capacity.

—Say you are encouraged by the reforms in the UNDP begun under Hoffman's leadership.

—Say you know Hoffman will do everything possible to make the transfer of responsibility to Peterson a smooth one.

262. Memorandum From Marshall Wright and John Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, February 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

Congress and the UNDP

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from the State Department asking White House assistance in ensuring a U.S. voluntary contribution to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for fiscal year 1972. Attached at Tab B is a letter to the President from Rudy Peterson expressing warm appreciation for the treatment of the UNDP problem in the President's recent State of the World Message to the Congress.²

We believe that State is absolutely correct on this issue. At the President's urging, Peterson has just taken over the leadership of the UNDP and was assured before doing so of the President's personal support for it. It is, therefore, hardly thinkable that the President would passively accept the Congressional gutting of the UNDP. Moreover, the UNDP is exactly the kind of UN operation we wish to encourage. It was our baby to start with. It is run by an American of our naming. It is controlled through a process of weighted voting and therefore subject to a large measure of U.S. control. It has caught on, and is now

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. Tab A is a February 16 memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger. Tab B is a February 16 letter from Peterson to President Nixon. President Nixon's Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy (February 9, 1972) is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972*, pp. 194–346. The references to the UNDP are on pp. 330–331.

receiving very significant support from other members of the international community. That support is increasing at a very satisfactory pace, 17 percent in 1972, for example. We therefore believe that the White House Congressional people should be instructed to put the full weight of the White House behind the restoration of at least \$86.3 million for the UNDP in the Conference Committee recommendations regarding foreign aid legislation. The importance of that figure is that it is the current level of U.S. support and any reduction from it would be totally inconsistent with the President's Annual Report to the Congress and would be interpreted as a gesture of no confidence in Rudy Peterson.

Recommendation:

That you ask Clark MacGregor and Bill Timmons to make a maximum White House effort to ensure a voluntary contribution of no less than \$86.3 million for the UNDP in the foreign aid legislation for fiscal year 1972 and that you authorize John Lehman to ensure that White House views on this matter are presented with proper vigor.³

³ Haig wrote "done Haig Feb 18" next to the approve option.

Appointments of Senior UN Personnel

263. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 14, 1971, 2341Z.

1595. Subj: Successor to Bunche.

1. When seeing U Thant on another subject June 14 Bush took opportunity of reiterating US interest in making available suitably qualified American replacement. He sought SYG's views on tenure.

2. U Thant confirmed that he agreed post should be filled by American. At present, all Under and Assistant Secretaries General had contracts terminating March 31, 1972 with exceptions of Guyer and Matthews. However, practice had been established that when new Secretary General inaugurated all senior staff submitted their resignations in order to give new incumbent maximum flexibility. (SYG indicated this was largely formality and that both he and Hammarskjold had requested almost all senior personnel to remain.)

3. U Thant said some people expect Sovs to reopen whole "troika" dispute. He made it clear that he would have nothing to do with any suggestion which would imply SYG should clear decisions with both a Sov and American Under Secretary General. On occasions when Sovs had criticized Bunche he had defended him as ideal of what international civil servant should be.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Confidential; Exdis.

264. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Brussels¹

Washington, December 10, 1971, 0133Z.

Tosec 45/222645. Subject: Succession to Ralph Bunche.²

1. We have made a further review of possible alternative courses of action and have concluded that our interests are best served in maintaining, and if necessary reinforcing, our position that the successor to Bunche should and will be furnished by the United States. While we understand that vacancy will be filled only after the new SYG has come into office, you should make sure that U Thant, Secretariat and others who ask are in no doubt that we expect to provide qualified candidate for that position.

2. As we see it, the Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs is a key political position even though its effectiveness will depend on

- a. the incumbent's personal relationship with the SYG;
- b. his caliber, stature and experience with UN; and
- c. his understanding of US policy and decision-making processes.

3. We understand there can be no assurance that this Under Secretary will have the operating responsibilities and degree of autonomy in peacekeeping operations that Ralph Bunche exercised; but it seems to us that, given the kind of man who can operate effectively in the UN system, incumbent could exercise considerable influence on the SYG not only in broad range of political matters but in others as well.

4. We have considered the alternative of seeking instead to provide an American candidate for position of Under Secretary for Administration, but concluded that the past record does not augur well for incumbent of that position to exercise significant influence on administration and budgetary matters of greatest concern to us. There is a history of US attempts to use such positions in UN and other agencies to exert influence on key administrative decisions, and record is not encouraging. Moreover, in a period in which we shall have to bear down hard on UN for economy and efficiency, it could prove awkward to have a US national in charge of administration since his actions

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 8–3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Herz and Assistant Secretary De Palma, cleared by Pedersen and Curran, and approved by Acting Secretary Irwin. Rogers was in Brussels for a NATO ministerial meeting.

² Bunche retired as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs on October 1 and died on December 9, 1971.

would appear to be directed by his Govt. On the other hand, we tend to believe that a capable Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs could exercise influence on the SYG himself in regard to some budgetary and administrative decisions as well.

5. As we see it, the key to proper utilization of the Bunche position will lie in coming up with the right kind of candidate who, by virtue of his qualifications and experience, will be able to get off to the right start with the new SYG.

6. At the same time, we hope to maintain US nationals in key deputy or similar levels in administration areas. Would appreciate USUN assessment whether US nationals now occupy adequate number such positions and if not which we should seek. Occurs to us that in process selecting new SYG we might wish make clear our desires in this area as well as nailing down Under Secretary position.

Irwin

265. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 4, 1972, 2240Z.

12. Ref: USUN 007.²

1. At lunch today Guyer and Urquhart told Bush and Schaufele that they had impression, which generally shared in Secretariat, that new SYG does not plan make many high-level UN staff changes. Specifically they almost unequivocal in stating Narasimhan would remain as SYG Chef de Cabinet even though US, UK, USSR and others, as well as Secretariat members would be glad to see him leave.

2. Guyer, specifically, and Urquhart, somewhat less so, in effect counseled against us replacing Bunche. They pointed out that his special position was achieved over twenty-year period and that no other American could expect to fill his role. In advising SYG Office of Special

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis.

² Telegram 7 from USUN, January 4, discussed Bush's courtesy call on Secretary-General Waldheim on January 3, during which Bush said that this government was interested in seeing an American succeed Bunche and that he wanted to be sure that the nominee would be someone with whom Waldheim could work closely. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 8-3)

Political Affairs has unique role and influence which carry over to most member states. Installation of American other than Bunche at high level would make its advice and influence questionable in eyes of others. Soviets would be suspicious and unreceptive in any case but this would extend to Arabs and other third world countries regardless of abilities and sensitivities of person involved. Success of office now—Guyer specifically mentioned Jerusalem affair and SYG's July 20 report on East Pakistan—would be compromised because of presence of US Under Secretary General even if proposals and initiatives were same.

3. Both men also expressed concern over SYG's sensitivity to press criticism which will probably become all the more evident as he continues his press, radio and TV interviews. Guyer would prefer his adopting lower profile but if Waldheim is going to get involved with media he should be more thick-skinned.

4. *Comment:* As Dept. aware we have always assumed that US replacement for Bunche could not expect to step into same position of influence and would have to carve out his own niche in UN structure. Certainly Guyer, as reported reftel and as he repeated in this conversation, believes there is no real job for two men in Special Political Affairs and is probably expressing personal considerations in his remarks.

5. Urquhart can be taken more seriously in view his long experience and his closeness to Bunche, although he too may have aspirations nurtured by UK. What emerges from this conversation is that Bunche replacement, in addition to high competence and acceptability to SYG, will require agility, toughness and nerve to surmount obstacles which may be placed in his path by Secretariat personnel. At same time we do not underestimate difficulties which Guyer and Urquhart mentioned and which will arise for him and office in view suspicions of others that he representative of US rather than SYG.

6. We disturbed about impression that Waldheim not expected make necessary staff changes. We will discreetly suggest to other Perm Reps of similar mind to weigh in on this subject. If Dept. believes it feasible it may wish draw attention of Amb. Gruber to this matter in hope he will pass it on to Waldheim.

Bush

266. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 5, 1972, 0003Z.

15. Subj: The Future of C.V. Narasimhan.

1. From a variety of sources we have picked up rumors that Waldheim has requested C.V. Narasimhan to stay on as Chef de Cabinet. Narasimhan himself has been exuding confidence ever since appointment of new SYG and this has tended to lend credence to the rumors.

2. This situation presents us with delicate problem. Senior Secretariat personnel are in general superannuated and Secretariat is badly in need of new blood. At same time Waldheim probably feels he needs to keep some experienced UN hands as he begins to grapple with some of long-neglected problems of the organization. In spite of his reputation of being no friend of US, Narasimhan is: (a) experienced; (b) relatively young; and (c) intelligent.

3. Our concern is two-fold. On political side, Narasimhan must have been deeply involved in advising U Thant to issue the many one-sided statements criticizing US role in Southeast Asia. On administrative and financial side, Narasimhan as one of U Thant's closest collaborators was either unable or unwilling to get Thant to deal effectively with these problems.

4. We will compare notes with UK and if they share our concern we should consider parallel informal approaches to Waldheim on this matter. We could say we have heard rumors Narasimhan might be asked to stay on as Chef de Cabinet. This major decision obviously one Waldheim must make on his own. However, Narasimhan closely identified with and responsible for record of previous administration which failed spectacularly to come to grips with financial and administrative crises afflicting the UN. We strongly support Waldheim's determination to tackle these serious problems and we cannot help but register our concern over reports that UN official who was closest advisor to U Thant on whole range of problems, might be asked to stay on in such a key post.

5. At same time, in order not to have our démarche appear to be a personal vendetta, we should indicate we willing see Narasimhan occupy a post commensurate with his past attainments (e.g. head of UNIDO or UNCTAD), in both of which C.V. has expressed an interest.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

6. In his Dec 24 lunch with Phillips, Waldheim said he had made no commitment to Narasimhan and above rumors may reflect normal nervousness of Secretariat personnel in time of change. However, they are widespread throughout upper levels of UNHQ.

Bush

267. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Replacement for Ralph Bunche

I thought you should be informed of the state of play surrounding a replacement for Ralph Bunche as UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs.

Waldheim had earlier assured George Bush that he knew we wanted an American replacement and would comply, but Waldheim now asks that we release him from this commitment and seek a different top-level job slot for an American (cable at Tab A),² because he fears that naming an American to the Bunche position "will open up tremendous opposition and demands from other big powers." Waldheim wants to give the job to Guyer, an energetic Argentinian, who is acting as Under Secretary General with some of Bunche's responsibilities.

Bush asks that Secretary Rogers review our position.

Assistant Secretary De Palma is waiting for Rogers' return to Washington to recommend that we stick to our guns and insist on an American.

As to whom we might put forward as the candidate, State's thinking has not yet jelled. Dick Pedersen's name is being bruited about, but it's possible that Secretary Rogers might want to go outside State.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for information.

² Telegram 36 from USUN, January 6; attached but not printed.

I agree with the line De Palma is proposing—that we hold Waldheim to his commitment to name an American. It's not surprising that other governments have started to crowd Waldheim, and precisely for that reason [we] ought to have our own man sitting next to the SYG as a counter-weight.

Since matters will be coming to a head rather soon on this, if you have any thoughts or guidelines you want to give me, I'll be grateful for them.

268. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 12, 1972, 1746Z.

112. Subj: Successor to Bunche—Bush—SYG Meeting Jan 11.

1. I met SYG 3 PM Jan 11 and specifically asked him "if we find that we can accommodate your wishes, do you plan to fill 'the Bunche job' with another nationality?" SYG gave a swift "no".

2. I told him we wanted 38th floor presence plus input on political matters.

3. SYG suggested GA affairs job with political input understood. We discussed possible titles such as "UNSYG for GA Affairs and Special Political Affairs". SYG rejected this saying it would appear to be vastly expanded US role. SYG then suggested "UNSYG for GA Affairs and Special Affairs".

4. We agreed to think about matter more. He is anxious to work something out.

5. He questioned me on 38th floor presence. I said we had to insist on it. He then mused that if we discussed new job including GA affairs, it could well be on 38th floor since GA people already had offices there. "The man could use the Bunche office and the administrative employees already located on the 38th floor."

6. SYG mainly worries about reactions of USSR and PRC. I told him USSR had no complaint with Kutakov already reappointed and further that no other country, particularly those he worried about, once having a senior position would ever give it up.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

7. We had general discussion of type of man.

8. The matter was left that we would both think more and then get back together. I made clear that no agreement had been made on giving up the Bunche job, only that we wanted to explore a way to accommodate his wishes and ours as well.

9. *General comment:* Waldheim still appears stung by press criticism. He is worrying too much about it. He is concerned about financial problems of UN and fortunately appeared concerned over costs of SC meeting in Africa. He is anxious to see President and specifically mentioned preferring to do this before the President's Peking trip, feeling this would show UN not on "back burner" as far as President's interest goes.

Bush

269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, January 14, 1972, 2234Z.

8038. For Bush from Secretary. Subject: Bunche job. Ref: USUN 036,² State 222645;³ USUN 112.⁴

We recognize SYG may find it necessary realign functions of Under-Secretaries in conformity present political realities. Obviously, Soviets and PRC will press him to avoid assigning peacekeeping functions to American Under-Secretary. We may not be able obtain assurance incumbent of that position will have specific responsibility exercised by Bunche in peacekeeping field, but we would like retain both general advisory role and as much substantive political responsibility as possible.

If SYG finds it impossible retain title of Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, we would be willing consider job now described as

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Assistant Secretary De Palma, cleared by Sisco and Eliot, and approved by Secretary Rogers.

² See footnote 2, Document 267.

³ Document 264.

⁴ Dated January 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN)

Under-Secretary for GA affairs, but would want Bunche's responsibilities for Middle East made part of that job. We could not accept view that ME responsibilities are not suitable for American. On contrary, US in unique position vis-à-vis Egypt, Jordan and Israelis. GA job has consistently involved other substantive responsibilities. Cordier, who held GA assignment, was also in fact Chef de Cabinet, as was Narasimhan.

To accommodate ME responsibilities job might be described as Under-Secretary for Political and General Assembly Affairs. This will parallel Kutakov's title: Political and Security Council Affairs. We think it important retain "political" in title. If we are offered that position we would want assurance that technical peacekeeping responsibilities would be assigned to national of suitable country (e.g., Canada) and not to USSR, PRC or country susceptible to Soviet or Chinese pressure. We feel this justified by UN's heavy dependence on US political, financial and logistics support for peacekeeping operations. As part of either above arrangements, we could envisage someone like Guyer as Chef de Cabinet. We also would expect the Bunche job to be abolished and that there be no increase in total number of Under-Secretaries.

In conveying above to SYG, you should express our understanding for pressure he will undoubtedly face on this matter, which is nothing new. However, we think it vital that American retain political role in UN analogous to that Bunche had, however described, including specific political responsibilities which would assure him effective base of operations. He must be located on 38th floor and we hope he would be one of close associates who participates with SYG in key political decisions.

American Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs has been necessary balance to Soviet Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs. We shall now also need post at this level of responsibility to balance PRC Under-Secretary. You should stress that retention of effective high level job comparable to that held by Bunche is critical to restoration US confidence in organization, a factor we hope he fully appreciates. It is important that Waldheim not even seem to downgrade responsibilities of senior American official.

You should also point out we have always observed Charter obligation and treated Americans in Secretariat as international civil servants. We shall continue to do so. At the same time we assume Waldheim appreciates importance of having strong American Under-Secretary in position to provide him sound insight into US attitudes, policies and decision-making process.

Rogers

270. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 18, 1972, 2216Z.

185. Subj: Narasimhan's Future.

1. During long conversation with me Jan 14 on Waldheim's initiative, he admitted he had a real problem with Narasimhan who is pushing hard to retain Chef de Cabinet position. Waldheim said the PRC, Soviets and French had all expressed lack of confidence in Narasimhan and he already aware of our own reservations. SYG said he knew Narasimhan would have to be moved but he had not been able to work out an appropriate alternative assignment.

2. I asked Waldheim if he had explored further the possibility of making Narasimhan SYG of UNCTAD or appointing him Executive Director of UNIDO. Re UNCTAD, SYG had learned Perez-Guerrero's term had been extended to March 31, 1973. Re UNIDO, Abdel Rahman's contract expires December 31, 1972. Of these two posts, Narasimhan would probably be more interested in UNCTAD position. On the chance that Perez-Guerrero might consider resigning before the end of his term (perhaps after UNCTAD III in April–May 1972) Waldheim said he intended to discuss question with Amb Aguilar of Venezuela prior to latter's departure to take up his new job as Amb to US. (Perez-Guerrero has retained his status in Venezuela's diplomatic service.)

3. Until he can resolve the Narasimhan problem, SYG intends to rely increasingly on his personal assistant, Anton Prohaska, whom he has moved into his immediate office from the Austrian Mission.

4. Waldheim has concluded that the post of Chef de Cabinet should not continue at the Under SYG level. Once he has found a new assignment for Narasimhan, he intends to downgrade the post to the level of Assistant SYG. This would release an additional Under Secretary position, which could be made available for the Chinese.

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 23, 1972, 0326Z.

49607. Subject: US Nominee for UN Under Secretary. For Bush from De Palma.

Following luncheon given by the OAS for Secretary General Waldheim I informed him that Secretary Rogers wished to propose Congressman F. Bradford Morse (R., Mass) for the post of Under Secretary General on the basis of earlier discussions concerning the role we expected an American Under Secretary to play. The SYG seemed visibly disappointed for a moment and remarked that following a press report that Congressman Morse might be proposed there was considerable discussion in UN circles of his apparent lack of experience and unfamiliarity with the United Nations. I told him that on the contrary, I was in a position to assure him that Congressman Morse has taken a keen interest in the work of the United Nations, that as a member of the Peace through Law group in the Congress he has been a leading advocate of UN causes, and that he is closely familiar with United Nations activities. When I added that the Secretary and the President felt that the designation of a member of Congress was particularly desirable at this time in order to improve Congressional confidence in the organization, the SYG reacted very favorably and noted that an experienced member of Congress could contribute much to the organization's work as well as to its image in the US Congress.

The SYG said he would appreciate an opportunity to talk with Congressman Morse and I undertook to suggest that Mr. Morse arrange to see him in New York as soon as possible.

I subsequently telephoned Mr. Morse who agreed to get in touch with the SYG later today to arrange an appointment.²

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Assistant Secretary De Palma, cleared by R. Christiansen, and approved by De Palma.

² Secretary-General Waldheim announced Morse's appointment as Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs on March 27.

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

272. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 10, 1969, 2149Z.

50. Chirep in SC—Wrap-up Jan 10. Ref: USUN 8669² and 08.³

1. Changed composition of SC in 1969 is unfavorable from US viewpoint on a wide range of issues including Chirep, ME, and African problems. If challenge on Chirep issue is to be raised, it should logically be done at first meeting of Council in 1969 to avoid adverse precedent of continuation of past practice. Therefore, we have initiated consultations with new SC members and will touch base again with old members on strategy and tactics designed to avoid a confrontation on this issue.

2. In addition to five perm members (China, France, USSR, UK, US), there are 10 non-perm seats held in 1969 by following (new members indicated by country replaced in parenthesis): Algeria, Colombia (Brazil); Finland (Denmark); Hungary; Nepal (India); Pakistan; Paraguay; Senegal; Spain (Canada); Zambia (Ethiopia). At 23rd UNGA, only 5 of above countries voted against so-called Albanian res which would have expelled GRC and seated PRC (China, Colombia, Paraguay, Spain, US). Senegal abstained and other 9 voted in favor.

3. Our policy premise is that GA, as plenary body of UN in which all members are represented, should be venue for discussions involving change of representation of a member state. Thus, a 15-nation body not representative of full membership, SC, should not take a decision on such a far-reaching matter affecting representation in UN of a founding member. This is particularly true when subject has regularly been debated extensively in GA. In our view, such an important issue as Chirep should not be approached through technical subterfuge of seeking to reject credentials of a member of SC.

4. Since 1948, SC has followed a procedure whereby SYG, when a rep on Council is replaced, simply circulates a report stating that credentials have been issued by proper authorities and are in order. Tradi-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Taipei, Paris, Moscow, London, Algiers, Bogota, Helsinki, Budapest, Kathmandu, Rawalpindi, Dakar, Madrid, Lusaka, and Asuncion.

² Dated December 31, 1968. (Ibid.)

³ Dated January 2, 1969. (Ibid.)

tionally, there has been no formal action by Council and credentials are thus tacitly approved. (Present GRC Rep has sat in SC since 1962.) In Jan 1968 Algerian Rep raised question of whether approval of credentials reports was tacit or explicit and stated that his del believed approval should be explicit in event objections were raised. At suggestion of Pres, SC went on to consider its agenda but requested SYG to prepare a report on how credentials were handled. Above practice was described by SYG in doc S/8365 and Algeria did not raise matter again in 1968.

5. If Algeria or some other member raises Chirep in SC, our first line of defense will be to argue that there should be no change in Council's long established practice on credentials and we would hope that Pres would rule any attempt to take up matter of handling credentials out of order. Obviously, we would not be able to count on such a ruling when France, Hungary and USSR are Pres in Feb, Mar and Sept respectively.

6. In order to give effect to our position in para 3 above, we have developed fol res which can be supported widely in SC without doing violence to position of friendly states (such as UK) which recognize Peking:

"The Security Council,

"Noting with approval the report by the Secretary General on 'practice of the Security Council regarding the credentials of its members' of 26 January 1968 (S/8365),

"Decides to take no further action at this time to consider the credentials of any of its members."

7. Such a res is not vetoable and would require 9 affirmative votes. Based on our consultations during 1968 and on past votes, we are reasonably confident that we can count on 8 firm votes: China, Colombia, Finland, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, UK, US. Thus we will need either Nepal or Zambia if we are to be successful. Our initial approaches to these two members are reported USUN 8669 and 08 and we will be following up here early next week. A summary of our consultation follows:

8. UK. UK, in consultations last year, approved text of above res. Support of UK essential but, since it recognizes PRC, cannot support us on some alternative ways of dealing with problem. Therefore, above text was worked out in consultation with UK and Danes.

9. Finland. During 23rd GA, Amb Jakobson told Pedersen that GOF supported basic US approach. We intend to check with him exact wording of text of our procedural res as well as to discuss various tactical contingencies which might arise while he is Pres. (Denmark, in agreeing to text last year, showed it to Nordic countries including Finland, but we still have to get formal Finnish approval.)

10. Nepal. See USUN 8669. (We still awaiting reply to State's 294243.⁴ Hope Emb can provide answer soon since Nepal vote critical.)

11. Zambia. See USUN 08.

12. Colombia. Based on Colombia's past votes on Chirep, we do not anticipate difficulty but we will discuss matter with Amb Turbay soon.

13. Paraguay. Based on our discussions with Amb Lopez in 1968, we believe Paraguay supports our position.

14. Spain. De Pinies told Buffum he expected GOS would support US position.

15. Senegal. GOS supports basic US position matter should be handled by GA. We will discuss text of res with Amb Boye in near future.

16. Pakistan. Although our discussions with Shahi on this matter were not very encouraging last year, we believe it would be worthwhile to have another round with him possibly followed by an approach in Rawalpindi.

17. France. Berard told Buffum Jan 9 that he would be bound by firm instructions and that he "would not be able to be helpful". Berard also said on personal basis that he would prefer not to face this issue when he is Pres (Feb). Buffum said best insurance would be for France to use its influence to discourage Algeria from raising it. Berard said he would also consult on this matter while he is back in Paris next week.

18. China. We have been in touch with Amb Liu and we will compare notes with Chinese in near future.

19. It is not yet clear what further approaches if any will be necessary in capitals but we thought it advisable to send foregoings as background against possibility approaches might eventually be required.

Buffum

⁴ Dated January 4. (Ibid.)

273. National Security Study Memorandum 14¹

Washington, February 5, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared on U.S. Policy Towards China, on U.S. objectives and interests involved and the broad lines of appropriate U.S. policies. The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved. It should include summary statements of the conceptions and policy lines of the previous administration.

The Study should include the following:

1. The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
3. The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
4. Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia perform this study.

The paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs 1-42. Secret.

274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 7, 1969, 2219Z.

679. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 028278.²

1. We would appreciate Dept's analysis of possible implications of third of "three constant principles" which ChiComs gave Canadians per reftel.

2. Under third principle Canada, and any other country wishing diplomatic relations with CPR, "must give support to restoration of rightful place and legitimate rights of CPR in UN and no longer give any backing to retention of so-called representatives of Chiang Kai-shek in any organization of this international body."

3. Three aspects appear noteworthy in comparison previous stands taken by Peking re UN:

A. Question of their representation in UN is given prominence by its injection as one of only three conditions related to bilateral relations. Peking has not often shown this much interest in UN.

B. Similarly, surprisingly positive interest is indicated by formulation which puts clause re Peking representation in UN ahead of that re GRC representation.

C. Perhaps most surprising is "soft" formulation re GRC; instead of demanding active support for expulsion, Peking asks that Canada merely cease their support.

4. We recognize Peking may have selected language calculated avoid jeopardizing relations with Canada. Nonetheless we would have expected Peking require active Canadian support for "expulsion of illegal reps so that PRC could take its rightful place."

5. We also recognize present hard line being taken by Peking makes it doubtful Peking is moderating its view of outside world.

6. Nonetheless we would appreciate comments on possibility Peking may be becoming more interested in entering UN. (Indian source here in late Jan speculated that then-current moderation out of Peking Foreign Ministry suggested Chinese realize how dangerous their isolation is under conditions of mounting hostility with Moscow. He speculated Peking may have realized importance to Czechoslovakia of having a voice at the UN last August, and this may have contributed to policy shift to seek improved relations with outside world and press energetically for seat in UN.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

² Dated February 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM)

7. Whether or not formulation of third principle represents policy shift by Peking, we are concerned that as knowledge of it spreads its effect may be to increase difficulty in holding line here at next GA in terms of defending GRC right to continued representation. This is because strength of US position against any proposal to throw GRC out of UN has rested in part on idea that Peking is disinterested in entering UN, as evidenced by their rigid insistence on explicit conditions whereby GRC will first be expelled.

Yost

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 18, 1969, 1053Z.

41509. Subject: Chirep. Ref: USUN 679.²

1. We do not believe that Chicom's presentation of "three constant principles" or their formulation of third principle to Canadians represents shift in Peking basic policy re recognition or UN. We do not however rule out possibility that Peking might wish to appear to be more interested than heretofore in UN membership. As Canadian/Chicom negotiations develop we will presumably get a clearer picture of Peking's intentions.

2. "Principles" outlined to Canadians are consistent with position taken by Peking for past several years in private discussions with US and in negotiations on recognition of which we aware with other non-communist countries. This was true even during period, i.e. 1965-66, when Peking publicly most strongly denounced UN and formulated its most extreme conditions for accepting membership. For example, Chicoms raised issue with us at Warsaw early 1966, charging US opposed restoration of their "legitimate" seat in UN. There are indications that these "principles" were put forward in negotiations leading to French recognition in 1964. We know that they were enunciated thereafter during attempts to get Japanese to follow French example.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Jay H. Long; cleared by Richard H. Donald, Harry E. T. Thayer, Thomas P. Shoemith, William H. Gleysteen, Nicholas Platt, and William S. Shepard; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

² Document 274.

3. With respect to para 3B reftel, it is uncertain whether clauses were in fact arranged or phrased precisely in the form passed to us by Canadians. Moreover, analysis is made difficult by lack of information concerning the precise manner in which the conditions were formulated to others previously. In any case, particularly if read, as clearly intended, in context of other two “principles”, we are inclined not to regard Chicom demand for support of its “rightful place” and for cessation of backing for GRC as a softening of traditional position. Whatever the order, it seems clear that Peking is not suggesting that continued presence of GRC in UN is any more acceptable.

4. Chicom formulation is consistent with proposition that Peking all along has wanted UN membership (on its terms of course) despite variations in the priority which it has given to achieving that objective. It should be noted that Peking has never explicitly ruled out UN membership and has never departed from attitude that it deserves to be member. It has simply made acceptance of membership conditional, with expulsion of the GRC as the minimum condition. Peking public denunciation of UN can be ascribed to “sour-grapes” recognition or belief that membership under its minimum condition has not been possible.

5. Despite the above, we agree with USUN (para 7 reftel) that any positive indication or impression of greater Peking interest in entering UN may make it more difficult to hold the line in the next GA as a result of our past use of the opposite argument. We will therefore have to watch developments very closely and in meantime recognize that such arguments could boomerang.

6. Hong Kong may wish to comment.

Rogers

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, May 19, 1969, 2243Z.

79607. Subject: Soviets and Chirep.

1. Recent conversations reported refTEL, USUN 1292² and elsewhere reflect Soviet preference, as result Sino-Soviet conflict to see continued exclusion of Chicoms from UN. Gradual Soviet shift away from full support of Peking on Chirep issue has been evident, though not always manifest, for past several years. Despite formalistic support in official statements and in voting Soviets on several occasions have made private statements or taken behind the scenes actions designed—sometimes grossly apparent—to give impression its support is not wholehearted. Fact that we have not faced serious challenge on Chirep in Security Council despite unfavorable composition of Council during 1968 and 1969 is due in part, we believe, to conscious Soviet disinclination to press issue when opportunity to do so has arisen.

2. Our preliminary judgment is that formal Soviet position in UN is likely to remain unchanged despite “unofficial” comments suggesting shift in attitude toward GRC and Chirep. We rule out possible change this year in traditional Soviet vote on Albanian Res and Important Question³ and expect statements in UN, although perhaps somewhat more muted, essentially to repeat past position.

3. Private comments reflect probably genuine Soviet preference that status quo in UN not be upset. But Soviets probably assume that Chirep position of GRC, US and its allies commands sufficient support in UN to assure continued Chicom exclusion without Soviets having to do embarrassing about-face. This is related to Soviet concern and probing about possible shift in US-China policy.

4. Most likely impact, if any, of these Soviet hints of changed position might be upon those countries whose position on Chirep is influenced more by Moscow than by Peking. Whatever position Soviets

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jay H. Long; cleared by Louise McNutt, Nicholas Platt, Adolph Dubs, Paul H. Kreisberg, and John P. Sontag; and approved by William H. Gleysteen. Also sent to Taipei and repeated to Moscow, Ottawa, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

² In telegram 1292, May 1, Yost reported that an unnamed First Secretary at the Soviet Mission to the UN said that he hoped that the United States would not change its attitude toward “Nationalist” China whether or not it sought improved relations with Communist China, adding that “Nationalist” China’s 13 million people could not be discarded. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 278.

take formally, cumulative effect of Soviet private expressions of concern might be to prompt shifts by these others.

5. On other hand, private, low-level Soviet assertions of need to preserve representation of Taiwan in UNGA might encourage consideration by others of proposal calling for admission of Chicoms without at same time calling for expulsion of GRC. Such a proposal would possibly receive considerably greater support than the Albanian resolution and in case of adoption would seriously risk GRC withdrawal, result which neither we nor presumably Soviets would like.

6. Outside UN, Soviet private statements might serve to discourage additional moves toward bilateral recognition of Peking.

7. For USUN: Your comments solicited. We would appreciate particularly reporting on any sentiment on this issue which you may hear expressed by other missions or any indications Soviets are discussing Chirep along lines reported refetel.

Richardson

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands¹

Washington, August 18, 1969, 2335Z.

139182. Subject: Chirep and Korea at 24th UNGA. Ref: A. The Hague 3107;² B. CA-10681, 9/6/68.³

1. Chirep: At moment we assume Chirep issue will follow traditional pattern, i.e. Important Question and Albanian-type resolutions (with or without Study Committee proposal). While we do not rule out possible new initiatives or some shifts in attitudes as result developments since last year—such as Canadian and Italian moves toward recognition of Peking and intensification Sino-Soviet conflict—we have no evidence anyone planning anything new. Since Netherlands was once co-sponsor (1967) of unsuccessful study committee proposal, you

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by McNutt, Thomas E. McNamara, Shoesmith, and Brynhild C. Rowberg; and approved by Gleysteen. Repeated to USUN, Seoul, and Taipei.

² Not printed. (Ibid.)

³ This airgram described issues expected to be considered by the 23rd regular session of the UN General Assembly. (Ibid., UN 22–2 GA)

might discreetly sound out intentions this year as well as any word they may have received from Belgians or Italians. We would of course appreciate continuing Netherlands support for IQ Res and at minimum another abstention on Albanian Res. US position on all three reses remains unchanged. (See Ref B.)

2. Korea: Since supporters of North Korea have inscribed usual item calling for withdrawal of UN forces from Korea, we will wish UNCURK to submit its report early Sept to UNGA, rather than SYG, so that it will be inscribed on agenda. Although our preference was to avoid debate (and 1968 UNCURK Res was designed to make it possible) inscription of hostile item has made usual debate inevitable. Our position on this issue also remains unchanged. We expect debate and outcome similar to last year.

3. You will receive shortly annual circular airgram outlining US position on issues likely to arise in GA, including Chirep and Korea.

Rogers

278. Editorial Note

During the 1961 UN General Assembly, a resolution sponsored by the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan was approved, making the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations an "Important Question." (UN document A/L.372; Resolution 1668 (XVI), adopted December 15, 1961) Items placed before the UN General Assembly that were "Important Questions" (IQs) required a two-thirds majority to pass. A 1962 draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union sought to replace the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council by the People's Republic of China. This resolution was defeated in the General Assembly on October 30, 1962. A similar resolution, sponsored by Albania, the so-called Albanian Resolution, was rejected in October 1963. See *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume XXV, Documents 230 and 274.

On September 17, 1969, the General Assembly agreed to consider another resolution sponsored by Albania and 13 other nations entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China." See *U.S. Participation in the UN, 1969*, pages 59-62.

279. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 11, 1969, 0037Z.

Secto 119/3544. Subj: Bilateral Talks Between Secretary and Foreign Minister Wei.

1. Following summary based on uncleared memcon, Noforn and FYI only subject to revision upon review:

2. Secretary opened discussion saying most important current problem Chirep. Foreign Minister Wei agreed and said when Secretary in Taiwan they hoped no complications would arise on this issue. Now there are difficulties with co-sponsors for IQ. Ambassador Yost said Latin Americans presenting some problems. This does not affect vote, only co-sponsors. Ambassador Liu said of last year's co-sponsors Colombia will not co-sponsor, Bolivian Mission uncertain of position of new government, and Brazil feels there should be more LA co-sponsors than just Brazil and Nicaragua. Nicaragua willing co-sponsor but thinks position awkward if Brazil doesn't come in. Liu thought it might be possible to add new LA co-sponsor, possibly Costa Rica, and ask for US assistance. Ambassador Yost said we will support Chinese moves that direction. Ambassador Pedersen said preliminary vote estimate is all right, but LA's must be firmed up. Ambassador Liu agreed and said Colombia and Ecuador required prodding. Ambassador Yost agreed, but noted statement by President of Colombia and Colombian Foreign Minister's plea for universality in GA. Ambassador Pedersen said a recent cable from Bogota indicated we might have some room for maneuver.² Secretary said he did not know reason for Colombian switch. Ambassador Liu said a Japanese colleague told him Colombian Perm Rep visited Communist China before coming to New York and Colombian Foreign Minister also visited mainland.

3. Conversation turned to Italy which was a co-sponsor last year and voted against Albanian Resolution. Liu said if Italy does not co-sponsor another European, possibly Spain, would be helpful. ROC Ambassador Madrid said GOS sympathized, however, wished to have judge elected to ICJ and also has problem of Gibraltar. Spanish reluctant move to forward position before ICJ candidates decided. We should have IQ Res circulated ASAP. If Spain agrees join later it would be acceptable. Liu asked if we would talk to Spanish. Yost agreed to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 CHINAT–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei.

² Not found.

do so. Foreign Minister asked if we could convince the Italians to continue as co-sponsor. They have not changed their relations with Taipei. Secretary said Italians have domestic problems this issue, a large Communist bloc and an active group of intellectuals who favor recognition. They must look at real world of internal politics. Foreign Minister Moro was understanding in talk with Secretary but stressed domestic aspects.

4. Ambassador Wei said efforts required not only for co-sponsors but also for votes against AR. Liu added AR had three additional co-sponsors this year. Secretary asked that he and Ambassador Pedersen be kept informed and said he would send Amb. Pedersen back to New York if needed. Liu said there was concern US might shift policy toward Peking. Secretary pointed out we had not given any indication of shift; in fact we convinced Malaysian Prime Minister to alter his position of abstention on both items. Malaysia would now abstain on IQ and vote no on AR. Ambassador Liu said articles such as one in *New York Times* of October 9 regarding US moves to meet moderates in Peking are interpreted broadly by certain delegations.³ Secretary said we would not change our position and, if necessary, he would make another statement.

5. Ambassador Wei asked President Nixon's view of talks between Secretary Rogers and President Chiang in Taiwan.⁴ Secretary replied President had read report with interest and approved of what was said. We will not change our policy toward Taiwan and intend to honor our treaty commitments. [Omitted here is discussion of U.S. assistance to the Republic of China.]

Rogers

³ Peter Grose, "U.S. Aides Discern Signs That Peking Is Easing Enmity," *The New York Times*, October 9, 1969, p. A-1.

⁴ A memorandum of conversation of the August 8 meeting between Rogers and Chiang is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972.

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 22, 1969, 2330Z.

179395. Subject: Chirep Voting Estimates.

1. On basis responses to CA-4850,² UNGA General Debate statements and other reports, we have compiled following preliminary vote estimate on Chirep resolutions: Important Question: Yes-70, No-48, Abstain-7, Absent-1; "Albanian" resolution: Yes-45, No-56, Abstain-24, Absent-1.

2. While estimate reflects decrease in favorable margin on both reses, margin on IQ is still substantial (22 compared with 26 last year). On more critical Albanian res, margin between yes and no votes estimated decrease from 14 to 11.

3. Following are estimated changes from last year on Albanian res: No to Abstain: Chile and Italy; Abstain to Yes: Ghana and Nigeria; Yes to Abstain: Kenya. On IQ: No to Abstain: Kenya; Yes to Abstain: Malaysia and Maldives; Yes to No: Libya; Abstain to No: Morocco.

4. Firm information is lacking however from following (on Albanian res): Botswana, Cameroon, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Uruguay.

5. Request USUN review and compare estimates with our co-sponsors to determine where additional information or effort required. Following review and further canvass of dels, you may wish recommend to Dept capitals where approach has some prospect of success, where further effort with UNDel not likely to be productive (e.g. Chile), or where special circumstances apply.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Jay H. Long, cleared in draft by Louise McNutt, and approved by Arthur R. Day. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

² See footnote 1, Document 83.

281. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 29, 1969, 0034Z.

3825. Subj: Chirep—Co-sponsors Meeting. Ref: State 179395.²

1. USUN chaired meeting IQ co-sponsors Oct. 28 to review voting estimates and general tactics for Chirep debate still tentatively scheduled open in plenary Nov. 3. Following co-sponsors attended: Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Philippines. (Brazil, Gabon, Thailand and Togo not represented.)

2. Consensus was that debate and outcome Important Question and Albanian reses would be similar to last year. There no sign here that study committee or other third proposal will be introduced.

3. Group reviewed soft spots in estimates and divided up task of follow-up approaches with UNDeIs as follows: Costa Rican and Paraguayan Reps will seek confirmation position of Colombia, Bolivia, Guyana and Jamaica; Madagascar to check Libya, Kenya and Nigeria; GRC to check Jordan and Saudi Arabia; Japan with Ghana and Turkey; New Zealand with Maldives; US with Ghana and Iran. Costa Rican Rep (Dobles Sanchez) said Guatemalan Amb told him Guatemala position same as last year. It was decided approaches should not be made here on Chile, Senegal or Belgium pending outcome approaches currently being made in capitals.

4. Group agreed number of friendly speakers should be keyed to number opposing. Following co-sponsors gave firm commitment to speak: Australia, China, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Philippines, and US. It was agreed that order of speakers and additional speakers would be arranged through informal consultation as situation develops.

5. Bautista (Secretariat) confirms Chirep debate will begin in plenary Monday, November 3.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei, Santiago, Brussels, and Dakar.

² Document 280.

282. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, November 4, 1969, 0420Z.

3957. Subject: Chirep Debate Opens in Plenary.

1. Chirep debate began late morning Nov 3 (fol expressions condolences on deaths Tanzanian Perm Rep Danieli and Malaysian Perm Rep Ismail) with statements by Cambodia, China, Japan, Afghanistan, New Zealand, and Algeria. Cambodia and Japan, respectively, introduced “Albanian” and Important Question reses.

2. New Zealand (Scott) reiterated PriMin Holyoake general debate statement that ChiComs should be in UN, and that time had come for new approach to find sensible and just solution to problem. However, Albanian res by expelling GRC wld be “clearly unjust” and “totally unacceptable” to GNZ. He urged adoption IQ res since issue was “in every sense” of far-reaching consequences.

3. At beginning GRC statement, usual supporters of Peking walked out. However, junior Amb remained in Sov chair. Moreover, EE diplomat told DelOff Sovs do not plan speak on Chirep. These inactions, including omission of ref to Peking in general debate speech, are first open reflections in UN of Sino-Sov conflict.

4. Debate continues tomorrow (Nov 4) with US statement scheduled late AM.²

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Taipei, Moscow, Tokyo, Wellington, and Hong Kong. Further reporting on the General Assembly debates on Chinese representation is in the following telegrams from USUN: 3977 (November 5), 4005 (November 6), 4027 (November 7), 4070 (November 8), and 4121 (November 11). (All *ibid.*)

² The statement of U.S. Representative J. Irving Whalley is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1, 1969, pp. 476–479.

283. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 12, 1969, 0103Z.

4146. Chirep Vote Results.

1. UNGA voted Nov 11 on Chirep reses with following results:

A. Important Question res adopted by vote of 71–48–4, 3 absent (73–47–5 in 1968).

B. Albanian res defeated 48–56–21, 1 absent (44–58–23 in 1968). (This one vote less than margin forecast USUN 3978.)²

2. Changes from 1968 were as follows:

A. Important Question: Ecuador–Abstain to yes; Equatorial Guinea–Yes to absent; Kuwait–No to absent; Libya–yes to no; Malaysia–Yes to abstain; Morocco–No to abstain. Favorable margin thus decreased from 26 to 23.

B. Albanian res: No to abstain: Belgium, Chile and Italy; Abstain to yes: Ghana, Libya, Mauritius and Nigeria. Only favorable change was Senegal from abstain to no. Favorable margin thus decreased from 14 to 8.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

² Dated Novembr 5. (Ibid.)

284. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 8, 1970, 0918Z.

126. Subject: GRC Plans on 1970 Chirep Tactics.

1. Summary: MOFA International Organizations Director, Che Yin-shou (protect source), gave EmbOff general description Jan. 6 of GRC 1970 Chirep plans, indicating possible GRC reliance on “Colom-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHINAT. Confidential; Noforn. Repeated to Bogota, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and USUN.

bian proposal” for UN Charter amendment as new tactic. End summary.

2. Che said that IO had recently completed “timetable” for 1970 Chirep activity. MOFA would complete by February its internal estimate of probable voting course of all UNGA members on Albanian resolution and Important Question. In late February or early March, Amb. Chou Shu-kai will be instructed to approach Dept. on Chirep. MOFA will concurrently begin liaison with US Embassy, Taipei. MOFA hopes to have preliminary consultation with close supporters such as US and Japan finished before ASPAC meeting in Wellington June 17. Final GRC Chirep strategy would be prepared for President Chiang’s approval by ad hoc committee under Presidential office SecGen Chang Chung in July and August.

3. Che commented that although it is too early to predict what circumstances will surround Chirep debate this year, GRC would probably pin hopes for holding line in respect to Albanian resolution on “Colombian proposal” for UN Charter amendment. Che said that this new approach to perennial question would drain off support for Albanian resolution, performing the function supplied in 1966–8 by Italian initiative on study group (a function which, according to Che, GRC has now come to recognize as useful). At same time, this procedure would afford GRC an opportunity as permanent member SC to block any unacceptable Charter amendment by non-ratification if it appeared that measure might otherwise succeed. Before and during 1970 UNGA, the GRC would not actively campaign against Charter amendment proposal, Che said, and would abstain when vote came up there.

4. In conversations with FonMin Wei Dec. 15 and Vice FonMin Yang Hsi-k’un Dec. 24, both mentioned to Ambassador their hope that consultations on Chirep could begin earlier than usual this year. If the GRC does in fact plan to move from its former bitter opposition to any form of third resolution which might carry “two China” implications, we will need to begin thinking soon of how to respond to GRC tactics.

5. Embassy would appreciate any information on Colombian proposal: text if available, US position, extent of potential support in UNGA.

6. Embassy is not certain how far this proposal as described by Che may have been considered outside of MOFA, although it appears that FonMin and Vice FonMin H.K. Yang both have approved active examination of new Chirep departures for 1970. Request that possible interest in “Colombian proposal” not be discussed with GRC officials until we have clearer reading of how “official” this interest is.

McConaughy

285. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 10, 1970, 0015Z.

32. Subj: Chirep.

1. Buffum met with Liu (Jan 8) at latter's request for preliminary discussion Chirep in light 24th UNGA and possibility this issue might arise in SC as result addition of Burundi and Syria. Buffum reported to Liu his conversation with Nsanze re possibility challenge to Chirep credentials (reftel USUN 022)² and unlikelihood of Syria raising any problems of a procedural character considering her ties with USSR. Liu agreed and also commented that GRC accommodations to Arabs during past year wld be a restraining influence.

2. After a brief discussion of vote changes in past GA (both agreed Belgium and Chile were expected but that Mauritius and Ghana were unpleasant surprises) Liu and Buffum agreed that LA was area for greatest concern. Liu said that state of US relations with LA has impact on Chirep and he asked if US foresees any more changes in future LA positions. Unlike Africa, LA was area where GRC economic assistance could have little effect, Liu believed. Buffum replied that it was still too early to forecast with precision but that we will develop a systematic appraisal of situation.

3. Liu's main concern appeared to be strategy for protecting GRC position in UN. He felt that recent statements by Secy Rogers on US desire for renewed contact with PRC and relaxation of trade and travel restrictions wld have great influence on attitudes of other countries. When US took one step, others want to take three.

4. Buffum assured Liu that flexibility of US toward PRC in no way affected US policy toward GRC representation in UN. US had not yet completed analysis of 24th GA on this issue and its implications for future. Therefore it premature to decide on specific tactics for 25th session. Liu expressed hope that consultations on Chirep tactics for next fall wld begin earlier, and neither Buffum nor Liu alluded to "Colombian proposal" (Taipei 0126)³ as a possible new tactic.

5. *Comment:* Overall impression was that Chinese, despite acknowledgement of continued US efforts on their behalf, are looking for continued reaffirmation of US support for benefit of others and assur-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

² Dated January 9. (Ibid.)

³ Document 284.

ances for themselves. VP Agnew's trip to Taiwan was one such reassurance. Liu obviously hoping for major diplomatic assistance with LAs.

Buffum

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, January 14, 1970, 0008Z.

5611. Subject: GRC 1970 Chirep Tactics. Ref: Taipei 126.²

1. Dept has following preliminary comments on GRC Chirep plans outlined reftel which you may pass on to MOFA:

a. Para 2 "timetable" appears generally reasonable, though we doubt that estimate of voting prepared this early can be very meaningful. Factors which cannot be assessed now and which may not be determinable until much closer to opening of 25th GA—such as progress of Canadian and Italian recognition negotiations and clearer indications of policy direction of LA and African countries, will be most important in preparing accurate estimate.

b. Although there appears to have been no reference in Che comments to GRC plans for activities in Africa and Latin America designed to strengthen bilateral ties which influence vote in UN, we assume such plans are being carefully considered.

c. We are prepared and willing, as always, to discuss this subject with GRC reps at any time—the level and timing depending on nature of consultations. If GRC contemplates discussion and/or development of new strategy, we concur that consultations should begin early; consultations to compare vote estimates and to determine where approaches to specific governments might be useful we believe are best left until late summer.

2. We welcome evidence, however tentative, that GRC is considering more flexible tactical approach. Believe best strategy on our part

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHINAT. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by Richard R. Hart, Paul H. Kreisberg, Frank P. Lockhart, Jr., William H. Gleysteen, and John A. Armitage; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to USUN, Bogota, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

² Document 284.

at moment is to give low-key encouragement in that direction, attempt to obtain better picture of types of moves GRC may have in mind, without taking initiative ourselves in suggesting new tactical approaches. In meantime we will continue to weigh various alternatives within Department.

3. We doubt "Colombian proposal" will be useful or desirable as tactical vehicle Che apparently has in mind. For your background information we have pouched text of proposal which called for establishment of special committee by 24th UNGA "to consider suggestions for revising UN Charter". The Sixth (Legal) Committee however and subsequently the Assembly decided instead to put off question until 25th GA where it will be discussed under agenda item entitled "Need to consider suggestions regarding review of UN Charter". While "universality" including Chirep question among reasons Colombians wish Charter revision, debate and suggestions for revisions will undoubtedly deal with other issues as well. We doubt links between debates on Chirep and on Colombian item will be sufficiently close to permit Colombian item perform role of 66-68 Study Committee proposals in "draining off" support for Albanian Res. Moreover, others will be aware that major power opposition to and hence likely veto in ratification process of Charter revision makes this item unproductive route for solution Chirep issue.

4. Nevertheless, we do not wish discourage any budding flexibility on Chirep issue. Therefore at this point without indicating position US likely to take you should express mild interest in any further refinement on use of this tactic that Che can provide. We would of course be interested in knowing level and extent GRC consideration this tactic (para 6 reftel).

5. *For USUN*: Welcome your comments.

Rogers

287. Airgram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

A-24

Hong Kong, January 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

China and the United Nations: Some Thoughts

Note: The Department, and especially the Secretary, has encouraged the submission by Foreign Service Officers of ideas and comments with respect to United States foreign policy or operations overseas. This report, prepared by a political reporting officer here, suggests an approach that might be taken toward the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations. It is realized that there may be many complications involved which are not addressed here, such as Charter revision, and the following is intended more as a vehicle for stimulating discussion and consideration of possible alternatives available to the United States than as a specific policy proposal. *End Note.*

The Soviet Union has three votes in the United Nations General Assembly. No amount of legal or political semantics can demonstrate that the Soviet Union had an inalienable right to three votes. It is difficult to conceive of the Ukraine or Byelorussia as being anything but a part of the Soviet Union. However, every member nation of the United Nations accepts the idea of the Soviet Union having three votes, because they realize that this was the price paid in order to gain Soviet participation in the United Nations.

The existence of this anomaly could form the basis for a solution to the problem of United Nations representation for divided countries and, specifically, the China problem. The solution simply stated, would be—"One Nation, Two Votes".

The formula "One Nation, Two Votes", translated into terms of the United Nations Charter would be "One Nation, Two Members". While this sounds like a strange concept, it is exactly the situation that exists as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. "Soviet Union, Three Votes" is translated into terms of the United Nations Charter as "Soviet Union, Three Members". The United Nations, by the very existence of the three members of the United Nations that represent the Soviet Union or parts thereof, has in effect said that a "member" is that entity which the United Nations decides to make a member without regard to tradi-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Richard A. Holmes, approved by Richard D. Nethercut, and cleared by Robert W. Drexler. Also sent to USUN.

tional concepts of "sovereignty" or of "a state". The degree of freedom which the United Nations has in this area is underlined even more by the fact that the Ukraine and Byelorussia were Charter Members of the United Nations. If the founding of the United Nations was based on such a practical political compromise, then there should be no reason why one of the United Nations' stickiest problems could not also be resolved by a similar solution.

The Case of China

A formula embodying the principle of "One China, Two Votes" would involve giving Peking one vote and Taipei one vote in the General Assembly. Again, in terms of the United Nations Charter, it would be translated into "One China, Two Members" following the Soviet example. In having two members representing China, the United Nations would not be addressing itself to the sovereignty claims of either Peking or Taipei, just as it has never addressed itself to the question of sovereignty with regard to the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. If in the future, Peking and Taipei are able to reach an accommodation between themselves, then a unified China would in reality be represented by two votes—just as in reality the Soviet Union is represented by three votes.

In addition, a General Assembly resolution on Chinese representation might also make the following points: 1) Although China is represented in the United Nations by two members, this fact in no way endorses the concept of Two Chinas. 2) There is only one China; at present China is not unified; however, it is the expectation and hope of the United Nations that China will eventually be unified. 3) The United Nations, in the interest of world peace, calls upon the two divided parts of China to seek reunification through peaceful means.

A "One China, Two Votes" solution tends to avoid problems inherent in a "Two Chinas" policy or a "One China, One Taiwan" policy. Neither Peking nor Taipei want either of these policies to become accepted in the international community. However, third countries, motivated by a desire to find a compromise solution to the impasse on the China problem in the United Nations, may be forced into advocating such policies.

The solution of the China problem in the United Nations is made more complicated by the fact that China is a Permanent Member of the Security Council. A "One China, Two Votes" solution to Peking's admission to the United Nations does not, of course, solve this problem. Neither, however, does any other solution short of excluding Taipei from the United Nations. However, it would seem quite clear that once Peking becomes a member of the United Nations, no matter what formula is finally used, any solution, short of awarding Peking the Security Council seat, is inherently unstable.

Naturally, at the present time, both Peking and Taipei would undoubtedly oppose a “One China, Two Votes” policy in the United Nations, but it is a solution more in keeping with their respective views on the China question than others now being considered and could conceivably represent an acceptable formula to them at some point in time.

Other Divided Countries

One possible way of making such a solution palatable to both sides is through example. The concept of “One Nation, Two Votes,” again following the Soviet example, could be extended to three other divided nations that are not now in the United Nations. Germany, Korea and Vietnam are important, albeit divided nations whose absence from the United Nations weakens the organization itself. All three countries have aspirations for eventual unification. Present political conditions prevent these three countries from being members of the United Nations. One major component of these political conditions is the fact that they are divided countries waiting for an eventual solution to the question of unification.

Of the three countries, Germany would seem to be the country most likely to be susceptible to a “One Nation, Two Votes” solution to admission to the United Nations at this juncture in time. Such a procedure again would not address itself to the question of sovereignty—as it has not in the case of the Soviet Union—and it would be based on the assumption of eventual unification as outlined earlier in the case of China.

If a solution for admission of both West and East Germany to the United Nations on the basis of a “One Germany, Two Votes” concept could be worked out, the example and experience gained by such a step would be useful in educating the member nations as well as Peking and Taipei as to the feasibility of such a step with regard to China. The same applies to Korea and Vietnam.

Martin

288. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 12, 1970, 2312Z.

408. Subj: Chinese Representation in UN.

1. In view major and politically costly effort required on continuing basis to maintain status quo on Chirep, it seems to us not too early to review whither our longstanding tactics in GA lead and whether modification seems warranted in light our overall China policy. We believe our policy toward China should dictate our tactics on Chirep issue in UN rather than vice-versa.

2. Present tactics. Our current estimate of probable voting situation at upcoming 25th GA is that, barring unforeseen developments and provided we again wage strong campaign especially with LAs, it would be possible again this year to obtain: (A) reaffirmation that change in Chirep requires two-thirds vote (IQ res); (B) rejection by slim margin of Albanian-type res calling for ouster of GRC and seating of PRC (by reason of res's failure secure even simple majority); and (C) subsequent approval of GRC credentials.

3. However, prospects are that in near future [or] thereafter majority will shift in favor of Albanian-type res. This could happen as early as upcoming GA if, for example, current negotiations between Canada and/or Italy and PRC on recognition issue should be successfully concluded within next few months, with result that Canada and Italy, accompanied by like-minded countries, switch from abstentions to positive votes on Albanian res. Colombia, Mexico and some other LAs also may follow Chile's example at 24th GA and abstain on Albanian res.

4. Once simple majority votes in favor Albanian-type res, it likely be mere question of time before Chirep question is posed in terms credentials issue and resolved on simple majority, irrespective of efforts we might make to forestall such development. We foresee specifically that when simple majority tips in favor Albanian res, same majority can be expected, at same or immediately subsequent GA, to insist on separate vote on GRC credentials and reject them, with result that seat of China could temporarily fall vacant with prospect being subsequently filled by PRC reps. At minimum, we would no longer be able to obtain favorable composition of Credentials Comite and our margin on IQ res would begin to decline markedly. Break in dike in GA would lead to crumbling of GRC position throughout UN system, including

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 297, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

SAs which, pursuant GA res 396(V), follow GA lead on issues involving representation of member states.

5. In summary, maintenance of our present tactics seems likely lead to early replacement (1971 or 1972) of GRC by PRC throughout UN system, imminence such development depending in part on behavior PRC in current negotiations with several states and in part on how heavily we are prepared continue lobby with friendly govts in NY and in capitals.

6. Two Chinas. In recent years a UN favored alternative to standing fast on traditional position, with eventual consequences outlined above, has been one or another form of “two Chinas” solution. If this should commend itself to USG, we could either ourselves promote some such initiative or encourage friendly state to do so; in latter case we could at least ostensibly remain on sidelines and either go along or abstain if initiative were successful.

7. Possibilities range from pressing anew for thrice-rejected res to establish study comite (with implication of “two Chinas” solution) to seeking outright GA endorsement of successor-state res which would note that governmental authority in territory under Chinese administration at time China became UN member is now exercised by GRC with its seat in Taipei and by PRC with its seat in Peking; would affirm continuing membership of Republic of China in UN; and express willingness seat PRC as member in addition to GRC, upon notification by former that it accepts UN Charter and membership obligations thereof.

8. However, it seems questionable that necessary two-thirds support for any approach calling for double-representation on separate state basis is likely be forthcoming or that such an approach could provide viable solution for Chirep problem. In view their consistent and vehement opposition to “two Chinas” concept, both GRC and PRC would refuse to participate in GA on such basis and would oppose proposed arrangement so strongly that necessary majority seems unattainable, even if US actively supports. Furthermore, for US to support or even fail actively to oppose any initiative in such direction would not only precipitate familiar crisis in our relations with Taipei but also perhaps be interpreted by Peking as new effort to perpetuate division of China and hence be viewed as hostile act toward PRC. The above estimate of non-success remains valid even if US were to induce third party (e.g., Belgium) to carry “two Chinas” ball in UN.

9. Alternative approach—one-China. Possible new variant on “two Chinas” theme within technical legal framework of “one China” might be approached based on precedent under which USSR has two extra seats in UN for constituent “republics”. Under such approach GA would adopt res which accepts view of both Taipei and Peking that

China is a single state, of which Taiwan is a constituent part, and decides that in view circumstances in this case seats in Assembly should be offered to both pending resolution by peaceful means of issue between them. As part of this, SC seat would go to PRC. Under this procedure we could nevertheless continue to recognize GRC and to protect Formosa pursuant our existing treaty commitments unless and until de facto reunification is decided by parties themselves by peaceful means.

10. However, necessary two-thirds majority for interim solution along these lines also seems unlikely to be forthcoming in absence reasonable prospect parties would refrain from active opposition and would be prepared acquiesce in such decision. We are not sufficiently familiar with Warsaw talks to know whether it would be appropriate and useful to raise this possibility there but would appreciate Dept's thinking on this point. Whether or not PRC is willing acquiesce in such an approach, we would have to be prepared for a major confrontation with GRC which would, at minimum, make decision go along only if it were convinced it has no other alternative. We could in any case, if this alternative commends itself to Dept, consult informally about it with our major Asian supporters on this issue (Japan, Australia, New Zealand) and perhaps with some others (Canada, Italy, Belgium) who have been most interested in finding new course.

11. Basic issue, as we suggested at outset this telegram, is whether our overall policy is designed to move toward accommodation with PRC, without abandoning GRC. If so, our Chirep policy at UN should be geared to this objective. Alternative strategy we suggest may not prove workable, however unpalatable to both Peking and Taipei, but it seems to us nevertheless best possibility for forestalling total exclusion of latter without adopting posture unacceptable in principle to former. It would in any case have advantage of moving away from position which is rapidly becoming untenable, of demonstrating our willingness to see PRC seated in UN under arrangements which are not inconsistent with its claims, and of relieving US from political liability of defending to last ditch cause which seems more and more unrealistic and which indeed is inconsistent with our emerging policy toward China.

12. We would appreciate Dept's comments on foregoing.

Yost

289. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-1069

New York, June 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Consultations on Chinese Representation Question

Chinese Permanent Representative Liu hosted a working lunch on June 11, 1970 to discuss the Chinese representation question at the 25th General Assembly with Japanese and U.S. Representatives. Ambassador Liu indicated that the Chinese believe the debate of the Important Question and Albanian-type resolutions would at the present reading result in approximately the same outcome as last year. Factors which might influence a change in position of some delegations include the fact that the 25th Anniversary of the organization may be cited by some as grounds for resolving the status quo. On the other hand, if the Lon Nol government holds out, Cambodia can be expected to shift to the abstention column. Ambassador Liu said he was reasonably encouraged by the apparent lack of progress in the Peking negotiations with Canada and Italy. Ambassador Liu sought the U.S.'s assessment of the likely voting position of Latin Americans, notably Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. We said it would take effort to keep them in the same columns as last year. We suggested that the Chinese Embassy in Mexico could usefully obtain confirmation of the Mexican government's support following the Presidential elections.

In reply to Ambassador Liu's query regarding cosponsors and the introduction of the question in the General Assembly, Japanese Ambassador Tsuruoka said that Japan could cosponsor but would not introduce the resolution.

He said the Japanese press and a number of Diet members including some from the government party were critical of the leading role played by Japan in 1969. With party elections scheduled for this fall and Prime Minister Sato's continuance in office uncertain, Ambassador Tsuruoka expected he would be instructed to adopt a lower profile.

Mr. Newlin averted to the possibility that some compromise formulation might be introduced in place of the defunct study proposal perhaps in the form of a general resolution deploring the continued

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Frederick H. Sacksteder, Jr., cleared by Kathleen McSweeney, and approved by Michael Newlin. Repeated to Hong Kong, Ottawa, Rome, Taipei, and Tokyo.

absence of mainland China from the United Nations. This kind of general expression of views is likely to be popular with the majority of members, including the Latin Americans, who give varying degrees of support to the universality concept. Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative Chang said everything indicated that Peking would not be interested in such an approach and still held out for the expulsion of the Representatives of the Republic of China.

The participants agreed to maintain close contact through further similar meetings and to the formulation of various contingency plans prior to the 25th General Assembly to cover any likely departures from the established scenario.

Yost

290. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Chinese Representation Question

Secretary Rogers has transmitted to you a detailed analysis of the Chinese representation question prepared in State (Tab A).²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. The first page of the memorandum is stamped "July 24 1970," and "The President has seen." A July 11 covering memorandum from Holdridge recommends that Kissinger sign the memorandum to Nixon. On this covering memorandum, Kissinger wrote "Note edit," and "What is Albanian resolution?" An earlier draft of the memorandum to Nixon was attached. Kissinger had removed several paragraphs that claimed "this [the ROC in the UN] is a major issue because we have made it a major issue. The most important US interest involved in this decision is 'face.'"

² Attached but not printed. On March 20 Under Secretary of State John Irwin requested that Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Samuel De Palma prepare a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President concerning both immediate and long-term positions for the United States toward Chinese representation in the United Nations. The final version of this memorandum went to the Under Secretary on May 25, and was submitted by Secretary Rogers to President Nixon on June 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

In his covering memorandum, Secretary Rogers does not explicitly recommend a course of action, but he strongly implies that we should continue our present policy even though eventually it will fail, and China will be represented by the People's Republic of China (PRC), or by nobody. He wishes to keep a place for the GRC in the UN, but he does not see any prospect of a solution which would permit the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) both to be represented, so long as they reject such a solution. And he sees no sign that either will change its mind.

He argues that any change in our UN tactics would require that we consider the effects on the ROC and the PRC, the Japanese and the Soviets, the implications for other divided states, and the consequences of the presence of PRC representatives in the UN and in the U.S. Since most of these points would argue on balance against any change in U.S. position, the strong implication is that we should continue as we are.

Secretary Rogers thinks the status quo can probably be held this year.

The State study describes seven policy options, ranging from a continued strong line to acquiescence in the PRC's taking over the Chinese seat. Most of the options are variants of the "two-China" policy, but some of them contain elements of the more sophisticated earlier proposals for a "successor state" or "contending claimants" policy. These variants were intended to permit us—and other states—to avoid the politically explosive problem of taking a position concerning the present juridical and future actual relationship between Taiwan and the mainland (an area in which one cannot take a position without angering either the PRC, the ROC, Japan or the Taiwanese majority on Taiwan—or all of them).

The study correctly points out that we could move to one of the "two-China" variants either

—as a tactic to disrupt a move toward acceptance of the "Albanian resolution". (This would be particularly effective if the ROC were persuaded to sit tight, recognizing that the PRC would not come in if the ROC stayed, and that this would leave the ROC in possession of the field.)

—*or*, as a means of moving toward a new policy looking toward the entry of Communist China into a more normal role in the family of nations. (For the present, this hangs up on the fact that the PRC would regard it as a sinister move to detach Taiwan from China, and therefore more hostile and dangerous even than our present policy.)

I do not think that a major shift of the US position is justified this year, if the estimate holds up that we can win with the traditional approach.

If we anticipate an eventual defeat, and [I] do not see how we can avoid it, we should minimize that defeat by preparing now to diminish its apparent significance, in so far as we can do so without hastening the event.

There are two policy lines already in existence, which we should underscore and continue:

—We should emphasize that our interest is in protecting a place for the ROC in the General Assembly, rather than in excluding Communist China. This position wins friends in the US and abroad, since there is considerable sympathy for the proposition that Taiwan should not be thrown out to accommodate the Communist demand. If the ROC should voluntarily leave, faced with a hostile or “two-Chinas” vote, we would have demonstrated our loyalty to a friend, and we could convincingly argue that the subsequent entry of the PRC was not a defeat at all.

—The Nixon Doctrine has played down the confrontation mentality, and Administration statements concerning our desire for greater communication with the Chinese Communists have also steered us away from the automatic assumption that any PRC gain in the UN is a US loss. We should continue such statements.

This line should be coupled with strong support for a continuing place for the ROC in the UN.

Taken together, this approach permits us to honor our commitments and protect our important interests, while at the same time it serves gradually to deflate the importance of Chinese representation as a policy issue.

If a “two-Chinas” movement gains momentum in the UN without our encouragement, the posture permits us to examine that movement and see whether we should acquiesce in it. These circumstances—being faced with such a movement but not having encouraged it—would put the strongest possible pressure on the ROC to face the question of its own continued place in the UN on its own merits, without being tempted to take a tough line to force our hand. Under such circumstances, it might decide that it should stay in. This would face the PRC with the choice of coming in on terms acceptable to us, or fighting for ROC exclusion on a very poor wicket. This could stabilize the situation for years. On the other hand, we would have done our best if the ROC decided to withdraw.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to inform Secretary Rogers that you wish—

(a) to continue the US position this year as heretofore on the Important Question and “Albanian” resolutions.

(b) to avoid introducing or encouraging any “two-China” type resolutions at the forthcoming UNGA, unless a later count of prospective votes requires reconsideration of this tactic.

(c) to emphasize that our interest is in protecting a place in the General Assembly for the ROC, rather than in excluding the Chinese Communists. As appropriate, to treat the advantages and disadvantages of a PRC presence in the UN in a generally straightforward manner, along the lines pages 17–19 of the attached paper.

(d) to make clear that we do attach importance to the continued representation of the ROC.

(e) in non-UN contexts, to avoid emphasizing the confrontation aspects of US/PRC relations, and to make clear that we wish to promote greater communication with the Chinese Communists and to see eventual PRC participation in worldwide cooperation on issues such as disarmament, narcotics control, exchange of weather information, outer space, seabeds, etc.³

³ Nixon initialed the approve option.

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 31, 1970, 1707Z.

123390. Subject: Chirep—Meeting with GRC Ambassadors to US and UN.

1. GRC Ambassadors to US (Chow) and UN (Liu) met July 29 with Asst Secretary De Palma (IO) and Deputy Asst Secretary Brown (EA) for annual pre-UNGA Chirep review.

2. Amb. Liu led off with report of July 28 meeting of US, Japanese and GRC Ambassadors to UN which discussed early round up of Important Question cosponsors, and agreed seek about same number and geographic distribution as in 1969.

3. Brief discussion voting positions on Albanian Res indicated outcome likely to be similar to 1969. Favorable shift (in terms our position) likely in case of Cambodia and, possibly Mauritius; unfavorable shift likely by CAR, and, although there no present indications, cannot

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Long; cleared by Armitage, Winthrop G. Brown, and Linwood R. Starbird; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Also sent to Taipei and repeated to Tokyo.

rule out small number unpredictable shifts. No shift in Canadian or Italian positions, provided, as is likely, their negotiations with Peking not yet successfully concluded. Amb Liu said recent GRC chiefs of LA missions conference revealed no change in LA positions, including Chile. De Palma suggested and Chinese agreed it desirable compare vote estimates and discuss tactics in greater detail in late August.

4. Ambassador Chow said continuing GRC concern was that recent US moves to reduce tensions (in relations with Peking and others) might be misconstrued as signaling change in US policy on Chirep. Referring to recent reaffirmation of unchanged US position given to Vice Premier (CCK) by President and Secretary, De Palma informed Chinese that annual circular going to field posts within next two weeks would contain explicit reaffirmation that our position has not changed. Ambassador Liu noted with satisfaction that this action coincided with GRC instructions to its missions to make usual annual *démarches*.

5. Most interesting exchange took place on possible new initiatives arising in 25th Anniversary atmosphere. Amb Liu specifically noted reports of possible Zambian initiative to introduce single paragraph res referring to admission of Peking without reference to position of GRC. De Palma said we had no firm indications such proposal would be introduced, but agreed need to be alert and devise tactical handling which would depend upon precise nature and language of proposal. He inquired whether Chinese had any reading on likely Peking reaction to such approach. Ambassador Chow said despite great deal of talk recently about Chicom flexibility, he believed Chicom basic principles and policies remained unchanged. Did not rule out however possible Peking tactical flexibility designed create confusion at UN, "disturb Taipei and Moscow and puzzle Washington." Chow seemed favor attempt amend such resolution, if introduced, to make explicit that it without prejudice to GRC seat in UN; resolution would then be unacceptable to Peking and its supporters. On other hand, Liu feared it would likely pass, even if amended, because it "difficult to prevent many from voting for it." To question by Ambassador Brown whether GRC would withdraw if such proposal adopted, Ambassador Chow said he did not know since decision would have to be made at highest levels. Chinese asked what US position would be on such resolution. De Palma reiterated it not feasible to attempt take position on hypothetical basis, i.e., we would need to have better idea of language of res before we could decide best tactical handling. In any case, we believed insistence on need to preserve place for GRC was best general approach to this and similar initiatives. Matter was left that we would consult closely if issue arose.

6. Meeting went smoothly and we believe was very useful, especially discussion of possible new initiative. In this connection we were

impressed with absence of usual rhetoric that all would be well if US holds line firmly and exerts its influence and with apparent realization that such resolution might be adopted despite our and GRC best efforts.

7. *For Taipei*: In devising contingency tactics for possible new initiative, would be helpful to know whether you think GRC Ambassador's realistic appraisal of situation and possible acceptance of need for flexibility is now shared at higher levels outside MOFA. Request your assessment without approaching host government at this time.²

Johnson

² The Embassy in Taipei replied on August 5: "Whatever increased tactical flexibility on Chirep may exist within MOFA circles, it is highly unlikely that it reflects any shift in thinking at higher levels on the fundamental issue of Chirep." (Telegram 3344 from Taipei, August 5; *ibid.*)

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, August 15, 1970, 1544Z.

132973. Ref: USUN 1643, 1644, 1652 (Notal).²

1. Belgian Chargé Lion called on Asst. Secy De Palma August 14 to present text of proposed Belgian Chirep res. Presentation followed closely that given USUN 1643, except that Lion explicitly described formula as "One China–Two Govts." He added GOB does not intend formally inscribe until consultation with friendly govts completed; acknowledged domestic political considerations figure in initiative; added Chile to list of those already consulted; and (in informal conversation with Deptoff) stated he knew of no plans float res with Peking.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Harvey J. Feldman; cleared by Armitage, Thomas E. McNamara, Melvyn Levitsky, and Linwood R. Starbird; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Also sent to Brussels and Taipei and repeated to London, Ottawa, Rome, Santiago, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

² Telegram 1643, August 12, reported on the meeting with Belgian Representative Longerstaey during which he presented the preliminary draft of the resolution. Telegram 1644, August 12, transmitted the text of the resolution. Telegram 1652, August 13, not printed. (*All ibid.*)

2. In reply, De Palma observed US had seen no real shift on Albanian res and considered vote this year would not differ significantly from last session. While we wished defer definite reply until further study of text, and would give that reply through Ambassador Yost in NY, following were our preliminary observations:

(A) View lack of any real drift toward Albanian res, we did not believe res such as this necessary in order protect GRC UN position as stated in Belgian presentation;

(B) We feared introduction of res at this session might force parties to take hard stand and thereby interrupt evolution toward possible consensus solution to problem.

(C) As practical matter, res did not seem likely to pass (as Belgians themselves recognized), but could have effect of clouding status of GRC and thereby increase chances for expulsion, a result which Belgians note they oppose.

(D) View foregoing, US preliminary view was that res should not be offered, but we would make formal reply at later date and hoped GOB would keep us informed of responses received from others as well as their more specific plans for tabling.

3. GRC Ambassador Chow called on Asst Secy De Palma shortly thereafter stating view that Albanian res likely be defeated by "comfortable margin", but expressing fear Belgian initiative might confuse the issue and lead to situation detrimental GRC interests. His govt wished ask USG try to dissuade Belgians. De Palma noted we had given Belgians only preliminary assessment today, tenor of which was certainly to dissuade them, and would be making more detailed and definitive reply in New York.³ He asked GRC views on best way deal with problem in event Belgians could not be persuaded withdraw.

Rogers

³ On August 19 Yost was instructed: "Request you seek early opportunity reply formally to Belgians re proposed Chirep res. Reply should state we note GOB describes initiative as being 'One China-Two Govts' formula, but actual wording of res somewhat different in operative paragraphs. In any event, we believe res unhelpful for reasons given para 2 reftel, and request GOB re-consider decision offer res." (Telegram 134931 to USUN, August 19; *ibid.*) Yost reported on his August 20 meeting with Longerstaey in telegram 1705, August 20. (*Ibid.*)

293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, August 19, 1970, 0710Z.

3550. Subj: Chirep: Belgian Proposal and Lusaka Conference. Ref: State 132973.²

1. During periodic review of Chirep situation MOFA Director IO Affairs Che Yin-shou brought up and discussed with EmbOff proposed Belgian Chirep resolution and possible results regarding Chirep of Lusaka Conference. Che said FonOff regards Belgian proposal as "misguided friendly assistance," and essentially a dangerous variation of "two China" approach. Although FonOff feels resolution could not pass, in part because of its undesirability from Chicom's viewpoint, resolution's introduction would confuse issue and be detrimental generally to GRC position.

2. EmbOff outlined generally observations regarding Belgian proposal as in para 2 and 3 of reftel. Che appeared genuinely relieved and expressed gratitude that US preliminary approach to dealing with Belgian resolution was similar to GRC's.

3. FonOff believes that dissuading Belgians from presenting resolution is best approach. Should this be unsuccessful, FonOff favors direct drive to defeat resolution.

4. Che expressed fear that Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference potentially more dangerous than Belgian or Albanian resolutions in undermining GRC position. Che foresees following possible scenario: Lusaka communiqué could espouse Chicom entry into UN. With this psychological starter, momentum could build in UNGA speeches resulting in "sense of Assembly" vote or expression that Chicoms should be invited into UN. Che claims this whole process could conceivably be accomplished without adoption of any resolution or roll-call vote by UNGA. (We are unaware of such a procedure, particularly in a matter which has been considered an "Important Question.") Although this strategy might not be successful in 25th UNGA session, Che fears great potential for undermining GRC, leading to seating of Chicoms in 26th UNGA session. GRC has also mentioned its concern over Lusaka

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Lusaka, Ottawa, Rome, Santiago, Tokyo, and USUN.

² Document 292.

Conference to Australians. Does Dept have any reading on possible discussion of Chirep at Lusaka?³

Armstrong

³ On August 20 the Department replied: "Che's scenario (para four, reftel) for sense of Assembly vote without roll-call on specific resolution seems rather muddy to us. Certainly procedural objections could be introduced at any point in this unlikely process, such as request for roll-call vote." The Department believed that any resolution about Chinese representation at the Lusaka Conference was unlikely to be binding or to change any later General Assembly votes. (Telegram 135482 to USUN, August 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

294. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 14, 1970, 2323Z.

1914. Subj: Chirep—Co-sponsorship of IQ Resolution.²

1. Chirep co-sponsors meeting held USUN Sept 14 under chairmanship Amb Phillips. Australia, Brazil, GRC, Costa Rica, Gabon, Haiti, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand present. (Togo invited but did not attend.)

2. After discussion of handling of IQ res, Phillips asked for comments on which res should be introduced and which countries had agreed to co-sponsor. All present agreed res should be circulated ASAP and Sept 18 was set as target date for submission to Secretariat in order pre-empt voting priority. Following countries agreed co-sponsor: Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, Haiti, Lesotho, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, US. (After meeting, Perez-Alonso (Nicaragua) telephoned to say GON prepared co-sponsor.) Waiting for instructions were: Brazil, Gabon, Spain, Madagascar (waiting for formal approval from new government) and Malawi. After meeting, Amb

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Asuncion, Bangkok, Blantyre, Brasilia, Canberra, Libreville, Lome, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Mbabane, Port-au-Prince, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San Jose, Taipei, Tananarive, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² Telegram 1754 from USUN, August 26, reported on the process of obtaining co-sponsors for the IQ resolution. (Ibid.)

Liu commented to MisOff that GRC Embassies in Gabon, Malawi and Togo reported confirmation of co-sponsorship. Liu plans request GRC Missions these capitals follow-up with view insuring that necessary instructions forthcoming UN dels soonest.

3. Jiminez (Philippines) expressed preference that we should have as many co-sponsors as last year before submission of item to avoid misconception that our strength weakening. All agreed res should be submitted with confirmed co-sponsors by Sept 18th in event other side decides to submit their res. Additional co-sponsors will be added per confirmation by government.

4. Liu expressed preference that Chirep be taken up prior to commemorative session and advocated, in any event, item be taken up early. There was little support for Liu's suggestion and it was pointed out that such course would interfere with proposed political comites' schedules and consideration of certain items prior commemorative session.

5. In reply to Anand's (Thailand) query re Canadian position, Hsueh (just arrived Chinese Amb to Ottawa) reported that Canadians had informed him that, regardless of outcome CPR/Canada negotiations, Canada will continue to vote in favor of IQ res unless Cabinet decides contrary.

6. No objections were raised to Phillips' suggestion that the text of the IQ res should remain the same except for updating to include reference to last year's res.

Yost

295. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 19, 1970, 0025Z.

2007. Subj: Chirep: IQ Res Co-Sponsors.

1. Chirep IQ draft res has been submitted with fourteen of last year's eighteen co-sponsors listed on understanding that others to be added as received. Gabon, Madagascar and Togo Reps still without instructions; Spain (which co-sponsored last year but is not a traditional

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Canberra, Brasilia, San Jose, Libreville, Port-au-Prince, Tokyo, Maseru, Tananarive, Blantyre, Wellington, Managua, Asuncion, Manila, Madrid, Mbabane, Bangkok, Lome, Taipei, Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa, and Kigali.

sponsor) has informed us it will support but not co-sponsor this year. Togo expects receive instructions early next week according Ohin. Gabon Perm Rep Davin en route Libreville and planning discuss this among other matters. Rabetafika does not expect instructions until formation new govt in Tananarive.

2. In effort ensure at least same number co-sponsors, US del is contacting additional dels from among past staunch GRC supporters in UN to urge they join co-sponsors list. Dels of Greece and Ivory Coast approached and seeking instructions. We also approaching Kinshasa and Rwanda.

3. In view likelihood Chirep draft reses will circulate soon, US del believes urgent efforts line up additional co-sponsors IQ res highly desirable and recommend Dept consider authorizing Embs Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa and Kigali make supporting approaches.² Text draft res being repeated septel for info latter four posts.

Yost

² A follow-up telegram to Athens, Abidjan, Kinshasa, and Kigali reads: "Request action addressees make supporting approaches as suggested refelt [telegram 2007]. You should note USG greatly values past support host government has given to proposition that any attempt to change the representation of China in the UN must be considered Important Question within meaning of Article 18 of Charter, and hopes host government will agree to associate itself as a co-sponsor." (Telegram 155301 to USUN, September 22; *ibid.*)

296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, September 28, 1970, 2255Z.

159694. Subject: Chirep—Conversation with Davignon re Belgian Initiative. Ref: Brussels 4387 (Notal).²

1. Summary: In conversation Sept 25, Belgian Fonoff Dirgen Davignon told Acting Asst Sec Herz (IO) Belgian res will not be tabled but consultations to find alternative to Albanian res will continue. Harmel

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by J. Theodore Papendorp, McNutt, Armitage, Shoemsmith, Alfred le S. Jenkins, Herbert S. Okun, and Sean Holly; and approved by Martin F. Herz. Repeated to USUN, Belgrade, Canberra, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Hong Kong, and USNATO.

² Dated September 25. (*Ibid.*, POL 16 CHICOM)

will discuss res in General Debate speech, noting Peking should be in UN. Kosygin had earlier told Harmel Chirep was “internal problem between the two states”, but GOB was surprised at vehement Soviet reaction to their res. Yugoslavs had told them Peking would oppose anything short of full Albanian res. GOB will try establish contact with Peking on recognition but expects difficulty since GOB will refuse break with Taiwan. End summary.

2. Following points made by Belgian FonOff Dirgen Davignon during conversation with Act Asst Herz Sept 25. Full memcon by pouch.

3. In proposed res, GOB sought explore solution to Chirep problem not involving ejection of ROC which GOB would find abhorrent. GOB does not consider it has “special vocation” this area, would be glad if others could come up with solution providing for Chinese participation while protecting Taiwan’s UN membership. Fact is, no one is doing this now and GOB still feels beginning must be made.

4. Resolutions which openly endorse “two Chinas” are lame ducks, shot at by all, Davignon said. GOB sought get around problem by devising “one China-two Govts” res, recognizing objections would be raised to wording but knowing objections would be raised to any conceivable wording. Davignon explained that difference between operative paragraphs re treatment of Peking and Taipei had been intentional: GOB felt something more had to be offered to Peking than to Taipei since former could be expected object even more vehemently to dual representation. This explained fact that entire res was described as temporary arrangement (which could in practice become permanent) pending different arrangements between the two govts. It also explained why Belgian draft would have declared PRC to “be” UN member representing territory it controls while ROC would “participate in General Assembly” in similar capacity. Of course, Davignon said, one would have to lean hard on Taipei to get their acceptance, but this inevitable in any case.

5. Result of Belgian soundings had been mixed, Davignon said, and reaction mostly unfavorable though GOB feels if tabled res would have received 25–30 affirmative votes. French opposed tabling on grounds it would draw votes off from Albanian res which should be passed as soon as possible. Bitter opposition of Soviet Union and EE bloc most surprising. Year ago Kosygin told Harmel Chirep issue was “internal problem for both states” and “both states” would have to solve it by themselves. Kosygin had repeated this formulation, so it must have been deliberate. GOB had tried take this into account in “pending other arrangements” clause of res, and had not expected vehement Soviet reaction. Yugoslavs, who also advised against tabling, said Peking explicitly informed Yugo Embassy “moment has not come to change Albanian res” and would oppose one paragraph resolutions.

(Yugoslavs, according to Davignon, had probed Chicoms on acceptability of simple res on PRC admission that would have been silent on ROC expulsion.)

6. View largely negative reaction, GOB will not introduce res at this GA, Davignon said. Res is not dead however and GOB will continue soundings in attempt find some way out of impasse. Harmel in General Debate speech will discuss problem, noting Peking should hold China's UN seat, and will describe GOB's proposed solution.

7. Davignon felt Belgium could not indefinitely maintain its present position of merely abstaining on Albanian res. It is one of small group of remaining EUR countries without relations with Peking. After Canada, Italy will soon establish relations with PRC. Thus Belgium will fairly soon have to try establish contact with Peking to negotiate recognition. Such negotiations will be hard for GOB as GOB will not agree break relations with Taiwan as price for relations with Peking, Davignon said.

8. Since Davignon informed us of cabinet decision not to table, Herz confined his remarks to expression of appreciation and assurance we would expect to work closely with Belgians in reassessment of situation after this year's Chirep vote.

Irwin

297. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 29, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Albert Lakeland, Executive Assistant to Senator Javits of New York
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs
Louise McNutt, UN Advisor, Office of Regional Affairs

Mr. Lakeland, who called at his own request, opened the conversation by noting that Senator Javits would be handling the Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by McNutt.

Representation issue for the United States at this General Assembly. He said that the Senator hoped that this Government could move its position off dead center at this session and he was anxious to use his influence in the direction of some new and constructive solution. Senator Javits as a leading Republican Senator and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee was in an excellent position to make such a contribution. Mr. Lakeland also said that in talks with leading personalities such as Dr. Reischauer it seemed plain that this year might be a particularly opportune time to work toward a new position. While Mr. Lakeland did not advocate any particular new initiative, as the conversation developed he mentioned the possibility of a study committee or some sort of dual representation resolution, or that we could suggest in our speech that we welcome new approaches. Mr. Lakeland argued that staying with the present sterile position could end in disaster. It was no longer tenable to support the idea that the GRC was the Government of all of China or to allow Taipei to lock us into a position on these issues. If we do not move to shape our position to new realities, the situation would be out of our control, with the Chinese Communists seated in the UN on their terms and with consequent severe problems in Congress and with the American people. He acknowledged that we had made a number of recent gestures toward Peking but he felt that the Congress and the people were really ahead of the Department on this issue.

Mr. Green, after noting that he had read with interest Senator Javits' recent statements on China, went on to stress that his further remarks were confidential. He said that we were in agreement that there should be movement on this issue, but added that the core of the question was tactics and timing. He did not believe that this was the year to change; for one thing we were now too close to the time of the vote. The important matter was to create conditions in which Peking and Taipei would be more flexible. We do not know when any changes in their positions might take place—it may be some distance down the pike, but Peking had actually made some movement in this regard. For example it showed more evidence of wanting to join the UN; it was not, apparently, posing as many pre-conditions for its membership; it gave some evidence that it was moving away from extremism; and was becoming generally more active in matters of trade and diplomatic relations.

Taipei is a real problem. Perhaps its rigid view will remain as long as the Gimo lives. But it also seems possible that developments at this Assembly—the possibility of a close vote or perhaps a plurality against us on the Albanian resolution and the possibility—even probability—that the Canadians and the Italians will be successful in reaching agreement with Peking on recognition—may force the GRC to look around for other formulations and to view their position more realistically.

Then we can perhaps try to move to something else. We see a change in the position at the UN as a developing and evolving process. We do not now know what precise shape such change will take but as moves are made it is highly important to maintain the confidence of the GRC and we must do our best to support it. Moreover we want to be able to avoid any dangerous reaction from Taipei. Mr. Green went on to speculate that what evolves may take some special Asian form that we cannot now envision. He recalled that during the Off-Shore Islands crisis no one could have possibly foreseen that it would end in a pattern of propaganda shelling every other day.

As for our bilateral position we have already come a long way. For a number of years now we have acknowledged that the Chinese Communists govern on the mainland and that the GRC governs on Taipei and the Pescadores. Indeed, tacitly, we believe that we should at some time have relations with Peking. Moreover we have given some thought to what we want to see evolve on the mainland. We believe it is in our interest that it be a viable entity, with a material life worth preserving, thereby tending the regime toward prudence rather than desperation.

As far as the situation in the UN is concerned we think it will in time fall into place. But we have to move with care. It is not only a question of Taipei's attitude. The attitude and position of the Japanese must be taken into account; a sudden move could create problems for Tokyo. And there is also the problem of Taipei's other Asian neighbors. In noting the apparent opposition of the Soviets to having the ChiComs in the UN, Mr. Green speculated as to whether there was any way to get them out in front on this.

Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Lakeland said that he did not feel the Senator would be satisfied with these answers; he will want to pursue the idea of reaching some change in our position this year. He again alluded to the attitudes of people generally and in Congress (though he acknowledged there were currents and counter currents on the Hill on this issue). And he spoke of our need to show a general capacity for leadership on this question and not be hobbled by bureaucratic inertia.

Mr. Green, in reply, said that he thought that in our China policy we had achieved a great deal already; that we had moved in concert with the Congress and the press. We have shifted the pace and degree of our actions. But we have to evaluate what the traffic can bear. The central issue is tactics and to bring the GRC along with us. He suggested, however, that Senator Javits might want to talk with the Delegation about his ideas on this question.

298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 7, 1970, 2037Z.

2302. Subj: Chinese Representation in the UN. Ref: USUN 408, March 12, 1970.²

1. In our basic analysis (reftel) we concluded that maintenance of our present tactics seems likely to lead to early replacement (1971 or 1972) of GRC by PRC throughout the UN system. We also noted that successful conclusion of the negotiations between Canada and the PRC on recognition coupled with further defections in Latin America could result in a plurality for the Albanian resolution (to seat PRC, and expel GRC) at the 25th GA. This latter contingency now appears to be a very real possibility due to unfavorable trends in most of the geographic groups and the impact that the establishment of Canadian-PRC ties is likely to have.

2. Our latest voting estimate in which we have assumed the worst in almost all cases of doubt gives the Albanian resolution a slight plurality this year (51–49–27) as contrasted with last year's eight vote margin in our favor (48–56–21). However, we estimate that the worst will not occur in all cases and our current best forecast (subject to revision) is that we can again: (a) obtain adoption of the Important Question (IQ) resolution (estimated vote 66–47–12); (b) narrowly defeat the Albanian resolution with either a tie vote or a one or two votes margin in our favor.

3. Obviously, our projected outcome on the Albanian resolution is much too close for comfort even if we did not have to contend with the built-in variables of a 127-member General Assembly. A few last minute shifts such as those that occurred last year (Mauritius, Ghana) coupled with possible absences of mavericks (both Baroody of Saudi Arabia and El Farra of Jordan are now listed to vote with us against the Albanian resolution) could lead to a 51–47–29 result.

4. Although we would still be protected at this GA by the prior adoption of the IQ resolution, we would have to face the consequences that would flow from the fact that a simple majority opposes our position on Chirep. This could lead to a close floor fight at this session on the Credentials Committee's report. Even more difficult would be a credentials fight at the next session of the Security Council because

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

² Document 288.

a majority of Council members already recognize the GRC. (For example, Zambia might raise credentials in SC using majority vote in GA on AR as springboard.)

5. Likely and possible shifts by regions follow:

A. LA

Chile from abstain to yes
Bolivia from no to abstain
Colombia from no to abstain
Peru from no to abstain

B. WEO

Canada from abstain to yes
Italy from abstain to yes
Luxembourg from no to abstain

C. NEA

Kuwait from abstain to yes

D. EA

Cambodia from yes to abstain
Fiji estimated to abstain

E. Africa

Cameroon from no to abstain
Central African Republic from no to abstain

6. Analysis by groups:

A. LA

It is only prudent to assume that Chile, under Allende, will move from last year's abstention on the AR to a yes vote. There are firm indications that Bolivia, Colombia and Peru will follow the lead given by Chile last year and will shift from a no vote to abstention. In addition, Peru will vote no on IQ resolution.

B. WEO

We have assumed the successful completion of Canada's negotiation with Peking will be reflected in Canada's vote on Chirep, i.e., Canada recognizes only Peking as the Government of China. In addition, there are firm indications that Italy will swiftly follow in Canada's footsteps and that Italy's negotiation with the PRC will also be completed by the time the vote is reached. Luxembourg has announced that it will follow Belgium's shift of last year and will abstain on the AR.

C. NEA

The strong statement by Kuwait FonMin in the general debate in favor of Peking's admission is generally considered to foreshadow a

shift from an abstention to a yes vote. Note comment in para. 3 above on Baroody and El Farra.

D. EA

The only good news is that we anticipate Cambodia will shift from a yes vote to an abstention. Although we had hoped that ASPAC members would be able to work on Fiji thereby obtaining a much needed no vote, we gather from Australia that Fiji is most likely to abstain. We have heard rumor that Indonesian FonMin Malik, while in NY, told his Mission Indonesia would no longer be absent during Chirep and Korean votes. Moreover, Indonesia would support PRC and NK. We assume ASPAC members will, as before, continue to work on Amb. Abdulgani to be absent.

E. Africa

There has been some uncertainty over the vote of the Central African Republic. While Amb. Liu tells us that the GRC has a firm commitment, all of us recognize that Bokassa is mentally unstable. To be on the safe side, we have carried CAR in the abstention column and we will be checking as we get closer to the vote. We also anticipate that Cameroon will shift from a no to an abstention. Our present expectation is that Equatorial Guinea will again abstain. However, Macias is in about the same mental state as Bokassa and we cannot exclude a last-minute shift to a yes vote.

7. Parsons (UK) told us Oct. 6 that his Mission had just completed Chirep vote estimate and he concluded vote on AR would be a tie. We note this estimate also shared by Embassy's Taipei 4328.³ Would appreciate Department's latest estimate.

8. For obvious reasons we have not yet shared above with GRC mission.⁴

Yost

³ Not printed.

⁴ On October 10 the Department advised Yost that it generally agreed with his forecast and analysis of the vote, but added that Malaysia, Tunisia, and Sierra Leone were possible swing votes. When discussing the situation with the Republic of China's UN Mission, Yost was advised to say that the United States would concentrate on Tunisia, Malaysia, Luxembourg, Fiji, and Colombia; the GRC should concentrate on Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Guyana. The GRC could ask Japan to approach Kuwait or Peru, and its advice on tactics should be sought. (Telegram 167550 to USUN, October 10; *ibid.*)

299. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

The vote on the Albanian Resolution, which seeks to seat Peking in the United Nations and to expel the Republic of China, was defeated last year 48–56–21. The vote this year seems likely to be closer, and a plurality in its favor seems possible. Our estimates, based on the available but incomplete indications of changed position, are roughly as follows: If all the shifts now considered “likely” occur, the resolution would fail 50–52–23. Should roughly half of the now discernible “possible” shifts also take place, the vote would be 51/52–49–24/25 in favor of the Albanian Resolution.

However, the Important Question Resolution (providing that a 2/3 majority of those voting is required to change China’s representation in the UN) should pass easily, though the margin may be reduced somewhat from last year’s 71–48–4. Thus a plurality in favor of the Albanian Resolution would not lead to its adoption. Nevertheless, such a plurality would be a psychological blow to our position and could lead to a marked deterioration in the vote next year. It also could conceivably open up the possibility of new motions unfavorable to our position at the present Assembly.

These estimates are, of course, distinctly subject to change in the period preceding the vote, now expected in mid-November. During that time, we will be consulting closely with the Government of the Republic of China and other governments which share our concern, coordinating tactics in an effort to forestall a plurality for the Albanian Resolution. It will be touch-and-go but I believe we have a reasonable chance of success.

William P. Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Feldman and Armitage and cleared by Marshall Green and Martin F. Herz. A covering memorandum from Green to Rogers is dated October 12. An enclosure entitled “Chirep Shifts, Likely or Possible” is attached but not printed.

300. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 15, 1970, 0026Z.

2464. Subj: Chirep. Refs: USUN 2302; SecState 167550.²

1. MisOffs (Newlin and Romine) went over ground in reftels with Hsueh (GRC) October 14. US and GRC anticipated shifts coincided in cases of Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile and Malaysia. This resulted in GRC estimated vote on Albanian res of 49–53–24.

2. MisOffs then informed Hsueh of possible trouble in cases of: Colombia, Peru, Italy, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Cameroon, CAR, Sierra Leone and Tunisia.

3. Hsueh took our most pessimistic estimate (USUN 2302) with sang-froid observing that it unlikely that worst would eventuate in all cases. We agreed and said our present forecast was for adoption of IQ res and defeat of Albanian res with much narrower margin than last year.

4. We agreed to following division of labor:

A. GRC to make further efforts both here and in capitals with: Bolivia, where GRC has active Spanish speaking Ambassador; Cameroon; CAR (Hsueh says Bokassa is still in Taipei and that CAR vote is safe); Mauritius; Guyana; Peru; Sierra Leone.

B. US similarly to approach: Colombia, Iceland, Fiji, Luxembourg, Morocco and Tunisia.

5. Hsueh said Indonesian PermRep Abdulgani has told him again that Indonesia will be absent from room at time vote taken.

6. Hsueh agreed that if other side dropped expulsion para from Albanian res or brought about separate vote on operative paras (in expectation admission para would achieve two-thirds majority while expulsion para would receive only simple majority and would be eliminated) would face us with difficult situation. Hsueh agreed that in event Albanian res were to receive simple majority there would be serious difficulty when it came to plenary adoption of report of Credentials Committee. He also agreed GRC would be placed in very precarious position in SC.

7. GRC mission, he said, had been concentrating on lobbying but he promised to reflect on above contingencies and to consult further on best tactics.

Yost

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

² See Document 298 and footnote 3 thereto.

301. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 20, 1970, 2:02 p.m.

Secto 26/2577. Subject: Sec Visit UNGA: Secretary's Conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wei.

Following is unclassified memcon for your info only and subject to revision upon review.²

Summary: FonMin Wei expressed concern Canadian recognition of PRC (perhaps followed by Italy) and prospective vote shifts by Chile, Bolivia and Colombia, plus certain others, would result in extremely close vote on Albanian resolution (AR). While GRC doing its utmost, US assistance would also be required, particularly in case of Cambodia where GRC considered it vital Cambodia vote No on AR. Help would also be needed with selected other countries.

Secretary said US would continue to do all we could to obtain adoption of Important Question (IQ) resolution and defeat AR. However, after this GA, we would need to discuss with GRC where we go from here. Many UN members were in favor of universality and we faced prospect FRG and GDR and perhaps other divided states would come into UN. In response to question by Amb Chow, Secretary said he did not think President's Oct 23 UNGA speech could be misconstrued re our position on China. End summary.

1. Conversation took place in Room 35A of Waldorf at 3:00 p.m. October 16. US participants were Secretary, Counselor Pedersen and Michael Newlin. Chinese participants were Foreign Minister Wei, Perm Rep Ambassador Liu and Ambassador Chow.

2. Wei thanked Secretary warmly for US support on Chirep and expressed gratification close cooperation between two UN Missions. Secretary said US doing all it could on this problem.

3. Wei said he was concerned over adverse impact Canadian recognition of PRC as well as changes of government in Chile and Bolivia would have on Chirep. Greater US and GRC efforts would be required.

4. In reply to Secretary's question on Cambodia's vote, Wei said matter had been taken up with Lon Nol and Deputy Prime Minister.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 71 D 227, 1970 UNGA, Volume II of VI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Michael H. Newlin (POL), cleared by Richard F. Pedersen, and approved by Alden H. Irons (S/S). Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, and Phnom Penh.

² Clearance was sent on October 21 in telegram 2609 to USUN. (Ibid.)

Wei said vote against AR would be consistent with neutral posture. (In response to repeated urgings, Secretary said we would consider speaking to Cambodians about possibility of a No vote.)

5. Secretary noted increasing difficulties as time goes on. He had urged FonMin Moro AM Oct 16 to delay any GOI move to recognize Peking until after Chirep vote. Moro had cited internal difficulties especially with Senate. Even Conservatives favored Italian recognition of Peking. While we would continue to be in close touch with Italians and we hoped GOI recognition would not take place until after Chirep vote in GA, there was a possibility of a shift in Italian vote in any case.

6. Counselor Pedersen agreed with Amb Liu that vote on AR would be extremely close this year. In his view, we would not know result until vote actually cast. In reply to question as to effect simple majority in favor of AR would have, Pedersen noted this could lead to difficulties when Credentials Committee's report came to plenary. However, if AR received only one or two vote margin, there was still a possibility report of Credentials Committee could be adopted approving GRC credentials.

7. Secretary said he thought we would probably come out all right this year. However, situation concerning Chirep had become more serious and we must look down the road. Many UN members favored universality and we could look for recognition of Peking by Italy, Belgium, certain Latin American countries as well as others. Although we could probably hold the line this year, we needed to engage in active discussions with GRC as to where we go from here.

8. Amb Chow said "universality" was for some a synonym for admission of Peking to UN. He expressed strong hope that President's statement before GA on Oct 23 could not be misconstrued as to US position on China. Secretary replied President would be addressing broader issues and he was confident there would be nothing on China which could be misconstrued.

9. Secretary observed that eventually FRG and GDR would become UN members. Same would probably occur re North and South Korea. As far as Vietnam was concerned, even on US side there was interest in having both North Vietnam and South Vietnam in UN since this would tend to undercut North Vietnam position on Saigon govt. Canada had recognized Peking and Italy would probably soon follow suit. We had to look at facts as they exist and study their implications together. Secretary said he was not saying US position would change next year but that situation needed to be analyzed.

10. Throughout conversation Chinese made numerous requests for US assistance with individual countries. Upshot was as follows: probably nothing could be done re Chile; US undertook to approach Bolivia, Colombia, Cambodia, Iceland, Fiji and Luxembourg with view

to obtaining No vote on AR. US also to approach Belgium to maintain abstention. GRC making effort have Mauritius switch from Yes to No vote and might need supplementary approach from US. GRC to make effort, in first instance, with Kuwait, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia.

Rogers

302. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

United Nations Membership

Attached is a memorandum to you from Dick Smyser suggesting that we move toward a Two-China policy with regard to Chinese representation in the United Nations.²

Considerations

The first point to make about his memo is that it is too late to evolve our position on this question this year—we should hold the line until the voting takes place and then review our policy. The second point is that it is clear from our public statements that we are already moving in the direction that Smyser suggests, i.e., the careful formulation that “we are opposed to Communist China’s entry at the expense of Taiwan.”

With regard to the tactical question in New York, almost every year we are told that we must change our policy because we cannot win the next year. A few years ago there was a tie on the Albanian resolution, and many observers said that the handwriting was clear—yet our margin increased in subsequent years. Admittedly, with the Canadian move, Italy, Belgium and possibly Luxemburg in the wings, probable

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files, Winston Lord Chron, October 11–31, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Al, Win informed. Pouch back.”

² Memorandum dated October 26, attached but not printed.

dents in the Latin American front (i.e., Chile, Bolivia), and a possible multiplier effect on others, there is more solid reason than before to worry about the future tactical situation. But I don't think the evidence is conclusive, nor do I think this should be the controlling argument.

Smyser lists three advantages in moving toward a Two-China posture at the UN—I think two are without merit:

—*Embarrass the Soviets*—It's hard to see how or why we would embarrass the Soviets. They would probably continue their present policy of supporting the admission of Peking and the expulsion of Taiwan, without overly exerting themselves, no matter what we do. The more relevant point on the Soviets is that we would stir their nervousness about US-Chinese relations, but in a way that they could not complain about.

—*Might improve our relations with Peking* (Smyser does emphasize the "might")—This is highly doubtful given Peking's violent objections to any Two-China formulation. An interesting question here is how we relate this issue to the Warsaw Talks or even whether it should be related at all.

—*Move us to a stronger wicket in the UN*—I would agree with this, but as I have indicated, I do not believe it should be the controlling factor in our decision.

Smyser also suggests that a shift in our policy might make Hanoi nervous and therefore be helpful in the Vietnam context. I find this unconvincing. If anything were to make Hanoi nervous and more amenable to negotiations, it would be our dialogue in Warsaw. Our previous conversations there, our changed rhetoric on China, and our modest unilateral steps on China policy have not made Hanoi nervous so far.

Launching Studies

Having said all this, I still agree with Smyser that we should take a hard look at this question. Before doing so, however, we should decide whether we want to look at it in isolation or as part of an overall review of our policy toward United Nations membership and the universality question. Should we look only at the China angle, or does it make substantive and public relations sense to study at the same time the questions of Germany, Vietnam and Korea?

I believe that the entire universality question should be studied. If, however, you choose only to look at the China aspect, the logical group would be the new China Policy Group which you plan to establish per Dick Moorsteen's suggestion.³

³ Reference is to NSSM 106, November 19; see footnote 1, Document 312.

There should not even be a hint of a study until the voting has taken place in New York, but one should be launched after that. There are two obvious bureaucratic routes: (1) issue a NSSM, and (2) do an NSC internal study.

I think we should do *both*. The former has the advantage of bringing in State with its obvious interest and expertise on these questions—I am still a believer in involving the State Department wherever possible. We can count on immediate leaks that such a study has been launched, but the public impact should be manageable and not necessarily all bad. In any event, we cannot not undertake studies which need to be done just because their existence might become known.

At the same time, I think it makes sense to move ahead within the staff with a parallel internal study to insure a dispassionate look at these issues and to sharpen your own thinking as the bureaucracy's study comes to the Senior Review Group.

Marshall Wright, in both his UN and long-range planning hats, is the logical man to head up an NSC study, working with Holdridge and Sonnenfeldt.

Recommendations:

1. That a NSSM be drafted and issued after the UN vote, calling for a study on the entire universality question (action to Wright and Kennedy, with Holdridge/Sonnenfeldt concurrence).

Approve⁴

Disapprove, NSSM on China question only

Disapprove, no NSSM

2. That action on this NSSM be assigned to an ad hoc group, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State (presumably De Palma), with the study to be submitted to the Senior Review Group.

Approve

Disapprove, assign to new China Policy Group⁵

3. That Wright, with Holdridge/Sonnenfeldt, undertake a parallel in-house study of the UN membership/universality question.

Approve⁶

Disapprove

⁴ Kissinger initialed this option and wrote: "Can we phrase it more neutrally?"

⁵ Kissinger initialed this option and wrote: "Let's discuss."

⁶ Kissinger initialed this option.

303. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 27, 1970, 1744Z.

2749. For the Secretary and Asst. Secys. Green and De Palma. Subj: GRC Interest in Dual Representation Formula.

Summary: At luncheon Oct 26 arranged at initiative of GRC reps, Amb Cheng Pao-nan and Vice Fon Min Yang (protect source), these officials suggested to Amb Phillips that time has come to consider new approach to problem of GRC representation and that it may be necessary to propose a dual representation formula at the 26th GA. End summary.

1. At initiative of Amb Cheng Pao-nan (GRC rep to UN Office in Geneva) Amb Phillips lunched with Vice Fon Min Yang and Cheng Oct 26. Prior to mtg, Cheng "speaking personally" said he did not know if US had begun to look ahead to 26th GA. While GRC hopes Albanian res wld again not receive even simple majority this year, it was unlikely present tactics cld be maintained beyond present GA.

2. Requirement, Cheng said, was for some kind of dual representation resolution, the modalities of which would require not only great deal of work but appropriately high-level political attention (i.e. President Chiang Kai-shek). Cheng hinted that diplomatic personnel in FonOff were prepared to think about future. Problem was that decisions taken by President Chiang and it difficult to get full exposition of options laid out to him.

3. Specifically, Cheng suggested Secretary have short meeting with FonMin Wei before latter leaves for Taipei in late November. He urged Secretary impress on Wei that 25th session was last GA in which Albanian res could be prevented from obtaining simple majority. Therefore, we needed to think of new approach designed to assure continued presence of GRC in UN. Cheng stressed importance of Secretary requesting Wei to report US views carefully to President Chiang.

4. Cheng made it clear he and Yang thinking about a formula analogous to FRG/GDR situation of two governments representing one state. It very important for GRC to be able to claim it is still legitimate Govt of China (of course, PRC would be entitled to do same). This required in order for GRC to be able to keep Formosa Nationalists in check.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis.

5. Cheng then urged, after ground had been prepared by Secretary's message to President Chiang via Wei, that US send high level emissary to Taipei in January or February. Yang later mentioned high respect President Chiang has for Vice President Agnew.

6. Phillips agreed on need to consider new tactics as soon as Chirep debate concluded. He then asked Cheng's views on SC seat. Cheng hedged and said this question should be left in abeyance while we proceeded in stages.

7. Substance of foregoing conversations was later repeated during luncheon at which Vice FonMin Yang also present. It essential that both Cheng and Yang be protected.

8. *Comment:* This is first time, in Mission's experience that senior GRC officials have been willing to discuss modalities and timing of possible dual representation formula. They were also candid re GRC need to style itself as the sole Government of China in order to help keep lid on Formosan Nationalists.

Yost

304. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 25th General Assembly

The following is in response to Mrs. Davis' memorandum of October 26 on the above subject (NSC 22741).²

The situation in the General Assembly on Chinese representation remains essentially unchanged from that reported in the Secretary's memorandum of October 13.³ The vote on the Albanian Resolution,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted October 27 by Robert B. Boettcher (IO) and revised October 28 in S/S-S by Thomas M. Harrington.

² In this memorandum to Eliot, NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne W. Davis requested that a brief memorandum be prepared for the President by October 27 as "an up-to-date report on the status of the Chinese representation question." (Ibid.)

³ Document 299.

which seeks to seat Peking and to expel the Republic of China, will likely fail to obtain a simple majority by a narrow margin, though a majority in its favor or a tie vote are still possible. Our best estimates continue to range between a vote of 51 yes–49 no–24 abstain (possible but not likely) and a vote of 50–52–23 (probable).

There does not appear to be any real threat developing to the adoption of the Important Question Resolution, although as we noted in the previous memorandum, the margin will likely be smaller than last year. However, should the Albanian Resolution obtain a plurality at this session, there may be serious erosion in support for the Important Question in the period before the 1971 session. Moreover, a plurality on the Albanian Resolution at this session would spell serious trouble for us, not only because of its effect on the Important Question Resolution next year, but also because it might encourage other types of initiatives, such as a challenge of Chinese credentials in the Assembly or the Security Council, additional bilateral recognitions, and possible consideration of other Chinese representation formulae.

Statements in general debate and in the commemorative session for the most part followed already-known national positions on the issue of Chinese communist membership, but there was increased attention given to the concept of “universality” of membership. Now that the general statements have concluded, attention is focused on the issues with which the Assembly is immediately concerned, especially the Middle East. We do not expect much change in this atmosphere between now and the opening of debate on Chinese representation, still tentatively scheduled for November 2–6 but likely to be delayed by a week or so as a result of the Middle East debate.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

305. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Part I—Chinese Representation

PARTICIPANTS

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 Albert Lakeland, Executive Assistant to Senator Javits of New York
 Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs
 Louise McNutt, UN Advisor, EA, Office of Regional Affairs

Mr. Lakeland, who was again calling at his own request, noted at the outset that he was very pleased to see the recent Ziegler statement on Chirep.² He thought this represented a most useful step forward and wondered whether we could not be similarly forthcoming in our statement to the General Assembly.

Mr. Green, who noted in passing that he had drafted the Ziegler statement, said that as far as what we say to the General Assembly is concerned, we have to be very careful to stand by what we have told the GRC and other Governments, especially at this time when the vote is so crucial. We hope to do this without digging ourselves into a hole and by stressing our strong adverse reaction to any proposal to expel the GRC.

What we had tried to do in the Ziegler statement is to set up a formulation to which we can look in the future. He noted that so far we have seen no reaction to the statement from the GRC and that indeed Ambassador Chow, in answer to a question had indicated that there were no problems for him. We feel that many officials in the GRC are well aware of the shadows on the road ahead. The problem, however, is the Gimo's reaction.

Mr. Lakeland argued strongly that we cannot wait too long—to the point of no return—to try to move our position to one of keeping

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted on October 30 by McNutt.

² During the White House news conference held on the afternoon of October 25, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler said: "But it should be stated very clearly, as I have stated it to you today, that the United States continues to oppose the admission of Red China at the expense of the expulsion of the Republic of China, and that the efforts we are making in seeking opportunities to improve our relations with Peking in no way lessens the importance we give to the close association with the Republic of China and the support we give to their constructive role in the international community." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, White House Press Conferences, Box 16, White House News Conference No. 789)

the GRC in the UN but not opposing a seat for the Chinese Communists. He said that this year we have to show that we have the strength to beat the Albanian resolution but we should shift while we are still strong. To him this suggested that we should now indicate a new formulation, otherwise we may see the Chinese Communists seated and the GRC expelled.

Stressing that what he was saying was highly confidential, Mr. Green said that we probably would have to make some changes in our position. But we must handle any such move with exquisite diplomacy. On the question of moving from strength, we already have the Ziegler statement on the record and after the vote his (Mr. Green's) statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will be published showing clearly it also came before the vote. But any subsequent moves must be in the closest consultation especially with the GRC and Japan. With regard to this year's vote, if the GRC were defeated by a significant majority Peking would certainly be in no frame of mind to do anything but demand a price for its seating. The situation is similar, if reversed, in the case of the GRC. If it feels the hot breath of a losing position, it may be more willing to face reality. Meanwhile, however, we have to stand by Taipei, otherwise our ability to influence it will be weakened.

The difficulty will come after the vote. We will then face such problems as how we take the matter up with the GRC; the need of avoiding precise labels such as two Chinas; one China—one Taiwan, etc. Probably the more nebulous the description of the relationship, the better. In this connection Mr. Green recalled that he had heard that Sato had mentioned something along the lines of one China—two voices.

Mr. Lakeland felt the question was how best to protect the GRC. We cannot do this if we wait too long. With regard to the GRC's reaction, perhaps we should move whether it is ready for us to do so or not. This even at the cost of the GRC's walking out. It could perhaps re-enter later. After all the Indonesians walked out of the UN at one time but subsequently came back without difficulty.

Mr. Green thought the situation in the case of Indonesia was quite different and that GRC withdrawal followed by a later attempted re-entry was likely to be impossible. He went on to stress however, that what we want is the GRC in the UN. We neither want to see it expelled or to have it walk out. We have a stake in this too and it poses us with a very difficult problem.

Continuing, Mr. Green took up an earlier comment of Mr. Lakeland's about the fact that a number of nations seem to be interested in the idea of universality. He noted that the concept had considerable support and it makes a good deal of sense. Mr. Green himself thought there was much to be said for the idea of universality with the added

element of self determination. In this combination we might be able to work out the necessary protection for Taiwan. But there are problems in connection with the concept. In East Asia there is a fundamental one in the attitude of the South Koreans. They would obviously react strongly and adversely, even though there was some element of give in Pak's recent statement with regard to relationships with the North.

In reply to a comment by Mr. Lakeland that we did not seem to show a sense of urgency about moving our policy on ChiRep, Mr. Green denied that this was the case. He said we thought it was a problem of the greatest urgency, but we have to be careful in how we go about it. He recalled President Roosevelt's actions in the early days of World War II. By not moving too fast in the early period of the conflict Roosevelt brought the country with him, so that by the time Pearl Harbor occurred the people were ready for the task ahead. There were similarities in the present situation with regard to China. The attitude of the American people is changing on this issue, but it still has a distance to go. Mr. Green referred to the recent Gallup Poll which found that 35% favored a seat in the UN for the Chinese but 49% opposed. While this showed a movement toward liberalization in the public's mind, it still indicated a considerable body of opposition. Accordingly we must play our cards very carefully.

Mr. Lakeland said he thought that if the question had been posed differently as for example—do you favor the continued opposition of the US to a seat for Peking, the answer might have been reversed. What we must do is free ourselves from the albatross of our present position.

In closing this section of the conversation, Mr. Green said that Senator Javits could be very helpful to us in trying to work out some method of dealing with this difficult problem. Mr. Javits as a leading Senator could help prepare the way in Congress and with the public and we hope that we can stay in close touch with him after the vote this year.

Mr. Lakeland said that the Senator was very appreciative of the role Mr. Green had played in this issue and was well aware of his persuasiveness in getting others to agree with his forward looking concepts.

306. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 2, 1970, 2346Z.

2888. Subject: Chirep at 25th UNGA. Ref: USUN 2860.²

1. Dept will note from reftel that in First Committee vote on Korean reses Oct 30, following countries shifted their votes in manner favorable to Soviet position and unfavorable to our own: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Congo (K), Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, Guyana, Ceylon, Kenya. Following countries shifted in manner favorable to US: Cambodia, Guatemala, Burundi, Saudi Arabia, Upper Volta.³

2. Some of these shifts appear to have no particular implications from Chirep standpoint. Absence of Congo (K) during vote was apparently deliberate, but seems based upon personal desire of Ambassador to make small show of independence on issue which he considered relatively minor. Naturally, we are checking further, but assume at this time no Chirep implication exists. View established Moroccan Chirep stand, their defection on Korea was to have been expected. Similarly for Ceylon and Kenya. On the other side of the line, Burundi's abstention is probably in nature of a bow to Ambassador Melady, while Saudi Arabia's "yes" seems attributable to confusion on part of their delegate while Baroodly was out of the room.

3. Following shifts do raise Chirep questions however: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Mauritius, Guyana, Tunisia. We have assumed little chance of stopping new Chilean Govt from this year voting against Important Question (IQ) and for Albanian res (AR). This seems confirmed by their vote on Korean invitation reses. Believe we must now assume Mauritius will not adopt voting stance more favorable than last year when they voted "yes" on both IQ and AR, and vote against IQ now becomes distinct possibility. Shift to more unfavorable position also seems indicated for Barbados (1969 vote: abstain on IQ, no on AR);

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

² Dated October 30. (Ibid.)

³ On October 30 the First Committee of the General Assembly defeated draft resolution A/C.1/L.250, that called for the simultaneous and unconditional admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part, without the right to vote, in future UN discussions relating to Korea. The First Committee approved draft resolution A/C.1/L.251, allowing representatives of both states to participate in discussion of the Korean question provided that they unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question within the terms of the Charter. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1970, pp. 209–210)

Bolivia (1969: yes on IQ, no on AR); Tunisia (1969: no on IQ, abstain on AR); and possibly Guyana (1969: yes on IQ, abstain on AR). Finally, though this did not emerge from Korean voting, Chad informed deloff today they were now instructed to vote yes on IQ and abstain on AR. On the positive side, we may perhaps take some comfort from fact Colombia did not shift and continued vote for our Korean res and against Soviet res.

4. Based on foregoing plus other info available to us and Dept, following is our picture of Chirep shifts certain, probable or possible, with approximately 7-10 days to go.

[Omitted here are two tables listing the possible voting shifts on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question.]

5. Above pattern of expectations indicates following spreads:

A. On AR:

Best—50-55-22 (most unlikely)

Probable—52-50-25 (now most likely)

Worst—54-48-25

B. On IQ:

Best—71-50-6

Probable—68-51-8

Worst—62-54-11

6. Note that we reluctantly conclude a small voting majority in favor of the Albanian resolution now appears probable, unless we can contain and limit the number shifts now foreseeable. Accordingly, in addition to Bridgetown and Rome, we recommend strong démarches in the following capitals: Yaounde, Fort Lamy, La Paz, Bogota, Georgetown and Lima. In addition, we urge strong efforts with Tunisian Foreign Minister Masmoudi while in Washington.

7. Dept repeat to posts as desired.

Yost

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, November 7, 1970, 2044Z.

183821. Subject: Renewed Japanese Concern over China Problem.

1. At meeting with Assistant Secretary Green following US/Japanese planning talks, Takeshi Suzuki, head of FonOff Policy Planning Bureau, raised China question in terms of urgent need for US/Japanese cooperation in devising means to preserve independence of Taiwan.

2. Suzuki used impending reversion to Japan of Ryukyus as basis for underlining critical importance to Japan of preventing hostile Communist China from occupying Taiwan which is strategic position astride vital shipping lanes on Japan's southern flank. Suzuki also said consensus free Asian nations is that PRC should be admitted to UN but Taiwan should also be recognized as independent political entity. Moreover, at least ten of Taiwan's 13 million population favor independence, even from Chiang.

3. Suzuki then led into proposal he had also raised at policy planning talks. This involved progression of events in which U.S. would first confirm its security commitment to Taiwan; Japan, and U.S. would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to remove GRC forces from Quemoy and Matsu to symbolize abandonment of intention to return to mainland; and UNGA would pass resolution recognizing existence of one Taiwan and one China. This scheme would preserve UNGA seat for Taiwan while Security Council seat would go to PRC. Suzuki admitted Peking and Taipei would both react negatively to idea that both could be seated in UN, but felt that eventually one or both would decide it in their interest to assume seat. In any event, arrangement would preserve independence of Taiwan.

4. Green assured Suzuki that in determining its position, U.S. would consult closely with Japan. Green then said he would give entirely personal, non-official reaction to Suzuki's comments. After agreeing that both Peking and Taipei now show some signs of less diplomatic inflexibility, Green stressed that in past Chinat pride and pretensions have been major obstacles to achievement any tactical goal. Case in point was Gimo's failure to stand fast in Paris in 1964 when French recognized PRC. Danger now is that Chiang will decide to pull out of UN if many more countries recognize Peking or if there is ma-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Richard A. Ericson, cleared by Robert Emmons, and approved by Assistant Secretary Green. Repeated to Ottawa, Rome, Taipei, Hong Kong, and USUN.

jority for Albanian Resolution. PRC would then be in unchallenged position for a resolution recognizing existence of only one China (including Taiwan) and we would face all the difficulties and embarrassments of trying to support what was regarded as disputed part of a UN member.

5. Suzuki again mentioned advisability of withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu as means by which Chiang might solidify Taiwanese people behind his leadership. Green responded that in its own peculiar way continued Chinat occupation of Quemoy and Matsu actually seems to have had stabilizing influence on situation. Troop presence symbolizes and confirms view of both governments on identity of China. To remove troops from islands would destroy this symbolism; new situation with clearcut division between two Chinas could precipitate crisis. It would for one thing remove only means by which Chicoms now feel they can reach GRC forces to further their objective of destroying morale and creating opportunities to take over Taiwan from within. Thus, while Suzuki's suggestion makes good sense in U.S. and Japanese eyes, it would not likely pave way for settlement of Taiwan issue. Suzuki accepted role of Quemoy and Matsu as described by Green (who had also described Doane-Wang agreement and its aftermath), indicating he had not previously considered that factor.

6. Subsequent conversation involved need for close consultation between U.S. and Japan on means of ensuring continued independence for Taiwan as soon as this year's results in UN could be assessed. As he did throughout conversation, Green stressed necessity to avoid using two-China or China/Taiwan labels in considering this problem, as PriMin Sato already has recommended. This would preserve maximum flexibility, perhaps even allowing possible future solution based on presence of Taiwan in UN as part of China—a province perhaps—but separate from the whole.

7. When discussion turned to combatting effect of Albanian Resolution, Green and Suzuki agreed that there could be widespread appeal for outcome based on principles of universality and self-determination.

8. Suzuki concluded by mentioning that when he visited Ottawa later in week he would urge Canadians in coming UN debate to make clear, as British had done in past, that their vote for Albanian Resolution did not alter status of Taiwan, which remained unsettled.

Rogers

308. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 13, 1970, 0111Z.

3133. Subj: Chirep—First Session.

1. Chirep debate opened in GA plenary morning Nov 12 with Algeria introducing res to “restore lawful rights of PRC” and expel “Chiang Kai-shek clique” from UN. Speech was almost carbon copy of last year, suggesting no flexibility on part of Peking or her supporters. Philippines followed introducing Important Question res. Again speech contained nothing new and was pitched to opposition Peking entry on grounds PRC not peace-loving state as required by Charter. GRC FonMin Wei then delivered lengthy speech built largely on anti-Sov quotes from PRC media (to prove they not peace-loving) and anti-PRC quotes from Sov media (ditto). Wei concluded by stating GRC not opposed to universality but believes it not relevant to Chirep question since GRC represents all of Chinese people, both on Taiwan and on mainland. Pakistan spoke for Albanian res and Costa Rica opposed, both on familiar grounds. Amb Phillips delivered US speech for which session closed.²

2. PM session Nov 12 adjourned after other business since no speakers inscribed on Chirep. Canada, Albania, Somalia inscribed for AM Nov 13. PM session will be given over to conclusion of debate and vote on Credentials Comite report, with Chirep resuming Nov 16. Now appears vote will take place Nov 19.

3. Reaction to US speech ran gamut from “nothing new” (Baroody, Saudi Arabia) to “clearly signals change in US policy” (Hearn, Canada). Yazid, who spoke for Algeria to open debate, approached MisOff and called it “most interesting speech—our own was same as last year but you broke new ground.” Petri (Sweden) termed it “excellent speech, striking exactly at our weak point.” Merilles (Australia), in private conversation called it, “thoughtful speech, pointing direction we should all take.” No comment yet from GRC Mission.

4. Press has shown great interest in speech and generally are pressing for elaboration. Among comments so far: Estabrook (*Wash Post*) “looks like a two China policy”; Tanner (*NY Times*): “important departure in US policy”; Yoshida (*Asahi*): “dropping opposition to Peking’s entry is beginning step to two Chinas policy.” Lin of Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong.

² Ambassador Phillips’ speech is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1970, pp. 733–735.

Central News Agency was among those inquiring whether speech means change in US policy or only change in emphasis. In responding to press inquiries, Mission spokesmen have refused elaborate or comment on speech, saying it speaks for itself and requires no further elucidation.

Yost

309. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the United Nations General Assembly

The annual vote on Chinese Representation at the United Nations General Assembly will come up this week, with last minute changes in delegation positions expected right up to the moment of balloting. Recent recognition of Peking by Canada, Italy and Equatorial Guinea are indicative of declining support for Taipei, and the possibility of a close vote in the United Nations. The procedure of the voting will remain as in previous years, i.e., a vote first on the "Important Question," followed by a vote on the Albanian Resolution (see below). State believes its strenuous efforts of the last ten days on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China have borne fruit and that the close vote may not go against the Government of the Republic of China. A summary of the situation and amplification of the issues follows:

Important Question Resolution:

—The United Nations General Assembly may decide by a majority vote that a matter is "substantive" rather than "procedural" and is therefore an "Important Question" requiring for passage affirmative votes of two-thirds of those present and voting.

—As in past years, the United States and other supporters of Taipei have introduced the Important Question Resolution on Chinese Representation, which provides a blocking third against Taipei's expulsion.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. An undated draft of this memorandum, prepared earlier in November, is *ibid*.

—State’s estimate of the probable vote this year for the Important Question is 65 in favor, 53 opposed, with 8 abstentions.

The Albanian Resolution

—The Albanian Resolution is introduced by Peking’s supporters. It specifically provides for expelling the “Chiang Kai-shek clique” and “restoring the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China” by a simple majority vote.

—State’s estimate, subject to revision, of the most likely vote on the Albanian Resolution is 50 in favor, 52 opposed and 24 abstentions.

—Even if the Albanian Resolution should gain majority support, Taipei’s representatives would not be expelled this year because of the two-thirds vote requirement imposed by the Important Question.

**310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Contingency Backgrounding Material for Adverse Vote on Chinese
Representation in the UN

An adverse vote (by a simple majority) on the Albanian Resolution at the present UNGA, which is possible, would of course not result in passage of the resolution because we would still have a majority on the Important Question resolution—but it would probably soon spell the end of the success of our present policy on the Chinese Representation issue. Once the Albanian Resolution obtains a simple majority there is a strong likelihood that our majority on the Important Question will be seriously eroded. It may, in fact, be eroded during the coming year to the point where that majority would be lost at the 26th UNGA, thus opening the way to passage of the Albanian Resolution by a simple majority.

I have approved the use of the following points in backgrounding in the Department and in conversations with key allies in the event the Albanian Resolution obtains a simple majority at this UNGA (the vote is expected the week of November 16):

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret.

1. We intend to have a thorough examination of the policy implications of the new situation, in full consultation with our friends and allies.

2. We recognize there is much sentiment in the UN in favor of the admission of Communist China. We do not believe, however, that a majority favors expulsion of the Republic of China. Certainly, the United States does not.

3. We note a glaring inconsistency in the position of some countries which favor United Nations "universality" in their speeches, yet vote for the Albanian Resolution which would expel the Republic of China from the organization.

4. We have long felt that a major problem is the fact that the Chinese Representation issue at the United Nations is posed in terms of expelling the Republic of China and seating the People's Republic of China in its place. While the United States is prepared to examine all the implications of the situation, it is not prepared to drop its firm opposition to attempts to deprive the Republic of China of its membership in the United Nations.

A copy of contingency guidance we plan to use for public statements is enclosed.²

William P. Rogers

² Attached but not printed. The guidance was transmitted to all posts in telegram 190133, November 20.

**311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Next Steps in Our China Policy

The adverse voting trend in the UN General Assembly on the Chinese representation issue and the likelihood that in the months ahead several more countries will follow the lead of Canada and Italy in recognizing Peking require that we take a thorough look at our China policy to see where we go from here. There is also always the possibility that Peking may on short notice propose a resumption of the Warsaw talks.

I plan to meet with Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming in early December, before his return to Taipei, to urge that he impress upon President Chiang the seriousness of the situation confronting his government in the UN and in its bilateral relations and the need for the GRC to consider carefully how best to meet it.

Meanwhile, I have asked my staff to initiate a thorough study and review of the situation and possibilities open to us and will make recommendations to you as soon as possible.

William P. Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted November 17 by U. Alexis Johnson and Shoesmith and cleared by Winthrop G. Brown, De Palma, Ronald I. Spiers, and William I. Cargo. An attached memorandum from Rogers to Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma, and to the Directors of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff, dated November 18, authorized the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs to coordinate the policy review. Another attached memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown to Rogers, dated November 17, recommended the initiation of a Departmental review of U.S. China policy.

312. National Security Study Memorandum 107¹

Washington, November 19, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Study of Entire UN Membership Question: U.S.-China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared of the membership question at the United Nations.

The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved.

The study should include but need not be limited to the following:

1. The implications of new approaches, e.g. "universality," on the membership question for the United Nations itself and on our ability to pursue U.S. interests within the U.N. organization.
2. In addition to dealing with Korea, Vietnam, Germany, and China, the study should treat with any other aspects of U.N. membership likely to be affected by the adoption of a new approach to the membership question.
3. The effect on our bilateral relations with other countries which would be caused by adoption of a new approach to U.N. membership.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Laird, Moorer, Stans, and Kennedy. In a November 10 memorandum to Wright, Holdridge, Sonnenfeldt, and Kennedy, Lord noted that Kissinger wanted "both an inter-agency effort and an in-house NSC study" of this issue. (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chron, November 1970) Nixon was initially unaware of NSSM 107. On November 22 he wrote a short note to Kissinger: "On a very confidential basis, I would like for you to have prepared in your staff—without any notice to people who might leak—a study of where we are to go with regard to the admission of Red China to the UN. It seems to me that the time is approaching sooner than we might think when we will not have the votes to block admission. The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by those who favor admission of Red China." (Ibid.) Kissinger responded with a short note on November 27 explaining to Nixon that the studies were already underway. (Ibid.)

Also on November 19 NSSM 106 called upon the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, together with representatives of the Treasury and Commerce Departments, to study long- and short-range U.S. policy goals toward China, U.S. policy toward Taiwan, tactics to be pursued to implement these policies, coordination of policies with other countries having particular interests in China, and the effects of U.S.-China policy on relations with the Soviet Union and on U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs) NSSM 106 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

4. The inter-action between U.S. policy toward Chinese membership in the United Nations and our bilateral relations with Peking.

Responsibility for this study is assigned to an ad hoc group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and including representatives from CIA and the NSC Staff. The study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by January 15, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

313. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

Hong Kong, November 23, 1970, 0430Z.

4725. Summary.

A. Strategy on Chirep in wake of last week's UN vote² must presumably be based on particularly close consultation with the GRC, but ought also to be consistent with by-now well-established U.S. posture of not opposing PRC participation per se. Necessity of concerting with GRC (together with other factors) appears to exclude U.S.–GRC common support of any formula which explicitly or implicitly suggests permanent political separation of Taiwan from the mainland, such as "one-China, one-Taiwan" approach. However, GRC might at least tacitly acquiesce in strategy aimed at marshalling support for "one-China, two delegations" formula, i.e., providing dual representation for China without prejudice to the claims of either Peking or Taipei with respect to sovereignty or territorial integrity.

B. We are not overly sanguine about prospects for adoption by UN of such dual representation formula even with GRC acquiescence, and we realize that complex Charter problems might block immediate

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. This telegram was forwarded to USUN on November 23 as telegram 191736 and to Taipei on December 1 as telegram 195256. (Ibid.)

² Telegram 3295 from USUN, November 20, reported on the results of the vote on November 20 in the General Assembly. The Important Question resolution was adopted by a vote of 66 to 52 with 7 abstentions, with Maldives absent and Indonesia not participating. The vote on the Albanian resolution was 51 to 49 with 25 abstentions, again with Maldives and Indonesia not participating. Since two-thirds majority of those present and voting was required because of passage of the Important Question resolution, the Albanian resolution failed to receive enough votes for passage. (Ibid.)

implementation of formula even if adopted. Also, as a matter of tactics, we might find it desirable to continue join with GRC in opposing Albanian resolution (or its successor) and supporting Important Question, while encouraging initiatives by others along "one-China, two-delegations" lines. Nevertheless, U.S. identification with "one-China, two-delegations" position would have implications for our long-run relations with Peking, for rationale of our relationship with GRC, and for peace of Pacific, whose benefits would out-weigh short-term tactical considerations, and which would in any case be better than implications of alternative strategies. End summary.

1. Just-concluded Chirep season appears to us to have publicly committed U.S. to position of not opposing seating of PRC in UN per se. In wake of favorable vote on AR, pressures for definition of rationale of this position seem to us likely to become irresistible before next year's Chirep vote. That is, U.S. may be forced to declare whether it favors seating both Peking and Taipei in UN as two separate countries ("one-China, one-Taiwan") or as two separate groups representing a single country ("one-China, two delegations").

2. At same time, as practical matter, historical role of U.S. as ally and supporter of GRC has also just been reaffirmed, with result that it would be difficult, and perhaps harmful to U.S. honor and prestige, for us to take formal position on Chirep in sharp divergence from that of GRC. Also, if our aim is ultimately to have both Peking and Taipei in UN, Peking's reactions must be taken into account. Peking would certainly strongly prefer to see Chirep continue to be fought out on all-or-nothing, "one-China, one delegation" basis. Peking, which more intent on winning seat than in past, wants her entry to come if possible as humiliating defeat for U.S., not as result of compromise. Despite majority vote for AR, Taipei may prefer defeat to compromise and also may want to gamble that IQ will pass at least once more. Nevertheless, based more on subjective estimate than on evidence, we believe that Taipei, and perhaps Peking too, if they had to choose between "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula and "one-China, two-delegations" formula, would choose latter. We believe in particular that KMT/GRC sensitivity to Taiwanese Independence Movement and suspicions re TIM's U.S. connections virtually rule out possibility of developing a Chirep strategy for next year based on "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula. In any case, "one-China, one-Taiwan" formula would have implications for territorial integrity of China that would be vehemently denounced by both Peking and Taipei.

3. We accordingly recommend that U.S. seek to develop with GRC common strategy which would, with minimal revision of our past position, nevertheless move toward support of a dual representation formula without prejudice to integrity of China—a "one-China, two-delegations" position. U.S. and GRC would not rule out tactics of con-

tinuing to oppose Albanian resolution and support Important Question rule, but would, as matter of longer term strategy, (a) encourage and support introduction of resolution calling on UN (in words of Lusaka) “to examine modalities of enabling all countries which are divided to participate in the activities of organization and its agencies”, and, (b) support introduction of “improved Belgian resolution” which would retain seat in UN for GRC “without prejudice to integrity of China or to competing claims of two governments”.

4. In keeping with this strategy, U.S. should endeavor, in direct contacts with Chinese Communists at Warsaw and in public statements, to demonstrate active interest in PRC participation in UN and even in its seating in Security Council. This, we believe, is essential if strategy is not to appear to Peking and majority of membership as simply another device to delay or prevent PRC seating. In addition, it would be desirable for U.S. to seek at Warsaw understanding with Peking on status and future of Taiwan consistent both with renunciation of force concept and with above Chirep position.

5. GRC would probably regard above strategy as much less than ideal; PRC would certainly denounce strategy as “two-Chinas” plot, and vigorously oppose it. However, if strategy gains support and if we present it properly at Warsaw, in broader context of Taiwan problem, it seems at least conceivable that Peking as well as GRC might come to see strategy as part of sequence of events most realistically calculated to prevent permanent political separation of Taiwan from Mainland. (Same, incidentally, cannot be said of any strategy of “one-China, one-Taiwan” variety. Adoption by U.S. of “one-China, one-Taiwan” strategy would in our view materially reduce prospect for improvement in Sino-U.S. relations.)

6. If, despite our persuasion, Taipei insists on sticking to all or nothing, “one-China, one-delegation” position, and refuses to join us in promotion of “one-China, two-delegations” solution, we recommend that U.S. agree to support GRC in defense its seat on terms acceptable to it. However, in such case we should in our talks with GRC let them know that we intend to lend informal encouragement to initiatives by third parties designed to enable both the GRC and the PRC to participate in the UN as dual representatives of one China. We are not sanguine about prospects for adoption by the UN of a dual representation formula, but U.S. identification with this position would have implications for our long-run relations with China whose benefits would outweigh immediate tactical considerations.

7. Department please pass Taipei.

Osborn

314. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 25, 1970, 2300Z.

3383. Subj: Chirep—Further Considerations on This Year's Vote.
Ref: USUN 3295.²

1. Reftel reported our immediate and largely statistical analysis of the two Chirep votes at 25th UNGA. Over following weeks we will report on conversations with other missions on this question, a process already begun, and hope to develop and comment on alternatives for coming year. We strongly recommend, and are sure Dept will wish to undertake, a most rigorous analysis of where we stand and where we want to go. Naturally, Mission would like to participate in this. For moment, we would make following observations:

A. In years past, for passage of IQ and defeat of Albanian res (AR), we have depended upon coalition of Western Europeans, Latin Americans, black Africa, and non-Communist Asia. Though we suffered some defections on IQ, this coalition held together this year, leading to our 66-52-7 victory. On AR, however, we lost Western Europe, the Andean LAs, and significant support among black Africans.

B. It seems unmistakably clear that without high level messages, démarches in numerous capitals and strenuous lobbying here on part GRC, US and Japan, AR vote would have been even more adverse. Before the round of approaches in capitals and letters was undertaken, it was not only possible but likely that AR would obtain plurality of six instead of plurality of two. In a sense, however, this result carries with it certain contradictory elements. In corridors word is spreading quickly that in representations, US asked for support this year on understanding we would have a new policy next year, and AR cosponsors have been quick to point out that despite a major effort both in NY and in capitals US could no longer command a simple majority against AR.

C. It seems to us that coalition which held together on IQ is far from stable. Peking will exert very strong pressure on the five states which recognize PRC but which nevertheless voted for IQ this year, and AR cosponsors will lobby very hard on this issue. With 66-52 vote, shift of seven votes from "yes" to "no" would produce tie, as would fourteen yeses shifting to abstention. While far too early to predict next

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.

² See footnote 2, Document 313.

year's voting behavior, it seems to us we can no longer count on "yes" votes from many WEOs and must also expect defections from some Africans as well.

D. With exception of Bolivia, we can probably hold LA support we now have both on IQ and AR. We have already lost Eur support on AR and (as noted above) must realistically expect to do so on IQ as well. We should be able to hold island states of Asia, though Japan and New Zealand will come under great public pressure. (We have impression Tsuruoka of Japan lobbied much harder than FonOff wished.) NEA countries, where we already have little support, will probably continue to vote much as they did this year (though further shifts by Cyprus, Lebanon and Kuwait are distinct possibility). The swing continent seems to be Africa.

E. African vote on AR this year split 18–18–5. Yet this split masks an underlying unity. Three AF states which voted for AR made statements in favor of dual representation (Ghana, Morocco and Nigeria). Ethiopia (which did not speak at all during Chirep debate) reportedly favors two-Chinas solution, and Tunisia's statements have already been reported. In their debate speech, Zambia, an AR cosponsor, never once called for ROC expulsion. Similarly many Africans who voted against AR privately or publicly advocate seating PRC. It seems to us there is unmistakable African consensus that Peking should be seated but Taiwan should not be expelled. We believe it is only realistic to take as our frame of reference that consensus.

2. We have read with much interest Hong Kong 4725.³ "One-China-two-delegations" proposal, one of several possible variants of two-para res (along with two-Chinas, one-China-one-Taiwan, one-China-two-governments), merits study along with other possibilities such as universality res, one-para res, etc. In this connection, Japanese Minister Yoshida today suggested to us one-para res which would make no mention of PRC but would express Assembly view ROC should not be expelled. Such a res might obviate necessity for IQ, would take advantage of African consensus mentioned above, and might place AR cosponsors in a most difficult position. Finally, we should also take into account alternative of continuing on our present course in knowledge that though defeat likely, other alternatives could be still less attractive.

3. In reviewing all policy options, Mission believes Dept should take into account:

A. Damage we would suffer if PRC entry were seen as resounding defeat for us. Such damage would be not only to our prestige and

³ Document 313.

hence our ability to influence events in UN, but to our ability to deal with Peking, in or out of UN, as well.

B. Effect on public and Congressional opinion if PRC were voted in over our strong opposition.

C. Fact that delegates, and thus presumably member states, worldwide want to see this problem solved next year and that if US is seen as blocking "equitable and realistic" solution we would be swimming against entirely adverse tide.

D. Fact there is strong UNGA consensus which believes PRC should be in, but views with impatience and frustration limitation to "either-or" choice.

Yost

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico¹

Washington, December 2, 1970, 1945Z.

196208. Subj: Memorandum of Conversation with GRC Foreign Minister Mexico City for Freeman Matthews from Peter Johnson.² Please deliver following to Mr. P. H. Huane, Secretary to the Foreign Minister. Understand Foreign Minister will be in Mexico City until December 4.

1. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Wei at Ambassador McBride's residence for twenty minutes at 9:15 a.m. on December 1.³

2. The Secretary opened the conversation and said that we made strenuous efforts this year on both the Important Question and the Albanian Resolution and that he personally had made numerous approaches both while in New York at the beginning of the General Assembly and then later with Austria, Chad, Iceland, Ireland and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei. Drafted by Peter Johnson, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Rogers. The telegram was passed to the President by Kissinger in the daily briefing memorandum for December 8. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 14, President's Daily Briefing)

² H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Vietnam Working Group beginning in August 1969; Peter B. Johnson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

³ Robert H. McBride, Ambassador to Mexico. Both Rogers and Wei were in Mexico for the inauguration of President Luis Echeverria.

Malaysia. The results of these efforts were not as good as we could have wished.

3. The Secretary said that for the first time since 1961, when the Chinese representation question took its current form, a simple majority voted to expel the GRC in order to seat Peking. It is unlikely that we can reverse this trend. The Secretary pointed out that the Albanian Resolution did not carry because the Important Question resolution imposed the requirement of a two-thirds majority. The Important Question passed by only 14 votes, down 9 from last year.

4. The Secretary added that we believe there will be further difficulties with the Important Question resolution next year. A number of governments (including Canada, Italy, Austria) which voted for the Important Question have indicated that they have reservations about continuing to support that resolution in future years.

5. The Secretary said the United States remains firmly opposed to the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations.

6. Under the present circumstances, however, we believe we both must examine the new situation carefully with a view to determining what courses of action may be open to us in preventing the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations.

7. The Secretary said he hoped that when the Foreign Minister returned to Taipei he would inform President Chiang in detail of the seriousness of the problem and the Secretary's personal concern about it, and that the Foreign Minister would emphasize to President Chiang the importance of examining carefully all available courses of action for meeting the problem.

8. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to convey to President Chiang the United States desire to consult fully on this matter as soon as possible.

9. Minister Wei said in response that in the Security Council in January, Somalia may take some action with regard to GRC credentials and that possibility there would be one more vote against the GRC beyond the present five. His government, he added, has been in touch with ours with regard to tactics. Minister Wei went on to say that the recent General Assembly results were disappointing but there is still some cause for hope. He said he expects the Albanian Resolution will be resubmitted next year and hopefully will be dealt with again as an Important Question.

10. Secretary Rogers pointed out that the process of erosion that is taking place probably will continue to present a dangerous situation to the GRC. Minister Wei then said his government foresaw problems within Mainland China which, although not as serious as during the Cultural Revolution, still could cause a change favorable to the GRC between now and next year's General Assembly session. Minister Wei

considered this year's vote was caused by a combination of negative factors including the Lusaka Conference and the Italian recognition. He expressed hope that the situation might be brighter next year.

Irwin

316. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

Hong Kong, December 4, 1970, 0800Z.

4967. Subj: Chirep—Tactics. Refs: A. USUN 3383; B. Hong Kong 4725.²

1. Particularly grateful to Dept and USUN for giving us chance to comment on reftel A. Chirep question appears to us to have reached stage at which definition of US position has policy implications more critical than any near-term tactical or political considerations. If US Chirep position is defined in manner which logically implies that Taiwan and mainland China are separate nations, we believe long-run effect could be to make conflict between PRC and ourselves (and others, like Japan, who might go along with US) more probable than if we keep our Chirep position consistent with concept that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of single nation. Short-run effect would be virtually to rule out significant détente between US and Peking, and to enlarge differences between US and GRC. In line with last sentence para 2 reftel A, we accordingly recommend avoidance of Chirep positions implying that Taiwan and China are separate nations, even if alternatives might appear to lead to tactical defeat, or seem harder to "sell" in the GA.

2. Our intent in reftel B was thus not merely to extol merits of one particular variant of "two-para res," but to call attention to importance of avoiding implications, via our Chirep position, that US has committed itself to perpetual political separation of Taiwan from China, thereby tending narrow options leading to accommodation with Peking. We believe that all Chirep proposals should be reviewed from standpoint of these consistent with concept that Taiwan is legally part

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis.

² Documents 314 and 313, respectively.

of China, and that those which are not consistent should either be eliminated from consideration, or, if feasible, revised to make them consistent with such a “one-China” position. For example, it appears to us that “universality res” could, depending on its definition and context, be either consistent or inconsistent with one-China position. As commonly used, “universality” seems to us to mean that every nation should be represented; if there is only one China, then Albanian res is not in conflict with principle of universality. Accordingly, if “universality” is to be used as basis for opposing expulsion of GRC, there should be a gloss on the term to effect that in favoring “universality” US intended, not just that every nation should have delegation in UN, but that every established regime in firm control of definite territory and population should have right to representation. We have thought of this as “popular universality” (as opposed to “national universality”) and have been attracted to it in part because it might accommodate cases of other divided nations.

3. Similarly, one-para res suggested by Yoshida might, in our view, be made acceptable if amplified to make clear that it was without prejudice to territorial integrity of China. Otherwise, given the prevalent assumption that only sovereign nations are entitled to have delegations in UN, Peking might fairly conclude that PRC was being asked to sacrifice territorial integrity as price for seat. Peking and probably many UN members would regard Yoshida res, if not amplified as suggested above, as merely another device to prolong exclusion of PRC. In this connection, it is noted that the amplification we have suggested would be quite in line with “one-China” position that Japanese Govt spokesmen have consistently taken in public statements and in Diet for at least past year.

4. I wish to make clear we are not urging that US operate on assumption that GRC and PRC will necessarily be able eventually to agree on peaceful reunification. Nor would US adoption at this time of Chirep position consistent with Taiwan status as province of China necessarily foreclose option of eventual recognition of independent Taiwan or its admission as such to UN, should this be course of history. We are concerned, rather with serious effects that would stem from our identification at this time with view that Taiwan is not part of China.

5. Dept please repeat USUN, Taipei, Tokyo.

Osborn

317. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 19, 1970, 0133Z.

3752. Subj: Chirep in SC.

1. With the accession of five new SC members on Jan 1, we must anticipate that GRC credentials will be raised at first meeting in 1971. This, of course, is an annual contingency (which has not materialized since 1968) but it appears likelier to arise this year in light of vote on Albanian res and election of Somalia. We have already heard reports Yazid (Algeria) is agitating that UN take cognizance of this year's Chirep vote by rejecting GRC credentials in SC.

2. On this question, the changed composition works in our favor: Argentina vice Colombia, Belgium vice Finland, Italy vice Spain, Japan vice Nepal, Somalia vice Zambia. We have a solid base in SC of six members which support our position on Chirep: US, China, Argentina, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone. If we can persuade UK, Italy and Belgium (all of which support IQ) to join us in procedural moves to defeat any effort to bring matter up, we will have procedural majority of nine votes.

3. Obviously, such procedural tactics must not prejudice position of anyone on substance.

4. We currently approaching UK, Italy and Belgium on above. President of SC for Jan, Sir Colin Crowe, has referred previous contingency plans worked out between USUN and UKUN to London for approval which he expects will be forthcoming.

5. On Dec 18, Amb Phillips approached Italian Acting PermRep Migliuolo. Latter had done considerable research in depth and said Vinci currently in Rome and would bring back instructions around Jan 1. Main contingencies discussed with Migliuolo were: (A) If Somalia and/or Syria request change in long-established practice of approving only credentials of five new non-perms, objection would be made with object of forcing member seeking change to submit formal proposal. Hopefully any such proposal would get only six votes: Burundi, France, Poland, Somalia, Syria, USSR. (B) If challenge is submitted to Chinese credentials or a vote on them is requested, President should rule consideration would require agenda item. President would submit challenge to the vote and hopefully it would receive only above six votes. (C) Somalia and Syria might request SC meeting for purpose of ap-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Rome, and Taipei.

proving credentials and submit agenda item to this effect. In this case, we should agree to meeting but seek to defeat adoption of agenda item (nine votes needed for inscription). (D) In event item nevertheless inscribed, we should seek nine votes for following res:

“The Security Council,
“Noting with approval the report by the Secretary General on ‘practice of the Security Council regarding the credentials of its members’ of 26 January 1968 (S/8365),
“Decides to take no further action at this time to consider the credentials of any of its members.”

6. While there are other contingencies, we stressed to Migliuolo that main thing we were seeking was commitment to cooperate in tactics which would keep SC from becoming embroiled in major controversy over matter which should be decided in GA where all members present. Migliuolo seemed personally sympathetic and said he had pointed out prior to Chirep debate in GA that a no vote on IQ would restrict Italy’s freedom to prevent SC from getting involved in Chirep. Since Italy voted for IQ, Migliuolo seemed to think there was good chance that GOI would agree to cooperate with US in elaborating contingency plans. However, he stressed this view was entirely personal and that decision was up to Rome. He promised to report above approach fully.

7. Yost and Phillips will see Belgian PermRep Dec 21.

Yost

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, December 22, 1970, 1750Z.

7341. Subject: Chirep in SC. Ref: USUN 3752.²

1. USUN’s flagging of potential GRC credentials problem in SC coincided with first intimations here that issue could become troublesome.

2. In recent talk with Ambassador, FonOff SYG Gaja hoped we intended to thoroughly review Chirep problem since it quite likely with-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Taipei, and USUN.

² Document 317.

out new approach we could be exposed to defeat next year. Reflecting Moro's belief that Secretary in New York had indicated awareness new Chirep policy essential, Gaja intimated that unless US produced one that Italians could support, internal pressures might cause increasing divergences between US and Italy on this subject.

3. A further indication of this possibility came December 21, when Foreign Ministry's UN Director told EmbOff that question of GRC credentials in SC would have to be decided at "high political level." He added, however, that UK and Belgium positions might conceivably affect Italian decision.

4. Transmission of SC credentials matter to higher Italian political level could be very troublesome, if it should involve political parties, as did earlier Chirec and Chirep decisions. At such level Italian Socialists assume a purposeful intransigence that is worrisome to government in best of circumstances, frightening in periods of uncertainty like that likely to prevail early in new year. Near crisis occurred last November when, as Gaja told Ambassador, Vice Premier De Martino and Socialist Party Secretary walked out of party "summit" when decision was taken to vote for IQ. Moro was not certain PSI might not leave government on this issue but, in view of clear US views presented Ortona by Under Secretary Johnson, remained adamant that GOI would vote for IQ.

5. We should assume same intense pressure will be applied again in hope of imposing PSI views on government, for in such way does PSI build up a power it hopes will give it a veto over Italian foreign policy.

6. Would therefore appreciate early and full status report in hope that by our acting early enough and forcefully enough here we may not only keep Italian position of SC credentials under control but at same time buck up the government in its resistance to PSI's search for foreign policy veto.

Martin

319. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 13, 1971, 2314Z.

87. Subj: Chirep—Phillips/Liu Meeting Jan 12.

1. Amb Phillips met with Liu at latter's request Jan 12 to compare notes in light of US policy review and Liu's recent consultations in Taipei. Phillips said US review in full swing and that we intended to consult GRC just as soon as it is completed. Liu said Taipei "very disappointed" that he, Liu, was not able to indicate preliminary US thinking about future strategy and tactics. In response to Phillips' probing, Liu admitted that various alternatives had been discussed (e.g., Belgian resolution—USUN 3750 with generally negative reactions).²

2. In course of long, rambling and disjointed discussion, Liu revealed that important preoccupation was SC seat. Liu said substitution of PRC for GRC in SC would destroy GRC's *raison d'être* (i.e., claim to be legitimate representative of Chinese people) and therefore was no better than "the worst" (adoption of AR resolution). Under these circumstances, best course might be to maintain present tactics and seek to shore up support for IQ. Liu several times stressed that this was not question of "ideological purity" but involved GRC's *raison d'être*.

3. Phillips asked if Liu thought IQ could be adopted again. Liu said GRC believed IQ would carry in 1971 provided US and Japan work for its adoption. Liu said Chiang Ching had met with former Japanese PM Kishi in Taiwan and GRC was pleased GOJ would follow its present course on Chirep. (*Comment*: This is not our impression from Tokyo 265 and informal discussions with Japanese Mission here.)³

4. Liu said GOJ had instructed its Embassies to submit appraisals on Chirep and he understood Japanese had requested early consultations with USG on this subject. Liu gave impression of alarm that US might have bilaterals with Japan on Chirep before consulting GRC. He mentioned DFM Hogen scheduled to have talks in Washington on Chirep next month. Phillips assured Liu that we had no intention of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis.

² Not printed.

³ Telegram 265 from Tokyo, January 11, reported that Japanese Foreign Ministry officials had said that their government was under increasing pressure to find an alternative to continuing the "Important Question" versus the "Albanian resolution" strategy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

initiating talks with other governments on this subject prior to consultations with GRC. Liu expressed appreciation.⁴

5. Liu next raised US commitment to exercise veto in SC "should this be necessary and effective". Liu recalled this commitment given by President Kennedy and later former Secretary Rusk confirmed Johnson administration maintained commitment. He wished to know if commitment still valid. Phillips said he unable to reply because this was first time he had heard of such commitment. Speaking personally, Phillips said we would not wish to take position credentials were substantive matter thereby having our own subject to Soviet veto. However, should challenge to GRC in SC be presented as expulsion this would be vetoable. Phillips promised to look into question.

6. In further inconclusive discussion of what Liu called "third resolution" (i.e. dual representation formulas) he admitted such alternatives had been discussed in Taipei and expressed some interest in the possibility that such a resolution would reduce support for the AR and, if adopted, the PRC would refuse to come to the UN. GRC could not support such a res but it would buy time. Liu repeated his earlier comments to the effect that it would be desirable to maintain IQ since this resolution has been standard for a number of years.

7. Liu asked if US would be consulting Soviets on Chirep. He recalled comment that Chirep would not be settled until US, USSR and PRC reached agreement. Phillips said US review still in progress and no decisions taken. We did intend to discuss results of our review with our friends, beginning with GRC, and he had no idea if US would eventually discuss matter with Soviets. Tripartite agreement, Phillips indicated, was farfetched.

8. In summing up, Liu said GRC's chief concern was not to become isolated or absorbed into Communist domination. He asked if US position on Chirep remained the same. Phillips said we shared similar goal and we were opposed to expulsion of GRC from UN.

9. *Comment:* Liu's trip to Taipei has only served to aggravate his case of jitters. Main reason for his call was to continue his fishing expeditions. Principal substantive clue was implication that, if GRC could be assured seat on SC (presumably along with PRC), GRC might decide to live with dual representation decision rather than continue to fight rear guard action against "worst case".

Yost

⁴ Telegram 166 from USUN, January 20, stated that Ambassador Phillips wanted to change the next-to-last sentence of paragraph 4 to read: "Phillips assured Liu that just as soon as US Chirep review concluded, we planned to consult GRC and other friendly countries intimately concerned." (Ibid.)

320. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Frank Corner, Ambassador E. and P., Embassy of New Zealand
Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary—EA
Mr. Martin F. Herz, Acting Assistant Secretary—IO
Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director, ACA

1. Ambassador Corner opened by observing that we are all faced with quandaries concerning China just now, and that it is important to keep in consultation. He said this was one of the few issues having important public opinion significance in New Zealand. Opinion is divided, but a fair number say that it is ridiculous to have China not represented in the UN. However, GRC representatives have done their work well in New Zealand and the China problem has the makings of quite an issue. There is no great division between the Labor and Nationalist parties. Labor dropped the issue from its formal agenda. The China question is, however, bound up with New Zealand-US relations because the US is regarded as the chief supporter of the GRC. If the GRC is forced out of the UN there would be an inclination in New Zealand to conclude that Peking should be recognized. The voice of the UN would have spoken, and the two issues of UN representation and diplomatic recognition are closely interrelated in the average New Zealander's view. The Ambassador said what is really wanted is a two Chinas solution, and in the last two years the Government has appeared to favor two Chinas.

2. Mr. Green asked whether the New Zealand public appreciated the fact that both Chinas are opposed to a two Chinas solution. The Ambassador replied that newspapers periodically reminded the public of this fact but there was not general awareness, even so, that we cannot have both in the UN. Holyoake had said that he believed that Chiang might stay in the UN even if Peking were in the Security Council and the GRC seat there was lost, but the Ambassador did not think so. The Ambassador further thought that whenever the issue of having one or the other China in the UN arose starkly the sentiment would overwhelmingly be to "let the GRC go." It seemed clear to the Am-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins.

bassador that we would end with Peking in and Taipei out. In response to a question from Mr. Herz he said he thought this would happen soon.

3. Mr. Herz said we have been trying to think through various alternative courses of action, without coming to any conclusion. We did believe that a two China resolution might draw votes from the Albanian Resolution. In answer to probing by Ambassador Corner about the legal aspects of such a resolution, Mr. Herz said that a number of dual representation formulas could be envisaged which would be difficult to attack on legal grounds. At any rate, legal obstacles could be overcome if there were sufficient political will behind a movement for such a solution.

4. The Ambassador thought that legal arguments augmented the position of those already disposed toward the question but did little else. He thought the "Important Question game was probably up." He thought it possible to contrive it so that for a time we would have neither China in the UN. In domestic terms the New Zealand Government wanted to find something which would enable it to say that it was willing to have Peking in the UN but unwilling to throw the GRC out but it must find a way for the formula not to be denounced as a gimmick. For instance, New Zealand had formerly put forward at US behest the idea of a study group. The New Zealand public saw through that as the gimmick that it was. This left a bad taste.

5. The Ambassador said that in more general terms his Government was worried about what would happen if the GRC were out. If this should encourage Taiwan to make a deal with the mainland, his Government thinks this would be bad. Or would this hasten the time when we would get an independent Formosa? If so, this would be in our interest. (1) New Zealand is interested in the effect on the strategic situation in the area, (2) the public reaction and (3) the linkage of the problem with New Zealand's relations with the US. If we use a gimmick and that gimmick is associated with the US it will harm our relations, since the public will feel that New Zealand followed slavishly US desires. Mr. Green observed that we had a similar problem in being accused of being subservient to Chang Kai-shek.

6. The Ambassador observed that if the Soviets should back a two Chinas resolution this would greatly enhance the prospects for its passage. Mr. Green thought it would be hard for the Soviets to change their position even though they do not want to see Peking in the UN. They want others to do battle on keeping them out. Mr. Herz agreed.

7. Mr. Green emphasized the importance of Japan's views on this whole question. He said we believe that the Japanese have not decided their policy in this regard as yet. In any event we certainly want to know more about other countries' views before we make definitive

decisions. The Ambassador asked whether Japan wanted a separate Formosa. Mr. Green said he thought they did. They used to talk openly of a one China, one Taiwan solution. In public, however, they have shifted to a one China theme. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that the Japanese actually want an independent Taiwan. The strategic considerations are perhaps more fundamental to Japan than to any one else, and her economic interests in Taiwan are also great. Japan would want to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands. Japan would not be as worried as some of us if the GRC simply quit the UN. Some Japanese are even willing to encourage the GRC to do so, but this would not solve the matter for Japan. There would still be the question of recognition on the agenda. Sato probably has reservations about any change in the current Japanese stand, but he does not want to be charged with inflexibility. Japan also has a strong sentimental attachment for China, and it is salivating over prospects for increased trade with the mainland. The Japanese people tend to think there is more potentiality for better relations than does the Government. The PRC in the UN is not a very attractive prospect for any of us. Nevertheless, it does represent a quarter of humanity; there are practical problems which cannot be solved without China's cooperation; and with increased international intercourse we can hope for a better attitude toward the world on Peking's part.

8. Mr. Herz said that if we believe that in a comparatively short time we will in any event have the PRC in the UN and the GRC out, one could argue that we might well let the Albanian Resolution pass and get the agony over with.

9. Mr. Green observed that because of domestic opinion it is very difficult to stick with a formula which faces defeat and which would appear to make us lacking in flexibility and realism.

10. The Ambassador said that if we mounted a great effort to pass a two Chinas resolution we might get it through and the result might be an empty China seat because both sides refused dual representation. Mr. Green said there could be a formula where the GRC would not walk out and we would still not have the PRC in. Mr. Herz added that if the GRC did walk out, Peking might very well come in since it could consider itself vindicated. Mr. Herz mentioned that there are some who believe that through great effort we might be able to pass a two Chinas resolution by a two-thirds majority (employing the IQ device), in which case it would then take a two-thirds majority to overturn it. In response to a question from Mr. Green, Mr. Jenkins said that he thought in all likelihood if a seat were offered to Peking and denied to the GRC that Peking would accept and enter the UN promptly. However, we should not rule out the possibility that Peking would play a bit hard to get, attempting in effect to exact an apology from the UN for its having spurned the PRC for so long.

11. Mr. Green said before we moved much further he would want to know whether the present formula might hold for another year, and what were possible voting patterns on variants of dual representation formulas. Mr. Green thought that if we did not try a two Chinas solution the American people would not be satisfied that such was in fact impossible. The Ambassador said that the minute we put forward a two Chinas formula we are undermining the GRC's *raison d'être*. He thought we had both already partly given that away. Mr. Green responded that the US has not really given that position away. We still maintain that the status of Formosa is undetermined.

12. Mr. Green thought that for the present we should do the necessary nose counting on possible Chirep formulas but not talk much about it. Mr. Green said he would certainly welcome the New Zealand Government's views at any stage, as well as those of the Ambassador, whose UN experience was extensive.

321. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E., Ambassador E. and P.,
Embassy of Australia

Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Mr. John A. Armitage, Director, IO/UNP

Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director, EA/ACA

Ambassador Plimsoll opened by asking whether things were moving with respect to China. Mr. Green said that we were in the process of preparing a basic issues paper on China policy and that IO was preparing a paper on tactics relating to Chirep. There were a number of possible alternative approaches. We would have to undertake more "nose counts" in the near future and we were now starting preliminary talks with our friends. We certainly wanted to keep in close touch

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins.

with Australia. If we hold to our present line on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question we could well have an increase in votes on the former and a decrease in the latter which could create a situation in which the GRC might walk out. On the other hand it is possible that a dual representation formula could at least buy time. The Ambassador thought there was no doubt that a majority of the membership would look favorably on the concept as such. Mr. Green said it would indicate that we recognized the realities in the situation and were trying to move toward what people wanted. We would also not look as though we were a prisoner of President Chiang. Over the last two years we have developed basic support among the American people for what we have been doing with respect to overall China policy.

The Ambassador expressed doubt that present Chirep policy could hold for long. Mr. Green thought that Peking would hold out for the time when it could get into the UN on its own terms. He was not sure that any of us had thought enough about what it would mean if the GRC were out of the UN. The Ambassador said he personally thought that things would not “go on pretty much as usual” if the GRC were out. Mr. Green said our consistency in supporting our pledges is a considerable asset to the US. If the GRC should walk out because it anticipates a defeat people might well ask: why should we be left holding the bag?—in other words why should we continue to support the GRC?

The Ambassador said as long as the GRC is in the UN any attack on it by Peking is difficult. Mr. Green agreed that there would be less credibility under that circumstance concerning Peking’s claim of our interference in internal Chinese affairs. Mr. Armitage thought most people were not aware that a two-China formula was anathema to both Chinas. Mr. Green said if we continued on our present line it would make it easier with respect to our relations to both Peking and Taipei but that we could be in difficulty because of domestic reaction in case of defeat. It could of course lead to a total resolution of the problem, with Peking in and Taipei out, although this would be far from an acceptable solution. One of the worst results would be for us to support dual representation, and then back down in the face of Chiang’s strong objections. We will have to go through with it if we start down the path of dual representation.

Mr. Armitage asked whether pro-Peking countries would not vote against dual representation. The Ambassador thought this would depend largely on Peking’s stand. He said the Yugoslav Ambassador thought it would be best to seat both, but he was not sure how significant this observation was. Mr. Green said if Taipei acquiesced in dual representation and Peking should not come in, the GRC could simply sit still for a while. Some key figures in the Government in Taipei give some signs of flexibility as have a couple of recent Taipei editorials.

The GRC line has been that the US has never let it down in the past, and it trusts we will not do so in the [future.]²

² The source text ends at this point.

322. Memonradum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

PARTICIPANTS

M. Pierre Harmel, FonMin of Belgium
Vicomte Etienne Davignon, DirGen for PolAffairs, Belgian FonMin
Ambassador Walter Loridan, Belgian Ambassador to US
M. Paul Noterdaeme, Chef de Cabinet, Belgian FonMin
M. Roland d'Anethan, Director of Western European and North American
Affairs, Belgian FonMin
M. Rene Lion, Deputy Chief of Mission, Belgian Embassy
M. Hugo Paemen, Press Officer, Belgian FonMin

Marshall Green, AsstSec for East Asian & Pacific Affairs
Samuel De Palma, AsstSec for International Organization Affairs
Thomas P. Shoesmith, Country Director for Republic of China Affairs
J. Theodore Papendorp, EUR/FBX
Harvey Feldman, IO/UNP
Alec Toumayan, OPR/LS

After welcoming Foreign Minister Harmel and his suite, Mr. Green noted that the US was concentrating very hard on the Chirep problem and although we had not yet reached any decisions, we were actively considering alternatives. We would be very pleased to hear the Foreign Minister's views.

Mr. Harmel began by mentioning that Belgium's views on the matter were not determined by domestic political difficulties or a need to deal with parliamentary pressures. Rather Belgium feels that the Albanian resolution is a bad presentation of the Chirep issue, and yet if

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Drafted January 26 by Feldman; cleared by Armitage, De Palma, Green, Shoesmith, and J. Theodore Papendorp; and approved in S/S-S on February 1.

matters take their present course before long the Albanian resolution will pass, Peking will be seated in the Security Council and Taiwan will be expelled from the UN entirely. If, after that, the PRC should attempt to use force to seize Taiwan, and if the U.S. and Japan or others went to Taiwan's assistance, they would find themselves opposed by the UN.

Mr. Harmel then took up the matter of the Important Question procedure, saying that there is no longer any certainty that the IQ will again receive majority support in the Assembly. The vote in favor of the IQ is narrowing steadily, and Belgium believes that Canada, Italy, Austria and others will not maintain their present position of supporting it. A shift of even a few votes would put the IQ in jeopardy, and it would be an act of carelessness not to have other alternatives available to meet the situation.

There are points that must be avoided in any new approach to the Chirep problem, Mr. Harmel continued. What must be avoided are: accepting Peking by expelling Taiwan; calling for PRC admission as a new member (since it will refuse to do this); calling for Taiwan to apply as a new member (since its application would be vetoed). The crux of the matter, however, is Taiwan's insistence that it is the only legitimate government of China and its refusal to give up its Security Council seat. Obviously Taiwan is a state, but equally obviously it is not a great power and thus is not entitled to a Security Council seat. Taiwan's insistence that it is such a state only gives weapons to the supporters of the Albanian resolution. Sooner or later diplomatic action must be taken to make the GRC understand that it is in its interest to remain in the UN, but to acquiesce in a dual representation formula under which the Security Council seat would go to the PRC.

Mr. Harmel noted that the legal basis for a dual representation resolution could be, briefly: (1) the PRC is one of the five major states described in Article 23 of the Charter; (2) the GRC, though changed in size and scope, remains a state with all the attributes of sovereignty and therefore should remain a member of the UN.

As far as Belgium is concerned, Mr. Harmel continued, it has no great desire to be in the forefront on this issue. If the US, Japan, Australia and the other countries more immediately concerned say that something can be done along these lines, Belgium is willing to play its part fully; it does not insist on the exact wording suggested, or even this specific approach. Belgium would like to find a way out of the impasse. If the GRC continues to claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, and digs its own grave, "we will attend the funeral and shed some—but not all the tears." It is not too soon to look for a way out. If support for the Important Question drops, and particularly if Canada, Austria and Italy change their position (as is likely), there will be great pressure on the Benelux countries to do the same.

Mr. Green thanked Minister Harmel for his thoughtful and well-stated views. He noted that if dual representation were tried, there would be difficulties with the PRC as well as the GRC. The old line GRC leaders will be thoroughly opposed. Although there is some recognition of a need for a change lower down the line, even those leaders would find it difficult to go along. Mr. Green asked Mr. Shoemsmith's views on the question, and Mr. Shoemsmith rated the chance of GRC acceptance at about 5%. Continuing, Mr. Green pointed out that even if one could get GRC acquiescence in dual representation, the PRC would continue to refuse to join the UN as long as Taiwan remained in the organization. He asked how Minister Harmel would view this development.

Mr. Harmel observed that the Belgian Government would shed no tears if the PRC refused to take an offered seat. What mattered most of all was that the seat not be vacated through GRC expulsion, and that both Chinese parties understood that despite their claims and counter-claims, the issues would have to be resolved peacefully, under the control and protection of the UN. He noted that changes do occur over time; once the West Germans emphasized the Hallstein doctrine with no flexibility at all, and now they themselves say they do not oppose separate UN membership for the two Germanies. If the Albanian resolution passes, there are no options for the future; if some other solution is put forward, the options remain open.

Mr. De Palma mentioned the difficulty of keeping the General Assembly from bowing to PRC pressures. Dual representation or some other formula short of the Albanian resolution might well become interim stages on the way to ultimate passage of the Albanian resolution by the Assembly. This raises the question of whether it is better at all to put forward short-term formulas since they would not be a final solution. Mr. De Palma also noted that the Belgian draft does not mention the principle of universality at all, and asked Minister Harmel whether he thought universality might be a first step toward dual representation.

Mr. Harmel thought not; universality would create problems for the West Germans and others. Combining Chirep and universality might complicate matters and yet not prevent the Albanian resolution from making progress. It would be best to keep the two problems separate. Vicomte Davignon observed that if one put forward the principle of universality, one would still have to contend with the view that the GRC is not China.

Mr. Green expressed concern that if we just stick with our present policy, the PRC will get in on its own terms. The US Government would come in for a great deal of domestic criticism. Most people in the US would prefer to see a dual representation solution and there would be support for the Belgian position. But the GRC is bound to be opposed.

It is hard enough for them to move over time to accept dual representation; all the harder for them to accede to the PRC taking the Security Council seat and to make so great a shift in policy in the course of one year. If the US and others attempted to persuade them to do so, and if they refused, this would impair the US–GRC relationship. At any rate, Mr. Green continued, the results of the voting on the Albanian resolution at the last Assembly have persuaded the Nationalists to begin thinking the unthinkable.

Mr. Harmel observed that unfortunately, we do not have several years available to educate the GRC. He expressed grave doubts that they can be persuaded of anything, and noted that they still talked of re-capturing the mainland by military means—an attitude which he called an “abyss of unreality”. If the GRC is willing to exist outside of the UN, well and good; that is what would happen if they continued on their present course.

Mr. Green noted that no one on Taiwan realistically expects to recapture the mainland militarily any more, and added that some are even coming around to viewing with relative understanding the US position on seeking better relations with Peking. But, he added, the present situation demands a great leap in their thinking all at once, and this is most difficult for them.

Mr. Harmel said that Belgium is prepared to continue sharing views with the US on this matter. If studies are to be made, Belgium will be happy to cooperate. But, he observed, it is now January and if nothing has been decided by July, it will then be too late—the situation will pass from our control. Belgium would like to participate in working out a solution—and does not believe that half-way measures like the Study Committee are of use any longer. However, Belgium will not take any separate initiatives and will act only as a member of a group. He noted that last year, when they floated their draft resolution, they encountered more opposition from the East Europeans, and particularly the Soviet Union, than from their Western allies.

Mr. De Palma asked if Belgium had continued to discuss dual representation formulas with other countries in the period since the General Assembly, and Mr. Harmel replied they had not.

Mr. Green again expressed great thanks to Minister Harmel and his party.

(In a subsequent luncheon conversation with Minister Harmel, Mr. Green requested that the Belgians convey to us the reactions of other countries to the Harmel proposal. Minister Harmel said his government would do so.)

323. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

PARTICIPANTS

Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Harvey Feldman, IO/UNP

Guy E. Millard, Minister, British Embassy
John Boyd, British Embassy

Mr. Millard began by noting that he was calling pursuant to instructions. Some months earlier, Mr. John Morgan of FCO had inquired what the US attitude might be if the UK stopped supporting the US position on the Important Question. He now wished to ask the same question, but more formally.

Mr. Millard went on to note that Britain has supported the US on the IQ for the past ten years, largely because of the close relations between our two countries and not really because of British agreement with the principle involved. The entire matter of China policy is under active study in London at the moment. The UK now has better relations with the PRC than they have had for some time. The Chinese have recently released the last of their British prisoners. It appears there is now an opportunity for the UK to improve relations further with the PRC, and put them on a long-term basis. At the same time, the UK might be able to assist in bringing the PRC more fully into the international community. In addition to these considerations, as far as the IQ itself is concerned, it appears to be a rapidly sinking ship. Speaking quite frankly, said Mr. Millard, the UK would not want to be one of the bitter-enders, particularly since this would incur Peking's wrath in behalf of a cause which appears lost in any event.

For these reasons, Mr. Millard said, the UK has come to consider that it can no longer support the US on the Important Question but has not decided whether it would vote against or abstain on IQ. In addition, again under instructions, he wished to make two further points:

(1) The UK could not support any new Chirep tactic which seemed to be a procedural device for further delay;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted on January 22 by Feldman and cleared by De Palma, Brown, and Armitage.

(2) The UK could not support any “Two Chinas” tactic, since this seemed quite unrealistic.

Mr. Millard noted that these were preliminary views. No final decisions had yet been made, but the British Government would appreciate receiving a considered American response.

In reply, Mr. De Palma noted that the US also has not yet reached the point of taking decisions on the Chirep problem, but is attempting to study the entire question as thoroughly as possible. However, in the course of this study, we definitely have not come to the view that the Important Question is no longer valid or no longer important to us. We therefore hope that the British Government will be willing to itself hold off a final decision on this matter, at least until the situation at the next General Assembly can be more clearly foreseen. That situation might well be quite different from what it has been in the past.

Regarding the question of “new tactics”, Mr. De Palma expressed the view that here too one would have to look carefully into the situation. In our study of the problem, we have not been able to identify any new approach that clearly would move the matter to a final solution once and for all time. But this did not necessarily mean that any new initiative taken to deal with the problem was merely a delaying tactic. If a reasonable suggestion is put forward, and if the two parties denounce it, this does not mean the suggestion was put forward as a delaying tactic.

Similarly with regard to the “Two Chinas” matter, Mr. De Palma continued, many different types of proposal could be, and would be labelled a “Two Chinas” tactic by the PRC or the GRC. But this did not mean that the proposal ipso facto should be discarded. The intent of the proposal and the manner of its application should also be taken very much into account—one should not be boxed in by labels.

Ambassador Brown expressed the hope the British Government would understand that the US was really taking a completely fresh look at the situation; it was not just a matter of refurbishing old tactics to make them appear better, or stand a better chance of success. The US is studying what is possible, what might be desirable, and what might be least undesirable. Before taking any decisions, we would like to consult closely with the UK and with other key governments, in order to benefit by their views. We hope that U.K. thinking will not be put into final form until we have had these consultations, and that the UK will not at the moment adopt final positions on the Important Question, dual representation, or anything else. At the end of the process we may come out with different conclusions, Ambassador Brown noted, but we should discuss these questions fully before reaching decisions.

Mr. Millard asked when it might be reasonable to expect to hold these consultations, and Ambassador Brown and Mr. De Palma agreed

that it should be possible in about five or six weeks. Ambassador Brown noted that it was not the US intention to stall on the issue, but rather that we hoped to go into this thoroughly within a reasonable period of time and therefore would like to ask that the British Government not take a firm decision at this point. Mr. De Palma expressed the hope that the British would not in any case make their views on the IQ generally known at this point.

Mr. Millard observed that it will not be possible to hold London off for long on this matter, since it is a matter of ministerial interest, and expressed the hope that discussions could begin soon.

As the meeting was breaking up, Mr. Boyd observed to Mr. Feldman that in their reference to not supporting any "Two Chinas" move, the UK meant it to be understood that they had in mind any "Two Chinas" strategy, no matter how it was technically described.

324. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 20, 1971, 2130Z.

168. Subj: Conversation With SYG on Chirep.

During a call on the SYG yesterday morning on another subject, I mentioned his statement, which he had made previously and reiterated in his January 18 press conference, that he did not expect Communist China to obtain representation in the UN before 1972 but that they might do so that year.² I inquired how he saw this coming about and particularly whether he thought any sort of dual representation for both PRC and GRC would be feasible.

He replied that he is inclined to think that while the Albanian resolution will obtain a larger number of affirmative votes this year, the Important Question resolution will still be adopted and hence there will be no change in China's representation this year. On the other hand he would think that by 1972 opinion would have evolved sufficiently so that the Albanian resolution would be adopted. He did not think that dual representation would be possible since he believes that Peking

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei.

² Yost reported on the Secretary-General's press conference in telegram 138 from USUN, January 18. (Ibid.)

is and will remain adamantly opposed to it. He said that during the last Assembly he had asked the Romanians to inquire of Peking whether it would consider any form of dual representation and it had replied firmly in the negative. I pointed out that, while this might be their present position, they might not necessarily stick firmly to it under all circumstances. Thant said that one could not be certain but he thought that they would.

Yost

325. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation Question

PARTICIPANTS

Chow Shu-kai, Chinese Ambassador
Liu Chieh, Chinese Ambassador to the UN
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State, EA
Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary of State, IO
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EA
Thomas P. Shoesmith, Country Director, EA/ROC
Harvey J. Feldman, IO/UNP

Mr. De Palma said that thus far in our approach to the Chinese representation problem we have been concentrating on an assessment of the situation and the prospects. He emphasized that we have not yet reached any decisions. A number of countries have expressed an interest in discussing this matter with us, however, and we wish to learn what we can from them, although we are not in a position to exchange views on policy questions. Mr. De Palma added that we would not wish to get into policy discussions until we have had an opportunity to consult with the GRC and some other key governments.

Thus far, all indications point not only to a great interest in this problem on the part of many governments, but also to a steady erosion of support for the position we and the GRC have maintained. This

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 2 by Shoesmith and cleared in draft by Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown and Assistant Secretary De Palma.

erosion is evident both in the shift of votes in the UN General Assembly and in the manner in which governments are addressing this problem.

Mr. De Palma stated that there is good evidence that this year the vote on the Important Question resolution (IQ) will be quite close. Our preliminary estimates show some 54 votes already lined up against it. This number probably will increase. The disturbing fact is that the trend is away from support for our position. Equally significant, however, is the fact that many governments are tending to adopt positions on this issue which are not subject to outside influence. More and more, governments appear to be structuring their positions in terms of their view of the over-all situation in East Asia and their policy toward the area, with consideration for their relations with the US becoming a less important factor. Mr. De Palma pointed out that other governments now are not in the least apologetic in telling us how they view this issue and, for our part, it is difficult to see what pressure or arguments we can bring to bear to influence their positions. In short, the trend away from our position is proceeding at a faster rate than we had anticipated and the attitudes of other governments are not nearly so susceptible to US influence as in the past.

At the same time, Mr. De Palma noted, a number of countries which share our concern to prevent the expulsion of the GRC are coming to believe that this can only be done if there is some new approach, although no one has yet been able to devise such an approach which seems certain to achieve that objective.

Mr. De Palma emphasized that in approaching this problem, it is important to view the situation as it is and not as we would like it to be. He had therefore given Ambassadors Chow and Liu this summary of our assessment to date, without preliminaries, and he suggested that they might like to comment on how they view the problem.

Ambassador Brown added that one government recently told us bluntly that, "We have supported the IQ for 10 years because of our friendship for you. Now we have to think of our own interest." Ambassador Liu asked whether countries taking this attitude already have recognized Peking. Ambassador Brown replied that in the case cited, the government was one which recognizes Peking. Mr. De Palma added that similar reactions have been encountered with countries not recognizing Peking, as well as with those which do.

Ambassador Liu then remarked that while he had been in Taipei during December of last year, he had discussed the Chinese representation problem with all government agencies concerned. In those discussions he had not failed to impress on them the erosion of the GRC position on the IQ and Albanian Resolution (AR). However, in the absence of any idea of an alternative, the consensus was that the GRC

should continue to rely on the IQ. Ambassador Liu noted that he had emphasized this point when he met with Ambassador Phillips following his return from Taipei. He had pointed out at that time that since, when the IQ tactic was adopted in 1961, it was with a view to preventing adoption of the AR should it obtain a majority, if the IQ were to be abandoned the first time that contingency arose, it would make meaningless our efforts over all these years to retain support for it. Mr. Feldman observed that the IQ had already played that role once; in the session just past it had prevented adoption of the AR by a majority.

Mr. Green commented that we also have anticipated that once the AR obtained a plurality or simple majority, our position on the IQ could erode rapidly. He recounted that prior to the vote at the last session of the General Assembly, we were told by a number of governments that they would stand by us on the IQ one more year, but that after that they would have to reconsider their position. The fact that the AR obtained a majority probably has reinforced that view.

Mr. Green observed that, looking over the alternatives, one might conclude that the easiest course would be to fight the battle on the same line as we have in the past, but would this be the wisest course? Our common interest is that the GRC remain in the United Nations, but this will not be possible if the AR is adopted because of our inability to hold the line on the IQ. It is this which concerns even the GRC's closest friends, who now feel that we must develop some new approach.

Ambassador Liu said that he appreciated this assessment of the situation, which he also had outlined during his consultations in Taipei. What he had attempted to explain to Mr. Green and Mr. De Palma, however, was how his government feels about the problem. It continues to feel that logic alone requires that the line on the IQ be maintained as the best safeguard against the situation we face and that sufficiently compelling arguments remain to persuade the General Assembly to reaffirm this resolution. This, said Ambassador Liu, was the consensus at all levels of government at the time he departed Taipei, and he believed that this remains the position of his government. Aside from questions of logic, Ambassador Liu continued, his government regards its fight in the UN as part of its political struggle against the Chinese Communists. From its point of view—and the GRC hopes that this is also the view of the United States—the main purpose must be to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN and to prevent the United Nations from recognizing them as the sole legitimate government of all of China. That, he emphasized, must be prevented at all costs.

Ambassador Brown commented that this position appears to be based on the assumption that support can be retained for the IQ, but if not, then what? Ambassador Liu replied that his government can see no alternative. Further, it feels that if the US, Japan and other key coun-

tries pursue the IQ as they have in the past, then that line can be held. Ambassador Brown asked whether he shared that assessment. Ambassador Liu conceded that he was not quite so optimistic, but stressed that he believes there is a distinct possibility that the IQ can be carried again. He added that while he was in Taipei, several Japanese "political figures" discussed this problem with "our high level people." The Japanese "seemed to have the encouraging impression that Japan should go along with the Important Question."

Ambassador Chow said that he looks at this question from the point of view of psychological warfare. He recalled that in 1965, when there was a tie vote on the AR, the atmosphere was similar to that which followed the vote this year. Today, the mainland regime has had some success in its psychological warfare campaign, giving the impression that it is returning to the international community. Under these circumstances, there is the danger of a growing mood that the Chinese Communists are irresistible. As for the strength of US influence, Ambassador Chow acknowledged that we must take into account the changed membership of the UN and some reduction of effective US influence, but he believed that "in their innermost thoughts" many UN members continue to be guided by what they believe the US will do. He implied that whether a bandwagon mood in favor of PRC admission develops depends in large measure upon the US attitude and that if such a mood now exists, it should not be considered irreversible.

Ambassador Chow recalled that in a recent *Business Week* interview, Prime Minister Sato had been asked for his reaction to criticism that his government might miss the bus on the Chirep issue. Sato had replied that whether one gets on a bus depends on where it is going. Before getting on any bus, Sato said, Japan will wait and see its direction and whether the US also is getting on board.

Ambassador Chow then asked what is this "new approach" that other governments are advocating, what alternatives are being offered by those countries which say they wish to prevent the expulsion of the GRC?

Mr. De Palma stated that he did not think that other countries are being influenced simply by a bandwagon mood. Rather, as the vote on the IQ narrows, those holding the deciding 2 or 3 votes will become very anxious about being placed in the position of the last to cross the line. He felt that this factor already is operating and that we must, therefore, anticipate that the next vote on the IQ will be very close.

As to alternatives which have been proposed, Mr. De Palma said that no government has come to us with any solution. It appears, however, that they are groping toward some kind of dual representation formula. Their thinking is based on the assumption that the present tactics will fail and that the only certain outcome of our present tactics

is that the PRC will enter the UN on its own terms. Since countries friendly to the GRC wish to avoid this, they are searching for some other course of action.

Ambassador Liu said that “our people” do not underestimate the possibility that other countries may change their position, but they also do not underestimate the influence of the US and Japan on other countries. Therefore, they continue to feel that the best safeguard of GRC interests is to continue to hold to the IQ. It follows from this, Ambassador Liu continued, that whatever alternatives others may propose, the IQ must not be abandoned, having been reaffirmed by the General Assembly on so many sessions. Further, if an alternative is proposed, his government feels that for “political, psychological and other reasons, the US should not be a party to it.”

Ambassador Liu then said that he understood the Belgian Foreign Minister recently had visited Washington. He presumed that the Foreign Minister had discussed alternatives with us and he asked whether the GOB intends to reintroduce its resolution as originally proposed or in some modified form.

Mr. Green replied that at the moment, the GOB is making no moves and that Foreign Minister Harmel has not yet made up his mind as to the best course of action. Harmel’s interest, however, is to find a formula which best will insure the GRC’s place in the UN. Mr. Green added that in our discussions with the Foreign Minister we had been able to say only that we are considering all alternatives. As in our discussions with other governments, we were careful not to give the impression that we necessarily will change our policy.

Mr. Green emphasized the importance of frankness in our conversations. The relevant fact which we and the GRC face is that if we stick to our past tactics we may not succeed in preventing the expulsion of the GRC; the evidence we have to date certainly points in that direction. Assuming that to be the case, has the GRC given any thought to alternative courses of action? We feel that we must do so and do not consider that by thinking of alternatives we are prejudicing a decision to remain on our present course. Perhaps the GRC feels that if it considers alternatives, its position will be weakened. For our part, we believe that our policy position and the position of the GRC in the UN could be weakened if we do not give careful consideration to possible alternatives. For this reason, Mr. Green expressed the hope that the GRC would not take rigid positions in our consultations, insisting that the US must do this and must not do that.

Ambassador Liu said that he appreciated the point which Mr. Green had made and agreed that frank discussion is most necessary. The GRC’s basic assumption is that the US is anxious to enable it to remain in the UN and that, “up to now, your policy has been to keep

the Communists out." "Thus," Ambassador Liu said, "we have a common problem and common objectives." In discussions within the GRC, the "worst situation" has been explored. However, Ambassador Liu emphasized, "You can understand that we have to consider the political consequences. We have our *raison d'être* to maintain. This makes it difficult to come up with any alternative. As for any alternative which seems to do damage to our position in the UN, our people may not be able to swallow it."

Ambassador Liu said that he personally had not been able to think of any acceptable alternative. He wished to have our assessment of the situation, but he hoped that we could understand why the GRC could not come up with any alternative. Summing up his previous remarks, Ambassador Liu repeated that the consensus within his government is that no matter what alternative is proposed, the IQ must be held.

On substance Ambassador Liu stressed that the basic GRC objective is to prevent the UN from recognizing the Chinese Communists as the sole legitimate government of all of China. The US should also realize that any alternative, such as the Belgian proposal of last year, which envisages ousting the GRC from the Security Council "would be very difficult for our people to swallow." Ambassador Liu explained that the GRC feels that it earned its position on the Security Council by its role in World War II and has to make no apologies for occupying it. The GRC holds that seat "as a matter of historical consequences" and considers that it is more able than many countries to fulfill the functions of that position.

Ambassador Brown asked what the GRC reaction would be to a formula providing for the admission of the PRC without recognizing it as the sole legitimate government of all of China. Ambassador Liu replied that he had not discussed this during his consultations in Taipei, which had centered on proposals, such as that advanced by Belgium, which have come up in the General Assembly's consideration of the question.

Mr. Green reiterated that the basic problem is whether to consider alternatives if it is clear that the old tactics will no longer work. Ambassador Liu had said that the GRC sees no alternative, that there is nothing which the GRC can propose or support. It may be, Mr. Green continued, that a consensus will emerge within the international community in favor of some form of dual representation. Although the GRC might be opposed to such an approach, it might be sophisticated enough to reckon on the fact that such an approach might also be opposed by Peking.

There are in this situation, Mr. Green suggested, several tactical possibilities and many ways of handling the problem. We should not be satisfied with saying that we can see no alternative, that nothing

can be done, since if we neglect other possibilities and stick with the old tactics, the GRC may lose with no chance of recovering its position in the UN. We must face the fact that if we stick to our present position, the AR will pass and the IQ may not. Mr. Green suggested that perhaps the GRC will feel that it cannot participate in the exploration of such alternative possibilities. He hoped, however, that it will understand why the US might have to do so, without prejudice to a decision to stay where we are.

Mr. De Palma reiterated that those countries which are looking for a formula which will prevent ROC expulsion do so because they are friends of the ROC and have its interests in mind. None pretend that they have a formula which will insure representation in the UN for both Peking and Taipei, but they do wish to find a solution that will help the ROC preserve its place in the UN.

Ambassador Liu stated that the GRC wishes to know the views of its friends and what the US believes is "the best way to achieve our objective—to keep the Chinese Communists out." His government feels that we can hold the line on the IQ. On that basis, he could see some possibilities in a situation where a "third resolution" would be introduced and, although it did not pass, it would draw votes away from the Albanian Resolution. "This would work out fine," he said. "The other side would vote solidly against the third resolution. We also may vote against it and have a few friends do so also; it would be all right if the US should vote for it, so long as the US does not co-sponsor it."

Ambassador Chow commented that the IQ originally was introduced not only as a tactic to block passage of the AR, but because the issue was considered on its merits to be an important question. Whether or not a new approach is adopted, therefore, we should continue to insist on the IQ. He thought, however, that if another resolution is introduced, those who have voted for the AR because they saw no alternative, might switch their vote.

Mr. De Palma pointed out that it will be important for us to have thought out well in advance what we should do if, as we get closer to the next session of the General Assembly and debate on this issue, it becomes apparent that the IQ will not carry.

Ambassador Liu suggested a situation in which there are three resolutions—the Important Question, the Albanian resolution and the Belgian proposal. Should worse come to worst and the IQ fail but the Belgian proposal carries, did we think that the Chinese Communists would enter the UN on that basis? Mr. De Palma replied that we do not think Peking would enter under those circumstances. Ambassador Liu indicated that his government has considered this possibility and the merits of remaining in the UN despite passage of a dual representation resolution, so long as the PRC refuses to enter on that basis. He

suggested that perhaps there could be a "simple resolution" inviting the Chinese Communists to enter the UN but affirming that the GRC should remain. "If this keeps the Chinese Communists out, we will have accomplished our objectives." "But," Ambassador Liu added, "if we were out of the Security Council before the Chinese Communists came in, our people could not swallow that."

Mr. De Palma remarked that it is difficult to look ahead that far, but that we should also think of a situation in which the question of the Security Council seat might have to be settled after the PRC entered the UN. Ambassador Liu observed that countries should not propose resolutions which could have a bearing on this question if they are uncertain as to the outcome.

Ambassador Chow referred to a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* reporting speculation, attributed to the American Embassy in Tokyo, that Peking is interested in UN membership and going so far as to state that Peking also is receptive to a "two Chinas" approach. The Ambassador wondered whether this might be part of a buildup to force the GRC to change its position. Mr. Green explained that no one in the American Embassy had made such a statement and that guidance has been sent to our Embassy for responding to further queries prompted by this report. He added that there has been no change in our support for the GRC's continued membership in the UN, although we continue our efforts to improve relations with mainland China.

Mr. Green then remarked that, as he had stated in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, the economic planners of the Republic of China are as good as any in all of East Asia. He thought a similar statement could be made about the GRC's diplomats. He suggested they might usefully be given a degree of flexibility in meeting the Chinese representation problem in a way that would be best for their country.

Ambassador Liu observed that when one is negotiating from strength, flexibility is more possible than when negotiating from weakness. He recalled that at the end of World War II, President Chiang had been generous in his treatment of Japan. However, "When you are on top it is easy to be generous, to forgive, to concede. But when any little flexibility means defeat, it is not easy."

Expressing his appreciation for this opportunity to discuss this matter at such length, Ambassador Liu said that before leaving he wished to confirm that "your position is still with us and that, if possible, you will keep the Chinese Communists out." Mr. Green replied that he would prefer to define our position in terms of our continuing support for the GRC. While he would prefer not to define our position as Ambassador Liu had, he realized that the end result might be the same.

Ambassador Liu also emphasized that “time is running short” and that within the next several months other governments will be firming up their positions. His government, therefore, is anxious to be informed frankly of the US views and conclusions and to consult with us. At this meeting, he had attempted to put before us his government’s point of view. President Chiang, he noted, has taken a direct personal interest in this problem and will not leave it to others. “The President is a man of high principle, and it is not easy for him to consider anything which might damage the Republic of China’s *raison d’être*.”

In conclusion, Ambassador Liu expressed his appreciation for the assurance that the US has not said anything to other governments which would give the impression that we consider the GRC’s case hopeless. He said that he would report to his government that we believe that the chances for holding the line on the Important Question are only 50–50 and that the US is continuing its examination of how best to assure the GRC’s place in the United Nations.

326. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 107¹

Washington, undated.

I. Conclusions and Options for Decision

1. The major problems facing us are Chinese Representation (Chirep) and UN membership for the divided states. We are likely to suffer a major foreign policy defeat this year on the Chirep issue if we persist in our present policy. Neither the Charter nor legal analysis furnishes real guidance for formulating a US policy. The issues are and always have been political, not legal. The choices before us are:

A. *Maintain our present policy*—continue to treat Chirep as a separate problem and deal with admission of the divided states on a case-by-case basis.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107. Secret. NSSM 107 is Document 312. According to a covering memorandum from De Palma, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, he submitted this report to Kissinger on January 25. It was then forwarded to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms by Jeanne Davis on January 27. She noted that the report would be discussed at the February 26 Senior Review Group meeting, but the meeting was not held until March 9. For the minutes of this meeting, see Document 335. Davis also distributed an Issues Paper prepared in the Department of State to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, Helms, Anthony Jurich (Treasury), and Robert McLellan (Commerce Department) on February 9. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107)

B. *Adopt "Universality"*—attempt to deal with the problems facing us within a single framework by urging General Assembly adoption of a doctrine of universality. Since there are important practical obstacles to the immediate admission of all divided states, we would not necessarily make specific proposals but might state willingness to see them admitted when conditions are appropriate. We would oppose expulsion of the Republic of China (ROC) as contrary to universality, and not oppose—perhaps even advocate—Communist Chinese (PRC) entry.

C. *Adopt "Universality" plus a Dual Representation resolution on China*—follow a universality resolution of the above type with a resolution calling for seating of both Peking and Taipei as a solution to the pressing Chinese representation issue within the universality context.

D. *Adopt Dual Representation Alone*—propose a dual representation resolution on China without the universality framework. A number of variations are available, some more desirable and/or more saleable than others.

2. *Maintain our present policy*: The ROC will strongly urge that we take this course and will resist any other choice. But doing so is likely to lead to early passage (this year or 1972) of the Albanian Resolution seating Peking and expelling Taiwan. It therefore involves the greatest potential loss of prestige for the US. (Curiously, this option least jeopardizes improvement in relations with the PRC—who also see it as leading to their early victory.)

3. *Adopt "Universality"*: The concept of universality has much to recommend it: it is supported by the great majority of UN members, would appeal to domestic and international public opinion, and might help stem the tide in favor of the Albanian Resolution. But espousing universality would cause us difficulties in our bilateral relations with the ROC, the ROK, and the FRG (in addition to the PRC). It would not by itself settle the China issue. Even if it were specifically invited to come in, Peking would almost certainly refuse to do so while Taiwan remained. It is more likely that the UN would eventually yield and eject the ROC, than that the PRC would yield and accept seating alongside the ROC.

4. *A Combination of "Universality" plus a Dual Representation Resolution on China*: This is the formula most likely to head off defeat on the Chirep issue, in the short term at least. Placing the dual representation resolution within the philosophic basis of universality improves its chances for passage by making it more difficult to attack. Should the PRC refuse to enter on this basis, even though it would have been specifically invited, the onus would be on them, and the ROC would remain a member (unless it decided to withdraw—see paragraph 7 below). In the long run, however, the same considerations about a contest of wills noted in paragraph 3 above would apply.

5. *Dual Representation Alone*: The Chirep problem could be dealt with independently by offering a dual representation resolution without universality as a philosophic cloak. This course would have less appeal in the General Assembly, but would avoid the problems with the Koreans and probably the Germans which universality would raise. Such a resolution would stand a good chance of commanding majority support in the General Assembly and blocking the Albanian Resolution and would be seen as a realistic and forward-looking policy. However, it also would have the problem of durability mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. Taiwan doubtless would argue that it would prefer to withdraw from the UN rather than agree to dual representation (see paragraph 7).

6. *If we go the dual representation route*, we must decide whether to press the Important Question again. By dropping the Important Question, we probably could easily pass a dual representation resolution by a simple majority—but it could later be overturned by a simple majority. If we go for the Important Question and the Important Question passes, we would have to get a two-thirds majority for dual representation, which seems rather doubtful. On the other hand, if we were able to get a two-thirds majority, dual representation would be established on a reasonably durable basis. Our decision on tactics should be made after an assessment of the situation later in the year, and in consultation with our allies.

A dual representation resolution probably would have to express the view that the Security Council seat should go to the PRC since this is in keeping with Assembly sentiment on the issue. However, we could and should attempt to explore other possibilities of keeping that aspect open. The Security Council, regardless of any specific Assembly recommendation, would probably decide to award the China seat to the PRC following Assembly action to seat Peking.

7. *If the ROC remains adamantly opposed to dual representation* and consequently withdraws from the UN before or after adoption of a dual representation proposal, our objective of preserving a place for it in the UN obviously would have failed. A carefully organized effort would be required to persuade the ROC that withdrawal would be against its interest, and there is no assurance that this effort would succeed. At the same time, we should recognize that the security of Taiwan depends primarily on the US defense commitment, which would not be affected, and not on UN membership. Taiwan's economy would not be directly affected by loss of UN membership.

8. It has been occasionally suggested that the US also has the option of opposing the Albanian resolution, but in a relatively pro forma manner—assuming that since we are bound to fail, we should cut our losses and involve our prestige as little as possible. We believe that the

ROC would view such a stance as conspiring in its ejection from the UN and thus as a breach of good faith and that passage of the Albanian resolution, over even passive US opposition, would still be seen as a serious American defeat. Accordingly, it appears that this option would be less attractive than it initially might seem to be.

9. PRC membership would be troublesome to us and to the UN. However, the PRC probably would not try to wreck the organization and could not even if it tried.

10. Microstates, insurrectionary regimes, irredentist organizations, etc., do not pose unmanageable problems to universality. Southern Rhodesia might be a theoretical problem, but in practice the UN would find ways of excluding it as long as its present racial policies continue. No state currently recognizes its sovereignty.

11. Whether or not we strike out on a new path, close consultation with a number of countries is required. After the ROC itself, Japan most urgently requires consultation on Chirep.

a. If we go the universality route, we must also consult closely with our German, Korean, and Vietnamese allies. ROK interests probably cannot be entirely reconciled with our own, but compromises satisfying some of their most urgent requirements are possible. In the case of the FRG, difficulties need not arise provided the US maintains the position agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, France and the FRG on December 2, 1970 (see Section V).

b. If we opt for dual representation, we must expect a period of major difficulties with the ROC, and it is possible that they would be of such a magnitude as to cause us to reconsider the choice of that policy option.

II. Introduction to the Problem

We have been asked to study the question of UN membership in its totality. There is only one urgent problem, that of Communist China, but another is not far behind—East Germany which is already being pushed forward by the USSR. (The other divided countries, Korea and Vietnam, are not pressing matters.) If we adopted universality as a broad, philosophical approach to membership questions generally, this would give us a tactical advantage; but it would entail some cost in our relations with individual countries, particularly our Korean allies. No problem need arise with the FRG if we maintain the position agreed by the four Foreign Ministers (see Section V). If we depart from this position, we would have to expect a sharp FRG reaction.

On the Chinese Representation (Chirep) issue in the UN, the trend is clearly against us. Although we obtained a majority on the Important Question (IQ) resolution at the 25th General Assembly, support for the IQ will be subject to accelerating erosion. If we continue on our

present course, the Albanian resolution will pass before long. There is little doubt that a strategy looking to UN acceptance of the principles of universality and dual representation for China would be better calculated to prevent or delay the expulsion of the ROC than our present policy. However, there are risks and pitfalls to every policy option. These are analyzed in this paper.

Curiously, if our overriding interest is in laying the Chirep issue to rest, to improve the prospect for relations with the PRC, and yet to remain faithful to our ally on Taiwan, it might be best to continue with our present policy and see the PRC admitted to the UN over our opposition and even at the expense of expulsion of the ROC. However, this would involve a major American defeat on an issue of world importance.

If we chose to go down to defeat on the Albanian resolution, the US Government would be widely regarded as wrong-headed, static, inflexible, and unrealistic—even though it might be pursuing a carefully calculated policy of the lowest aggregate of liabilities abroad. There would also be a political price to pay for the fact that the US Government was suffering a major defeat at the hands of the Communists. It is clear, therefore, that a rational calculation of international advantages and disadvantages is not sufficient for the choice among policy options. Domestic political considerations must play an important part in the decision.

[Omitted here are Sections III–IX.]

327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 1, 1971, 0854Z.

436. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 13771.²

1. During courtesy call by PolCouns and William J. Cunningham of Embassy Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un took opportunity to raise Chirep. He emphasized that he had not discussed his

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis.

² Telegram 13771, January 27, transmitted an account of Ambassadors Chow and Liu's January 25 meeting with Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma. (Ibid.) See Document 325.

views even with his colleagues, and that he was speaking personally and most confidentially. Yang prefaced his statement by remarking that there was little imagination "at higher levels" of GRC on Chirep.

2. Yang said that he views the Chirep situation this year as critical. He said that this year, as after the tie vote of 1966, his government, like that of U.S. is re-examining Chinese representation problem.

3. Yang referred to "exploratory" conversation Jan 25 between Ambassadors Liu and Chow and Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma on which he had just received a report. Yang said he believes that some new formula, such as a "third resolution" is necessary to "preserve the Important Question." (Yang did not elaborate on this point.) He suggested a two-paragraph resolution: one paragraph would seat the People's Republic of China in the UN; a second paragraph would note that the seating of the PRC would be without prejudice to the rights of ROC in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, with the understanding that the differences between the two contending governments would always be subject to peaceful resolution by the parties concerned. After the adoption of such a resolution, the burden would then be on the ChiComs to show whether they would be prepared to accept this kind of a formula. Yang said it was essential that the Republic of China be called "the Republic of China" in such a resolution, even though it was understood that the ROC was government of "only Taiwan and a few small islands." (Yang did not mention the Security Council.)

4. Yang said it was most desirable that "third resolution" get a two-thirds majority. When asked if he thought this was essential, he replied that the vote should be as close to two-thirds as possible. In order to obtain a high vote for third resolution, Yang said it was necessary that the United States, Japan, and other close friends of the ROC be free to lobby as strongly as possible. He thought it also desirable to have as many co-sponsors of the third resolution as possible, including Japan, the U.S., and if possible past supporters of the Albanian Resolution. Yang said that if the 45 votes for the Albanian Resolution which represent hard-core ChiCom support could be reduced to 35 opposing the third resolution, he believed that at least 70 votes could be obtained for the resolution. There would, of course, have to be a tacit understanding that the GRC would oppose such a resolution, but it would not object to its friends voting for it.

5. Yang said that within the GRC bureaucracy it is extremely difficult to present a proposal of this sort to President Chiang, since the motives behind such a proposal could easily be misunderstood. He thought the best way would be a presentation by the United States, which would inform GRC that after thorough study, U.S. had come to the view that a third resolution was necessary to protect the interests

of both the GRC and itself. Yang said that President Nixon would be the ideal person to present such a proposal to President Chiang, but supposed this was impractical. He believed, however, that if President Nixon were to send Vice President Agnew, for whom President Chiang has highest respect and trust, there would be good chance of getting a sympathetic hearing. Yang emphasized that President Chiang could not publicly agree to a third resolution, but Yang believed he might “acquiesce” in one.

6. Yang reverted to the 1968 vote on the Italian study committee resolution which had been considered a GRC victory in Taipei. He said he had pointed out that of the 67 votes against the study committee, only six (Thailand, Philippines, Australia, Jordan, Paraguay, and Honduras) were really firm supporters of the GRC. After the 1970 Chirep vote, he had reminded a meeting of the GRC’s National Security Council of this vote in his report, and said he thought the situation more serious this year. President Chiang, who was chairman, asked for Yang’s views on Chirep this year. Yang said he demurred, saying the decision was purely political and should be made by the President himself. When Chiang insisted on hearing Yang’s views, Yang said that [for] the GRC to withdraw in any way or to be expelled from the United Nations would lead to international isolation, and for the GRC isolation is suicide. (Yang said that he had never discussed this statement with anyone outside the NSC.) Yang added that if the GRC were expelled, the Chinese Communists would enter the United Nations, and immediately lodge a formal charge against the United States of aggression against Taiwan. Yang said the United States, to protect its own interests, would then be forced to modify its policies in all East Asia.

7. *Comment:* Yang’s views are obviously not current GRC policy, and Department will recognize necessity of protecting him. For this reason, these views should not be discussed with Chinese or other foreign nationals. Yang had carefully thought out what he said, and we believe he would give full support within GRC to U.S. proposal for “third resolution.”

8. Department may wish to pass this on eyes only basis to Hong Kong, Tokyo, and USUN.

McConaughy

328. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

New York, February 8, 1971.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I terminate my mission at the UN and as a contribution to the review of US policy toward Chinese representation now under way, I should like to submit the following personal views on this subject.

The US would appear to have three options: (1) to continue to seek both to maintain the GRC presence and to exclude the PRC, either by holding to the "important question" tactic or by resorting to a new one; (2) to work out or encourage others to work out some form of dual representation which would have a reasonable chance of being approved by the General Assembly; (3) to cease to organize active opposition to PRC representation, even if it means GRC withdrawal or ouster.

I have for many years been an advocate of the second policy as the best means by which a GRC presence might be maintained after the time arrives when the demand for a PRC presence becomes irresistible. There is naturally a strong temptation to opt for this alternative in 1971 when it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether option one will any longer be viable, or in any case be viable for more than one more year. Yet before choosing the second option and putting our prestige behind it, we should consider carefully how realistic it actually is, whether it is any longer viable itself or whether, in attempting to make it so, we might not seriously and uselessly jeopardize our relations with *both* Chinas.

Indications from Taipei so far are that the Generalissimo is not prepared to abandon his long-standing policy of exclusive representation. Some of his advisers are beginning to think the unthinkable but it is clear they have no confidence in their ability to change the Generalissimo's mind and would expect that, if it is to be changed, the US would have to bring it about. We would have to convince him, not only that continuing the present course would lead to expulsion, but also (1) that a dual representation formula offers a good prospect of preventing expulsion and (2) that we will mount the same sort of worldwide campaign in support of such a formula as we have for the previous strategy.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Secretary Rogers acknowledged Yost's letter on February 23, and invited him to attend the meeting of the Senior Review Group of the NSC when it discussed NSSM 107. (Ibid.) See Document 335.

As to the attitude of the PRC, several diplomats at the last GA who have recent first-hand experience with the Chicoms, including Algard who is present Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, Petri longtime Swedish Ambassador there and Shahi Pakistani Permanent Representative, have expressed to us their firm conviction that the PRC will not come into the UN at this late date while the GRC is represented here in any form. The Secretary General has recently expressed to me the same opinion and this would also appear to be the British view. Given long-standing PRC policy, their relative indifference to UN representation and their probable belief that they will be invited in a year or two on their own terms, this judgment seems a plausible one.

As to evolving UN attitudes, it is probably true that a majority of member governments would at this time prefer to see both Chinas represented. If there were a reasonable chance both would accept, a majority, possibly even two-thirds, would we believe vote for dual representation. Many will wish, in light of the 1970 vote, seriously to explore this possibility.

If it should become clear, however, that, even if the GRC would tacitly acquiesce, the PRC would adamantly oppose such an arrangement, it would also soon become clear that the arrangement falls under option one rather than option two, that is, that it amounts to a new device for maintaining the GRC presence and excluding the PRC rather than a realistic means of securing the presence of both. As soon as this became clear, I believe a large number of those who favor real dual representation would fall away, a minority reverting to the present strategy but a majority swinging over to something like the Albanian resolution.

The growing purpose among UN members to involve the PRC in world problems through their presence in the UN is almost certainly an irreversible trend unless the Chicoms themselves should reverse it. There is a strong feeling that neither disarmament nor the problems of East Asia can be effectively dealt with in or out of the UN without Chicom participation. This feeling is likely before long to outweigh with many governments any regard for the status of the GRC. The US would therefore be unwise to count on a dual representation proposal as more than a temporary and inconclusive expedient.

If the above analysis is correct, we should weigh carefully whether, for a short-term advantage, it would be worthwhile (1) to exert the pressure and undertake the commitments necessary to bring the GRC around to dual representation and (2) to impede any possible rapprochement, however limited, with the PRC by mounting a worldwide campaign which, in their eyes and the eyes of many others, would be again designed to exclude them from the UN. It would seem that our policy toward the second Communist great power, and the role it might

play in balancing the first, should be determined by more fundamental considerations than whether one or both Chinas is represented in the UN. Hence the second option is probably not a real one and our actual choice may lie between continuing to pursue option one through a dual representation tactic or reconciling ourselves to option three, however we might choose to handle it tactically.

There is, however, one more important aspect to be considered—the effect on domestic and international opinion of whatever posture we may adopt. To continue to maintain our present policy seems to most foreign and an increasing proportion of domestic opinion to be both wrongheaded and unrealistic. On the other hand, to shift out of hand to option three would seem to many a cynical abandonment of the GRC, even if we maintained our security and political commitments to it outside the UN. From this angle dual representation seems the respectable and logical way out. Yet to go all out in support of it, as we could easily drift into doing, as we might have to do to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in it, would entail the disadvantages described above and would risk aggravating rather than mitigating the domestic sense of defeat when the effort eventually fails, as it almost certainly would.

Under these circumstances the lesser of evils, in extricating ourselves from this messy and anachronistic situation, seems to me to be to assume the lowest possible posture and not to promise or even to appear responsible for an outcome which we can no longer control. In my view we should say that we ourselves favor a dual representation solution, will ourselves vote for it and hope both Chinese governments will see the advantages of accepting it. On the other hand, we would not undertake a campaign in support of it, *vis-à-vis* either one or both Chinese governments or anyone else. We would tell the GRC that this seems to us the best solution but that we certainly could not assure its success and they would have to decide themselves whether it is in their interest either to support or to acquiesce in it. We would inform our other friends of our support of this solution but we would make clear that the responsibility for putting it forward and putting it over must rest with others than ourselves.

If it should unexpectedly prove that, despite the opposition of the PRC, the General Assembly adopts a dual representation formula, we would urge the GRC to keep its seat and the status quo would be preserved for another year or two. On the other hand, if support for dual representation evaporated in face of adamant PRC opposition, we would not have committed our prestige and our public opinion to another lost cause and would be no worse off than we are now.

The essential fact, in my judgment, is that, unless Communist China again dissolves into turmoil, a substantial majority of UN

members will, within another two years, vote to seat the PRC, even if it means the withdrawal or expulsion of the GRC. This is an evolution of opinion which the US, by very active support of dual representation, might delay for a year or so, but could not stop. The real problem is how to adapt to this evolution in the most graceful, dignified and politically acceptable fashion.

The above analysis relates of course only to representation of the GRC in the UN. It need not affect our defense commitments or economic and political association with the GRC nor need it weaken the ability of that Government to maintain for many years its sovereignty over Taiwan. Representation in the UN is by no means indispensable to national survival.

On the other hand, we would under those circumstances want to consider most seriously whether or not it was any longer to our advantage to hold that Taiwan is a part of China rather than a separate entity. Presumably the decision would be based primarily on our judgment whether the need for our maintaining a defense perimeter through Taiwan over the long term outweighed the disadvantages of continuing indefinitely a serious and irreconcilable territorial dispute with mainland China.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. Yost

329. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 10, 1971, 0020Z.

390. Subj: Chirep in SC.

1. As expected, Amb Farah (Somalia) raised Chirep on point of order at beginning of first SC meeting of 1971. His speech was carefully reasoned but pro-forma attack on right of GRC to represent China in SC. Reps of Syria, USSR, France, Poland and Italy spoke in support of Farah and Burundi would have but did not since Amb Terence away from NY. GRC and US spoke in rebuttal.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Bujumbura, Mogadiscio, Tokyo, London, Paris, and Rome.

2. Farah's statement expressed his del's "strong objections" to acceptance of credentials of Amb Liu (GRC) and recalled Algerian move to have SC consider credentials of all SC members in 1968. However, he made no procedural moves, simply expressing desire to return to the matter "at a future date, after consulting like-minded delegations".

3. Remainder of Farah speech was routine re-hashing of arguments that GRC has no right to sit in UN and attempt to refute arguments that PRC did not want or was not fit for UN membership. Farah spoke confidently of growing awareness of injustice being done to PRC, which applied to take China seat as early as 1949. He referred to passage of IQ as dishonest procedural device to thwart will of GA majority and quoted statement by Senator McGovern as evidence of growing public demand for new approach to Chirep problem.

4. Speaking as President of Council, Yost "took note" of Farah's statement and said his gov't's position would be reflected in SC records. Reverting to role as US Rep, Yost totally rejected as unfounded Farah's allegations concerning so-called US aggression in Indochina.

5. Tomeh (Syria) said he was in full agreement with Farah's remarks and agreed that GRC Rep's credentials subject to objection under SC rules of procedure.

6. Malik (USSR) made brief, pro-forma statement along lines of his last-minute intervention on Chirep at 25th GA. He said Sov position on Chirep "well-known and unchanged" and called for GRC expulsion from all UN organs.

7. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) briefly said he fully shared views of Farah and had no doubt Chinese seat belonged to PRC.

8. Kulaga (Poland) chimed in with statement which appeared more enthusiastic than Malik's.

9. Vinci (Italy) simply noted that "GOI shares views of previous speakers on Chirep in UN".

10. Liu (China) made relatively mild statement arguing that SC not place for Chirep debate and affirming that GRC is authentic voice of people of China.

11. Speaking as Representative of US, Yost gave statement prepared by Dept stating that Liu's credentials approved in 1962 and not objected to since, and recalling GA Res 396 (V) pointing out that GA was proper place to discuss Chirep.

12. *Comment:* As Farah is aware that he does not have the votes to carry procedural motion on Chirep in present SC, we expect we have heard last of this question for a time.

Yost

330. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, February 17, 1971, 2157Z.

26614. Subject: Chirep: Consultations in NY with Australian, New Zealand and Japan UN Missions.

1. Deptoffs Jenkins (EA/ACA), Shoemsmith (EA/ROC) and Feldman (IO/UNP) held consultations in NY Feb 10 with officers of Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese UN Missions.² USUN personnel accompanied. Following is summary these meetings. Septel reports meeting with Ambassador Liu, ROC Permanent Representative.³

2. Deptoffs met with Charles Mott, Australia UN Feb 10. Mott began by noting GOA in process of reviewing Chirep and he therefore under instructions listen but unable outline GOA views. Deptoffs stressed USG has not reached firm decisions on Chirep policy but wished hold full and frank consultations with key allies (particularly Japan, Australia and New Zealand, in addition ROC) for mutual exploration of situation and discussion of possible alternatives. Hopefully, consultation process would establish parameters and lead to consensus on best course of action. Also noted USG did not see this as necessarily remaining a bilateral consultation process with US consulting separately with GOA, GNZ, GOJ, etc. and then reporting views to GRC; we assumed individual countries would wish to consult with each other and with GRC.

3. Jenkins began substantive discussion by describing our view of Peking's attitude. Noted our belief PRC definitely wishes join UN, but for foreseeable future will insist upon prior ROC expulsion. PRC doubtless optimistic this will happen 1971 or 1972, wishes no change in manner in which issue presented to UNGA (IQ and Albanian Res), and will exert great pressure, particularly on countries with whom it has relations, to vote against IQ and for AR. Over next several months, countries negotiating PRC recognition may find this part of price. Peking probably fears US and allies will attempt new tactics to deprive it of victory almost in its grasp, probably expects this will be dual repre-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by Armitage, John A. Froebe, Jr., and Shoemsmith; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz. Sent to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington and repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Hong Kong.

² Telegram 18209 to USUN, February 3, informed the Mission that Jenkins, Shoemsmith, and Feldman would be in New York for a continuation of exploratory discussions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI)

³ The meeting with Ambassador Liu was reported in telegram 27069, February 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

sentation formula, and will make every effort prevent this tactic from succeeding.

4. Shoemith discussed GRC attitudes noting that realistically we see only slim chance of its acquiescing in any substantial change from present Chirep policy and tactics. However, we believe possibility of such change is more than just theoretical. GRC has not yet made final decision or attempted to define limits beyond which it will not accept compromise. In addition, discussion of various alternatives to present policy is taking place within govt and KMT. We consider these circumstances moderately encouraging, and are holding frank talks with GRC to encourage further process of objective and careful examination of all facets of situation. We have given GRC our estimates of adverse IQ situation, will discuss specific alternatives and have stressed importance of not underestimating impact loss of UN membership (whether through expulsion or withdrawal) not only on GRC interests but on policy concerns of friendly governments wishing maintain close relations with and support for GRC. GRC has told us they believe IQ should be vigorously pressed at next UNGA and that they regard Security Council seat as matter of prime importance.

5. Feldman noted IQ situation adverse and that tide running against us. If policy unchanged, many countries which voted for IQ in 1970 likely to abstain in 1971 and IQ opponents probably already number 54, increase of 2 over last vote. Vote probably will be very close. Hard to predict outcome at this point, but most likely only three or four votes will separate winners and losers. Noting list certainly not exhaustive, Feldman summarized theoretical alternative dual representation and universality resolutions including general advantages and disadvantages of each. Noted that any alternative formula put forward must be seen by UNGA as reasonable and equitable attempt at solution of Chirep problem and not as gimmick to block PRC entry. If decision ultimately made to follow one of these alternatives, language should be worked out through consultation process to find most saleable and durable formula as far as Assembly concerned, and one which protects strategic concerns in area. In addition, would have to find answers to following questions: How deal with Security Council seat? Maintain present IQ and attempt get two-thirds vote for new Chirep formula or drop IQ and seek passage by simple majority? Put forward new IQ formula stating that resolution to expel ROC requires two-thirds vote instead of present formula that any proposal change China's UN representation requires two-thirds vote?

6. Mott expressed appreciation for full presentation, expressed particular gratification for observation that final policy decisions should be based upon consensus view major concerned allies. Mott, who had taken full notes, said his mission would be reporting to Canberra in detail.

7. Deptoffs lunched with Minister Yoshida and Kagami of Japan UN mission Feb 10, explaining purpose of their visit to NY for discussions with Australia, NZ and ROC Missions and noting Herz visit to Tokyo preceding week. In general luncheon discussion, Yoshida expressed personal view that separate universality resolution might prove troublesome but suggested that philosophic basis could be established simply by having dual rep res pay homage to universality principle in preamble. Yoshida principally concerned, however, to emphasize importance he personally attaches to retaining IQ formula at least for one more year, either in present or amended form as suggested para 5 above, as essential safeguard against passage of AR. He also alluded to "serious problems which Chirep poses for GOJ" and, although he not specific, seemed to have in mind conflicting forces within Japanese government and LDP. In connection with handling of SC seat, Yoshida said these problems so difficult that he thought GOJ might have to abstain on new resolution. Yoshida also seemed to feel that for similar reasons it might be difficult for GOJ to take lead in developing support for some new approach to Chirep problem.

8. Deptoffs met with Ambassador Scott, Small and Williams of NZ Mission and Hensley of NZ Embassy Washington Feb 10 pm, making presentation essentially similar that given Australia. In following discussion, New Zealanders noted their assessment IQ situation closely parallels our own. Hensley indicated that GNZ primary concern is to avoid expulsion or withdrawal of GRC since this likely generate strong public pressures in NZ to recognize PRC and cease support for GRC. Over time, Hensley suggested, such development could threaten bring Taiwan under PRC control, thus weakening security situation in East Asia. GNZ, therefore, would not wish to see GRC position lost because no new approach made to protect it. Fact that PRC would not agree to some new approach, Hensley stated, would not be "fatal disadvantage" if such approach would buy time to deal with problem of public opinion. New Zealanders saw problems with universality res but also (though independently since we had not mentioned Yoshida's remarks) thought preambular language of dual rep res might bow in universality direction. GNZ had not thought of quite as many variant dual rep reses as the six listed by Deptoffs, but since meeting between Hensley and Deptoffs (reported State 1989),⁴ has been giving consideration to rather different style scenario under which two separate reses would be introduced in tandem, one seating PRC and one maintaining place for ROC. Idea was that countries would have complete and free choice: they could vote for both reses, or only for "country of their choice."

⁴ Dated February 5. (Ibid.)

NZ offs did not know whether Wellington intended that both reses be introduced by same set of co-sponsors and agreed with Deptoffs that this approach would not preclude Albanian res being introduced in its traditional form. Parliamentary handling of two parallel reses, therefore, would be quite tricky and perhaps ultimately uncontrollable. This led to general discussion of whether US and allies would have to get out in front in handling dual rep res or whether it might be preferable let others carry the ball. General view was that if dual rep was to succeed, US and allies would have to make major effort in its behalf. Scott stated his view that even those countries which strongly favored dual rep solution are "waiting for Godot" and would take no action until US intentions became clear.

9. Scott noted he returning to Wellington Feb. 13 for consultations and would discuss matter with Ministry. Both sides expressed desire hold further meetings in near future.

Rogers

331. Memorandum From the Country Director for the Republic of China (Shoesmith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)¹

Washington, February 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Consequences of GRC Expulsion or Withdrawal from the UN—Weekend Reading

Outlined below is our assessment of the consequences of the loss of GRC representation in the United Nations on the political and economic stability of Taiwan, GRC relations with the United States, US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan, and GRC relations with third countries. We also have considered the impact on US-PRC relations.

We have tried to foresee the consequences under two different circumstances: (a) Although the GRC is willing to acquiesce in some compromise of its position as the sole representative of China in the UN

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHINAT. Secret. Drafted by Charles T. Sylvester and Shoesmith and cleared by William T. Breer and William A. Brown.

and not to work against some form of alternate approach which might preserve a place for it in the UN, it is voted out through passage of an Albanian-type resolution or, (b) the GRC is unwilling to accept any compromise of its present position and either withdraws from the UN in the face of a proposed dual representation resolution or is voted out after actively working against passage of such a compromise resolution. In the case of withdrawal, we assume that the GRC's action is clearly final and from the entire UN system. We also assume that under either circumstance, the GRC's departure from the UN is followed closely by Peking's entry. If this did not occur, we believe that some of the more adverse consequences might be softened or postponed.

Our conclusion is that the most significant consequences of GRC expulsion or withdrawal from the UN are likely to be in the areas of US–GRC relations, the viability of our own policy toward the GRC and Taiwan and the GRC's bilateral relations with third states. The impact on internal political stability and on Taiwan's economy seems likely to be less direct and more dependent on how the GRC responds to this situation. We also believe that these consequences are likely to be more serious in the event of a GRC refusal to acquiesce in some compromise and withdrawal from the UN than if it should be expelled despite a willingness to compromise.

I. Although willing to compromise, the GRC is expelled from the UN:

A. Internal political stability would probably not be greatly affected under these circumstances.

(1) Expulsion would be a blow to the GRC's claim to legitimacy as the government of all of China in temporary exile on Taiwan. Such action by the UN could be interpreted as having stripped the GRC not only of any claim to be the government of China but also of any standing as a separate international entity. However, the present government's effective rule over the island is not dependent primarily on its status as the caretaker of the 1947 Constitution. Its control is based on the monopoly of force and a well-organized internal security system together with a record of material progress, limited democracy, social order and reasonably efficient government administration. There is no organized opposition to the government on the island of Taiwan and little likelihood that one could develop quickly.

(2) The GRC probably would seek to cushion the domestic impact of expulsion and would develop some form of self-justifying rationale for internal consumption.

(3) Mainlander members of the government, military and party structure on Taiwan seem generally to have been pessimistic about the future of GRC representation in the UN. For them, expulsion from the

UN would be more a confirmation of long-held fears than a cause for basic recalculation of national or personal goals.

(4) Politically aware Taiwanese probably would welcome any discrediting of the present government while tending to be anxious about the possibility of internal repression if the GRC were no longer worried about its international image. A few Taiwanese leaders may be concerned for the possibility that expulsion of the GRC might prejudice the possibility of obtaining international recognition of Taiwan as an independent entity.

(5) A significant minority of both mainlanders and Taiwanese probably would welcome the end of the annual struggle for the UN seat. Some mainlanders find this yearly test of the GRC's credentials to be an undignified process for the GRC to suffer through. Some Taiwanese resent the expenses involved in UN dues, contributions to specialized agencies and the costs of GRC diplomatic efforts which are devoted mainly to Chirep.

(6) In the final analysis, the domestic political consequences of expulsion will depend importantly on the government's response. If, out of fear that this development might increase disaffection with or provoke an overt challenge to mainlander rule, the government tightens internal security and gives way to repressive measures, tensions might build to the flash point. This situation probably could be avoided, however, if the government avoided such a response and particularly if, after a face-saving interval, it gave some signs of willingness to accommodate Taiwanese desires for greater participation in the central government. We are uncertain how the GRC will respond, but are inclined to believe that it probably will avoid over-reaction.

B. The effect of expulsion on the economy of Taiwan would probably be transitory, if the GRC is able to manage the internal political consequences without too much strain.

(1) Although the investment climate is partially formed by subjective factors such as international political respectability, investors should over the long run continue to be attracted to Taiwan by low wages, official interest in attracting foreign capital and growing domestic technical and managerial experience. The immediate result of expulsion probably would be some slowdown in new investment to allow for assessment of the situation—including such elements as the degree of investment risk associated with any changes in US or Japanese policies toward the GRC or the effect of investment in Taiwan on future opportunities for trade with mainland China. The duration and severity of the slowdown would depend also on how well the GRC handles the internal political consequences of expulsion.

(2) The Taiwan economy is heavily export-oriented. Since new investment (particularly American) is concentrated in production for

export, the economy as a whole would probably feel the effects markedly of a slowdown in the input of foreign capital if it were severe and extended. Loss of UN representation per se, however, should not adversely affect Taiwan's foreign trade patterns any more than in the case of the GRC's loss of bilateral diplomatic relations where there has been no noticeable fall-off in trade with the individual countries involved.

(3) Discontinuation of grant assistance from the UN Special Fund and technical assistance from UNDP would have minor drawbacks for the GRC, as would possible loss of membership in ECAFE. The relationship of the IMF and the IBRD to the UN is more indirect and their voting arrangements more favorable to the GRC. No Communist countries belong to either organization and there has been no pressure for PRC entry. On the other hand, ROK and the GVN are members of both IMF and the IBRD without being UN members.

C. *GRC relations with the United States might suffer new strains, the severity of which would depend upon the nature and extent of our efforts to prevent the GRC's expulsion and our policy subsequent to GRC departure from the UN.*

(1) If, after having agreed in consultation with us to acquiesce in a compromise, the GRC should feel that we had not made a determined effort to win support for it within the UN and to block passage of an Albanian-type resolution by all means available, it probably would conclude that we had not dealt with the GRC in good faith and that our purpose had been to mask our willingness to have the PRC admitted at the price of GRC expulsion. This would place a severe strain on US–GRC relations. If, on the other hand, we had demonstrated clearly our determination to preserve a place for the GRC in the UN, such strain is likely to be minimal even if our efforts fail.

(2) The GRC would probably press us after expulsion for renewed assurances of support, including reaffirmation of our defense commitment and provision of items of military equipment (submarines, F-4's, tanks) as evidence of our continued close cooperation and support.

(3) The Taiwanese Independence Movement in the United States probably would interpret expulsion from the UN as the beginning of the end for the GRC and might intensify efforts to unite Taiwanese overseas and publicize their cause. Our tolerance of their activities in the US would lead to increased tension in our relations with the GRC.

(4) The GRC would be even more sensitive to our policies toward the PRC, and is likely to urge strongly that we take no further steps toward improving relations on the grounds that this would further undermine the GRC position internationally.

D. *US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan would face new challenges if the GRC were expelled from the UN.*

(1) Without the imprimatur of UN membership it would be more difficult for us to shore up the international position of the GRC since the PRC and other governments unfriendly to the GRC undoubtedly would insist that the UN action had stripped the GRC of any international standing. Even governments friendly to the GRC probably would confront rising pressures from public opinion no longer to cooperate with the US in seeking to support the GRC internationally.

(2) The PRC also would argue that the denial of UN representation for the GRC in effect acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China and thus confirmed its claim to sovereignty over it. Within the UN, it probably would introduce resolutions condemning US interference in an internal matter and declaring our Mutual Defense Treaty to be an infringement on China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Even if we succeed in defeating such resolutions, the debate will focus critical attention not only on our treaty commitment but on our continued support for the GRC, and even close allies might find it politically difficult to come to our support. Within the US, the effect of such controversy may be to increase pressures for a change in our basic policies toward the GRC and Taiwan.

(3) On the other hand, within the US GRC expulsion from the UN despite its willingness to acquiesce in a compromise solution might evoke some short-term sympathy for the GRC and opposition to PRC entry. This reaction probably would be strengthened if Peking were to trumpet the GRC's expulsion as a victory over the US and to seek immediately to exploit the UN as a forum for attacks on our policies.

(4) Over the longer term, however, the trend of international and US public opinion following the expulsion of the GRC probably will be in the direction of declining support for our present policies toward the GRC and Taiwan and increasing sentiment in favor of greater accommodation to PRC demands on this issue. This trend conceivably could lead to pressures for some change in our defense commitment and policy of continuing relations with and support for the GRC.

E. GRC relations with third countries can be expected to erode further following expulsion.

(1) The expulsion of the GRC from the UN probably would accelerate the erosion of its bilateral relations. Even governments such as Belgium, Australia and New Zealand which either are not now actively interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Peking or are unwilling to break with Taipei in order to do so would be under increasing internal pressures to recognize the PRC on its terms. Within several years following its expulsion, the GRC might be reduced to a position where it is recognized only by a handful of strongly anti-Communist countries (such as the Republic of Korea and South Vietnam) and, in

addition to the US and Japan, a scattering of other countries in Africa and Latin America.

(2) Having been willing to accept compromise in the UN, the GRC might succeed in slowing this trend if it made clear its willingness and desire to maintain diplomatic relations on the basis of its *de facto* position even with governments prepared to recognize Peking. Its ability to hold the line on this basis probably would be greater if the GRC also made clear its willingness to continue programs of technical assistance to and to participate in regional organizations even with countries recognizing Peking. It is possible, however, that having been expelled from the UN, the GRC might elect to contract its diplomatic efforts, turning inward to rely on the support of firm anti-Communist allies in East Asia, together with that of the US and Japan.

(3) The position of Japan would be vitally important for the GRC. Japan's major concern—that Taiwan not come under Chinese Communist control—would curtail its room for maneuver in changing its China policy even though domestic pressure probably would build for some new stance. The GOJ, however, would probably not move from its present position on the recognition of Communist China as long as there were no changes in the top LDP leadership, President Chiang were still alive and American policy on recognition did not change.

F. *US-PRC relations.* The PRC can be expected to oppose strongly any compromise solution of the Chirep problem. It will be harshly critical of US support for such a solution and probably will interpret it as a plot to insure the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland, charging that the US intends to maintain Taiwan as a permanent military base. Since defeat of a compromise solution and expulsion of the GRC would be a major victory for Peking, it probably would be less willing to agree to any compromise on the Taiwan issue which we might advance in our efforts to clear the way for some improvement in US-PRC relations. Peking also would attempt to exploit this circumstance in an effort to increase domestic and international pressures for a major change in US policy toward Taiwan and the GRC by refusing to resume the Warsaw talks and rejecting all unilateral initiatives, thus heightening the appearance that the US is isolated on the question of relations with mainland China.

II. The GRC refuses to compromise and either withdraws or is voted out of the UN.

A. *The internal political consequences under this circumstance* probably would not be much different from those in the case of expulsion as outlined above.

(1) The fact that the GRC could insist that it had rejected any compromise of its claim to be the government of all of China and that the

UN's action was without legal effect in the absence of its agreement might have some stabilizing effect internally.

(2) However, a sizeable minority of influential mainlanders and of the Taiwanese elite would feel that President Chiang and the more reactionary elements in the KMT and the government had deprived Taiwan unnecessarily of hard earned international recognition.

(3) Supporters, on Taiwan and overseas, of Taiwanese separatism may see withdrawal under these conditions as a blow to their own hopes for the island, since the GRC will have thereby rejected a course that might have helped preserve Taiwan as an independent entity.

(4) Refusal to compromise in the UN probably would signify the predominance of hard-line conservatives in GRC policy councils. A likely concomitant, therefore, would be a tightening of internal security controls. In combination with reduced confidence in the viability of the government following the loss of UN membership, this could increase domestic political tensions.

B. *The immediate economic consequences* of GRC refusal to compromise and withdrawal from the UN might be somewhat greater than indicated in I/B above.

(1) Foreign investors might assume that GRC refusal to compromise not only makes Taiwan's future viability more uncertain but may make the climate on Taiwan less hospitable to the foreign investor. This assumption would be strengthened if, in the immediate aftermath of the GRC's withdrawal, there were anti-American or anti-foreign demonstrations.

(2) Taiwan's trade relations might be damaged if, in an effort to discourage further erosion of its bilateral relations, the GRC were to threaten pressures, either in the form of boycotts or suspension of trade, with countries which may seriously consider recognition of Peking in the aftermath of GRC withdrawal from the UN.

C. *US-GRC relations would be strained* if the GRC had urged strongly that we at least not support any compromise proposal but we had felt that it was in our best interests to do so. This would make more difficult continued cooperation subsequent to the GRC withdrawal.

(1) It is possible that under these circumstances there would be violent anti-American demonstrations on Taiwan, condoned if not encouraged by the GRC, protesting the US "betrayal." It would be in the GRC interest, however, to keep such demonstrations in check given its continued reliance on our defense commitment and political support.

(2) Other consequences for US-GRC relations indicated in I/C(3) and (4) above probably would be aggravated in the event of GRC refusal to compromise and its withdrawal from the UN.

D. *US policy toward the GRC and Taiwan* probably would be under greater pressure for change under these circumstances.

(1) GRC refusal to compromise probably would evoke little sympathy in the US and considerable resentment and impatience with its position. Both in the press and Congress, there probably would be strong sentiment that Chiang had refused to be helped, that we had discharged our responsibilities to the GRC and that we now should be guided solely by our national interests in seeking an accommodation with the PRC.

(2) The foregoing reaction would make our policy more vulnerable to such pressures as indicated in I/D(2) and (4) arising from PRC efforts to take advantage of the GRC withdrawal and the longer term trend of domestic and international opinion.

E. *GRC bilateral relations could be expected to erode even more rapidly* in this circumstance than if it were expelled despite a willingness to compromise.

(1) In this circumstance, it is unlikely that the GRC would become more flexible in defending its bilateral relations than its position in the UN. It is more likely that the GRC position would become more rigid, accompanied by less imaginative and more doctrinaire diplomatic efforts.

(2) Public opinion in other countries probably would swing against the GRC even more rapidly than in the US thereby placing the governments, even in Japan, under strong pressures to recognize Peking even at the expense of breaking with Taipei.

(3) If we had tried and failed to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in a compromise, our leverage in encouraging other governments to resist such pressures probably would be next to nothing.

F. *US-PRC relations.* Peking's initial reaction under this circumstance is not likely to be much different from that described in I/F above, particularly if it is clear that the US had sought to persuade the GRC to acquiesce in some dual representation compromise. Peking's subsequent reaction would depend partly on our own. The PRC might, for instance, seek to exploit the strains in US-GRC relations and lowered sympathy for the GRC in the US and other countries by holding out to Taipei some offer of a "Chinese settlement" of the Taiwan problem. It is also possible that the PRC, despite its limited capabilities, might attempt to mount a clandestine campaign on Taiwan to stir up anti-US, anti-foreign sentiment, at the same time sapping confidence in the Chiang government.

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State¹

Canberra, March 2, 1971, 0338Z.

1151. Subj: Discussion of Chirep with Prime Minister.

1. Summary. Prime Minister Gorton describing GOA position said that past Chirep policy no longer promising, new approach needed, but every effort should be made preserve GRC position so far as possible. End summary.

2. Ambassador Rice, Brown and Jenkins met with Prime Minister Gorton March 1 for one hour devoted entirely to Chirep. Prime Minister opened with observation prospects not good for our present position on Chirep. PRC one way or another would be in UN in next year or two. Asked what we planned to do about situation.

3. Brown said US felt our present course would almost certainly lead to defeat probably this year; if not then, certainly in 1972. Even if we should succeed on IQ this fall, margin of victory likely to be small and expenditure of effort and diplomatic capital required to achieve it very large. Gorton indicated preference for change of approach now rather than postponement to 1972.

4. Brown emphasized US had reached no decisions and would not pending completion of discussions with governments most interested in problem. At official level, however, some form of dual representation had appeal as probably most reasonable course. US preliminary estimate was that such an approach might receive substantial support from UN membership. It would have to be seen as genuine effort solve problem, however, and this meant Security Council seat would have to go to Peking. Gorton readily agreed, adding that in his view attitude of GRC was key to success. GRC would have to accept loss of Security Council seat and in effect also accept that it was the government of Taiwan. A seat for it in the GA in that capacity should be assured before allowing PRC into UN with veto power. Then it would take two-thirds vote to oust GRC, which unlikely.

5. Ambassador Rice said British were not being very helpful. They had told us not only would it be very difficult for them to support IQ again this year, but one British working level official had even said UK could not support any form of dual representation formula. Gorton said that surprised him. He inclined believe UK might still find it pos-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Hong Kong, and USUN.

sible to go along with dual representation. Brown said we might at some point want Australia's help in enlisting UK support.

6. Prime Minister said Australia very anxious so far as possible preserve status Taiwan, but this could not be done unless GRC recognized situation as it was. He thought Brown's party in its coming visit to Taiwan had no choice but to state situation forthrightly as USG saw it and ask what GRC felt should be done about it. Brown said high level GRC official told us GRC's most basic position was avoidance any formula which would negate GRC's claim to be sole legitimate government of all of China. In addition, GRC would find loss of Security Council seat "very hard to swallow." Jenkins said great difficulty was that GRC claim to be government of all China was closely related to its very *raison d'être* as national government and hence legitimacy of mainlander control of Taiwan polity. Prime Minister said if GRC would not bring itself to recognize its actual situation as government controlling Taiwan and Pescadores, it would be very hard for its friends to help it maintain its membership. Said it would raise real problems if GRC insisted on including Quemoy and Matsu in its territory.

7. Prime Minister asked whether we detected any flexibility in GRC position. Brown said that at the official level in GRC there was discussion of alternative courses which would have been unthinkable two or three years ago. We did not know what President Chiang's actual thinking was, but one small ray of hope was assurance given us by one top GRC official that Chiang was extremely well versed in the whole Chirep problem. Gorton asked whether we would be seeing Chiang Ching-kuo, implying he thought this would be useful. Brown said he would rely on Ambassador McConaughy's judgment on that.

8. Gorton said he would be most interested in what we learned in Taipei about GRC attitude. Brown promised keep in close touch, but said we did not expect obtain definitive GRC position on this trip. He rather suspected Chiang might wait until last minute before revealing how far he would be willing to go. He might not be able at any point to favor dual representation, as certainly Peking would not, but Chiang might not work against.

9. Brown asked Prime Minister what he thought we should all do if Chiang refused to acquiesce in dual representation approach and insisted that we all "work hard" for another year on IQ and opposition to Albanian resolution. Gorton said even if we did so and succeeded, we would have only postponed the problem a year, and success in any event doubtful. Gorton thought if GRC refused to cooperate in its friends' efforts to save it, Australian official level would probably be willing to "scuttle" GRC but he doubted this would be position of Cabinet. In his personal opinion he rather thought we should go ahead with dual representation effort even in face of GRC non-cooperation.

10. Prime Minister thought it important try to keep questions of recognition and Chirep entirely separate, even though in average Australian mind they were rather closely linked. Brown said he had heard that some Australians were interpreting President's statement on China in his report on foreign policy just issued as opening the door very widely to recognition for PRC. Recognition was not even under discussion. PM assured us he had not so interpreted President's report.

11. Brown asked whether PM had any views as to who should take lead in mobilizing support for whatever Chirep course we decided on. Perhaps US should not. PM did not answer directly, but thought Japan did not want take lead. Brown said on other hand Japanese were very concerned not to appear to be following in our wake where PRC was concerned. Jenkins said Japanese certainly wanted to be a jump ahead of us on over-all question of rapprochement with Peking, but it was doubtful whether they would want to be out front on Chirep.

12. Brown said another possibility as a new departure was the concept of universality. Gorton said emphatically that this raised too many problems concerning North Korea, North Vietnam, etc. Brown said nevertheless it had a certain philosophical attraction and if stated in very general terms might have utility in connection with dual representation.

13. In conclusion PM said official GOA position was that past Chirep policy no longer promising, that new approach needed, that every effort should be made to preserve GRC position so far as possible, and in any event GOA could not vote against GRC interests. Official position went no further as of now. He repeated his interest in hearing results of our talks in Taipei.²

Rice

² Department officials later expressed satisfaction with the meetings with senior Australian officials, and mentioned that the latest discussions of NSSM 107 within the Department had accepted that the PRC probably could not be denied the Security Council seat, but might decline to be seated in the General Assembly as long as the ROC was there. (Telegram 35421, March 3; *ibid.*)

333. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSSM 107—The UN Membership Question

The Key Issue. The key issue is Chirep. Other UN membership matters (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, Micro-states) can be handled, one way or another, whatever we decide to do about Chirep. For example, we can veto East Germany, North Korean, or North Vietnamese membership, if we wish. But that useful device is not available to us to keep the Chicoms out.

The Chinese issue is urgent for the simple reason that our policy can no longer command international support. A decision to stick with our current policy is, in effect, a decision to accept defeat, the expulsion of the GRC, and the entry of the PRC within two years.

The Basic Question. Therefore, the basic question is: Should we deliberately follow that course, or adopt a new policy supporting UN membership for both Peking and Taiwan?

It seems to me there are only two cogent reasons for following our present course:

1. Chiang Kai-shek wants us to. He is almost certain to resist any change in our policy. This is true even though a dual representation position carries the only prospect for preserving Taipei's UN seat. Although a considerable amount of realism is now evident at levels of the GRC below Chiang, the GRC is paralyzed by the Gimo's position.

If we change our policy, therefore, we will almost certainly have an unhappy ally on Taiwan. It is possible that a bitter GRC would refuse to accept a dual representation formula, even if we succeeded in getting it through the UN, and would resign in a huff. That would, of course, defeat our purpose of maintaining the GRC membership.

2. Public, press and Congressional opposition. There are those who think the public reaction would be negative to a change in our policy of opposition to CPR membership in the UN. Frankly, I do not believe it.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, Chirep. Secret. Sent for action.

The State of Public Opinion. Attached is a study of American opinion on the Chirep issue.² The essence of it is that between 1966 and September of 1970 (with no leadership from anybody) general public opinion favoring PRC entry doubled to 35%, and opposition to PRC entry sharply declined from two-thirds to less than 50%. More significantly, college-educated Americans have drastically changed their position on this issue since 1966 and by September, 1970 a majority favored Peking's entry. Most significantly of all, the contest in the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1970 precipitated widespread U.S. editorial comment on this issue. Of the 33 representative papers whose editorials have been studied, 27 of them (over 80%) came out flatly in favor of seating Peking (but not expelling Taipei). Only 3 papers (the *Chicago Trib*, the *Richmond Times Dispatch*, and the *St. Louis Globe Democrat*) strongly opposed seating Peking. The papers in favor of seating Peking include the Hearst and Scripps-Howard chains, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Minneapolis Star*, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the *Chicago Sun Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Salt Lake City Tribune*, the *Denver Post*, the *Miami Herald*, the *New Orleans Times Picayune*, and the *Houston Post*, as well as the *New York Times*, the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, and the *Baltimore Sun*. Finally, as long ago as 1966 the Gallup Poll posed this question to a sample of those listed in *Who's Who in America*. Even then, this elite group was overwhelmingly in favor of Peking's entry (by a margin of two to one).

I will add to this my personal, if unscientific, knowledge of the results of the President's UN Commission Hearings at various cities around the United States in the fall of 1970. Among those testifying before the Commission, there was virtually unanimous agreement that both Peking and Taipei should be members of the UN. The Commission will so recommend to the President in its Report, due in April.

In short, I am convinced that a change in our policy on Chicom UN membership is no longer contrary to politically significant American public opinion. To the contrary, I am convinced that a change in the policy would be of domestic political advantage to the Administration.

Chiang Kai-shek's Opposition. Back to Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to a change in policy, I do not think this should be the controlling factor in American policy. Every other government in the world, including those that are most devoted to the GRC's well-being (Japan, Australia, etc.) recognize fully that we are at the end of the road on the current policy. Many in the GRC, itself, recognize the same thing. It is,

² Not attached. Reference apparently is to an undated memorandum from Wright to Kissinger, "U.S. Public and Press Opinion on Chinese Representation at the UN." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January-May 1971)

simply, no longer a question of whether the PRC will come into the UN. It is coming. It is a question, rather, of whether this will be done over our dead body and with the expulsion of the GRC from the UN. Adherence by us to our current policy will be viewed by no one in the world except Chiang Kai-shek as indicating firmness of purpose. By everyone else, friends and foes, it will be viewed as foolish rigidity and excessive deference to one aged man. It would also be totally inconsistent with the theme and the major thrust of the President's Report to the Congress which called for realism and flexibility in foreign affairs, and the creative burial of the vestiges of the post-World War II world.

Reasons for a Change. Other salient reasons for a change in our policy are the following:

1. With or without us, Peking is coming into the UN. (This is therefore an excellent example of the kind of situation where one who aspires to leadership finds out where the crowd is going and then positions himself in front of them.)

2. Significant domestic discontent is likely to be aroused by Peking's entry only if it represents an American defeat at and by the United Nations. Rigidity on our part, therefore, will damage the reputation of the UN in the United States, and could make our participation in it a matter of domestic controversy. That is certainly not in the interest of this Administration. On the other hand, if we stick to our current policy, we will certainly be criticized for antediluvian policies by that 80% of the newspapers mentioned earlier.

3. Those abroad who have for so long gone with us on this issue are now looking to us for leadership, and our international reputation will be diminished if we fail to provide it.

4. It is in our interest to see the GRC continue a UN member. That is possible only if we take the leadership in espousing a new approach to this problem at the UN which permits membership for both Peking and Taipei.

5. This issue has been around too long, and the Administration will gain credit both domestically and internationally, from an effort to resolve it equitably.

6. Dual Representation will give us a legal hook at the UN for our defense treaty with Taiwan, which otherwise is subject to plausible interpretation, if the PRC becomes the only Chinese representative, as interference in Chinese domestic affairs.

7. It provides us with a respectable position permitting us to welcome Chicom entry into the UN without abandoning, in the eyes of the world and our own public, our GRC ally.

Other Major Issues. From the above, it is perhaps excessively obvious that I favor going for some form of dual representation. If this view

is accepted, it raises several issues: First, will we present our position to our allies as a firm one or as a tentative one subject to modification after consultation with them. In other words, are we informing them or consulting with them.

This question ties in with the tactical one of exactly what kind of dual representation formula we should seek. As a practical matter, our new policy cannot succeed without a very wide measure of international support. It is therefore essential that we consult widely and fully before deciding on precise tactics.

I suggest, therefore, that we should make a firm decision for a dual representation approach, but not attempt to work out the tactics in any detail until after we have consulted widely. This position commends itself for another reason: it permits us to go to the GRC committed firmly to a dual representation policy but with maximum flexibility to negotiate with them on the exact nature of the formula. This will not make our decision palatable to Chiang Kai-shek, but it should moderate at least slightly his distaste for it. It also permits us to get on with the business of serious consultation with our other allies on tactics without putting us in the somewhat ridiculous position of having to say that our commitment to dual representation is contingent upon acceptance by the GRC. Finally, if there is any "give" in our position when we approach Chiang, he will know it and we will never get his acquiescence.

If Chiang is convinced that our decision is firm I believe that he will accept it and try to exact a big quid pro quo for his acceptance. I believe that because Chiang has not survived all his years and troubles by committing suicidal acts. He is likely to argue that significant new gestures of "friendship" from us are necessary to convince his people that we are still with them. We will need to be alert to avoid undertakings which sap the integrity of the commitment to dual representation, or inhibit the possibility of improvement in relations with the PRC. Apart from those two issues, we can afford to be sympathetic, but we need to keep firmly in mind that Chiang has made a lifetime business out of permitting us gratefully to dissuade him from self-immolation.

I should also mention to you the distinct possibility that Chiang will try to mount a major effort in the US to force us to back away from dual representation. My own estimate is that he can make some noise—but not any real trouble. Others feel he could arouse a considerable last gasp effort from the right wing remnants of the China Lobby.

Another basic issue, partly tactical but partly strategic, is whether to go for dual representation only on the Chinese issue, or to wrap it into a general formula of universality. All my instincts are for universality:

1. It gives us the high moral ground, and a simple rationale for our change of policy.

2. It is easy to defend the proposition that all peoples should be represented in the United Nations.

3. It wraps our Chirep policy in a formula that has wide international appeal and will, therefore, enhance our chances of parliamentary success.

4. It provides an intellectually respectable justification for retention by the GRC of UN membership.

5. It finesses the whole unanswerable question of one China, or two Chinas, or one China–two governments, etc. The principle of universality is irrelevant to legal questions of sovereignty. Where factual political divisions exist it is up to the parties to the dispute to resolve them, but not by depriving any significant government or number of people of representation at the United Nations. Universality, therefore, does not preclude eventual unity, or for that matter, permanent division.

Universality, of course, raises problems in the German, Korean, Vietnamese, and Micro-state situations. I do not think any of the problems are sufficiently serious to deter us much. We can take the position that each case, as a practical matter, must be handled individually. In the German problem, we can refer to our prior and public commitment to hold off on any action until the current negotiations are completed. On the Korean problem, we can, if we must, find a similar formula, perhaps related to the fact that North Korea is still in an overt state of hostility with the United Nations forces. Vietnam doesn't seem to me to be a problem one way or the other. As for the Micro-states, there is so far no international agreement on the minimum size required for UN membership. If we ever get agreement on that question, it automatically becomes part of the definition of universality. Opting for universality now neither helps us nor hurts us on that issue.

Finally, I have a beady-eyed point to make: In cold fact, nobody can do anything about German, Korean, or Vietnamese membership in the UN without our assent. The Chinese question is one of representation, and the veto does not apply. The German, Korean, Vietnamese and Micro-state matters are questions of membership. The veto does apply. Therefore, we can do what we wish about Chicom representation without fear that from that precedent will flow actions seriously damaging to our interests, but unavoidable. (In actual fact, I would not expect a veto to be necessary.)

The Security Council. There is one other problem I should mention because other people insist on treating it as if it were a more salient issue than it really is. This is the question of which China occupies the Security Council seat. In the first place, this becomes an issue only if

we succeed in having the General Assembly adopt a dual representation formula. If we fail in that, the PRC will get the Security Council seat within two years. Even if we succeed, the PRC will still get the Security Council seat if it shows up to claim it, and there is nothing we can do to prevent that. Therefore, the occupancy of the Security Council seat is a real issue only if dual representation is adopted, if the GRC stays in the United Nations, and if the PRC refuses to come in under those circumstances. In that situation, we may be able to hold the Security Council seat for the GRC on the simple grounds that the Charter provides for China in the Security Council, and there is no other claimant for the seat. Our chances of holding the seat would be much enhanced *if* we make it plain that our position in favor of GRC retention is without prejudice to the merits of the case whenever the PRC presents itself to claim the seat.

It is altogether likely that in our consultations with the GRC, this matter will have great prominence. For instance, the GRC might offer to accept dual representation on the condition that we guarantee their Security Council seat. Should that contingency arise, I urge that we use it to put added pressure on the GRC to accept dual representation. That can be done by telling them that the chances of retaining the Security Council seat are totally dependent, in the first instance, on their continuing to participate fully at the UN. If they do so, and if the PRC refuses to do so, we believe that the tactical situation may be such as to permit the two of us working together to retain their Security Council seat for the indefinite future. We should not, however, commit ourselves to them any more deeply than that, for there will, in fact, be almost literally no international support for the GRC retention of the Security Council seat *once the PRC claims it*.

Recommendations:

I therefore recommend to you the following positions on this issue:

1. We should opt firmly for a dual representation policy.
2. *Within that firm commitment*, we should remain entirely flexible on tactics until we have consulted fully with our allies, including the GRC.
3. We should attempt to persuade our allies of the advantages of preserving the dual representation position within an overall commitment to universality as the guide to UN membership questions.

The attached Talking Points are intended to reach consensus on those positions.³ This issue should, however, for cosmetic as well as

³ Attached but not printed.

substantive reasons, be discussed at a full NSC meeting. The SRG, therefore, should only examine and clarify the issues, accept the NSSM 107 study, and refer the matter to the NSC. Incidentally, we should have the NSC meeting at the earliest possible time, for we are beginning to run a real danger of our potential allies on this matter getting themselves committed to contrary courses.

The IG has prepared two papers on the UN membership question—the formal NSSM 107 study and a shorter issues paper. The shorter version is, in fact, a redraft and improvement of the first. We think you will find it the more useful of the two, and expect it to be the focus of discussion at the SRG. Analytical summaries of both papers are attached.⁴

Herb Levin concurs, as does Hal Sonnenfeldt, in regard to the German problem.

⁴ See Document 326 and footnote 1 thereto.

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, March 5, 1971, 2121Z.

37377. Subject: Chirep Consultations with UK. Ref: London 1914.²

1. Summary—Under Secretary called in British Ambassador (Lord Cromer) March 4 to emphasize once more to British importance USG places on UK not taking a position or getting themselves into a situation requiring them to take position on Chirep until we have concluded policy review and had opportunity consult with UK on results of that review. Lord Cromer assured Under Secretary that UK would not take such steps without first discussing with US, but emphasized time element getting very short for UK since PRC has made

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Long; cleared by Armitage, James A. Williams, Robert T. Curran, Shoesmith, McNutt, Robert T. Burns, and Winthrop G. Brown; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to USUN, Geneva for Herz, Taipei for Brown, and Hong Kong.

² Dated March 4. (Ibid.)

“encouraging noises” and will set pace in talking with British on improvement in their relations, including exchange of ambassadors. End summary.

2. At the request of Under Secretary Irwin, British Ambassador Lord Cromer, accompanied by Counselor Moberly, called at the Dept at 3:15 PM March 4 to discuss Chirep. The Under Secretary led off by noting that Dept had already expressed to UK EmbOffs US hope that UK would not take position or get into situation requiring them to take position on Chirep until we have concluded our Chirep policy review and had opportunity consult with UK on results of that review. He had called in Ambassador in order to emphasize once more importance that USG places on this point. In response to Lord Cromer’s query on how study is going, Under Secretary said we unable at this point to give specific time when review would be completed but that we moving as quickly as possible.

3. Cromer said UK predicament is that PRC has made “encouraging noises” on prospects for improvement in relations with UK, that without being certain how promising these overtures might be, UK did not wish to spurn “tiny shoots which might otherwise blossom” and that it would undoubtedly not be very long before UK would have to say something positive to them. Moberly interjected that Chinese had raised for first time in six years, question of exchange of ambassadors and that they were certain in this context to raise question of British position on Chirep. Ambassador then said, “However, we won’t do anything without first discussing it with you.”

4. Under Secretary assured Cromer that USG not stalling to keep PRC out of UN and that we are seriously attempting to find a solution to the Chirep problem in a way acceptable to the majority. At same time, he reiterated importance to US of keeping ROC in UN. We believe our efforts to work out an equitable solution would be damaged to considerable degree, if not even more, if UK were to take an early decision damaging to our position. He emphasized that we are not asking UK to support any particular proposal that might emerge from review, but simply that we hope UK would not take a position that might do harm to our position before we have had chance to talk.

5. Cromer noted that 25th UNGA Chirep vote, which for first time gave Albanian resolution simple majority, had created new situation in UK eyes, and that UK did not believe its position of support for Important Question, which had been taken for US benefit, could be continued if it appeared to be thwarting the will of the majority. He said Chinese could now say UK support for IQ would be tantamount to working against their entrance into UN and there would be logic in such a position. He then reiterated assurance with statement: “All we can really say

at this time is that we won't take any action likely to embarrass you without consulting with you." He concluded saying that the fact is that the tide is running "that way", but he would be pleased if US could really come up with "something that would satisfy everyone."

6. Conversation then turned to reported meeting of Chou En-lai with British Chargé Denson in Peking. Cromer said Embassy had not yet been informed on this meeting, but he understood that Chargé was being given chance, for first time, to talk directly with Chou En-lai. Moberly added that initiative had come from Chinese side and that he was certain Denson would not have put forth any new initiative. Ambassador promised brief us on talks when report received.

7. Returning to US request, Cromer said time element getting shorter and that UK may get to stage where it difficult to defer "an announcement on this." He also reiterated that UK not setting the pace, was reacting to PRC initiatives "in friendly way", but UK fully understood sensitivity of problem from US point of view. Under Secretary said we would try to move along as quickly as possible.

Rogers

335. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 9, 1971, 3:48–4:51 p.m.

SUBJECT

UN Representation—NSSM 107²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Jeanne Davis of the NSC staff forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a March 11 memorandum. (Ibid.) Green summarized these minutes in a memorandum to Rogers, March 11. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107) Another record of the meeting, prepared by Armacost is *ibid.* A note on the minutes indicates that Farley and Petty were not present at the beginning of the meeting.

² Document 312.

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John N. Irwin

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Marshall Green

Mr. John Armitage

Mr. Michael Armacost

Defense

Mr. Armistead I. Selden

Col. Paul Murray

Mr. Dennis Doolin

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms

[*name not declassified*]

JCS

Maj. Gen. Richard Shaefer

Col. Kenneth McFadden

Col. Kemper Baker

ACDA

Mr. Philip J. Farley

USIA

Mr. Frank Shakespeare

Treasury

Mr. John R. Petty

NSC Staff

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. W. Marshall Wright

Mr. John H. Holdridge

Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Senior Review Group agreed that:

1. The President should be asked to authorize the Department of State to consult with allied and friendly countries on alternatives to the Important Question-Albanian Resolution formula for dealing with the Chinese representation issue in the UN.

2. In the course of these consultations the United States would seek to determine what formula maintaining the GRC seat would be most likely to gain and hold approval in the General Assembly, and would include dual representation among the alternatives.

3. The Department of State should review again the desirability of relating the Important Question to a dual representation formula. The desirability of applying the principle of universality to the dual representation formula should also be reviewed.

4. Following the consultations and the review by the Department of State of the points in 3, above, recommendations on a Chinese representation strategy to be followed in the UN will be submitted to the President.

5. An NSC meeting to discuss the points mentioned above will be scheduled if desired by the Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger: Shall we take the UN issue first? The key issue is what to do about Chinese representation at the next UN General Assembly. The issue has some urgency, partly because of the problem with the British, who are anxious to change their position.

(to Irwin) I assume you have the cable from Ambassador Bush.³

Mr. Irwin: Yes, he telephoned and asked me to explain that he couldn't come down to Washington today but that he wanted to keep in close touch on this issue and to be helpful in any way possible.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not automatically invite him whenever State is represented at one of these meetings?

Mr. Irwin: I have told him that we would.

Dr. Kissinger: On the Chinese representation issue one has a choice between sticking with the present policy or adopting a new one. If we opt for a new policy, we have to assume that it will involve some formula that will permit Communist China into the UN. The question is which formula we should choose. Also we need to consider the degree to which we need to push the issue.

Mr. Irwin: From our point of view there is some urgency. There is the possibility that the British will go ahead without us; and the longer we wait to decide, the more we will find that countries have taken positions that preclude cooperation with us.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anyone believe we should stick with our present policy?

Mr. Selden: I presume State knows how the vote is shaping up.

Mr. Irwin: We don't have any figures except on what the vote was the last time the issue came up.

Mr. Armitage: At that time there was a fourteen-vote majority in favor of considering the Albanian Resolution an important question. A slippage of eight votes would mean defeat.

Mr. Green: Several countries told us that this was the last time they would vote with us.

Mr. Armitage: The voting line-up on the important question applies only to the Albanian Resolution.

Mr. Wright: A headcount was done by IO in State. The results are very iffy, but they indicate that if we stick with the present formula, we would lose by two votes this fall. Of course, the outcome depends to some extent on how much muscle we put into our campaign for support.

Mr. Green: If the important question is married with dual representation, the important question resolution will almost certainly pass, and dual representation will also probably pass.

Mr. Armitage: There will probably only be a majority for dual representation.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that mean that the important question could pass, but that dual representation would fail?

³ Not found.

Mr. Armitage: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What if the important question were coupled with the Albanian Resolution?

Mr. Armitage: It [the important question]⁴ might squeak by, and it might not.

Dr. Kissinger: If you put it that way, we have no choice.

Gen. Shaefer: If the important question squeaks by, the main resolution would lose or lack of a two-thirds vote.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, if the important question does not pass, the Albanian Resolution will pass. If we couple dual representation and the important question, the important question will pass, but dual representation will not get a two-thirds majority. The status quo would continue.

Mr. Armitage: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: That is complicated enough for a Chinese to understand.

Mr. Irwin: Then there is the question of introducing a resolution on universality.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me see if I understand the thinking behind this. People are so annoyed by our sticking to our old policy that they will vote against the important question.

Mr. Doolin: Some of the states that are voting for admission of Communist China say that they do not mean to exclude the Republic of China.

Mr. Armitage: They want a less bald attempt to keep Communist China out of the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they prepared to consider an important question resolution?

Mr. Irwin: What he [Jack Armitage] is referring to is a proposal based on universality rather than dual representation. Dual representation would get a majority but not two-thirds. If that happens, the Albanian Resolution will succeed.

(Mr. Farley and Mr. Petty joined the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: I am just trying to understand the thought processes of these countries.

Mr. Armitage: Because the Albanian Resolution now has a majority, coupling it with the important question makes the latter seem like nothing more than a method of keeping Communist China out. If the substantive proposal were for dual representation, this would not be so.

⁴ All brackets from this point are in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: The UN is not my subject, but isn't somebody interested in the substance of the dual representation proposal or the Albanian Resolution? Is the big issue only whether it is coupled with an affirmative vote on the important question?

Mr. Irwin: If both [the dual representation and Albanian] resolutions were introduced, whichever was voted on first would in effect decide the fate of the second.

Dr. Kissinger: Then the mere fact that a proposal for dual representation is introduced will make it more probable that the important question issue will be raised.

Mr. Irwin: You could have both a resolution on dual representation and the Albanian Resolution. Whichever was decided first would decide the other. It would help to have the added protection of a vote that Chinese representation constituted an important question, but it really won't be needed as much as in the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Since one of our important concerns is the GRC, wouldn't it help to be able to assure them that dual representation is the way for them to stay in the UN, whereas without it they will be expelled?

(Dr. Kissinger left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Irwin: This argues for universality. I agree that with dual representation alone [i.e., without universality] Communist China would prevail in a relatively short time. They may prevail even with universality, but with the UN on record in favor of universality, it would be harder to move against the GRC. Overall, I think we would be better to go with universality.

Mr. Wright: There is another problem related to the tie-in between dual representation and the important question. If circumstances are such that the important question would pass but dual representation would not get a two-thirds vote, then any proposal coupling dual representation and the important question would be clearly identified as a gimmick to keep Communist China out of the UN. This will sap support for the important question or dual representation or both. I am not sure we will get a majority on the important question if we are clearly after the status quo.⁵

⁵ Additional information on the various formulas for dual representation in the United Nations is in memoranda from Marshall Wright of the NSC staff to Kissinger, March 3 and 9. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 304, NSC Files, Senior Review Group, February–March 1971)

Mr. Armitage: It is possible that such a situation might develop over time. But that will not happen next year.

Mr. Johnson: Is it given that we would couple the important question with dual representation?

Mr. Green: Yes, in order to get the GRC aboard. We need to be able to commend the course of action to them on the grounds that it will lead to a stalemate.

Mr. Johnson: Dual representation will result in a stalemate.

Mr. Green: If only a simple majority were required, dual representation would carry the day, but it is offensive to both Chinas.

Mr. Johnson: If dual representation receives a majority and Taiwan stays in, then the Communist Chinese would stay out.

Mr. Green: Dual representation might hold this year but not two years from now. If we maintain the consistency of treating the matter as an important question, it will help us buy time. I think Communist China will ultimately get into the UN. I think that dual representation is likely to command the most support in this country. At least it will let us off the hook.

Mr. Doolin: At the ANZUS meeting, there was concern that however the representation problem is resolved, Taiwan should not be forced formally to withdraw from the organization.

Mr. Green: Yes. Once they are out, they are out.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. Not even under universality would they be able to get back in.

Mr. Green: I agree. Dual representation may be suspect as a gimmick but universality has a broad appeal.

Mr. Johnson: Universality involves questions of timing. There is the problem of the Korean elections.

Mr. Green: The elections are scheduled for May 1.

Mr. Wright: If dual representation is not coupled to the important question, everyone goes out being able to get a majority over a period of time although we might be able to hold a majority together next year.

Mr. Armitage: Erosion will set in.

Mr. Green: Erosion is going to set in right away. A nose count now will not show what the line-up will be in September.

Mr. Wright: If there is no hope of maintaining a simple majority for dual representation, we don't have a Chinaman's chance of holding to a position based on the important question. The net effect would be that the GRC would be out.

Mr. Johnson: That is the thought that was going through my mind.

Mr. Holdridge: We may lose a lot of votes on the important question from people who really want a solution to the problem. Coupling the important question to dual representation does suggest a gimmick.

Mr. Wright: The way we are talking about it now, it *is* a gimmick.

Mr. Green: We want both regimes in. That should be the basis for our actions. That is our policy; it is what we want. There are other countries that feel the same way.

Mr. Johnson: Then why make achievement of dual representation as hard as possible by tying it to the important question?

Mr. Armitage: There is no foreseeable way we can get both regimes into the UN.

Mr. Green: The important question will pass this year but perhaps not next year. We are in a transition period. Once we have gone the important question route, we can hardly drop it.

Mr. Doolin: Our previous support of the important question was in terms of the Albanian Resolution.

Mr. Green: Is there really any distinction?

Mr. Irwin: How is the important question worded now?

Mr. Armitage: It says: "Any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question."

Mr. Irwin: Is there any precedent for a change of position on what constitutes an important question?

(Dr. Kissinger rejoined the meeting.)

Mr. Green: It is hard to fix a position until we finish the consultation process.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there merit in coupling the important question with either formula?

Mr. Johnson: That is what we were just discussing.

Mr. Irwin: One problem is that the important question would be considered just a gimmick to keep Communist China out of the UN.

Mr. Johnson: The intellectual problem that I have is that if we think both should be in, why should we make it hard to do?

Dr. Kissinger: Because the issue of who belongs to the organization is always an important question even if it slows down getting what we want.

Mr. Irwin: China is the only case that has been considered an important question.

Mr. Johnson: I wonder how we rationalize using the important question.

Mr. Green: The GRC feels that the important question is significant and wants to continue using it. To get the GRC aboard, we have to assure them that we will back application of the important question

rule. Once we get a favorable vote on the important question, there would be a better chance of having the GRC continue in the UN without the PRC. Next year we may not be able to get a majority to support considering the China representation issue an important question, but we can roll with the punches. This is the first step in a transition.

Dr. Kissinger: Are there any other views? Dick [Helms]?

Mr. Helms: I have no particular views. However, I do have one question. If we continue to fight against the Albanian Resolution but finally lose, what do we calculate the actual loss in prestige for us will be? Would getting overruled and having the GRC tossed out give us such a black eye internationally?

Mr. Irwin: It would give us a black eye, but I don't know how much damage it would really do. Our stubbornness would be unpopular with the doves and generally. You could argue that we would make points by staunchly standing by our ally. I think it is an arguable question.

Mr. Johnson: If the GRC is expelled, the GRC is in fact being declared a non-state. This would enormously complicate our problem of maintaining the integrity of the GRC. It would become an international outcast.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you sure that dual representation would win the day over the Albanian Resolution if the important question rule were not applied?

Mr. Irwin: A considerable number of people think it would prevail over the Albanian Resolution.

Mr. Armitage: This year.

Mr. Irwin: I have some doubt about this.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be a tremendous change in our position if we were to give up the important question and throw the issue into the General Assembly in such a way that it could result in the expulsion of the GRC.

Mr. Selden: We would lose on both counts.

Mr. Green: It would make our relations with the GRC more complicated.

Mr. Irwin: Perhaps I overemphasize universality, but if we advocate both universality and dual representation, I think we can get our way without using the important question rule.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean that if we propose universality, we don't need the important question?

Mr. Irwin: The universality proposal would be a general resolution. The idea would be to implement it only in the case of the two Chinas. We would try to avoid implementing it now with respect to other countries.

Dr. Kissinger: What do we gain by this?

Mr. Irwin: Endorsement of the concept of universality and its application to China. We would retain the possibility of a Security Council veto on the other membership questions.

Mr. Johnson: All that we gain is that we would be standing on principle.

Mr. Selden: I think Dick Helms made a good point. We ought to consider how much we would lose if we go down fighting.

Mr. Green: One thing we gain is more understanding among the American people for our foreign policy. People will not be able to say that we stood blindly by Chiang Kai-shek. On the other hand, if the GRC is ejected, this will affect attitudes in this country toward the UN.

Mr. Selden: You will have Communist China on the Security Council.

Mr. Johnson: With dual representation the Communist Chinese don't go on the Security Council.

Mr. Green: Our recommendation would be that the GRC continue to occupy the Security Council seat until such time as the PRC is in.

Mr. Selden: That is a difficult point to argue with the American public. People in my area of the country want to leave the GRC in and keep the PRC out.

Mr. Green: That is not going to happen. Actually, on the basis of conferences we have had around the country, we find that most people favor dual representation.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) You favor universality as a means of assuring more votes for dual representation and the important question.

Mr. Irwin: Universality would make it appear a matter of principle rather than just a question of deciding between the two Chinas.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, if we stick with the important question, we won't need universality.

Mr. Green: It would be advantageous for us to be identified with the majority view.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it that the majority view favors admission of any organized government. Does this apply to Rhodesia?

Mr. Green: Rhodesia is not in my area of responsibility. In any case, a resolution would state universality as a general principle.

Dr. Kissinger: Where else would universality apply?

Mr. Doolin: Germany, Korea, Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no problem with Germany. The FRG has already agreed not to oppose East German entry into the UN.

Mr. Irwin: There would be a problem if East Germany came in before the two Germanies had reached an agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you deal with that problem?

Mr. Irwin: We would just say that we are agreeable to having East Germany join but that the two Germanies must first reach agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: What if the President decides on a two-China policy but without universality?

Mr. Irwin: Such a course would be more apt to be considered a gimmick to prevent PRC entry. That is almost exactly what [British Ambassador] Cromer told me last week. He said: "We just can't support pure dual representation".

Dr. Kissinger: What are the British planning to do?

Mr. Irwin: They would vote against the important question and for the Albanian Resolution.

Mr. Armitage: We could probably pick up some votes with dual representation.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that those countries that want to make points with Communist China will not vote for any resolution that would impede Communist China's entry. I have the impression that the British are looking primarily to improving their relations with the Communist Chinese.

Mr. Doolin: They would prefer to have the GRC in.

Dr. Kissinger: But they will not do anything to keep the GRC in. The ideal solution for them would be for the important question to pass; then a vote in favor of dual representation would not count.

Mr. Doolin: The appeal of universality is that it is like motherhood. It is hard for anyone to be against it.

Dr. Kissinger: If the British are voting on the basis of their domestic opinion, then universality will serve their purposes. But if they are voting to appease Communist China, they want to support effective action. I think they want to improve relations with Communist China even if it means expelling the GRC.

Mr. Green: That's right. Also they see Chou En-lai's talks with Bensen as a serious Chinese initiative for improving relations.

Dr. Kissinger: Then they are not likely to vote for dual representation under the guise of universality.

Mr. Irwin: It will require high level pressure—probably by the President—to get them to go along. It is clear they oppose dual representation alone; there may be some chance they would support universality.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the one-China-two-delegations proposal on the Soviet model?

Mr. Irwin: They would not go along with that.

Mr. Armitage: There are some lukewarm friends of the Communist Chinese who might come on board with universality.

Dr. Kissinger: Who?

Mr. Armitage: Some of the African states.

Dr. Kissinger: They would go along with dual representation coupled with universality but not with dual representation alone? That is hard to understand.

Mr. Armitage: There is great sentiment for universality.

Dr. Kissinger: Whom does it benefit? The Koreans, Vietnamese, and Germans don't want it.

Mr. Armitage: Almost everybody else does.

Mr. Green: It has a broad, universal appeal. Many see it as a way of facilitating the settlement of world problems by having every political entity recognized in some sort of world forum. As Dennis Doolin says, it is like motherhood.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you know such sentiment exists or only think so?

Mr. Green: We know, based on discussions we have had. We need to advance some philosophy for what we want to do.

Dr. Kissinger: Does it make any difference what dual representation formula is proposed?

Mr. Irwin: We take the fuzzy one.

Dr. Kissinger: Don't do anything uncharacteristic. Which is the fuzzy one?

Mr. Green: The one that merely says there will be two delegations.

Mr. Irwin: It says that the question of who rules China is one for the two governments to work out. There is a certain logic to this approach.

Dr. Kissinger: But who agrees with us on this?

Mr. Irwin: I don't know.

Dr. Kissinger: Is such a formula, which would not say that there are one or two Chinas, really an answer to our problem? Would it guarantee that the PRC does not come in?

Mr. Irwin: If we adopt either of those other two formulas [one China or two Chinas], we find that there are definite objections.

Dr. Kissinger: One possibility would be a one-China-one-Taiwan formula. Do you object to that?

Mr. Green: It would make both sides angry.

Dr. Kissinger: What about one-China-two-states?

Mr. Green: The point is that on these different formulas we would like to talk to other governments before making a decision.

Mr. Johnson: A one-China-two-states policy would imply that Taiwan is part of China.

Mr. Green: Yes, both regimes can claim to be the government of China.

Dr. Kissinger: How does that differ from the two-China formula?

Mr. Green: Just in the language. It is important to keep the idea of one China. Sato, for example, lays great stress on that.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell you his name is a dirty word around here. We had such an explosion around here this morning [on textiles] that I thought the pictures would be blown off the wall.

As a technical formula, why would one-China-two-states not be like one-Soviet-Union-three states?

Mr. Armitage: The precedent doesn't apply. The three Soviet "states" were original members.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you want the President to decide this? The first question is whether we stick with the existing policy or go to some modified policy that permits seating the PRC without having the GRC expelled.

Mr. Johnson: You should add that the present policy may well result in the seating of the PRC.

Dr. Kissinger: And also that whatever we decide, the Albanian Resolution might pass.

The second point is that assuming we decide in favor of seating Communist China, what course of action would best achieve our objective of preserving the seat of the Republic of China. Should we link our proposal to the important question? Should we link it to universality? What dual representation formula do we prefer? Your [the State Department] view is that it doesn't make any difference what formula we choose; we should take the one that has the widest support.

Mr. Johnson: We have to consult with other countries on this.

Dr. Kissinger: My judgment is that the President would react very badly if the end result of this exercise is the passage of the Albanian Resolution, the seating of Communist China, and the expulsion of Taiwan.

Mr. Doolin: That is going to happen if we don't change our policy.

Dr. Kissinger: You can't prove that unless we stick with our present policy.

Do you believe that dual representation coupled with universality offers the best chance to defeat the Albanian Resolution?

Mr. Green: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Should our proposal be linked to the important question?

Mr. Green: Yes.

Mr. Wright: No, that would make it appear to be a gimmick.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Armitage) According to you, if the important

question is linked to the Albanian Resolution, the Albanian Resolution will pass.

Everything depends on the assessment that the Albanian Resolution is less acceptable than universality. As I understand it, there is an incentive to pass the important question if dual representation is on the table. The countries that do not want to antagonize Communist China can avoid doing so by voting against the important question.

Mr. Irwin: Except that as Marshall Green said, bringing in both universality and dual representation would provide a positive philosophic concept to support. To some degree, universality would thus take the place of the important question. Universality provides a better philosophic basis than the important question.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Green) As I understand it, the only way dual representation has a chance of winning acceptance by the GRC is for it to be linked to the important question.

Mr. Green: That is generally right. It would provide a way to sell dual representation to the GRC.

Dr. Kissinger: I am pretty much persuaded that if the President decides to try dual representation, we should pick the formula that has the best chance of getting votes. Otherwise, we will be opening the way for the Albanian Resolution.

Mr. Green: We can't determine what the best formula would be without consulting. We need time to advance the concept of dual representation. We should not continue saying that we have no position. This connotes irresolution and weakens our hand. We need a green light to take soundings on dual representation.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we need an NSC meeting or should we just send a memorandum to the President?

Mr. Irwin: The Secretary [of State] is thinking in terms of an NSC discussion.

Mr. Green: I thought that he considered it would be difficult to make a final decision without more consultation.

Dr. Kissinger: My view is that whenever a cabinet member wants an NSC meeting, we arrange one if the President's schedule permits.

However, I have seen no division of opinion here.

Mr. Johnson: We ought to say to the President that we are reasonably certain the new position will prevail.

Mr. Armitage: We can't be sure on that until we talk with some of the other countries.

Mr. Green: We can say to the press that we are not taking a position until we have taken soundings with other UN members.

Dr. Kissinger: What you need is a Presidential decision that we are willing to abandon the position that we have upheld up to now and

that we are willing to consult with other countries on the possibility of adopting dual representation as a solution.

Mr. Green: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we need a decision on the important question?

Mr. Johnson: That can wait until after our consultations.

Dr. Kissinger: My own feeling is that we do not need an NSC meeting. Why don't we leave it that we will try to get an answer from the President but that if the Secretary wants an NSC meeting, we will schedule one.

Mr. Johnson: It would be best to have an NSC meeting after we consult other countries.

Mr. Green: We have a problem with the British. The important question resolution is crucial to them. They want to vote against it.

Dr. Kissinger: Alex's [Johnson's] argument on how we make the point that universality is an important question is a little odd.

Mr. Johnson: I think that the important question issue is significant.

Dr. Kissinger: It will be easier to get the President's approval if we show some sensitivity toward Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. Green: We don't want to have Chiang leave the UN in a huff. Next summer we will have a better idea of the ins and outs of this whole issue.

Mr. Armitage: Don't we have to tell the British something about the important question issue the next time we meet with them?

Dr. Kissinger: When do we have to give them an answer?

Mr. Irwin: There is no specific deadline. It depends on their anxiety over Communist China. Things have been moving faster since Chou En-lai talked to Bensen.

Mr. Johnson: I don't understand it. Chou En-lai has one conversation with Bensen, and the British fall all over themselves.

Mr. Irwin: I don't know how far up in the British Government the enthusiasm extends.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Heath believes he can proceed by issuing ultimatata.

Mr. Doolin: The British have always been impressed by the potential Chinese market.

Mr. Irwin: A timing problem involves the Korean elections. The consultations should not be public before them.

Dr. Kissinger: When are the elections?

Mr. Green: In May.

Dr. Kissinger: You would not raise it before the elections?

Mr. Green: Yes we would. Park would be so anxious that we not mention it publicly before the elections that he might be much more cooperative.

Dr. Kissinger: We will defer the other paper [the NSSM 106 study on China] until later next week.⁶

⁶ The minutes of the March 12 Senior Review Group meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

336. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 11, 1971, 2208Z.

657. Subj: Chirep.

1. Amb Liu (GRC) paid courtesy call on Amb Bush March 11. Amb Liu, noting his concern with Terence Smith article (*NY Times*, March 10) and *Times* editorial (March 11)² said he can't understand why US wants PRC in UN when fundamental policy of Communists has not changed. Amb Bush said our policy review is not based on naivete, that we hold no brief for Peking vis-à-vis Taiwan, but that we are faced with a new situation in the UN and must decide on most realistic course of action.

2. Amb Liu, acknowledging the above, said he realized it is because of the adverse tide facing us that we are considering alternative strategies to preserve GRC place in the UN but he would like us to keep in mind the following before deciding on any third resolution:

A. Pres Chiang is engaged in a political struggle and anything which damaged the GRC position in the UN would have grave repercussions in Taiwan.

B. US should not co-sponsor any third resolution as this would be damaging to whole political struggle of GRC and "pull rug out from under them."

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Taipei.

² "U.S. Said To Plan a Shift on Peking," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1971, p. 1; and "China Policy . . . Negotiation . . .," *ibid.*, March 11, 1971, p. 38.

C. SC seat should not be mentioned in any resolution as retention of seat is of prime importance to GRC.

3. Before leaving, Amb Liu told Amb Bush to please ignore press comments coming from Taipei re President's report as he (Liu) fully aware of positive points report had made concerning US-GRC relations.

Bush

337. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

Hong Kong, March 12, 1971, 1000Z.

1580. Subject: Recommended Phrasings on China Questions. For EA/Green.

1. When I saw you recently in Department, you suggested the preparation of a "say-don't say" guide for persons making statements about Chirep and Chirec. We both felt that Peking's U.S.-watchers will be reading between the lines of our statements and that it is important to avoid giving them the wrong signals by inadvertent turns of phrase.

2. We wish to signal Peking that there is flexibility in our position regarding Taiwan, so that Peking will be encouraged to seek better relations with us to enhance the prospects for eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. We wish to avoid signaling Peking that our position regarding Taiwan has hardened along lines that rule out any acceptable mutual understanding between us.

3. Key message we should try to convey is that the United States has not made up its mind to seek to detach Taiwan from China permanently. We realize that Department spokesmen have at various times sought to convey this message, and that you have exercised great prudence in avoiding positions of an explicitly "one-China, one-Taiwan" sort. However, given high degree of ambiguity that is inherent in the actual situation, it is hard to avoid formulations that might be misconstrued

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Exdis.

to mean that the U.S. has made up its mind to bring about or support the secession of Taiwan from China. As more and more public attention focuses on Chirep and Chirec, the number of pitfalls will multiply.

4. Among seemingly innocuous themes that might convey the wrong signals to Peking are the following:

A. "Taiwan is a small, law-abiding national being arbitrarily attacked by the PRC."

B. "All we ask is that Peking leave its neighbors alone . . ."

C. "Taiwan is entitled to self-determination."

D. "Taiwan is vital to U.S. (or Japan's, or the Philippines') security."

E. "The U.S. has a commitment to keep Taiwan free from mainland control."

F. "The U.S. has a commitment to safeguard the independence of Taiwan."

5. While it is of course impossible to give a complete catalog of all the contexts in which there will be risk of sending Peking the wrong signals, we have attempted below to suggest the principal pitfalls by illustrative questions and answers. We have not attempted to polish the language of these little scenarios, and would welcome comments and criticism.

I. Chinese Representation

Q#1. Does the U.S. oppose seating PRC in the UN?

Say: No, the U.S. favors seating the PRC, as well as the GRC, in the UN. Neither the PRC nor the GRC alone is able to speak for, or undertake obligations on behalf of, the entire Chinese people. Therefore, both ought to be represented.

Don't say: We believe the PRC should be represented, but we do not think it should be allowed to exact a price—the price of expelling the GRC.

Q#2. If the PRC takes China's seat, how can the GRC stay in?

Say: The PRC is no more able to speak for the Chinese on Taiwan than the GRC is for the Chinese on the mainland. The UN needs representatives able to speak for both groups of people, and both are entitled to representation.

Don't say: Taiwan is entitled to membership because it is a country with 14 million people and has been a law-abiding member of the peace-loving community of nations for the past 22 years; and it is recognized as such by a large number of members of the UN.

Q#3. If the GRC were to stay in the UN, would it not have to change its name to "Republic of Taiwan", or "Formosa"?

Say: Both the PRC and the GRC claim that Taiwan is a province of China, not a separate state. How their delegations should be distin-

guished in the UN is a matter for the two of them to decide, if and when both are seated. (Don't fail to note: PRC/GRC both claim that Taiwan is province of China.)

II. *Recognition of China*

Q#4. Why does the U.S. oppose country X's withdrawing recognition from the GRC as a concomitant of its establishment of relations with Peking?

Say: We would like to see all Chinese, wherever they may reside, free to interact with peoples of all nations. We hope that Peking and Taipei, pending settlement of their differences, and without prejudice to their respective claims, can be persuaded to abandon their past doctrinaire insistence on exclusive recognition. Country X's withdrawal of recognition from the GRC would be a step in the wrong direction.

Don't say: Taiwan is a law-abiding, respected member of the family of nations, with a modest population of 14 million people, larger than that of 2/3 of the UN member states, and entitled to recognition as such. China is seeking to impose its will on Taiwan by force and intimidation, and country X should not accede to Peking's arbitrary and unreasonable demands.

Q#5. Does the U.S. oppose country X's "taking note" of Peking's claim that Taiwan is part of China?

Say: No. Both Peking and Taipei make this claim. No other country claims Taiwan.

Don't say: Yes, because the status of Taiwan is undetermined and we would hope that country X will explicitly reserve its position in this regard.

III. *Future of Taiwan.*

Q#6. What is the status of Taiwan?

Say: Historically and juridically, complex questions may be raised about the status of Taiwan. In fact, both Peking and Taipei claim that Taiwan is a province of China, and no other country claims it.

Don't say: The status of Taiwan is undetermined.

Q#7. What is the U.S. position regarding the future status of Taiwan?

Say: The future of Taiwan is likely to depend primarily on the eventual resolution of the differences between the PRC and GRC. We hope this will come about by peaceful means, and that due attention will be paid to the will of all the people affected.

Don't say: We support the right of self-determination for Taiwan.

Q#8. Does the U.S. favor self-determination for the native-born Taiwanese?

Say: We believe that the future of Taiwan should be decided in accordance with the will of all those involved, including, but not limited to, the native-born Taiwanese.

Don't say: Yes, we support the right of the Taiwanese to self-determination.

IV. Security.

Q#9. Why does the United States have a commitment to the GRC?

Say: We undertook a solemn treaty obligation, reflecting our belief that an attempt to settle the differences between the PRC and the GRC by force would jeopardize the peace and security of Asia.

Don't say: We believe Taiwan is vital to the security of the U.S. (or Japan, or the free world). Taiwan is a vital link in our chain of bases. In enemy hands, Taiwan would represent a threat to us and our allies.

Q#10. Does the United States have a commitment to keep Taiwan free from mainland control?

Say: That is not a correct statement of our commitment. The United States has declared that it would not try to block a peaceful settlement between the GRC and the PRC. Obviously, such a settlement might result in the extension of mainland control to Taiwan. Our commitment is to help the GRC keep the PRC from imposing a settlement by force.

Don't say: Yes.

Q#11. Does the United States have a commitment to safeguard the independence of Taiwan?

Say: No. Our commitment is to the GRC, to help it keep the PRC from imposing a settlement of their differences by force. The GRC maintains that Taiwan is a province of China. Any question of Taiwan's independence, or its secession from China, is hypothetical, and the question of a U.S. commitment to protect its independence is doubly so.

Don't say: Yes, the U.S. has a commitment to safeguard the independence of Taiwan.

Osborn

338. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 13, 1971, 0021Z.

681. Chirep.

1. As requested in Armitage–Newlin telcon,² USUN has attempted to predict vote count on varying Chirep reses. Dept will appreciate that this is inexact science at best, since any change in usual Chirep scenario introduces many uncertainties. Even if ground is prepared for new Chirep res well in advance, there are likely to be alarms and excursions created by submission of last-minute reses or amendments, procedural wrangles and the like. Under such circumstances, unpredictability heightened by fact that some dels will be operating without instructions if there are last minute maneuvers.

2. With these caveats, fol are our head counts:

A. We share view of practically everybody at UN that IQ will be defeated if strategy of past years is followed. Our head count is 52–55–20 with situation deteriorating fast as US and others get noses further under dual rep tent. We have assumed UK will oppose IQ but have not taken other potential Anglophone dissenters into account.

B. A dual rep res, such as Belgian, could command a sizeable majority, but not two-thirds, if US works hard for it, GRC acquiesces, and it is understood that SC seat goes to PRC. Our estimate is 71–49–7 provided all above conditions fulfilled. We assume PRC's supporters would oppose such a move strongly and that PRC would refuse to join if dual rep res passed. This would result in Chirep issue coming up in subsequent Assemblies with attendant erosion of support for dual rep. We would guess that dual rep would be viable for 2–3 years under these circumstances.

C. A dual rep res would not fare nearly so well if GRC opposed it and implied or announced that they would withdraw if it passed. We would guess that pressure from US and others could still carry day for dual rep under these circumstances but by a very narrow margin (55–52–20 is our best estimate). There is a real risk that the AR would obtain about same vote and an uncertain fight over priority could be decisive as to which received larger vote. In any case, we doubt that a dual rep res strongly opposed by both Chinas could carry for a second year.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret.

² No record of this conversation has been found.

D. We do not believe that combining dual rep with universality would significantly affect either of above two votes.

E. We believe that submission of IQ and a dual rep res would be perceived by many as a procedural gimmick to block PRC membership. In such a case, both IQ and dual rep res would probably lose votes. IQ might lose only 2–3, but since we see it losing anyhow this would be more than enough. Dual rep res could lose ten or more votes if combined with IQ.

F. Japanese suggestion of a res declaring that expulsion of GRC is an IQ would probably command greater support than traditional IQ since it goes to the heart of a principle many here support—that GRC expulsion should not be the price of PRC admission. If proponents of such a res handled it carefully and GRC kept quiet, we could see a majority as high as 76-45-6 for it. This majority would erode also if it became evident that the PRC would not come in under these conditions, but it would probably last longer than a dual rep res.

G. Another possibility which is gaining popularity here is a simple res admitting PRC and not mentioning GRC. This would command broadest support of all, but in our view would be procedurally dangerous since it would be subject to amendment to conform to AR.

Bush

339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, March 18, 1971, 1907Z.

45572. Subject: Further Consultations with GRC on Chirep.

1. During call on another matter, March 17, GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai remarked to Assistant Secretary Green that he and GRC Ambassador to UN Liu thought it might be useful to have another discussion in Washington as follow-up to Ambassador Brown's recent meetings in Taipei with Vice Minister Yang Hsi-kun and others. Chow suggested possibility first part of April, by which time, he suggested, USG may have crystallized thinking on Chirep problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Shoemith and approved in draft by Assistant Secretary Marshall Green. Repeated to Tokyo, Wellington, Canberra, London, and Hong Kong.

2. Green agreed that such meeting would be useful around time Chow had suggested. He remarked that Brown and party had had most profitable talks in Taipei. Green said that he had been encouraged by degree of realism and flexibility which both GRC and US had demonstrated in those talks and which offers hope that our governments will be able work together along generally agreed lines, even if GRC is unable formally to endorse our position. These talks, together with Ambassador McConaughy's subsequent meeting with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, indicated that we should be able pursue tactics which could serve our mutual interests.

3. Chow stated that time of essence, and expressed hope that by April US would have come to some conclusion as result of its study. If, he said, we can on that basis come to agreement on common objective or approach, then we can work together to obtain support of other governments.

4. Green expressed hope that if we should conclude that some change in tactics is called for, we will have at least GRC understanding, even though it might not be able say so publicly. He also expressed strong hope that GRC appreciates importance of retaining position in UN. To latter point, Chow stated that GRC will not say that it might withdraw, and he noted that in recent TV interview he had explicitly rejected any such inference from his remarks on GRC view of problem. He added, however, that in order for GRC to remain in UN, its position "has to be tenable both domestically and externally."

5. Green remarked that any resolution of Chirep problem will involve real difficulties: in many ways it is a choice between something that is painful and matters that could be more painful. He emphasized that it is out of a sincere concern for GRC that US and other friendly governments are engaged in such a thorough study of this problem. Chow acknowledged this is case, adding that, "If there is mutual confidence, the pain will be easier to bear."

Rogers

340. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 23, 1971, 1752Z.

744. Subj: Chirep Voting Estimates. Ref: USUN 681.²

1. We have further analyzed the likely voting breakdowns next fall on the various possible votes on Chirep. To estimate such votes, when numerous complex variables will influence the final position of many delegations, is difficult at best. To do so now, eight or nine months before the event, when the situation may be affected by the outcome of policy reviews in a number of countries including the United States, makes it a highly inexact science. With the possible exception of the voting estimate on an exact repetition of last year's tactics: i.e., vote on a U.S. sponsored Important Question resolution followed by vote on Albanian type resolution, our estimates cannot be considered more than "educated" guesses (see ref tel).

2. The credibility, hence the success or failure of any alternative to the old strategy, will depend on its not seeming just a gimmick to keep Peking out for another year or two. There is widespread view that the traditional I.Q. (Important Question) resolution is such a gimmick. Only alternative form of IQ that appears to us to stand much of a chance of passage is in a resolution that clearly differentiates between the specific question of representation of China, and the general question of the expulsion of a member state. Should this general expulsion I.Q. resolution be linked in any way to the member representing the people of China, or the China cited in the Charter, it would lose any chance of passage. A general expulsion resolution would have to be voted on first, and would have to be followed by a dual representation resolution of the Belgian type. It may be assumed that both of these resolutions would obtain the necessary simple majority and would be adopted against the votes of the supporters of the traditional Albanian-type resolution. The Albanian-type resolution would then be voted on last, but would fail of passage by not obtaining the required two-thirds majority. (There might be difficult procedural battles in order to set up above voting sequence.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI. Secret. The telegram bears the following marginal notes by Assistant Secretary Green: "HAK—Here is the vote count Amb. Bush promised to do. Marshall." "You might want to call this to HAK's attention before tomorrow's NSC." "A 'general expulsion' IQ which did not refer to the GRC might not work, because the issue is representation, not membership."

² Document 338.

3. Our current voting estimate on traditional IQ is 51 for, 57 against, and 19 abstentions. This is the best we could expect, and approximately five votes (Canada, Ecuador, Maldives, Mauritius and Sierra Leone) could slip from support to abstention or abstention to opposition. Several others could do likewise as time to vote approaches if they realized that by continuing to vote for the IQ they were going to be on losing side. These include Jamaica, the only black Caribbean still listed as in favor of IQ. Albanian-type resolution would then be adopted with at least same two vote margin as last year, but almost certainly more.

4. A general "expulsion of a member" IQ would probably command a simple majority but not two-thirds, although much would depend on its exact wording and on the extent to which members saw it as an attempt to keep the PRC out and the GRC in. The hard-core Albanian res supporters (i.e., between 45 and 50) would oppose it. The remaining 75-80 votes would be cast in support of such a generalized IQ resolution or would represent abstentions. Our current rough tally, subject to revision, indicates 62 in favor, 50 against, and 15 abstentions.

Bush

341. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the United Nations and Our Relations with Taiwan

The study you ordered of this issue has been completed, and has been discussed by the Senior Review Group. An NSC meeting has been scheduled for March 25 to review the problem.

This extremely complex and involuted matter involves U.S. international prestige, the attitude of the American public toward the UN, and our future relations with both Taipei and Peking. There are two separate but related categories of issues: (a) those specifically

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meetings. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum is stamped "The President has seen" and was initialed by Butterfield.

pertaining to representation at the United Nations, and (b) those pertaining more generally to our relations with Taiwan and Peking.

I. The UN Representation Question

The current situation. For many years our strategy has rested on two actions: support for the Important Question Resolution and opposition to the Albanian Resolution. The Important Question Resolution establishes each year the requirement for a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to effect any change in the representation of China. The Albanian Resolution calls explicitly for the expulsion of Taipei and the seating of Peking.

Time is running out on this strategy. Last year, for the first time, a majority voted for the Albanian Resolution. Taipei's expulsion was prevented only by the passage of the Important Question Resolution. A change of only eight votes will beat us on the Important Question, and support for it is eroding rapidly. Major supporters (the U.K., Canada) have already indicated an intention to vote against the Important Question this year.

However, the strong international sentiment in favor of Peking's entry into the United Nations is not yet matched by an equal enthusiasm for expelling Taipei. Therefore, while it is unlikely that any policy can succeed for long in keeping Peking out, we may be able to prevent Taipei's expulsion.

Therefore, the issue is whether to change our current policy, and, if so, to what.

The Policy Choices:

- Stick with the present policy.
- Dual representation alone.
- Dual representation with universality.

1. *Stick with Current Policy.* We would continue our major diplomatic effort to maintain majority support for the Important Question Resolution, as a means of neutralizing the majority support for the Albanian Resolution. The purpose would be to keep Peking out and Taipei in.

Advantages. At least initially, this posture would be welcomed by Taipei. As its results become clear, however, Taipei would probably have serious second thoughts as to our real intent in being so "loyal" to our ally. This posture would also be pleasing to Peking, which would correctly assess it as leading to their early victory.

Disadvantages. It will lead to a major U.S. defeat at the UN, will be considered by all our allies and by the U.S. press as rigid and unrealistic, could cause serious difficulties with U.S. public attitudes toward the UN, and would lead to the expulsion of Taipei from the United Nations.

In view of the state of international sentiment, this is a certain loser. Defeat is very possible this year, and virtually certain in the 1972 General Assembly. This gloomy judgment is shared by all, including such pro-Taipei stalwarts as the Japanese and Australians.

State and your UN Mission believe that this policy cannot be successfully maintained much longer. Defense might like to see it continued but recognizes that it is certain to fail soon. I share the view that a decision to stick with the current policy is a decision to accept defeat, if not this year, then next.

2. *Dual Representation.* This would involve our support for a resolution calling for UN membership for both Peking and Taipei. There are theoretically a number of variations on how a dual representation resolution might be worded ("one China-one Taiwan", "one China-two states", "two China's", etc. I have summarized these for you (Tab Dual Representation Formulae).² However, as a practical matter, any formula legally distinguishing between mainland China and Taipei is anathema to both Taipei and Peking, and, moreover would simply complicate our problem at the UN.

Therefore, the only feasible dual representation formula is one which calls for the representation of both Peking and Taipei without any conclusion as to the territorial or sovereignty claims of either. The resolution would simply argue that both are long standing de facto governments and both should be represented in the UN and bound by its Charter. In effect, the issue would be avoided.

Advantages of Dual Representation. It would stand a good chance of commanding majority support and thus blocking passage of the Albanian Resolution. Moreover, if Peking refused to enter on this basis, the onus for its non-participation would be squarely on Peking.

Disadvantages. Peking would consider this policy hostile to its interests, and Taipei might, initially at least, take the position that it would prefer to leave the UN rather than sit with Peking. Even if Dual Representation were passed, it is not certain how long majority support could be retained for it in the face of Peking's refusal to enter the UN on that basis.

The central issue in a dual representation policy is what its end result will be. If in the end it leads to the expulsion of Taipei and the entry of Peking as the only representative of China, it is not greatly different from sticking with our present policy and going down to defeat. It might postpone defeat for a year or so, and it might make our defeat appear somewhat less stark. But the end effect would be the same.

² Attached but not printed.

The likelihood of this development can be somewhat diminished by the treatment of the Important Question Resolution as part of a dual representation strategy.

There are three options on the Important Question:

—to abandon it, and put forward only a dual representation resolution.

—to keep it, putting forward both a dual representation and an important question resolution.

—to modify it, so that it applies only to the expulsion of Taipei, not the entry of Peking.

The Important Question Resolution is now the only thing preventing Taipei's expulsion and Peking's entry. Taipei will, therefore, attach the greatest of importance to its retention as part of any new strategy we may propose.

—If we abandon the Important Question Resolution, a simple majority can vote Peking in and Taipei out. In view of the fact that a majority has already voted to do so, it would be imprudent, to say the least, to give up the Important Question Resolution altogether.

—There is, however, a near fatal flaw in going to the UN with both a dual representation resolution and the Important Question Resolution. While we can get a majority for dual representation, we can probably not get two-thirds. Therefore, if we continue to insist on the treatment of dual representation as an Important Question, we are, in fact, simply freezing the status quo. This would be seen by everybody as a transparent gimmick intended merely to keep Peking out and Taipei in. While it might enable us to stave off defeat for another year, or possibly two, its eventual result would, in all probability, be the GRC's expulsion.

—If we seek an Important Question Resolution applying *only to the expulsion of Taipei*, this would permit Peking's entry by a majority vote, but would require a two-thirds vote to expel Taipei. Nothing would then stand in the way of Peking's entry except Peking's own insistence that it will not come in until it can set its own terms. This might hold together a coalition of those who like Taipei, those who dislike Peking, and those who are beholden to us, sufficient to resist such a demand from Peking.

State believes this should be treated strictly as a tactical issue and we should take no position until we have consulted with our allies. My own view is that it goes to the heart of our relations with Taiwan and the hope of maintaining its UN seat.

3. *Dual Representation with Universality.* Universality is the doctrine that all governments should be represented in the UN. This doctrine has wide international and domestic approval. However, since the Chinese issue at the UN is one of representation rather than state mem-

bership, it is perfectly possible for UN members to favor universality and, at the same time, favor Taipei's expulsion. Universality will not, therefore, by itself, resolve the Chirep issue. Nonetheless, coupled with a dual representation resolution, a general statement favoring universality as the guide to UN membership questions is a relevant option.

Advantages. Because of its international appeal, universality might win some additional support for a dual representation solution to the Chinese problem. It would also provide a popular, credible and easily defended explanation for the change in our longstanding opposition to Peking's entry and it would give a strong additional argument in principle for maintaining Taipei's seat. Finally, it might make a dual representation policy somewhat more palatable to Taipei.

Disadvantages. It will make problems with our German, Korean, and Vietnamese allies. None of them want us now to come out in favor of UN membership for East Germany, North Korea, or North Vietnam. With the Germans, it is primarily a matter of timing, since Bonn has already agreed to UN membership for both Germanys, once their current negotiations have been satisfactorily concluded. The South Koreans will be passionately opposed to any form of UN participation by North Korea. The South Vietnamese will not like universality, but should be easier to deal with than the Koreans.

Whether or not to couple universality with a dual representation strategy is not affected by the treatment of the Important Question Resolution—the effects would be the same as discussed earlier.

Secretary Rogers is enthusiastic about universality, and does not believe we should permit our allies' distaste for it to control our policy. He believes it will greatly improve both our international and domestic stance on a dual representation policy. I agree that universality has some advantages as a debating point, but am skeptical that it will actually gain us many, if any, additional votes at the UN for dual representation. Unless it will do so, I do not believe that it is worth the trouble it will cause with Korea and Germany, and possibly with South Vietnam.

The Security Council Seat. The issue of China's Security Council seat is closely related to our decision regarding UN membership. Although General Assembly resolutions are not binding on the Security Council, the passage of a dual representation resolution would set in motion pressures that would likely make Peking's invitation to the Security Council an inevitable concomitant. It is, in fact, possible that the Council will act to expel Taipei and invite Peking even before the General Assembly acts. There has been some discussion in the Council of such an action.

Chiang Kai-shek is very likely to seek assurances from us about the Council seat, as part of any discussion of a dual representation policy. While we may be able to hold the seat for Taipei until such time

as Peking shows up to claim it, there is nothing we can do to hold it permanently. We are weak on this issue in the Council, with both Britain and France favoring Peking's seating.

It is probably not possible to avoid this issue in a dual representation strategy. If we do not explicitly provide for the Security Council seat in our resolution, some other nation likely will offer an amendment specifying that the Council seat goes to Peking under dual representation.

State feels that we should accept the inevitable and agree to Peking's occupancy of the Security Council seat *as part of a dual representation strategy*. State believes that to do otherwise will make us look insincere in professing to favor dual representation.

Chiang Kai-shek would find it intolerable if the United States openly supported or acquiesced in depriving Taipei of its Security Council seat. Taipei might very well prefer to walk out of the UN rather than accept such a development. That, of course, would totally and permanently defeat our effort to maintain Taipei's UN membership. We may not be able ultimately to avoid Peking's winning the Council seat. But, we can let that development be forced upon us rather than voluntarily taking a position which is anathema to our Taiwan ally.

II. *Issues in Our Relations with Taiwan and Peking*

There are four other issues which relate to our posture toward Chinese representation. These are: (1) the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship, (2) our position on Taiwan's claim to sovereignty over all of China and its future status, (3) a possible renunciation of force agreement with Peking, and (4) possible arms control initiatives toward Peking.

1. *U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship*. There are three principal aspects of this relationship: (a) our Mutual Defense Treaty, (b) our force level on Taiwan, and (c) the level of military assistance. Chiang Kai-shek will demand as the price for agreeing to any Chirep formula other than the current one, the following:

—*At the minimum*, a strong reaffirmation of the U.S.-GRC Mutual Defense Treaty,

—*In all probability*, assurances on the maintenance of at least our present force levels on Taiwan, and

—A renewed request for a squadron of F-4's and 3 submarines for the Chinese armed forces.

By these demands, Chiang will hope to improve the defense of Taiwan against a growing PRC capability, and also to slow improvement in U.S.-PRC relations by identifying us as closely as possible with that defense.

A. *The Defense Treaty*. The treaty dates from 1954 and commits us to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores in the event of external attack. You again stated our commitment to the treaty in the recent

Annual Report on Foreign Policy.³ Chiang continually seeks reassurance, but the PRC may be nettled by further statements on our part.

—Defense would favor a reaffirmation. State may argue, however, that it would needlessly inhibit improved relations with Peking.

—I see no harm in giving Chiang an additional reaffirmation, if he seeks it. It would entail no greater commitment than we now have, and which Peking is well aware of.

B. Force Level on Taiwan. We now have about 9,000 troops on Taiwan. Of these, about 2,200 are directly related to the defense of Taiwan or support of its defense, 6,800 are there in connection with our strategic posture in East Asia, or are support troops related to our general military activities in Asia.

Chiang will want the level maintained, and perhaps increased. But any real progress in improving U.S.–PRC relations is likely to require some reduction in U.S. force levels. Peking, in an obvious bargaining ploy has said that all U.S. forces must leave Taiwan as a prerequisite to any improvement in our relations.

Defense wants to hold the existing level and does not rule out a future need for some increases as our support activities elsewhere in Asia are displaced. State wants at least some reductions in the interest of furthering relations with Peking. [1 line of source text not declassified]

My view is that we should not commit ourselves at this stage to a reduction. A military cutback on Taiwan, coming simultaneously with a move to permit Peking's entry into the UN, would be subject to serious misunderstanding by Peking as well as the Taiwanese public. In the final analysis, after we have taken into account Chiang's demands and Peking's posture toward us, our own strategic requirements should govern. We should not undertake reductions unilaterally if what we want is some step on Peking's part to ease our relations.

C. Military Assistance Levels. Chiang will want us to maintain our existing military assistance levels to Taiwan as a counterweight to the PRC's growing military capability. In addition, he will probably renew a plea, begun in 1969, for a squadron of F-4's and 3 submarines.

There is no problem about maintaining existing military assistance levels. The supplemental appropriation last fall restored some fairly drastic cuts in Taiwan's programs made for Cambodia, and State and Defense are agreed we should continue at about the same rate. On the F-4's and the submarines, they both are opposed on the grounds that to provide these systems would be very expensive, give the GRC an offensive capability against the PRC, and also involve high operation and maintenance costs.

³ Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 25, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

I believe that despite our past opposition to giving F-4's and submarines to the GRC, we may need to consider this in order to gain Chiang's support for any change in our Chinese representation policy. The decision need not be made now however, and can await your decision on Chinese representation and Chiang's reaction.

2. *The U.S. Position on the Status of the GRC.* The GRC claims to be the government of all China, and we have so far been able to avoid taking a position on this claim. We have followed a policy of maintaining diplomatic relations only with Taipei, keeping silent about its pretensions regarding its sovereignty over all China, while making clear that we deal with Peking on matters of mutual interest.

The *issue* is whether or not we can hold to that posture if we adopt a UN representation formula which does not exclude the PRC from the UN.

—The present policy gives us the maximum flexibility as to the future status of Taiwan, and does the least damage to U.S.–Taiwan relations. However, it looks highly unrealistic if we opt for Peking's membership in the UN, and it brings us very close to an unspoken two China policy.

—A possible alternative is to state publicly that the question of which government is the legitimate government of China is not one which the U.S. can decide and that we regard this issue to be a matter for peaceful resolution by the parties directly concerned. That posture would be more credible, and would be more consistent with a dual representation policy, if you opt for such a policy. Moreover, it keeps open our options on Taiwan's ultimate status. There would be strains in our relations with Taiwan, however.

State favors holding to our present position, but if forced by pressures resulting from a change in our UN representation policy, would then favor the alternative.

My own view is that if we stick with our present position at the UN no change is needed. If we move to dual representation, however, I think logic forces us to move simultaneously to the alternative position.

I recommend that you conduct the meeting by first calling on Mr. Cushman (in Mr. Helms' absence) to brief on the situation in Taiwan and then call on me to outline the issues. Following these briefings you will want to ask the participants for their views beginning with Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush. I also recommend that you not make a decision at the NSC meeting but inform the participants that you wish time to consider the views they have expressed.

Your talking points proceed in this way.⁴

⁴ Attached but not printed.

342. Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, March 25, 1971, 10:12–11:15 a.m.

The President: We have a subject this morning which could take us all day. I propose to get the problem out on the table so that we know what the issues are. We have a sticky problem over the Chinese Communists in the UN. We all know what our position has been, and we all know that each year we have a harder time getting the votes necessary to keep this position viable. Therefore we must consider the question not only of what we ought to do, but what our options would be in case George Bush gets up and finds that he doesn't have the votes. I don't think that this year we will have a problem, but my judgment is that we will next year.

This is a very complicated matter and I advise all of you to read the papers.² Obviously, this matter is a very delicate one and our discussion here must be held in the strictest of confidence. That is always so of these meetings but it is particularly so of this one.

I think it would be advisable for Dr. Kissinger to give a rundown regarding the problems which came out in the Working Group, and then hear from Bill and George, and then go on to any others who have thoughts, and then go into the question of our military relations with Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two kinds of issues. First, those which concern the UN representation of China and, second, those which pertain to our relations with Taiwan. They are related. We have first a policy issue of whether we want to stick to our present course. If not, then we have the tactical issue of what course we ought to follow.

The fact is that we will face almost certain defeat this year and if not, next year. We may not get a majority on the Important Question. Last year you recall a majority voted for the Albanian Resolution. Sticking to our present policy then would have the paradoxical result of assuring the entry of Peking over our opposition, and the expulsion of Taiwan. We would go down fighting by sticking to our present policy, but we would go down.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals. Secret. Attached but not printed were the draft minutes for the meeting. A covering memorandum from Wright, April 7, suggests that he prepared these minutes. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. In addition to President Nixon, the following attended: Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Connally, Lincoln, Mitchell, Bush, Moorer, Cushman, Farley (Acting Director, ACDA), U. Alexis Johnson, De Palma, Green, Kissinger, Holdridge, Wright, and Kennedy. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

² Presumably a reference to Documents 312 and 326.

If we are to change our policy the question is in what direction should we change it. There are two formulae and one major issue. We could go for dual representation, which would mean both Peking and Taiwan would be represented, or we could go for dual representation within the concept of universality. That would mean that we would favor membership in the United Nations for all countries, and as a part of that position we would favor the admission of both Peking and Taipei.

A major issue is what to do about the Important Question. If we insist that entry into the UN is an Important Question then dual representation would defeat the Albanian Resolution, but the Important Question would defeat dual representation, for which we wouldn't get a two-thirds majority. If we want dual representation to pass, we have to give up the position that this is an Important Question. But we should remember that even if we give up the Important Question and dual representation prevails in either of its two forms, the Communist Chinese may not come in. In two or three years a majority in the UN may still go for either a straight or modified version of the Albanian Resolution just to get Peking in.

We have three options regarding the Important Question:

1. We can abandon it.
2. We can keep it with dual representation, the practical consequences of which would be the defeat of the Albanian Resolution but also the failure of dual representation.
3. We could modify the Important Question by making it apply only to the expulsion of Taiwan. This would have the effect that dual representation would win, the Communist Chinese will not come in, but only because they would be trying to impose their own terms on the UN, and we would have a hedge against the expulsion of Taiwan.

We can pursue any one of a number of dual representation formulae or we can put dual representation in the context of universality. Universality might get a few more votes for a dual representation formula, but would make a problem for South Korea which would strenuously object to any arrangement permitting North Korea to enter. It would also create problems with South Vietnam and some tactical problems with Germany, which already has agreed in principle to the two Germanys being represented after their current negotiations are completed. We could probably protect ourselves against these problems. But they would be the cost to us of universality. The choice, then, is whether to go to dual representation, and if so, whether to link it with universality.

There is another issue related to the representation question: who shall hold the Security Council seat? If we go to a dual representation formula this would set in play pressures that would inevitably result

in the Chinese Communists taking the seat. However, we may be able to hold the line for several years, although this is not a procedural matter and we can't use the veto.

Secretary Rogers: But we can hold it off until Peking demands the seat.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true but when Peking does demand the seat it will be a difficult problem for us.

Those are the principal issues relating to representation. But there are other issues which affect our relations with Taipei because Chiang will almost certainly insist on reassurances and our continued military presence. Peking will also figure in because of its reactions to our defense posture. There are three aspects to our defense posture on Taiwan: (1) the Mutual Defense Treaty, (2) our force levels on Taiwan, and (3) our military assistance to Taiwan.

(1) The treaty dates from 1954. We have restated our commitment to that treaty in the Annual Report on Foreign Policy.³ Chiang will want a further reaffirmation. There is no practical consequence to doing so, except that Peking may not like it.

(2) Force Levels. We now have 9,000 men on Taiwan—2,200 associated with the defense of Taiwan and 6,800 associated with our general military activities in Asia. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] Chiang will want us to maintain, or even increase, our force levels. But if we want to get negotiations with Peking, one thing certain is that it will want a reduction of our military presence. A military cutback on Taiwan in the near future, coming at the same time as a movement to permit Peking's entry into the UN, could have unfortunate consequences.

We are now making a study in an interdepartmental forum of which of our activities on Taiwan are essential, and which might be relocated some other place. I don't think that anyone recommends cuts this year. By the time we consider cuts, we will know what we are talking about.

(3) Military Assistance Level. Chiang wants at least the present level of military assistance from us and he may renew his request for F4s and 3 submarines. There are no problems on maintaining our existing military assistance levels. The supplementary appropriation last fall restored some of the cuts. But the judgment always has been that there is no essential military need for submarines and F4s.

Secretary Laird: He has changed his views slightly. He now wants one submarine and two or three destroyers.

³ See footnote 3, Document 341.

Admiral Moorer: In the past we provided submarines to assist them in their ASW training but we no longer have the submarines available to do this for them. They want us to provide some so that they can do their own ASW training.

Secretary Laird: We more or less agree with them about this.

Dr. Kissinger: There is another issue which will be referred to you which relates to the representation issue and that is the status of the government on Taiwan. We have followed a policy of maintaining relations only with Taiwan, but remaining silent about its claims to sovereignty over all China, and we also deal with Peking. This policy gives us the greatest flexibility but we may not be able to hold to it if we go to a new policy on UN representation. The alternative is to state publicly that which government is the legitimate government of China is not for us to decide. The consensus is that we should stick with our present policy.

There are two other issues which do not need decision now and in view of the shortage of time do not need to be discussed in any detail now. They should, however, be presented to you later. These issues are a possible renunciation of force agreement with the PRC and an arms control agreement with the PRC.

So the matters for decision now concern what policy to follow at the UN: whether to change our policy, and if so, to what, and what to do about the Important Question Resolution, and about universality. We also have to consider what to do about the military issues in our relations with Taiwan and the status of Taiwan.

The President: What is the timing? When do you have to know.

Dr. Kissinger: The Department needs to know in about two weeks for purposes of consultation.

Secretary Rogers: The last part of Henry's presentation, the issues of the renunciation of force and arms control are well in the future and we don't have to worry about that now. By the time we get to those, we will all be gone, maybe from this Earth.

As to our support for Taiwan, if we change our policy in the UN we will certainly have to keep our support for Taiwan and I believe that any reduction in our force would be very difficult. I don't anticipate any trouble with the Congress on this.

So the real question is what to do in the UN. The Important Question Resolution always comes first at the UN. Its passage means that a two-thirds vote is required to change the Chinese representation. However, a simple majority can pass the Important Question Resolution. We have always held firm on the Important Question.

The second question is the Albanian Resolution, as Henry said. We have always defeated it by a good margin. But last year, for the first

time, the Albanian Resolution got a majority and the vote on the Important Question showed considerable slippage, and it was 66 in favor and 52 against. There has been considerable additional slippage since then.

The assessment is that we will lose on the IQ this year. That means the PRC would be admitted and Taiwan would be expelled. Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and Japan and also George Bush and his colleagues all agree with this assessment. We recently sent Ambassador Brown to Taiwan. He talked to Taipei officials, and they too think we will lose this year although they haven't told Chiang. They think that probably a change of policy would be desirable.

We think that we can get sufficient support for a new policy to prevent GRC expulsion, and if we do, Peking won't come in. Everybody thinks that dual representation is the policy to follow. It keeps the GRC in for two or three years at least.

The problem is the rationale for a change in our policy. We could say that we have just changed our policy in the face of the fact that otherwise we would face certain defeat. Or we can move to the principle of universality. This of course would have to support the position that all viable nations should be admitted. This includes North Vietnam and East Germany and North Korea. We can exclude the Germanys from this because this is already under active consideration.

The question really is what change in policy should we make, and how can we state our rationalization of it. We must consult soon because other nations are about to take positions. The U.K. is among them and if they change, several countries including Canada will follow their lead. Incidentally, I am going to call Alec Home to try to get them to hold up. We need to talk over our position with them now, or it will be too late. On any decision we make we can wait to announce it, certainly, until after the Korean election in April.

The President: If we start talking with these countries, won't our position leak?

Secretary Rogers: It probably will, but everyone knows that we are considering a change. We should state our position affirmatively at some point. An announcement by you, for example, might be appropriate and there is a draft which we have given you of a speech. If you don't want to make it, I could. But before we say anything we should first consult with other countries. And, if we change our policy we should do it openly, rather than let it slip up on us.

The President: Is Brown still in Taiwan?

Secretary Rogers: No he is back.

The President: Even though we have made some feelers on Taiwan and had some indication of a reasonable response, they will clearly

be disturbed. All of their chips are on the table. Even small moves that we have made toward the PRC in my report sends Taiwan up the wall. On the military side do we feel that strong military commitments can be justified and supported?

Secretary Laird: Yes, we can get all the support we need.

The President: What I mean is that if we make a change, it is important that we go to Chiang first and that a quid pro quo for him be announced as part of our change. We have to know that we can get all the support we need.

Secretary Rogers: Yes, but Taiwan knows the situation and they know that we are not working behind their backs. We are not trying to do this against their will. Brown found that they know a change is necessary.

The President: Yes, they see what is coming and they may realize they have to relax and enjoy it as best they can. But if they have military reassurances they will feel much better about it. But we can still expect an emotional response and we must be sure to show them that we are sticking by them militarily. Now, the military would give destroyers, a sub and some F4s.

Secretary Laird: No problem with a sub and destroyers. But F4s are expensive. We can get this through Congress though if we need to do so. Young people may see advantages to a change in policy, but Chiang may not. Chiang may prefer to be expelled rather than accept a change. He is a tough guy, and he runs the show. [2¹/₂ lines of source text not declassified]

Admiral Moorer: We have had to reduce our forces in Japan, and Okinawa has reverted. The Philippines also are shaky as a base for our forces, and we have no replacements yet for the trust territories as a location for our forces. Taiwan provides very important facilities in the Western Pacific. Taiwan is providing support therefore for the Nixon Doctrine. I have been there as a Commander many times. The Chinese always cooperate better than anyone else—they cooperate to the fullest. I know they don't have anywhere else to go, but I think we should remember their cooperation and the fact that they provide us with important facilities in an area where we are losing places to put those facilities.

Secretary Rogers: There is no disagreement in the government on this. In fact, if we change our policy, I think we should *strengthen* our position on Taiwan. So far as Chiang is concerned, his subordinates that we have talked with indicate that if we do change they will vote against us, but tacitly go along with us. All we are talking about is discussing it with them and reaching an understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: We are doing an interdepartmental study on force structures [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in Asia including

on Taiwan. It will look into the strength we have on Taiwan and why it is there. We will have this study in May or June, and there is no need for a decision now.

Secretary Laird: Those studies consider reductions in our forces.

The President: Brown did not see Chiang?

Secretary Rogers: No, he did not. If we are going to keep Taiwan in the UN we have to make our position known soon because the others are moving to positions. If the UK gets out in front of us we will have a hard time getting them in line.

Under Secretary Johnson: The UK has supported the Important Question but has voted for the Albanian Resolution in the past. Now they say they will not vote for the Important Question.

Ambassador Bush: We should think carefully about how this should be presented. It would be disastrous if we denigrated the excellent past performance of China in the UN. China has supported us on every issue, has paid its dues promptly. Our contacts feel there could be some change in the attitude of China. China recognizes that support is rapidly falling away from the position we have held. We need to begin to consult with others at the UN. Our friends are deserting us on this issue, the Australians, the Belgians, Canadians, Italians. We in New York agree that we have got to get moving on this issue without delay. From our study of the votes, even if we don't mention Peking or Taiwan, a simple resolution saying the expulsion of a member from the UN is an Important Question will only get a narrow majority. This is silly season up there.

The President: There is another important political problem. A poll was taken two weeks ago by ORC.⁴ I was surprised at the results. One of the questions was "Do you favor the admission of Communist China to the UN?" The vote was 3 to 2 against. Let us make no mistake. The majority of the people in this country are against Communist China's admission and many believe that if they do get in, we should get out. So we have a serious problem in the country. I can face this better than most, for nobody is going to think that I am caving in to the Communists. But make no mistake, there is a majority against Peking in the UN, and universality and the Important Question don't have much to do with it.

The old man's⁵ position is important. I don't think they will walk out of the UN. I think the Chinese will find a way. They will kick. They will scream. But this will be for domestic consumption, and in the end they will go along.

⁴ Opinion Research Corporation.

⁵ Apparent reference to Chiang Kai-shek.

But if the old man can make it a little easier for us here at home, it will make it more possible for us to make a change in terms of our serious domestic problem. Lots of Americans think Communist China in the UN is a bad idea. If we change our policy, we will get glowing editorials from the *New York Times*, *Time Magazine*, etc. But we will get a hell of a kick from the people. If the U.S. opens its arms to let Peking in, a lot of people will object. In Texas they are 2 to 1 against. In California it is about 3 to 2 against, like the rest of the country. In New York it is about even. All across the country they are against it.

Secretary Rogers: This points up the real problem. If we continue on our present policy, we will have the worst of both worlds.

The President: I know what we have to do. But we have to get Chiang in a posture from which he can help us and our domestic position on this issue.

We need to get the old man to help us. And secondly we need to position this thing domestically so it will sell. One thing we could do would be to let the UN take the rap.

Secretary Rogers: If we are successful with a dual representation policy, the results will show. Taiwan will still be in the UN, and maybe Peking won't come in.

The President: I am sure that Peking won't come in unless Taiwan goes out.

Secretary Rogers: So we have two, three or four years.

The President: We have a problem with Taiwan but I think we can bring them around. I may need to send a personal representative to bring Chiang Kai-shek around but I think it can be done.

But with US opinion, we don't want to get caught in the crunch of welcoming Communist China into the UN. I am not inclined to think that there are any points for us to make in saying that we have seen the light, and Communist China ought to be in the UN. That would be bad for us. It would be bad for Taiwan. I recognize that we are going to have to take the lead privately—but publicly we should be very careful. I would like for you to give me some thoughts on how to handle American opinion. The same policy [*poll?*] that I mentioned earlier shows the UN is in very low repute with the American public.

Now I am going to argue the other way. If it is done in such a way that a polyglot bunch of countries in the UN push us into Communist China membership when we didn't want it, that will hurt the UN. We don't want to hurt the UN any more. But it will be hurt if it pushes us into something we don't want. Universality and the I.Q. are OK but to the average guy it is a simple question "Do we want Peking in or not?" That is what we've got to work on.

Secretary Rogers: We must know whether the new policy will work. We will have to fight for retention of Taiwan's seat. If we will

lose, we may as well stay where we are. There were 25 abstentions on the Albanian Resolution last time. Many of those would vote for both seats.

Secretary Laird: Can't we check this out?

Secretary Rogers: Not until we have a position.

Secretary Laird: If we can't save the seat that way, why make a public issue out of it?

Ambassador Bush: I agree that we should put the issue in terms of trying to save the seat.

Attorney General Mitchell: Our public posture is that we are fighting to retain the seat for Taiwan.

The President: We must do this. The issue is whether we should bite the bullet and go in on the universality question. But there are problems with this. For example, the question of North Korea which is fighting the UN. East Germany is also a problem and I can't see it, and as for North Vietnam, I can't see the Soviets ever letting in South Vietnam. So maybe we can handle these.

Attorney General Mitchell: If we go with universality, we are letting more Communists in the UN. But if we stay just with the Chinese issue, we are not.

Secretary Rogers: No, actually they will be equal in number and getting South Vietnam in would be a great coup.

Under Secretary Johnson: We would be letting in South Vietnam, South Korea and East Germany.

The President: We have a lot to gain with universality in theoretical terms but we also stand to lose something.

Secretary Rogers: The Germans have already announced that they want to do it.

Dr. Kissinger: But the Germans want to do it themselves and not have us give it away for them.

Attorney General Mitchell: The political question still will be that we are letting Communists in.

The President: We can handle it. I did not raise the political problem as a block. We have handled worse political problems than this before. But if we can't get the votes, then there is not much point in changing our policy. We could just get rolled and let the UN take the rap. We should start a check on this right now.

Ambassador Bush: We may not get the votes.

Secretary Rogers: We need to talk with our friends, say that we are thinking about a change in our position and get their thoughts. (turns to Mitchell) John, politically, if the Chinese are not admitted we can say that our policy had been successful in keeping them out.

Attorney General Mitchell: Could you say that? Don't they have the option of coming in at any time?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, you could say it.

Under Secretary Johnson: No, if we present it to the American public this way, only as a way to keep Peking out, it will be seen internationally as just a gimmick.

The President: No, we can't say that.

Attorney General Mitchell: But the fight to keep Taiwan in is important with respect to the U.S. public.

The President: The old man (President Chiang Kai-shek) is partly a realistic figure, but he is also very firm on other matters.

Secretary Rogers: To go back to Mel's point, we can't keep quiet about it. It will leak. We must have a policy. How to announce it will be an important political judgment. We have a draft speech which you can consider making which will highlight the issues.

Secretary Laird: My point is that this is not a big winner for the President.

The Vice President: Could I make a few radical observations?

The President: Radical?

The Vice President: In view of what has been said here, yes, I suppose it is radical. I did not know of the polls that you referred to, Mr. President, so that is not part of my thoughts. I'm not sure whether we should consider a defeat in the UN as something we should shy away from as a bad thing for the US now. I am not sure that a defeat at the UN is not in our interest. If we are defeated and Taiwan is replaced by Communist China, it does not affect our national security. Looking down the years with Peking in the UN—it will have a tall podium for espousing its interests, which are not compatible with our views of the world. If Peking gets in with our assistance or tacit consent, its statements later will have enhanced dignity before the world community.

I have come to the conclusion that it may well be the UN is not in the US best interests. I can see all of the considerations, but I don't see how playing the game on Communist China's admission gains us anything. I think that if we stand with what we believe and take our lumps, that might preserve your options, and the options of other Presidents, better in the future. Looking now to what is expedient may not be in the best interests of the US. We should consider what happens if we do not go along: We would be sustaining our credibility in Asia. We would still have the ability to support security conditions on Taiwan. And we wouldn't have given in to a country that has given no indication at all that it is out for our interests.

The President: (To Connally) Do you want to say something?

Secretary Connally: I am talking from instinct, because I don't really know very much about this. But, if I know Chiang Kai-shek at all, he won't ever agree to it. He'll try to get a quid pro quo—to extract everything he can from us. Privately he may agree with us. But in public he can't agree. If I were in his place, I wouldn't agree either. For the US public, therefore, he has to fight. That is what the American people will see and understand. I have the same basic view as the Vice President. What is so wrong with getting defeated if you were standing for what you believe? One thing we need from a political standpoint is an enemy, and that enemy is Communist China. What have we lost, as a practical matter, if we lose? What has Chiang Kai-shek lost, even if he is kicked out from the UN, if he retains the friendship of the US and our commitment? So the UK, Canada and Ireland leave us. So what?

Secretary Rogers: Most hope that we can keep the Communist Chinese out. I know that Australia and New Zealand feel this way. If our policy succeeds, we will be keeping Communist China out.

Secretary Connally: But this is not salable as an adroit move to keep the Communist Chinese out. Everyone will see that they can come in whenever they want. They have the option of coming in at any time and to try to kick Taiwan out. Why shouldn't we take a hard line on this one?

The Vice President: Because we Americans are compulsive negotiators.

The President: Let me say I thought that this was a brilliant paper. I read it last night. It helps us to focus on the issues.

For whatever it is worth, I would like to close on one point. I don't know how we can sell it, but my own view is that the Communist Chinese won't come in. Everybody seems to be an expert on the Chinese, but nobody knows anything about them. In fact, the Chinese might say, "We need an enemy." I had an interesting talk with the man who owns half of the Mandarin Hotel in Hong Kong, Harold Lee. He is undoubtedly a man who plays all sides and has some contacts with the Communist Chinese. I asked him, "What do you think about our recognizing Communist China?" His reply was, "You are crazy. Do you know what they would say? You recognize us? The question is whether we would recognize you."

If they play it the clever way, they have the option of coming in. Their reaction is: "We need an enemy and we won't come in until those guys get out". Their reaction will be as the leader of a dynamic movement all around the world. They won't come in until the others get out.

We need to talk about this some more. I will look it over again over the weekend.

**343. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to
Certain Posts¹**

Washington, March 31, 1971, 2330Z.

54227. Subject: Chirep.

1. Pending further instructions, you should not initiate any consultations on Chinese Representation in the UN. If host government raises question, you should indicate matter still under study within USG and we hope to have full discussions with host government after our position clarified.

2. Foregoing not intended to preclude addressees from discussions with host governments on question of recognition of Communist China (in which case previous instructions continue to apply) should this matter arise. However, paragraph one guidance is controlling in event Chirep issue arises in that context.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Feldman, Armitage, and Shoesmith; cleared by Jenkins, Daniel Goott, William A. Helseth, Peter C. Walker, Whitman, and Winthrop G. Brown; and approved by Herz. Sent to Accra, Abidjan, Ankara, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, Lome, London, Kuwait, Oslo, Rome, Seoul, Tehran, Tokyo, Taipei, Vienna, Wellington, Yaounde, USUN, and Tunis, and repeated to Hong Kong.

344. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the United Nations

The primary issue is whether to continue with the current policy aimed at keeping Peking out and Taipei in (the Vice President's preference) at the risk of defeat this year or next, or shift to a new policy aimed at preventing—or at least deferring—Taiwan's expulsion (State's preference). The necessity for a joint policy with Taiwan makes it desirable to defer final decisions on this issue until your personal representative—hopefully Bob Murphy—has talked the whole problem out with Chiang Kai-shek.

The need for speed. It is important, however, to complete that process as quickly as possible, for there is a growing momentum working against us in the international community. In recent months, Ethiopia, Canada, Italy, Nigeria, Chile and Equatorial Guinea have recognized Peking as the only legitimate government of China. This week Kuwait joined that list, and five others are now negotiating with Peking. If we are going to try to hold some line at the UN, we need to approach our friends before any more of them get frozen into postures which preclude cooperation with us. Otherwise, we are in danger of losing the ballgame during the seventh inning stretch.

The immediate question for decision is how, and with what, to approach Chiang. Frankly, I do not see much point in sending a representative to Chiang merely to discuss *in general terms* the problem and the possibility of a new policy. Such talks will surely result in the need for further talks, and we do not have the time for prolonged palaver.

Instead, your representative should present to Chiang the precise alternatives as you see them, and bring back to you Chiang's precise views on them. This means that we must decide now which specific

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Nixon/HAK Memoranda, The President, Kissinger, and Ambassador Chow, April 12, 1971. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum is stamped "The President has seen." A covering note in the files suggests that it was drafted by Wright, with the concurrence of Holdridge. (Ibid.) Another copy of the memorandum contains a covering note that reads: "April 12, HAK—Pres. didn't act on this. Do you want to A. ask him, B. send back?" Kissinger initialed option "A" and wrote "Let me take in to [unreadable] to get signed. HK" (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, 1 January 1971–May 1971, Vol. VI, Part 2)

new strategy we are prepared to consider, provided Chiang will cooperate.

State believes that a change of policy is worthwhile, even if it only staves off expulsion for a year or so. I do not agree. That position does not adequately reflect your concern for the domestic reaction. Moreover, such a “change” is not really very different from sticking with our current policy. Both result, sooner or later, in Taiwan’s expulsion. I do not think Chiang will seriously consider such an “alternative”.

It seems to me, therefore, that a new policy is worth considering if—but only if—it has a real chance of preventing Taiwan’s expulsion for the foreseeable future—not just for a year or two. I believe there is one strategy which *may*—I am not sure it *will*—serve that purpose. Its elements are as follows:

1. *Universality*. I would include universality for three reasons: (a) it should make a change of policy slightly more palatable to Chiang, (b) it would provide us with a principle and a good debating point, internationally for retaining Taiwan’s seat, and domestically for our change of policy, and (c) it might win us a few votes at the UN.

2. *Dual Representation*. Given the UN sentiment, there is no prospect for saving Taiwan’s seat with a policy which continues to bar Peking’s membership. Dual representation is, therefore, an essential part of any strategy to save Taiwan’s seat.

3. *A Modified Important Question Resolution Limited to the Expulsion of Taiwan*. Limiting the Important Question Resolution in this way will permit the dual representation resolution to pass with a simple majority. Thus Peking will have been voted in. That puts the remaining issue, Taiwan’s expulsion, in the sharpest and best possible form for us. So long as a simple majority supports the Modified Important Question Resolution, the expulsion can be prevented by only one-third of the UN membership. We can certainly hold one-third for the foreseeable future. The crunch question, therefore, is whether we can hold, in the years to come, a majority for a modified Important Question Resolution. If we can, we can save Taipei’s membership. If we cannot, Taipei will be expelled.

Armed with this as the alternative policy, I suggest your representative should make the following points to Chiang:

1. Your concern in this matter is to prevent Taipei’s expulsion from the United Nations. It is to discuss that danger, and how to meet it, that you have sent a personal representative.

2. If we stick to the current policy, we cannot prevent Taipei’s expulsion—probably this year, certainly next.

3. The only new policy we can see which has a real chance of permanently preventing Taipei’s expulsion is the mix of universality, dual

representation, and a modified Important Question Resolution. We are not sure if that policy will work and cannot know without consulting widely with other UN members.

4. You are prepared to make a major international effort on behalf of this policy if Chiang wishes you to do so, and will help. A new policy, however, is not practical internationally or in U.S. domestic terms, unless it has Chiang's support.

5. You recognize that a new policy is difficult for him as well as us. You are prepared to lessen his problem by (a) reaffirmation of our Defense Treaty, (b) assurances on the maintenance of U.S. force levels on Taiwan, and (c) sympathetic consideration of his military assistance needs.

6. Under these circumstances, which course does he prefer: staying with current policy, or trying to line up support for the new policy?

Presented in this stark way, I think there is at least a chance that Chiang will opt for a change of policy. He has not survived all his troubles by giving in to an impulse for suicide. However, his domestic considerations may lead him nonetheless to prefer expulsion to compromise.

Whatever Chiang's preference, there is a compelling reason to consult very candidly with him on this issue before you make up your mind. Otherwise, a decision to stick with the current policy is singularly subject to misunderstanding. After all, the practical effect of such a policy is Taiwan's expulsion, and everyone knows that including Chiang's officials, foreign governments, and the U.S. press. Unless there has been a clear understanding with Chiang on it, many people, both at home and abroad, will seriously question the real motive behind a U.S. policy which can only result in Taiwan's expulsion.

*Recommendations:*²

1. That you approve Robert Murphy as your personal representative to Chiang.

2. That he proceed to Taiwan as soon as possible to consult with Chiang along the lines set forth in this memo, with stress on obtaining

² The approve option has been marked "done" below recommendations 1, 2, and 4. The approve option below recommendation 3 is marked "yes." During his meeting with Murphy and Kissinger on April 15, Nixon emphasized the need for secrecy, adding that he could not ask McConaughy to carry out this mission because the Ambassador had to report to the Department of State. (Ibid., White House Tapes, April 15, 1971, 5:26-6:20 p.m., Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 249-26) Also see footnote 2, Document 349.

Chiang's preferences between sticking to our current policy and shifting to a new policy of dual representation aimed at maintaining Taiwan's UN seat.

3. That your final decision on our policy and consultations with other governments be deferred until we have Chiang's reactions.

4. That pending those decisions, State be instructed carefully to avoid any indication of a new U.S. position on the Chirep issue.

345. Memorandum From Melvin H. Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

A number of erosive developments on Chirep are worth bringing to your notice:

—USUN reports that the ping pong visit to China is having a considerable impact at the UN, where it is the main subject of corridor discussions. The general impression is that the visit bolsters Peking's campaign to enter the UN this year. There is also a growing impression among other Delegates, despite negative noises by USUN, that the visit means the U.S. has completed our policy review on Chirep and has decided to go for dual representation.²

—In a round-up cable of opinion on the China question, Embassy Canberra reports that the events of the past week have given a psychological lift to advocates of a new China policy, and put the Australian Government on the defensive.³

—In another somber comment, USUN predicts that there will be three (Bhutan, Bahrein, Qatar) and perhaps four (Oman) new UN mem-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: "HAK has seen," with the date June 4, 1971.

² Telegram 924 from USUN, April 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 16 US)

³ Telegram 2134 from Canberra, April 14. (Ibid., POL 16 CHICOM)

bers at the beginning of this fall's General Assembly. All of those can be expected to oppose our traditional position on the Important Question and the Albanian Resolution.⁴ Hal Saunders agrees with this analysis.

—State is concerned by a report that the Chicoms are trying to keep the snowball on recognition growing by asking the Mauritians to work on the Senegalese. There have been other reports along this line. The list of potential candidates for diplomatic recognition of Peking may be widening.

—ROC Ambassador (and Foreign Minister-designate) Chow Shukai paid a farewell call on Assistant Secretaries DePalma and Green last Friday.⁵ Chow was accompanied by UN Ambassador Liu.

Chow and Liu stressed the importance of maintaining the Important Question resolution in our Chirep strategy. Asked about the possibility of a modified I.Q. (limited to Taipei's expulsion) they didn't rule the idea out, but apparently preferred the traditional model.

Green and DePalma made clear that the USG has reached no final decisions on Chirep, although the situation regarding our traditional policy has continued to worsen.

In a brief discussion of a possible "third resolution", Chow said he personally liked the idea of a relatively vague resolution seating both Peking and Taipei without going into legal and political cases. Chow thought he could sell such an idea in Taipei if it would effectively combat the Albanian Resolution and would give the ROC the protections the Charter affords to a member (now of doubtful availability since the issue is representation not membership). However, Chow closed the conversation on a rather hard line by stating that there might be considerations more important to Taipei than UN membership.

Comment: In addition to the foregoing items, our own gestures toward Peking—including today's announcement—will add to its international respectability. Although we will not be able to assess the full effects with precision for some time, we can expect a further weakening of support for our traditional Chirep position.

John Holdridge concurs in this memo and Hal Saunders.

⁴ Telegram 928 from USUN, April 14. (Ibid.)

⁵ A memorandum of conversation of this April 5 meeting is *ibid.*, UN 6 CHICOM.

346. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Bush) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

New York, April 17, 1971.

Dear Henry,

The Security Council (SC) question is fundamental. It will be impossible to consider Peking's (PRC) coming into the General Assembly (GA) without considering the SC question.

I have not talked to a single person around the UN who feels that a Dual Representation (DR) would have a chance unless the SC went to PRC. As we ask the official of GRC to consider a policy shift on our part they must face this basic fact.

A DR resolution could in fact include a paragraph recommending that PRC hold the China seat on the SC; but at a minimum there would be an unwritten understanding. Any effort to obscure the SC seat question will be viewed as an effort to keep the PRC out of the UN. Alas, I wish it weren't so.

Some comments on the parliamentary situation:

1. The election of PRC to the Security Council by the members of the SC is NOT VETOABLE because it is a *credentials* question.

2. If PRC is voted into the GA under a DR formula it could appear at the first meeting of the SC in 1972, present its credentials as the Government entitled to represent China. A majority (9) would clearly support PRC over GRC.²

3. If the question was on admitting a "New Member" an SC veto would apply. New Members are admitted to the UN by a 2/3rds vote of the GA *following* recommendation of the SC with the permanent members all in agreement (none vetoing).

4. If the question was on "Two Chinas" as opposed to Dual Representation it would then be a membership question and would then be vetoable. But Two Chinas is a non-starter, both PRC and GRC vigorously opposing it, plus all the Albanian Resolution types would say—"just a device to keep PRC off the SC".

My recommendations:

1. Any emissary discussing UN representation with GRC must not avoid facing up to the SC question. It is a regrettable fact of life.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN 1, June–30 September 1971, Vol. VII. No classification marking.

² Bush's handwritten clarification reads: "(9 required)".

2. Pres Nixon would be ill served by any policy that appears to be “selling out” the GRC. It is argued by the elite—“PRC is a reality” . . . It is but so is GRC and we must not appear to “sell out” a little reality in order to face up to a big reality. It may happen, but we must not be its advocate.

3. Time is important. As soon as things shape up, we should be able to get you a lot more dope as to how viable a DR plan is, but we will have to be able to hustle up some votes, and we will need some insight into the GRC final position.³

George Bush

³ Bush added a handwritten note at the end of the letter: “If you need more detail—[UN] charter references etc.—call me: I’ll be in N.Y. Sun. night—until then WASH 362–1214. Self-typed—apologies . . . GB. If you show this to anyone please re-type the damn thing!” Melvin Levine drafted a response for Kissinger to Bush. In his covering memorandum to Kissinger, he did not agree with Bush’s proposal to confront the ROC immediately on the Security Council issue, because “we should not at this juncture add another straw to Chiang’s back.” The letter acknowledged that the Security Council seat was essential to any dual representation plan, but suggested that it was in U.S. interest to see the issue “kept blurred a bit longer.” Haig commented on the draft response: “HAK: You shouldn’t spell your views in writing. This should say thanks—let’s talk sometime you’re here.” Kissinger added “Right, HK.” The response actually sent, dated May 7, reads: “I am sorry to be so long in responding to your letter of April 17. I was glad to get your thoughts on the fundamental importance of the Security Council seat for the Chinese representation issue. Let’s talk about it next time you are in Washington.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, 1 June–30 September 1971, Vol. VII)

347. National Security Study Memorandum 124¹

Washington, April 19, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China

The President has directed a study of possible diplomatic initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the objective of furthering the improvement of relations. These initiatives should explore the degree to which it is possible to build on recent progress. They should be put into the context of our relations towards other countries, especially the USSR and Japan.

The analysis of each possible diplomatic initiative should include:

- the objective of the initiative;
- anticipated reaction or response by the PRC;
- the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative;
- an assessment of the possible effects on our relations with and the anticipated reactions of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the USSR, Japan and other nations as appropriate;
- an illustrative scenario by which the initiative could be pursued.

The initiatives should be placed into various groups of increasing scope and also include consideration of appropriate arms control measures included in the ongoing studies provided for by NSSMs 69 and 106 on this subject.

The study should assume that there will be no change in our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.

The President has directed that this study be prepared on a priority basis by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by May 15, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs 104–206. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

348. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1971, 11:40 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

Australia

Hon. Leslie H. E. Bury, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Sir James Plimsoll, Australian Ambassador

United States

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

James V. Martin, Jr., Director for Australia, New Zealand Affairs

Minister Bury said he would like to raise the question of Chinese representation.

Secretary Rogers told him we were going through a careful process of reviewing our policy and the possible alternatives for change. What was the Australian position?

Bury replied that the Australian Government would not like to see Taiwan ejected from the United Nations. On the other hand, to continue with the pretense that Taiwan was China, he said "won't wash." In Australia the view was becoming strong that China should not be excluded from the U.N. This was especially evident after the Canadian recognition of Peking and the Australian failure to sell wheat this year. China had bought from Canada, not from Australia. However, the Australian Government believed that the motivation in Peking was commercial, not political.

Mr. Green commented that the CPR bought wheat from Canada every year. It sold rice, bought wheat, which was cheaper, and saved money.

The Secretary repeated that our policy had not yet been decided. We had been considering dual representation as an alternative to the present policy and had been considering various rationales for such a policy. We had asked ourselves whether dual representation might be based on universality. A very real consideration was whether such a policy would succeed. If it would not, why try it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Martin and approved by Assistant Secretary Green and in S as amended on May 12. The memorandum of conversation is identified as part three of seven parts.

Ambassador Plimsoll noted that the rationale of universality would get us into admitting two Koreas, two Vietnams and two Germanies. Australians could not go that far.

Secretary Rogers thought we could adopt the principle of universality but still exclude, for example, North Korea because there was no peace in Korea yet, only an armistice. As opposed to that the two Germanies had a treaty with each other. We could tie admission to the ratification of a treaty between the two entities concerned. Why, then, would Australia have trouble with universality as the rationale?

Ambassador Plimsoll felt it would be too difficult at this stage.

Mr. Green suggested that the obvious other course would be to hold to the old policy of the Important Question. We knew, however, that this would fail. There might be a good deal of support this year for the Albanian Resolution if there were no good alternative that would keep the GRC in the United Nations.

The Secretary observed that under the present difficult circumstances people were becoming more realistic.

When Mr. Green referred to Korean attitudes in this connection, Ambassador Plimsoll said he did not think that the Koreans would be able to do anything before their elections took place. Green noted that the elections were just a few days away.

349. Record of Conversation¹

Taipei, April 23, 1971.

SUMMARY RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND MR. ROBERT D. MURPHY

President Chiang Kai-shek received Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Richard M. Nixon, on April 23, 1971, at 4:00 p.m., at Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, Taipei. Also present were Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai and James C. H. Shen, Ambassador-designate to the United States, who did the interpretation. Following is a summary of the conversation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 828, Name Files, Murphy, Robert. Top Secret. Forwarded to Kissinger by Melvin H. Levine on May 3, along with a draft covering memorandum for the President and Murphy's covering letter to Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 1031, Files for the President, China Materials, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) The package was not forwarded to Nixon.

After the exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Murphy said in effect as follows: Certain problems have now arisen for the United States and the Republic of China concerning the United Nations. He said parenthetically that there are those who may have reservations regarding the effectiveness of that organization, and no doubt President Chiang is aware of that sentiment. The United States and the Republic of China, however, are now confronted with certain practical problems. The most important thing at the moment is to seek a common understanding between the two governments. President Nixon has chosen Mr. Murphy to make this trip in order to have a personal, face-to-face exchange of views with the President without arousing too much attention. The problems today are not created by the United States but by the changing world situation and a developing international trend. It is President Nixon's sincere hope that the traditional friendship between the two governments long based on mutual trust will not be adversely affected by these problems. On the contrary, it behooves both governments to study together whether we should pursue the old strategy to cope with them or to find a new way out. Mr. Nixon seriously doubts the feasibility of maintaining the old formula. As a result of a very careful study, it is believed that should we persist in using the old formula, we would encounter defeat in the UN this year or, at the latest, next year. President Nixon, therefore, has entrusted him to ascertain from President Chiang his opinion whether we should maintain the original tactics or adopt a new approach so as to protect the common interests of the United States and the Republic of China.

President Chiang asked whether President Nixon has already found a new formula?

Mr. Murphy replied that President Nixon has given him to understand that no final decision would be made before Mr. Murphy could visit President Chiang and report back the results of this conversation.

President Chiang inquired whether the U.S. Government now has any new proposal to make?

Mr. Murphy replied that in the past there were the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question Resolution. The U.S. Government feels that due to changing circumstances, if no new approach is devised, there is a serious danger of the Albanian Resolution being adopted and the Important Question Resolution being defeated.

President Chiang wanted to know what sort of a new approach one should make?

Mr. Murphy said that so far no drafting work has been undertaken because this would require a joint study by both governments. The general idea is to replace the Important Question Resolution with a "dual representation" formula. The new resolution might be prefaced

by a statement in favor of the principle of universality and then go on to propose a dual representation for China without defining which of the two contending parties is the sole representative of China, since this is an issue which will have to be solved by the two parties themselves. While supporting this new approach, the United States will continue to honor its treaty commitments and to provide military assistance to the Republic of China. It must be pointed out, however, this new proposal, when formally presented to the members of the U.N., must be a sincere effort to solve the Chinese representation question and not merely a gimmick. On the other hand, it could be that the Chinese Communist regime would not accept this new formula and would refuse to enter the United Nations.

President Chiang then asked what would happen to the Republic of China's seat in the Security Council.²

Mr. Murphy said the new proposal will avoid this point so as to enable the ROC to retain its seat in the Security Council.

President Chiang said he understands what Mr. Murphy has just stated, but pointed out that one must realize that while the Chinese representation question seems to be primarily a political issue, there are also certain legal principles involved.

Mr. Murphy said that if President Nixon could have his way he would have preferred to make no change whatsoever in the present setup.

President Chiang said he could understand the pressure on President Nixon to do something different this year. Nevertheless, the U.N. is located on American soil and the United States is a leading member of the organization. If the U.N. Charter were to be tampered with, it would damage the world's respect for and confidence in the United States.

Mr. Murphy jokingly mentioned that certain members are in favor of moving the U.N. away from the United States.

President Chiang went on to say that though he has not seen Mr. Murphy for a number of years, he knows Mr. Murphy is the Republic

² During their April 15 meeting, Nixon, Kissinger, and Murphy spoke little of the Security Council seat, but Kissinger seemed to suggest that the PRC would get the seat. Murphy and Nixon emphasized that the United States would try to delay this as long as possible. (Ibid., White House Tapes, April 15, 1971, 5:26–6:20 p.m., Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 249–26) The talking points prepared for Nixon, April 14, contain only one reference to the Security Council: "He [Murphy] should also explore Chiang's thinking on Chinese representation in the UN. He should point out: We believe that, with the best will in the world, our present strategy is doomed to failure, either this year or next. The issue will almost certainly not be presented in a form which will allow for a Security Council veto." The memorandum bears the handwritten note, "The President did not wish to see." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 828, Name Files, Murphy, Robert)

of China's friend, and he, therefore, proposed to discuss this matter with him frankly and cordially.

Mr. Murphy assured President Chiang of President Nixon's very warm friendship towards him. He was of the firm belief that Mr. Nixon will not abandon a good friend of such a long standing.

President Chiang pointed out that from the legal point of view, the Important Question Resolution should remain the principal instrument to bar the admission of the Chinese Communists. Since the Peiping regime stands condemned as an enemy of the U.N., any attempt to admit it into the organization must be considered as an important question. Out of respect for the U.N. Charter, which requires countries to be peace-loving before they can be admitted as members, the United States can justly maintain this stand. There is, of course, strong opposition from other quarters, but we must not forsake the sanctity of legal principles in order to appease Peiping.

Mr. Murphy lamented that if this principle should be carried to its logical conclusion, certain existing members would also have to be disqualified.

President Chiang affirmed that while other countries have violated the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter, the United States, as the leader of the free world, must not ever lose sight of them.

Mr. Murphy expressed regret that the United States for instance has to tolerate a hostile member such as Cuba.

President Chiang said that though he still considers the Important Question Resolution to be major instrument against the admission of the Chinese Communists, he would be willing to hear what views the United States may have on the subject since the United States, an ally, now anticipates difficulties in pursuing the same strategy as before.

Mr. Murphy said that the United States would prefer to maintain the status quo, but it must face certain realities including the establishment of diplomatic relations by eight more countries with the Peiping regime in recent months. (Indeed the first Chinese Communist ambassador has just arrived in Rome.) If the United States should choose to disregard this general trend, there is great danger of her going down in defeat together with the Republic of China on this issue. Mr. Nixon's position is that should the Republic of China insist upon using the old formula in the United Nations this fall, he would be prepared to go along. But Mr. Nixon is very anxious to know President Chiang's own views and to get his advice.

President Chiang said he felt that no matter whether the Important Question Resolution could be adopted or not, it must be introduced again. If the United States deems it necessary to propose a new approach, it must be so designed as to preserve both the Republic of

China's membership in the General Assembly and her seat in the Security Council, because the two really are inseparable. If the Republic of China's seats in the General Assembly and in the Security Council are to be treated as two separate matters, the admission of the Peiping regime into the U.N. would render the Republic of China's continued presence in the U.N. untenable, because it would deprive the Republic of China's U.N. membership of any legal basis. In such an eventuality the Republic of China would find it impossible to remain in this world body.

Mr. Murphy said that according to the latest U.S. estimate, if the old tactics should be used again, the Important Question Resolution could be defeated perhaps by 48 (in favor) and 56 (against). Should this turn out to be the case, nothing could be done to forestall disaster for our two countries. If a new formula to protect the Republic of China's position is used, there is a good chance to defeat the Albanian Resolution again.

President Chiang observed that should the United States find it absolutely necessary to resort to a new approach, such a new approach must reaffirm the substance of the Important Question Resolution and must not touch the ROC's seat in the Security Council. President Chiang stressed that yielding of the ROC's seat in the Security Council to the Peiping regime would undermine the legal foundation of the ROC's very existence. Such a humiliating situation would be against our national honor and tradition and would be, therefore, totally unacceptable.

Mr. Murphy reassured the President that any new formula would not involve ROC's seat in the Security Council.

At this moment Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai interposed this question: What would the United States do if some other members should raise the issue of the Security Council seat?

In reply, Mr. Murphy said that the new proposal which the United States is going to back will be so worded as to secure the support of the largest number of member states. The United States certainly has no intention, under the circumstances, of making it possible for Peiping to be seated in the Security Council. Furthermore, many member countries, some of them in Europe, would be satisfied once Peiping is granted membership in the General Assembly only, and would not actively advocate a seat in the Security Council for Peiping. In such an event, Mr. Murphy's guess is that the Peiping regime would reject the invitation and the onus would then be entirely on that regime itself.

President Chiang expressed his belief that it is not part of President Nixon's policy to damage the position of the ROC. On the condition that the ROC's seat in the Security Council remains intact, President Chiang would be prepared to discuss with President Nixon such a new formula as the United States now seems to have in mind.

Here Minister Chow Shu-kai interposed another question: Is it envisaged that the substance of the Important Question Resolution will be incorporated into the new formula?

Mr. Murphy explained that this is possible and probable. But the new formula should not be made to appear as only a gimmick. He stated further he knows that any new formula would not be to President Chiang's liking. But under the circumstances, there is no other way to deal with the question of the Peiping regime and the U.N. His guess is that the Chinese Communists would not accept the new formula.

President Chiang said he also tended to believe that if the Security Council seat is denied to the Peiping regime, it is possible that the latter would refuse to enter the U.N. But if the Security Council seat should be given to Peiping, then it would be difficult to predict what would be Peiping's response.

Mr. Murphy said it must be realized that this new trial involves certain risks. But time is running short and is not necessarily in our favor.

President Chiang then summed up his views as follows:

(1) From the standpoint of the Republic of China, we hope the Important Question Resolution can still be resorted to this year.

(2) If the United States should see difficulties ahead, the ROC would do nothing to stop her from suggesting a new formula provided that this new formula would not cause any serious damage to the ROC.

(3) Any new formula which endorses the U.N. General Assembly's acceptance of the Peiping regime is damaging enough to the ROC, even if Peiping does not come in.

(4) The new formula must by all means protect the ROC's seat in the Security Council in order to preserve the ROC's basic position and the integrity of the Charter.

(5) Should any other country try to amend the new resolution by including the ROC's seat in the Security Council, the United States must do its utmost to thwart such an attempt.

Mr. Murphy assured the President that the United States will insist on the adoption of the text in toto as supported by the United States without any amendment.

President Chiang expressed the strong hope that if a new resolution is to be introduced the United States should not be one of the sponsors.

Mr. Murphy said that Mr. Nixon himself does not want the United States to be an official sponsor. But this question of sponsorship may have to be decided by our common assessment with a view to facilitating the passage of the resolution.

President Chiang said that while it is the hope of the ROC not to see the United States as one of the official sponsors, he would leave it to the U.S. Government to weigh all the pros and cons.

Mr. Murphy reiterated that the United States really does not like this kind of new formula, but it must find a way out to solve this question.

President Chiang reemphasized the inseparability of the ROC's seats both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. Should the ROC's seat in the Security Council be taken away, then the ROC would have no choice but to act according to the Chinese proverb, "rather be a jade broken than an earthen tile intact".

Mr. Murphy jokingly commented that if we, under the old formula, should encounter defeat, then the jade would really be broken.

President Chiang said that he is fully aware of the consequences, but our legal stand and moral traditions would not allow us to coexist with the rebel regime in the U.N.

Mr. Murphy advanced the view that in his personal opinion even the United States herself, in such an eventuality, should not care too much about the U.N. membership.

President Chiang expressed his regret that the nature of the U.N. has already changed so much. If the Chinese Communist regime were to be admitted the seriousness of the consequences could not be overstated.

Mr. Murphy recalled what had transpired in the Cairo Conference which President Chiang attended. It is Mr. Murphy's observation that the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt had pinned excessive hope on the U.N. and this had failed to materialize. In connection with the condemnation of the Chinese Communist regime by the U.N. for its role in the Korean War mentioned earlier by President Chiang, the United States, because of the heavy casualties she suffered in that war, was indeed a direct victim of that crime.

President Chiang made the observation that in the case of Korea the crime committed by the Peiping regime was greater than that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Murphy said on top of that the Chinese Communists are still attacking the U.N. and the United States.

President Chiang pointed out that even after the visit of the American ping pong team to the Chinese mainland, the Peiping regime has not abated its attack on the United States. It is Peiping's deliberate attempt to drive a wedge between the American people and their Government.

Mr. Murphy said that Peiping has by now almost exhausted its vocabulary of invectives for use in its propaganda against the United States.

President Chiang recalled how certain quarters in the United States were pleased when Peiping did not attack Secretary of State William Rogers during his stop-over to Hongkong two years ago. President Chiang considered this kind of attitude as merely an illusion.

Mr. Murphy said in jest that perhaps at that time the Chinese Communists did not know who was Mr. William Rogers. Peiping has issued several hundred warnings against the United States since the Vietnam War began. The United States really has no illusion about the Chinese Communists' intentions. Mr. Murphy wished to know what is President Chiang's assessment of the sudden change of attitude on the part of the Chinese Communists?

President Chiang said it is his belief that this may have been due to (1) Peiping's desire to gain entry into the U.N. and (2) its wish to play off the United States against the Soviet Union in order to reduce the Russian pressure on itself.

Mr. Murphy wondered whether by "pressure" the President had meant military pressure, because the Soviet Union is now known to have deployed 41 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border areas.

President Chiang made the observation that while armed clashes may occur between Communist countries it does not follow that force on a really large scale will necessarily be used between the Soviet Union and the Peiping regime.

Mr. Murphy mentioned the 23 divisions which the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries used against Czechoslovakia two years ago. There must be some significance since the Russians now have 41 divisions along the Chinese mainland border.

Finally, President Chiang requested Mr. Murphy to transmit the following message to President Nixon. In President Chiang's opinion, the various overtures Washington has made to placate Peiping have reached a maximal limit, beyond which any further steps would bring disasters. As a good friend of President Nixon's, it is his wish to be very candid at all times. Frankly speaking, this time he was quite surprised when Mr. Nixon suggested for his daughter, Tricia, and her future husband to spend their honeymoon on the Chinese mainland and even expressed a desire to visit the mainland himself. If the United States does not put a stop to its concessions to the Peiping regime, eventually Peiping might get into not only the U.N. General Assembly but also the Security Council. Should the ROC one day leave the U.N., the world would know that she has been forced out not by the Communists, but by the United States.

Mr. Murphy said he regretted that the American younger generation nowadays is at times innocent and uninformed. The older generation has had experiences concerning Russia and the Chinese Communist regime. But unfortunately the youngsters do not have such personal knowledge. They are impatient and eager to change everything. They urge more people-to-people contacts with the Chinese Communists. He was not aware what Tricia had commented but others of her age are samples of this younger generation.

President Chiang felt that such thinking and such behaviour will have serious repercussions. But, of course, this is merely a chit-chat between friends.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the population of the United States is becoming younger every year. Very soon 50% of the voters will be below the age of 25. And they all clamor for change. The same thing is occurring in Europe. He recalled that during his visit to Rumania in November 1970, the President of Rumania spent half an hour criticizing the United States' opposition to Peiping's admission into the U.N. This criticism was, of course, occasioned also by Rumanian dislike of the Soviet Union and by Peiping's assistance to Bucharest.

By now the conversation between the President and Mr. Murphy had lasted well over one and a half hours. Mr. Murphy said that in order to keep the contents of this conversation known to as few people as possible, he would not send any written message from the American Embassy in Taipei but would instead report to President Nixon in person upon his return to Washington.

The question of the drafting of the new proposal came up at this juncture. Mr. Murphy inquired whether the two governments should not appoint a small working group to undertake this task. Both the President and Minister Chow Shu-kai thought that the drafting should be done by the U.S. side alone and that the Chinese side would comment on the text whenever it is ready for discussion. As to the future channels of communication on this matter, President Chiang suggested that the Chinese Permanent Representative to the U.N. and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington could be designated to follow up this question with the United States designee or designees. Mr. Murphy hoped that this contact should be confined to as few persons as possible and suggested that the Chinese Ambassador be the channel in Washington.

Mr. Murphy took his leave from President Chiang, and asked to have his high regards conveyed to Madame Chiang. President Chiang thanked Mr. Murphy for his visit, asked him to convey warm personal regards from both Madame Chiang and himself to President and Mrs. Nixon, and also wished Mr. Murphy a very pleasant sojourn in Taipei.

350. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tokyo, April 27, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Nobusuke Kishi—Former Prime Minister of Japan
Ambassador Robert Murphy

In response to Kishi's initiative about China (a subject in which Kishi obviously takes a very deep interest), Ambassador Murphy reviewed the situation at the UN in terms of the probability that the old formula of IQ vs Albanian resolution would fail next year for certain, if not this year. Thus, it is essential to develop strategy which would meet the desire of the majority of UN members that Peking not be excluded, but which would also preserve Taipei's seat. Mr. Kishi agreed with this estimate of the factual situation, and the requirements it presents.

Mr. Kishi stressed throughout his remarks that neither Japan nor the United States could ignore the Peking problem and that both must work seriously for a resolution which did not abandon Taiwan, particularly in view of its strategic position as a link in the offshore island defense line (Okinawa–Taiwan–Philippines) and in view of the vital interests involved. These factors limited our freedom of action, in contrast to Italy and Canada, which had little interest per se, in Taiwan.

Kishi reviewed conversations he had last year in Taipei with Chiang Kai-shek and his Secretary, Chang Chun, both of whom he urged not to walk out of the UN regardless of changes that are made in representation formula. Any premature walk-out would seriously embarrass those who were making a great effort to retain a seat for Taiwan even if Peking were to be admitted. Both Chiang and Chang found these representations unpleasant, and neither agreed. But Kishi said they did listen.

Comment: (Others here closely associated with Taipei have also made this pilgrimage, and Japanese are clearly trying to persuade Chiang not to walk out.)

Kishi expects to continue to thus encourage Chang Chun when he visits Tokyo in July during the Japan/China Economic Cooperation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Francis J. McNeil and James J. Wickel. The meeting was held in former Prime Minister Kishi's office. An attached transmittal memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger is dated May 5.

meetings. Moreover, Kishi was thinking of visiting Taiwan again in late summer to press the point.

Kishi, without committing himself on a specific formula, said that while a majority of UN members wished to admit Peking, a majority also could be persuaded not to expel Taipei, a faithful member since the UN's organization. Kishi then noted his long-standing belief that the UN should reflect the real world. For example, of the "divided states"—China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam—only the GRC is represented, but ideally all eight should be represented in the UN.

Kishi did not respond to the question of what to do about China's Security Council seat, nor did he discuss specifically whether Chiang might be tempted to walk out, although it was clear from his earlier remarks that he considers it essential to forestall this.

Although he had not previously considered it, Kishi agreed that the timing of Peking's ping-pong diplomacy might well have something to do with Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi. However, information available to him indicated that the Chinese and Soviets, despite efforts to paper over their differences, have split even more deeply in recent months. Thus, China would seem to be trying to counter-balance improvements in US-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese relations in order to fend off Soviet pressures.

Most of all, however, Kishi vehemently stated that Chou's purpose was to divide opinion and split Japan in two, setting people against government, just as he was seeking to do in the United States, by "adding branches and leaves" to the "China mood" tree already present. Further, Chou's aim is to worsen Japan-US relations. Despite smiling overtures to the American people, Chou and Peking have not relaxed their hostility to the US Government.

China also presents a smiling face to Japanese people and business circles, but continues to treat official Japanese visitors to China with a "high posture" attitude tantamount to interference in Japan's domestic politics. Kishi commended President Nixon's recent moves on China. However, the problem, here as in the US, was to avoid being stampeded into precipitate action to improve relations, going as far as recognition, that might sacrifice Taiwan. Progress toward long-term accommodation with mainland China depends on the exercise of cool judgement by leaders of both Japan and the US with respect to timing and extent of such moves.

Domestic pressures of China mood in Japan were similar to those in the US, only much, much worse. He cited, for example, Japan's leading newspaper, the *Asahi*, whose nostrums for China policy closely parallel those enunciated by Chou En-lai himself.

Despite Chou's four principles, big business in Japan maintains an active membership in the Economic Cooperation Committees for both

Taiwan and Korea, including New Japan Steel, Mitsubishi and Mitsui, to name a few. Chou applies his four principles rigidly only to those companies which yield to this kind of blackmail, but when necessary, China continues to buy essential products even from companies that reject four principles, as does New Japan Steel. Kishi agreed that these were "four flexible principles". Moreover, literal acceptance of four principles would require the writing-off of the present great investments by Japan in Taiwan (and Korea, too, for that matter). At present, Kishi said, Japanese big business is following the GOJ lead.

Kishi believed that China's recent change of face could not have been engineered by Chou En-lai alone, without the assent of Mao and the support of the military. Following the cultural revolution, Kishi felt that Chou was supported closely by the military (and presumably Lin Piao) and thus enjoyed a favorable position in terms of exercising the real power after Mao.

In conclusion, Kishi recalled his conversation with DeGaulle in Paris, two years after France recognized Peking. DeGaulle then denied that la Belle France coveted any petty trade advantages, and had recognized China out of its sincere desire to promote true world peace. In response to Kishi, DeGaulle said that Taiwan was not part of the territory of China recognized by France, and that he would leave its disposition to Japan and the United States. However, Kishi said, the problem was not that simple and our efforts to promote long-term relations with China now turned on whether we could persuade the UN not to expel Taipei to make room for Peking, at the same time persuading Chiang not to abandon the field should this development occur.

351. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Turkey¹

Washington, April 30, 1971, 2226Z.

Tosec 129/75175. For the Secretary from Ted Eliot.

Following memorandum to you from the President dated April 28 received April 30 afternoon.

“Subject: Chinese Representation at the United Nations. Text: During the SEATO meeting next week Sir Alec Douglas Home may well expect a definitive discussion with you on the question of Chinese Representation at the UN. Since we have not made our own final decisions, we have no alternative but to ask that the British also wait awhile longer. Sir Alec may be unhappy with this request. You may want to tell him of our latest moves with Chiang. And, if it would be helpful, you may also indicate that I rely heavily on British understanding and cooperation in this matter and that, if necessary, I will speak directly with the Prime Minister. Richard Nixon.”

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHINAT. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Executive Secretary Eliot. Secretary Rogers was attending a CENTO Ministerial meeting in Ankara.

352. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

General Considerations

With few exceptions, the General Assembly rather than the Security Council has been the forum for consideration of Chinese Repre-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. An attached letter of transmission from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger, dated May 5, notes that Haig had on May 3 requested this information to supplement material contained in the Response to NSSM 107 (Document 326; NSSM 107 is Document 312).

sentation. When the subject was raised in the Council, as it was by Somalia in February of this year, the United States took the position that a matter as important as Chinese Representation is better considered in the General Assembly, in which all 127 members of the UN are represented, than in the 15-member Security Council. In support of our view, we cited a 1950 General Assembly resolution which stated: "In virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the view of all Member States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole."

This tactical position, which has been sustained over the years in the Security Council, has an implicit corollary—that if and when the General Assembly decides to change the representation of China, that decision would be reflected in the Security Council. As a matter of practical politics, we must expect in any case that once the General Assembly seats the PRC, the Security Council is likely to do the same.

Theoretically, the Security Council could decide to take up the Chirep problem, independent of or before action in the General Assembly. For example, should the PRC apply for admission as a new member, or should the ROC withdraw from the UN and apply for admission as a new state of Taiwan, the Security Council would consider these applications under the procedures specified in Article 4 of the Charter. Alternatively, the matter could [arise?] as a challenge to the credentials of the ROC Council representative.

It is most unlikely that the Chirep question would be raised as a membership issue by either the PRC or the ROC. The PRC will not apply for admission as a new member since it takes the position that it is the only lawful representative of the member state, China, and has been illegally prevented from taking its rightful seat. The ROC will not leave and re-apply since it insists that it is the only legitimate representative of China and the rightful holder of China's seat. This hypothetical membership contingency is mentioned for two reasons: (a) Some have assumed the issue could be settled in this way, by admission of the PRC and/or the ROC as a new member—the Dutch, for example, informally suggested double admission last year; (b) It is precisely in connection with a *membership* question that the use of the veto would most clearly apply, whereas it is very doubtful that the veto could be used as long as the question is one of *representation*.

[Omitted here are sections entitled "The Veto, and a Possible Credentials Challenge," "Assurances Given to Chiang Kai-Shek," "The Security Council and the Albanian Resolution," and "The Security Council and Dual Representation."]

Aftermath

It seems inescapable that, one way or another, China's seat on the Security Council will be offered to the PRC in the wake of an Assembly decision to admit Peking. Passage of the Albanian resolution (a likely result this year if we maintain our present Chirep policy) would bring the PRC into the Council at the earliest date. Passage of a dual representation resolution by the Assembly is unlikely to result in Peking taking the seat in the immediate future, but could lead to a situation in which the ROC representative is expelled from the Council (in order to make possible the offer of the seat to Peking) and the seat remains temporarily vacant. As noted above, there is some chance of persuading the Council to make seating the PRC conditional upon acceptance of the General Assembly resolution.

Likely PRC behavior as a member of the UN, including the Security Council is analyzed in Chapter VII and Annex F of NSSM 107. It will not be discussed here other than to emphasize the probable undesirability of PRC accession to the Council seat this fall when there is some possibility that the Security Council might be dealing with a Middle East peace agreement. We may note, however, that PRC membership on the Council is likely to increase pressures for Charter revision (something which we have generally opposed and to which, according to intelligence reports, Peking is also opposed) to enlarge the Council by the addition of new permanent members (e.g. Japan and/or India, and perhaps the FRG after it becomes a member of the UN), to do away with the permanent member veto, or to add new permanent members without the right of veto. If Charter revision continues to appear inadvisable or unobtainable, one possible but unlikely solution might be agreement in the respective regional caucuses to give states such as Japan, India or Brazil semi-permanent member status through repeated elections to the Council. Finally, should the seat remain empty for any substantial period of time, this might lead to pressures to reassign it to another Asian power (again Japan and India would be the logical contenders), a factor which Peking would also have to take into account.

**353. Letter From Australian Prime Minister McMahon
to President Nixon¹**

Canberra, May 13, 1971.

Dear Mr President,

In continuation of the valuable consultations we have had with your Administration about the problems we both face in respect of China, my Ministers and I are anxious to know your feelings about the recent trend of events.

In February, we had very useful discussions with Ambassador Winthrop Brown about the problem as it then presented itself, giving particular attention to the United Nations aspects. Discussion of various possible United Nations moves was followed up in detail by officials. Later, I arranged for our Embassy in Washington to convey to Dr Kissinger a preliminary analysis of the Chinese representation question which had been prepared by our Department of Foreign Affairs.

In more recent weeks, a number of things have occurred, which have led us to wonder whether time is not running against the courses we then discussed.

First, you will no doubt be aware that the China question has become a matter of urgent public debate in this country. This has been in part a reaction to Peking's recent exercises in person-to-person diplomacy.

Additional popular feeling has been generated by the failure so far of the People's Republic of China to purchase any Australian wheat this year. The Chinese have let it be known that they have two reasons: they have had a series of good harvests and their need for grain imports has declined, and they have told various people including journalists that their decision was also a political one, in that they prefer to trade with countries with whom their political relations are satisfactory. Most recently, as a result of a telegram sent to Chou En-Lai by the Australian Labour Party, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs has invited the Australian Labour Party to send a delegation to China to discuss problems of diplomatic relations.

At the same time, there has been a rather strong movement against Taiwan's interests on the United Nations front. Since the Canadian decision to establish diplomatic relations with Peking last October, seven

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. An attached memorandum indicates that this letter, which was delivered by the Australian Embassy to the State Department, was forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger on May 14.

other countries have recognised the PRC. At least two more have opened talks to this end, and others appear to be inclining that way. It seems to us that if an attractive alternative to the Albanian resolution is not soon floated, the question of maintaining a place for Taiwan in the United Nations will go by default.

I can summarise our attitude very simply as follows. First, we accept that the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, either this year or next, is a virtual certainty. It seems to us axiomatic that it will succeed to the Security Council seat now held by the Republic of China. Any alternative approach seeking to avoid this will be regarded as an unrealistic device by those whose support will be vital, and will fail. Secondly, we have attached considerable importance to the protection of the rights of Taiwan, including its rights to representation in the United Nations if it so wishes. Thirdly, we acknowledge that a range of questions require the cooperation of the PRC if settlements are to be achieved, and we have as our long-term goal the normalization of relations with Peking. To this end, we have made some gestures towards Peking and are indicating our readiness to make more. On 11 May, I announced that we had decided to explore the possibilities of establishing a dialogue with the Chinese People's Government.

I appreciate the difficulties and heavy responsibility you face in reaching a decision on the courses of action to be taken on the China problem. For our part, however, the passage of time is creating increasing problems in reconciling the second and third points above. An indication of your present thinking would be of the greatest value.²

Yours sincerely,

William McMahon³

² President Nixon's reply, dated July 10, noted that the U.S. Government was currently studying the Chinese representation question and consulting with other countries about it. He expected to announce a decision late in July. (Ibid.)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

354. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, May 21, 1971.

RE

Meeting Between the President, Ambassador Robert Murphy and General Haig in the Oval Office (5:26 p.m.–5:55 p.m.)

The President began the meeting by asking Ambassador Murphy to give his impressions of Chiang Kai-shek's views based on the Ambassador's recent mission to Taipei to discuss options open to the United States and Taiwan with respect to Peking's entry into the United Nations. In responding, Ambassador Murphy made the following points:

—Chiang is old and seems to believe that if the U.S. would only fight hard enough Taipei could retain its membership in the U.N. and Peking would be excluded.

—Chiang's convictions are based on rigidity of age and the family quarrel nature of the issue.

—Chiang expressed a willingness to accept a two-China policy if such a policy would not be at the expense of the Republic of China's Security Council seat.

The President stated that retention of Taiwan's Security Council seat would, of course, be impossible given the realities of the international attitude toward Peking.² The President asked Ambassador Murphy whether or not he had made this clear to Chiang and Ambassador Murphy confirmed that he had indeed done so. Ambassador Murphy noted that the men around Chiang, including his son, appeared to have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 85, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² In a May 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote: "As you can see from the memcon submitted by Ambassador Murphy [Document 349], his meeting with Chiang left much to be desired: Murphy's memcon is poorly structured and Chiang's position does not come through coherently; Murphy underestimates our problem with Chiang, especially on the linkage between dual representation and Taiwan's Security Council seat." Haig presented two options: "Buy Chiang's position on the Security Council with all its implications; Go back to Chiang in an effort to correct Murphy's mistake. Getting Chiang to shift his position looks like a sure loser." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, Ambassador Murphy) Commenting on a memorandum of conversation between George Yeh and William H. Gleysteen, Jr., in Taipei, January 28, 1972, Moser noted that "George Yeh makes, *inter alia*, the point that the Murphy mission last year had 'encouraged illusions and hardened the views of President Chiang,' and consequently magnified the impact of our subsequent shift on Chirep on the Gimo." (Memorandum from Moser to Green, February 8; *ibid.*, RG 59, EA Files: Lot 74 D 471, Memoranda to Mr. Green, February 1972)

far more realistic attitudes with respect to the United Nations. However, the Generalissimo was still in firm control. Also, Chiang was apparently still under the strong influence of Madam Chiang who for some reason refused to see Ambassador Murphy and therefore appeared to be greatly irritated by our approaches to Peking.

Ambassador Murphy stated that he had spoken to Mr. Kishi in Japan and he was very much in favor of the continued viability of Taiwan and strong U.S. ties with the Chinese Nationalists. The Ambassador stated that this was a remarkable attitude, given former Japanese-Taiwanese animosity. The President observed that Japan without question was a pivotal factor in the future of Asia and would watch very carefully our handling of the Peking issue in the United Nations.

The President then asked why Chiang Kai-shek appeared to be so unrealistic about the Nationalist Chinese U.N. seat. Ambassador Murphy replied that the issue was obviously an emotional one for Chiang, involving not only factors of national interest but the competition generated by strong family feelings. The Ambassador reiterated that the Generalissimo appeared to be convinced that if only the U.S. would fight hard enough, the status quo could be preserved.

The President then stated that he had given considerable thought to the U.N. issue and recognized that it would be impractical for us to adopt a two-China policy which would preserve Taiwan's Security Council seat. He added that a case could be made that our support for a two-China policy could end up irritating not only the Chinese Nationalists but Peking as well, since Peking would most likely not accept an arrangement recognizing the principle of two Chinas.³ General Haig interjected that the most sophisticated supporters of improved relations with Communist China could interpret a two-China policy as a cynical move on the part of the U.S. which would, in effect, not be consistent with the normalization of relations with Peking.

Ambassador Murphy remarked that he was inclined to favor the status quo even though it might mean defeat since our obligations to Chiang Kai-shek were long standing and since our other allies and the uncommitted states would be watching the U.S. decision very carefully. The President indicated that he had not yet decided which way

³ According to a tape recording of this meeting, Nixon stated: "There's only one way to do this, it's either up or down. In my opinion, it's got to be one or the other. Both cannot have seats in the UN. I don't think so." Haig replied: "It won't work." Nixon continued: "It's not going to work. Now, under those circumstances, it's going to be Communist China at some time, [it's] inevitable, it's got to be. But let them do it, don't let's us do it. That's the way I feel about it." Nixon wondered whether it would not be better to stick with the Important Question, but not try very hard to win. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, May 21, 1971, 5:26–5:55 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 503–17)

to go but felt that whatever position we ultimately took should give full play to the views of the Generalissimo. At the present moment, a two-China policy might be more cynical than it appeared on the surface. It could ultimately prove counterproductive in achieving our overall objective of a normalization of relations with Peking. Should we determine to pursue a status quo strategy, then it would be the membership of the United Nations which would be responsible for whatever outcome ultimately occurred and we might better be able to limit the damage to our relations with Taiwan. Ambassador Murphy agreed, noting that he was generally in favor of that approach at the present time.

The meeting then adjourned.

355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, May 22, 1971, 0109Z.

90063. Subject: Press Speculation on Chirep.

The Department has been receiving spate of inquiries about reports that US has decided a new Chirep policy. Some of these appear to have Japanese source.

In addition Reuters today reports that US and Japanese policy planners at Lake Kawaguchi meeting agreed China's entry into UN unavoidable and that their countries should try to keep Formosa in the UN, even if PRC allowed to enter.

Department does not wish to encourage or participate in speculation about future US Chirep policy, and is replying to all inquiries that policy review this subject has not yet been completed and no decisions have been made. Some press have been advised on background that in course of review, US has consulted with other countries including Japan.

With respect to Reuters report mentioned above, Department will simply state its long-established position that we are opposed to admission of PRC at cost of expulsion of GRC and will decline to speculate on voting prospects for Assembly this fall.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Winthrop G. Brown; cleared by Charles W. Bray, Jr., William T. Breer, and Robert Emmons; and approved by Brown. Repeated to Saigon for Assistant Secretary Green and to Hong Kong.

You may wish inform GOJ that leaks of this kind make candid consultation very difficult.

Rogers

356. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the UN

Ambassador Robert Murphy, at your request, raised with Chiang Kai-shek our concern over the diminishing prospects for success in the General Assembly meeting this fall of our past policy aimed at exclusion of Communist China from the UN and retention of Taipei's seat. Chiang understood fully the likelihood of failure of this course. He agreed to go along with a dual representation strategy but *only* on the condition that we protect his Security Council seat. Murphy agreed to this condition and Chiang unquestionably considers it a commitment.²

We cannot guarantee Chiang's Security Council seat. The issue will be decided by the Security Council itself. We cannot use the veto because the issue will be procedural; and we do not have the votes in the Security Council to prevent Taipei's expulsion in favor of the PRC—eight Security Council members recognize Peking and two others say the PRC should have the seat.

We have two choices:

—Go ahead with a dual representation strategy recognizing that we cannot protect Taipei's Security Council seat, *or*

—Continue with our traditional strategy aimed at exclusion of Peking, recognizing that we will be defeated either this year or next.

If we take the first course, and if Chiang acquiesces, we could reasonably expect to retain Taipei's seat in the General Assembly. Peking would be irritated initially because her maximum goals—the expul-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Top Secret. Sent for action. This memorandum is stamped "The President has seen." According to a May 19 covering memorandum, it was prepared by Kennedy and Levine of the NSC staff.

² See Documents 349 and 354.

sion of Taiwan and recognition of the PRC claim to represent all of China—would have been thwarted. It is likely that Peking would not enter on these terms, at least for a while. Thus, for the present, Taiwan would retain its seat in both the Assembly and the Security Council. However, it is most probable that Chiang will not agree to concede the Security Council seat, and therefore, a dual representation strategy is not viable. Our efforts to maintain the Security Council seat for Taipei would simply convince many UN members that the whole strategy was a mere gimmick to perpetuate Peking's exclusion. A UN majority will not accept this.

If we pursue our traditional strategy we certainly will be defeated within a year or two. We will take a good deal of heat over this defeat. The fact, however, that we would have stood steadfastly by Chiang will be in our favor. The effect on our relations with Peking will be two-fold. First, she will not be surprised at our continuing to resist her entry and she will in fact gain her objectives. So our present moves toward more normal relations will not be complicated by her resentment of our policy. But secondly, she will feel herself to have inflicted a defeat on us, and our relationship with her will to some extent be adversely affected by this psychological fact.

I believe that, in the likely event Chiang holds to his view on the Security Council seat, our best course will be to stick with our traditional policy of trying to keep Peking out. It would avoid the appearance of a betrayal of an old ally and it would not seriously affect our policy of moving toward more normal relations with Peking.

Before you decide, however, I believe we must go back to Chiang to make clear to him that there is no way we can guarantee his Security Council seat.

—We have told Chiang we are convinced that the present strategy will be defeated this year or next. And Chiang himself may feel that he has taken a monumental step in acquiescing—however unenthusiastically—to dual representation. If we were simply to inform him—without consultations—that we have decided to adhere to our traditional strategy, he might well falsely interpret this decision in the context of steps we have taken to ease tensions with Peking. He might conclude, in short, that we have chosen this route to sell him out.

—A second reason for consulting again with Chiang, is to take account of the possibility, admittedly very slim, that he might drop his condition that we protect his Security Council seat. If he did, the dual representation strategy would be a realistic course.

We should put the issue squarely before Chiang once again. In the unlikely event he would prefer that we go along on the dual representation formula in these circumstances, we can do so. Otherwise he will know clearly the reasons we did not.

I recommend, therefore, that we go back to Chiang and tell him that we cannot guarantee his Security Council seat and that therefore if he

maintains his position on this question we are prepared to pursue our present policy seeking to exclude Peking, with the full realization that we probably will be defeated this year or next.³

³ The President did not initial either the approve or disapprove options, but did write “K: Follow up on basis of our meeting today (5/27/71).” See Document 358.

357. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the United Nations: Recommended U.S. Position

1. *Recommendation*

The U.S. should begin active consultations now with a view to tabling a Dual Representation Resolution at the next General Assembly. The resolution should call for seating the People’s Republic of China and, in the same text, should provide that any proposal to expel the Republic of China shall require a two-thirds vote. This formula, which is favored by the Japanese and the Australians, gives the Republic of China the protection of the Important Question procedure directly with the document calling for Peking’s seating. I attach a text proposed by the Japanese, and a revised version prepared in the Department.²

2. *Rationale*

Unless we begin working for Dual Representation now, it is virtually certain that the Republic of China will be expelled this Fall through passage of the Albanian Resolution and defeat of the Important Question. Similar action probably would be taken by the Security Council shortly thereafter.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. An attached memorandum of transmittal from Assistant Secretary De Palma and Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown to Rogers is dated May 26.

² Both are attached but not printed.

3. *Forecast*

Provided we begin work immediately and exert a maximum effort, a Dual Representation Resolution of the type described should receive majority support in the General Assembly. An accurate forecast is difficult to make since we have not been able to consult on this issue since the end of March, but we believe the probable vote would be on the order of 65 in favor, 50 opposed, with 12 abstentions. Votes for such a resolution could be as low as 42 or as high as 76 votes; the votes against it could be as few as 37 or as many as 55. A country-by-country breakdown is attached.

4. *Tactics*

If this recommendation is approved, we would immediately inform our Japanese, Australian and New Zealand allies and request their active assistance. At the same time, we would inform President Chiang but would not be deterred if he withholds cooperation. We would undertake the widest possible consultations to enlist supporters and resolution co-sponsors. We should seize the initiative by inscribing an agenda item for the next General Assembly by early August and shortly thereafter table our resolution so that it would be voted on before the Albanian Resolution. If the Albanian Resolution is tabled first, we would have to wage a parliamentary struggle to gain priority.

5. *The Security Council Seat*

As tabled, our resolution would say nothing about the Security Council seat. We must expect that an amendment will be put forward from the floor stating that the seat should go to Peking, and that the amendment undoubtedly will pass. We would argue that the amendment is unnecessary and irrelevant since the Security Council is not bound by Assembly recommendations, and therefore we would either vote against the amendment or (preferably) abstain, but would not lobby. Outside the Assembly chamber, we would state (to the press as well as to other governments) that we consider it wiser to wait and see what attitude Peking takes: if Peking is willing to take the Council seat on the basis of the Dual Representation principle, well and good; if Peking refuses to come on this basis, we will all have to take that fact into account.

Within the Council itself, our options are severely limited. There is already a Council majority in Peking's favor and we must expect that whether or not Peking has indicated willingness to accept Dual Representation, this majority will vote to seat Peking in the Council. We can try various parliamentary maneuvers to block the issue until Peking accepts the Dual Representation principle, but none of these have much chance of success. We would not have the votes necessary

to sustain the position that a negative vote by ourselves (or by the Nationalists) constitutes a veto.

6. *Republic of China Reaction*

We believe that President Chiang may be willing not to oppose our tabling a Dual Representation Resolution which was silent on the Security Council issue even though he may still feel that he has to take the ROC out of the U.N. if the Security Council seat is subsequently lost.

7. *Aftermath*

Even if we are successful with the Dual Representation Resolution, we may not have found the ultimate solution to the Chinese Representation problem. Unless Peking alters the policy which it has maintained for over twenty years, we doubtless will have to fight this battle again, and it may be that in the end the Assembly will bow to Peking's insistence and adopt some version of the Albanian Resolution.

8. *Universality*

We continue to believe that chances for success of a Dual Representation Resolution will be maximized by placing it within the philosophic framework of a general doctrine of universality, and that universality is an attractive policy in any case. I have been invited to address the London Bar Association in early July and believe this would afford an excellent opportunity to surface our new Chinese Representation policy against the background of the universality principle.

William P. Rogers³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

358. Meeting Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 27, 1971, 2:42–4:26 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of dual representation strategy and possible support from other nations for the ROC in the United Nations.]

Nixon: Frankly if we start out fresh, we would put, I mean, Communist China in the UN, right?

Rogers: Um, hmh.

Nixon: And, we wouldn't dream of letting Communist China take over 15 million Taiwanese any more than we'd let North Korea take over South Korea. That's another point.

Rogers: That's another point.

Nixon: And a defense treaty and all the rest.

Rogers: This doesn't relate to our relations with Taiwan at all, this is just representation in the UN.

Nixon: Could I suggest a line, which you could do? [unclear] How, first what is . . . we're talking now on the 27th of May, how long will you be, until you are back? You'll be over 2 weeks in Europe?

Rogers: No, 10 days.

Nixon: Ten days. Well, of course, the time, and incidentally, I think you should handle it pretty much yourself on a very very close basis, indicating that we have reached a position. You can say that we have talked, you know what I mean? And that we frankly are examining our position. We tend, we are examining our position at this point, and you are trying to determine . . . now I wonder if you can do that. I'd just, or perhaps [unclear] on the British before they say, "You put them all on that basis."

Rogers: Yeah, I can't do it.

Nixon: Well [unclear exchange]. What I meant is, could you put it up in this term. I know you've got to have something to say to them. Could you say to them, "Look here," because, you see, since you've returned, we've had [Robert] Murphy come back. And Murphy has

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 504–13. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers met from 2:42 to 4:09 p.m., and Kissinger and Nixon spoke alone until 4:26 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

said that Chiang says that they'd [accept] two China provided we give them the Security Council seat. We can't do that, it won't work. Nobody can guarantee the Security Council seat.

Rogers: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, he didn't understand. Anyway, that's done. The point I made, we now know Chiang's position, which is very clear. And he's, he says, "Either go down fighting, or I'll take two China but you've got to give me a Security Council seat." Well, we can't do that. But on the other hand, knowing now what our problem is there, could you give us the time [unclear], because I think time is going to be extremely important in terms of . . . I'm going to have to, on this one, if we make a move on the two China thing, I've got to move on the right wing myself. I've got to get Walter Judd in and talk about this issue. I may be able to do something with him. But I want to do it by, I want to be able to move now. I think if you could, if we could confirm [unclear], discuss with the various . . . I figured you could discuss this matter for this period of time, then come in and, I realize you probably already have. But there's still, it's further along and it's crystallizing all over the bullets. I think that's, that would then allow me to have the chance to sort of figure out how exactly to do it. I wouldn't want to have, for example, on your trip, I wouldn't want to have the whole thing come out. The United States has changed its position and is trying to develop the support for it. I think it's premature to do that. When we change the position, I think that we ought to try to involve . . . I'd like to compose a message. I'm not concerned about [unclear]. We'll take the heat on the international stuff. You can handle that. But I've got to handle these domestic people—the hardliners in the House and Senate, some of the columnists, and people, frankly, who are part of the China Lobby, which is still a considerable group. I think that if you can get a verdict in the next couple weeks, if it were to come out that the U.S. has actually changed its position and is consulting with its allies to get support for a new position, that would be very difficult. If, on the other hand, you can discuss it in a way that we, you were trying to explore the position that they would take, in other words, here are the options, where will you end up? Having in mind the fact that in the final analysis we will have to take a position one way or the other. Could you do that? Can you handle it that way?

Rogers: I don't think that's [unclear].

Nixon: You see, the things seeping out is what I'm concerned about. I'm concerned about having to come out because [unclear] I don't want them to descend on me like a pack of little jackals and I have to say, then I'll have to lie to them, and [unclear] lie to the press conference and say, "Oh no, we're not considering, we haven't decided anything yet and so forth." See what I mean?

Rogers: I don't see how there's any problem with me. I think it's going to be a problem of, as far as our policy is concerned, because so much has gone on with the delay that no policy is going to succeed. In other words, other nations are making, they've been waiting for us to tell them.

Nixon: Yeah. Well now wait a minute. Let me ask you, when we talk about delay, I'm not talking about a delay of 2 months. I'm talking about a delay of [unclear].

Rogers: [unclear] talk to him about it? I know, you know, [unclear]. The present course as agreed to by everybody is disastrous, even Chiang Kai-shek. So what we're talking about is suicide as far as they're concerned. I mean, it's doomed to failure. And they know that and everybody that talks about the subject knows that. Really what we're asking them is, "Do you want us to go down in defeat in this way or would you rather have us try something else?"

Nixon: Well, what you're suggesting is that, what you would like to do, or what you would recommend is that you go over and—

Rogers: What I'd like to do is to—

Nixon: See, if you do that, that will get out [unclear exchange]—

Rogers: I don't have to when we get there, but I, what I think we ought to do is to decide now what we want to do. Then I think all, whoever we want to talk to, the Walter Judds and the others, put it on the line. And say, "Look it, are you prepared, do you want us to go down to defeat this way? We don't think this is a good thing for Chiang Kai-shek and for us." Now they'll all have to come to that conclusion.

Nixon: I think the way we ought to handle that is, the best way to handle that, probably it's the best way anyway, remember you've got to have [unclear]. You do not feel, now wait a minute, leaving out the Walter Judds and the rest for a moment. What I'm getting at is what is going to come out between now and the next couple of weeks? What is going to come out is that, this is a, this isn't, even announcing two Chinas is a monumental decision. And it is a monumental decision, it's a helluva news story.

Rogers: Oh, sure.

Nixon: Now, if that comes out in a way, that well, that the United States is privately or secretly discussing the, is trying to enlist support for the two China thing, it seems to me that that's, I'd rather, I think maybe the proposition of doing it through a speech, as you suggested, at a later time, more frontally [unclear] is better than doing it through consultations. See my point? You see what I'm afraid of, you talk to the British and you talk to the French or all these other people, now this is the way to do it. I think when it's done, it ought to be done in an orderly, [unclear exchange]. I had a feeling myself, I don't know, it's just a thing, Bill will do this and it's the kind of a thing that he ought to handle.

Kissinger: Well, he could, I don't see, he could do the consultation and still give the speech in July.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I mean, he wouldn't—

Rogers: Well the President's giving [unclear]. I'm not, see, everybody knows we're talking about [unclear] all over the world.

Nixon: That's true.

[Omitted here is more debate, but Nixon's decision is to wait for any public announcement. Rogers reviews his position on the need for consultations on a possible U.S. policy change. Nixon wants it handled in a way that emphasizes that the decision has not yet been made. "It's a problem we're considering and consulting with allies." Rogers wants to say that the United States is leaning in one direction because "we know we're going to lose."]

Nixon: I said, "Here is the proposition. We examined the situation. It appears that we are certain to lose if we consider the present course. For that reason, we are seriously considering this proposition." What do you think of it?

Rogers: That's the way I feel.

Nixon: How's that sound, Henry?

Rogers: That's what I think.

Nixon: Don't you think that's good?

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: "We're seriously considering it."

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: What do you think [unclear]? And as you go down and then, you can—

Rogers: Now, in other words, [unclear] we can sort of get a count now that we find out the number of votes. But in the meantime, I think we should start talking to [unclear].

Nixon: Yes, I know. I know. Well, my inclination with them is to hit them pretty hard and frontally, when it's due, just before it's done, and then just say, "All right. The [unclear]." I think if you, the trouble is, you see, you hit them over a period of time though. I know this will hurt extremely well. What happens? They go home and they [unclear], and they talk about it and the rest, and then they gin up a lot of columns, and raise hell, letters and all that sort of thing. I'm inclined to think, once we decide, I like the idea of decisive motion, decisive motion. We get them all in, we hit them and say, "Here we go." Henry, you know some of these people there? [unclear]

Kissinger: Just to be the devil's advocate and express [unclear], on this one I go back and forth. [unclear]

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: It's really a very close vote. What would we lose if we delayed another 6 weeks without having a vote?

Rogers: Well, we'd lose a lot of votes. We'd get a lot of people [unclear]. What do we gain by it? Aren't we just sort of—

Kissinger: Well—

Rogers: [unclear]

Nixon: That's really—

Kissinger: Well, no. [unclear] We cut 6 weeks off the public discussion.

Rogers: Oh, no. We need the public discussion. The public discussion is [unclear]. Allows us to get nations to support us.

Kissinger: Well now—

Nixon: He's referring to public discussion on that.

Kissinger: Taking also the fact that [unclear] this new position.

Rogers: [unclear] You think that's the way to look at it, if you do what you're doing you're going to die? Do you think we should state our position? How can they [unclear]? Even Chiang Kai-shek recognizes this. [unclear] Everybody knows that what we're doing, our present course is doomed to failure. So how can anybody be unhappy if you say, "Well, should we try something else?"

Kissinger: Why would you try something else 6 weeks later? I mean, to whom did he [unclear]?

Nixon: What we're talking about basically is a moot question in a sense but [unclear] come down to is this. That I think that it would be best just to, [unclear] that we should, after you completed that process [unclear]. But, I think the idea, Henry, of building the thing that the ABA is building—

Kissinger: But that speech offered—

Nixon: I think his idea—

Rogers: By that time we'll know the vote [unclear] too. [unclear]

Nixon: I think if he makes the announcement there, and he can make it there. But then that also, it also will [unclear] that much of a crack in the door in other words. And I'm considering it from this standpoint. That then we can evaluate the events and so forth.

Rogers: I would like it—

Nixon: But you think [unclear]—

Rogers: Well, I think it will hurt you. I really do think it hurts you. I think it'll—

Nixon: You mean get rolled?

Rogers: I think you'll get rolled. I think your conservative friends

will think that it's a terrible defeat and you followed a policy that's doomed to failure.

[Omitted here is discussion of the view of other nations on UN representation and NATO forces in Europe.]

[Rogers left the meeting at 4:09 p.m.]

Kissinger: I don't see the sense of urgency that Bill feels, because it's a purely tactical embarrassment we are suffering from not having a position. But this way is the best we could get out of it.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: It's my own, you know, it isn't worth overruling the Secretary of State on it. I think tactically the best would have been just to keep it hushed up for another 2 months.

Nixon: He doesn't think he can do that.

Kissinger: Well I think he believes that—

[Omitted here is brief discussion of the President's schedule.]

Kissinger: I suspect they're going to sell the living bejeezus out of it.

Nixon: What?

Kissinger: I suspect they're going to sell the living bejeezus out of it.

Nixon: Oh, sure.

Kissinger: What I find so interesting in the State Department is that they have no strategic sense. All they worry about is their personal embarrassment and not having a position. So now they can [unclear]—

Nixon: That's the whole point, that is, of his concern was that I've already told them that I don't have any position. Well Christ almighty, so we've got no position, just go out and say so. Goddamnit, I do it every day in a press conference. But, or every week.

Kissinger: Well, he follows [Marshall] Green's advice. It isn't, he doesn't, but it's, it's really . . . We can handle it.

Nixon: Let him go. As a matter of fact we can handle it. After all, Henry, there is a lot of discussion about the two-China thing. It's probably what we're going to end up with. [unclear] I am greatly tempted to stand on principle and get rolled and get them out. I am concerned about one thing: we've got to think very selfishly. But—

Kissinger: But another way of getting rolled, Mr. President, is to delay our position as long as possible. Then, fairly late, go to a two-China position and then lose on that. Then we've done everything.

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: But that's—

Nixon: But that's another thing. The main thing—

Kissinger: It's really not important enough.

Nixon: When you go to two-China, that's going to appear awfully reasonable to a hell of a lot of people.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: Awfully reasonable.

Kissinger: Actually, the way he's formulated it now is better.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: If he then gets off the universality one which will drive everybody, will drive the German situation. He just says "Communist China in by majority vote; Taiwan expelled only by a two-thirds vote."

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Then we don't make a general principle. And that we can, I think—

Nixon: I like that formula, the expulsion by two-thirds vote. And that [unclear], but I'm going to pull this. I want to know what the hell our problem is in the domestic politics before we do it. And I also will have to determine whether or not I am announcing it myself or have him do it. I think there is much to be said for letting him do the announcement.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: It's a technical matter. There's a hell of a lot of people who are going to say we'll get the credit for it anyway.

[Omitted here is discussion of Mutual Force Reduction in Europe.]

Nixon: Now on the China thing, we're back exactly around the time he needs.

Kissinger: That's right. Because—

Nixon: Now if the China doesn't come back, they should be back—

Kissinger: They'll be back within 10 days to 2 weeks.

Nixon: You think so? Has Yahya delivered the message?

Kissinger: He delivered the message on May 19. It took 5 days. I've now got a good channel, but I told his Ambassador to send it by pouch, didn't want it on a Pakistan wire. I've now set up a wire to Karachi for our Ambassador, which goes only through Morris. Nobody knows it. And it's got a special code, which only Haig knows, so even Moorer can't read it. And which only, and so now we can deliver messages in 24 hours. It took 5 days to get there, then it took, then Yahya was in Lahore so he didn't deliver it until the 19th. So they've only had it for 7 days. And my guess is that they'll reply the first week of June.

Nixon: You think they'll reply in the positive or negative?

Kissinger: Almost certainly, yes.

Nixon: There's a lot of things in there about a Presidential visit and all that kind of stuff.

Kissinger: We offered them a Presidential visit. We told them I'd be authorized to arrange the visit of a public emissary if it was thought useful; it's hedged a little bit. And—

Nixon: In addition to a Presidential visit?

Kissinger: Yeah, in addition to a Presidential visit. And for them, Mr. President, after all, they are revolutionaries. But you think of this peasant, former peasant, Mao, the Great March, and then the President of the United States comes to Peking at the end of his life. That's—

Nixon: Well that's why this former [unclear] Brezhnev has goddamn well got to decide whether he wants to come or not. And—

Kissinger: I think that, Dobrynin again this morning talked about that trade deal, that \$500 million trade deal.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We just don't have enough information to act on it.

Nixon: Well, but he didn't raise the summit. He never raises it does he?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: Well, he must have a reason you know.

Kissinger: Well, no. They are very cute. They figure you're very eager, so they figure they're first going to make you pay on Berlin. Then they're going to make you pay on trade, and after that they give you the summit.

Nixon: What the hell are we going to talk about there?

Kissinger: But I think, well, we can have, we need the summit for a number of reasons. It will discipline them during SALT.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, we've got to have, we need the summit for the reason of getting the deal on SALT.

Kissinger: That's what I mean.

Nixon: So then we've got to hammer them.

Kissinger: And, we can—

Nixon: Did Dobrynin say he'd let Semenov know that he's not going to screw around on that final announcement?

Kissinger: That's right. That's right. I can always try a little deal. He said, "Can we talk the first 2 weeks about India only?" I said, "Anatol, let's not horse around. If we want an agreement, you need some face saving thing, you want to talk about ABM for a week, that's one thing. But essentially it has to be concurrent." And if you read the letter, it says "to be discussed before," so we know what we have. And I have tapes of conversations.

Nixon: Oh, I know. Yes. But anyway—

Kissinger: So what I think we should do is, it's playing dangerously, it's living dangerously, but that's how you've got where you are in foreign policy and in other things too. The thing to do is to tell, in my view, is to tell Dobrynin in early June, "We've reviewed our state of relations, things are now moving on a number of fronts, either you can commit yourself now for a summit in September, or we won't have one this year."

Nixon: Will that appear too eager?

Kissinger: That's less eager than just sitting there waiting for them.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: And then if they turn us down, Mr. President, then I would drag our feet on trade, on Berlin, for at least, yeah, I'd certainly on trade drag our feet. Otherwise we'll have given them almost everything they need and they don't need the summit any more.

Nixon: Well we're going to drag, trade, hell I'd never sign another goddamn thing for them.

Kissinger: My feeling, Mr. President, has been that I gave them an ultimatum on their exchange of letters.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: [Llewellyn] Thompson would have had a heart attack.

Nixon: I know. And incidentally, we're going to be, but can we still drag on Berlin?

Kissinger: Yeah. I just cabled to Rush for Christ sakes not to settle this too quickly.

Nixon: Does he know this? You're sure he understands it?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. For all these reasons, we should not let them control the pace of events if you're willing to forgo the summit in September.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: But I think we, that wait through the next week would be—

Nixon: Are we going to have a summit at all with the Russians? You got a deal with the Chinese, we'll go to China earlier. Why not?

Kissinger: It also has the advantage that then we know where we stand.

Nixon: You notice the hard-line the Chinese are taking on Taiwan. Predictable, right?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: The Nineteenth Province and all that sort of crap?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Oh, I know. No, what they have asked from us up to now—

Nixon: Basically, to remove the Sixth Fleet.

Kissinger:—is to remove our military forces from Taiwan. If they would help us make peace in Vietnam—

Nixon: We'll do it.

Kissinger:—we could do it early in your new term.

Nixon: Just put it in the terms, "Yes, we will do it. We made a private [unclear] to do so."

Kissinger: But Taiwan, except for the sentimental thing, is really the least significant American [unclear].

Nixon: I'm afraid it is. I'm sorry.

Kissinger: It's a heartbreaking thing. They're a lovely people.

Nixon: I hate to do it, I hate to do it, I hate to do it, I know. And they've been my friends. [unclear] I still think, I can't believe Bill is right when he says the Koreans don't care, Kishi doesn't care, and the rest of them don't care about Taiwan.

Kissinger: Totally wrong.

Nixon: Somebody is selling him a bunch of shit.

Kissinger: Totally wrong. Totally wrong. Your instinct is absolutely right.

[Omitted here is discussion of the media.]

359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, May 29, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

95331. Ambassador McConaughy Eyes Only. Subj: Chirep.

1. Following based on memcon of Secretary's discussion of Chirep with Chinese Ambassador Shen, May 28, 1971:²

2. Secretary said he had asked Ambassador Shen to call in order tell him that US was seriously considering modification in Chirep policy. We trying make best appraisal of how we would come out if we continued present posture as compared to how we would come out if we changed. We would be consulting with number other governments to get their judgment on this question.

3. Secretary stated that our present judgment and, we believe, a generally-held assessment, is that present formula will lose this fall, no matter how hard we work for it. Ambassador Shen asked whether this was change in policy or tactics. ROC's opposition to admission Communist China unchanged. ROC did not see how question which had been important for 10 years could suddenly cease be important. If we believed that IQ formula would not work, however, his government would not stand in way of its friends trying something else. He asked whether US was serious in wanting Communist China in UN or whether this just window dressing.

4. Secretary said we facing practical situation. We could stick to present formula and fail. Shen interjected that ROC will not insist on this. Secretary continued that we would seriously consider sticking with old formula if our assessment that it would fail was wrong. Ambassador Brown said that ROC officials in Taipei had agreed in March with our assessment that IQ would fail by 4 or 5 votes, and we believed that this margin was increasing. Shen nodded.

5. Shen said that President Chiang had indicated to him that if it felt that IQ would fail, ROC would not stand in way of new proposal

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Brown and cleared by Johnson. Repeated to USUN.

² Following the meeting among Rogers, Kissinger, and Nixon on May 27 (see Document 358), Rogers forwarded a memorandum to the President outlining what he would say to Shen, as well as diplomats from Western Europe and Australia. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII) Marshall Wright forwarded Rogers' memorandum to Kissinger, adding in a covering memorandum that he saw a "very serious flaw in it. That is the intention publicly to announce the plan at so early a time." He suggested that the administration do the "diplomatic spadework" before making any public statements. (Ibid.)

which kept essence of IQ; for example, under new formula Communist China might be admitted by majority vote, but two-thirds vote would be required to expel ROC.

6. Secretary said we would like not just ROC acquiescence in new formula but encouragement. We did not want people, either in Taipei or elsewhere, to feel that we letting ROC down. He stated that President Nixon might be willing go down fighting under old formula, if that was what President Chiang wanted. Shen again interjected that this was not ROC position. Shen said that it would be too difficult for ROC to give impression it would accept any kind of “two-China” formula. They would have to vote against any proposal for admitting Communist China. Secretary said he understood.

7. Secretary said we considering formula which, in single resolution, would invite Peking into UN and would state that two-thirds vote would be required to expel ROC. We would not propose such a resolution but would support it. Secretary said there no way to assure that ROC would retain SC seat, but we would try develop plan which would give best chance to doing so. Original resolution which we contemplated would not mention SC. However, amendment from floor allotting seat to Peking would be almost certain and would probably prevail. We would oppose such amendment on ground that this not matter for Assembly and that Assembly action would not be binding on SC. If such dual representation resolution passed, Peking would probably not accept so long as ROC remained in UN. If Peking refused, we would argue that question of SC seat did not arise.

8. Shen said that ROC considered that its seat in Assembly and in Security Council are inseparable. Their present assessment is that Peking would not enter while ROC still in, but there still chance that if Peking felt that SC seat would be available they might surprise us. ROC would like maximum effort by US on their behalf with respect to SC seat.

9. Secretary said we could not give ROC any guarantees but will help as much as can. We hoped for ROC’s understanding, even if we could not have full agreement, and hoped Government of Republic of China would say that US doing best it could. He reminded Shen that easiest thing for US would be simply to stick with its present position and go down with it. Secretary said that proposal which he had described had no relation whatsoever with ping-pong diplomacy. It would have been made whether or not ping-pong team episode had occurred.

10. Secretary summed up US position as follows: US has not reached any final decision but its present thinking is a) we will be defeated this fall if we do not change our policy; b) a dual representation formula of kind he had described would probably succeed in holding

Assembly membership for ROC; c) Peking would probably not come in so long as ROC remained; d) we will do our best to help on SC seat but cannot give any assurances of success. We would inform the Republic of China of the results of consultations with other governments and would, of course, work with them on drafts of possible resolutions and so forth.

11. Finally Secretary repeated that US at present would give very serious thought to continuing with present formula, if President Chiang really wanted us to do so. We feel, however, that such course would be disaster.

12. Ambassador Brown said that what Secretary had outlined to Shen is being very closely held and Shen is first person to whom we have communicated it. We hoped that ROC would confine this information to its own senior circle, since we would, of course, want GOJ and other countries to hear about our thinking first from Secretary himself. Shen said he fully understood.³

Rogers

³ When Rogers discussed this conversation with Nixon on May 28, the President emphasized that Rogers should not announce any policy change regarding Chinese representation in the UN until after July 4. He added that Rogers should make public the dual recognition strategy in a Senate hearing. (Ibid., White House Tapes, May 28, 1971, 2:50–3:07 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 3–178)

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, June 3, 1971, 0409Z.

5221. Subj: Rogers–Aichi talk re Chirep in Paris.²

Summary: [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] PriMin Sato place highest importance on: a) keeping GRC in UN; and b) closest consultations with USG on China issues.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Paris, Taipei, and USUN.

² Secretary Rogers attended the OECD Ministerial Council meeting in Paris June 6–9.

1. During 90-minute session June 2, PriMin Sato attached great hope to FornMin Aichi's forthcoming discussion re Chirep with Secretary Rogers in Paris. [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*]

2. Stressing importance of continued close USG–GOJ consultations, Sato observed that once course of action is determined, GOJ can lobby effectively with some countries, e.g. SEA nations, while USG can cultivate other territory, e.g. English speaking world.

3. Sato said he has impression USG is still gathering info. He indicated tempus is fugiting and much spadework will have to be done in anticipation of UNGA this fall. He noted that because of its involvement in Indo-China hostilities, in which PRC has direct interest, situation is in some ways more difficult for USG than for GOJ.

4. According to Sato, of utmost importance is close USG–GOJ consultation. I noted we staying in close touch but final USG decision re course to be followed not yet taken.

5. When asked specifically what message he wished conveyed to Secretary, Sato said it is GOJ's determination to honor its treaty obligations with Taiwan, and to uphold its "international faith." If GRC could keep its UNSC seat so much the better, but in any case GOJ wishes to take whatever steps may be necessary to assure that GRC stays in UN. He was glad to have reassurance that USG also wants GRC's continuation in UN.

6. Sato said Japan's new chief rep at UN Nakagawa has been instructed to sound out U Thant's views.

7. Earlier in day, Vice FornMin Mori had suggested to me that while it is GOJ's wish and PriMin Sato's strong determination to assure GRC's preservation in UN, impression in GOJ circles is that USG's primary interest is maintaining bilateral commitment to GRC, with GRC's status in UN of lesser importance. I assured Mori that we share GOJ's desire to keep GRC in UN.

Meyer

361. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 3, 1971, 2233Z.

1476. Subj: Chirep—Amb Bush's Meeting With Amb Liu.

1. Amb Bush met with Amb Liu June 2 primarily for the purpose of personally expressing to Liu his contempt for fact that Amb Malik (USSR) walked out of SC and other UN meetings whenever Liu spoke.

2. Bush said he had told Malik, after Malik refused to brief Liu on the SC proceedings, that he disapproved of this kind of behavior and approach to the problem. Bush told Liu how distasteful he thinks this whole performance is, that gentlemen, especially diplomats and UN representatives, should be above such bad manners, and that Malik's cold war tactics are insulting, not only to Liu but to the ideals and aspirations of the UN. Liu was very appreciative of Bush's sincere empathy and fact that Bush took Malik to task for his discourteous behavior.

3. In discussion re Chirep, Bush said US has not reached any final decision but our present reading indicates IQ formula would not work this fall and therefore we are considering alternatives. Amb Liu said he is also concerned that previous IQ formula will no longer work and has stressed to his government the need for a flexible approach on this problem if GRC is to remain in UN.

3A. Liu said USG must realize that GRC could only consider alternative which would not damage GRC's *raison d'être*. Pres Chiang must consider internal politics as well as the international scene and the Pres is very concerned in his moral commitment to whole Chinese people. Liu also repeated as he has on previous occasions, that the GRC earned its seat on the SC by its role in World War II; that at the founding of the UN, the GRC was not in control of the whole Chinese mainland.

4. Liu also expressed grave concern re the six weeks referred to by Pres Nixon in his 1 June news conference.² Liu feels that six weeks hence will be too late to decide on a position which will prevent a defeat this fall.

5. Amb Bush told Liu he would make known the latter's concern to Washington and he stressed to Liu the firm commitment of Pres Nixon to Pres Chiang and the GRC.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Moscow and Taipei.

² For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*, pp. 695-696.

6. *Comment:* Amb Liu made no mention of Amb Shen's conversation with Secretary Rogers.

7. Liu again extended an invitation to Amb Bush, on behalf of himself and Pres Chiang for Bush to visit Taiwan, emphasizing how honored his President would be by such a visit.

Bush

362. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) and East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, June 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

Timing of Announcement of Chirep Policy

The President stated at his press conference June 1 that he expected to announce a decision on Chirep in about six weeks; i.e., end of July.

There are clear advantages in putting off publicizing his decision in order to defer an angry reaction from the PRC which would follow a US decision in favor of dual representation and to avoid stimulating early tabling of the Albanian resolution on the provisional agenda for the Assembly Meeting. The President may well have other reasons also.

On the other hand, the agenda is already open for inscription and the date of filing resolutions determines the order in which they will be considered by the Assembly.

It is important that our dual representation resolution be voted on before the Albanian resolution, since we would almost certainly get a larger vote for it if it came up first. Moreover, if our resolution was passed, we could move that the Albanian resolution not be voted on because the issue had already been settled. Prior filing would also mean that we could give the agenda item a more neutral caption than "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China."

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Brown and Herz; concurred in by Assistant Secretary Green, Shoemaker, and William A. Brown.

Should the Albanian resolution be inscribed first, we would have a difficult parliamentary battle, which we might well lose, to get our proposal dealt with first.

The other side knows this and probably will inscribe earlier than in the past. Any public statement that we will sponsor or even favor a dual representation resolution would undoubtedly precipitate action by them, so we should be prepared for simultaneous announcement and inscription.

The last day for filing items on the provisional agenda is July 24, though supplemental items may be added until August 23 when the agenda is made substantially final.

To be able to inscribe a resolution by July 24, we would have to have a text and co-sponsors, the more the better. This will take several weeks to arrange.

Both ROC Ambassador Shen and Foreign Minister Chow have told us that delay in decision on UN tactics was putting us behind schedule on such necessary pre-Assembly Chirep activities as lining up votes. For example, we have just had word that Liberia is wavering and we can't do anything about it in the absence of a decision. Sato said substantially the same thing to Meyer June 2, and McMahon made a similar point in his letter of May 13 to the President.

Moreover, we have been asked to testify on June 25 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open session about the Javits, McGovern and Gravel resolutions, all of which deal specifically with the Chirep question.

Preliminary check with Norvill Jones and Trimble of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff indicated sympathy for our quandary but the feeling that the Committee would, nevertheless, want to have a State witness on the 25th, even if he could not deal directly with these problems.

Not being able to state a position would make our position in testifying rather embarrassing. There would be rumors about a new policy and denials would create a credibility problem. Given the subject matter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff's suggestion that we should confine ourselves to comment on the legislative proposals (attached)² simply would not work. Moreover, our search for co-sponsors would be considerably hampered if at the same time we were indicating continued indecision in our testimony before the Committee.

² An attached memorandum for the record, June 3, by Harrison M. Symmes on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's interest in an administration witness on China policy on the morning of June 25 is not printed.

These conflicting considerations could, however, be substantially reconciled by the following scenario:

1) The President would make, but not announce, his decision shortly after the Secretary returns and, if he decides on further pursuit of the dual representation formula, authorize us to conduct further exploration of other countries' views and particularly to line up co-sponsors. This could be done, even though no public statement of position had been made. Leaks would occur, but we could deal with them.

2) The date of July 24 would fit within the President's decision not to announce his policy before the end of July. If we could persuade Fulbright to postpone at least State's appearance to testify on the three resolutions until that date, the Secretary could announce our new policy on that date and we could simultaneously inscribe our resolution on the provisional agenda.

3) We would, however, have to be ready to inscribe and table first if we get any indication that the other side is about to do so, even if it should mean speeding up the timetable. We have always been able to get advance notice of such action.

This program would be consistent with the Secretary's memorandum to the President of May 28,³ in which he reported his understanding that the President would make his decision upon the Secretary's return from Europe, and that this could be announced either before the Committee on June 25 or before the Bar Association in London in July. The Secretary pointed out the difficulty of keeping our current thinking secret and said that the hearings might be the best forum for making the announcement, particularly since this would help improve our Congressional relations.

We would like to discuss this problem with you to get your views on how best to present these additional elements in the situation and our proposed scenario to the President.⁴

³ Presumably a reference to Roger's memorandum mentioned in footnote 2, Document 359.

⁴ Johnson wrote "Done, 6/5/71" and his initials in the time option block.

363. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, June 5, 1971, 0105Z.

Secto 35/1868. Subj: Secretary's Bilateral Conversation With Douglas-Home: Chirep.

1. The Secretary outlined our view of likely developments and our current thinking about possibility of resolution seating Communist China, by majority vote, retaining seat for GRC, and deciding expulsion of GRC would require two-thirds vote. We would not comment on SC seat, as that would be separate decision by SC which we think should be faced in SC when we knew whether Peking would actually enter UN or not. Sir Alec observed that UK still wished to raise the status of their representation in Peking. They were certain they could do this within about two weeks; whether after three weeks or so they did not know. Requirements were that they no longer support the Important Question resolution and withdraw their Consulate from Taiwan. He thought both could be accomplished by UK without interfering with approach we had in mind.

2. The Secretary said he would appreciate it if the UK waited for about two weeks before conveying this decision to PRC. Sir Alec agreed but asked that the details of the US position not be divulged in the meantime. He said that if the Chinese learned that the Important Question resolution would no longer be a crucial matter his bargaining position would be undercut. The Secretary indicated understanding and observed our intention was not to reveal details of our thinking for about six weeks.

3. Pedersen suggested UK statement on Important Question should be addressed specifically to issue of representation of China in terms used in previous UN resolutions, thus retaining flexibility on future decisions to apply two-thirds vote to an expulsion proposal. Sir Alec indicated UK could do this.

4. Sir Alec raised problem of GRC name, noting it not proper to have two representatives claiming to represent one state. Secretary said we already had Byelorussia and Ukraine in UN and that we should simply use names both Chinese governments used without taking any position on their respective claims. Sir Alec responded that our approach might raise questions about universality elsewhere. The Secretary said membership of North and South Vietnam was no problem,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Secretary Rogers attended a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon June 1-6.

membership of FRG and East Germany might be possible in circumstances envisaged by FRG, and that the Korean matter could be considered an exception in view of United Nations forces in South Korea.

5. Dept rpt as desired.

Rogers

364. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep: U.S. Co-Sponsorship of a Dual Representation Resolution

In your May 28 conversation with GRC Ambassador James Shen,² while discussing the Dual Representation strategy you noted that the U.S. would actively support but not propose the Dual Representation resolution. This accords with a GRC position taken earlier this year—that the GRC sees the necessity for a “third resolution” but would prefer that the U.S. not be a co-sponsor—though Shen did not so request at the May 28 meeting.

Our soundings to date indicate that it will be difficult for a Dual Representation resolution to be successfully launched if the U.S. does not act as a co-sponsor and make a major diplomatic effort in its behalf. This is also the view of our UN Mission. We believe that Japan, Belgium, New Zealand and other states which strongly incline toward Dual Representation nevertheless would be reluctant themselves to act as co-sponsors if the U.S. were not prepared to do so. For example, Belgium, which can be of great use in promoting Dual Representation, has told us it would not take the lead—but we believe Belgium would co-sponsor a Dual Representation resolution if we take the lead. New Zealand, too, has told us it considers U.S. leadership vital.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Feldman and concurred in by Winthrop G. Brown and Pedersen.

² See Document 359.

There are also a number of neutrals whose support is essential and who would be much more likely to co-sponsor or take an active role if we ourselves are co-sponsors.

Also, without our sponsorship the probability would be very high that a paragraph on the Security Council would be included in a Dual Representation resolution, even before the resolution is tabled.

We therefore believe we should talk about this with the GRC (and also with the Japanese, who must be kept in step with us at every stage).

We recommend that when the President's decision is conveyed to the GRC (and assuming that it is in favor of dual representation), we also inform them that we have consulted with several of our close allies and have restudied the tactical problems from every angle, and that we have come to the conclusion that it would be useless to go the dual representation route unless we are willing to commit ourselves to it, which means that we would have to act as co-sponsor of such a resolution. We could add that we are aware that the ROC had expressed the hope that we would support a new strategy without formally taking the lead; but we assume that the results are more important to the ROC than the tactical manner in which they are obtained—and if we do not get out in front together with other co-sponsors, the danger is simply too great that the enterprise would fail.

365. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep: Getting the "Go" Signal from the President

In accordance with your conversation with the President on May 27 about Chinese Representation,² you will now wish to obtain from him the decision on whether we are to promote a Dual Representation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Herz. Sent through Pedersen and Under Secretary Johnson. The memorandum was initialed by Rogers, who added, "Noted by Secretary, 6/15."

² See Document 358.

resolution in the next General Assembly. It is understood, of course, that that decision would not be made public until later. It is urgent, however, that it be made soon because potential supporters for the formula that we have in mind would have to be rallied if they are not to be lost. Erosion is continuing as Communist China pursues its diplomatic initiatives.

The President's approval for consultations has so far been limited to our NATO allies most concerned, plus Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the GRC. There are a number of other countries that have been among the GRC's staunchest supporters in the past who have indicated to us that they are reviewing their policies and that the U.S. position will be an important factor in their decisions. Examples are Thailand, Greece, Togo, Spain and South Africa. Then there are countries like Tunisia, Ghana, Mexico and Ivory Coast, which want the PRC in the UN but might be brought to champion Dual Representation.

In your memorandum to the President of May 28, you explained that when he has made his decision, "we should then . . . begin to marshal maximum support for this position in the United Nations." You also reminded him "it would be desirable also to touch base in the fairly near future with certain . . . key countries which have supported us on the Important Question over the years."³

Expanding our consultations obviously increases the chances of leaks to the press. Leaks and speculations provide the PRC and its allies with much smaller targets than an officially announced position, and it is thus right to postpone the latter.

The President no doubt appreciates that our new strategy, if he approves it now, will not automatically win acceptance by a majority. A great deal of hard work will be required. We now believe that if the selling job is to be effective, the U.S. will have to act as co-sponsor of the kind of Dual Representation resolution that we have in mind. If we don't act as co-sponsors, there is also a high probability that a paragraph on the Security Council would be included in the resolution even before it is tabled.

Recommendation:

That you talk with the President along the above lines, using talking points as attached.

³ Presumably a reference to Rogers' memorandum mentioned in footnote 2, Document 359.

Attachment

TALKING POINTS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

1. You will wish to inform the President of your discussions with the UK, France and Japan and of Mr. Green's conversations with Australia and New Zealand.

2. You believe wider consultations would add little to this and you hope the President could now decide to proceed with a Dual Representation policy. A decision now to go the Dual Representation route does not mean a public announcement need be made before the middle of July. But we should go ahead to seek support from more governments as soon as possible.

3. With most of them it will be better to talk on the basis of a policy conclusion on our part and to be seeking their support. Examples: (a) Countries that have been staunch supporters of the GRC but which are reconsidering their position—Thailand, Greece, Spain, Togo; and (b) countries that want the PRC in the UN but could be brought to champion Dual Representation—Tunisia, Ghana, Mexico, Ivory Coast.

4. Once we start consulting more widely, there will inevitably be leaks and speculations, but these will furnish a smaller target to the PRC than would an official announcement at this time.

5. Getting a majority in the General Assembly in favor of the kind of Dual Representation resolution that we have in mind won't be easy. We shall have to exert leadership, which means that we shall have to act as co-sponsors. If we don't, there would also be a great likelihood that a paragraph about the Security Council would be included in the resolution even before it is tabled.

6. Another matter which will require early decision if the President chooses the Dual Representation approach is whether and to what extent the concept of "universality" should be utilized. If it is decided to use that concept you would like to consult with Japan, the FRG, the ROK and the GVN.

366. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep: Getting Full Advantage Out of Your Recent Talk With Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home²

If the President makes his decision on Chirep in the next few days, and assuming that it is in favor of Dual Representation, we would under present arrangements inform the British and they would then make their approach to Peking along the lines discussed with Sir Alec Douglas-Home at Lisbon. However, unless the President's decision is really imminent, we risk losing some time unnecessarily which could handicap us in the consultations we will need to have with other governments. We have an idea on how that handicap could be avoided.

You agreed to Sir Alec's request that we not make our position on the Important Question public until they had had time to try to install their Ambassador in Peking. Implicit in this would also be a reasonable delay in our telling other governments what our decision was as well. There are bound to be press leaks and speculations as a result of such wider consultations (largely with former co-sponsors of the IQ, as you explained to the President in your memorandum to him of May 28). We would certainly not want the British initiative for an exchange of ambassadors with the PRC to be unintentionally undercut in this manner. On the other hand, we would want to start such consultations at the earliest possible point after the President's decision, as the movement toward acceptance of Peking's position is continuing.

Since you obtained from Sir Alec what we needed most—his willingness to commit the UK only against the IQ “in terms used in previous UN resolutions”—there actually would be advantage now if the British went ahead soon with their approach to the PRC.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Herz. Sent through Pedersen and Johnson.

² See Document 363.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached telegram to Sir Alec Douglas-Home.³

³ Attached but not printed. This telegram (107549 to London), in which Rogers informed Douglas-Home that the United States had no objection to Britain's raising the status of its representative in Peking, was sent on June 16. Ambassador Annenberg delivered the message on June 17, and was informed that Britain intended to announce the name of its Ambassador on June 22 and to close its office on Taiwan. Douglas-Home said that Britain would not support the Important Question or any measure that would prevent the PRC from being seated in the UN, and that he believed dual representation formulae were "non-starters." He did not say whether Britain would support the U.S. position after it was announced. (Telegram 5663 from London, June 18; *ibid.*)

367. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 24, 1971.

SUBJECT

Decision on Chirep

I am concerned that this matter seems to be languishing. I am told that Secretary Rogers has discussed the matter with the President since his return from NATO and has told his people to do nothing more to precipitate a decision. As you will remember, the previous expectation was that a Presidential decision would be made after Rogers' return and that we would use the time before a public announcement to try to line up diplomatic support to avoid Taiwan's expulsion.

We have reached the point where we are literally going to lose this by default. We may, in fact, have already reached that point. Attached is a cable reporting on the somber results of a Japanese survey of the views of 57 more or less well disposed countries.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not printed. The attached cable (5753 from Tokyo, June 15) stated that officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry were increasingly pessimistic about the likelihood of the Republic of China retaining its seat in the United Nations.

I want to be certain that the hold-up here is not caused by the lack of initiative on my part. Should we be precipitating a final Presidential decision by giving him recommendations? Do you wish John Holdridge and me to provide you with such a memo? Or should we relax and try to enjoy it?

Give me a decision memo

Relax³

See me

³ Kissinger initialed this option. Wright added a handwritten paragraph at the bottom of the memorandum: "P.S. Incidentally, our continuing delay is inexplicable to most outsiders, and I have positive knowledge that several foreign and friendly embassies, part of the press, and the State Department, strongly suspect that the delay is deliberate, and intended to make a successful Dual Representation policy impossible. I would bet money that the Chinese are beginning to share that suspicion. MW."

368. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 1, 1971, 3:17–3:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation Issue in the UN

Ambassador Shen expressed appreciation to Dr. Kissinger on being able to see him on the eve of his, Dr. Kissinger's, departure for a trip to South and Southeast Asia. Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted very much to see Ambassador Shen, apologized for the shortness of time available, and indicated a desire to see Ambassador Shen under less crowded circumstances following his return.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 21. The time of the meeting is from Kissinger's Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 446, Miscellany, 1968–1976)

Ambassador Shen brought up the question of the Chinese representation issue in the UN, noting that time was becoming short for organizing a campaign in the UN to retain the position of the GRC. Dr. Kissinger stated that the President would make his decision concerning the U.S. stand in July, and that he anticipated an announcement as to this stand within the next several weeks. Ambassador Shen appeared to accept this as satisfactory.

Ambassador Shen then reminded Dr. Kissinger of what President Chiang Kai-shek had said to Ambassador Murphy on the imperative need for the GRC to retain its Security Council seat.² Any formulation which the U.S. wanted to follow in preserving the GRC's UN position was acceptable so long as the GRC held on to its Security Council seat. Dr. Kissinger observed that the U.S. would do everything it could to preserve the GRC's Security Council seat; however, frankly speaking, the checks which we had made with other interested parties suggested that it might be very difficult to do this. In a brief exchange with Ambassador Shen on the possible U.S. use of a veto to prevent Communist China from entering the Security Council, Dr. Kissinger explained that it might not be technically possible for the U.S. to exercise its veto power on this issue. If the question were put in terms of which entity *represented* China, Communist China or the GRC, this might be considered a procedural matter not subject to the veto. In addition, there were evidently quite a few countries in the UN which, while advocating the continued presence of the GRC, would advocate Communist China's assuming the GRC's Security Council seat. This attitude might be difficult to counter. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that we would do everything we could to safeguard the GRC's Security Council seat, but that we could not offer a guarantee of success.

Ambassador Shen expressed concern over what Dr. Kissinger had said, and noted that if its Security Council seat could not be assured, the GRC might have to reconsider its position on the Chinese representation issue. He said that he would inform his Government of what Dr. Kissinger had said.

The meeting concluded with Dr. Kissinger expressing the President's and his own best wishes to President Chiang. We intended to maintain our strong ties with the GRC and to honor our mutual defense treaty with it. Ambassador Shen thanked Dr. Kissinger for these sentiments. He spoke again about calling on Dr. Kissinger after the latter's return to Washington.

² See Documents 349 and 354.

369. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep—Estimate of Chances for Success of Dual Representation

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring to your attention circumstances which have a bearing on your decision on Chinese Representation policy, as well as our current estimates of the chances of passing a Dual Representation resolution at the next General Assembly.

We have had consultations with a limited number of countries on the Dual Representation formula under consideration. None have stated a final position and none have conducted a thorough canvass, but the following is a brief summary of their immediate reaction:

Australia—Would support Dual Representation; prefers a different formula; believes the Security Council seat should be offered the PRC in the resolution; believes Dual Representation unlikely to pass.

Belgium—Would support Dual Representation but believes the resolution must offer the Security Council seat to Peking; expressed no view on chances for passage.

France—Would not support Dual Representation; believes it has a slight chance of passage.

Japan—Would support the Dual Representation formula we are considering; agrees it is desirable not to mention the Security Council seat, but senior Foreign Ministry officials fear inclusion of such a provision may be necessary for passage.

The Netherlands—The Dutch Foreign Office has said it will be unable to express an opinion before the new Dutch Government, to be formed at the end of July, has had an opportunity to study our proposal; the Dutch believe that the odds are probably against passage, particularly if the Security Council seat is not mentioned.

New Zealand—Would support Dual Representation but prefers another formula; considers giving the Security Council seat to Peking essential to success.

Thailand—Agrees Dual Representation is probably the only alternative to ROC expulsion but fears the resolution might not pass in any case.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Feldman and cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green.

United Kingdom—Would not support Dual Representation; strongly doubts it can pass.

In our earlier estimates, at the time NSSM-107 was submitted in January and later when the National Security Council met in March to discuss it, we gave our judgment that a suitable Dual Representation formula could command strong majority support in the Assembly. At the time, we foresaw a 20–25 vote majority in favor of Dual Representation. These estimates were conditioned on the assumptions that the U.S. would begin lobbying actively for Dual Representation in the spring, would co-sponsor the resolution, and that the resolution would contain language (unopposed by us) to the effect that the Security Council seat would go to Peking. I must caution that given present uncertainty regarding these assumptions, the earlier estimates of a sizeable majority for Dual Representation cannot now be relied upon.

In part due to our delay, the situation has changed over time. Peking has managed to create a bandwagon psychology by establishing or reestablishing diplomatic relations with seven countries in the last six months. Also, the steps we ourselves have taken toward normalization of trade and travel with Peking during this period probably have led many countries to assume that we are emphasizing our bilateral relations with the PRC and deemphasizing Chirep.

It is extremely difficult to offer a reasonably hard estimate of the chances for success now, particularly since we have been unable to consult widely on the basis of a specific proposition and country positions are in process of change in many cases. (“Hand-holding” consultations were necessary in some cases just to gain more time.) However, we have formulated tentative in-house estimates, and have compared notes with Australia and Japan. The latter, in particular, has undertaken a world-wide canvass.

The Japanese contacted 105 countries and received 69 replies, but at least 37—well over half—were the personal observations of middle-level Foreign Ministry officials and therefore cannot be considered hard data. Of these 69 countries, about 25 might favor Dual Representation, about 26 might oppose and 18 were uncertain. The Japanese have formed their own in-house estimate for the Assembly as a whole and believe Dual Representation might pass by about three votes. This estimate assumes we will not make an all-out effort. Oddly, some medium-level GOJ officials feel Dual Representation might have a better chance if the Security Council seat were *not* mentioned in the resolution because certain friends of the ROC might vote against it under those circumstances. Our own analysis of their data does not support that judgment. Of the countries checked by the Japanese, ten told them a Dual Representation resolution must include language awarding the seat to Peking and only one felt otherwise.

The Australian estimate is that Dual Representation might pass by about two votes—but only if the Security Council seat were to go to Peking. If the Council seat issue is finessed, the Australians believe the resolution is bound to fail.

Our own estimate is somewhat more optimistic—but only if the U.S. co-sponsors and begins soon to lobby intensively, and only if the resolution (with our acquiescence) states that the Council seat should go to Peking. Under these circumstances, we believe Dual Representation could get a majority of 5–7 votes in its favor. This is still a much smaller margin than we had estimated in March. If the U.S. does not co-sponsor, and if the Council seat is not included, we believe the resolution could lose by up to 20 votes, *even if the U.S. lobbies hard in its favor*.

I must emphasize the tentative nature of these forecasts. The closeness of the vote in these three estimates—a majority of 2, or 3, or 5—shows that if you give the go signal for Dual Representation, we will have to make a very big effort and even then there can be no firm assurance of success.

William P. Rogers

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, July 6, 1971, 1107Z.

6561. Subj: Chirep.

Summary: FornMin officials dealing with Chirep now virtually unanimous in strongly recommending: a) separate resolution making expulsion of GRC an IQ; and b) subsequent and separate simple dual representation resolution for admitting PRC. They stress urgency in view of fact that Albanian resolution may be tabled in mid-July, which would put our side at great disadvantage tactically.

1. FornMin DirGen UN Affairs Nishibori pulled me aside at lunch for Congressman Danielson July 6 to request that we telegraph Wash-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and USUN. Also sent to Secretary Rogers at San Clemente, California, on July 7 as telegram 121378. (Ibid.)

ington of increasing concern here re Chirep situation. He said cable going forward to Japanese Embassy in Washington on same subject.

2. According to Nishibori, every day which passes is probably losing one vote for position which both our governments wish to see prevail on Chirep issue. He said GOJ information is that Algerians or others will inscribe Chirep issue on or before July 15, and will probably at same time propose Albanian resolution. This will put our side in most difficult tactical position.

3. Although new ForMin Fukuda still not had time to focus on Chirep problem, Nishibori said general consensus in Foreign Ministry has now developed strongly favoring: a) separate and special resolution specifying that expulsion of member nation, i.e. GRC, is Important Question and will require two-thirds vote; and b) subsequent and separate simple dual representation resolution passable by simple majority. DR resolution would not include reference to SC seat, but undoubtedly attempts at amendment would be made.

4. Re SC seat, as Nishibori sees it, even though UNGA resolution would only be recommendation, it would be virtually impossible for GRC to hold UNSC seat when issue would be raised, as it undoubtedly would, in UNSC itself. Double veto would not prevail, and most our side could count on would be six votes, including Belgium which Nishibori considers highly doubtful.

5. Because luncheon requirements precluded extensive discussion, Nishibori was able only to convey above essence of GOJ position. He said he had been instructed by Hogen to inform me of above, including fact that all working levels of Foreign Ministry are now of same opinion.

Comment: Hogen two days ago also stressed to me importance of tactics, i.e. that inscription can take place 60 days before UNGA which means circa July 21 and that AR supporters likely to beat us to the draw.

Meyer

371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and International Organization Affairs (De Palma) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin¹

Washington, July 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep: ROC Acceptance of a Dual Representation Formula

The ROC Foreign Minister has suggested that as soon as the US has made its policy decision Japan should begin working immediately, with tacit ROC and US support, to round up votes for a simple dual representation formula that does not mention the Security Council seat, combined with a separate “reverse Important Question” resolution which would require a two-thirds vote for the expulsion of the ROC. He also expressed to Ambassador McConaughy an earnest hope for the promptest possible US decision. The Foreign Minister also stressed the need for an early tabling of an agreed resolution in order best to forestall priority consideration of the Albanian Resolution.

This information indicates quite clearly that the ROC has now decided, at a minimum, that:

1. The former IQ–AR formula cannot be successfully used again.
2. It can accept—and presumably work tacitly for—a dual representation formula provided it does not state the Security Council seat should go to Peking and provided there is the protection of a two-thirds vote on expulsion.
3. It can go this far for tactical reasons because it judges that the PRC would not enter the UN under this formula.

The ROC has already quietly moved further than many would have predicted a few months ago. Even though it remains unlikely, we should not now exclude the possibility that, while remaining silent or apparently obdurate until the eleventh hour, President Chiang will finally decide to move even further than he or the ROC has thus far indicated.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by John T. McCarthy and Starbird and cleared in draft by Armitage.

² Attached but not printed are telegram 3300 from Taipei, July 7, and telegram 3314 from Taipei, July 8, which are summarized in this memorandum.

372. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and International Organization Affairs (De Palma) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep—Scenario for Dealing with GRC on Dual Representation

Here is a suggested scenario for dealing with the GRC in the event the President decides in favor of some form of dual representation. The scenario assumes that our soundings will continue to show that a dual representation strategy has little chance for success unless the resolution contains language to the effect that Peking should have the Security Council seat. If the later soundings do not indicate this, our problems with the GRC would be greatly lessened.

Attachment

CHIREP SCENARIO

President decides to try out the dual representation approach with US co-sponsorship and initial silence about the Security Council.

Through Ambassador McConaughy, US informs GRC of decision and US plan to seek support. At same time, US frankly tells GRC that although this first effort will be silent on Security Council seat, preliminary information makes it appear that any DR resolution will have to state that Security Council seat should go to PRC if it is to succeed. US adds that building 2/3 requirement explicitly into resolution may also prove a limiting factor.

US actively seeks co-sponsors and agreement on text, as well as support within GA from countries who may not be prepared to co-sponsor. We find that support will be inadequate unless the Security Council seat is explicitly awarded to Peking in resolution as tabled, or unless US signifies it will acquiesce in amendment to that effect.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Winthrop Brown and Feldman and cleared by Shoemith, William A. Brown, Armitage, and Pedersen.

Option One

Through Ambassador McConaughy, or through a special envoy—in either case employing a letter from President Nixon—US tells GRC that unless GRC is prepared to acquiesce on the Council seat, US will announce publicly it has tried to develop support for what it considers a reasonable solution and has found international support. US will thank these supporters, but will go on to state that since neither PRC nor GRC will accept this solution, US will not engage in exercise in futility by proposing it. US, therefore, will simply support an Important Question resolution and will oppose Albanian resolution. In event other nations propose dual representation formula that US considers reasonable and equitable, US would vote for it. US tells GRC that, in our opinion, inevitable result of this course of action would be GRC expulsion under Albanian resolution, requests early GRC decision.

US informs GOJ, GOA, GNZ of above approach to GRC and asks them to weigh in as well.

If GRC sticks to its opposition, or if GRC temporizes, US will make public announcement described above.

Option Two

Through Ambassador McConaughy, or through special envoy—in either case employing a letter from President Nixon—US tells GRC that despite opposition of both PRC and GRC, US considers dual representation plus Security Council seat to PRC to be a reasonable solution and will press on for its adoption by Assembly in the hope that when the moment for decision comes, either or both parties will accept. US will point out our belief dual representation is in both our interests as the only alternative would be GRC expulsion under the Albanian resolution and will emphasize the eroding effect on US ability to maintain its security commitment and close cooperative relations should GRC either walk out or be ejected from UN.

US informs GOJ, GOA, and GNZ of above approach to GRC and urges them to weigh in as well.

US continues to work for dual representation and tables resolution even if Chiang is opposed or temporizes.

Option Two-A

If, in response to above approach, GRC advises that it will not walk out if dual representation resolution with Security Council seat to PRC is passed, but will only walk out if PRC accepts and enters UN on that basis, US will press for dual representation resolution with Security Council seat included. If it is adopted, probable result would be that PRC refuses to enter and GRC can remain if it wishes. If PRC should accept dual representation plus Security Council seat and enter UN on

this basis, it will be up to GRC to make ultimate decision (even though advised by US and other friends) whether it will walk out or remain.

Advantages of Option One

1. Under this option, US will not have to oppose publicly the wishes of the GRC.

2. It would be clear that we had made every reasonable effort to protect GRC place in UN; responsibility for leaving UN would clearly be placed on GRC.

3. Would be consistent with position taken by Secretary with Ambassador Shen.

4. Would be least annoying to Peking since PRC will see this as leading to earlier entry into UN.

5. Would place US in reasonably good position with American public opinion; we would have demonstrated our desire for a reasonable and equitable solution.

6. Would avoid the necessity for the US formally to sponsor PRC entry.

7. Would dispose of the Chirep issue, albeit in a manner which we will not like.

Disadvantages of Option One

1. GRC would be expelled under Albanian resolution.

2. Possibility of last minute change of mind by GRC would be ruled out.

3. Might give the appearance that US has allowed Chiang a veto on significant areas of US foreign policy formulation.

4. Would be tacit admission by US that IQ is just a gimmick to delay Assembly decision and in any case is a "second best" formula.

Advantages of Option Two

1. Would hold open the door to a later GRC change of mind.

2. Would be seen by American and international public opinion as a realistic and equitable policy and would demonstrate that our hands are not tied by Chiang.

3. Even if GRC walks out, this may be preferable to their expulsion (assuming the resolution passes) since the latter would reduce them to the status of a non-state in the eyes of many.

4. It would keep the door open for the very remote possibility that the PRC might be willing to enter the UN on the basis of dual representation.

5. If PRC refused to enter on this basis, onus would be on Peking.

Disadvantages of Option Two

1. Would be considered by PRC as an additional, but not unexpected, unfriendly act and could interfere with further movement toward normalization.

2. Given our very late start (we would be well into August at that point), there would be no assurance of passage of the dual representation resolution.

3. It would open the US to charges by those who are concerned only with getting the PRC in that we were simply trying to find a new way of keeping the PRC out of the UN.

4. It would not resolve the Chirep issue. It would be back next year.

373. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 13, 1971, 0001Z.

1879. Subj: Chirep-Japanese Suggestion for Pro-GRC Initiative.

1. Japanese PermRep Nakagawa on instructions asked to see Bush urgently July 12. Referring to reports co-sponsors of Albanian res planning to submit their draft agenda item prior to July 15, Nakagawa said Japan wished US if possible or a third country to take advantage of imminent submission of traditional Albanian item to submit pro-GRC proposal first. Although initial presentation was somewhat vague, after series of questions Nakagawa said GOJ hoped US or third party would submit pro-GRC draft res to UN Secretariat in immediate future with understanding such draft would be held pending submission of Albanian-type item. When Albanian item submitted, pro-GRC draft res would then have priority.

2. In response to further questions, Nakagawa said pro-GRC draft res could either be simple DR res or modified IQ res (decision to expel GRC subject to two-thirds vote). We explained our understanding that Albanians and co-sponsors were planning to submit not only agenda item but explanatory memo and draft AR res as well. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to have pro-GRC draft res

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and Taipei.

circulated prior to AR res submitted at same time item given to Secretariat. If, contrary to expectations, Albania did not attach draft res at time item submitted, then Japanese approach might be considered. Best approach to meet GOJ concern would be prior submission of pro-GRC draft agenda item with draft res attached.

3. Bush noted difficulty for US since US policy not yet decided. In event US not able to accede to GOJ request, would Japan be willing to submit pro-GRC item and res? Nakagawa said his instructions spoke only of third countries if US not in position submit pro-GRC draft res (it clear Japanese would have difficulty acting alone or even in concert with us). We asked about possibility of Australia or New Zealand. Nakagawa said difficulty was that both of these countries believe SC seat should go to PRC and if this put in draft res difficulties with GRC would ensue.

4. Bush said would report Japanese request to Dept.

5. *Comment:* We agree with Japanese that it would be preferable to have priority for pro-GRC draft res since it not at all certain that we could win a fight on priority. Therefore, without prejudice to what position we may subsequently adopt, there is merit in the US (with others if they can be quickly rounded up) submitting item neutrally worded "the problem of the representation of China" and attaching a modified IQ res declaring decision to expel GRC subject to two-thirds vote. We could always modify our draft res prior to actual debate in GA in late Sept or early Oct.

Bush

374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 15, 1971, 0141Z.

127416. Subject: Chirep: ROC Position and Request for Consultations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Starbird, cleared by Sean Holly, and approved by Assistant Secretary Green. Repeated to Tokyo, Hong Kong, and USUN and to Secretary Rogers at San Clemente as Tosec 118.

Ref: (A) Taipei 3300; (B) Taipei 3314;² (C) Taipei 3387; (D) Taipei 3388.³

1. Acting under instructions ROC Ambassador Shen called on Assistant Secretary Green July 13 to make approach parallel Foreign Minister Chow's July 10 discussion with Ambassador McConaughy in Taipei (Ref C). Conversation was relaxed and friendly throughout.

2. *Inscription and Tabling*: Shen said the ROC had reports that the AR co-sponsors had met and decided to inscribe their item and table their resolution for the Provisional Agenda, which closes July 23. The ROC hoped, therefore, that whatever resolution our side may have will be ready sufficiently early to inscribe before then.

3. We reviewed the difference between inscribing an item and tabling a resolution, pointing out that it is the latter which gives a claim to priority. We also noted that agenda is later reviewed by General Committee and finally adopted by General Assembly. Thus not tabling on the Provisional Agenda is not the end of the ballgame.

4. Green said the President is fully aware of all aspects of the Chirep problem, including the considerations relating to inscribing an item and tabling a resolution. He said we are waiting for a decision which should be forthcoming shortly.

5. *Prior Consultations*: Shen formally requested that the ROC be informed of the US decision before other governments are and certainly prior to any public announcement. Green responded that after the President's decision is made we would expect to be in touch with the ROC and then with other friendly governments. At the end of the conversation Shen asked that the ROC's requests regarding prior consultations be made known to the White House, and Green assured him we would.

6. *Security Council*: Shen said the ROC regards its place in the GA and in the SC as one indivisible question, not as two separable questions. He said that, as the ROC had told us earlier, the ROC would find it intolerable to have its SC seat affected. He realized that there was no preventing others from raising the SC issue in the GA or in the SC itself. He hoped that the US would use its influence to nip any such attempt in the bud. If that were impossible, then he asked that the US treat any move in the SC as a substantive matter not a procedural one.

7. Green replied that the ROC had made its point very clearly and that we realized the importance that the ROC attached to its SC seat. Some countries, ourselves included, would prefer that a GA resolution not mention the SC seat, but others think the success of a dual repre-

² See footnote 2, Document 371.

³ Both dated July 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM and POL CHINAT-US, respectively)

sentation resolution may hinge on it. The SC seat is likely to be a most difficult aspect of the problem, one requiring subtle and flexible handling. The objective is to protect ROC membership in the UN. The problem is obtaining sufficient support from others to do so. We understand the implications of this for the ROC. We can give no guarantees of success but we will do the best we can. We would expect to move to seek support promptly after a Presidential decision.

8. Shen reiterated the point that if anything happened to its SC seat the ROC would be left with no choice. He was sure numerous arguments could be marshaled in support of the ROC position, but he also said he realized that in the final analysis the need was for votes. Green noted that many countries feel strongly about the question of expelling the ROC, a founding member in good standing. This presented a more attractive case than arguing against Peking's entry, which no longer appealed to a number of governments.

9. *Japanese Estimates:* Green asked for the ROC's views about Japan's position. Shen replied that the Japanese seemed to be strongly opposed to including reference to the SC seat in a dual representation (DR) resolution. Also the Japanese seem to be more optimistic about passage of such a resolution than is the US.

10. There ensued some discussion of the Japanese soundings and our reservations about whether their data were firm enough to support their conclusions. (For details see State 120452⁴ and its reftels.) Shen expressed the hope that the US would not feel it absolutely necessary to include the SC in order to pass a DR res since the Japanese do not think so.

11. *ROC Activity on DR:* Shen noted that the Japanese estimates indicated that the margin in favor of dual rep was small and that a lot of hard work would be needed. He said that the ROC would have to vote against a DR res because of its opposition to any "two Chinas" principle and that, for the same reason, the ROC could not talk in favor of item. In response to a question Shen said that the ROC had not yet decided whether it would work against a DR res; that would depend in part on its content.

12. Green said that the ROC attitude on a DR res could be critical for some countries which are good friends of the ROC and noted that the Japanese estimates so indicated. If the ROC speaks against DR, it could drive away potential supporters. Green raised the question as to whether friendly countries don't need to know that the ROC considers DR preferable to some of the other alternatives (such as passage of the AR). Shen agreed that this will be one of the problems that the ROC will have to face if DR is decided on.

⁴ Dated June 22. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM)

13. These considerations were reviewed with DeptOff following close of conversation with Green. Shen wryly described ROC quandary in that case as how to convey the idea: “don’t listen to what we’re saying (i.e. just for the record); what we really want you to do is thus and such.” How ironic it would be, he said, if the ROC’s own vote (and, by implication, its activities) should lead to its defeat.

Irwin

375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 16, 1971, 1847Z.

128777. Subject: Chirep.

1. Canadian Embassy gave us following text July 16 of latest GOC position on Chirep:

“The Canadian Govt. has decided that if the ‘Important Question’ resolution is introduced in relation to the ‘Albanian Resolution’ in the next session of the UNGA Canada will vote against the Important Question resolution. The Govt. has also decided that Canada will oppose a ‘reverse Important Question’ formula, i.e. any move to make the ‘expulsion’ of Taiwan proposed in the Albanian Resolution subject to two-thirds majority vote. In effect this means that the Canadian delegation will oppose proposals that would have the effect of delaying the entry of the PRC into the UN through linking continuing participation of Taiwan representatives in the UN with the seating of representative of the PRC.”

2. Canadians have also informed UK, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Austria and PRC of this position.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William A. Brown, cleared by Starbird and Mansfield, and approved by Brown. Also sent to Ottawa, London, Wellington, Canberra, Tokyo, Brussels, Taipei, Rome, Vienna, and Hong Kong.

376. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, July 21, 1971, 2243Z.

132194. 1. At their request, Chiefs of following European missions called on Assistant Secretary Green for briefing on President Nixon's July 15 announcement:² Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. During twenty minute session Green made following points:

2. He appreciated group's desire for information but speaking frankly there was not much he could say beyond the Presidential announcement. He cited President Nixon's 1971 Foreign Policy Report statement, "In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community and particularly with the rest of Asia."³ Consistent with that view, President had taken a number of unilateral steps designed to open up communication with the PRC, to renew the dialogue, to improve relations with Peking and to facilitate PRC movement into the international mainstream. Internal changes within PRC since end of Cultural Revolution offered hope that now might be a propitious time for such an initiative.

3. He regretted our inability to hold advance consultation with friendly governments on this latest move but it had to be handled with the greatest secrecy; no country was informed in advance and very few were privy to this information in USG. He hoped that those present would also appreciate the necessity for holding down speculation which could impair or jeopardize the success of the Presidential visit, no date for which had yet been set.

4. The President's trip was not directed against any country. On the contrary as we moved toward better relations with Peking there was no reason for others to believe that it would be at their expense. We continue to stand by our friends, including the Republic of China, and our commitments to them.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHINAT. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by William A. Brown; cleared by Armitage, Arva C. Floyd, Russell Fessenden, and Robert H. Miller; and approved by Assistant Secretary Green. Sent to Helsinki, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, Brussels, Vienna, Bern, Dublin, Madrid, Lisbon, The Hague, USNATO, USUN, and Luxembourg.

² Reference is to President Nixon's announcement of his acceptance of an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819-820.

³ The full report is *ibid.*, pp. 219-345; the quote is on p. 276.

5. Although he could not go into substance of the Chou–Kissinger talks, he could say that there were no agreements beyond that set forth in the communiqué.⁴ The talks were exploratory in nature, directed at preparations for Presidential trip including the drafting of the communiqué.

6. World reaction had been almost uniformly favorable and Green thanked those present whose governments had supported our move.

7. In the ensuing question and answer period, Green said: (A) USG is close to a decision on the Chirep issue but must consult further, especially with Taipei; (B) we could not comment on the modalities of future contacts with Peking; and (C) the term “normalization of relations” in the joint communiqué was carefully chosen because it is not specific with regard to the question of diplomatic recognition.

Rogers

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 819–820.

377. Editorial Note

In a meeting with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on July 22, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers reviewed the Chinese representation issue in both the General Assembly and Security Council:

“Rogers: Now, Mr. President, if you should decide, just in this room that it’s better from our standpoint to just lose to begin with, then we can sort of indicate to the Republic of China, go ahead with the statements, and we’ll just vote on the Albanian Resolution.

“Kissinger: Yes, that’s what we talked about at the beginning.

“Nixon: I don’t think it’s a good policy.

“Kissinger: I don’t either.

“Nixon: I think it looks too damn—

“Rogers: It’s too cynical.

“Nixon: Cynical, well another thing is this: Let’s look at it from the standpoint now of domestic relations, American relations, there’s still a helluva lot of people who oppose the initiative to Red China and the UN [unintelligible]. It’s still a very substantial number, I understand that. But in terms of this new initiative from China, it looks like we’re being tricky as hell, if we on one hand say we’re going to Com-

munist China, and on the other hand we're voting against Communist China coming into the UN. I wonder if that doesn't just make us look like a bunch of hypocrites. Does it or doesn't it?

"Rogers: I think it does.

"Kissinger: I agree with Bill. If you remember in April I was sort of attracted by the idea—

"Nixon: Just get rolled.

"Kissinger: Then if we were going to lose anyway, but it was an opposite situation. I felt that as long as we were going to lose, we might as well lose maintaining our principles, but right now maintaining our principles makes us look tricky. We're not going to get credit for maintaining the principle while going to Peking, because we had had the principle that China ought to be excluded from the UN. So my original reason for it is no longer valid. Secondly, I did remember mentioning to Chou En-lai just in passing, there's always voting on the Albanian Resolution, which [unintelligible] and he certainly did not pick that up. I mean he didn't say [unintelligible], so I think the game with that is just too cynical. So I think if Taiwan wants to stay in, we owe them a fight for it.

"Rogers: Suppose they decide they don't want to? And I think—

"Kissinger: We'd be better off making a fight [unintelligible], except we might fight less intensely.

"Rogers: Well, do we all agree? I think I certainly feel that we have to vote for the PRC's admission.

"Nixon: You think so?

"Kissinger: Yes.

"Nixon: I guess we have to. I wish we didn't have to, but I don't see how we can avoid it—"

After further discussion, President Nixon commented: "I think that, it seems to me that the way it sorts out, we've got to indicate that we would support the admission of Red China into the United Nations. We will oppose the expulsion of any nation which has been a good member of the United Nations, period. Well, and we oppose the expulsion of Taiwan because Taiwan has been a good member, period. Right?"

The discussion continued, and Kissinger concluded: "What we should do in my judgment, is we should make a real fight, but we should do it in a way that we don't elaborate too much on the legal basis for a two China solution. If we can win just by arm-twisting and—

"Nixon: In other words, what we really need here, Bill, is to have George [Bush] or whatever, not to make a great big damn legal case for it, just say the nation shouldn't be expelled, and we're going to fight for them. Is that a good point?

“Kissinger: That’s actually my point.

“Nixon: Because basically you don’t want to get into a position where the two China thing is so strongly—

“Kissinger: I’d like to be in a position where we have made a genuine fight, but at the same time, Peking could figure that anytime they could get two-thirds, they could get rid of Taiwan and that seems to be something they could look forward to in two or three years, maybe even one year. But I think for us to roll over and play dead on the basis of just one visit, no matter how well you’ve talked to them or how well they’ve talked to you, is just too unprincipled.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, July 22, 1971, 3:49–5:05 p.m. Oval Office, Conversation No. 543–1) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed specifically for this volume.

378. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 22, 1971, 2345Z.

1993. Subj: Chirep—Bush—SYG Meeting July 22.

1. Summary. Bush, during call on SYG on another subject July 22, took occasion to brief U Thant along lines para 4, State 131353.² SYG expressed appreciation. End summary.

2. Bush explained restrictions placed on members of administration on this subject. Although US tactics in GA not yet decided and he under firm instructions not to speculate, Bush said he believed he owed SYG as much information as was currently available.

3. Basic purpose of President’s July 15 announcement was to improve relations with PRC. At same time, US was going to continue to have good relations with GRC. Our basic defense treaty will remain in force and we will work for retention of GRC in the UN. Our assessment is that if we continued with same policy as in past we would not be successful in blocking Albanian Resolution or getting majority for IQ. Reiterating US support for GRC, Bush said US will support GRC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis.

² Dated July 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

membership in UN and noted our tactical position still being worked out. Only thing yet decided is that we will vote against expulsion of GRC.

4. U Thant said he understood situation and expressed appreciation for briefing. In reply to question, Bush said we had been in touch with WE allies and others on this issue.

5. In reply to Bush's question, SYG said it possible Albanian res cosponsors would seek and obtain priority consideration in plenary immediately after general debate. This could lead to question being decided about middle of October. SYG volunteered, "I will then have to get in touch with Peking."

6. *Comment.* This is first hint we have had SYG may have changed his long-standing prediction PRC will not enter UN until Nov 1972.

Bush

379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 23, 1971, 0042Z.

133369. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Chirep: Approach to GRC. Refs: A. Taipei 3540;² B. State 130330;³ C. Taipei 3595.⁴

Summary. We are concerned, particularly because of Chiang's extended seclusion, that GRC's response to Secretary on Chirep may be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Starbird and Shoemith; cleared by Winthrop Brown, Armitage, Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma, and Samuel E. Fry; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Canberra, Tokyo, and USUN.

² In telegram 3540, July 20, McConaughy reported that Chow cancelled his meeting with him in order to discuss the issue with members of the Legislative Yuan. McConaughy stated: "I find it impossible to make a reasonable assessment of how the GRC will respond to the Secretary's statement that the GRC will have to agree to relinquishment of its SC seat if we are to make any serious effort at a dual representation formula in the UNGA." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, China, Vol. VII) Secretary Rogers had met with Ambassador Shen on July 19. A record of the meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972.

³ Dated July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 CHINAT-US)

⁴ Dated July 22. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM)

inordinately delayed and that decision may be made on narrow grounds of effects on GRC image and claim to be sole government of all China. You should approach GRC to underscore our views of importance of continued UN membership even without SC seat for continued viability of GRC's international position. You also should stress need for early decision in order to have best possible chance of success. You should point out that it will be an up-hill fight but that if GRC agrees we are prepared to undertake it.

1. We are concerned—particularly because of President Chiang's unusually extended seclusion and possibility that he may not be accessible to full range of policy advisers (Ref A)—that GRC response to Secretary's presentation of Chirep problem to Ambassador Shen (Ref B) may be not only inordinately delayed but also temporizing and not sufficiently clear-cut to provide a basis for action. We are also concerned that as result of his remoteness from current scene, bruised feelings, and shock at President Nixon's announcement, Chiang may tend to reach decision on Chirep issue within narrow context of its presumed effects on GRC image and its claim to be sole government of all China. In attempt to insure that GRC decision takes adequate account of all major factors at stake you are requested to make approach along following lines to Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai or Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo or both if you deem that desirable. In making your representations you should state that Secretary has instructed you to make this further amplification of his remarks to Ambassador Shen. In light Ref C, which received after this message drafted, you may subsequently make our views discreetly known to other sympathetic high-level GRC officials.

2. Throughout our deliberations on Chirep we have been keenly aware of GRC concerns and interests, as conveyed both in Taipei and Washington, and they have been given full weight in our efforts to devise an approach to this problem. We recognize gravity of choice which now confronts GRC and realize that it will require an act of high statesmanship to weigh all various factors involved. Decision is clearly one which GRC as sovereign government must make for itself and we will, of course, respect whatever decision it reaches. This is, however, a matter of real mutual concern, and it is in this context that we wish share with GRC certain considerations which we believe highly relevant to that weighty decision.

3. We believe that retention of UN membership, even at cost of relinquishing Security Council seat, is of great importance to maintenance of broad support for GRC. We hope, therefore, that the GRC will consider most carefully the difficulties that would be posed for its friends (particularly the US, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) in maintaining political support for it internationally if it withdraws or is expelled

from the UN. So long as GRC is UN member, it has firm and acknowledged international status both in UNGA and in international organizations which strengthens its hand in its dealings with other countries and in maintaining relations. If GRC left and PRC entered UN, a number of governments which had hitherto recognized GRC, might feel faced again by either/or choice and might well decide to follow UN precedent. Some might make rather cynical decision that it more important have relations with 700 million people on mainland than with 14 million on Taiwan. Thus there real danger that if GRC leaves UN its international position may erode and it may find itself relatively isolated.

4. Even among GRC's close friends there is likely to be a public opinion trend along this line, particularly if GRC had rejected opportunity for continued UN membership under dual representation, and frankly we fear this could occur in US.

5. Over time the GRC has moved from a position of (A) wanting to use the old strategy of combatting the AR with the traditional IQ to (B) acceptance of a modified IQ or non-expulsion resolution plus a DR that did not call for the SC seat to go to Peking. We have sought to support successive positions that GRC has adopted on Chirep but have also informed GRC of our estimate of their chances. It is our current estimate that in order to have a chance to retain UN membership the GRC must be willing to relinquish the Security Council seat. To succeed even on this basis will be an up-hill fight. If GRC willing to proceed on this basis, even though it might not so indicate publicly, then we would be prepared to work hard to achieve that result.

6. We share with GRC sense of urgency in deciding on what course we should follow. As Secretary explained to Ambassador Shen, given importance GRC had attached to SC seat, when it became apparent that GRC membership in UN could not be preserved on that basis, we felt we could not proceed further without ascertaining GRC views. If approach which Secretary has outlined to Ambassador Shen is to have fighting chance, we must consult soonest with other governments to develop best possible texts of resolutions and tactics for use in UNGA. For that reason, we earnestly hope for early decision and prompt response to Secretary.

Rogers

380. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 23, 1971, 1304Z.

3627. For Secretary From Ambassador. Subj: Chirep: Ambassador's Meeting With Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Ref: State 133369.²

Summary: Ambassador made representation to Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in accordance instructions reftel. CCK made clear that GRC takes dim view of proposal put to Ambassador Shen by Secretary. During conversation he referred repeatedly to Murphy conversation in April and said that GRC considered SC seat and UNGA membership as separate matters. If PRC were to come into the SC in disregard of the Charter, ChiCom presence would "negate the legal existence of the ROC." Chiang asked if US had definitely discarded IQ tactic. He said he wished to have further discussions as soon as possible. Atmosphere of talk was good and it was psychologically helpful, but GRC's inclination at present is negative.

1. I decided to make approach authorized reftel to Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo rather than to FonMin Chou Shu-kai. I met with CCK for an hour and twenty minutes this afternoon. His aides Gen. Wen and Capt. Yeh only other persons present. Both of them took full notes and Chiang Ching-kuo himself occasionally made notations in a small notebook. Chiang Ching-kuo greeted me warmly and with very amiable personal inquiries. Atmosphere friendly and natural throughout although seriousness of occasion was evident. Chiang Ching-kuo seemed well but somewhat care-worn. He said he felt that both Pres. Nixon and I as friends of the Republic of China of long standing would understand the difficulties he and his associates in the government were going through. I assured him of my sympathetic understanding and added that I knew that he and his colleagues had found reassurances in the last paragraph of Pres. Nixon's announcement and in the President's letter of July 16.³

2. I then set forth systematically and in detail presentation contained reftel. At the end I added on informal individual basis several related points of my own devising which I felt might exert some additional influence on GRC thinking on the issue. These related to: (a)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, China, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.

² Document 379.

³ For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

problems created for Peking by continued GRC presence in the UN whether or not Peking accepted the invitation; (b) sufficiency of membership in the GA (without SC membership) for purpose of achieving the needed benefits of GRC identification with the UN; (c) the better capability of influential Japanese leaders in the LDP to assist the GRC cause in Japan if the latter remained in the UN; and (d) importance from the foreign trade, investment, and international credit standpoints of avoiding the economic isolation and possible discrimination that could accompany withdrawal from the UN.

3. Chiang Ching-kuo listened closely to the entire presentation without interruption. He then said that he attached great importance to frank US–GRC exchanges of views on matters of critical importance, and he was glad that we were having this meeting. He was deeply aware of the magnitude of the problem confronting us, and he could see that USG was also fully aware. He said that the attitude of his government on the Chinese representation question was amply stated in the conversations held here last April with Amb. Robert Murphy. He noted rather pointedly that there had been no reply since Amb. Murphy returned to the US. He said if there is a need for further discussion of the UN problem, “The gist of the Murphy conversations can be used as a basis.” He added that the foregoing was his “personal observation as a friend” and was not made in his capacity as a government official.

4. Then (apparently speaking in his official capacity) he recalled that he had indicated to me fully in an earlier conversation the paramount importance which his government attached to the Security Council issue. He noted that the Security Council question is concerned with the Charter itself. He mentioned the specific provision of the Charter that the “Republic of China” is to occupy the permanent seat of China on the SC. Hence the Republic of China is by Charter provision a permanent member. He termed this as a “political consideration of tremendous importance.” “If Communist China comes into the Security Council in disregard of the Charter, the ChiCom presence would negate the legal existence of the Republic of China”. He reiterated that President Chiang had discussed the SC issue fully with Amb. Murphy and he thought they had agreed that “The SC was one thing and general UN membership another, to be treated separately.” He noted that the Charter specifies the “ROC, not the PRC.” Any change or violation of this provision is certainly a matter of substance, not merely procedural.

5. The Vice Premier said that the issue before us is of such moment that close consultations are called for and he hopes to continue a close interchange on this subject, as we have done on all important matters in the two decades past. He said speaking as a friend and off-the-record, he wanted to ask a question to clarify one part of Ambassador Shen’s report of the July 19 meeting with Secretary

Rogers,⁴ as follows: “Did the Secretary tell Ambassador Shen that the USG would only discuss the Chirep issue further if the GRC tacitly agreed that it would acquiesce in the abandonment of the Security Council seat?” He said Ambassador Shen’s report seemed to indicate that only under this condition would the US agree to any further discussion. He would like to know if there was any other basis for continuing the discussion.

6. I replied that while the Secretary had been very definite in stating the only basis on which we could support a new approach in the GA it was certainly not the Secretary’s practice or intention to shut off discussion with representatives of friendly governments. The door was always open for further discussions with the GRC without conditions. The only pressure imposed on our discussions was that of time. At best the remaining time available for the necessary preparatory work on texts of resolutions and consultations with member governments was quite short. If we lost much more time it might be impossible to prepare our position as thoroughly as we should like. I said if our estimates of the voting alignment for the various propositions was not challenged, it would seem that we should be about ready to take the needed decisions. However we would certainly extend discussions if this was the desire of the GRC. But we would both be paying a price in terms of lost time.

7. CCK again reverted to the SC issue and said that both in the Murphy conversations and in the conversation of Ambassador Shen with Secretary Rogers on May 28⁵ the GRC had thought that the American representatives had agreed that the Security Council issue should be treated separately from the GA dual representation resolution. CCK reaffirmed that he felt strongly the two matters can and should be treated separately and that the SC issue is a matter of substance.

8. CCK inquired if we had definitely discarded the IQ tactic, and if so how did we expect to handle the problem of stopping the Albanian resolution? I replied that we were skeptical about use of the IQ approach because our voting estimate indicated it could not win a majority. We could not rely on it if it was a losing tactic. If a DR resolution could command a majority, that would ensure the defeat of the Albanian resolution and make IQ procedure unnecessary. (*Comment: I did not feel I had enough basis to encourage CCK to think that we might still be able to utilize some form of modified IQ procedure. However if the Dept contemplates accompanying the DR resolution with a modified IQ resolution or incorporating some IQ procedure in the DR resolution itself it would be extremely helpful to be able to pass this information urgently to CCK and FonMin Chou.*)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 379.

⁵ See Document 359.

9. CCK volunteered that he “took a dim view” of the DR approach, and he did not think his government could agree to it. I said I supposed he was referring to a DR with the SC rider attached, and not to a straight or simple DR with no reference to the Security Council seat. I said I thought we had had discreet confirmation several times from the GRC that it could reluctantly live with the simple DR concept, if this was the only solution. CCK only nodded in assent.

10. CCK said that he would like to sum up by saying that the GRC position was that “the gist of the conversation with Ambassador Murphy should be treated as the basis of the current position.” He said that Ambassador Murphy had “taken a copy of the minutes with him.”

11. CCK said that today’s conversation had been helpful. He and his associates would consider the points I had made and he would like to have clarification of several obscure matters. He said he wanted to have further discussions with me “as soon as possible.”

12. I expressed my satisfaction that we had had an extended exchange and expressed my readiness to meet with him again as soon as he was ready. I had thought it best to ask for this meeting with him rather than with the FonMin, but I did not want FonMin Chow to feel that I had improperly bypassed him. CCK readily agreed to inform the FonMin of the substance of our conversation.

13. *Comment:* While atmosphere of talk was good with some clarifications made and it was psychologically helpful, it is clear that basic inclination at or near the top is still rather on the negative side. CCK may be reflecting more of the Gimo’s posture than his own, although I think he too is relying rather heavily on GRC interpretation of Murphy talks. Since I am not fully posted on Murphy talks, I do not feel able to make an informed recommendation as to how we handle that aspect of the problem. In a sense the ball is in GRC court and I expect CCK to ask for another meeting soon, but I cannot envisage much progress until I can give him something definite in response to the questions raised about the April conversations.⁶

McConaughy

⁶ In a follow-up telegram, Ambassador McConaughy wrote that he had also mentioned that “regardless of the legal and logical strength of the constitutional case that could be made in the GRC’s behalf . . . , the hard fact of the matter was that a great number of UN members in these times make their decisions and cast their votes without particular regard for Charter restraints or legal niceties. Their voting decisions are often based on their conception of immediate national interest, judged from a standpoint of pragmatism or expediency.” He doubted that there was any way of appealing an adverse vote in the General Assembly, or a Security Council vote that Chinese representation was a procedural rather than a substantive issue. (Telegram 3630, July 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 24, 1971, 1702Z.

134611. Subject: Chirep: Secretary Conversation with Shen, July 23, 1971. Ref: A. State 130330,² B. Taipei 3627.³

1. GRC Ambassador Shen, on instructions, called on Secretary July 23. Assistant Secretary DePalma also present. Discussion lasted approximately one hour.

2. Shen opened by stating that he was “not exactly bringing answer you have been waiting for.” Instead, he instructed to convey certain GRC views and to remind us of “certain things.” He also remarked that this matter being given closest attention by President Chiang, Premier Yen and FonMin Chou.

3. Shen stated that he first wished to remind Secretary that it was USG which first raised DR approach through discussion which President Nixon’s personal envoy, Mr. Murphy, had with President Chiang on April 23. At that time, Murphy had assured Chiang that USG had no intention to permit Communist China have Security Council seat under DR formula. When Secretary had discussed this problem with Shen on May 28, Secretary reiterated that USG would do its utmost to keep SC seat for GRC and that neither President nor Secretary would do anything at expense of an ally. Shen recalled that on July 1, he also had met with Mr. Kissinger who had indicated belief that we could get by this year by acting along lines Murphy had indicated to President Chiang.⁴ Shen indicated that it was his impression that, as of that time, it remained our intention to block attempt to amend DR to award SC to Chinese Communists by relying on parliamentary procedures and on argument that this is matter for SC decision. All these discussions, Shen pointed out, transpired before announcement of President’s intention to visit Peking.

4. Shen stated that President Chiang and Premier Yen had noted assurance of President Nixon that whatever is done to improve relations with mainland China, it would not be at expense of old friends. GRC position has been made quite clear; and it continues to feel

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shoesmith, cleared by Assistant Secretary De Palma and Executive Secretary Eliot, and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.

² See footnote 3, Document 379.

³ Document 380.

⁴ See Document 368.

strongly that membership in UN and position on SC are inseparable. If anything happens to GRC seat on SC, it will be placed in most difficult position, externally and internally, "as much as GRC would like to cooperate in retaining UN membership." GRC therefore wishes to determine whether USG sees any possibility of avoiding mention of SC in DR formula which it has been working on. Is there any way in which USG could proceed along lines of earlier decision indicated to President Chiang by Murphy? Shen stated that, "In a way, this will be looked on as test case of your repeated assurance that you will not do anything at expense of old friend." His government wished to know, therefore, whether USG would seriously consider assisting GRC by leaving reference to SC question out of DR formula.

5. Secretary stated that he had just received report of Ambassador McConaughy's conversation with Vice Premier Chiang (Ref B) and wished to clear up apparent misunderstanding. He, of course, had not stated to Shen during their July 19 conversation that USG would only discuss Chirep issue further if GRC tacitly agreed that it would acquiesce in loss of SC seat (Ref B, para 5). On contrary, he quite willing to discuss this question as much as GRC believes necessary. Shen, who had not yet been informed by Taipei of CCK meeting with McConaughy, stated that he had certainly not reported any such statement by Secretary.

6. Secretary then stated he appreciates that this is difficult period for GRC and fully understands reasons GRC attaches such importance to SC. It is true that we first proposed DR approach, and we had done so because we felt sure that past policy would no longer succeed. Given that fact, we had been searching for some other way to protect GRC membership as a practical, not theoretical, matter. In this search, it has been necessary to determine views of other countries since, even if we make strong effort—and last year we had made our strongest drive on Chirep—we can affect only a few votes in UNGA. It also true that Murphy had assured President Chiang that we would do our utmost to block amendment of DR to include reference to SC. However, it has become clear that cold, hard facts are that we do not have fighting chance to protect UN membership of GRC unless PRC is offered SC seat.

7. Secretary emphasized that this not matter of discretion or of USG willingness to follow through on previous decisions. Secretary reminded Shen that Murphy had told Chiang we prepared to follow through as we had done in previous years, making effort to hold line on traditional IQ and opposition to AR. He said we still prepared follow that course if GRC wishes, although we certain it would fail. Shen interjected forcefully, "That not what we want. We respect your judgment and have an interest in following DR approach."

8. Secretary stated it had been our hope that we could persuade our friends to go along with resolution which would have admitted PRC by majority vote but require two-thirds to expel GRC, leaving SC question in abeyance on grounds that this matter for SC to decide. He had discussed this approach with number of European governments during NATO meeting. It clear, however, that we cannot obtain sufficient votes to carry such resolution. Number of NATO members told him they could not support such resolution since it device to keep PRC out of UN. These governments stated that since there no doubt PRC would refuse membership on that basis, a vote for such resolution would be vote to exclude PRC, contrary to their view and that of number of other governments.

9. Secretary stated that when he had asked what would be position if PRC was given SC seat and USG made strong effort to retain UN membership for GRC, some governments, such as UK and Canada, indicated that they could not support even such resolution, but others had indicated they would support it. We not sure what actual vote would be, but our latest educated guess is that such resolution might carry by at least few votes. Secretary cautioned that this only an estimate and he would not wish to be held to it.

10. As practical matter, therefore, we face situation where we see no chance to preserve GRC membership in UN unless there is understanding that PRC will get SC seat. As he had stated to Shen during their previous conversation, we do not expect GRC could say publicly that it willing to accept such approach, but if we going to be able to put up successful fight, there has to be an understanding on this point. Secretary pointed out that other governments have reached same conclusion, including Australia. He stated that if GRC assessment of voting prospects differs we would wish know it, but if GRC agrees with our assessment and is willing to remain in UN on basis he had outlined, then we prepared put up strongest possible fight to preserve its membership. Secretary asked whether Shen had discussed Chirep problem with any of his diplomatic colleagues. Shen stated he had discussed with Australian Ambassador Plimsoll whose assessment was same as USG.

11. Secretary reiterated that this is question of hard reality and not one in which we have a free choice. On that point, we have made clear we will continue our security treaty commitment and maintain warm relations we have had in past.

12. Shen asked whether it would not be possible to leave to some other government question of amending DR to provide for SC question. He also asked whether it would not be possible to have IQ "variation" voted on first, thus providing protection against passage of Albanian Resolution. Secretary and DePalma reviewed parliamentary

situation, emphasizing importance of obtaining at early date majority support for our position in order to insure precedence for DR over AR. For that purpose, other governments will want to know our position on SC question. Secretary pointed out that if we attempt duck that question, we will be unable obtain majority required both to obtain precedence for DR and its passage. Result would be adoption of AR.

13. Shen pressed for some alternative, asking whether we would consider introduction of IQ "variation" and then proceed with DR which did not mention SC, leaving it to others to amend resolution on that point. At later point, Shen stated that GRC had hoped that in this way, even if DR did not obtain a majority AR also could not pass and situation would remain as is. Secretary replied that we would be prepared to give such approach serious consideration if GRC concludes that what it wants, but he emphasized that in his judgment it would fail. He stressed that our ability to defend GRC membership depends on obtaining majority support for our position and, without making clear that we foresee SC seat going to PRC, we do not believe we can obtain such support. Under any circumstances, we face difficult task, but if we delay much longer in making our position clear on this point, our problem will be made even more difficult by speculation that we uncertain what to do.

14. Shen again asked whether enough votes could be obtained to keep GRC in UN without reference to SC seat and whether we could not leave that question in abeyance until next year. Secretary replied by distinguishing between whether we would be willing to consider such an approach, to which answer is yes, and whether such an approach would succeed, and we convinced that it would not, particularly given shift which has taken place in position of many European governments. He stated that he had discussed this matter at some length with President on July 22⁵ who wants to help GRC retain its membership and that they had gone over practical situation in detail. As had been explained to Congressional leaders, it was basic problem of how to obtain sufficient votes.

15. Secretary expressed hope that Shen would convey to his government spirit which prevails in Washington on this problem, and conviction that we confront hard, practical situation. Many other governments simply will not engage in any procedure designed to keep PRC out of UN, and they believe that failure to offer SC seat to Peking would be just such procedure. On other hand, if they understand that PRC would get SC, then we can make argument that it would be most unfair to expel GRC, which is larger than most UN members, has been

⁵ See Document 377.

member of UN in good standing since its birth and has lived up to Charter; we could also argue that it would be harmful to UN itself if such member were expelled. Such arguments would have advantage of not becoming confused with other issues. If counter-argument is made that PRC would not enter on that basis, we could take position that that up to Peking to decide. In response to Shen's question, Secretary stated that we did not know what PRC would do, even after the Kissinger visit but if it chose to stay out, then its case would be weaker than it is in present situation when its sheer size gives it advantage in either/or contest with GRC. In new situation, PRC would have to stand on position that it would not enter unless GRC expelled. Our position would be that, without prejudice to relative claims of either of two entities, both should be represented in UN. In response to Shen's question as to how long such an arrangement would last if PRC refused to enter UN and what would US do if PRC held out for GRC expulsion, Secretary replied that he believed GRC position would be much stronger than it is at present.

16. Shen commented that GRC being asked to agree to give up SC seat without any assurance that it would be able to retain UN membership. Secretary stated that we not asking GRC to make any particular decision. What we have done is to provide GRC with our best assessment of prospects and sought its views as to how it thought we should proceed. We not attempting to persuade GRC to do something which it believes would be wrong. Question facing us is not one of right or wrong or of what we might hope could be done, but of choice which hard facts present to us. We have come to conclusion that approach which Secretary had outlined to Shen offered best chance to protect UN membership of GRC. If GRC believed that some other course would be more effective, Secretary would be prepared to recommend that President give it serious consideration.

17. Shen asked whether we believe it legally possible to transfer SC seat to PRC, since Republic of China specifically named in Charter. Secretary noted that he had discussed this with Canadian Government which had concluded that Charter revision not required; our own legal experts had reached same conclusion. DePalma explained that use of certain names in Charter is not legal fact but matter of convenience, pointing out that Charter refers to "France" and not "Republic of France." Entire UN practice makes clear that question of name cannot be used as substantive factor concerning this issue. Secretary commented that those who oppose us would take position that with passage of time, it cannot be ignored that PRC in fact represents China.

18. At Secretary's suggestion, DePalma reviewed situation in SC concerning use of veto. He pointed out that question is certain to rise in form of challenge to GRC credentials. At present, there are eight

members who have recognized PRC and would vote to seat it on SC; in addition, there are one or two other countries who probably would cast similar vote. If USG votes no, question will arise as to whether such vote constitutes veto. On basis past SC practice, credentials issue has been consistently viewed as procedural matter and if, in conformity with that practice, SC President rules our vote not a veto, we would have to obtain nine votes to overturn that ruling. Again it is practical problem of votes, and we could not obtain necessary nine votes. DePalma explained that Peking's supporters are not likely to make this challenge unless President friendly to their cause is in chair. Although it unlikely, President could alternatively put his own ruling to vote in which case he would need to find nine votes to sustain his ruling. Unfriendly President would not choose that alternative. In any event, it should be remembered that for past 23 years there has been no successful attempt to exercise double veto. For number of years we have been able to avoid such challenge in SC by persuading members not to raise issue. Now, however, just as with past policy in UNGA, we cannot command sufficient support to insure outcome which would protect GRC on SC seat.

19. Secretary expressed hope there no misunderstanding about USG position. Shen assured Secretary that there was not and that USG position "quite clear to me." He asked whether there any timetable for USG announcement of its decision. Secretary said that there is not, although he felt that both our interests would be served by making USG position clear as soon as possible. Shen stated that he would immediately report his discussion with the Secretary.

20. As on July 19,⁶ discussion was friendly and matter-of-fact throughout. Shen obviously probed hard to determine firmness of our assessments and conclusions, but at no point did he indulge in re-creminations. He appeared relaxed but carefully attentive to Secretary and DePalma's comments and explanations.

Rogers

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 379.

382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 27, 1971, 1643Z.

135646. Subj: Secretary's meeting with Ambassadors Shen and Liu, July 26, 1971. Ref: A. State 134611;² B. Taipei 3632.³

Summary: Ambassador Shen, accompanied by UN PermRep Liu, informed Secretary July 26 of GRC formal reply on Chirep approach together with several additional points on confidential basis. In formal reply, GRC agreed to "abandon" old IQ-AR approach and to introduction revised IQ. In additional points, GRC indicated it would not oppose introduction DR resolution by USG and other friendly governments provided no mention made of SC seat and hoped that USG and GOJ would neither sponsor nor vote for move to amend DR in that way. In lengthy discussion exploring implications of GRC position, Shen and Liu made clear GRC not asking USG to oppose move to award SC seat to PRC or fight to preserve seat for GRC. Both agreed it would be compatible with GRC request if USG let it be known it would acquiesce in UNGA majority decision, provided award of SC seat to PRC was result of separate motion made by other governments either to amend our DR resolution or introduce separate resolution.

1. On instructions, GRC Ambassadors Shen and Liu Chieh, GRC PermRep to UN, called on Secretary July 26. Also present were Assistant Secretaries DePalma and Green. Discussion lasted approximately one hour.

2. Shen opened by following paraphrase of instruction which he had received morning of July 26 from Taipei: a) GRC wished express appreciation for what USG has told it of consultations with other countries on Chirep problem. GRC has taken note of USG conclusion that past formula will no longer work and agrees to abandon that formula; b) GRC grateful for concern which USG and number of other governments, including GOJ, have shown for GRC position in UN. It also

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Shoemith, cleared by Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma and Robert H. Miller, and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.

² Document 381.

³ In telegram 3632, July 26, McConaughy reported on a meeting with Chow, who promised a decision "within next few days. He implied this might be along lines of his own recommendation that GRC gamble at least in the first instance, on chance PRC would not take SC seat if GRC retained membership in GA." Chow asked that the ROC's views remain private, and that the United States "not publicly advertise in advance its view regarding SC seat." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, China, Vol. VIII)

grateful for repeated expressions of USG readiness to do all possible to retain GRC membership in UN and to use all provisions and procedures of Charter to that end, including application of basic spirit of IQ which might be embodied in new proposal for purpose of reaffirming that any move to expel GRC is important question and therefore requires for adoption two-thirds majority of those present and voting. If USG, GOJ and other friendly governments advance resolution to that effect—i.e., that any move to expel GRC is important question and requires two-thirds vote—and which does not refer to entry of Chinese Communists, GRC is “ready to agree;” c) it is fervent hope and expectation of GRC that USG and GOJ will work with other countries to defeat Albanian Resolution (AR).

3. Shen stated that foregoing three points constituted GRC formal reply to USG. In addition, he was instructed to make following points which he asked be treated as confidential and not divulged to other governments, adding that he expected GOJ would be informed separately of these points: a) if friendly countries “really believe” there is need to propose something along lines of Dual Representation (DR) resolution in order to detract votes from AR, GRC will “understand” but does insist that nothing be said in such resolution concerning Security Council seat; b) if others try to amend such resolution or advance separate resolution “aiming” to deprive GRC of SC seat, “GRC hopes that USG and GOJ will not sponsor or vote for such resolution;” c) to be consistent with its past position, GRC will have to “speak against” any formula providing for dual representation.

4. Secretary first commented that, realistically, he did not think it would be possible to keep GRC position confidential for very long since other governments will ask us what we understand it is and we would have to disclose in some manner what we believe GRC position to be. Turning to substance of approach outlined by Shen, Secretary stated that in his judgement, if USG refuses to take position on SC issue, we will be unable to obtain sufficient votes to preserve GRC membership in UN, with result that AR will carry. In our judgment, this would be mistake, since we believe it most desirable that GRC retain its membership.

5. Shen responded that GRC is only asking that USG not be associated with proposal to award SC seat to PRC. USG could still advance DR resolution, but it should be left to others to raise SC issue. In other words, Shen explained, GRC was requesting that USG separate its DR approach into two resolutions. USG would sponsor part relating to dual representation but leave to others sponsorship of part awarding SC seat to Chinese Communists. Ambassador Liu explained that underlying GRC request is its desire to “soften blow” which announcement of President Nixon’s intention to visit Peking had had on Chinese public opinion. That announcement had created impression that USG had completely reversed its policy, and this impression would

be confirmed if USG appeared to be taking initiative to give SC seat to Chinese Communists. This would be difficult for Chinese public to accept. "Whole idea of our approach," Liu said, "is that US and Japan would not take initiative in co-sponsoring or supporting such a proposal."

6. Secretary acknowledged possibility that we might in first instance avoid taking stand on SC question, but he believed that after we announce our position, other governments will press to determine where we stand on that issue. We had originally thought that we might fend off such queries by stating that we should wait to see whether Peking would be willing to enter UN on DR basis. We had concluded, however, that we could not succeed in defeating AR if we proceeded in that manner. Secretary said that if GRC fully understands that the position it is requesting US to take is likely to fail in preserving its UN membership, he can so inform President who may be willing to consider such course if that is what GRC wants. But, Secretary asked, is this best way to proceed if GRC wishes to retain its membership? This had been central question which Secretary had posed in conversation with Shen on July 19. As Secretary understood position which Shen had outlined today, GRC's answer is that it would like to retain its membership if possible, although it cannot make any concessions or reveal its position. Shen replied that his instructions indicated that GRC has every intention of remaining in UN if that possible. Its only request to US is that we proceed with DR approach but leave question of SC seat to others to raise. Shen added, "We will leave that to vote of majority of UNGA, but we don't want US and Japan to vote for it." Shen observed that only difference between position GRC is taking and that previously outlined by Secretary is that instead of one resolution (embodying both dual representation concept and disposition of SC seat), there would be two. This, he said, would "free you of onus of supporting giving SC seat to Chinese Communists as you have refused to do for so many years." In Shen's view, such a USG shift would be difficult to explain. Secretary commented that explanation is very simple: without understanding on disposition of SC seat, we cannot obtain sufficient votes to protect GRC membership in UN. In approaching other governments with that purpose in mind, we cannot take position that we have not made up our minds on SC question; GRC, moreover, is asking that we oppose giving SC seat to PRC. Shen interjected that his government is asking that we do not vote for such a proposal and he noted that USG could abstain.

7. DePalma commented that GRC approach would rely entirely on passage of revised IQ. However, to secure sufficient votes for such resolution, both to obtain precedence in voting and insure its passage, we must deal with SC issue since other governments will want to know what we foresee as end result of our approach before they will support us. Secretary emphasized that in our judgment, only way in which

we can get majority support for revised IQ is to make clear that SC is going to PRC. If we say to other governments that our purpose is to protect GRC membership in UN and its place on SC, we cannot get such support. Shen suggested that on latter point we could say that we will leave that issue up to UNGA. Liu observed that GRC position as outlined by Shen already indicates "quite a degree of flexibility as compared to its previous position." He stated that, "We are not asking you to oppose (giving SC seat to PRC) or take steps to safeguard our place on SC. But we have to consider feelings of people if our best friend not only no longer opposes admission of Chinese Communists but is taking the lead in co-sponsoring giving SC seat to them."

8. At Secretary's suggestion, to insure complete understanding, Shen reviewed six points of GRC position. His summary followed closely his original presentation but he rephrased second of points given in confidence (Para 3b above) as follows: "Make sure that there nothing in DR resolution about SC seat; if others wish to amend that resolution, let them, provided US and Japan do not co-sponsor such amendment and we hope US and Japan will refrain from voting for such amendment." Secretary observed that if we say that we are going to fight to keep SC seat for GRC, we will be unable to defeat AR. Shen replied that his instructions were not to ask US to "fight" but merely not to co-sponsor or vote for resolution affecting GRC's SC seat.

9. Green commented that we will need every vote we can muster to obtain precedence for revised IQ and defeat AR. DePalma added that it essential we be able persuade other governments that it worth their while to make procedural fight on precedence for revised IQ, but approach GRC proposed would not provide rationale which many governments believe they require to cooperate with us in such effort. Secretary suggested that GRC may not have fully faced up to fact that in order to succeed on revised IQ, we have to be able to indicate what we see as resolution of SC issue. If we duck this question, we probably will lose quite a few votes on revised IQ. If, however, we take position with other governments that we recognize that if PRC enters UN it will have to get SC seat but that we might not be able to vote for such proposition, then we might be able pick up enough votes to preserve GRC membership. Liu observed that Shen had suggested US make clear it not opposing effort by others to amend DR resolution. Shen was asked whether it would be compatible with approach GRC is proposing if US stated that we leave question of SC seat to majority UNGA but could not support move to award seat to PRC. Shen replied he could see no problem in US taking such position unless it wishes get credit for giving SC seat to Chinese Communists. Secretary stated that it would not be a matter of credit but of the reality of the situation, i.e., how do we get enough votes to save GRC's membership. He said that the only credit we seek is that for preserving GRC's membership in UN. He

observed that if we say in response to queries from other governments that we leave question of SC seat to others and if majority wishes to award it to Peking, that up to them, such position would be interpreted as USG willingness to see SC seat go to PRC. Liu stated that it his impression from contacts in UN that most governments already believe that USG is willing to acquiesce in such result and take it for granted that USG would be willing to go along.

10. Green observed that in order to obtain passage of revised IQ we would have [to] be prepared vote for resolution giving SC seat to PRC, even though we might not have supported it. Shen's only comment was that it would still be a separate motion, apart from DR which we would have introduced. Secretary added that whether we take lead in advancing proposal to award SC seat to PRC might be finessed, but he felt that we would have to tell other governments how we thought this issue likely come out.

11. Green stated that USG and GRC positions now appear much closer, with which Shen and Liu agreed. Liu suggested that it would be most helpful to further consultations if US would prepare draft resolutions for GRC consideration. Secretary indicated that this might be possible within few days. Liu noted that we might wish consider Japanese draft on revised IQ and simple DR resolution. Secretary also agreed that our positions now closer than previously, and he suggested that discussion be resumed in several days. Secretary also suggested that in response to press queries both sides say only that meeting was for purpose of continuing consultations. Shen and Liu agreed.

Rogers

383. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 27, 1971, 1037Z.

3665. Subj: Chirep: GRC Partial Decision. Ref: Taipei 3632.²

1. FonMin Chow Shu-kai saw me at his request at 8:45 this morning to inform me of GRC decision on Chirep which was taken yester-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² See footnote 3, Document 382.

day afternoon. He said the decision was taken “at the highest levels” of the govt and was influenced by Secretary’s July 23 conversation with Amb. Shen, as well as my conversations with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo July 23 and FonMin July 26. He said Shen had been instructed to convey this decision to Sec. Rogers soonest and had in fact already done so, at 2:30 P.M. yesterday.

2. He then read me the GRC decision (translating ad lib from the Chinese text) as follows:

A. In view of the advice given the GRC by the US Government after consultation with various governments that it would not be feasible or effective to resort to the old strategy, the GRC has now decided to accept this advice and will consider the use of some other formula than that used (IQ) in previous years.

B. Since the US and other countries, especially Japan, have repeatedly expressed the earnest desire to make it possible for the GRC to remain in the UN and since they are prepared to use all devices within the framework of the Charter, including the principle of the IQ as embodied in Article 18, to propose a formula whereby any attempt to deprive the GRC of its seat in the UN is subject to a two-thirds majority vote, the GRC has therefore decided to accede to this suggestion—namely, the US, Japan and others will propose a resolution to protect the position of the ROC in the UN.

C. The Chinese Government earnestly hopes and requests that the [US] Government, in conjunction with other friendly powers, will do everything possible to defeat the Albanian type of proposal for the expulsion of the GRC and admission of the Chinese Communists.

3. FonMin said that he would add certain supplementary points in the strictest confidence. He asked that these supplementary points not be disclosed under any circumstances. He preferred that they not be included in any minutes of conversations:

A. If the US and other friendly governments deem it really necessary to propose a so-called “DR” resolution in order to get approval of the “IQ variation” to defeat the Albanian resolution, the GRC will understand. What we earnestly request is that this DR resolution should not include the Security Council seat held by the ROC.

B. If any other country or countries should inject the issue of the SC seat, either by amendment or by separate resolution, aimed at depriving the ROC of its status in the SC, we strongly urge the US not to co-sponsor any such resolution or be a party to such an amendment. We also hope the USG would not vote for such resolution or amendment. (The GRC will of course have to speak against any form of DR resolution because of the inclusion of provision for invitation to Communist China.)

4. I told Chow that this GRC decision as read did not appear to cover the fundamental question, which was, “Would the GRC consent to remain in the UNGA in the event of the passage of an Assembly resolution which included a recommendation for the transfer of the Security Council seat to the Chicoms?” I reminded him that we urgently needed an authoritative answer to this 64 dollar question for our own confidential background use in determining our own Chirep tactics. The PriMin conceded that this question had not been answered, merely adding that this aspect of the problem would have to be considered further.

5. I also noted that we could not be sure that the “modified IQ approach” would be saleable to all the UN members whose votes would be needed to assure a majority for a DR resolution.

6. Comment on this rather evasive reply will follow in septel.

McConaughy

384. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep Scenario and Draft Resolution

I. Scenario

We think the following scenario is the best way to handle Dual Representation (DR) at this point:

A. Table a revised IQ and a separate DR Resolution.

B. Try to get priority in voting for the IQ and have it voted on ahead of the Albanian Resolution (AR).

C. Beyond this point, we must remain flexible in our tactics since everything will depend upon the voting situation we face.

D. Our present thinking is that if the IQ passes, we should still try to get priority for the DR resolution. If DR is adopted, we would

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman and cleared by Assistant Secretary Green, Winthrop Brown, Aldrich, Ernest L. Kerley, Shoesmith, Jenkins, and Armitage.

argue that the matter is decided and that the AR should not be put to the vote.

E. If the IQ fails, or if we do not get priority for DR, make a strong effort to amend the AR to knock out the language that would result in ROC ouster. If we are unsuccessful, and if the AR passes in unamended form, the issue will probably have been decided then and there and our DR resolution probably will not even come up for a vote.

II. Resolutions

There are four considerations that seem particularly important in framing Chirep resolutions:

- (1) The impact of the language used on domestic and international public opinion;
- (2) The impact on our relations with Peking and Taipei;
- (3) Vote getting appeal in the General Assembly;
- (4) Legal problems that particular turns of phrase might involve—not just for the present but for the future as well.

A. The IQ

We are probably better off at this point with separate IQ and DR resolutions since we would have a better chance to get priority for an IQ than for a DR resolution. In addition, some of the countries we have consulted have expressed reservations on building the two-thirds requirement directly into the DR resolution.

We suggest a simply worded IQ along the following lines:

The General Assembly,

Decides that any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the UN is an Important Question under Article 18 of the Charter.²

It is best that the resolution not make any explicit mention of Article 6, which deals with the expulsion of members from the UN. Reference to Article 6 would probably scare off potential supporters who would not want to associate themselves with the view that this is now (after 21 years) a *membership* issue rather than a *representation* issue. The argument that the ROC is a member (rather than that China is a member) is dubious on legal grounds and in any case poses dangers to a DR resolution: if the ROC is a member in its own right, then the PRC must be admitted through Security Council procedures as a new member and this cannot be done through a DR resolution. In addition, the

² The phrase “which would result in depriving” could be replaced by the phrase “to deprive.” The former is the broader formulation, including without question both the explicit and the implicit. The latter could be read as being narrower in scope. It is important that this paragraph be phrased in terms of *representation* and not of *membership*. [Footnote in the source text.]

Article 6 reference would presumably mean that the ROC could not be expelled unless the Security Council recommends its expulsion, a view to which few countries would wish to commit themselves at this time. We ourselves might not want to be in the position of having to decide whether or not to exercise a veto on this issue at some time in the future.

Similarly, it is best that the IQ resolution not explicitly be tied to Article 18(2) (expulsion of members), since this article necessarily involves Article 6. The UN Legal Adviser strongly believes the question is one of representation and not expulsion of a member, and doubtless would so state if asked from the floor. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to tie the IQ explicitly to Article 18(3) (Assembly action to create a new category of important questions in addition to those cited in 18(2)). In order to preserve maximum tactical maneuverability, it is best to leave it open to delegations to decide for themselves whether they are supporting the resolution as an affirmation of Article 18(2), or as a decision to add a new category as per Article 18(3).

We should keep in mind that we will be attacked on the grounds that even this revised IQ still is just a clever dodge to force the AR (once again) to secure a two-thirds majority and thus to prevent the Assembly from seating Peking, despite the fact that we are now talking about ousting the ROC. We will aid our cause if we can say forthrightly that we want Peking in the UN and believe they can be voted in by a simple majority—just as long as ROC ouster is not involved.

There should be no great problem in getting ROC sanction for this IQ, though they may press for explicit mention of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and it is easy enough to explain its meaning to press and public. Presumably the text would offend the PRC as little as any IQ would.

B. Dual Representation

To have the greatest vote-getting ability in the Assembly, and to do as little damage as possible to US bilateral relations with either Peking or Taipei, the Dual Representation resolution must meet certain criteria:

—it must be couched in terms of *representation* and not *membership* to avoid as far as possible the legal objection that we are acting contrary to Article 4 (admission of new members) or Article 18(1) (each member of the Assembly shall have one vote) of the Charter;

—it must avoid any position on the political, legal, or geographic claims of PRC or ROC;

—unless our policy is changed, it should avoid the question of whether China is one entity of which Taiwan is a part—though if we wished it would be easy enough to add in a “one China” phrase, possibly by taking note of the contention of both PRC and ROC that China is one.

It may be best not to include any explicit legal justification for dual representation in the body of the resolution since whatever legal arguments we put up will be targets for rebuttal. For example, the UN Legal Adviser does not consider that “successor state theory,” in the Chirep context, means two states can succeed to the UN seat held previously by a single member state, unless one of the two is admitted as a new member through the procedures specified in Article 4. Our true justification is the argument from *de facto* reality, and it may be best to leave legal justification to oral and written statements rather than to insert them into the resolution itself.

Having examined the texts which the Japanese, Australians, and others have suggested, we have produced the following draft preamble to a dual representation resolution. The footnotes are intended to explain the function of each paragraph:

The General Assembly,
Having considered the item entitled “The Representation of China in the United Nations,”³

Noting that since the founding of the United Nations, fundamental changes have occurred in China,⁴

Having regard for the existing factual situation,⁵

Noting that the Republic of China has had continuous representation in the United Nations since 1945,⁶

[Believing that the People’s Republic of China should be represented in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council]⁷

Recalling that Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,⁸

³ If the General Committee declines to assign this more neutral sounding title, we would have to use “The Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China.” [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ This is the argument from reality essentially, but it can be understood as something of a legal justification via dual succession. Note it has a one-China flavor, but not blatantly so. The paragraph can be omitted if it looks as though it would cost us votes. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ The argument from reality again. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ Best to avoid phrasing it as “has been a member” since that would open the Article 4 Pandora’s box. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Once again, representation rather than membership. The thought re the Security Council can be expressed either in a preambular or operative para, but in view of the fact that the resolution probably had best not purport to decide the issue, then it is better as a preambular paragraph. If an operative paragraph, it should recommend rather than declare. *Note:* We would *not* show this paragraph to the ROC at this point. It should be omitted from any draft resolution passed to them now. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

⁸ Not necessary, but psychologically valid as a means of countering adverse legal arguments via an appeal to reason and duty (don’t worry about messy legal questions; solve the problem). [Footnote in the source text.]

Taking into account the general sentiment of Member States, which found expression in the Final Declaration of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, that universality in the United Nations should be realized,⁹

Believing that an equitable resolution of this problem should be sought in the light of the above mentioned considerations [and without prejudice to the eventual settlement of the conflicting claims involved,]¹⁰

Drafting the operative paragraphs, particularly as they relate to Peking and Taipei, is a far more difficult task than drafting the preamble. In order to avoid a conflict with Article 4, we must not use any formulation which appears to admit either Peking or Taipei as a new *member*, and must carefully couch the resolution in terms of *representation*. If we talk of either the PRC or the ROC as a member, we plunge into a heavily overgrown legal thicket.

At the same time, it is probably best to avoid operative paragraphs phrased in terms of an *invitation* to the PRC to send representatives. Invitation formulas leave open the question of whether some affirmative act on Peking's part is required and whether in the absence of an affirmative act the resolution has taken effect. Ideally, a DR resolution should resolve the matter without requiring any response from Peking so that we can say (next year, for example) that the issue has been decided and Peking's right of representation fully confirmed, hence no need to reopen the matter at the 27th GA.

As far as vote-getting ability is concerned, we maximize our chances if we come in with a resolution that looks as much like a "cleaned-up" version of the Albanian Resolution as possible. We can present this as a clear-cut choice between an equitable solution fully in keeping with contemporary realities, and a bad either/or choice. We recommend that the operative paragraphs read:

"Hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China;

"Affirms that the Republic of China continues to be entitled to the right of representation;¹¹

⁹ The universality argument is no longer that universality means bringing the PRC in; now it means keeping the ROC in. A useful tool. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰ Combines an appeal to reason with the idea that the GA, if it buys this resolution, damages neither the claims of the parties nor the prospect for some other settlement which they themselves work out. We include the last phrase in brackets because it may be that some countries would prefer not to make even so tentative a reference to the competing claims. We will have to check whether the reference gains or loses us votes. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

¹¹ Some states may object to referring to an ROC "right" of representation, but the ROC would surely object if the linguistic treatment given them were less than that given Peking. [Footnote in the source text.]

“Recommends, in accordance with Article 10 and General Assembly Resolution 396(V) (14 December 1950), that the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies take into account the provisions of this resolution in deciding the question of Chinese Representation in those organs and agencies.”

For ease in reading, the recommended IQ and DR texts are attached.¹²

¹² Attached but not printed.

385. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, July 29, 1971, 1905Z.

3170. Subject: Italian, Netherlands and Belgian Views on Chirep.

1. Summary: Italian UN expert strongly implied his govt has all but decided it will oppose any form of dual representation. Netherlands expert said matter still open, but we cannot assume new govt will see its interest served by supporting continued representation GRC. Belgian expert said Harmel will work to convince his govt Belgium should continue support representation GRC, but there is considerable resistance in light growing conviction US and Belgium likely be virtually isolated among NATO members. End summary.

2. Following NAC meeting reported septel,² De Palma talked privately with UN experts from Italy, Netherlands and Belgium. Reiterating that President has made no decision, he asked each whether he thought that, given otherwise satisfactory Chirep resolution (i.e., one dealing with Peking as his govt might wish), his govt would find it possible support continued representation GRC in UN.

3. Alessi (Italy) said there was definite tendency his govt to adopt Canadian view that it could not support any form of dual representation since this will prevent Peking's entry. When asked if matter could

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis.

² The North Atlantic Council met on July 29 to review expected agenda items of the 26th UN General Assembly. (Telegram 3174 from USNATO, July 30; *ibid.*, UN 3 GA)

be kept open for further discussion, Alessi said only that he was reasonably sure his govt would not announce its decision before discussing it with us.

4. Vixseboxse (Neth) said matter will be considered Aug. 12 by Foreign Ministry with view to recommending position to new govt. He felt there is definite trend away from former Dutch support for continuing GRC representation as consequence of renewed interest in regularizing Dutch relations with Peking. Matter thus still open but one cannot assume new govt will maintain view of past govts. He felt firm Canadian and UK opposition to any form of dual representation will also influence new govt. He implied Foreign Ministry recommendation will not foreclose possible support for continued GRC representation but also said it might be put in terms which are not likely be acceptable to GRC. He felt his govt would appreciate knowing final US decision before adopting firm position of its own.

5. Belgian expert (Fourdin) reiterated Harmel's intention seek support his govt for continued representation GRC. He felt there was still considerable popular support for this position in Belgium, but added there is growing sentiment in govt to avoid going down with lost cause. Harmel will be eager to know US decision soonest.

6. Fourdin also said he was virtually convinced Italy has for all practical purposes already decided adopt Canadian-UK position, and probably Austria as well. He guessed that Turkey would also move in that direction. He was concerned Belgian Govt decision will be complicated by fear that Belgium and US would be virtually isolated among NATO members. While regularizing relations with Peking has not been priority Belgian objective, it might become so in such circumstances. However, he concluded by saying Harmel is man of principle and "still has some influence".

7. Each expert understood discussion was off the record and their views should be protected.

Vest

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 31, 1971, 0036Z.

139288. Strictly eyes only for the Ambassador. Subject: Chirep Consultations: GRC.

1. At Secretary's request, GRC Ambassador Shen, accompanied by UN PermRep Liu, met with him on July 30. Also present were Asst. Sec. Green and Acting Asst. Sec. Herz.

2. Secretary stated he wished to read statement of US position on Chirep problem which he requested be considered an oral presentation of our views to be conveyed to FonMin Chou. He also said this position would be reflected in public announcement which we plan tentatively to make on August 2. Secretary noted we have been under considerable pressure from Congress and press to make our position known. He added he believed our position is not far from that which GRC preferred we take. Secretary's statement to Shen and Liu today follows:

3. *Begin Statement:* In our consideration of this problem, we have been guided by constant desire to be of every assistance to ROC in maintaining honorable position in family of nations which it has earned by its long record of peaceful and constructive participation. To that end, we believe it to be of utmost importance that ROC continue to be represented in UN.

4. Objective situation which confronts us, however, is that overwhelming majority of UN members have come to believe that PRC should be represented in UN. Many nations which hold this view also are reluctant to see ROC expelled, as would be case if so-called Albanian Resolution were adopted. The exhaustive consultations we have held over past nine months, however, have made clear that in coming session of UNGA the IQ resolution which we have supported for so many years probably will not obtain a majority and, as a result, Albanian Resolution will be adopted. We understand that ROC shares this assessment.

5. In consultations with Japan, Australia and other governments having strong ties of friendship with ROC, we have considered how best this problem could be surmounted. This has been time-consuming effort as we have tried to protect special interests of ROC of which we

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shoemith; cleared by Assistant Secretary Green, Herz, and Curran; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.

have been constantly aware. If, however, we are to have reasonable hope of preventing expulsion of ROC, we must act now and, to that end, we must make our position clear.

6. We have come to conclusion that only chance of preserving membership of ROC in UN is for US to support a resolution which would provide representation both for your government and government in Peking and at least to acquiesce in majority view that government in Peking should hold permanent seat on SC. Such resolution might be combined with a priori resolution which would provide that any proposal to deprive ROC of representation in UN is an Important Question under Article 18 of Charter which, if adopted, would insure that Albanian Resolution cannot be adopted by simple majority vote.

7. We have been under strong and persistent pressure from American press and public to make a public statement of our position on this problem. This we shall do in announcement we intend to make on Monday.

8. You have forcefully and faithfully conveyed to us the problems which such a course of action would create for your government. We realize that your government would not be able to associate itself with this formula and may have to oppose it publicly. We have considered most carefully the alternatives that your government has proposed. Facts, however, compel us to conclude that sufficient support for continued representation of ROC in UN can only be obtained on basis we have outlined above and with full and active support of US. We are prepared to provide that support. We will, of course, want to continue our close cooperation with you.

9. US, of course, intends to honor our Mutual Defense Treaty commitment and wishes to maintain the long and close relationship which has existed between our two governments. *End Statement.*²

10. Shen's first question was whether by acquiescing in provision for SC seat to go to Peking is meant that such provision would be included as part of DR resolution which US has in mind. Secretary summarized our position as follows: we will state that we oppose expulsion of ROC; we will attempt to obtain majority support to insure precedence for resolution providing that any proposal to deprive ROC of representation is Important Question requiring two-thirds vote; we also will have to say that our consultations have shown that majority of UN members favor SC seat being awarded to PRC and, although

² Haig and Kissinger slightly modified the statement (drafted by Green and approved by Rogers on July 31) to remove any mention of "dual representation." Haig's letter to Eliot explaining these changes is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII.

we consider this matter to be decided by SC, we will accept decision of majority. With respect to last point, Secretary stressed our conviction that we cannot win fight to preserve ROC membership unless we make our position on Security Council issue clear. Green noted that Australian PriMin recently has made explicit statement that it believes SC seat should go to PRC, a position already taken by New Zealand Government. We have, therefore, two close friends of ROC which have taken such position publicly. Shen returned to this point in later part of conversation to ask whether "acquiesce" also means that US will vote for such provision. Secretary stated that position he had indicated did not necessarily mean that US would advance such a proposal but only that we would accept will of majority on this issue. As to how we would vote, that would depend on what would be required to obtain majority support for our revised IQ and DR resolutions. He emphasized again, however, our belief that unless we make clear from outset that we will acquiesce in will of majority on this issue, we cannot carry the day. For that reason, a statement to that effect will be included in announcement we intend to make.

11. Ambassador Liu raised question of tactics, stressing importance of lining up firm majority support for DR resolution and not relying on revised IQ as absolute safeguard against passage of Albanian Resolution. He thought it would not be particularly difficult to obtain majority for revised IQ, but cautioned against assuming that all who support us on that resolution will oppose AR. On contrary, he thought it possible that number of members outside solid pro-PRC bloc might abstain on AR. Since Liu thought it possible that votes in favor of AR might increase, he particularly concerned for possibility that increase in abstentions might result in AR obtaining two-thirds vote. He emphasized importance, therefore, of lining up solid support for DR resolution.

12. Herz agreed and said this shows we must work hard to obtain solid majority for DR. It for this reason that it of especial importance that our efforts to obtain such majority be not disturbed by impression that ROC strongly opposes what we are trying to accomplish.

13. Secretary and Herz then discussed with Liu number of tactical approaches to question of insuring defeat of AR. Secretary emphasized possibility that once US indicates its willingness to see PRC enter UN we may have entirely new tactical situation. In past, vote for IQ was in effect vote to keep PRC out, placing in ambivalent position many governments favoring PRC entry but opposing ROC expulsion. In new situation, however, entry of PRC will be accepted and issue will thus focus on protection of ROC membership. Secretary suggested that if we can win on revised IQ, we could take position that AR resolution out of order since, although question PRC entry could be decided by

simple majority vote, second part of AR calling for expulsion of ROC would require two-thirds majority. This would force separate votes on two parts of AR. Herz noted that such vote could also present danger to us in that first part of AR would admit PRC as “sole legal government of China”. It was agreed that there would have to be further discussions on these tactical questions.

14. At conclusion of discussion, Shen asked whether it would be possible for us to delay our announcement until August 3 since he required be away from Washington on August 2 and delay would give his government better chance to make any further comments it may have. Secretary replied that date tentative, but he would prefer to have announcement made on August 2. Green pointed out that waiting until August 3 runs serious risk of leakage and that it is most important for USG and GRC that news first appear in context of Secretary’s carefully prepared statement.

15. Neither Shen, who had been in telephonic contact with Taipei just prior to his meeting with Secretary, nor Liu took any exception to substance of Secretary’s statement or to fact that we intended make public announcement of our position. They were completely attentive to Secretary’s statement but did not give any impression of consternation with its content. They evidently had received no word from Taipei whether ROC would be willing remain in UN if DR resolution adopted providing for SC seat going to PRC. They did not allude to that question. Atmosphere of meeting was entirely friendly.

16. For Ambassador: You should repeat orally and soonest for Fon-Min Chou substance of Secretary’s statement, paras 3 through 9 above. You should emphasize utmost importance that this information and our intention issue announcement be closely safeguarded.³

Rogers

³ The statement was sent as telegram 139510 to Taipei, July 31. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) McConaughy met that day with Chow, who asked that the United States “adopt most passive possible public position on SC issue.” McConaughy agreed with Chow that the United States should supply the draft public statement on this issue to the ROC as soon as possible. (Telegram 3745 from Taipei, July 31; *ibid.*) McConaughy also asked Chow whether the ROC would vote against the dual representation resolution, even if that threatened to defeat the measure. Chow replied that he could not predict his government’s decision. (Telegram 3765 from Taipei, August 2; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII)

387. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, August 1, 1971, 1635Z.

139511. Eyes Only Chief of Mission from the Secretary. Subject: Chirep: US Announcement of Policy.

1. Please personally convey following message from me to Foreign Minister.

A. As you know, since the President's announcement on July 15 we have been in particularly active and urgent consultations with GRC on Chirep policy. The GRC now understands and accepts the need for a new strategy that would involve representation for both ROC and PRC in the United Nations.

B. The President has decided that in view of this situation and because our continued public silence on this issue may jeopardize any chance of maintaining ROC membership in the United Nations, it is important that we should now publicly disclose our above position in favor of a resolution which would make a proposal to deprive the ROC of UN representation an important question.

C. Accordingly, at a press conference to be held in Washington probably on August 2 or 3,² I plan to announce that the United States will support action at the General Assembly to seat the People's Republic of China and at the same time will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or to otherwise deprive it of representation at the UN. I will go on to say that our consultations have indicated that the question of China's seat on the SC is a matter which many nations may wish to address and that we are prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of the members of the UN.

D. I would like to express our great appreciation for the advice and assistance which you and your government have given during our past consultations on this exceedingly difficult problem. I strongly hope we will continue to work very closely on this issue in the days ahead.

2. *For London*: End Secretary's message at this point.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by Assistant Secretary Green, Herz, and Curran; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Sent to London, Brussels, Manila, Seoul, The Hague, and Bangkok and repeated to USUN, Taipei, Hong Kong, Wellington, Canberra, Tokyo, and Djakarta.

² Secretary Rogers' August 2 announcement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1971, pp. 193-194. The text was transmitted in telegram 139614 to all posts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

3. *Other Action Addressees*: Continue with following paragraph:

E. We would appreciate your views on the next steps now to be taken. We have in mind convening as early as possible a meeting of like-minded nations at our UN Mission in New York to seek agreement upon common texts for Important Question resolution and resolution to provide representation for both ROC and PRC as well as upon tactics to be followed.

4. In conveying above message from Secretary, all addressees should stress fact we are giving advance notice to only few governments and should emphasize utmost importance of safeguarding above information until announcement made.³

5. *For Seoul and Manila*: View possibility of Fonoff leaks, Ambassadors at their discretion may convey message to President.

Rogers

³ Telegram 139829 to all posts, August 2, transmitted talking points for use in presenting the U.S. position and answering questions. (Ibid.) Telegram 150259 to all posts, August 17, circulated additional guidance. (Ibid.)

388. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, August 2, 1971, 2128Z.

139831. Subject: Rationale for IQ and Representation Resolutions.

Following are explanations of draft IQ and representation resolutions, superseding those contained in memorandum Herz to Secretary dated July 28.²

1. IQ Resolution—

A. We are probably better off at this point with separate IQ and representation resolutions since we would have a better chance to get priority for an IQ than for a representation resolution. In addition, some of the countries we have consulted have expressed reservations on building the two-thirds requirement directly into the representation resolution.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by Pedersen, Aldrich, Herz, and Miller; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.

² Document 384.

B. The phrase “which would result in depriving” could be replaced by the phrase “to deprive.” The former is the broader formulation, including without question both the explicit and the implicit. The latter could be read as being narrower in scope.

C. We believe it is best that the IQ resolution not explicitly be tied to Article 18(2) (expulsion or suspension of rights of members), since this article necessarily involves Article 5 or 6. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to tie the IQ explicitly to Article 18(3) (Assembly action to create a new category of important questions in addition to those cited in 18(2)). In order to preserve maximum tactical maneuverability, it is best to leave it open to delegations to decide for themselves whether they are supporting the resolution as an affirmation of Article 18(2), or as a decision to add a new category as per Article 18(3).

D. We should keep in mind that we will be attacked on the grounds that even this revised IQ still is just a clever dodge to force the AR (once again) to secure a two-thirds majority and thus to prevent the Assembly from seating Peking, despite the fact that we are now talking about ousting the ROC. We will aid our cause if we can say forthrightly that we want Peking in the UN and believe they can be voted in by a simple majority—just as long as ROC ouster is not involved or implied.

E. There should be no great problem in getting ROC sanction for this IQ, though they may press for explicit mention of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and it is easy enough to explain its meaning to press and public. Presumably the text would offend the PRC as little as any IQ would.

2. Representation Resolution—

A. To have the greatest vote-getting ability in the Assembly, and to do as little damage as possible to US bilateral relations with either Peking or Taipei, the resolution must meet certain criteria: (1) it should be couched in terms of *representation* to avoid as far as possible legal objections that we are acting contrary to Article 4 (admission of new members) or Article 18(1) (each member of the Assembly shall have one vote) of the Charter; (2) it must avoid any position on the political, legal, or geographic claim of PRC or ROC; (3) it should avoid the question of whether China is one entity of which Taiwan is part or whether there are two entities. This should not be pronounced upon by the GA.

B. It may be best not to include any explicit legal justification in the body of the resolution since whatever legal arguments we put up will be targets for rebuttal. (For example, but not to be propagated, the UN Legal Adviser does not consider that “successor state theory,” in the Chirep context, means two states can succeed to the UN seat held previously by a single member state, unless one of the two is admitted as a new member through the procedures specified in Article 4.) Our true justification is the argument from *de facto* reality, and

it may be best to leave justification to oral and written statements rather than to insert them into the resolution itself.

C. The “fundamental changes” para is an argument from reality essentially, but it can be understood as something of a legal justification via dual succession. Note it has a one-China flavor, but not blatantly so. The paragraph can be omitted if it looks as though it would cost us votes.

D. The “existing situation” para is an argument from reality again.

E. The only reference to the ROC as a “member” is in the para on its “continued representation.” We would like to retain this for possible future uses, but do not wish to call attention to it. If questioned, you should support it on the basis that it is a factual statement of the reality.

F. Once again, representation rather than membership is stressed in the “believing that the PRC should be represented” para.

G. The “Recalling” para is not necessary, but psychologically valid as a means of countering adverse legal arguments via an appeal to reason and duty (don’t worry about messy legal questions; solve the problem).

H. The “equitable resolution” para combines an appeal to reason with the idea that the GA, if it adopts this resolution, damages neither the claims of the parties nor the prospect for some other settlement which they themselves work out. The last phrase could be deleted if some countries prefer not to make even so tentative a reference to the competing claims. We will have to check whether the reference gains or loses us votes.

I. In order to avoid a conflict with Article 4, we have avoided any formulation in the operative paragraphs which even appears to admit either Peking or Taipei as a new *member*. The text is therefore couched in terms of *representation*.

J. We have also avoided operative paragraphs phrased in terms of an *invitation* to the PRC to send representatives. Invitation formulas leave open the question of whether some affirmative act on Peking’s part is required and whether in the absence of an affirmative act the resolution has taken effect. The resolution should resolve the matter without requiring any response from Peking so that we can say (next year, for example) that the issue has been decided and Peking’s right of representation fully confirmed, hence no need to reopen the matter at the GA. The objective is to have the UN put up a nameplate for the PRC upon adoption of the resolution.

K. Some states may object to referring to an ROC “right” of representation, but the ROC would surely object if the linguistic treatment given them were less than that given Peking.

389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep—Initial Reaction of Key Governments to US Policy Announcement

The initial reaction of the countries with whom we have closely consulted on Chirep over the past several months—Japan, Australia and New Zealand—has been extremely favorable. The Japanese are particularly pleased that we gave them three days' notice and accommodated Prime Minister Sato on the language of the announcement. Australia and New Zealand welcomed the announcement, but said that to have a chance of success the resolution must state that Peking should hold the Security Council seat.

Reaction from the other countries to which we gave advance notice was also good, except for the UK. The Indonesian, Korean, Philippine and Thai Foreign Ministers all reacted very favorably, the Dutch slightly less so. Douglas-Home, however, took a rather jaundiced view of our position and feared it might adversely affect the President's planned trip to Peking.²

Just prior to our announcement, the Taipei Foreign Ministry issued a statement which reasserted its claim to be the only legally constituted government of China, called upon all peace-loving nations to defeat the Albanian resolution, and stated that it would continue to struggle "for the preservation of the Charter." The words "struggle to the end", which appeared in an advance text given us earlier by our Embassy in Taipei, do not appear in the official English version. Public reaction thus far has been relatively moderate.³

Our UN Mission held a meeting with 22 potential co-sponsors on August 3. Most supported our new policy, but several emphasized that the representation resolution must address the Security Council seat problem. The Ivory Coast and the Netherlands were especially clear

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. An attached transmittal memorandum, also dated August 4, from Assistant Secretary De Palma indicated that the memorandum was drafted on August 3 by Feldman, and cleared by Shoemith, Armitage, Herz, and Winthrop G. Brown.

² Douglas-Home's message was passed to the Department of State in an August 4 note from the British Embassy. (Ibid.)

³ The August 2 statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3787 from Taipei, August 3. (Ibid.)

on this point. The Japanese UN Representative (before the meeting) tried to caution Ambassador Bush that if the Security Council seat came up, “it would not be sufficient for Bush merely to say (he) would report back to Washington” and he felt the US should indicate then and there that we would support including the Security Council aspect in the resolution. He said he thought Japan would go along.

New Zealand today officially informed the Department it would *not* co-sponsor unless the resolution explicitly dealt with the Security Council seat.

R.H. Miller⁴

⁴ Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature.

390. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 4, 1971, 0203Z.

2097. Subject: Chirep—Bush Meeting With ROC Perm Rep Liu.

1. Summary. Bush on Aug 3 presented texts draft IQ and representation reses to ROC Perm Rep Liu and explained rationale behind drafts. Liu expressed satisfaction with draft res, fully aware of possible pressure for inclusion of SC clause in DR. Emphasized importance of tactics and highlighted advisability of obtaining priority for both modified IQ and DR. Liu agreed it best he not attend afternoon meeting of potential cosponsors. End Summary.

2. Amb Bush met with GRC Amb Liu Aug 3, gave him texts of draft IQ and DR reses and informed him of potential cosponsors’ meeting USUN that afternoon. Liu studied resolutions carefully while Bush and PolCouns explained rationale behind drafts. Liu, commenting first on IQ, felt that legality of modified res could be successfully argued and therefore thought it would be possible to obtain majority for IQ.

3. With regard DR res, Liu noted absence of ref to SC seat. He asked what happens when others raise this question, and if US thinks

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

final DR will include SC clause. Bush replied that US not so naive as to think SC seat question won't come up at afternoon meeting and afterwards. However, Bush said, we only intend to present DR res in present form, obtain reactions and report back to Washington. Liu, who referred several times to psychological problems in Taiwan, said blow of DR would be softened if US does not cosponsor and does not support DR with SC clause, but he clearly sensitive to probability of others' pressure to include SC reference. Bush confirmed that we would have to realistically take this into account.

4. Liu said he appreciated omission of SC seat in initial draft and that we would face SC questions when they arise. Major question, Liu said, is how we get the votes.

5. Liu stressed his judgment that tactics very important and that we must obtain priority for both IQ res and DR, rationale being that support for IQ does not guarantee support for DR. If AR is voted on immediately after IQ, Liu argued, many members will think IQ preserves seat for GRC and will abstain on AR. Increase in abstentions might result in AR obtaining two-thirds majority. Newlin said another possibility would be to seek priority for IQ and obtain blocking third against AR. We should seek maximum negative votes on AR. Liu reiterated his feeling that it would be advisable to obtain priority for both IQ and DR. Bush said no tactical decisions, of course, have been made and that we would want to continue to address questions raised by Liu in light consultation with ROC and others. We have no defined script, Bush emphasized.

6. Returning again to question of SC seat, Liu said Reyes (Philippines) rather perplexed at Rogers' statements on SC seat. Liu said suppose DR, including ref to SC seat, carries and PRC doesn't come in. What then is the position of GRC in SC? Newlin said we could argue that this should mean no change in seating, particularly if PRC sent no rep to SC to claim seat. However this matter for future and SC members to decide. GA action would have political impact on SC members. Liu said he recognized majority of UN members believed if PRC comes in, SC seat should go to Peking.

7. Bush said US prepared make major effort obtain passage of DR res. Bush said arguments have been voiced in such a way as to secure maximum support for our resolutions, whose principal purpose was to secure ROC seat. If, in our consultations, others thought it essential to cover SC seat, we would consult closely with GRC.

8. After discussion of possible embarrassment Liu's presence at afternoon meeting might cause him and others, Liu concluded that he should not attend.

Bush

391. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Starr) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Brown) for East Asian and Pacific Affairs¹

Washington, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep—Important Question

In our Chirep guidance to USUN (State 139831)² we did not indicate whether the USG considers that a proposal to deprive the ROC of representation in the UN would constitute an important question under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 18 of the Charter. The ROC may press for an explicit mention in any IQ resolution of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and in any case they may seek USG support for the position that action to expel the ROC would come under paragraph 2 rather than paragraph 3 of Article 18. The question of the USG position on Article 18 may also be posed by other delegations in New York as we get into the Chirep issue.

Our Chirep guidance to USUN states only that:

“We believe it is best that the IQ Resolution not explicitly be tied to Article 18(2) (expulsion or suspension of rights of members), since this Article necessarily involves Article 5 or 6 (of the UN Charter). On the other hand, it is unnecessary to tie the IQ explicitly to Article 18(3) (Assembly action to create a new category of important questions in addition to those cited in 18(2)). In order to preserve maximum tactical maneuverability, it is best to leave it open to delegations to decide for themselves whether they are supporting the resolution as an affirmation of Article 18(2), or as a decision to add a new category as per Article 18(3).

“. . . There should be no great problem in getting ROC sanction for this IQ, though they may press for explicit mention of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and it is easy enough to explain its meaning to press and public.”

Relying simply on Article 18, without indicating whether we believe paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 is involved, may create a false impression that our IQ position is based on paragraph 2. A speech by Ambassador Phillips on the Chirep issue in last year's UNGA debate (Tab A)³ contained references to the Charter provisions on expulsion of a member and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Exdis, 1971. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Robert I. Starr.

² Document 388.

³ Attached but not printed. Phillips' speech is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1970, pp. 733–735.

led to a critical article in the *New York Times* by Harvard Professor Jerome Cohen (Tab B).⁴ Cohen read the Phillips speech as contending that a simple majority decision of the UNGA to seat the PRC and expel the ROC would constitute a Charter violation.

Cohen argued that such an interpretation, if accepted, would deprive the UN of flexibility for achieving a political solution. He also noted that, should the Assembly reject that interpretation and decide to settle the representation question by simple majority vote, the USG position would brand such action as illegitimate.

We had considered sending a clarifying letter to the *Times*, in order to avoid the buildup of expectations that the USG would consider as illegal adoption of last year's Albanian resolution by less than a two-thirds majority vote and without a Security Council recommendation. However, it was agreed that further journalistic speculation would be more harmful than beneficial, and a letter was sent instead to Professor Cohen making it clear that the USG did not intend the implications suggested by Cohen in his article. In the letter we made it clear that the reference in the Phillips speech to Articles 6 and 18(2) of the Charter did *not* involve an assertion that these provisions would apply as a matter of law. Rather, the references were intended mainly for purposes of analogy—to buttress our position that the UNGA *should* consider the Chirep issue an important question, and *not* to argue that it *necessarily must do* so under the Charter. (That letter has been reproduced in the April, 1971 issue of the *American Journal of International Law*) (Tab C).⁵

I believe we would find it extremely difficult to make a persuasive legal case for the proposition that expulsion of the ROC would involve Articles 6 and 18(2) of the Charter, particularly in view of our position that seating the PRC involves representation, and not membership. Moreover, there are sound reasons of policy for avoiding a situation in which the USG would have to brand as illegal UNGA action to deprive the ROC of representation by less than a two-thirds vote and without a Security Council recommendation. Such a position would deny us necessary flexibility in dealing with the essentially political issues involved.

Accordingly, if pressed and if we believe it necessary to take a more forthcoming position, we should concede that the UNGA has discretion to decide whether or not depriving the ROC of representation should be considered an important question. In other words, paragraph 3 and not paragraph 2 of Article 18 would be viewed as controlling.

⁴ Attached but not printed; "China: A New U.S. Move," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1970, p. 47.

⁵ Attached but not printed; *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 1971), pp. 396–397.

392. Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

The attached cable from George Bush recommends that the U.S. draft resolution on Chirep include at least a preambular paragraph that the Security Council Seat should go to Peking.² Bush thinks we need this to get the Australians and New Zealanders on board, and that we should line up the Japanese and then rapidly inform the GRC.

Putting this reference in the resolution could be interpreted in Taipei as going beyond what we have told them we intended on the Security Council Seat. This is that we are, in the words of Secretary Rogers' statement, "prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of members of the United Nations."

If it should be USUN and State's judgment that including this reference to the Security Council in our resolution is essential to the success of our efforts, we should at least tell the GRC this and give them a chance to react before we talk with the Australians, New Zealanders, and Japanese. Otherwise, they may accuse us of breaking faith (and they may do that anyway if they believe we have given them a commitment).

Another point is involved here: the question of whether Peking does or does not consider that we will sponsor a Chirep resolution supporting the continued seating of the GRC, as opposed to only supporting such a resolution. Winston Lord has sent you the pages from the transcript of the Peking talks on this subject and believes that you did *not* commit yourself to Chou. If you believe that we should not act as a sponsor (or in this case, co-sponsor) we will need to move rapidly to stop the process, which is clearly well advanced.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Materials. Secret. Sent for action. An attached memorandum from Winston Lord to Kissinger, also dated August 6, includes a handwritten note from Holdridge reading: "HAK—I called Eliot to be sure nothing got out. He told me Rogers told Bush to knock it off. We're not ready for this kind of thing *yet*."

² Telegram 2125 from USUN, August 6. (Ibid.)

*Recommendations:*³

1. That you call Rogers or Johnson concerning inclusion of Security Council in our resolution.
2. That you review Peking transcript on Vietnam to ensure you see no problem with our sponsoring resolution rather than just supporting.

³ Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked or initialed.

393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, August 7, 1971, 0202Z.

144386. Subject: Chirep.

1. UK Chargé Millard called at his own request on Deputy Asst. Secretary Herz today to ask about results of US consultations with other countries on Chirep. Herz said it is still too early to make judgments on basis of NY meetings, but first reactions from capitals are quite encouraging. Several countries which either now have relations with Peking or are in process of establishing them have told us they see no obstacle to voting for our formula and against Albanian Resolution. Herz named Turkey as example. Even one co-sponsor of Albanian Res, which Herz declined to name, apparently was prepared to go along with US formula. Herz said we recognize that we still have uphill battle, but from our consultations so far it appeared that UK's bearishness about US formula was exception rather than rule. Many countries which had supported Albanian Res in past had done so because it was only way they could register their desire to see PRC in UN. Now they have an alternative.

2. Millard noted that UK has consistently said it would not support a two-China solution because (a) it has reason to believe that PRC will not enter UN on that basis; (b) UK has supported Albanian Res for ten years and for sake of consistency proposes to adhere to that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Robert T. Burns and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.

position; and (c) UK has legal problems with our formula due to apparent conflict with Articles 4 and 18(1) of Charter.

3. In reply, Herz said with respect to legal problems that we had studied them very carefully, and did not consider them insurmountable. This was really a political issue. UN Charter does not make distinction between UN members and states. Byelorussia and Ukraine are not states but are nonetheless members of UN. Millard observed that their membership had been settled by special arrangement. Herz said that that was exactly his point; for political reasons special arrangements could be made which were in no way in violation of UN Charter.

4. In response to Millard's reiterated question of whether our proposal was not clearly in conflict with Articles 4 and 18(1), Feldman replied we believed there was no conflict. Article 4 (admission of new members) did not apply since we were not proposing admission of new member. China is already member of UN and question is, "How shall China be represented?" We saw no legal obstacle to the General Assembly deciding that, for the present at least, China shall be represented by a delegation from PRC and a delegation from ROC. If "legal rationale" were necessary, this could be found in successor state theory. More specifically, in connection with Article 18(1) (each member of General Assembly shall have one vote), Feldman pointed out Charter nowhere defines either "state" or "member" and two terms cannot be considered synonymous. India, for example, became member of UN when still a part of British Empire and before it had attributes of sovereignty which would permit it to be described as "state" in international law. Other original members of UN (e.g., Philippines, Syria, Lebanon) were in similar situation. Best examples of members which were not states remain Ukraine and Byelorussia. Despite their presence in UN, no one speaks of UN having imposed a "three Russias" solution. UN Charter in 1945 was sufficiently flexible to take fully into account the de facto realities of that time and, in our view, retains same flexibility today. Moreover, though all these legal points are interesting, it is important not to lose sight of fact Chirep has been and remains a political problem, requiring a political and statesmanlike solution.

5. Millard asked what prospects were for Taipei's acceptance of dual representation formula. Herz noted that ROC had publicly stated that it would struggle to the end in UN. He thought we had reasons to hope that Taipei would see that its own interests would be served by our proposals.

In closing, Herz said we hoped UK would stay in close touch with us. NY was best place to consult, particularly on tactics. Even if UK could not support our effort, we hoped they would be able to avoid actions that could damage our prospects.

6. We note that British Embassy notetaker was rather sporadic in making notes on above conversation. In particular, he took no notes at all on points made by Feldman (paras 4 and 5 above), and we are unsure whether these points will be made to FCO. Believe it would be useful if Embassy could make similar points to FCO, drawing on this message and State 139829.²

Rogers

² See footnote 3, Document 387. Discussions with British officials about the U.S. legal position on the China representation question were reported in telegram 7378 from London, August 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

394. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 11, 1971, 0100Z.

2193. Subj: Chirep—Advantages of Separate Agenda Item.

1. Mission of definite opinion that we should seek to inscribe separate agenda item on Chirep with neutral formulation “the representation of China in the UN”.

2. Issue has already surfaced in wording of first preambular para in our draft DR res and at Aug 3 meeting of potential cosponsors. If we do not seek inscription of a separate agenda item we will be faced with equally difficult task of seeking to change wording of Albanian item.

3. New agenda item helps dramatize that we, as result of new US policy announced Aug 2, in an entirely new ballgame. We are not just trying to block adoption of traditional AR under “restoration of rights” rubric—we are making major and serious attempt to solve difficult problem by providing for representation of PRC and ROC in UN thereby recognizing existing realities without prejudicing either’s claims.

4. Japanese are attracted to idea of separate agenda item and have suggested one possibility might be to seek priority in General Committee for our neutrally worded item together with draft reses

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

circulated in connection with it. Japanese mission tells us they have recommended to Tokyo that Japan cosponsor separate agenda item.²

Bush

² Telegram 150415, August 13, authorized USUN to request the inscription of a new agenda item, "The Representation of China in the United Nations." Bush was advised not to seek additional co-sponsors in view of Secretary Rogers' August 2 announcement. Potential co-sponsors were to be advised in advance, and the new item was to be inscribed before August 21. (Ibid.)

395. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 11, 1971, 0242Z.

2229. Subj: Chirep: Aug 11 Mtg.

1. Summary. At mtg of inner core group of potential cosponsors Aug 11, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Belgium all volunteered (some on personal basis) that it is necessary to include language awarding SC seat to PRC in order to convince others of sincerity of our effort and to achieve maximum vote. Philippines suggested utility of separate agenda item with title which appears in US DR res draft. All agreed seek authorization cosponsor separate item prior to deadline for submission of supplementary items (30 days before GA opening Sept 21). New Zealand made point that, while decision to cosponsor and circulation of our draft reses could take place after that deadline, it would help if members of group also had prior authorization cosponsor reses. Next potential cosponsors mtg tentatively set for Aug 17. End summary.

2. At Bush invitation, reps of six Missions met Aug 11 discuss Chirep. Represented at mtg were Australia (Ashwin), Belgium (Longestaey), Japan (Ogiso), New Zealand (Scott), Philippines (Reyes), and Thailand (Klos Visessurakarn). Phillips, Bennett, PolCouns, Legal Adviser and MisOffs also present.

3. Bush opened mtg by stressing US determination, confirmed by conversations past few days with President, Secretary and Kissinger,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Bangkok, Brussels, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

to succeed in new Chirep policy, specifically to offer PRC seat and to insure continued representation of ROC. Assured reps that administration giving full backing to deadly serious and priority USUN effort to have UNGA accept both procedural and substantive reses, whether incorporating precise US texts of amended through consultations. Bush emphasized that rumors and press reports to contrary are without basis.

4. Bush reported that we in process of meeting with some 80 other Missions, starting with 22-nation mtg Aug 3. Said generally we feel response had been quite good but many govts still considering positions. Although not full agreement, consensus of those we have contacted appears be that we have close but reasonable chance to succeed. Virtually none have rejected US approach out of hand and reactions here reflected overlapping majority desires to see PRC seated and ROC stay seated.

5. Bush said purpose his calling mtg was to move process one step forward, to invite criticism of US drafts. While he did not want put any rep on spot, he hoped for frank discussion. Based on contacts to date, US somewhat more optimistic now than when operation began. Asked for reports on what others have found and comments on US approach and on substance.

6. Scott said New Zealand also taking issue seriously and welcomed opportunity for consultations. Generally, NZ position well known since PM and FonMin have made statements. Scott said he could say clearly that his govt had same objectives as others in room: to devise a formula for retaining ROC seat while being prepared to vote for PRC. Since all sharing these goals were starting late and AR sponsors started early, we faced with problem that requires all to focus on best way to cope. Not simple problem. Any formula we propose must take account of "erosion of support for ROC and increase in support for PRC."

7. Scott said he felt sponsors should pay special attention to "floating vote," those who are concerned about ROC expulsion but have no strong commitment. On other hand, trend in UN is that there will be strong majority, but perhaps not two-thirds, for bringing Peking in. Any res, Scott said, must cover certain points. Major point is, which govt should occupy SC seat. It can of course be argued that UNGA does not need to comment on this. But GA members want to know our view and our intention in regard to SC seat. New Zealand feels there should be no doubt as to which China reps proponents of reses feel should occupy SC seat. NZ aware this not spelled out in draft reses. Frankly, NZ feels that to have best chance of success—and issue is tricky and will require work in any event—situation requires specific mention of SC seat.

8. How can this be done? Scott asked. Even though language specifying SC seat not in draft res, sponsors could make clear in

introducing reses their attitude on SC seat. This would invite amendment to res, which would result in language regarding SC in final text. However, this such serious question that most govts by time of any amendment would have been fully briefed and comparatively locked in to fixed and unhelpful position based on lack of SC language in res. Relying on change in res text at that time, therefore, is not best. NZ believes that if language is to be changed to include SC seat it should be done at beginning of process.

9. Bush asked if Missions are far enough along in their consultations with other reps to say that presence or absence of language on SC would have effect on votes. Are contacts saying, for example, that they would support a res with SC language and would not support without. If such an accommodation is necessary, US is flexible. On basis our consultations thus far, we not yet at point of being able say presence or absence of SC seat language would, for example, make ten vote difference.

10. Scott said he not in position to discuss numbers of votes, but he pointed out that AR does specifically mention SC seat and we will need to counter this in our res.

11. Longerstae (Belgium) earlier had highlighted problem created by summer absence from Brussels, resulting in no firm GOB decision this issue. He now said, however, that US draft reses very close to lines of what Belgium has been supporting. But main difference is that mentioned by Scott. Belgians believe language on SC seat should be included. Belgians think it would have influence. There have been doubts about seriousness of US purpose. Inclusion of language would help resolve these doubts.

12. Longerstae noted that our efforts are now proceeding in a new pro-PRC environment, not as favorable a climate as existed year ago. He expressed conviction there is built-in majority for dual representation. Problem is to bring it into open and that many will abstain even though they among a majority. Reason is that they influenced by new environment. Longerstae said he believes legal basis for draft reses is weak. We should admit to ourselves that this a very "soft spot." He concluded by apologizing foregoing must be considered only as personal view.

13. Ashwin (Australia) said he would like make two points. First, Australia "agrees entirely with Belgian and NZ positions." Reality is that SC seat should go to Peking. This should be reflected in res to attract more votes. Second, Australia has always accepted ICJ position that question of representation should be decided by GA rather than subsidiary organs of UN, including SC. PolCouns explained implications of 1950 ICJ ruling.

14. Reyes (Philippines) recalled his comments at Aug 3 mtg (when he pointed out that AR specifically mentions SC seat but he felt SC, re-

ardless of GA should insist on SC competence to decide—USUN 2099).² Reyes recalled he had asked for clarification of US position on SC seat. Reason was not that Philippines eager see PRC become perm member but Philippines looking to 26th GA, foreseeing that IQ might get priority but that vote on representation res would be influenced by precisely what alternative offered to AR language. US-sponsored alternative draft should be as acceptable and attractive as possible.

15. Reyes said he had not yet received response from FonMin on this question, although he had explained difficulty in denying SC seat to Peking. Reyes said he wanted identify himself with remarks of previous speakers. Question of SC, Reyes said, “must be dealt with in drafts in some form.”

16. Reyes introduced question of inscribing separate item or modifying AR item language so as not to prejudice reception of our draft. Term “restoration” could be to our procedural disadvantage. Reyes said he and Scott had discussed this problem before today’s mtg. Issue could be dealt with in General Comite or in some other fashion.

17. Phillips suggested this could be handled in manner similar to our handling of Korea item. Newlin, after draft text of China item distributed (text septel), noted that it could be inscribed as separate item or could be combined with AR.

18. Longerstaey suggested better have own item but predicted items would finally be combined.

19. Bush asked if any others wished comment. Ogiso, who had been silent at Aug 3 mtg and had said nothing yet this mtg, asked if Secretary Rogers’ remark to press that US prepared follow majority view on SC seat necessarily referred to majority expression by GA. Or could it mean majority expressions in informal prior consultations. Bush responded that Secretary merely indicating US flexibility and willingness to follow majority lead. Representation for both Chinese govts principal issue and Secretary simply intended convey impression of flexibility on SC issue. If this will of GA members and is what they feel is required, then US would agree. US not going to walk out if majority felt that way.

20. Ogiso asked: does this therefore mean that Secretary’s statement does not prevent US from accepting SC seat allocation to PRC? Bush confirmed this meaning, adding that, while all in room are sympathetic to ROC, question was simply one of votes. Bush said he had clear impression from discussion that reps present feel that representation res would be better with SC seat included. If this what it will take, US is flexible. Mtg very helpful in clarifying this point.

² Not printed.

21. Scott commented that SC seat ref in res text would “greatly improve credibility of our seriousness.” With such language, we couldn’t be criticized for going insufficient distance to meet Peking. Scott agreed with Longerstaey that inclusion of language would neutralize rumors that US approach is gimmick.

22. Longerstaey returned to legal question. Suppose, he asked, res does not dispose of SC seat. Is ROC veto possible? Legal Adviser (Reis) explained that atmosphere in GA would be reflected in SC. Thus veto might be attempted but it probably would not be sustained. Reis said he would like make another point on legalities. Perhaps US approach does not touch all legal points but even AR expulsion of ROC is of doubtful legality.

23. Ashwin said that everybody he had discussed US approach with had raised legal questions, particularly centered on legality of providing second China seat without proper admission procedures. Because of this legal question, Ashwin said, many were opposed to our approach. Reis, mentioning Byelorussia and Ukraine, pointed out that UN incorporated anomalies when founded. Mentioned India status. Noted Charter nowhere defines member or state. Reis added: is it not worthwhile ask if Charter not flexible enough to accommodate this proposal.

24. Ogiso asked to turn to different issue. For Japan, he said, study of SC question is very important. On this question, Ogiso said “Personally, I am in full agreement with what Scott said about need to mention SC seat.” Furthermore, he added, inclusion of SC clause might have impact on voting on procedure and on possibility of obtaining priority. To avoid dels concluding IQ res simply same device for same purpose as in prior years, we must demonstrate relationship between IQ and representation res, making clear their bearing on SC question.

25. Ogiso said he had been asked certain questions by dels he had contacted. If our approach succeeds this year, what happens next? If ROC is finally expelled next year then others doubt they should support this year. These reps doubt that next year US will make same effort as this year. If US willing make effort only this year, then they doubt should support. Ogiso said that speaking personally he felt that if US formula gets majority this year it could provide basis for compromise between two Chinese sides. What bearing does this have on US policy?

26. Bush replied that we do not know what exact bearing Kissinger and Nixon visits will have on this question. There is no way of substantiating a link. But who can foretell Peking flexibility particularly when we see how Taiwan’s position has developed over short period?

27. Klos (Thailand) said his govt favors some specific ref to SC, and said he agreed with Scott.

28. Bush excused self, explaining he must leave to make call on another Mission to seek support for Chirep policy. Phillips (returning to question raised by Reyes) suggested mtg discuss agenda item, noting that he understood that only item itself and not necessarily explanatory memo need be submitted by 30-day deadline.

29. Belgian Deputy PermRep Van Ussel, who accompanied Longerstaey to mtg, interrupted to refer to rep res pream para referring to UN as "center for harmonizing actions of nations." Would implications for universality be harmful? Newlin and Reis explained rationale for para, pointing out that it provides useful talking point and that we felt we could find way to explain it to GVN, ROK and FRG. Scott felt this para helpful toward enlisting neutrals support.

30. Scott, returning to subject of agenda item, asked if we felt we should submit separate item before deadline for supplementary items and if his understanding correct that did not need table res at that time. Phillips confirmed both. Scott asked how closely list of co-sponsors of item should reflect list of co-sponsors of res. Phillips and Reis replied that there no requirement of which we aware and that precedents exist for more co-sponsors for inscription than for res itself. Normally, list expected be same, in that case, Scott concluded, it important at time of submitting item to have as wide agreement as possible on text of res.

31. Phillips said we had been assuming mtg next week to include those likely to co-sponsor. Suggested mtg Aug 17. Reps agreed that potential co-sponsors would need two–three days for instruction prior to mtg, thus requiring preliminary efforts with these delts starting this week. Agreed tentatively schedule potential co-sponsors mtg 11:00 am Aug 17.

32. Ogiso asked when we would circulate draft explanatory memo, urging that we do so Aug 13 at latest. We agreed complete ASAP.

33. Scott asked if he understood correctly that US would give consideration between now and Aug 17 to question of amending rep res to include SC seat. Phillips confirmed that we would give serious attention.

34. Longerstaey volunteered that he believed reps attending mtg had been unanimous that SC seat should be mentioned in res. He asked if we could provide figure on reaction of other delts to absence of SC clause in draft res. We said roughly 15–20 others had raised question, many stressing importance of addressing SC issue in res.

Bush

396. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 13, 1971, 0200Z.

2267. Subj: Chirep—Credentials Committee.

1. Stavropoulos reported to MisOff 13 Aug that Sov Mission has told him they expect SYG will propose constituting Credentials Committee for 26th GA on basis 4–4–1. Noting his conversation with another MisOff 12 July, Stavropoulos said he believes increased number of countries recognizing PRC, which is basis for CC composition, now requires 4–4–1.

2. Stavropoulos said that tactical question is more important than increase UN numbers of countries treating in one way or another with Peking. SYG is obliged to propose composition of CC at very beginning of session and before commencement general debate. If he proposes 5–3–1, there is certain to be prolonged and heated challenge to his proposal in volatile context where reps will not be tightly instructed and with unpredictable results. On other hand, Stavropoulos believes that there would be no serious or unmanageable challenge if the SYG proposed 4–4–1.

3. *Comment:* We cannot any longer maintain that 5–3–1 is justified by the facts. These are that as of 13 Aug, 58 UN members recognize PRC (of whom 50 have diplomatic relations with PRC), while 60 UN members recognize GRC (of whom 59 have diplomatic relations with GRC), and 4 recognize neither PRC nor GRC.

4. Stavropoulos is correct in saying that in view of these facts, and possible furthering of bilateral trend toward Peking before 26th GA, even if we succeeded in persuading SYG to recommend a 5–3–1 CC, this would almost certainly be challenged from the floor. It would be extremely dangerous for this matter to be put to the vote unless we had gone to capitals on this issue and had sought to build a majority to overrule such a challenge. This would involve not only adding a further issue to continuing efforts to seek support for IQ and DR in Washington, here and in capitals, but the weakness of the case and consequent lack of appeal would very likely harm our search for IQ and DR support.

5. There is of course no guarantee that an SYG proposal for a 4–4–1 CC would not also provoke challenge. But we are confident such a challenge would be defeated—first, because the hard facts of the mat-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Pretoria.

ter show a near parity of recognition and diplomatic relations as between Peking and Taipei, and second, because the membership would recognize that our agreeing that the SYG should come forward with 4-4-1 represented considerable movement and a willingness to accept facts.

6. On the other hand, a 5-3-1 CC, if we could get it, would insure to the greatest possible extent that Chinese representation would not be resolved in the context of credentials. If any way could be found to sustain an SYG 5-3-1 proposal without adversely affecting our basic goals, we would opt for it. Since there is none, we recommend informing Stavropoulos that although we would prefer 5-3-1 CC, we would be prepared to consider 4-4-1 and would expect that, in return, the SYG and all reasonable dels would wish to support such a recommendation as against any possible challenge. Finally, we would want to make the point that we expect the 4-4-1 will be selected in such a way as to produce a majority in the CC for South Africa's credentials. Request reply.²

Bush

² The Department replied that an effort should still be made to seek continuation of the "traditional" 5-3-1 formula on the Credentials Committee, seeking, if necessary, support from the Secretary-General. (Telegram 151262 to USUN, August 18; *ibid.*)

397. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, August 18, 1971, 2059Z.

152449. Subject: Chirep. Refs: A. USUN 2297;² B. State 150259.³

1. For Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Bathurst, Blantyre, Bogota, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Gaborone, Kigali, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Panama City, Port au Prince, Quito, San Jose, San Domingo, Suva, The Hague, Tokyo, Tunis, Wellington:

A. Meeting of friendly delegations in New York Aug 17 (their capitals listed in para above) was helpful in advancing our initiatives but did not result in commitments regarding co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions. The time has come therefore to make approaches at addressee posts, to follow up on the discussion in New York, obtain pledges of co-sponsorship, or where this is not possible elicit suggestions re what we can do to make such co-sponsorship possible. We realize in particular that two points in the representation resolution seem to give most trouble:

B. One point is preference of some countries that representation resolution refer to "Taiwan" rather than ROC. We believe you have adequate material in para 7 Ref B to explain why substitution of Taiwan for ROC, far from making the res more saleable, would actually increase PRC and other opposition to it. Where govt is troubled that use of term ROC in resolutions somehow might be taken to imply acceptance of ROC claim to represent all of China, you could make these points: (1) Use of term in no way entails acceptance of such claims, and co-sponsorship would in no way prevent host govt from making its views on this point clear in public; (2) normal UN practice is to use names by which countries refer to themselves; (3) if Chirep problem

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Herz; cleared by George N. Monsma, John D. Rendahl, James H. Boughton, Peter C. Walker, C. Robert Moore, Winthrop G. Brown, Pedersen, and Eliot; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Beirut, Blantyre, Bogota, Brasilia, Bridgetown, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Dakar, Djakarta, Dublin, Fort Lamy, Gaborone, The Hague, Kampala, Kigali, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Lagos, La Paz, Libreville, Lima, Lome, Lusaka, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Montevideo, Nairobi, Nicosia, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Panama, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rabat, Reykjavik, San Jose, Santo Domingo, Singapore, Suva, Tehran, Tokyo, Tunis, Vienna, Vientiane, and Wellington. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Rio de Janeiro, Dakar, and Bathurst.

² Telegram 2297 from USUN, August 18, reported on the August 17 meeting. (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 3, Document 387.

is to be settled at all in a realistic way, resolutions must steer clear of seeming to endorse either set of conflicting claims.

C. The other point has to do with the fact that our draft resolution does not include language recommending that Security Council seat be given to PRC. If this is what gives host government trouble you should refer to Secretary's statement Aug 2 that we will abide by views of the majority on SC seat and assure them that you will immediately report their views to us. FYI. This is of course the most delicate aspect and most difficult for ROC to accept. We have not yet decided how or when to handle it, but clearly our most important objective is to retain UN membership for the ROC. End FYI. If host government is not prepared to co-sponsor res as it now stands, you should ask them if they would be prepared to co-sponsor if it were amended to include recommendation on Security Council. In any case, info on degree to which this matter will affect vote of host government will be valuable to us in deciding next steps.

2. Addressees other than those listed in para 1 we regard as unlikely to be co-sponsors although we hope to have their support for our resolutions. Accordingly, those addressees should explore host government attitude to our resolutions and when indicated also try to elicit information on extent to which Security Council issue in DR resolution would affect their ability to lend support (or might lead them to abstain rather than oppose).

3. All addressee posts should report again even where this info has previously been reported, so that we will have most up-to-date picture enabling us to decide on next moves.

4. Some addressee posts have reported special factors (e.g., absence of key govt figures) which have made host govt unable to express firm views at this time. At such posts, in Ambassador's discretion, his own assessment of host govt attitudes would be helpful pending opportunity to approach host govt.

5. If question of timing of submission of resolutions to UN is raised, you should say that matter is open, but that we think it advisable to table resolutions well before beginning of General Debate at UNGA. Hence we are anxious to ascertain very soon the potential list of co-sponsors, and what needs to be done to make it as broad and representative as possible.

6. FYI. We recognize that we may not in every case be able to get support for both the IQ and representation resolutions and may have to settle for support for only one of them. However, at this stage we should avoid any indication that we would settle for support of the one resolution alone. End FYI.

Rogers

398. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 20, 1971, 0009Z.

2333. Subj: Chirep Meeting With Central Americans. Ref: USUN 2280.²

1. Summary: In meeting with Central Americans on Chirep, Bush drew attention to new position on DR which ROC now conveying to close friends. Urged governments to consider joint ROC–US conviction that support for DR is best means of preserving ROC representation. Agreed continue close consultation in NY and capitals. Recommend addressees make further approaches. End Summary.

2. Bush held follow-up meeting Aug 19 with five Central American dels: Molina (Costa Rica), Castenada-Cornejo (El Salvador), Asensio (Guatemala), Sevilla-Sacasa and Roman (Nicaragua), Rios (Panama). Phillips and MisOffs also present. (No Honduras rep now in NY and we still have not seen here.)

3. Bush remarks designed principally to move these governments toward support and co-sponsorship of DR. For this purpose, he emphasized that to preserve ROC's seat DR policy must be successful and that ROC itself wants it to succeed. Protection of ROC's seat requires support for widely acceptable DR concept embodied in US reses. Bush paid tribute to loyalty toward ROC that made some of best friends of US and ROC reluctant to support DR. He and MisOffs brought dels up-to-date on our understanding of ROC's private attitude. Referring specifically to recent ROC instructions—clarified at Chiefs of Missions conferences held in past 10 days—that ROC missions should encourage friends to support DR (reftel), we urged dels to discuss with ROC Amb Liu and to stimulate governments to seek clarification directly from ROC.

4. Group seemed receptive to presentation. Discussion indicated most not aware of current ROC position. Discussion of ROC attitude and other aspects of problem also tended verify our previous impression that FonMinistries not communicating sufficiently with these UN dels on Chirep.

5. Sevilla-Sacasa (although he typically postured as senior of group) revealed sparse understanding of rationale for new reses, and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to San Jose, San Salvador, Guatemala City, Managua, Panama, Taipei, Tegucigalpa, and Tokyo.

² Dated August 16. (Ibid.)

we sought to clarify (with unknown success) such questions as why we were not using old IQ formula and why we want avoid issue of admission of new state. Sevilla-Sacasa summarized problem as centering on attitudes of GA membership, of PRC and of ROC. Sevilla-Sacasa asked Bush how many Asians would co-sponsor US reses. Bush said we anticipated EA governments support and co-sponsorship. We working intimately with them trying to adjust to their needs. However, EA governments need time to consider; therefore, for example, we requested item inscription alone. Bush reported that several EA's have spoken of need for DR language on SC seat; he described US attitude in terms of Secretary's statement regarding a majority view.

6. Castenada-Cornejo (El Salvador) said he and other ROC friends concerned that their support for DR concept would give impression of policy inconsistency. Furthermore, vote might imply political recognition of PRC; this might damage relations with ROC, perhaps even leading to break in relations. Issue is also domestic political concern. We replied, in addition to substance of para 3, that our approach would avoid UN seeking decide rival claims and that member's UN vote need not mean change in bilateral policy.

7. Rios (Panama), pointing out he had no instructions, said Chirep question so sensitive that he believed it would be more fruitful for US to discuss in capitals. FonMinistry has informed him GOP studying issue. We agreed discussions in capitals important and described extensive US activity in field. We assured Rios we would continue approaches in Panama but added that we would hope also to work closely in NY as well. Underlined value of close coordination among US, ROC and others both here and abroad.

8. *Comment:* Recommend addressees make clear to Fon Ministries high value we place on type of consultations reported this message. At same time it would be helpful if addressees could find means of getting across point that it in mutual interest for hosts to keep UN reps as fully informed as possible.

Bush

399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 26, 1971, 0234Z.

2408. Sub: Chirep—Credentials Committee. Refs: USUN 2267² and 2320 (latter NOTAL)³ State 151262.⁴

1. USUN Legal Adviser called on Stavropoulos to explain our difficulties with his proposal for 4–4–1 Credentials Committee. Noted that traditional 5–3–1 formula originated in East-West issues across-the-board, not merely in context of numbers of member states recognizing Taipei or Peking, and that moving to 4–4–1 would produce so volatile a situation within GA and specialized agencies that credentials issues involving, for example, Cambodia, Germany, Korea and Vietnam might no longer be handled on technical-procedural-apolitical basis, as called for by GA rules, but would be subject to every current of national unpopularity and personal “initiative”. While we understood concern that first day of 26th GA not be marred by violent challenge to a Stavropoulos/Hambro 5–3–1 recommendation, we thought Albanian proponents were more likely to complain than go so far as formally to challenge 5–3–1, in large part because they couldn’t be sure of winning at outset of GA and would not wish to jeopardize entirety of Chirep on possible defeat on this issue. Also noted possibility UN membership at large would go along with 5–3–1 recommendation in view of widespread feeling Chirep should be subject of everyone’s views, not merely those of (unrepresentative) 9-member Credentials Committee.

2. Stavropoulos said he appreciated even if he did not share fully our viewpoint. Difficulty would be with acting Pres Hambro, not him. Stavropoulos thought we would have very considerable difficulty convincing Hambro of rectitude of 5–3–1 and suggested we undertake this task without delay.

3. Stavropoulos asked what we are telling other Missions with regard to optimum timing Chirep debate. MisOff replied only the extremes seem clear; we do not think that Foreign Ministers would appreciate delaying the general debate in order that Chirep be taken up, and resolved, at very beginning of the Assembly; on other hand, we are not seeking to delay Chirep until Dec. We think Albanians unlikely

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Pretoria.

² Document 396.

³ Dated August 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 396.

to want to push Chirep to a vote before the general debate draws to a close, both because of attendance Foreign Minister problem and because they will need opportunity to gauge measure of support that 1971 GA is likely to accord Albanian Res. Stavropoulos said he is considering advising that Mon 18 Oct—which will mark conclusion of 3-week general debate—would be as appropriate a time for plenary Chirep discussion as any other. MisOff said we would like opportunity to reflect; it was still early to have answers to these questions.

4. Stavropoulos said he assumes that, having looked at probable General Committee composition, we are bearing in mind the likelihood that the GC will recommend combining the 2 Chirep items. He thought it awkward to have an item beginning (A) “Restoration of the lawful rights . . .” and (B) “The representation of China in the UN”, and that, by reasons of practice and tradition, it would be better to have a chapeau followed by (A) and (B). He asked that we consider for this purpose “the question of China”. While others would say there is no “question” but merely a denial of lawful rights, “the question of China” would be neutral and thus serve non-prejudicially.

5. Stavropoulos said a 4-4-1 Credentials Committee could be formed without endangering South African credentials. Might not Pakistan be recommended as one of the “PRC four” and agree to abstain on any [vote?] in the Credentials Committee to decline South African credentials? MisOff reiterated importance we attach to Credentials Committee treating South African credentials no differently than those of anyone else; 4-4-1 seemed a particularly tricky business.

6. Stavropoulos also said USSR Mission is pessimistic and appears to fear PRC will be in UNGA this year. Sov Mission is sending Rybakov (Counselor level) to review with Stavropoulos possible effect on handling and outcome of agenda items of active PRC participation in 26th GA (*sic*).

7. MisOff thanked Stavropoulos and said we would need to reflect on questions raised and might require some time to do so.

8. Request info addressees protect Stavropoulos in any discussion foregoing problems. Relationship could be jeopardized by citation Stavropoulos in capitals.

Bush

400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1608Z.

158910. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling Resolutions. For Amb From Secretary.

1. Our sense of timing on Chirep issue in NY is that it is highly desirable to submit DR Res with reasonably balanced group of sponsors by Labor Day. Japanese co-sponsorship in our view will be essential in obtaining such a list and to prospects for ultimate success.

2. We have also concluded that inclusion of provision on SC seat will ultimately be critical in prospects for favorable vote. As Japanese know, Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines are strongly urging that such provision be included at outset, in fact have said their co-sponsorship hinges on this point.

3. Our impression of ROC position is that it has evolved not only to point of urging its friends to support DR but also to point where ROC will acquiesce in SC seat going to PRC. We gather Japanese are getting similar impression. At same time we remain concerned at possibility inclusion SC seat in our own text when initially tabled could cause Chiang to react adversely or GRC to cease urging favorable vote—with possible loss several conservative votes in GA.

4. Accordingly, I would like you to consult with Sato in way you consider best with view (a) to obtaining Japanese agreement to co-sponsor both IQ and DR, (b) to obtain their views on how SC para should be brought into the Res and (c) to obtain their active lobbying support with others.

5. Presentation, whether orally or with assistance of written note, would be along following lines:

“The Secretary has asked me to counsel with you personally on the next steps we should take in the matter of Chinese representation in the UN. Because of Japan’s importance in this entire endeavor, we are anxious to discuss with you the considerations set forth below in advance of consultations with any other government.

“We believe we have made a good beginning in putting forward our new initiative. Many governments around the world have been receptive to our proposals. We think the time has come when we must

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pedersen, Herz, and Feldman; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Richard A. Ericson, Pedersen, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.

take a further step and formally table by Sept 6 the dual representation resolution in order to consolidate and broaden our support. For the moment we are undecided on the timing of tabling the IQ Resolution. For tactical reasons in obtaining treatment as a procedural motion it may be desirable to delay its submission until close to the vote.

"This raises the question of co-sponsorship. Although well-disposed to our initiative, many countries whom we would very much wish to have as co-sponsors are hanging back in order to see whether the principal countries of the Asian region, and Japan in particular, are willing to commit themselves. We ourselves believe that Japanese co-sponsorship of both the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions is essential to success of the policy on whose broad outlines our two Governments are in agreement. We therefore would hope that Japan could concur in this and join with us in urging others to co-sponsor as well.

"The Security Council aspect is one which must be handled with special care. A number of countries have forcefully stated the view that the Dual Representation resolution is unlikely to succeed unless it includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat. Our analysis is that this is correct and that the most favorable impression would be created if we included such a provision at the outset. For Japan and the United States to sponsor a recommendation to that effect, however, would cause obvious problems for the Government of the Republic of China. Our impression is that the GRC is moving toward acquiescence in the SC seat going to the PRC but still would prefer the issue to be precipitated by countries other than Japan and the US.

"For these reasons, we have come to believe that the best approach might be for the US and Japan to seek co-sponsorship of the present DR resolution from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, one or two Latin American countries, one or two African countries and, if possible, Belgium and Ireland, but with the prior understanding that within a week several of these countries (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Belgium) possibly with others not on our original list, would submit an amendment on the SC seat, which we would incorporate into a revised text before the GA opens. It may be that Australia and New Zealand would not agree to such an approach and that we would then have to revise it. Or you may believe that relations with the GRC do not require us to go through such a process and that we could safely have the SC seat recommendation in the text before we submit it. I would appreciate your views on this point.

"We recognize that a commitment to co-sponsor and to include the SC seat are serious steps which your government must carefully consider. If we are to maintain and build our momentum, however, the

tabling of the dual representation resolution should take place as early as possible. We therefore would like to ask that you agree to join with us and other like-minded states to accomplish this necessary task in the immediate future.”

6. *Comment:* We consider Australia and New Zealand support for such an approach to be essential. If they did not agree we would then probably want to proceed on the basis of including the SC seat from the outset. We would not consider Belgium or Ireland necessary, though they would be desirable.

7. If Sato asks whether we are sure we can win the vote if the US and Japan co-sponsor and the SC is in, you should say no one can be positive at this point because the situation is too fluid. Without Japanese sponsorship and the SC seat recommendation we believe it would be unlikely; with GOJ sponsorship and active support, and continued GRC acquiescence, we believe the prospects are favorable. That is probably all we, or they, could honestly say at this point.

8. As passage of time is beginning to cause us problems we would hope Japanese could give us answer next week.

Rogers

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1804Z.

158911. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling of Resolutions. Ref: Taipei 4290.²

1. We are repeating to you message to Tokyo asking personal démarche to Sato requesting his cooperation in the two-stage approach on the Dual Representation resolution.³ We are making it clear to the Japanese that we expect stage two to be reached very soon and that, in fact, we are resorting to the two-stage approach largely because of the deli-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Pedersen, Leo J. Moser, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.

² Telegram 4290, August 27, described a meeting between Ambassador McConaughy and Foreign Minister Chow. (Ibid.)

³ Document 400.

cacy of the problem for the ROC and also because of Japanese concerns. At the same time, we are pointing out to Sato that the two-stage approach might have to be abandoned if we could not get Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to agree to co-sponsor on that basis.

2. Reftel states the GRC hopes we can muster a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors for a DR resolution which did not include a recommendation that the PRC hold the Security Council seat. It is precisely the question of putting together a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors which is the crux of our present difficulty. Frankly, the prospects are quite bleak at present.

3. Having approached some 90 countries in New York and in capitals, and with repeated follow-ups where appropriate, only one country (Costa Rica) thus far has agreed to co-sponsor the DR res without the Security Council seat recommendation. While it is possible that the Australians and New Zealanders will agree to the two-stage approach if the Japanese come on board, their past repeated statements to us have been to the effect that they would not co-sponsor unless the SC seat is covered. It is thus possible that the two-stage approach may get into serious difficulties at the very outset, due to Japanese or Australian and New Zealand non-cooperation. We would then have to decide whether it is desirable to table with only a corporal's guard of co-sponsors, instead of a large and well-balanced group, since we must assume in that case that other key countries such as Philippines, Thailand, Belgium, Mexico, Colombia, etc. would also stand aloof.

4. Given the considerable risk factor in the two-stage approach even if we can get it going (as some countries would interpret our action in tabling the resolution without any reference to the SC seat as evidence of "lack of seriousness" on our part, and as an effort that was doomed to failure), and in the light of recent indications that the ROC may be becoming more flexible, we would like to have your assessment of what the ROC reaction would be if we explained subsequently that the two-stage approach is not workable and that it is necessary to success that the Security Council seat be covered in the resolution when it is tabled.

5. Of course we are mindful of your conversation with Foreign Minister Chow reported reftel, and of his statement that the ROC would prefer that the resolution as tabled make no reference to the Security Council seat, though the ROC clearly expects the resolution to be adequately co-sponsored as well. On the other hand, we are impressed by the recent accumulation of indications that the ROC is becoming more flexible on this entire question, perhaps including its tactical aspects as well:

(a) Tokyo's 8434 reporting that according to Vice Foreign Minister Hogen, several ROC Ambassadors have told their Japanese

counterparts that President Chiang has indicated his willingness to stay in the UN even if the Security Council seat is given to the PRC;⁴

(b) USUN 2426 reporting that Ambassador Liu not only appears to accept the necessity of including a recommendation on the Security Council in the DR res, but that he displayed “equanimity at the prospect;”⁵

(c) Blantyre 968 reporting that the instructions issued to ROC Ambassadors overseas state ROC Ambassadors are to ask host governments to vote for the DR resolution “regardless of how amended;”⁶

(d) USUN 2406 reporting that a “special emissary from Taipei” had told a recent meeting of ROC Ambassadors to LA countries that the Security Council seat question had become a “side issue;”⁷

(e) Maseru 494 reporting that the ROC Ambassador to Lesotho told our Chargé that the ROC would not oppose a DR resolution which includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat.⁸

6. Subject to your concurrence, we think it may be useful to acquaint the ROC with the realities of the bleak co-sponsorship situation now facing us, even though we are proceeding to discuss the two-stage approach with the Japanese. We consider (and we assume from his statements that Chow agrees) it is essential to have on board with us from the start the core group of influential Asian countries as well as at least one or two influential co-sponsors from Europe, Africa, and Latin America. We believe the ROC should be made aware that the two-stage approach carries with it a substantial risk, and that this risk could become unacceptable if we are able to launch stage one with only a small group of minor states that have no influence in the international community.

Rogers

⁴ Dated August 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

⁵ Dated August 26. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII)

⁶ Dated August 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

⁷ Dated August 26. (Ibid.)

⁸ Dated August 17. (Ibid.)

402. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, September 1, 1971, 1011Z.

8607. Deliver opening of business Wednesday. For the Secretary. Subj: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship of Resolutions. Ref State 158910.²

Summary: Sato is studying possibility of GOJ co-sponsorship of DR via two-stage approach. His preliminary reaction not unfavorable, but he is concerned by prospect of deferring submission of IQ. He also concerned over altering Chirep scenario which was disclosed to LDP and press two days ago.

1. In context of Secretary's seeking his counsel, substance of para 5 of reftel was carefully conveyed to PriMin Sato morning September 1. Emphasis was placed on our views re essentiality of Japanese co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions and urgent need to submit DR by next Monday.

2. Sato agreed that time is running short. He also agreed on importance of having as broad sponsorship as possible. He emphasized need to be successful. In response I employed essence of para 7, i.e. course which both our countries considering offers best hope, provided GOJ co-sponsors and supports it actively.

3. Sato suggested there some change in proposed handling of both IQ and problem of UNSC seat, wondering about reasons. I noted there only slight change re timing of submission of IQ but even this undecided. More important change was two-stage approach to handling question of UNSC seat, and this change motivated by our trying to be responsive to GOJ considerations as well as our own. I stressed that two-stage approach not been discussed elsewhere and we unable to prophesy that it will be acceptable to those who would be involved such as Australia and New Zealand.

4. Sato indicated two stage approach sounded agreeable, but noted GOJ been having serious domestic political problems re Chirep. GOJ favorably disposed to co-sponsorship of IQ in conjunction with submission of DR. He doubted DR could be achieved without IQ. I made clear USG still solidly supports IQ; only question is tactical one of timing.

5. Sato said that despite domestic pressures against IQ, there no change in GOJ position. He wondered if change in US attitude toward

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.

² Document 400.

timing of IQ was result of domestic pressures on USG (slight implication re our seriousness). I assured him emphatically it is simply question as to tactics at UN. I added that only concern we have is whether resort to two-stage approach might be interpreted as lack of USG seriousness.

6. Re domestic support in Japan, I reminded Sato of *Sankei Shimbun* poll which showed that 74 percent of Japanese would like to see PRC in UN provided Taiwan not ousted. Only 11 percent of Japanese people polled indicated willingness to see Taiwan out of UN. He agreed this represents thinking of Japanese people. They wish see both represented in UN as an “interim measure” without confirming two-China or one China one Taiwan policy. (I had earlier described our official position as “seating” PRC and not ousting GRC.) Sato noted even Chiang insists on principle that China is one, e.g. Chiang opposes Mongolian independence.

7. Sato said he would give Secretary’s views urgent study and asked when I leaving for ECONCOM. I noted that because of importance of this question, I deferring departure until this Friday. Sato indicated he hoped to have reply by that time.

8. *Comment.* When Assistant Secretary Trezise and I called on Fukuda previous afternoon, I tipped off Fukuda re my visit to Sato. He will be key figure from now on in decision-making. He and Nishibori who was present were worried that just previous day PriMin and Fukuda had decided to co-sponsor IQ but defer final decision re complex DR until circa September 10. This position been communicated to LDP Committee and in fact to press (Tokyo 8561).³ They concerned re public reaction to switch, which would place DR and particularly GOJ co-sponsorship ahead of co-sponsorship of IQ. As supplement to approach to Sato we staying in touch with Fukuda via Mori, Hogen and Nishibori with view to securing full FornOff support.

9. *Action.* Would appreciate urgently rationale behind tactics for handling of IQ resolution since this seems to be matter of concern to FornOff particularly.⁴

Meyer

³ Not printed.

⁴ In telegram 160827 to Tokyo, September 1, the Department advised Ambassador Meyer that “we considered having IQ go in as motion rather than separate formal resolution only as a tactical variation which might assist somewhat in the matter of gaining priority in voting over the Albanian Res.” The United States remained fully committed to the Important Question principle and was prepared to table a formal IQ resolution at the same time as the Dual Representation resolution was tabled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

403. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chirep

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Secretary Rogers proposing that we now submit to the United Nations a resolution which specifically recommends that Peking assume the Security Council seat heretofore occupied by Taipei.²

As the Secretary's memo makes clear, we have made a major effort to line up support for a dual representation strategy which did not explicitly involve the Security Council seat, at least initially. That effort has failed. Even such stalwarts as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines have refused to co-sponsor such a resolution. In fact, after approaching 35 potential co-sponsors, we have only two firm commitments, Costa Rica and Guatemala.

It is now abundantly clear that there is not a prayer of maintaining the GRC's membership in the United Nations unless our dual representation resolution provides the Security Council seat to Peking. That is dramatically illustrated by the following best estimate of how the General Assembly will vote on the three resolutions relevant to this issue.

<i>Important Question Resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
If the DR covers the SC, we win:	60	50	17
If the DR does not cover the SC, we lose:	44	61	22

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, 1 June–30 September 1971, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the first page reads: "Approved orally by President, September 7." Much of this memorandum, including the predicted voting totals, is based on a September 3 memorandum from Wright to Kissinger, in which Wright wrote: "Because of our inability to bite the bullet now on the Security Council issue, we are perilously close to frittering away what ought to be a winning hand." (Ibid., Box 285, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. 13)

² Rogers' September 5 memorandum is attached but not printed. Posts were informed of the new policy and strategy for the upcoming UN vote in telegrams 166117 and 166118, September 7, and 166140, September 9. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

Albanian Resolution

If the DR covers the SC, we win:	50	55	22
If it does not, we lose:	63	41	23

Dual Representation Resolution

If it covers the SC, we win:	57	51	19
If it does not, we lose:	43	55	29

I hasten to add that these estimates are fragile, and may be optimistic. But they do indicate two salient facts: We cannot possibly win unless we face up squarely to the Security Council issue. We have a good chance of winning if we do so.

The question, therefore, is not whether the Secretary is right in stating that this course is necessary in order to maintain Taipei's seat. He unquestionably is. The question is whether the possibility—and it is no more than that—of saving Taipei's seat is worth the price.

There are three principal elements to be weighed, the domestic reaction, the international reaction, and the effect upon your trip to Peking.

Domestic. The right will undoubtedly be outraged at our sponsoring a resolution awarding the SC seat to Peking. That, however, needs to be balanced against their reaction if we handle this whole issue in such a way that Taipei is totally expelled from the U.N. Another consideration is the broader central sentiment in the country, which does not care particularly about the Security Council seat, but which does expect that Taipei's U.N. membership will be preserved.

My own instinct is that the right is going to be critical, whatever we do on this issue, and that the only good defense is that we did what we had to do to save Taipei from expulsion.

International. We are thoroughly on the record with foreign governments as determined to save Taipei's membership, and resigned not to stick over the disposal of the SC seat. If we do not behave in a manner consistent with that position, it will be widely believed that we have acted in bad faith, with the deliberate intent all along of sacrificing Taipei's U.N. membership to the demands of Peking. The delays and indecisiveness inherent in our maneuvers thus far will come to be viewed as a deliberate strategy calculated to result in our own defeat. For this we will get little credit from those who want Taipei expelled, and considerable obloquy from those who share our desire to save Taipei's membership in the U.N.

Taipei's reaction to this move on our part is unknowable. They do not want us to do it. Yet they undoubtedly realize that it is necessary. In a narrow judgment call, I agree with Ambassador McConaughy that Taipei will probably acquiesce in our disposing of the Security Council seat in the dual representation resolution. In any event, I am certain of one thing. If in the end, we do not save Taipei's membership, they will blame it on us.

Relations with Peking. It is difficult to foresee how this issue will affect Peking. On the one hand, Peking is subtle enough to see that intransigence on our part has the effect of strengthening the drive to put Peking in, and Taipei out, of the U.N. On the other, Peking's leadership is not likely to be reassured of our reliability or firmness if we "help" them in such a "duplicitous" way.

In any event, it seems clear that Peking is prepared to disagree with us on the U.N. issue without letting that disagreement interfere with the discussion of other issues. Undoubtedly, Peking is now confident that in time it will get what it wants in the U.N., with or without us. She is not, therefore, likely to attach cardinal importance to what we do now on this issue.

The Need for an Urgent Decision. This is one of those matters in which a delay is tantamount to a negative decision. The General Assembly meets in mid-September. All over the world policy decisions are being taken and delegations are about to depart for New York. We are about out of the time to persuade governments to stand with us. Once they make their decision, it may be possible to turn some around. But others will be irretrievably lost. And according to the estimates above, a switch of three votes will beat us on the Dual Representation and Albanian Resolutions, and a switch of five votes will beat us on the Important Question Resolution.

If you approve Secretary Rogers' recommendation I strongly urge that you generate immediately the widest possible consultation with Congressional and political leaders to explain the situation which has led you to take this step. If the situation is presented squarely in its full bleakness: a choice between (1) accepting Peking in the Security Council but keeping Taipei in the U.N., and (2) the expulsion of Taipei from all U.N. bodies with Peking still getting the Security Council seat, I believe there will be considerable understanding, if not approval, of your decision.

On foreign policy grounds, I concur with Secretary Rogers' recommendation. On domestic grounds, I am less certain, but inclined to believe that we could reduce the unfavorable domestic reaction by an energetic program of consultations. Moreover, if the effort to save Taipei's membership succeeds, I think that to some extent it will serve as its own adequate justification.

*Recommendation:*³

1. That you approve Secretary Rogers' recommendation.

³ Neither the approve nor disapprove options under each recommendation is checked or initialed.

2. That you authorize an immediate and intensive round of consultations with domestic conservative leaders, making maximum use of the Vice President, the Attorney General, and Secretary Connally.

404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, September 8, 1971, 0048Z.

164355. Subj: Chirep. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Please seek early appointment with Foreign Minister Chow to deliver following personal message from me:

2. "Since my announcement on August 2 of our Chinese Representation policy, the United States has made exceptionally intensive efforts around the world to explain and seek support for this new policy. In addition, we have made strenuous and repeated efforts to persuade an appropriate group of influential countries to join with us in co-sponsoring the Important Question and Representation resolutions.

3. I believe your Government is aware, through reports from Ambassador Liu in New York and from other diplomatic missions, of the drive we have mounted in this regard, as well as the fact that we have sought by every means to obtain co-sponsorship for a Representation resolution which was silent on the Security Council seat problem, even though it was understood between us that the resolution might have to be amended soon after tabling to take an explicit stand on this matter.

4. In the month since we launched our initiative, and in particular over the past two weeks, we have found our prospects becoming bleaker with each passing day. Despite our best efforts, we have been totally unable to assemble even a minimally acceptable list of co-sponsors for the Representation resolution. This is due primarily to the absence from that resolution of any reference to the Security Council seat. Well over forty friendly nations have pointed to this omission in their discussions with us, and almost all have expressed the view that the Representation resolution will have no chance for success unless it

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Herz and Feldman; cleared by Pedersen, Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma, Kissinger, and Curran; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to USUN, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Brussels.

recommends that the Security Council seat be held by the People's Republic of China. Indeed, some countries have come to regard our willingness to include such a recommendation as a test of our seriousness in pressing ahead with all available means to make our approach prevail in the General Assembly. Many more have reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to associate themselves with a resolution which in their view has no chance of success.

5. In specific terms, this means that as of this date, we have had firm assurances of co-sponsorship of the Dual Representation Resolution from only two countries, Costa Rica and Guatemala, although we understand Upper Volta has also informed your government it will also co-sponsor. While it is probable that we could add to this brief list a few more countries from Africa and Latin America, these would not be countries with influence in the General Assembly. Even the prospective co-sponsors among our closest allies, such as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Belgium, have stated that they are unable to co-sponsor the Representation resolution in its present form. In the case of Japan, the government is unable at this time to come to any decision on co-sponsorship. I believe your own Government has received similar information from Republic of China diplomatic missions in those countries.

6. As you doubtless know, we have greatly stepped up our efforts over the past two weeks in the awareness that time is pressing and that many have commented on our delay in tabling our resolutions. We have made a special effort with Japan, realizing that its position in this matter could be crucial. We have communicated directly with Prime Minister Sato in an effort to see if Japan would co-sponsor now on a temporary basis a Representation resolution which was silent on the Security Council seat, on the understanding that appropriate revision could be made shortly thereafter. The Japanese Government has so far been unable to give us a definite response, and we have indications that the political situation in Tokyo is such that it may be some time before they will be able to make a decision in this matter, and it is unclear what that decision will be. It is clear, however, that further delay would seriously jeopardize the chances for success of our initiative.

7. The overriding objective of the United States has been to make every possible effort to preserve the Republic of China's representation in the United Nations. It was for this reason that we launched our initiative on August 2. I must inform you that we have been forced to the conclusion that our choice now lies between tabling a Representation resolution which recommends that the People's Republic of China hold the Security Council seat or anticipating the overwhelming passage of the Albanian Resolution. Our latest estimates show that unless we take this step now, the Important Question resolution is likely to lose by a

substantial margin. The Albanian Resolution will be adopted by an even larger margin, and the Representation resolution itself will never even come to a vote.

8. Given this situation, given our commitment to attempt by all means at our disposal to protect your Government's representation in the United Nations—a commitment which I publicly reiterated on September 3²—and because any further delay would be fatal to what we and the Republic of China would hope to accomplish, I am sending urgent personal messages to all potential co-sponsors of influence in the General Assembly informing them that we have determined on the basis of our consultations that a majority of UN members wish to see the People's Republic of China seated in the Security Council and that, accordingly, we are soliciting their co-sponsorship for the Representation resolution amended so that the first operative paragraph will end "... and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

9. I am aware, of course, that this action will present many problems to your Government, just as it does to our own. I trust you will understand that we are forced to take this step by the situation we now face and the prospect of defeat if we fail to act decisively and in timely fashion.

10. As you are aware, there are certain intangibles which will have a bearing on our prospects for success in the General Assembly. One of these is the need to prevent any public acrimony between ourselves and the Republic of China. Only if we give the impression to other countries that we have made a cool-headed appraisal of the situation and are reacting to it realistically and with all the resources at our command—and with at least the tacit acquiescence of the Republic of China—can our efforts be crowned with success. In particular, we will need your continued active cooperation behind the scenes with countries who may be inclined to stand aside because of a mistaken belief that this would be agreeable to the Republic of China.

11. We believe that, given this new basis, we can muster the minimum number of co-sponsors needed and that both our resolutions will now have a fair chance for passage. Our current estimate is that if we and our allies, including the Republic of China, will bend every effort to the common task, and if in the end Japan finds it possible to join in co-sponsoring, the chances for success are good. I must emphasize, however, that to accomplish this result we shall have to mount the most

² Reference is to a news conference on September 3 during which Rogers reiterated the U.S. position on Chinese representation in response to a reporter's question; for text see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 27, 1971, pp. 327–328.

intensive campaign yet seen in the General Assembly. I trust that in this we may count upon the unstinting cooperation of the Republic of China, so that we may be victorious in defeating the Albanian Resolution.”

12. FYI. We have carefully considered whether it is in our mutual interest to give the GRC an opportunity for rejoinder or counter-proposal or a request that we delay seeking co-sponsorship on this basis. In view of your reporting and assessments, as well as indications of ROC attitudes from posts around the world, however, we concluded that it is best to inform them that we are acting and to seek their acquiescence through silence rather than in explicit terms. Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that they be convinced of the reasonableness of what we are doing and of the continuing importance of their own active cooperation in lining up a solid majority in favor of our resolutions.

13. Should it be pointed out, as it probably will be, that our action in making provision for the Security Council seat will create internal problems for the GRC, you should reply that we understand this all the more keenly because the decision will occasion difficulties of an internal nature for us as well. Because of the over-riding importance of preserving UN membership for the ROC, however, we are taking the step with reluctance but with urgency since in our considered opinion the situation simply will not brook any further delay. If you deem it useful, you might also point out that the uncertainty of Japan’s position will seriously complicate our efforts. End FYI.

Rogers

405. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, September 8, 1971, 1031Z.

4498. For Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Chirep: Delivery of Secretary’s Message to ROC FonMin. Ref: State 164355.²

Summary: Ambassador on September 8 delivered Secretary’s message to FonMin Chow Shu-kai, notifying ROC that US has decided it is necessary to amend its draft DR resolution to recommend seating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, Tokyo, USUN, and Wellington.

² Document 404.

PRC in Security Council. FonMin, who was deeply unhappy to learn of this decision, minimized his comment, saying he would be back in touch after consultation with President Chiang and other senior officials. Although we expect prompt sharp rejoinder, we cannot estimate how severe it will be.

1. Very shortly after receipt of reftel I met with FonMin Chow Shukai at 3:00 p.m. today and read him your message, making sure that he understood all the key points and leaving him a copy.

2. Chow asked briefly whether other governments had already been informed, and if we had set date for tabling resolution. I said the other messages seemed to have gone out simultaneously and that even though we did not have a date for tabling, I knew it was a matter of great urgency.

3. Chow refrained from extensive or systematic comment. Instead he reminded me of the very strong views of President Chiang and said he would report immediately to his seniors, specifically mentioning the Vice President and the Vice Premier in addition to the President. Chow did not know how they would react “initially” but left little doubt that it would be very negative and that he, personally, would be in a most uncomfortable position.

4. During our relatively brief conversation the Foreign Minister said he had hoped the US and Japan could desist from taking the lead in introducing the SC seat issue, thus “making our task less painful.” He asked rather rhetorically why the US could not have tabled a simple DR while hinting broadly to others that we would acquiesce in an almost immediate amendment. The direct approach would not only create problems with conservative elements in the ROC but would also reopen suspicions that the US may have struck some bargain with the PRC during Dr. Kissinger’s Peking visit.

5. After noting that I was available at any time the government wished to convey any further views to us, I explained that your message was very clear as to why we felt it mandatory to move without any further delay to save the situation. It was simply too late to contemplate any other successful approach; we had to move now on the SC issue in order to attract the maximum possible number of significant co-sponsors and achieve the requisite majority in the Assembly. If we failed to do so, some key governments, which were in the process of making up their minds during this stage of the pre-GA deliberations, would refrain from co-sponsoring and might commit themselves to support the Albanian Resolution.

6. I also emphatically countered Chow’s comments about a possible US–PRC “bargain” on the SC seat. I said we had made it clear—and had done so publicly—that there had been no substantive agreement reached in Peking. Moreover, I thought it should be fully apparent

that we had not pulled any punches in our massive campaign to protect continuing representation for the ROC in the UN. The decision to include a reference to the SC seat was a most uncomfortable one for us and one that had been forced on us by the hard facts of the parliamentary situation we faced in New York and capitals around the world. Finally, as authorized, I explained that we too were faced with internal difficulties and were taking this step only because we did not think the situation would brook any further delay. I pointed out the difficulties caused by Japan's indecision, but I did not mention Fukuda's comments to Marshall Green.

7. *Comment:* I think it is virtually certain that we will receive a strong reaction either through the Foreign Minister or possibly at a higher level, with some criticism of both the substance and the manner of the move we have been forced to take.³

McConaughy

³ Further details of the meeting are in telegrams 4552 and 4553 from Taipei, both September 10. (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Taipei's Position on UN Resolution Giving Security Council Seat to Peking

Although we expect pro forma, public opposition from the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), we now believe that Taipei will not oppose our resolution on Chinese representation behind-the-scenes. Indeed, if the vote is close, we feel that Taipei may well support our initiatives in its private representations to other governments.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. A covering note dated September 14 indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Marshall Wright with the concurrence of Holdridge. Kissinger forwarded Rogers' memorandum to the President under cover of a brief memorandum. (Ibid.)

² See Documents 404 and 405.

The GRC's response to my personal message to Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, informing him that we had decided to modify our draft resolution to specify that the Security Council seat go to Peking, was about as favorable as we had hoped. On September 10, Foreign Minister Chow handed our Ambassador a formal written response which called the decision "particularly regrettable" and reiterated the traditional position of the GRC: to admit the Chinese Communists to the UN would violate the Charter. The moment such a resolution was tabled, his government would have to issue a public statement objecting to it in the strongest terms. The GRC would continue to object, moreover, as required by the occasion.³

In addition to his somewhat "hard line" written response, however, Foreign Minister Chow made several statements to our Ambassador that show that Taipei's position remains in fact both flexible and pragmatic. He indicated that the GRC did want our dual representation resolution to succeed. He implied that GRC public statements would be most carefully drafted and that, if the margin of support for the resolution should appear dangerously narrow, Taipei might adopt a more positive role in working for it off stage.

Over the last few months, Taipei has come a very long way toward developing a more pragmatic foreign policy—much farther than many would have predicted. We must be careful not to overreact when the GRC feels it must publicly reassert its basic and long held principles. To do so would be to risk inhibiting future GRC flexibility.

It will be most important for us in the weeks ahead to make it as easy as possible for the GRC to work with us behind the scenes for the passage of our dual representation resolution. Any public announcements that we make on this subject should be viewed in terms of the difficulties they might create for Taipei. To the extent possible, we should coordinate the exact wording of our statements with the GRC—or at least give Taipei adequate advance notification.

William P. Rogers

³ Chow's written reaction was transmitted in telegram 4552 from Taipei, September 10; see footnote 3, Document 405.

407. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, September 16, 1971.

171047. 1. ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai called on the Secretary Sept 16 accompanied by ROC Perm Rep Liu, Amb Shen and other officials.² Conversation turned largely on need for ROC support in certain capitals and how it could be provided. Secretary put it plainly to Chow that with active (if behind-the-scenes) ROC support we can win, but without it we will lose.

2. Upshot of conversation was that ROC will lend support for both resolutions both in New York and in capitals although for reasons of internal politics this will be done in a very Chinese manner. Chow showed great concern that "instructions would be on the historic record, we can't put it black on white."

3. What ROC is saying so far is that "every country must make decision on the basis of its own national policy and ROC will understand if decision is taken in light of that country's own appreciation of interests of ROC and relations with US." We remonstrated that this is too sybilline and Chow said he understands the problem and will personally work actively in New York. He specifically acknowledged importance of obtaining co-sponsorships for our resolutions as well as voting support.

4. From foregoing it appears that for time being instructions to ROC Ambassadors will not yet be to urge host governments in so many words to support our (amended) DR resolution. However, they should allow ROC Ambassadors to answer affirmatively if host government asks if ROC agrees with US assessment that their support is necessary to prevent expulsion of the ROC; and if question is put to them whether ROC has any objection to host country support or co-sponsorship of the resolutions, ROC Ambassador should be able to reply in negative.

5. While this is not yet good enough, we also have assurance from Foreign Minister Chow in New York, where he will be from now on,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Herz, cleared by Moser and Pedersen, and approved by Herz. Sent to 34 posts in Central America, South America, and Africa, as well as to Taipei, Tokyo, and USUN.

² The meeting lasted from 11:35 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. and included Rogers, Pedersen, De Palma, Brown, Herz, and Moser. (Ibid., Private Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) A 12-page memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Exdis, 1971. Rogers reported the results of this meeting to Nixon in his evening report for September 16. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 36, President's Daily Briefing)

that he will be available personally to ambassadors of friendly countries who wish to take counsel with him. Accordingly, if host country remains in any doubt about ROC position after checking with ROC Ambassadors, it should be encouraged to make approach directly to ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai through UN delegation.

6. In the same conversation we also discussed the importance of not only defeating the Albanian resolution but also passing the Dual Representation resolution if, as may happen, the AR is put to a vote first and fails to get the necessary two-thirds majority. In such case some friends of ROC could lose enthusiasm for the DR resolution in the mistaken belief that danger of ROC had already been averted.

7. We went over this with Chow in some detail and found he completely understands that defeat of both AR and DR under such circumstances would be very bad indeed for the ROC; for if the DR fails there is bound to be a new move to unseat the ROC, possibly through credentials challenge, and there is little doubt there would then be large majority for such action. We thus have complete meeting of minds with ROC on importance that friends of the ROC understand that not only is passage of the IQ and defeat of the AR necessary to safeguard the ROC seat in the UN, but also passage of the Dual Representation resolution as well.

8. We realize that not all host governments are hesitant to vote for our resolutions out of misplaced concern for friendship with the ROC; some are ideologically opposed to any resolution that will bring the PRC into the UN, even if failure to vote results in expulsion of the ROC. However, we believe ROC Ambassadors can be useful in all of addressees.

9. You are specifically authorized to tell host government that we have had recent high-level review of UN voting situation with the ROC and they are in complete agreement with us that support for our two resolutions is necessary to prevent their expulsion from the UN. At this point in the process, their view is most likely to be expressed in terms of “understanding” if host govt decides to support or co-sponsor DR resolution with Security Council included.

10. If local ROC rep waffles on this or if host govt does not get the purport of what he is saying, you should encourage host government to seek confirmation through its UN Mission directly from ROC Foreign Minister Chow who has just arrived in New York and is making himself available for such questioning.

Irwin

408. Editorial Note

During a press conference on September 16, 1971, President Nixon received a question about a statement by Dr. Walter Judd, Chairman of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Judd had asserted that the expulsion of the Republic of China would not be legal under the UN Charter without a vote by the Security Council. The President replied that there were "different legal opinions" about the expulsion procedure.

"We, however, have reached the conclusion that the position we presently take, which has been stated by the Secretary of State and by Ambassador Bush, is the legally sustainable one.

"To put, also, our policy in clear perspective, we favor the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations and that will mean, of course, obtaining a Security Council seat.

"We will vote against the expulsion of the Republic of China, and we will work as effectively as we can to accomplish that goal." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*, pages 950-951)

409. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 17, 1971, 0345Z.

2712. Chirep: Cosponsors Meeting, Sept 16.

1. Summary. Reps of thirty-five Missions attended Chirep cosponsors' meeting at USUN Sept 16. Bush reviewed Chirep activities since cosponsors' meeting Aug 17, explaining US decision to accept others' recommendation that dual representation resolution must be revised

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Abidjan, Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Bangkok, Bangui, Bathurst, Bogota, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Canberra, Cotonou, Dakar, Dublin, Fort Lamy, The Hague, Gabarone, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Kampala, Kigali, Libreville, Lima, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Mbabane, Mexico City, Monrovia, Montevideo, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rome, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Suva, Tegucigalpa, Tokyo, Tunis, and Wellington.

to enable resolutions to succeed. Distributed revised text of DR.² Described ROC flexible reaction prior to DR revision and said we continuing to consult closely. Solicited statements of cosponsorship for IQ and DR. At same time, Bush made clear that we understood number of other governments needed more time to consider, that therefore we would consider that list not closed and that we fully anticipated additions to cosponsors' list prior to tabling early next week. Following said they would cosponsor IQ: Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Philippines and Swaziland. Following said they would cosponsor DR: Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Philippines and Swaziland. Colombia commitment conditional. Phils spoke especially strongly on behalf of reses. Australia and New Zealand, in similar statements, said they prepared in principle to cosponsor pending identification of others on list. Following asked questions or made other comments without discussing their willingness cosponsor: Belgium, Netherlands, Fiji, Thailand and Ghana. Japanese did not speak. Philippines reiterated request for revision of third operative paragraph of DR. We accepted revision. End Summary.

2. Following Missions represented at Chirep cosponsors meeting at USUN Sept 16: AR: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay; EUR: Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain; NEA: Turkey; EA: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand; AF: Botswana, Car, Chad, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Swaziland, Uganda, Fiji. Phillips, Bennett, Schaufele, PolCouns and MisOffs also present.

3. Bush opened meeting by reviewing events since last meeting Aug 17. He cited continuous consultations in New York and capitals, strong recommendations that representation resolution must be explicit regarding Security Council seat, our agreement to revision as only way to ensure maximum support for reses and preservation of ROC seat. Bush also reviewed ROC flexibility since Secretary's Aug 2 statement. Noted that ROC viewed situation realistically and understands, from closest consultations with US and others, why revision necessary. Mentioned ROC restraint since notified last week that we obliged to revise text.

4. Bush said we have delayed tabling resolutions to permit other govts ample time to consider them. Recognized need to table and an-

² Telegram 166117, September 10, which invited governments to this meeting, transmitted a message from the Secretary that informed the governments of a revision to the draft Dual Representation Resolution that recommended that the People's Republic of China be seated as one of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. The Secretary invited governments to join with the United States in co-sponsoring the revised resolution. (Ibid.)

anticipated doing so "by early next week". Said we already privately had word from number of govts that they would cosponsor both resolutions. Said we hoped reps would record at meeting their govts' willingness to cosponsor. Invited specific commitments or any other explanations of govts present positions. Said we aware some govts need more time to consider and we would expect, in addition to those speaking at meeting, that others would join us over next few days.

5. Bush distributed new text of representation resolution with first operative paragraph revised to read "hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

6. PolCouns (Newlin) provided summary of our attitude toward tactical questions. Anticipated that AR and US items would be merged under neutral heading; priority for IQ; question of priority for DR would be handled in light of existing situation. Would work to pass IQ, defeat AR and pass DR.

7. Anand (Thailand) asked about AR cosponsors tactical plans. Reply included statement that we had heard nothing about intentions in Credentials Committee and that we would seek to insure best composition with neutral chairman. Belgium, Netherlands and Fiji also asked questions about tactics. Ghana and Liberian reps asked about support from govts not represented at meeting.

8. Australia (McIntyre) first to respond to Bush's invitation to speak on cosponsorship, said GOA had taken no final or formal position on cosponsorship. Wants to cosponsor both, especially since the DR includes SC seat. GOA explaining position to many govts, soliciting their support and cosponsorship. GOA not inhibited in this direction. McIntyre said he believed IQ definitely winnable. Later in mtg, in response to Thai request for clarification of GOA position (as well as positions of New Zealand and Philippines), McIntyre repeated foregoing, adding that GOA only waiting to see what the final list of cosponsors looks like; meanwhile doing its best to encourage others to support. (Merrillees later verified to MisOff that he had made round of calls to other missions.)

9. New Zealand (Scott) in somewhat more positive statement than McIntyre, said New Zealand waiting to see number of other cosponsors, then New Zealand will be able to cosponsor. Revision enhances chances of successes. In later response to Anand's question, Scott rephrased to say that New Zealand prepared to cosponsor but final position will be taken in light of responses of other govts.

10. Philippines (Reyes), who made strongest supporting statement of meeting, said that change in DR was not easy decision for US to take. Phils had been among first to remark on weakness of original draft's ambiguity on SC seat. Basis of whole USG approach had been

to face up to reality. Phils aware of extreme difficulty Dual Rep policy faced in GA because of lack of precedents giving two seats to one state. Phil Govt feels should maintain seat of ROC and bring in PRC. Reyes said he authorized to state GOP would cosponsor both resolutions. (In his later response to Anand, Reyes added only that after USG accepted GOP recommendation it logical and fair that Phils cosponsor.)

11. Reyes then added that GOP believed DR operative para three may not cover all UN bodies. He suggested we insert ref to “all UN bodies”. Bush agreed to change op para three to read “recommends that all UN bodies and the specialized agencies take into account, etc”.

12. Colombia (Espinosa) said GOC supported admission of PRC while preserving ROC position. Two draft resolutions are carefully composed and well balanced statements for these purposes and GOC is prepared cosponsor. It can wholeheartedly support revised DR because it now clarifies SC seat question. GOC appreciates USG agreeing to revision. Associating self with GOA and New Zealand statements, said GOC would favor inscription of drafts with sufficient cosponsors to indicate strength. Asked that his delegation be kept currently informed of progress of draft reses. (In later conversation with MisOff, Espinosa said he surprised by failure Australia to make commitment to cosponsor in view of earlier private statement by McIntyre to effect GOA cosponsoring both reses. Espinosa added Australian and New Zealand cosponsorship would seem essential to any credible cosponsors list. Colombia would be happy to be included in such list.)

13. Chad (Ouangmotching) said in view of modification of DR, Chad would cosponsor that res. Position on IQ would be decided later. (Chad Del not informed of Fort Lamy 1681³ prior to meeting.)

14. Bush informed meeting that Honduras had authorized USUN to announce its cosponsorship of both reses.

15. Costa Rica (Molina) said Govt of Costa Rica would cosponsor both because wanted to preserve ROC seat while seating PRC in both GA and SC.

16. Haiti (Coradin) said he had received instructions just prior to meeting enabling him to state that GOH would support both reses provided they do not affect the interests of ROC and ROC’s continued participation in UN. Accordingly, Haiti would cosponsor both reses.

17. Swaziland (Dlamini) said position of his govt was that he is free to cosponsor both resolutions.

18. Bush said that he would not tell waiting press names of participants in meeting or identify cosponsors but would attempt make clear that we see significant forward movement in meeting. Reyes ex-

³ Not printed.

pressed appreciation for Bush's desire not to embarrass participants by giving press name lists. He added hope that delegations interested in fate of DR would come to decision ASAP. Failure to decide complicates public relations aspects of Chirep effort. Very fact that we unable to finalize and table reses or to indicate a definite date for tabling gives negative impression. At this stage, Reyes said, other side has psychological advantage because AR cosponsors known and resolution already tabled. Reyes said he appreciated difficulties with which other dels confronted but reiterated urgency of issue.⁴

Bush

⁴ Further reports on the September 16 meeting were sent to certain Latin American posts in telegram 172102 and to certain African posts in telegram 172118. (Both September 17; *ibid.*) The Department also urged the Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to make special efforts to persuade those countries to support the IQ and DR resolutions. (Telegram 172103 to Canberra and Wellington, September 17, and telegram 172259 to Tokyo, September 18; both National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

410. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 21, 1971, 0100Z.

2773. Subj: Chirep: UK Position.

1. Bush at SC luncheon Sept 20 again made strong pitch UK support US initiative on Chirep to maximum possible extent. Although we recognized UK had not supported us on substance in the past, it had been helpful on procedure. We very much needed UK support for such procedural aspects as inscription of US item, grouping it with AR under neutral formulation, priority for IQ. Colin Crowe said he still had no instructions on Chirep.

2. Just after lunch Crowe called to say UK position was as fols:

(A) UK would vote against IQ and DR.

(B) UK would have to vote for priority for AR (UKUN interprets this as voting against priority for IQ).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Taipei.

(C) UK would have to oppose inscription of US item if it came to the vote. (Crowe gave as his personal estimate that AR co-sponsors might not oppose inscription of US item.)

3. Bush said he “was ashen with dismay.” He said he would report foregoing to Dept immediately and he knew reaction would be one of surprise in view of UK undertaking that it would do nothing to make US task more difficult.

4. In subsequent telcon, Weir (UK) asked when in General Comite we would make motion to have items grouped under neutral title. We said we had not decided whether to do this at outset of consideration of Albanian item or to wait until Albanian item and US item inscribed and then propose grouping. Weir said his instructions did not yet cover this point.²

Bush

² Later in the day, the Department telegraphed Ambassador Annenberg and urged him to meet with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home at the earliest opportunity to seek to persuade him to vote for inscription of the U.S. item during the General Committee meeting. (Telegram 173141 to London, September 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) Douglas-Home agreed to review the British position and decided that, if the General Committee discussion was purely procedural, Ambassador Crowe could vote for inscription. Should the discussion turn substantive (dual representation), Crowe should vote against inscription. (Telegrams 8746, September 21, and 8777 from London, September 22; both *ibid.*) Annenberg’s analysis of Douglas-Home’s reasoning is in telegram 8792 from London, September 22. (*Ibid.*)

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, September 22, 1971, 1040Z.

9356. Subj: Chirep: PriMin Sato Announces Decision to Cosponsor.

Summary: At dramatic press conference arranged only minutes beforehand, PriMin Sato announced that GOJ would cosponsor reverse IQ and complex dual rep resolutions.² End Summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Canberra, Wellington, and USUN.

² Other posts were informed of Prime Minister Sato’s announcement in circular telegram 174849, September 22. (*Ibid.*)

1. In response to questions at impromptu news conference covered on national television at 11:30 a.m. Sept 22 PriMin explained his decision on cosponsorship as follows:

2. More and more countries are recognizing “People’s Republic of China”, and it can be foreseen that even more will do so in future. At present, 60 UN members recognize PRC and 57 UN members recognize GRC. Thus situation has changed completely, and we must have policy suited to changed realities. Therefore at this juncture we wish to invite PRC to UN and provide it seat as permanent member of Security Council. Simultaneously, based on our support of UN Charter, we believe expulsion of GRC is important matter which should require two-thirds majority. As opinions within party and government have been divided and as Japan, in contrast to US, is Asian neighbor of China, it has been necessary to act with great care and I have had difficulty reaching decision. I believe our policy must (1) suit Japan’s national interest, (2) be consistent with our one China policy—there is not one mainland China and one Taiwan but only one China—(3) avoid aggravating international tensions and (4) be in step with changing realities. It seems that appropriate policy is to support and to cosponsor complex DR and reverse IQ resolutions. In accordance with premise that China is one, this policy is transitional measure. As it recognizes present realities and does not attempt to change them, it will not aggravate international tension.

3. Question has been discussed freely within party and government; all have had opportunity to express their views. Majority opinion seems to be that Peking should be welcomed into UN, offered permanent seat on Security Council and that GRC’s position in UN should be preserved. Once that major decision made, I hope it will be understood that issue of cosponsorship is secondary, tactical question. Cosponsorship is consistent with our policy of support for these resolutions.

4. Today’s announcement is not just step forward, but actually great leap forward in our China policy. While recognizing existence of PRC, we have until now avoided referring to it directly and have sought to deal with it through a policy of separating economics and politics. That is now completely changed. This is positive step, and despite opposition, I as PriMin and party leader have made decision. However, it should not be thought that this will solve our bilateral problems, or that it is equivalent to recognizing or establishing relations with PRC. Some even more positive act will be required for that. We must work to build friendly relations with China, reflect upon our past history, recognize that deep misunderstandings exist and strive to build mutual understanding.

5. Should this approach at UN fail, question of political responsibility is complex one because outcome is determined by majority will in international forum. Thus it is not just the responsibility of a single Prime Minister or a particular Cabinet.

6. In front page commentary, all evening newspapers stressed fact that PriMin's decision on cosponsorship was made despite strong opposition even within LDP and Cabinet. *Asahi*, *Sankei* and *Tokyo Shim-bun* stressed that there is strong possibility that Sato Cabinet would be forced to resign if resolutions should fail at UN, particularly since vote in UN will take place during Diet session.

6. [sic] *Comment*. In deciding to cosponsor both resolutions, despite strong opposition within the LDP, Sato has made courageous decision calculated to demonstrate that he is strong leader who has grasped helm of his party and government. Sato acted in dramatic fashion by calling impromptu nationally-televised press conference solely for purpose of announcing major policy decision. Although he appeared somewhat fatigued, his manner was confident and resolute throughout.

7. Form and content of announcement designed to appeal directly through television to wider public audience in order win understanding for and defuse criticism of his decision. As the substance of the decision pleased pro-Taiwan elements, logic of his argument was shaped to appeal to opponents of resolution and cosponsorship. He portrayed decision as a major positive change in GOJ's approach to China, and as consistent with international trend towards bringing China into UN. He repeatedly used formal title "People's Republic of China" and emphasized that decision was fully consistent with GOJ's "longstanding" one China policy. He admitted Japan must self-reflect about its pre-war relations with China. For other listeners, he reiterated standard phrases about Japan's national interests and relaxation of international tensions. He avoided references to maintenance of international faith toward Taiwan and reality of two regimes in China—comments which would have given opponents handle for criticizing his logic.

8. Nowhere in statement did Sato refer to fact that US had pressed Japan to cosponsor or imply that this controversial decision was anything other than his own response to international imperatives and Japan's own national interest.

9. Deputy Political Editor of *Mainichi* told EmbOff immediately following announcement that consensus among news corps was that Sato by acting decisively and out of obvious personal conviction had applied a temporary brake to his declining power within LDP and to his crumbling prestige elsewhere in Japanese establishment. LDP US Problems Research Committee Chairman Naokichi Kitazawa echoed this appraisal shortly before his departure on mission to US, commenting that while there was still strong disagreement within LDP, Sato had gained full measure of respect for his decision.

10. There are rumors that Sato has come to tacit agreement with LDP factional leaders who oppose his Chirep policy to effect that he will step down if UN strategy fails. However, until then, as quid pro

quo, hounds will diminish their baying. This scenario given some credibility by statement by Masayoshi Ohira, one of leading candidates for Sato's job, that he "not surprised" by PriMin's decision and that he would "make no fuss" over issue of political responsibility.

Sneider

412. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 28, 1971, 2138Z.

2936. Subj: Chirep: Tactical Situation. Ref: State 175888.²

1. Now that GA plenary has voted to inscribe our Chirep item,³ our efforts here will be targeted, as indicated reftel, on support for four questions:

- A. Priority for Important Question resolution
- B. Adoption of IQ
- C. Defeat of Albanian Resolution
- D. Adoption of Dual Representation resolution.

2. Most governments have indicated positions on one or more of these questions, in some cases at highest level. However, in view of PRC's continuing skillful application of pressures and of intense Chirep activity in New York, we anticipate that alignment on all four issues will remain fluid until end. We thus cannot absolutely rely on constancy of some who have given us categorical assurances of support; nor should we take for granted opposition on all four issues by some, given application of pressures from ourselves and other co-sponsors, with which we are still at least able to discuss Chirep.

3. For purposes of handling problem here, we have broken down target list into categories below. We are using these categories as a basis for coordinated efforts by missions of Japan, New Zealand, Australia and USUN, supplemented by the ROC Mission.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² Telegram 175888, September 24, gave an estimate of the votes on the IQ and DR resolutions in the General Committee. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 2814 from USUN, September 23, informed the Department that the General Committee voted to inscribe the item on September 22 by a vote of 11-9-4. (Ibid.)

A. Co-sponsors of either resolution plus those whose full support seems certain (although listing in this category does not mean that we should take them altogether for granted): Australia, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, United States, Uruguay, plus Brazil, Ivory Coast, Khmer Republic, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Senegal, Upper Volta.

B. Conservatives whose support for all issues but Dual Representation seems assured (ROC démarches still required): Congo (K), Malagasy, Panama, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia. In addition, IQ co-sponsors El Salvador and Guatemala need shoring up on DR.

C. Support on all four questions seems unlikely although in some cases (see para 3-D below) we should continue to press for such support; in any event, we should continue seeking support for priority for IQ: Austria, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, UK.

D. Countries which may be leaning either way but which we should continue (in concert with allies) to press for support on all four questions: Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Car, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela.

Bush

413. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts¹

Washington, October 1, 1971, 0055Z.

180508. Subj: Chirep: Status Report and Action Program. For Chief of Mission or Principal Officer.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman and Herz; cleared by Fessenden, Moore, Davies, Brown, and Crimmins; and approved by Herz. Also sent to the POLADs for CINCPAC, CINCSO, CINCSTRIKE, CINCEUR, CINCLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, HICOMRY, USNMR SHAPE, COMAC, and HICOMTERPACUS.

1. This message is to bring you up to date on Chirep situation and to help in focussing our further efforts. We wish to stress the very high priority given our Chirep initiative at highest levels of USG as well as our desire that Chief of Mission give this matter their continuing personal attention, even where host govt decision seems firm. The votes may be close, and continuing efforts will be required world-wide to win the battle.

2. Message is in three parts: Part I is brief description of current status of our initiative and what we see as likely scenario over the next few weeks; Part II provides breakdown of how we believe countries are lining up and what actions are required; Part III recapitulates in brief the principal talking points given in previous circulars on Chirep.

3. Part I—Current Situation and Scenario

A. Both the Albanian and US items are now included on UNGA agenda. Our resolutions (IQ and DR) are tabled under both our own and the Albanian agenda items. Texts were transmitted to posts by State 175244.² The Albanian agenda item will come up for discussion first, but the debate will be wide-ranging and will cover all three resolutions.

B. We expect the Chirep debate to begin shortly after conclusion of the current General Debate period, probably on October 18 or 19. We expect debate to be fairly lengthy, expect the Albanian side will probably attempt a number of parliamentary maneuvers, and believe actual voting will take place in late October or early November.

C. Aside from whatever procedural maneuvering our opponents may attempt, there will be four major votes: (1) a motion for “priority”, which we will make, to have the Important Question resolution voted on before the Albanian Resolution is voted on; (2) the vote on the IQ itself; (3) the vote on the Albanian Resolution; (4) the vote on our DR resolution. If we lose on the first vote (priority for the IQ) we will probably lose on everything thereafter. If we lose on the IQ itself, the AR would pass by a simple majority.

4. Part II—The Line-up

A. Following information on positions being taken by countries is believed current as of the date of transmission, and is analyzed under three headings: how we believe countries are lining up on the matter of having the Important Question resolution voted on ahead of the Albanian Resolution (shorthand term: priority for IQ); how they stand on the IQ itself; how they stand on DR.

B. *Action to be taken by all posts:*

(1) If posts believe their country is incorrectly listed below, this should be reported to Dept with info to USUN, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington and Canberra.

² Not printed.

(2) In the “Believed Favorable” and “Decided For” categories we list countries that have told us they will vote with us and those countries we believe will almost certainly vote with us even though they have not yet said so. Experience shows that shifts and slippages can still occur in this category, even where govt has assured us of favorable votes. We are not encouraging you to reopen the dialogue (although an occasional expression of gratification that they and we are together on this issue may be helpful). Nevertheless, posts should be alive to note any changes in attitude and take whatever action seems appropriate to reinforce host government’s original resolve. In any case, should you notice any slackening or nervousness or tendency to back away from previous expressions of support, this should be immediately reported. Since votes may be close, we need to keep tabs meticulously on the likely voting behavior of all UN members.

(3) Where countries are indicated as “Believed Unfavorable” or “Decided Against”, and where this is not patently unreasonable, posts should work by all available means to persuade host govt to abstain rather than vote against our resolutions, and abstain rather than vote for the Albanian Resolution.

(4) Where countries are indicated as leaning in favor, leaning against or uncommitted, posts must make every effort to obtain vote in favor of having the IQ voted on before the Albanian Resolution; vote in favor of the IQ itself; vote against the Albanian Resolution, and vote in favor of DR. This also applies to countries in the “abstain” category.

(5) Dept welcomes post suggestions as to best tactics in dealing with individual countries, including recommendations for a personal message from the Secretary.

[Omitted here are Sections C and D with lists of countries and their probable votes on the IQ and DR resolutions.]

5. Part III—The Arguments Recapitulated

A. Principal arguments in favor of our resolutions:

a. Dual representation is the only fair solution to the Chirep problem. The AR would deprive 14 million people of representation in the UN.

b. It is reasonable and realistic: Both the PRC and ROC exist. The UN should take cognizance of realities. This does not imply approval or endorsement of any legal position.

c. There is no need for the UN to rule on PRC and ROC claims and counter-claims, nor need UN action affect the position which any member takes in its bilateral relations with either entity. In terms of assisting movement toward a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, the best contribution the UN can make is to serve as a mechanism which Taiwan and the Mainland can use to settle their problems peace-

fully. The extreme act of depriving the Republic of China of representation and driving it outside the UN would do the opposite.

d. If the ROC should be deprived of representation, this would be a dangerous precedent. Moreover, it would be something that the UN would probably be unable to undo (because once PRC is in Security Council, it would veto application of ROC as new member).

e. For neutrals: The Albanian Resolution is fundamentally un-neutral because it would settle issue brutally in favor of the stronger side. Our resolution does not propose to adjudicate in favor of the weaker; it would simply recognize existing situation and leave question to be worked out in future.

f. For supporters of universality: Passage of the Albanian Resolution would be a retrograde step from point of view of those who espouse ideal of universal UN membership.

g. We are making a determined effort to win. We are very serious in our resolve. This is a matter of importance to the United States.

6. Principal Counter-arguments to Objections

a. "There can be only one China, and DR implies two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan)". Not so. DR not only makes no statement about two Chinas, leaving question entirely open, it explicitly states that the solution proposed is without prejudice to a settlement of the conflicting claims of parties involved. Japan, for instance, in announcing co-sponsorship for our resolutions, made ringing affirmation of its position that China is one and must not be divided.

b. "ROC should remain, but under name of Formosa". It is conceivable that some day status of ROC may change, but we believe UN should be careful not to take a position on this. If it did, friends of PRC and ROC (both of whom are for "one China") would combine to defeat any such resolution. In addition, a resolution which described the ROC as "The government of Formosa" would be more distasteful to Peking than our present resolution.

c. "You are creating a new member, and new members must be admitted under Article 4 procedure." Not so, our DR resolution decides how China should be represented, it does not involve new membership. Admittedly, dual representation is unusual, but it is not unprecedented. USSR has triple representation.

d. "PRC will never come in under DR." How can anyone be so sure? It would be surprising if PRC did not proclaim at present that it will have nothing to do with UN if DR passes since to do otherwise would lose votes for the AR; but after DR resolution passes the PRC will be confronted with a new situation. PRC has shown that it can be flexible when that suits its interests. (In countries where this might be helpful, you could call attention to speculative stories from Hong Kong that Chou En-lai might come to UN "to take seat and wage fight from inside UN for

expulsion of the ROC." It is also possible that PRC might take the Security Council seat only for time being. There are many other possibilities.)

e. "We are afraid that if we vote against them, that will make the PRC angry." We wonder why friendly countries who are prepared to worry over the state of their relations with the PRC should not be at least as concerned about their relations with us.

7. Embassies should not hesitate to ask for instructions if anything in our position is not clear to them or if they hear arguments that are difficult to answer.

Irwin

414. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1971, 0200Z.

3059. Subj: Chirep—Co-Sponsors' Meeting October 1, 1971.

1. Summary: Chirep co-sponsors met briefly at USUN October 1. All co-sponsors represented except Colombia, Dominican Republic, The Gambia, Guatemala, Lesotho and Liberia. Bush provided Chirep status report; explained how both IQ and DR submitted September 29;² encouraged continued energetic proselytizing for our resolutions; stressing confidence that hard work would bring success; reviewed tactical prospects (including Zambian plan to apply two-thirds requirement to our DR); urged close liaison among co-sponsors: and solicited others' recommendations. Australia (McIntyre), New Zealand (Scott), Thailand (Anand) and Japan (Ogiso) all commented. End Summary.

2. Bush chaired forty-five-minute co-sponsors' meeting at USUN October 1. Following representatives attended: Australia, Chad, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Fiji, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand and Uruguay. Phillips, Bennett, Schaufele and MisOfs also present.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Bathurst, Bogota, Canberra, Fort Lamy, Guatemala, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Monrovia, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, and Suva.

² The Important Question draft resolution was submitted as UN doc. A/L.632 & add. 1.2. The Dual Representation draft resolution was submitted as UN doc. A/L.633 & add. 1.2. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, pp. 127–128, 136)

3. Bush opened by saying we assess Chirep effort to be in reasonably good shape. He recalled last week's 65-47 margin for inscription, recognizing that not all inscription supporters will support us in Chirep vote. Result of co-sponsors' work in New York and capitals beginning to show. Voting appears close now, but we convinced have excellent chance of winning. Zambia general debate proposal to apply two-thirds requirement to our DR implies AR co-sponsors concerned that our IQ will pass. Important we not slacken efforts. Secretary giving priority to Chirep in extensive New York bilaterals.

4. Bush described September 29 tabling of IQ and DR reses under Albanian item 93 and our item 96. Said we expected simultaneous discussion in plenary. Regarding Zambia general debate proposal, suggested we take line it absurd to apply two-thirds majority for continued representation of UN member; we have not sought apply two-thirds provisions to seating PRC and we puzzled by Albanian co-sponsors' wish to do so. Bush endorsed earlier Australian suggestion that in UN corridors we refer to IQ as "non-expulsion resolution" to strengthen psychological position. Bush concluded by specifying need to seek votes for (A) priority for IQ, (B) adoption of IQ, (C) defeat of AR and (D) adoption of DR.

5. McIntyre concurred in Bush's remarks, particularly that policy is "winnable." He noted that we should be prepared face various tactical problems. Scott suggested we be clear in lobbying whether we discussing priority for IQ and/or DR. Bush confirmed we not now planning seek priority for DR. Regarding timing of vote poll counts, Newlin said AR co-sponsors still want Chirep debate to begin as soon as possible after general debate which closes Oct 13. Tuesday, Oct 14, earliest possible beginning date. In subsequent discussion, including remarks by Ogiso and Anand, group seemed to agree that US preference for Oct 19 beginning is acceptable. Bush noted that (despite erroneous *New York Times* report that 100 speakers inscribed for Chirep debate) Legal Counsel Stavropulos had said there would be twelve sittings on Chirep, but we have no hard information on length of debate. Nevertheless, we preparing texts of our Chirep statements and others might also wish begin do so.

6. Scott suggested consider advisability of using universality argument to support Chirep resolutions; suggested we begin to prepare speakers' lists; urged co-sponsors avoid discussion with others of vote counts, advocating we stick to line simply that we will know vote count after vote is taken; pointed out that general debate statements of Soviets, Czechs and others said minimum about Chirep, indicating worry about internal PRC developments and desire to avoid unnecessary commitment.

7. Meeting closed with tentative agreement to reconvene October 8, at 9:30 A.M.

Bush

415. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 6, 1971, 0243Z.

3198. Subj: Chirep—Plenary Debate To Begin 18 Oct.

1. UN Legal Counsel Stavropoulos told us this afternoon that Albanian group has decided it wishes plenary to begin debate on Albanian Chirep item 18 Oct. (*Comment*: This is a good development; we had been concerned that Albanian cosponsors would try to insist on beginning A.M. 14 Oct following conclusion of general debate on 13 Oct.) Stavropoulos said USSR agrees. Stavropoulos will thus advise President Malik to announce for 18 Oct.

2. On length of debate, Stavropoulos reiterated difficulty of predicting how many sittings should be required but will repeat his earlier advice to Malik that 12 sittings should suffice. Assuming a tightest possible schedule of two sittings per day, Stavropoulos thus foresees earliest possible dates for voting on Chirep reses as 25 or 26 Oct.

3. Stavropoulos said that Soviets stated they have no objection to plenary taking up US Chirep item immediately following Albanian item. Albanian group had made no comment on US item. Stavropoulos thought Malik might not wish to propose that “plenary take up your item after the Albanian item.” He said that if Malik did not make a proposal of this character, “someone might do so from the floor”. (*Comment*: We purposely refrained from responding to this last point.)

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, October 8, 1971, 1357Z.

185067. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 180508.²

1. Request you raise Chirep issue in way you consider most appropriate with Permreps (i.e. individually or at Permreps' lunch), and emphasize overriding importance US ascribes to favorable vote on US resolutions in UNGA. In these discussions, you should draw as appropriate on arguments outlined in reftel. As reftel indicates there will be four key votes at end of Chirep debate: (a) priority for the IQ; (b) the IQ itself; (c) the Albanian Resolution; and (d) our Dual Representation resolution.

2. FYI—We are reasonably certain of support on all four votes only from Belgium and from Luxembourg. In addition, we are hopeful Greece and possibly Turkey will eventually decide to vote with us on priority, on IQ and on DR. Several members, notably Norway, Denmark, UK, France and Canada, believe themselves committed to support the Albanian Resolution and oppose IQ. In their case we are working mainly on obtaining support for priority for IQ although there is small chance that pressure in some cases will induce abstentions on IQ as well. Portugal may be persuaded to support the IQ, particularly if it is thinking of voting in favor of Albanian Resolution this year as we suspect (in their special case we might accept this as a trade-off). Dutch position still uncertain but we believe that they are leaning toward abstention. We should work on Dutch for affirmative vote on priority and on the IQ itself. We are hoping to persuade Iceland to vote in favor of priority for the IQ and for the IQ itself. We are attempting to persuade Italy to vote with us on all resolutions. End FYI.

3. We of course have been raising issues on continuing basis in all NATO capitals at highest levels and will continue to do so until vote. While some Permreps may consider Chirep issue peripheral to NATO affairs, expulsion of ROC could have destabilizing effect on security situation in Pacific. One purpose of your efforts will be to demonstrate extent of our concern, as shown by our effort to press our position in every available forum. Some NATO countries have impression we not making maximum possible effort. This impression is entirely incorrect

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Samuel B. Bartlett; cleared by Feldman, Fessenden, and Floyd; and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN and to all NATO capitals.

² Document 413.

as demonstrated by number and level of our démarches.³ Thus raising subject in NATO context will be yet another indication of US concern and should relay back to NATO capitals fact that we seeking all possible help from Allies and are determined to obtain favorable vote.

Johnson

³ Telegram 182445 to all posts, October 5, reviewed tactical considerations and sent detailed instructions for démarches to host governments, including advice to excerpt the portion of Secretary Rogers' October 4 speech before the General Assembly on the Chinese representation issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) For text of Secretary Rogers' speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1971, pp. 437–444.

417. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Status Report on the Chinese Representation Issue

As votes stand at the moment, we are neck-and-neck with the opponents of our approach to Chinese Representation in the United Nations. Although it is impossible to predict the final outcome because of the number of uncommitted or wavering votes, I would say that our prospects for success are just a little less than even. I have little doubt that we will win priority consideration for the Important Question Resolution. As for the vote on that resolution itself our present estimate is that we can count on about 52 votes in its favor, while our opponents have about 56 votes against. Whether the Important Question Resolution passes or not will be decided by how the remaining member nations vote, and my present judgment is that we have a better chance than our opponents of picking up some of those undecided votes if we make an urgent, high-level effort.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman and cleared by Herz, Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, and Pedersen. An attached memorandum of transmittal from De Palma and Green to Rogers is also dated October 12.

On the Albanian Resolution itself, our opponents can count on some 62 sure votes in its favor and could get as many as 70. If we manage to pass the Important Question Resolution, I am confident that we can muster a blocking third. We can be sure of 37 votes against the Albanian Resolution and may be able to increase that number by an additional 6 to 8 votes from among the undecided. Everything thus depends on picking up the necessary number for the Important Question, thus requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption of the Albanian Resolution.

The vote count on the Dual Representation Resolution is also close. We can count on some 45 votes in favor; our opponents can count on 47 firm votes against. However, if we manage to pass the Important Question Resolution and thus prevent passage of the Albanian Resolution, we should be able to obtain sufficient votes from those presently uncommitted (and possibly even from a few who will have voted against us earlier), to give us a small margin for victory. Clearly, everything hinges upon whether we can muster the extra votes needed to pass the Important Question Resolution.

My conversations with Foreign Ministers in New York and reports from our posts around the world indicate that countries are reluctant to commit themselves to support our initiative primarily for the following reasons:

(a) Interest in improving their own relations with Peking, especially now that we ourselves are moving toward normalization, and fear of being left behind. Peking is playing on the worries of such countries that failure to support entry on its terms will affect their relations.

(b) A belief that it is more important to see Peking seated in the UN than to prevent Taiwan's expulsion, and a conviction that Peking will not come in as long as Taiwan remains. All this is wrapped up in a great amount of legal argumentation, ranging from the specious to the sophisticated. Our task is to cut through the legalistic underbrush and down to the essentials.

Since launching our initiative on August 2, we have made a maximum effort around the world to build support and to counter the opposing arguments. I have urged that our ambassadors give this top priority, and as a result there have been repeated *démarches* in all countries where we have a diplomatic mission and the issue is not foreclosed. The Department has mobilized all its available resources. I myself have sent personal letters to 51 Foreign Ministers, and in New York held discussions so far with 68 Foreign Ministers or Chief Delegates. Ambassador Bush has been equally unstinting in his own efforts.

I would cite just two examples where despite our best efforts the situation looks unfavorable or is still in the balance, but where we should not take no for an answer.

1. *Mexico.* From the beginning, Foreign Minister Rabasa has been hostile to our resolutions and favorable to the Albanian Resolution. It is doubtful that our arguments reached President Echeverria. For a while it looked as if Echeverria were inclined to give us support, but apparently Rabasa convinced him otherwise. When Echeverria addressed the UN General Assembly he came out strongly against “dividing” China, which was widely interpreted as foreshadowing votes against our Important Question and Dual Representation Resolutions. I had a discussion with President Echeverria in New York, and found that Rabasa was doing most of the talking for him on this subject. Apparently Rabasa expects to produce a Mexican abstention as a concession to us, but we need an affirmative vote.

2. *Austria.* In the past six weeks alone, our Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister, the Chancellor and the Chef de Cabinet, and has written to the Chancellor. Other Embassy personnel called on senior people in the Austrian Foreign Ministry three times. In Washington we had three discussions with the Austrian ambassador and two informal talks with the Foreign Minister. Finally, I had an intensive session with the Foreign Minister in New York. All he would say was that his government would give further study to our Important Question Resolution. At the same time, the Foreign Minister said that Austria is prepared to vote in favor of the Albanian Resolution.

The debate on Chinese Representation is scheduled to begin October 18, and the first votes are likely to be taken about a week later. It is my judgment that we must bring about ten more nations to our side on the Important Question Resolution to assure its adoption. If we cannot do this, we must expect to see the Important Question defeated, in which case the Albanian Resolution will pass and the Republic of China will be expelled from the United Nations.

In an effort to maximize our chances, I will shortly recommend a few carefully timed Presidential messages for your signature, to be despatched to selected countries whose votes could make the difference between success and failure.

William P. Rogers

418. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 14, 1971, 0246Z.

3479. Subj: Chirep—Cosponsors Inner Group Meeting October 13.

1. Bush chaired half-hour meeting October 13 with core group of Chirep cosponsors: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines and Thailand, plus ROC. This was first time that Chinese (represented by Ambassadors Liu and Hsueh, plus directors Che and Chien) attended meeting with cosponsors this year. Principal purpose of meeting was to stimulate increased sense of (and actual) participation in Chirep efforts, particularly on part of Thai and Philippines. They have not been engaging in same intensive consultations and exchanges of information with US as case with Japan and ROC and to lesser extent Australia and New Zealand.

2. Meeting chaired by Bush characterized by general exchanges regarding psychological atmosphere on Chirep, summary discussion of grey-area countries requiring special work, need to clarify procedural matter with less sophisticated cosponsors, significance of Congressional activity, etc. At close of this session, Bush invited delegates desiring more detailed discussion with USUN working level to remain. We pleased to find that both Anand (Thailand) and Yango (Philippines) chose to remain, along with Ambassador Liu and other delegations' staffs, for detailed consideration, inter alia, of how each might assist in most effective coordinated approaches to score of uncertain delegations here.

3. Of some interest to Canberra and Wellington might be byplay, during discussion of need to persuade more friendlies to speak during Chirep debate, between New Zealand and Australian staffs, with former twitting latter for failure to inscribe. Australians obviously embarrassed. Later in day, Australia did inscribe to speak (septel). Thailand has not yet inscribed.

4. Regular weekly cosponsors' meeting scheduled for October 15.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

419. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 14, 1971, 2341Z.

Secto 192/3549. Following is Noform, FYI only, uncleared and subject to revision on review.

Memorandum of conversation: FM Chow (Republic of China) October 14, 1971; 12:30 PM 35A Waldorf. Chirep.

1. Participants: Republic of China—FM Chow, Ambassador Liu, Dr. Chien; US—The Secretary, Mr. Pedersen, Mr. DePalma, Mr. Murphy (reporting officer).

2. Summary: FonMin Chow requested public statement by President Nixon on Chirep and suggested that if IQ fails and AR is adopted we should consider taking expulsion case to Security Council where veto applies. The Secretary observed that US veto on this might be overturned, and Chow agreed but said at least it would look like we tried. Chow also requested Presidential letter to Botswana. The Secretary said we still expect to win on the IQ. End Summary.

3. FonMin Chow expressed appreciation for the Secretary's hard work on behalf of the ROC, but said our enemies are spreading rumors that the White House is working at cross purposes, and this greatly disturbs those who are still undecided. He requested that the Secretary discuss with President Nixon a statement of Presidential support for our efforts on Chirep. The Secretary said the President had already made a strong statement to Moro and asked which countries were most affected. Chow said some Latin American and African countries, particularly Panama and Mexico, who say the lack of a White House statement on Chirep shows the US is not sincere. The Secretary said something will be done about this, and Chow pointed out that he felt a *public* statement from the President was required.

4. Chow said our two Missions have been working closely together, and we should maintain confident attitude. At same time he asked if the US had a fall-back position in case our present program fails. The Secretary said he did not think there was one, and asked if Chow had one. Chow stated that of course the ROC cannot even mention such a thing for the other side would spread damaging rumors, and that they could not show any sign of weakness, but that they were thinking, if they lose on the IQ and the AR is adopted then the US is

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 302, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the telegram indicates it was sent to Kissinger.

released from its commitment to get the PRC in the SC and keep the ROC in, he felt the matter would then revert to the issue of expulsion. He wondered if we would cite Article 6 of the UN Charter on expulsion of a member and fight the battle in the SC, where the US could veto. The Secretary asked if this was based on grounds that the AR refers to expulsion and the Charter requires a 2/3 vote, and Chow agreed, saying that Article 6 also applies. Mr. DePalma pointed out that the AR refers to expulsion of a representative rather than a member and that, in any event, the question was where we could find the votes.

5. The Secretary asked about the procedure on credentials, and wondered why this procedure was not being used by the other side. He observed that they had by-passed the traditional method of testing credentials. Mr. Pedersen remarked that we had never wanted to argue on those grounds because the Credentials Committee goes by majority vote. He commented that the Soviets take the position that representation matters should not go to the Credentials Committee, which can only check the signatures of FonMins on credentials, and added that we have essentially gone along with that position. Mr. Pedersen remarked that the PRC has never attempted to present any credentials and FonMin Chow observed that this time they would do so.

6. The Secretary commented that the difficulty with the fall-back position dealing with credentials in the GA is that the final vote on representation would be settled by a majority rather than 2/3. Mr. Pedersen observed that FonMin Chow was considering this a case of expulsion requiring action by the SC, rather than one of representation. Chow said this year the AR resolution is vaguely worded, and is in violation of Article 18 of the Charter. Mr. Pedersen remarked that if we cannot get enough votes to win on the IQ, we cannot sustain that this is a representation issue either, as some of our votes will desert us in a credentials fight. Chow said if there were not enough votes, then we should consider a veto in the SC. The Secretary said we had talked about this, before. A US veto could be appealed as being on a procedural item, and would probably be overturned. FonMin Chow said it would be important for ROC public opinion that the US will do all it can, even to a veto, and at least if we then lose they will know the US really tried its best. The Secretary said he would think about this, but observed that it could be very difficult for the US to use a veto under the circumstances, and added that we still expected to win on the IQ.

7. Asked about Botswana, Chow said he received their FonMin in Taipei and everything was fine, but he has now changed his position. The Secretary said the Botswana Ambassador at the UN probably changed the mind of the FonMin, and observed that this pattern occurs often at the UN. Ambassador Liu said some African states are under the influence of the more truculent Africans like Zambia and are

influenced by rumors creating doubt that the White House fully supports present US efforts on Chirep. FonMin Chow suggested that a letter to the President of Botswana from President Nixon would help. The Secretary commented that the FonMin now said Botswana would abstain on the IQ, but the Ambassador was not in sympathy with this. Asked about Bhutan, Chow said it was influenced by India, and the Secretary remarked that it might abstain on the IQ. Ambassador Liu said the UK and others are saying the IQ is an attempt to delay PRC entry into the UN, and this convinces many other nations to vote against it. Chow also asked if the AR could be amended, if we fail on the IQ and the Secretary replied that that was a possibility. Mr. Pedersen said we still think we will win on the IQ, and the Secretary pointed out that Indonesia will be for us. Mr. Pedersen added that two individuals on the other side have said they now believe their side will lose on the IQ. It was agreed that we would give future consideration to possible fall-back positions if our present program fails and that this would be done in strict confidence so as not to cast any doubt on our expectation of winning.

Rogers

420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 16, 1971, 0054Z.

3608. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning.

1. Japanese, Australians, ROC and New Zealand have all approached us on desirability of contingency planning against possibility we fail to carry IQ by a few votes.² All are aware of extreme sensitivity of any such planning since any leaks on the subject would undermine our ongoing efforts to round up votes for priority, for IQ, for DR and for negative votes on AR. At same time, Ministers wish to be assured that every possible effort will be made to retain seat for ROC. Above Missions believe that such planning best done in New

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.

² Telegram 3574 from USUN, October 15, reported on an October 14 meeting between Hsueh and a Mission officer on a fallback position if the IQ resolution failed. (Ibid.)

York and that it should be in general terms to avoid firm positions which might not fit precise contingency that arises.

2. Following are our preliminary views on fallback positions on which we would like Dept's reactions as soon as possible. Once our general lines are set, we would plan to discuss in first instance with Japan, Australia and New Zealand. After three of us are agreed we could then bring in ROC.

3. Amendments to AR. Australians are under some pressure from Canberra to urge consideration of substantive amendments to AR along lines previously discussed with us (USUN 2507).³ Neither we nor Australian Mission are attracted to this approach. If we do not have the votes to obtain priority and adoption of IQ, we would, in effect, turn it into the DR.

4. Votes by division on AR. Weakest point in AR is expulsion language: "And to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related with it." If, prior to the first vote (vote on priority), it is reasonably certain that we will not be able to carry IQ, we should ask an African who is not a cosponsor (Tunisia, Ghana) to request a separate vote on the expulsion language. Such a request would be opposed but we would stand a chance of winning a motion for a separate vote and a somewhat lesser chance of defeating the expulsion phrase. If expulsion is deleted, we should abstain on a truncated AR. We should not seek separate votes on other objectionable words in the AR such as "the only legitimate representatives of China in the UN." We would not have even a slim chance of deleting these words and an unsuccessful attempt would critically damage the interpretation that we would seek to apply to a truncated AR.

5. Interpretation by President. If it appears likely that we will have to resort to a vote by division on the AR, we should inform GA President Malik of our intention and urge him, in event we are successful, to rule on basis of logic that a truncated AR means ROC seat is retained since GA had rejected a proposal for expulsion. Malik likely refuse to make such controversial ruling, in this event we would have to seek some other way to have our interpretation accepted by GA. We would also have to have assurances from ROC that it would not walk out if a truncated AR were to be adopted.

6. Decision to press DR to vote. If expulsion is deleted from the AR and we sustain a reasonably satisfactory interpretation, we should

³ These amendments, transmitted in telegram 2507, September 21, would soften the wording of the Albanian Resolution (AR) by changing the phrase "restoration of the lawful rights" of the People's Republic of China to "representation." (Ibid.)

not press the DR to the vote if it appears that it might be defeated. If we are confident that the DR will carry even after adoption of a truncated AR, we should press it to the vote.

7. Attempt to apply IQ to DR. In spite of Zambia's statement, we understand AR cosponsors are divided on whether to try to apply the IQ to the DR. At present, we believe we have a reasonably good chance of defeating such a motion if submitted. However, if it appears that a large number of countries who vote for our IQ, and who do not wish to have to vote on DR in its present form, will vote for IQDR as part of a balancing act, we should consider revising our DR to drop op paras two and three.

8. Miscellany. As long as it appears that we have a good chance of winning the IQ, we should discourage any delegation from seeking a vote by division on the AR. (Of course some delegation over which we have no influence could make this motion at any time prior to the voting.) Finally, as long as we are reasonably certain of winning the IQ, we should discourage any movement in direction of a moratorium or postponement.

Bush

421. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 19, 1971, 0150Z.

3658. Subj: Chirep: First Day Roundup.

1. First day of Chirep debate got off to reasonably good start from our point of view but produced major surprise when Baroody (Saudi Arabia) submitted amendments to AR and announced he hoped to submit amendments to DR as well.

2. AR cosponsors decided to forego rumored procedural challenges. At outset, GA Pres Malik announced opening of debate on Item 93 and noted three resolutions (AR, IQ and DR) had been submitted. During statements by Albania and Algeria, which immediately followed Malik remarks, neither of them sought to challenge consideration of IQ and DR under Item 93.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

3. When in course of his statement Ambassador Bush formally moved priority for IQ, this also was not challenged.²

4. It was interesting that during Albanian speech Soviet seat was occupied by a Counselor. During Ambassador Bush's statement, ranking Soviet Rep, Ambassador Mironova, showed up.

5. In addition to usual congratulations of cosponsors on Ambassador Bush's speech, several middle grade Soviets volunteered that it had been "excellent." A senior French diplomat described it as "wonderful."

6. In late afternoon, Baroody, without consultation with us, went to rostrum to propose a series of amendments to AR. (For text see sep-tel.) The most important of these (to op para three) would have the GA decide on a "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy and would justify latter on basis of self-determination. Baroody said neither AR nor DR were perfect and said he "hoped" to have some amendments to DR later on.

7. In response to press queries re amendments we have been saying that we were not consulted and that we were as surprised as everyone else, and that amendments are obviously important and will require careful study. On background we are noting that Saudi Arabia amendments take a "one-China, one-Taiwan" position which our DR is careful not to do.

8. We are confident that the AR cosponsors as well as the ROC will reject Baroody's amendments and that he will come under pressure not to press his amendments to the vote. As for his intentions re the DR, he told us after the session that he was "still thinking."

9. *Comment:* We assume Baroody thinking of submitting amendments to DR which will also refer to self-determination. Ambassador Bush will see Baroody October 19 and will try to ascertain his intentions. If opportunity presents itself, we intend to discourage him from presenting formal amendments to DR. Assuming Baroody's amendments are not pressed to vote, scenario is set as we wished: vote on priority, IQ, AR, and finally DR.

10. We heard 12 speakers plus Baroody October 18. As of now, additional 56 inscribed and list will close October 20. GA President and Stavropoulos anticipate general debate will occupy remainder of this week. Monday, October 25, they presently anticipate will be taken up by explanations of vote before the vote. Tuesday, October 26, could largely be occupied with procedural maneuvers and vote could come

² Bush's statement at the start of the debate is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 15, 1971, pp. 548-552. Reporting on the General Assembly debates on October 20 and 21 is in telegrams 3729 and 3759 from USUN, October 21 and 22, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday, October 27. This is preliminary timetable and it could slip as more speakers are added.

Bush

**422. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

UN Chirep Situation

This issue is still very much in doubt. There will be four crucial votes:

(1) Our so-called "priority motion" (to get our Important Question voted before the Albanian Resolution): We expect to win this one. State's current forecast is 63 yes, 54 no, and 13 abstentions.

(2) The Important Question Resolution itself: We're still slightly behind. State's latest headcount shows 58 yes, 55 no, and 18 abstentions. This is the vote upon which all else will depend.

(3) The Albanian Resolution: The opposition will certainly get a big majority. But if we can pass the I.Q., they will be well short of the required two thirds. State's forecast is 71 yes, 45 no, and 14 abstentions.

(4) The Dual Representation Resolution: State's current headcount is 55 yes, 56 no, and 19 abstentions. If the I.Q. passes, however, thus blocking the Albanian Resolution, we expect to pick up the votes of some who will then see Dual Representation as the only effective way to admit the PRC.

So, our whole effort turns on passing the Important Question Resolution. We are still working on the following countries, some of whom we are trying to switch from an abstention to a yes vote, and some from a no vote to an abstention.

Special Category

Ireland—Abstaining and we want a yes. The Foreign Minister is against us, and the President is angry because of the air route dispute.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN October–November 1971, Vol. VIII, Part 4. Secret. Sent for information. This memorandum is stamped: "The President has seen." A covering memorandum from Wright to Haig is dated October 20.

We have sent a Presidential interest message, got Speaker McCormack and Majority Whip O'Neill to send a cable, and asked the Vatican to help. Still the Irish vote is uncertain. A message indicating a willingness to be flexible on the upcoming air route negotiations might give President Lynch what he needs to switch the Irish vote. Peter Flanigan has agreed that this minimum commitment is acceptable.²

Israel—Incredible as it seems, the Israelis have adamantly and ostentatiously refused to commit themselves. That fact, plus the open opposition of such close friends as the UK and Canada, continue to hurt us badly, for it leads many to suspect that we are not really serious after all. We could, assumedly, get Israeli supporters on the Hill to make a useful intervention, but Joe Sisco has vetoed that idea.³

Latin American States

Argentina—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a message attesting to your personal interest. We are also trying to get Brazilian President Medici to intervene with President Lanusse.

Ecuador—Abstaining and we want a yes vote.

Mexico—Abstaining and we want a yes. We have sent a Presidential interest message to Echeverria, with the results not yet clear.

Peru—Peru is voting no and we would like an abstention.

Trinidad—They are abstaining and we want a yes vote.

NATO Allies

Italy—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. Graham Martin is putting the big heat on. Your conversation with Moro helped. If we can get Italy in time, we can use it to help turn others such as Argentina, Turkey, and the Netherlands.⁴

Netherlands—They are abstaining and we want a yes. We have sent a Presidential interest message but the result is not yet clear.

Portugal—Now an abstention, we want a yes. Their problem, of course, is Macao on the Chinese mainland.

Turkey—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message.

Norway, Denmark, Iceland—All voting no, and we want abstentions. The Nordic countries—NATO and otherwise—are voting as a bloc, and are voting against us. We have pushed Norway, Denmark, and Iceland hard, but so far to no avail. The Nordics are voting against us even on priority for the I.Q., which seems excessive by any standards. They are

² Nixon's handwritten comment in the margin reads: "Flanigan, give them routes."

³ Nixon wrote "OK" in the margin.

⁴ Nixon wrote "Italy + US should not be against" in the margin.

supporting Max Jakobson of Finland to succeed Secretary General U Thant, and Jakobson has been rock hard on the Chirep issue. (His candidacy is reputed to have Peking's support.) The Nordics have agreed to let Finland determine their vote on priority. It would be playing the game hard, but it seems to me that the time has come discreetly to let the Nordics and Jakobson know that the solid Nordic opposition to us is not going to help Jakobson's candidacy. Such a move might get their support on priority and get one or two Nordic votes for the I.Q., while they save their virginity with Peking by all voting for the Albanian Resolution. George Bush will know best whether this approach is worth trying.

Africa

Botswana—Abstaining and we want a yes. Botswana is a country for which we have done much recently and we applied great pressure to get their vote. President Seretse Khama has, however, turned us down flatly.⁵

Burundi—Voting no and we want an abstention. The Foreign Minister seems to be over-ruling the President on the Chirep issue and it is a country for which we do nothing and therefore have little leverage except good will.

Cameroon—Voting no and we want an abstention. No apparent leverage here, and the chances for a switch seem bleak.

Ghana—Abstaining and we want a yes. We have a good chance here. President Busia is coming to the United States in several weeks and badly wants to call on you. A message giving him the meeting and expressing your personal interest in this issue would probably turn the trick. We have been trying to get approval of an office call for the last week.⁶

Kenya—Voting no and we want a yes vote or an abstention.

Morocco—Abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message to King Hassan.

Togo—Abstaining but still considering a yes vote.

Uganda—Voting no and we want an abstention. We lost ground in Uganda when we refused President Amin's request for an office call on you. The circumstances are not promising for a Presidential message or for a switch in the Uganda position.

Miscellaneous

Austria—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message.

⁵ Nixon wrote "No more aid" in the margin.

⁶ Nixon wrote "No, unless a vote" in the margin.

Laos—Now abstaining. Presidential message should do it, however.⁷

Malta—You are receiving the new Maltese Ambassador Thursday. If you could press him for support on the I.Q. vote, it might work.⁸

[1 paragraph (1½ lines of source text) not declassified]

⁷ Nixon wrote "Cold Turkey" in the margin.

⁸ Nixon wrote "Done" in the margin.

423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, October 20, 1971, 2348Z.

192811. Subj: Chirep.

Please ask to see FonMin with view to seeking UK support in Chirep debate on at least one procedural issue. We are not seeking to re-open UK position on the several resolutions that will be put to the vote in the next few days. But we do believe UK need not oppose us on procedural aspects of the issue.

UK help would be beneficial to us, while not incompatible with the UK position on the resolutions themselves, in assuring that GA takes decision on the Important Question resolution before it proceeds to vote on the Albanian resolution. We will make a formal motion to this effect and expect that it will be put to the vote.

Priority for the Important Question resolution, while having psychological significance, is essentially a matter of proper parliamentary procedure. It is only reasonable that the General Assembly should decide whether the Albanian Resolution can or cannot be adopted by a simple majority before proceeding to the vote on the Albanian Resolution itself. That is how the issue has invariably been decided in the past, and issue would have to be decided before effect of vote on Albanian Res could be announced in any case. USG therefore hopes that when our motion is made, British delegation will be able to vote with us on this limited point. We would hope UK could so vote even if it felt it necessary to make clear that that vote was without prejudice to UK position on the resolutions themselves.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Feldman and Pedersen; cleared by Herz, Scott George, and Curran; and approved by Pedersen. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Tokyo.

Secty appreciative of the fact that Sir Alec has endeavored not to make our task in the UN on this issue more difficult (although knowledge of extreme firmness of UK and Canadian positions has been our most difficult obstacle in getting votes). But much as a British vote against inscription of our item would have created what would seem to be unnecessary difficulties for us, so would a vote against priority. Such a vote would signal British opposition to our position even down to procedural details.

Sentiment in the United States—both among the public and in Congress—about the preservation of the Republic of China’s seat has been growing. We have not artificially stimulated this sentiment; it is real, as UK Embassy undoubtedly has reported. We hope UK could take this factor into account in its decision also, for such sentiment could result in a considerable diminution of our ability to improve the UN and other international institutions.²

Rogers

² On October 22 the Department informed the Embassy in London that Secretary Rogers had met with Lord Cromer on October 21, and Cromer assured him that the United Kingdom was not “lobbying” against the U.S. position. (Telegram 194614 to London, October 22; *ibid.*)

424. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 21, 1971, 0239Z.

3715. Subj: Chirep—Fallbacks.

1. After repeated and insistent requests by Australia, NZ and Japan, we agreed to informal meeting at staff-level afternoon October 20 to hear preliminary views of others on fallbacks. Participants were: for Australia, Cumes (Canberra) and Merrillees (Mission); for Japan, Amau (Tokyo) and Kawakami (Mission); for NZ, Harland (Wellington) and Small (Mission); for US, Newlin (briefly), Reis and Thayer.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.

2. Australian, Japanese and NZ positions ranged over the lot, e.g., Cumes said that in event of failure of priority or IQ, Canberra is thinking of first moving for a separate vote on beginning of AR operative para to seat PRC, and thereafter for a second separate vote on expulsion end of that para. When questioned, he said Australia wants separate vote on PRC-seating so as to be able to demonstrate genuine character of GOA desire for PRC entry into UN. Stressing we without instructions we replied our initial reaction to Australian suggestion was it was risky in the extreme; PRC-seating part would probably receive large majority, bedlam would follow, many who would in a more tranquil atmosphere like to show their opposition to expulsion provision of AR would be intimidated, and adoption of expulsion provisions would be likely result. Japanese and NZ likewise had strong reservations. At other extreme, Harland said Wellington believes there no chance of deleting expulsion provision in event priority of IQ were to fail; they see no point in moving for separate vote on expulsion. Australia said, sharply, that in view of tremendous Chirep efforts, they could not understand NZ unwillingness to try for separate vote. Japan took similar view.

3. We were able to bring inconclusive discussion to an end by noting that only situation thus far discussed was possible amendment of AR or vote by division. We would need at an appropriate time to turn our thoughts to other questions such as what to do in event priority and IQ succeed but we estimate DR unable to win. We also briefly drew attention to Saudi Arabian amendments in such a way as to indicate personal view that they might offer some possibilities that should not be dismissed out of hand.²

4. Cumes also noted GOA had suggested possibility of extensive detailed amendments to AR.

5. *Comment:* Above thoughts of Canberra underline need for us to consult, on basis Dept's views, with GOA, NZ, and Japan on contingencies at early date.

Bush

² Telegram 193137, October 21, advised Bush that if the IQ succeeded and the AR failed and there were not enough votes to pass the DR, USUN could seek a delay to allow time for canvassing for more votes. Alternatively, the DR could be modified by deletion of its second and possibly third paragraphs. If the IQ failed, USUN could endorse Baroody's amendment to the AR or seek to delete that part dealing with expulsion. ROC proposals to rely on Articles 6 (expulsion of a member required recommendation by the Security Council) or 18(2) (expulsion of a member was an important question and required a 2/3 majority) were considered unworkable. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

**425. Memorandum for the President's Files by the President's
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹**

Washington, October 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Secretary William Rogers, Ambassador George Bush,
and Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Friday, October 22, 1971 at 2:15 p.m.
The Oval Office²

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary William Rogers
Ambassador George Bush
Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig

The President opened the meeting by informing the group that he wished to review the status of the vote line-up prior to United Nations consideration of the UN Chinese representation issue.³ Secretary Rogers commented that he was very concerned about the timing of Dr. Kissinger's return from Peking. He felt that should Dr. Kissinger arrive on Sunday or just before the UN vote on Monday, it could have a most deleterious impact on the outcome of the vote. Ambassador Bush endorsed Secretary Rogers' view, noting at the same time that Dr.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memcons, President's File, October–November 1971. Secret; Sensitive.

² The meeting ended at 3 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) A recording of the meeting is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, October 22, 2:05–3:00 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 599–17.

³ Nixon and Kissinger wanted the Department of State to take the lead on the UN fight and had told Bush to "fight hard" to keep the ROC in the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, September 30, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) Nixon asked Rogers to handle the UN issue: "I think getting me involved puts in too direct a deal, particularly when we're working out the Peking, too direct in the case that we'll try to play it as if we're playing it against Peking, which is really not the case." (*Ibid.*, October 17, 6:13–6:26 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 11–105) On another occasion Nixon said that he wanted to avoid personal involvement in the UN issue and to enable Rogers to gain support from conservatives for the Secretary's role in attempting to keep the ROC in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, October 14, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18)

Kissinger's trip had cast an ambivalent cloud on the UN vote.⁴ In some cases it appeared to suggest a U.S. cynicism with respect to our concern about Taiwan's continued membership. On the other hand, it also confirmed among the eastern bloc and the Communist supporting nations that China as well might not have the strong view that expulsion of Taiwan was essential.

General Haig stated that he did not believe Dr. Kissinger's return would have a deleterious impact on the UN vote and that in sum the impact of Dr. Kissinger's visit was neutralized on both sides of the voting ledger.

President Nixon then said that in any event it would be well if General Haig informed Dr. Kissinger immediately that he should delay his return to Washington so as to arrive after the UN vote had been taken. The President suggested that Dr. Kissinger lay over in Hawaii or in Alaska for the purpose of rest so that his arrival could be effected quietly following the vote. General Haig retorted that this kind of a layover would appear contrived to the press and might give credence to rumors that the trip was connected in some way to the U.S. attitude on the UN vote. Secretary Rogers strongly disagreed with General Haig and stated that Dr. Kissinger's arrival before the vote would definitely influence the attitude of many fence-sitting nations. The President

⁴ The timing of the UN vote on Chinese representation and Kissinger's second trip to the PRC became a source of concern as it became apparent that the vote would be held in late October rather than in November, earlier than U.S. officials had anticipated. In numerous conversations, Nixon and Kissinger wondered whether the trip would reduce the chances for the ROC remaining in the United Nations. On September 30 Kissinger concluded that "I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think objectively it effects the votes of anybody." Nixon responded: "I know, no, I know that. People will use things for excuses." They also debated attempting to change the date of Kissinger's trip to China, but felt that going to the PRC immediately after the defeat in the United Nations would be even more difficult. Ultimately, Kissinger felt that there was little chance of winning the UN vote: "I mean I thought as long as we were going to lose we were better off losing on the old stand. But, I think we're farther behind than they [Department of State officials] think. You have to consider that these diplomats when they talk to us, they'll try to make it sound as good as possible. Why annoy us 4 weeks before the vote?" (Ibid., September 30, 2:25-2:50 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582-3) On October 12 Jeanne Davis sent the following language to Eliot for distribution to all posts: "You may be asked by host governments about ChiRep implications of Kissinger trip to Peking at end of this month. If so, you should stress that sole purpose of trip is to make arrangements for Presidential visit and that there is no connection between Kissinger trip and ChiRep issue. The U.S. is firmly supporting the continued membership of the ROC in the UN." (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, China Trip, October 1971) Nixon was only slightly more optimistic on future of the ROC in the United Nations, stating on one occasion: "My idea is that the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, shouldn't be this year, it's not good for the Chinese." (Ibid., White House Tapes, October 14, 3:05-5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289-18)

directed that General Haig instruct Dr. Kissinger to lay over in either Hawaii or Alaska so as to return following the vote.⁵

The group then proceeded to review the status of those countries whose vote would be unfavorable on the Chirep issue or whose vote at that time was uncertain. Secretary Rogers urged the President to make direct communications with certain heads of state either telephonically or by written message. The President agreed that he would make certain telephone calls. Included among these would be a call to the President of Mexico, a special message to the President of Argentina, a call to the President of Italy, and a call to the King of Morocco.

The question was then debated as to whether or not the President should intervene personally in the case of the Irish. The President decided that this would not be an effective move and noted that the current Irish attitude was closely linked to the airlines problem. If the Irish were to vote against us in the United Nations, despite our urging up to now, it could not but have a serious impact on our attitude on airline rights negotiations. He wanted this thought clearly conveyed to the Irish and at the same time he wanted it clearly conveyed that were their vote to be favorable we would take this into consideration in deciding the airlines issue.

The President stated that he was appalled that certain African countries who had received our support consistently were apparently going to vote against us in the United Nations. He instructed Secretary of State Rogers to move promptly with respect to those countries with whom the United States had "clout."

Following the discussion of the status of the United Nations vote, Secretary Rogers observed that the vote was very tightly balanced and that at that point in time the United States might win or lose by one vote. He was somewhat optimistic that the U.S. would win by one vote. The President commented that he was somewhat less optimistic but in any event it would be important to use that day's meeting to further emphasize the President's personal interest in the outcome of the vote. For this reason he suggested that Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush accompany him into the Rose Garden where they might be photographed by the press to insure that all understood there was a high-level meeting to discuss the outcome of the United Nations vote on the Chinese representation issue.

⁵ The October 20–26 messages exchanged between Kissinger in Peking and the White House are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

426. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 22, 1971, 0440Z.

3760. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning. Ref: State 193137.²

1. We anticipate priority will win by a slender margin but the IQ is likely to lose. We understand that the 21 Oct staff-level count of the Dept is 57–57–16. Ours is less optimistic since we do not think we can count on such countries as Barbados and Senegal whose affirmative votes are included in Dept's estimate of 57 in favor. Therefore, we anticipate actual result will be closer to 55–58–17.³

2. We agree that the two possibilities in event of defeat of the IQ are (A) seeking adoption of Baroody amendments to AR or (B) seeking to delete AR expulsion clause. As to (A), ROC Vice-Minister Yang told us 20 Oct he believes ROC could live with AR as amended by Baroody proposals. Nevertheless, we think that we could not pick up a majority in favor of Baroody amendments in atmosphere of just-defeated IQ. We do not know of any AR supporters who, in likely time frame, could be prevailed on to support these amendments, and doubt we would pick up enough additional support for deletion to compensate for erosion of a number of our IQ supporters that would be inevitable in view of their lack of instructions to support the amendments. Defeat of Baroody amendments thus seem likely assuming he decides to press them to a vote.

3. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for adopting this course of action's first fallback position. For one thing, it would be a Saudi text that had been rejected by the GA, not a US proposal. Second, we would have shown our determination to pursue every alternative reasonably open to us to oppose the ROC's expulsion. Finally, if Baroody amendments are maintained, we do not have to move to have them voted; they must be put to the vote (unlike a motion for division).

4. As you note, there is no certainty of Baroody's maintaining his amendments, but we think if we get behind them he might do so. He is, of course, not reliable, and has spoken recently of a "completely new resolution" whose contents and effective purpose remain unknown.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.

² See footnote 2, Document 424.

³ Circular telegram 194327, October 22, requested from the posts "clear information" on how the host governments would vote on the IQ. The telegram noted that all replies should be received by the morning of October 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

5. As to (B), an effort to defeat the expulsion clause of the AR, we come to a parallel conclusion that we could not, in the wake of IQ defeat, put together a majority to support our motion for a separate vote on the expulsion clause. Even if, by some regrouping of votes that does not now seem possible, we were to win both a motion for a separate vote and the deletion of the expulsion clause, we would be faced in the GA with exceedingly difficult problem of interpretation. We would insist that by deleting the expulsion clause the GA had expressed its will to continue ROC representation. Others would argue to the contrary; the President would refuse to rule and would put the question to the vote; the GA would probably vote that the deletion of the expulsion clause had no effect on the AR and the ROC would be obliged to leave. At best the outcome might be ambiguous.

6. We conclude that alternative of a motion for separate vote is a second line of defense. Although as noted above, we are not optimistic we could win a vote on division, we lose nothing by making the attempt.

7. We were attracted to the possibility of seeking a delay at one or another stage to permit renewed efforts in capitals. But a proposal for suspension involving even a few hours would likely be shouted down and voted down in the PRC-“victory” atmosphere that would immediately follow defeat of the IQ.

8. As to situation in event IQ is adopted: believe we and the Dept concur that we cannot get a simple majority for the DR. If IQ is adopted, we agree we could raise a point of order and read out the text of a revised DR whose principal changes would involve deletion of the 2nd and 3rd operative paras. (We would want to consider, as well, shortening the preamble.) We would at same time seek suspension of the plenary to gain some time. But we are uncertain of advantages of this course. As of now, chances of success appear dim and should we win we are left with same problem of interpretation outlined in para 5 above. At best, we would face interminable series of wrangles throughout entire UN system as to practical effect.

9. Re option (C), last para your tel, we concur your judgment such course would only compound defeat.

Bush

427. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 23, 1971, 1745Z.

195059. Subject: Chirep: October 22 Call by GRC Ambassador Shen on Secretary.

Following is Noform, FYI only, unclassified and subject to revision on review.

1. Memorandum of Conversation: Chinese: Amb. James Shen; Political Counselor Henry Chen. US: The Secretary; Counselor Pedersen, Acting Asst Secy Herz, IO; Mr. Moser, EA.

2. Summary: Shen, on instructions, asked Secretary for review of possible fallback positions if IQ should fail, presented no comment upon hearing current US thinking. Shen asked if President Nixon would be making any public statement on Chirep and also took opportunity to express concern that return of Dr. Kissinger might coincide with vote on Chirep. End Summary.

3. The Secretary and Ambassador Shen began by reviewing recent efforts to line up votes at New York. It was agreed that further efforts would be made with Togo, Ecuador and Peru. Ambassador Shen asked for a report on how the voting projections stood at present. The Secretary stated that it stood at a tie on the important question, with several of the undecided countries "leaning against" us. We are, however, working very hard at the highest levels to win over the uncommitted. He discussed efforts to assure that countries generally friendly with the US but not voting with it on this issue would not work against our interests, for instance by predicting that we will lose.

4. Ambassador Shen asked about contingency plans if the IQ should fail. Mr. Herz said there were a number of possibilities. First, there was the Baroody amendment. The US saw no harm in his advancing his amendment under such circumstances. Its chance of success, however, appears small in its present form. Secondly, there is the possibility of a separate vote on the expulsion language of the AR. The chance of success in that case would be less than even. The Secretary emphasized the unpredictability of the vote of many delegations under new circumstances. Some supporters of the AR might well abstain on the expulsion part of that resolution if offered separately. Hopefully, we would have at least one overnight period during which we could

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leo J. Moser; cleared by Pedersen, Herz, Curran, and Peter B. Johnson; and approved by Pedersen. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

emphasize once again what expulsion would mean to the future of the UN. There followed discussion of the rules of debate and how “explanations of vote” might be used to delay a vote.

5. Ambassador Shen asked if there were any other contingency positions that the US had under consideration. Mr. Pedersen replied that in a contingency in which we were successful with the IQ and had defeated the AR, but did not expect majority support for the DR, we might consider removing the second—and perhaps also the third—operative section from our DR.

6. Ambassador Shen asked if this would be done in order to improve the chance that the remainder of the resolution would pass. Mr. Pedersen replied affirmatively and added that it could also give us needed time. Mr. Herz emphasized that in this contingency we would have created a legislative history for a position that the General Assembly had rejected expulsion of the ROC but nevertheless had brought in the PRC.

7. Ambassador Shen asked if President Nixon likely to say anything publicly on the Chirep issue. The Secretary remarked that he would be seeing the President later in the day and that it might be possible for Mr. Ziegler to issue a White House statement of some type. Ambassador Shen then mentioned that he had heard that Dr. Kissinger would be returning Monday, the very day Chirep would be voted on. He expressed concern about the effect of Dr. Kissinger’s answers to questions about his trip. The Secretary confirmed that Dr. Kissinger would be returning late Monday evening and observed that this might be after the vote. He expressed his understanding of the problem that Ambassador Shen had mentioned, and said that he would follow up on it. Mr. Pedersen remarked that should Dr. Kissinger reaffirm upon returning that the subject of Chirep had not come up in Peking at all, this might in fact help our position on the vote. Ambassador Shen recognized this possibility. The Secretary said he thought it would be better if no statement were made before the vote.

8. The Secretary volunteered that if it would help, he would either return to New York or make further press statements on Chirep. At this point he was not sure, however, whether either would be to our real advantage. The meeting ended with Ambassador Shen expressing the gratitude of his country for all the efforts being made by the US to retain ROC membership in the UN.

9. *Comment:* As can be seen from the above, Ambassador Shen received all comments sympathetically but made no substantive comment on any of the contingencies presented. As Mr. Moser accompanied the Ambassador to his car, the conversation made it apparent that neither Ambassador Shen nor his Political Counselor had been closely following the procedural situation in New York. The concept of trun-

cating the DR seemed entirely new to them. They appeared, however, open-minded and not unduly pessimistic.

10. We are not yet discussing such contingencies with other Dels.

Rogers

428. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 24, 1971, 0004Z.

3816. Subj: Chirep: Meeting of Inner Core of Co-Sponsors Oct. 23, 1971.

1. Summary: Informal mtg with Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese co-sponsors was held at USUN morning of Oct 24.² US side represented by Phillips, De Palma, Newlin, and MisOfs. Phillips reported US belief our position was strong and we should continue concentrate all our efforts on attaining victory for IQ. During discussion initiated by Australians of possible contingencies it became apparent Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly also Japanese had received preliminary guidance as to fall-back positions should IQ fail. Australian Cabinet, meeting this weekend, may decide to abstain on AR in event IQ fails and probably would favor Baroody amendments (BA) should they be put to vote. New Zealand also favorably inclined toward BA but would like certain changes in wording. Japanese also favor BA with reservation GOJ believes there only one China. Advisability of voting on AR in parts was also discussed. If IQ fails, Japanese felt we might seek to defeat last part of AR as final effort to save ROC seat although chance of success not bright. End Summary.

2. Phillips opened mtg with report that White House and State Dept felt at highest levels our position was strong and we should press on with IQ. At this point USG was not prepared to consider fall-back positions. We would, of course, listen and report views of our friends.

3. One important objective, Phillips noted, was to have maximum number of speakers inscribe to explain vote on Mon, Oct 25. In view

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² The weekly meeting of all the co-sponsors was held October 22. (Telegram 3794 from USUN, October 23; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII)

of lobbying actions yet to be completed and undesirability of vote Mon evening, US felt it highly desirable for GA to commence voting no earlier than Tues, Oct 26.

4. PolCouns Newlin reported AR co-sponsors were split over timing of vote. Albanians believed vote should come only after full, fair debate and, for example, did not oppose mtg of First Comite scheduled for Mon morning at expense of morning plenary session. Activists such as Yugoslavs and Pakistanis within Albanian camp, on other hand, seemed anxious to have vote ASAP.

5. Phillips pointed out it also important to work for interval between defeat of AR and vote on DR to allow for consultations and full assessment of situation. Legal Adviser Reis will confer with Under-SYG Stavropoulos regarding feasibility of having explanation of vote between AR's defeat and vote on DR, although from strictly legal view this proposal to interrupt voting may be difficult to sustain. We could also consider moving for temporary adjournment or suspension of GA.

6. Remainder of mtg for most part involved discussion of tactics and contingencies in case IQ should fail. Discussion was led primarily by Australians and New Zealanders, both of whom clearly had received at least preliminary guidance from their govts regarding possible fall-back positions.

7. McIntyre (Australia) welcomed encouraging view of Washington but expressed concern about possibility—even if not at present anticipated—of uncoordinated situation should things go wrong in what surely will be close vote on IQ. Australia has and will continue to explore with Canberra various contingencies should IQ fail. Australian Del has not yet received substantive instructions but has begun to receive “broad guidance.”

8. McIntyre said he could not overlook possibility that his Ministers, meeting this weekend, might decide to abstain on AR were IQ to lose.

9. McIntyre asked how US might vote on AR assuming defeat of IQ. De Palma responded Dept had not sent guidance in view of decisions taken yesterday in Washington.

10. Newlin, speaking personally and hypothetically, supposed it likely US would oppose AR in whole or in parts given traditional Albanian interpretation of AR, which is shared by Under-SYG Stavropoulos, that first part as well as second calls for ROC expulsion. Further, should we be faced, against our present expectation, with IQ's defeat, it probably would be difficult to win vote for considering AR in parts. In any case, with prospect of passage of IQ we obviously should not oppose splitting AR. Japanese and New Zealanders agreed.

11. Scott (New Zealand) indicated he had received preliminary instructions regarding Baroody amendments. Wellington favors altering

BA by deleting phrase “de jure” and substituting “territory” for “country.” Scott suggested we should consider approach to Baroody prior to voting on IQ regarding these changes. Otherwise interval between defeat of IQ and voting on AR probably would not allow for sufficient consultations with him. On balance, Scott felt his govt would support BA but would prefer changes mentioned.

12. McIntyre thought his del also would vote for BA if IQ fails. Nakagawa (Japan) said his del probably would do same, with reservations stemming from GOJ’s view that there only one China.

13. McIntyre, who spoke with Baroody Oct 22, reported Baroody probably would withdraw his amendments and save them for next year in event IQ passes. If not, he likely would press them to vote. Newlin added that Baroody seemed determined to offer self-determination amendment to DR before voting begins.

14. Nakagawa did not say he had received Tokyo’s thinking of fall-back positions, but commented that in his view BA could not win if IQ failed. So perhaps we should consider asking for vote on AR by parts, with vote on second (explicit expulsion) part coming first. Such vote would be difficult to win but would represent last ditch effort to preserve ROC seat. McIntyre agreed this might be worthwhile tactic.

15. Nakagawa raised possibility Albanian side might ask GA President to rule, before voting on IQ began, whether IQ applied to whole of AR or only to second part. Scott felt certain Malik would refer questions of interpretation of AR to GA for vote no matter what Under-SYG Stavropoulos recommended. We therefore might wish to ask for ruling as to meaning of first part of AR ourselves to ensure question is phrased in best possible way. Newlin commented best procedure would be to see how situation unfolds and at appropriate time determine whether our interests best served by clarifying meaning of AR or by leaving matter vague.

16. Newlin also noted possibility that Albanian side might challenge legality of DR under UN Charter. We will be prepared for this but hope it will not happen.

17. *Comment:* Mtg was characterized by frank, informal exchange of views with complete understanding by attending co-sponsors of US determination to bring about victory of IQ and defeat of AR.

Bush

429. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 0639Z.

3845. Chirep: Plenary October 25.

1. Summary. Unexpected defeat of IQ by vote of 55–59–15 Oct 25 caused by massive last minute Arab defections. Shifts which occurred in previous or expected positions were: Belgium (yes to abstain); Cyprus (yes to abstain); Ireland (abstain to no); Mexico (anticipated abstention to yes); Oman (yes to absent [*abstain*]); Morocco (yes to abstain); Qatar (yes to abstain); Tunisia (yes to abstain); Trinidad and Tobago (anticipated abstention to no). End Summary.

2. Loss of IQ by four votes evening Oct 25 came as surprise when compared with conservative voting estimate of 60–57–13 early same morning. First sign of what later became long list of defections occurred before session began when we learned Belgian Cabinet had decided to shift from “yes” to “abstain.” Next sign of trouble came when Trinidad and Tobago (whom we originally had expected to abstain) decided to vote “no.”

3. During the meeting Lebanon tipped us off that Cyprus was going soft. Pedersen approached Kyprianou and, remarking on narrowness of vote, expressed gratification Cyprus was with us. Kyprianou indicated he would not support IQ. Pedersen said he was astonished, given two assurances of support by Makarios. Pedersen said US took this issue very seriously and GOC would damage its relations with US much more than it would improve them with PRC. Kyprianou said, as FonMin, he had to shoulder his responsibilities. Foregoing was shortly reinforced by Bush directly to FonMin who said we counting heavily on earlier assurances and that last minute defection would not be understood.

4. We then learned that, contrary to earlier expectations, Morocco would abstain rather than vote yes. (Although this was as unpleasant a surprise as the rest, at least Morocco moved half way toward our position since previously Morocco has voted against the IQ.)

5. At the opening of meeting we took last minute readings in cases of Tunisia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. In all cases we were given assurances that they would vote yes. In the event, only Bahrain honored its word. Driss (Tunisia) after submitting three draft reses that he had no intention of pressing to vote, and after voting for Baroody’s unsuccessful motion to postpone vote to Oct 26, announced that Tunisia would abstain on IQ.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential.

6. Bush early in the meeting also talked to Khampan Panya and urged Laos to reconsider its decision to abstain but latter made clear he bound by firm instructions.

7. Since we knew that new Gulf Arab states were under tremendous pressure from Arabs (and possibly UK too) to be absent, we together with Japanese, Chinese, Jordan and Lebanon kept a close watch on them. Oman nevertheless left the Assembly hall. When reached at his hotel he alleged he had received telegram from his ruler instructing him to be absent. Qatar, in explaining his abstention, told MisOff that he too had received telegram permitting him to be absent but that he preferred to abstain.

8. Under circumstances, Luxembourg deserves credit for not following in the path of Belgium and Bahrain deserves credit for not bolting along with Oman and Qatar.

9. Major favorable development was yes vote of Mexico. On instructions, Pedersen called FonMin Rabasa to express Secretary's appreciation for what had been a difficult decision that had been taken in the interest of good US-Mexican relations. Mexico's decision all the more appreciated under the circumstances. Rabasa was touched and most appreciative.

10. Vote on IQ by Latin Americans generally was gratifying, including favorable votes, in addition to Mexico, from Argentina and Venezuela, who had earlier given us concern. Total vote in favor 18, against 5. There were no abstentions. The negative votes of Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru were anticipated, T&T's final decision to oppose was made known shortly before vote by PermRep Seignoret to Japanese. Gratifyingly, Barbados followed instructions despite evident pressure from both Caribbean and Africans.

11. After defeat of IQ we made last-ditch effort to get separate vote on expulsion language of AR but were defeated by 51-61-16. Under these circumstances, bandwagon psychology set in and AR adopted by 76-35-17.

12. *Comment:* Given what proved to be extreme fragility of some of our support, we doubt that a postponement until October 26 would have led to a substantially different outcome. The Soviets sat this one out. Albania did not not display any great leadership. The result was the pressures and the lobbying of the radical Arabs, Pakistan, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Zambia, the Scandinavians as a bloc, and, despite assurances to the contrary, probable behind the scenes work by the UK and France.²

Bush

² Despite the defeat in the General Assembly, the Department sent, in circular telegram 196436, October 27, a message from Secretary Rogers to the Presidents or Foreign Ministers of the co-sponsoring nations thanking them for the "support and assistance you provided to our common cause during the debate and vote in the UN General Assembly on the issue of Chinese representation." (Ibid.)

430. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 0800Z.

3848. UN General Assembly—Albanian Chirep Res Adopted.

Albanian Res (AR, L. 630) adopted 76–35–17 late Oct. 25 and GA Pres Malik (Indonesia) announced PRC would be notified accordingly. Just before vote Chinese FonMin stated “in view of frenzy and irrational behavior in hall del of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly.” During continuous eight-hour meeting, Important Question (IQ) res (L. 632) defeated 55–59–15 after motion for priority approved 61–53–15. Bush’s request for separate vote on expulsion clause rejected 51–61–16. Saudi Arabia’s motion to defer voting overnight also rejected 53–56–19. Saudi Arabia withdrew its third amendment (L. 637) after first two defeated 2 (Saudi Arabia, Mauritius)—60–66 and 2–62–64. Pres stated explanations of votes after vote be made A.M. Oct. 26.

At outset, Driss (Tunisia) submitted three new reses to be voted if necessary which would: 1) invite PRC occupy China’s seat (L. 639); 2) invite ROC, pending solution affecting status quo of Formosa, continue to occupy UN seat under name of Formosa (L. 640); and 3) inscribe current item in 27th GA agenda and invite SYG report on inquiries with view to seeking solution to Chirep problem (L. 641). Baroody (Saudi Arabia) introduced new res (L. 638) which would have admitted PRC and retained ROC, i.e., people of Taiwan, in UN until those people declared wishes by referendum or plebiscite. He declared this was one of most momentous occasions in UN’s history, and stressed sense of fairness, justice and compromise required. Arita Quinoez (Honduras) supported IQ and DR and stated both Chinas should have rights and duties as member states. Malile (Albania) denounced US anti-Chinese activities.

Liu (China) pointed out Mao Tse-tung already dictating terms to UN and asked if GA could in honor and conscience, accept these impossible terms. He expressed gratitude to reps who upheld his gov’t representation, and concluded: “In your decision lies fate of Chinese people, peace and security of Asia and whole world, and fate of UN itself.” Bush summed up “strongly held view of US,” and urged UN to take “constructive road—not discredited and utterly sinister road that leads to rule of strong over weak.” Explanations of vote before

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Unclassified; Priority.

vote made by Mongolia, Japan, El Salvador, Malaysia, Singapore, Austria, Peru, Madagascar, Rwanda, Dahomey, Senegal, Argentina, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Pakistan, Ghana, Congo (K), and Algeria.

During five-and-half hours after conclusion of general debate, in addition to explanations of vote, Baroody requested priority for his res and moved to defer voting. Before his motion rejected, it was supported by Japan, Philippines and Liberia and opposed by AR co-sponsors. Pakistan formally opposed US motion for priority. Senegal stated it would ask for separate vote on expulsion portion of Albanian res. Bush's request for priority for IQ was supported by NZ, Japan and Australia.

After votes on priority for IQ and for IQ res, Bush moved to delete expulsion clause, and was opposed by Iraq and Tanzania on grounds voting had begun. Bush interjected it had not started; motion clearly in order; and he asked for chair's ruling. Pres Malik then stated: "Voting is continued. Amendment is not receivable." Baroody charged Pres could not prevent voting by division, and said Senegal already requested division. Syria endorsed Pres's ruling and Liberia challenged it. Tunisia withdrew its three reses. Bush requested separate vote on expulsion clause under Rule 91, and Sierra Leone asked for clarification on what such vote would mean. Tanzania appealed to Senegal not insist on separate vote on last clause, and Senegal withdrew proposal claiming some persons insisted on changing its meaning.

After US motion for division rejected, Chinese FonMin said it was flagrant violation. "In view of frenzy and irrational behavior in this hall, del of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly." His govt would continue struggle with like-minded countries, and he was confident cause for which they had been fighting for more than quarter of century would prevail.

Albanian res was then adopted. Albanian rep made victory statement, which Pres attempted interrupt on grounds explanations of vote would be heard at next meeting. GA then adjourned at 11:22 P.M. until 11:00 A.M. Oct. 26.

[Omitted here are lists of countries and their votes on the Albanian resolution, priority for the IQ resolution, the IQ resolution, and the motion for division on the AR.]

Bush

431. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 2358Z.

3870. Subj: Bush–SYG Meeting Oct 26.

1. Bush requested meeting with U Thant Oct 26 in light of Chirep vote previous evening. At outset Bush said he would try to keep separate his deep personal disappointment that US position did not prevail for main purpose of his call. Bush said as we went into meeting he felt we would win. U Thant said his own estimate as meeting began give US the edge.

2. Main purpose of call was because Bush sensed SYG's discomfort over emotional and carnival atmosphere in GA after key votes and when ROC withdrew. Bush said he wanted SYG to know that he and USUN would conduct selves so as not to complicate the problems of UN. This did not mean that there would not be real difficulties with Congress and Chirep defeat came at awkward time when efforts underway to solve deficit crisis. However, Bush pledged himself personally to do what he could to see that US continues to support UN. We would try to be constructive and would strive to counteract inevitable reaction.

3. SYG was obviously moved and expressed his appreciation. He very much hoped there would be no financial reprisals by Congress. He gave Bush an advance copy of his press statement (septel) in which he regretted departure of ROC. SYG indicated he understood sharpness of US disappointment over vote but said that in long run he believed UN would be strengthened.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.

432. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, October 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Timing of the UN Chirep Vote

You asked for an analysis of the timing of the UN vote, why it came so much earlier than our initial estimates, and why our people at the UN did not delay the matter until the end of October or early November. The following seem to be the salient facts:

1. Neither we nor anyone else had control over when the Chirep debate began. It was the first item on the agenda, and thus became the order of business immediately upon the end of the general debate (the initial round of general statements by delegation heads).

2. The initial estimate was for a vote probably on October 28 but possibly running several days later. That was based upon an estimate of how many people would want to speak to the issue and at what length.

3. As soon as the debate got underway, it became clear that not as many countries were choosing to speak, and that the speeches tended to be extremely short, compared with those made in previous years. At that point it seemed clear that the vote would take place during the last week of October, possibly during the middle of the week.

4. Our delegation at the UN was aware of the necessity of putting off the vote, at least until Henry was out of Peking. They did, therefore, take steps to extend the debate by encouraging countries to speak that might otherwise not have done so, and by getting additional pages inserted in speech drafts.

5. By the end of last week, however, it was clear that the general sentiment of the Assembly, and the strategy of the opposition, were both driving toward a quick disposal of the issue. Over the weekend, Secretary Rogers passed the word to put the vote off at least until Tuesday morning.

6. That brings us to Monday, and you know of the tactical considerations which led to the vote Monday evening. According to Sam DePalma, the other side knew they had the votes on Monday and were

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum bears a handwritten note by Kissinger reading: "Key para on 2nd page. HK." The last paragraph of the memorandum is marked.

determined to push for a vote before anything could happen to change the situation. State, on the other hand, saw no advantage to further delays (the impending Belgian announcement etc.) and, in any event, given the general atmosphere, could not press too hard for further delay without making it obvious that we did not have the horses, thus causing a further erosion of our support.

In connection with Henry's apparent wish that the vote be delayed for at least several days after his return, I do not know what he may privately have conveyed to Secretary Rogers or George Bush. At lesser levels, however, people knew that the vote should be delayed until Henry was out of Peking but were not aware that importance was attached to any further delay.

433. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep, ROC–US Bilateral Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Chow Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
James Shen, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Frederick F. Chien, Director, North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Secretary
Richard Pedersen, Counselor
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, EA
Samuel DePalma, Assistant Secretary, IO
Leo Moser, Director, Republic of China Affairs

Summary: Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, enroute back to Taipei after his departure from New York, paid a call on the Secretary in which he expressed his gratitude for US support on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, indicated a generally flexible position in respect to future contests to maintain ROC representation in specialized agencies, and requested continued US bilateral support in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Moser, cleared by Assistant Secretaries Green and DePalma and Pedersen, and approved November 8 in S.

terms of 1) military equipment and 2) actions to help maintain the economic viability of the Republic of China. End summary.

The conversation began with the Secretary expressing his regret that he had to meet the Foreign Minister under these conditions. The US had struggled mightily in its efforts to maintain ROC representation in the UN. The Secretary reviewed successful last minute efforts to line up the votes of such countries as Mexico. He mentioned the difficulties presented by the change of position on the part of Senegal, Cyprus, Belgium and others. (The Senegal change was particularly difficult because it involved also the loss of the Togo vote.) The Secretary stressed that the President had been deeply involved in the effort to assure continued ROC representation in the United Nations.

Minister Chow expressed the gratitude of his country for the support of the US Government and mentioned in particular Ambassadors Bush and Phillips in New York. He feared no decent country would want to be associated with the United Nations and it might go "down the drain." He mentioned the fact that the General Assembly had broken into laughter when the votes of Israel and Portugal were recorded. The opportunistic position of those governments he decried as "disgraceful." He expressed his gratitude to Japan and said he was happy to see the Sato government had weathered the criticism.

The Secretary observed that the vote had gone reasonably well in Latin America. US efforts had turned both Argentina and Mexico toward our position. Only Trinidad and Tobago was a last minute disappointment. Belgium's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China came, he remarked, at a bad time—particularly since we had so little support in Europe generally. Minister Chow mentioned that in the future the bilateral relations of the Republic of China with good friends like the United States and Japan would be more important than the multilateral side of things. He mentioned that the US Government had assured his government of the continuation of the Treaty commitment and of close economic ties. He expressed his hope that the Secretary or the President would once again be able to make a public statement along these lines.

The Secretary of State mentioned that the issue had been covered in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on October 27. He provided Minister Chow with the appropriate pages from that testimony, saying that the GRC could use his statements if it felt they would be appropriate.

For the future, Minister Chow said, the two important things were to guarantee a viable economy and assure external security. External security would require military equipment. The ROC armed forces were in need of modernization. He specifically mentioned the need for tanks, for two or three submarines for training purposes and for more

modern aircraft. Minister Chow mentioned that the delivery of such equipment might take place over the years but that a US commitment at this time would be of great value in terms of morale on Taiwan. On the economic side, Minister Chow expressed his hope that the US would continue to encourage trade and investment on Taiwan.

Minister Chow stated that his Government was attempting to maintain commercial relations with those governments that have recently established relations with Communist China. In Belgium it hoped to set up a group called perhaps "the Chinese Cultural Center" to provide consular, cultural and commercial contacts in the area. The ROC was also interested in maintaining offices in Geneva and Vienna. It was contemplating launching a "counteroffensive" in Scandinavia, in an attempt to develop commercial relations and an informal presence in that area. From Saudi Arabia a roving ROC Ambassador would cover the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia would be a good anchor for ROC interests in the Near East since the King was a good friend. Brazil could be a similar base for South America, Guatemala for Central America. Ambassador Shen expressed the hope that the US would be able to help the ROC maintain its informal commercial relations with Canada and Italy.

The Secretary stated that he felt the USG could be helpful on the economic side. He mentioned the visit of Governor Reagan to Taiwan as a recent evidence of interest in expanded commercial contacts between California and the Republic of China. The USG could probably encourage US investment in Taiwan to some extent by its future actions. On the military side, the Secretary said, there could be problems. It would not be in the interest of either the ROC or the US to make it appear that there was some sort of military crisis in the area that had to be met by new military equipment. The Secretary expressed his opinion that the Treaty commitment of the US was our major presence in the area. It would be most unfortunate, he said, to give any signal that might be misinterpreted as concern over the security of the area.

Minister Chow stated that he did not wish to make an issue of military aid but stated that he hoped that US assurances in terms of the defense commitment could be translated into something tangible. The Secretary responded that there was a problem of psychological impact, since an action designed to increase stability by supplying more equipment could lead to the opposite effect of undermining the military stability of the area. The most immediate need was to guarantee the economic stability of the ROC. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister for his views on the specialized agencies.

Chow stated that generalization was difficult. Each agency must be studied separately in terms of its history, membership, and voting procedures. He noted that there is weighted voting in the Fund and

the Bank and that the communist nations had not generally joined some agencies. The UPU, ILO and some other agencies are much older than than UN, Chow noted, and these older agencies are not a part of the UN system in the same way as organizations like ECAFE—in which, for example, he foresaw no chance of retaining ROC membership.

Chow stated his Government would have to declare publicly that it intended to fight to the end to retain its seat in all specialized agencies. He added, however, that he did not intend in fact to expose his Government to unnecessary loss of prestige by entering into hopeless contests.

The Secretary stated that it was obvious that further study would be necessary before we could decide what could be done in the various specialized agencies. Meanwhile, we would remain in consultation with the ROC. Mr. DePalma said that the USG would in the interim do its best to insure that each specialized agency followed its own constitutional procedure and did not act precipitously in the area of Chinese representation.

The Secretary remarked that Mr. Meany had said that if the ROC were expelled from the ILO, he would not wish to stay in that organization. The Secretary asked Mr. DePalma how the situation looked in the ILO, and Mr. DePalma replied that it was most difficult to say at the present time.

Ambassador Shen remarked that in the IMF the US had some 25 percent of the shares. Presumably the Chinese Communists would not want to enter such an organization, anyway. Mr. Pedersen said that in most of the “main line” UN specialized agencies it would be very hard to win, since most rely on a simple majority.

Chow recalled that USSR had formerly criticized the UN, saying that the US always had “an automatic majority.” Now Chow feared, “the other side” may think they have an automatic majority. This could turn the UN and other related agencies into irresponsible “circuses,” no longer capable of fulfilling their proper role.

The conversation ended with Minister Chow stating that he hoped the USG would be able to continue to repeat its assurances in respect to its relations with the ROC. “Of all good things,” he said, “you can’t have too many.”

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

196136. Subject: Chirep.

1. You are instructed to call as soon as possible upon President Chiang, or in the case of his unavailability on Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, to deliver the following oral message. Leave an aide-mémoire consisting of the text which you have delivered orally.

2. "I have been instructed to express to you the sincere and deep regret of the Government of the United States as regards the recent action of the United Nations depriving the Republic of China of representation in the General Assembly. We believe that action to have been a serious mistake, neither just nor realistic.

3. The Government of the Republic of China has contributed positively to the UN since its inception and the Government of the US had looked forward to your continued advice and counsel as a member of that organization. Defeat of the Important Question resolution came as a surprise to the Government of the United States, since our voting estimate early on the morning of October 25 indicated that we would win that vote by a narrow margin.

4. The representatives of the Government of the United States who have had the honor to work closely with their colleagues of the Government of the Republic of China during the last few months on this difficult question, have been uniformly impressed with both the adherence to principle and tactical flexibility reflected in your Government's decisions. Our representatives have worked closely around the world in this joint endeavor, and the spirit of close cooperation we have gained will not be lost.

5. In the view of the United States Government, nothing that has happened in the UN will in any way affect the ties between our two countries. The Republic of China has a dynamic and growing economy, our two countries have close bilateral relations in a wide variety of fields and we expect those relations to continue to prosper. As has been stated before, the defense commitment of the US to the ROC is in no way affected by recent developments.

6. My Government will continue to be in contact with your Government to discuss the implications of the decision of October 25th. You may be assured that the Government of the United States remains

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Moser; cleared by Brown, Green, and Haig; and approved by Rogers.

deeply interested in the status of the Republic of China as an honored and valued member of the international community.”²

7. At the conclusion of your oral presentation (but not to be included in the aide-mémoire) you should state the following: “I have been instructed to inform you that these views have the full support of the President of the United States.”

8. You may wish also to take the opportunity of this representation to mention the Secretary’s personal appreciation for the great effort of Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai in our common cause at the United Nations.

Rogers

² The message was delivered by McConaughy in a short meeting with Chiang on October 29. (Telegram 5403 from Taipei, October 29; *ibid.*) The ROC requested that the “general character” of the U.S. message be made public. (Telegram 5405 from Taipei, October 29; *ibid.*) The Department of State agreed. (Telegram 198797 to Taipei, October 30; *ibid.*)

**435. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in UN-Related and Specialized Agencies

In the wake of the passage of the Albanian Resolution in the UN General Assembly, we need to formulate the US position with regard to the participation of the Republic of China (ROC) in UN-related and specialized agencies. The timing, the manner in which the issue will arise and the likely outcome will vary from agency to agency.²

We have already begun to face the question of Chinese representation in the specialized agencies. There are no scheduled plenary meetings of these agencies before the end of the year, but the UNESCO

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret. An attached memorandum of transmittal from Marshall Wright to Kissinger is dated November 2.

² An Annex entitled “Chirep in the Specialized Agencies,” which provides a summary estimate of the situation in the agencies, is attached but not printed.

Executive Board is considering the question of Chinese representation on October 28. There are two proposals before the UNESCO Executive Board. One is an Algerian motion requiring the Director General to address all communications regarding the execution of the UNESCO program to the PRC rather than the ROC. The other is a Mexican proposal calling for the convening of a special session of the UNESCO General Conference to deal with this matter. We are opposing the first and seeking to delay the second on the grounds that there is no evidence of any PRC intention to participate in UNESCO. The executive organs of ICAO and the ILO will meet in early November and the IAEA Board of Governors in December.

As in the case of UNESCO, executive bodies of other specialized agencies meeting before the next sessions of their plenary bodies will probably be urged to take some interim action which would have the effect of excluding the ROC from participation. Even technical commissions or the secretariats of these agencies might undertake actions in this direction.

Although there is no indication as yet of any PRC intention to participate in these bodies, it has made known its view that the ROC should be expelled from all specialized agencies. The People's Republic of China and its supporters will certainly press the position that the General Assembly action means that the Republic of China should not participate in the activities of most, if not all, of the UN-related and specialized agencies. As the vote on the Albanian Resolution signified, there will be strong support for this position generally. The UN Secretariat is also strongly disposed to accommodate the early entry of the PRC and the early departure of the ROC from UN-related bodies. We have requested USUN to inform the Secretary-General that we are opposed to any irregular actions by executive or subsidiary organs of these agencies seeking to prejudge decisions which should be taken by the membership as a whole.

The Republic of China has indicated that it regards its announced withdrawal from the UN to apply also to subsidiary UN organs (the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council and its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and UNICEF). The Foreign Minister has stated that the ROC does not regard its decision as applying to those specialized agencies of which it is a member: International Labor Organization (ILO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunication Union (ITU),

World Meteorology Organization (WMO), Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) or to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He also said that the ROC has decided in principle to fight to preserve its membership in each of the specialized agencies. We will want to obtain a more specific reading of the way in which the ROC envisages handling this issue in each agency. The position we propose to take may importantly influence the ROC approach.

In the past to protect the ROC's seat we have consistently taken the position that specialized agencies should be guided by the UNGA Resolution 396 of December 14, 1950 which recommends that specialized agencies take into account the decision of the UNGA with regard to the representation of a member state. In supporting the ouster of the ROC from UN-related organs and specialized agencies, the Secretary General and other members are certain to cite this resolution and our previous position, the language of the Albanian resolution which passed (to expel the ROC from "all the organizations related to" the United Nations) as well as the language of our dual representation resolution which was not put to the vote ("recommends that all United Nations bodies and the specialized agencies take into account the provisions of this resolution in deciding the question of Chinese representation").

In terms of the situations we will face, UN-related organs and specialized agencies can be divided into four categories:

(a) Agencies and bodies with such integral ties with the UN that the ROC considers itself to have withdrawn from them. These include the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, ECAFE and UNICEF.

(b) Agencies in which the question of Chinese representation will, for all practical purposes, have been virtually decided by the adoption of the Albanian resolution. These are agencies in which a substantial majority of the members voted for the Albanian resolution in the UNGA, most of whom will take a position in the agencies consistent with that vote. While there would in some cases be valid legal grounds for contesting the ouster of the ROC, since the supporters of the Albanian resolution insisted that the question was one of representation and not expulsion of a member, the voting strength to uphold this position would not be present in case of a challenge. These agencies include UNESCO, ICAO, IMCO, ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU and WMO. A preliminary study of the probable voting position of the members of these agencies indicates we would lose a fight to maintain ROC representation.

(c) There are also the financial institutions, the IMF, the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, and IFC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). They have different provisions in their respective articles of agreement, which are under close study. In general, these economic institutions, of which the IMF and the World Bank Group have

acknowledged themselves to be specialized agencies of the UN, have not always followed the guidance of UNGA resolutions. The possibility of ROC exclusion is, therefore, considered not to be so acute in these apolitical institutions in which we and other responsible nations enjoy a preponderant influence.

(d) A case can be made for continued ROC participation in certain agencies by reason of their purely technical nature (ICAO, IAEA, UPU, ITU, WMO and IMCO) or because they engage in standard-setting or risk-limiting activities requiring the broadest membership to be effective (WHO and some others of the above). But, in the end, the decision is likely to be taken on political grounds and will be determined largely by the desire of a majority to assure PRC participation, if necessary on its own terms.

(e) Lastly, there is the question of ROC participation in UN-related conferences and conventions. The normal position of the UNGA has been to apply the "Vienna formula" in issuing invitations. The Vienna formula provides for the invitation of states members of the United Nations, specialized agencies, the IAEA and parties to the International Court of Justice. Were the ROC able to continue to participate in the IMF or another specialized agency, there would be grounds for its inclusion under the Vienna formula. However, this position might be challenged on the grounds that, following the adoption of the Albanian resolution, the ROC is not a state recognized as such by the UN and the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly would probably support that interpretation. Our only recourse might be to ask for a ruling by the International Court of Justice, but that too would require approval by a majority.

This brief survey of the technical and voting considerations suggests that the realistic possibilities for the ROC retaining a position in UN-related organs and the specialized agencies are confined largely to the financial organizations and possibly some special arrangements could be reached in IAEA. Apart from these factors, our policy and posture toward the ROC and the PRC will, of course, bear on the positions we decide to take. We assume that:

(a) We attach high priority to the normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China and accordingly would not wish to work intensively to impede its participation in the UN-related agencies and international conferences, particularly those where participation has significant political connotations. The PRC itself has given indications that it will want the ROC out of all UN-related activities if it is to participate in the UN and international conferences.

(b) We wish to do what is feasible to avoid the rapid isolation of the ROC in the international community. This interest would be served if the ROC could participate in one or more of the UN-related or specialized agencies and thereby qualify for participation in the UN De-

velopment Fund and for inclusion in the Vienna formula and could therefore attend various international conferences and adhere to various conventions.

There will be a clear contradiction between these two objectives in most instances. We will, therefore, wish to examine each situation on a case-by-case basis before making a final determination. Moreover, the prospects of gaining sufficient support to maintain ROC representation in most of these agencies is dim and we shall have to consider how much more US prestige should be engaged in such an effort.

Pending further study of the matter, we can in the governing bodies where the question arises take the position that constitutional procedures must be observed and, without entering into the substance of the matter, vote against proposals based on irregular procedures or on attempts to prejudice decisions by organs competent to take them. We can also seek to deter action by the secretariats of the specialized agencies simply to decide to send correspondence and invitations to the PRC rather than the ROC without prior reference of the question to their plenary bodies or other organs competent to decide the matter.

We could also at this time speak to the ROC along the following general lines:

(1) We wish to ascertain what the ROC position is with regard to its continued membership and participation in the various UN-related bodies and the specialized agencies.

(2) We believe that the PRC may make its participation in the General Assembly contingent upon the expulsion of the ROC from all UN-related agencies. However, we do not have any clear indication regarding PRC intention to participate in the work of specific agencies.

(3) We believe that the international financial institutions, the IMF and the other affiliated agencies, form quite a separate case in that they are apolitical and we and other responsible nations enjoy a preponderant influence in them. They offer the least likely possibility of ROC expulsion.

(4) We would want to study very carefully the statutory and voting situation in UN-related organs and specialized agencies before formulating our position on a case-by-case basis. Frankly, the prospects for sustaining ROC participation do not appear bright in many of them.

(5) We will, in any event, favor strict observance of appropriate statutory procedures in deciding the question of participation in the various agencies and will not support proposals aimed at by-passing competent organs or prejudging their decisions.

Ted Curran³

³ Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

436. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, October 30, 1971, 0050Z.

3956. Subj: Chirep in Specialized Agencies. Ref: USUN 3909.²

1. ROC Vice Minister Yang (please protect) expressed to Amb Phillips Oct 29 his strongly held personal view that with adoption of AR, ROC membership in all specialized agencies should be considered as terminated.

2. While recognizing right of each agency to be judge of its own membership qualifications, Yang thought it would be a serious mistake for ROC to fight to retain its membership in agencies. To do so, he said, would be to expose ROC to another round of bruising contests doomed to end in failure and thus contribute to a further erosion of ROC's diplomatic position. Rather than fighting for a lost cause, Yang said ROC must now devote its energies to strengthening its bilateral relations with as many countries as possible.

3. Yang said FonMin Chow's initial reaction following General Assembly vote had been a determination to fight to retain ROC's seats in specialized agencies. Yang believes he has now convinced FonMin of fallacy of this policy and he hopes USG will refrain from giving ROC any encouragement to mount a campaign to retain its membership in specialized agencies. Yang observed that AR called for expulsion of "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek," rather than ROC. He speculated what situation might be if in future a new govt came to power which explicitly claimed jurisdiction over only Taiwan. Under these different circumstances he said Taiwan might find greater receptivity to membership in some of specialized agencies, particularly those which act on principle of universality and which include in their membership states not members of United Nations.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Noform; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei.

² In telegram 3909, October 28, ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai expressed his government's intention to try to keep its seat in the specialized agencies. (Ibid.)

437. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, November 2, 1971, 0952Z.

5457. Subj: Chirep: Atmospherics of Ambassador's Meeting With President Chiang. Ref: Taipei 5403.²

Summary: When Ambassador delivered oral message to President Chiang following UNGA expulsion action, President's attitude was one of interest and appreciation for US support, but he was not in a communicative mood. All of Ambassador's efforts to draw him into substantive conversation were unsuccessful. President asked pointedly whether message was from President or State Dept. Ambassador replied message was from US Government and explained exclusive authority and responsibility of President for conduct of foreign relations under US Constitution. President Chiang's unusually close-mouthed posture is believed to stem from his need for more time to adjust to the setback of Oct. 25 before he takes a position.

1. In my October 29 meeting with President Chiang to deliver USG oral message of reassurance and sympathy following UNGA expulsion action, President seemed normally vigorous and showed complete self-control. He was courteous, considerate, and mildly responsive to my sentiments of felicitation on the eve of the 84th anniversary of his birth. However, he was not inclined at all to enter into substantive conversation. My efforts to elicit something of his thinking on the new situation created for the GRC, or at least to get his reaction to the sad events of October 25, were unavailing.

2. I prefaced my delivery of oral message with some general comments which were a blend of expressions of regret and sympathy on the one hand, and an effort to focus on ways to minimize the adverse consequences and make the best of a difficult situation on the other. I mentioned particularly the problem of maintaining GRC membership in the specialized agencies of concrete value to the GRC, capitalizing on the fact that the specialized agencies are not bound by the action of the General Assembly. I indicated that our legal and international organization specialists were already studying this problem in close concert with GRC representatives in New York and Washington and I speculated in a preliminary way on the relative utility to the GRC of membership in several of the specialized bodies. Ordinarily this type

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.

² See footnote 2, Document 434.

of approach would be sufficient to launch an animated discussion with the President, but he remained noncommittal though attentive. I then directly invited him to give us the benefit of his thinking on the best means of coping with the difficult new international relations situation we face as a result of the exclusion action of the UNGA. I recalled how illuminating and how valuable to us his insights and analyses, based on his wisdom and vast experience, had proven on numerous occasions. Again the President showed a disinclination to be drawn out by indicating that he would prefer to hear the US views.

3. I then delivered the oral message reading slowly, and with added emphasis on some key passages. I paused after every sentence or so for translation by Ambassador Ying, who was serving as substitute interpreter in the absence of Fred Chien. Ying did a rather poor job, even though he had before him a carbon copy of the document from which I was reading. He hesitated, stumbled, corrected himself, and seemed almost in a state of confusion at one point. The President's military aide came to his rescue on the spur of the moment, showing a good comprehension of the locutions which were giving Ying difficulty. President Chiang followed the presentation closely and asked for clarification of several phrases which appeared to be obscure in Ying's off-the-cuff translation. When I finished delivery of the oral message, I passed the confirmatory aide-mémoire to Acting FonMin Tchen.

4. The President briefly expressed his thanks for the message. Noting my added remarks at the end of the oral message characterizing the views expressed as having the full support of the President of the United States, President Chiang asked bluntly if the message was from the President or from the State Department. I replied, possibly with a trace of warmth, that the message was from the Government of the United States. I added that the President under our Constitution has full authority and responsibility for the formulation of the foreign policy and the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. The Department of State serves as the agent of the President in implementing the foreign policy which he establishes.

5. In a further attempt to draw President Chiang into a discussion which would give me some insight into his thinking or at least his mood, I referred to the important meeting of FonMin Chow Shu-kai with Secretary Rogers which would begin in Washington within a few hours. The President merely said he hoped Minister Chow would not fail to express the gratitude of the GRC for all the hard work of Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Bush, and their colleagues in defense of GRC membership in the UN.

6. As I prepared to depart I expressed the strong resolve of the USG to do all it could to shore up the international position of the GRC in this time of adversity and in conjunction with GRC representatives

to seek the best possible means of offsetting the damage done by the UNGA action. President said we must all work harder than ever in order to negate the bad effects of the UN action.

7. *Comment.* The President did not strike me as a man having nothing of a substantive nature in mind. Rather he seemed to be refraining for a reason from significant comment at this juncture. I estimate, that while he is not in a state of actual shock, he wants more time to evaluate his drastically altered situation and to determine the best posture for him to adopt in the wake of the traumatic events of the week. He is aware that any views or reactions voiced by him will be carefully studied by US representatives, and he probably feels it would be premature for him to go on record at a time when his mental and emotional reaction has not completely jelled. I do not believe we should read any broad implications into his rather uncommunicative attitude on this occasion.

McConaughy

438. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 2, 1971, 2319Z.

3991. Subj: USUN Relations With Chinese Delegation.

1. Although it is not yet certain, it appears that Chinese delegation might arrive at the end of this or beginning of next week. As host country, we will have a certain amount of routine administrative work to perform in facilitating entry, providing privileges and immunities, documentation, and assisting with other numerous problems associated with opening of a permanent mission. It is not clear whether Chinese will wish to deal directly with us on these matters or whether they will ask third parties (e.g., Pakistan, Albania) to assist them.

2. From outset we will be faced with problem of the proper attitude US del should adopt toward PRC reps. We assume we will wish to avoid the extremes of effusiveness or aloofness. In the SC and in main committees there will be specific items on which it would be unusual for us not to engage in matter-of-fact consultations on the same

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Canberra, and Wellington.

basis as we do with other delegations with which we do not have diplomatic relations (e.g., Egypt, Syria).

3. We expect that those who fought for the AR will wish to have PRC's entry taken note of in some fashion. Stavropoulos tells us Romanians have already asked if special plenary meeting could be called for purpose of welcoming PRC del. Secretariat has replied in the negative but has indicated that on day PRC del arrives, plenary could be called in connection with a current item such as WDC which would provide opportunity for welcoming speeches.

4. As for welcoming statements, we will wish to consider forum and particular circumstances. In SC and plenary where majority of other delegations are making welcoming remarks, we assume we should make brief statement recalling that US has supported representation of PRC in UN and we hope its presence will strengthen the organization in realizing the Charter's goals.

5. As Dept aware, USUN does not ordinarily send Mission officers to airport upon arrival of new UN delegations. Given special circumstances surrounding PRC arrival and fact reps will not be issued visas, believe Dept might wish consider having USUN officer present when Chinese arrive.²

Bush

² In telegram 4058 from USUN, November 5, the Mission confirmed instructions from Assistant Secretary De Palma that the arrival of the PRC delegation would be handled under "general ground rules governing the arrival of new UN delegations." Under no circumstance would the Mission have Ambassadorial representation at the airport. (Ibid.)

**439. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, November 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Travel Restrictions on PRC Mission

Peking's announcement that it intends shortly to send a delegation to the General Assembly raises the question of what kind of travel restrictions will be applicable for the PRC Mission.

There are at present three types of travel restrictions applied to Communist missions in New York:

(1) The Soviet Mission must notify USUN at least 48 hours in advance of proposed travel beyond a 25-mile zone around New York (unless we specifically disapprove, the Soviet traveller proceeds on his trip);

(2) Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania need not give advance notification though they and the USSR must apply for permission to visit specified closed counties (appreciably greater in number in the case of the USSR);

(3) Albania, Mongolia and Cuba must receive prior permission for each trip and follow more cumbersome procedures to travel anywhere beyond the 25-mile zone. While implementation in fact varies, travel theoretically is supposed to take place only in connection with UN business.

The third alternative would be logically consistent with the policy we have followed toward Communist UN members with whom we do not have diplomatic relations and is the nearest equivalent to the type of restrictions applied by Peking on the travel of foreign diplomats in China. A later decision to ease controls would be easier to handle than if such controls had to be tightened. Countries governed by this alternative have done much less travelling in the United States, a fact which has eased the security problem.

Choosing either of the first two alternatives might be useful as a gesture to Peking in connection with the President's visit as well as a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. An attached transmittal memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger is also dated November 8. At the end of that memorandum, Kissinger initialed his approval of a recommendation authorizing USUN to notify the Chinese Mission that it would be subject to the same travel restrictions as the Soviet Mission.

gesture of reciprocity for the manner your own visits to Peking were handled. Application of the first type of restriction also would be in line with our general effort to treat Peking on the same basis as Moscow. Application of more restrictive procedures might be taken by Peking as an excessively cool U.S. welcome to the international community. However, the limits on travel involved in these alternatives stem from reciprocity for treatment of U.S. diplomats, a factor not yet existent in the case of the PRC.

Allowing the PRC representatives travel privileges no less favorable than those granted the USSR would give the PRC greater access to Chinese communities and to extremist organizations in the United States. We believe, however, that the PRC will be circumspect, at least initially, in its dealings with such groups. In any case, our ability to control PRC travel and handle problems of personal security, would be almost the same under the first as under the third alternative since under both we can disapprove trips and ascertain the itinerary of PRC travellers.

It is our recommendation that we follow the policy applied to the Soviet Mission, permitting the PRC representatives to travel beyond the 25-mile zone upon 48-hour advance notice to USUN and giving them the same list we give the Soviet Mission of counties situated throughout the United States to which travel is barred. In practice special permission is often given for travel to these areas.

Mr. Mardian of the Department of Justice, in his capacity as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (established under the NSC with representatives from Justice, Defense and State) has sent a letter on behalf of the Committee to the Secretary of State containing a recommendation identical to the one in this memorandum.

We believe that we should inform the PRC representatives of these restrictions as soon as possible after their arrival in New York. Therefore, unless we hear otherwise from you before then, we will instruct USUN to send a note upon their arrival informing them of the applicable rules with respect to travel in the United States.²

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

² Authorization was transmitted to USUN in telegram 205625, November 11. (Ibid.) Delivery of the note was reported in telegram 4228 from USUN, November 13. (Ibid.)

440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 10, 1971, 0100Z.

204697. Subject: USUN Relations with Chinese Delegation. Ref: A. USUN 3991;² B. USUN 4023.³

1. In your contacts with PRC delegation you should observe following guidelines:

a. Working contacts, including arranging administrative details connected with opening PRC Mission: You should not take the lead in trying to establish bilateral contact on administrative problems, but should be responsive if the PRC reps initiate, or indicate a desire, for such contact. You should promptly report any such contacts, and any administrative difficulties which the Chinese may experience in opening their mission. On working contacts required or desired in connection with substantive or procedural matters before the UN, you should refer to the Department for instructions.

b. Social contacts: Your general attitude toward the PRC reps should be friendly but restrained, and you should leave to them the initiative in setting the tone for more intimate contacts. USUN personnel may attend parties given by friendly states honoring the PRC reps. You should promptly report any contacts with the PRC delegation and the atmosphere in which they were conducted. For the time being, you should request Department advice on case-by-case basis should invitations be received from PRC delegation.

2. In making above decisions, we have in mind unique nature of US-PRC relationship, including President's planned visit to Peking and US-PRC bilateral efforts to improve relations.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Confidential. Text received from the White House; cleared by Armitage, Jenkins, Eliot, Under Secretary Johnson, and Winthrop G. Brown; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Canberra, and Wellington.

² Document 438.

³ Dated November 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM)

**441. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, November 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in UN-related and Specialized Agencies

After a close examination of the problem of Chinese representation in the specialized agencies and the IAEA, I have reached some conclusions regarding agencies in which we should endeavor to maintain Republic of China (ROC) membership, those in which it is desirable to avoid a losing confrontation and those in which further study within the U.S. Government and further consultation with other governments is necessary. The Department is consulting with ROC representatives with a view to coordinating our positions. We will not seek to foreclose the possibility of participation of the People's Republic of China in agencies of which the ROC remains a member.

Our examination of the membership, likely voting positions and constitutional factors in each of the specialized agencies has led me to conclude that:

(1) It will not be possible, under present circumstances, to preserve ROC representation in the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Despite legal or technical grounds that we might cite in justification of continued ROC representation in these organizations, an overwhelming majority of the members will not consider them sufficiently important to override their interest in voting as they did in the UNGA. (The UNESCO Executive Board has already taken a decision to regard the PRC as the sole representative of China in UNESCO; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has invited the PRC to apply for membership, but the ROC is not a member.)

(2) With careful planning and some effort, it is likely that ROC membership can be preserved in the IMF and the World Bank group, at least so long as the PRC does not express an interest in participating. It may be possible to preserve ROC representation in the International Civil Aviation Organization as well, at least for the time being, but an indication of the PRC's readiness to assume the rights and ob-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted November 5 by Long; concurred in by Armitage, Stevenson, Brown, Pedersen, and Rein. An attached transmittal memorandum from Assistant Secretary De Palma to Rogers is dated November 9.

ligations of China under the ICAO Convention would probably lead to the exclusion of the ROC.

(3) Complexities in the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) require further examination before we can make a final decision on the approach we should take in these agencies. Our preliminary view is that we could not prevent the exclusion of the ROC from the ILO or the ITU. The situation in IAEA is particularly complicated because of the organization's mandate to safeguard peaceful nuclear activities in member and non-member countries.

We are consulting with the ROC regarding these conclusions and informing them that we are examining the means to preserve their representation in the agencies in which we have concluded it is possible to do so (the IMF, World Bank group and ICAO). We are at the same time informing them that we wish to avoid a confrontation in IMCO, UPU, WHO and WMO, in which there appears to be no feasible way to preserve their position, and that we are continuing to examine the more complex situations in the IAEA, ILO and ITU.

We are also consulting with other appropriate governments and groups, especially Treasury with respect to the financial institutions, to coordinate strategy to be followed in the agencies in which we have decided to work actively to preserve ROC representation and to obtain more precise assessments in regard to the agencies on which we have not reached a decision.

In the interest of maintaining institutional integrity and in order to avoid ill-considered actions, we are continuing to urge, in all agencies, that the issue be dealt with in strict compliance with the agencies' statutes and rules of procedure.

We intend to inform the ROC that we will probably share with the international community the view that PRC participation in the work of certain conferences, e.g., nuclear arms limitation, population, drug control and environment, will be desirable and will be insisted upon by a majority of UN members. We may wish to encourage the ROC not to contest the issue of representation in such fields.²

William P. Rogers

² A meeting between Assistant Secretary De Palma and Foreign Office Director of UN Affairs Che Yin-shou on November 10 on Chinese representation in UN agencies was described in telegram 206298 to Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and USUN. (Ibid.)

442. Editorial Note

On October 26, 1971, Secretary-General Thant had notified the heads of UN agencies of the passage of Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that declared the representatives of the People's Republic of China to be "the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations," and reminded them of a 1950 resolution recommending that the General Assembly's decisions concerning representation "should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies." Agency heads were to inform him of any actions taken concerning Chinese representation.

The Executive Board of UNESCO was the first to vote to recognize the PRC as representing China in the UN on October 29. The ILO Governing Board followed on November 16. GATT revoked the Republic of China's observer status on the same date. The ICAO Council followed on November 19. The FAO Council voted on November 25 to invite the PRC to join, and the Board of Governors of the IAEA voted to seat the PRC on December 9.

The Director-General of the WHO put Chinese representation on the provisional agenda for the 1972 World Health Assembly on November 11, 1971. Its Executive Board recommended representing the PRC on January 26, 1972, and the World Health Assembly voted to do so on May 10, 1972. The WMO invited member states to vote on Chinese representation on November 26, 1971, and a majority voted for the PRC by February 24, 1972. The PRC gained representation in the UPU on April 13, in the IMCO on May 23, and in the ITU on May 28. The IBRD and the IMF took no actions concerning Chinese representation during 1971 or 1972. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, pages 133–135, and *ibid.*, 1972, pages 765, 778, 795, 801, 804, 808, and 812)

443. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Ch'iao Kuan-hua Addresses the UN: "China Belongs to the Third World"

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, head of the PRC UN Delegation, has reaffirmed the basic political orientation of the Peking Government in his first address to the world organization.² The major theme of the statement is that China is not, and will not become, a "superpower"; that the PRC belongs to the "third world." Peking thus stresses its intent to rally support for its cause from the small and medium-sized countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ch'iao's address reiterates the main themes and issues of Chinese foreign policy of the past few years:

—It is only because of "gross interference in China's internal affairs" by the U.S. that the PRC has—until this year—been excluded from its rightful place in the UN.

—The strong majority of UN support for the Albanian Resolution is a defeat for the U.S., in collusion with "the Sato Government of Japan," in its effort to create "two Chinas." The PRC thus is targeting on Sato, while hoping a political figure in Japan will emerge who is more favorable to their position on Taiwan (or that Sato will modify his position to outflank his opposition).

—Regarding Taiwan, "it was only because of the outbreak of the Korean War" that the U.S. went back on its word (as expressed in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations) that the island should be restored to mainland control. "On behalf of the Government of the PRC, I hereby reiterate that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and the U.S. armed invasion and occupation of China's Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits cannot in the least alter the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan, that all the armed forces of the United States definitely should be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and that we are firmly opposed to any design to separate Taiwan from the motherland. The

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for information.

² A translation of Chiao Kuan-hua's November 15 address was sent in telegram 4245 from USUN, November 16. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA)

Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and no force on earth can stop us from doing so.”

—Regarding Indochina, Ch’iao called for “immediate and unconditional” withdrawal of U.S. forces, and supported the 7 point peace plan of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

—Concerning Korea, there was no direct call for withdrawal of U.S. troops; but North Korea’s 8 point program for national reunification was supported, and the demand was pressed that the UN annul its “illegal resolutions” on the Korean question and dissolve UNCURK.

—In the Middle East, Ch’iao expressed support for the Palestinians and other Arab peoples against “Israeli Zionism” and the major powers.

—Support was given to the African states struggling against “white colonialist rule” and racial discrimination.

—Ch’iao expressed support for the “third world” in its desire for economic independence, explicitly backing the Latin American countries seeking to extend the limit of their territorial waters out to 200 miles.

—Regarding disarmament questions, “China will never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries. Under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.”

Comment:

Ch’iao’s speech seems basically a “going on the record” with positions which the PRC has been advocating for the past several years—longer in the cases of Taiwan and Korea. It contained no surprises. The presentation is notable, however, for its lack of an operational focus. Ch’iao does not telegraph very much about specific measures which Peking will resort to in solving issues of concern such as Taiwan and Korea. The PRC intends to differentiate itself from the U.S. and USSR, and challenge us on the outstanding issues; but there is no indication in this speech that Peking has thought through the operational choices necessary to obtain its end.

While taken at face value the anti-U.S. tone of the speech can be read as laying down the gauntlet to us, it may be that Peking has merely stated its general position for the record to satisfy domestic and international audiences. Evidence from diplomatic sources, and from a Chou En-lai press conference of October 28, most strongly supports the view that the PRC delegation will adopt a low-profile posture during the remaining General Assembly session. One cannot preclude the possibility that Peking might now see it in its interest (or find its hand forced) to press aggressively on certain issues which would lead to a public confrontation with the U.S. It seems most likely, however, that

Ch'iao and his associates will wait for an assessment of PRC strength in the General Assembly (particularly among "third world" countries) before adopting a more aggressive political posture next year.³

³ After this first speech by a PRC representative in New York, Kissinger described to Nixon his conflict with Rogers over how the United States should respond. Kissinger stated: "Then I want it low-key. [Rogers] said it was an outrageous speech, and it's partly his ignorance. If you read what they said about Vietnam, it had tough rhetoric, but it didn't ask for a deadline. It didn't ask for the overthrow of Thieu, all it said was American troops have to be withdrawn, but no deadline." Nixon called the PRC statements a "damn smart strategy on their part, instead of coming in and sucking around at the UN." Kissinger continued: "Now what I did is I gave Bush a statement, which repeats some of my rebuttals to Chou without labeling them as such, and a very brief one. It says we're disappointed that they came, instead of being—firing empty cannons of rhetoric. The reason I picked that is that when I complained about these placards [during his October trip to the PRC], Chou said to me, don't worry about it, it's just empty cannons." Kissinger and Nixon agreed that these statements should be made from New York. As Kissinger stated: "Well, moreover if we do it in Washington, they'll reply in Peking. If they do it in New York, they can reply in New York if they want to. Secondly, nothing would please the Russians more than for us to be in a public brawl with the Chinese. Thirdly, people are going to say what the hell is he going there for, if we now get into a huge brawl with them." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, November 16, 12:33–1:59 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 619–28) For Bush's remarks, see Tad Szulc, "US Assails China as 'Intemperate' in Speech at UN," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1971, pp. 1, 10.

444. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 17, 1971, 2336Z.

4314. Subj: PRC Statement in GA.

1. Bouayad (Algeria) approached MisOff November 17 to query why Bush had released statement to press re PRC's statement in plenary November 15.² MisOff replied that this was matter which had been considered very carefully and that statement by PRC could not be left unanswered in view US public opinion. Bouayad said that it fortunate US had not replied in GA to PRC statement since statement was generally mild and merely restatement of PRC policy.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers, Hong Kong, and Taipei.

² Bush's statement to the UN General Assembly is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 20, 1971, pp. 715–716.

2. MisOff acknowledged that this may be case, but that it [not?] possible for US overlook such a statement in view of lively interest by US public opinion in what PRC does and says. Bouayad said he understood US position and remarked that Vice FonMin Ch'iao Kuanhua had seen Algerian Perm Rep Rahal November 12 to go over speech. According Bouayad, speech was far more abusive against US and that Rahal had managed clean up speech to great extent. Only point which had been over-emphasized perhaps was question of Palestinians on which Algerians felt very strongly. He said this information should be closely kept. When asked whether Algerians being front runners for PRC del, Bouayad said no and that they speaking to PRC as equals. Bouayad further pointed out that PRC del is totally unfamiliar with procedures in UN and is still feeling its way around and thus consulting with friendly delegations.

Bush

445. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Participation of Republic of China in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's)

ISSUE

What should the U.S. position be on Chinese participation in the IFI's? Specifically, should the United States press to retain Taiwan in the IMF, World Bank Group and ADB—and if so, how hard—and how should the question of PRC entry be handled in this connection?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. An attached transmittal memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger, dated November 19, asking Kissinger to approve the Volcker-Samuels positions, bears Kissinger's handwritten note: "I agree but should we trigger the fight? HK." Another, undated, memorandum from Kissinger to Volcker and Samuels, in which he concurred with their recommendations, was not sent.

Because of the importance of the IFI's to development and to international monetary stability, and because of our own interest in Taiwan's economic well-being, we wish to encourage an equitable and internationally acceptable settlement of the Chinese representation issue in those institutions. ROC exclusion from the IFI's would probably jeopardize continued major U.S. support for the institutions. Moreover, entry of the PRC could create important operational and political problems for the IFI's, which would have to be carefully addressed.

Exclusion of the ROC would clearly be inequitable to a functioning economy and to a member in good standing of the institutions. Exclusion would cut the ROC off from IMF support as well as from important development financing from the World Bank Group and the ADB, could also damage the climate for private investment in Taiwan, and could give rise to additional financial demands on the United States to support Taiwan's economic viability. In addition, ROC exit from the IFI's could result in its virtually complete isolation from international organizations.

U.S. tactics in support of the ROC would have to be very carefully formulated, since if the issue were forced to a vote and if countries voted as they did in the UN, Taiwan might well be excluded in spite of the weighted voting system.

Options: Against this background, our broad options are:

1. *Remain silent as long as possible*, on the theories that the issue may simply recede with time, and that any positive action on the part of the United States may trigger a reaction. Although U Thant has called the UN China decision to the attention of the Fund and Bank by telegram, no member has yet indicated a desire to precipitate the issue in these organizations. This option appears inadvisable, however, because the lack of a clearly stated U.S. position could be interpreted by other governments, as well as Taipei, as an absence of U.S. concern.

2. *Make a serious effort to retain the ROC*, but not by a major diplomatic campaign as we mounted in the UN. If the PRC wishes to join, raise questions only of a technical nature concerning fulfillment of the obligations of membership (e.g., avoidance of discriminatory currency practices), applying the same standards we would to the membership application of any other Communist country. This is the favored option.

3. *Make an all-out effort to retain the ROC*, which may involve opposing PRC membership as incompatible with the objectives of the institutions. This alternative is considered inadvisable because defeat of an all-out effort would have far graver consequences for the IFI's themselves as well as for U.S. public and Congressional support for them than any other option.

Recommended Position: As noted, we recommend option 2. The specific tactics which we intend to initiate at once in support of this option are detailed in the Tab.²

Our intention would be to keep the primary focus of our activities on this issue within the framework of the institutions themselves, utilizing our IMF Executive Director as a principal channel of communication.³ As necessary, we would also make selected diplomatic contacts. At the same time, we would be exploring with the ROC various ways to adjust its position in the IFI's to reflect the size of its economy.

Our strategy on this issue in the Asian Development Bank should be similar to that for the IMF and World Bank Group.⁴

Paul A. Volcker
Nathaniel Samuels

² The attachments, none printed, are as follows: Tab: "U.S. Strategy for Continued ROC Membership in the IFI's"; Annex A: "Current Situation"; Annex B: "Foreign Policy Analysis in Support of the U.S. Strategy" (prepared by the Department of State); Annex C: "Background, Analysis and Options" (prepared by the Treasury Department); Annex D: "IMF and IBRD Staff Background Papers."

³ Membership in IMF is a prerequisite to membership in the World Bank Group. It is assumed, therefore, that the IMF will be the principal forum for resolution of this issue. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The principal difference in the factual situation regarding ADB is that, when ADB was established in 1966, the ROC became a member on the basis of the Taiwan economy only. [Footnote in the source text.]

446. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 20, 1971, 0227Z.

4408. PRC UN Del First Week Miscellany.

1. Summary. PRC UN delegation, statements about lack of preparedness and conservative approach to committee participation to contrary, has been active in UN corridors speaking to wide variety of newsmen and mostly third world delegates. In calls on various dele-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 22–2 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

gations in and outside UN, Chinese have listened to advice, asked many questions and kept silent on intentions. PRC apparently relying primarily on UN Secretariat for formal briefings and acquisition of documents. Delegation has shared USUN reluctance to take initiative on contacts, but Bush and Phillips have now met, respectively, Chiao and Huang. End summary.

2. In mild, low-key approach, Chinese have been going about process of learning the UN ropes. PRC delegates have made calls on many AR cosponsors, solicited and listened to advice, and have taken cautious first steps toward inserting selves into UN committee issues. Though many delegations (e.g. Norway, Algeria, Burundi) have taken initiative to put selves in position of intermediaries with USUN and presumably other delegations, Chinese appear to be relying on Secretariat for basic briefings and documents. (See septel for a Secretariat view of Chinese.)

3. In first week of UN participation, Chinese attended only plenary, SPC, First and Third Committees. Despite this limited activity, numerous Chinese delegates met in lounge and corridors with Afro-Asian and Latin American DeLOffs especially Chileans and Cubans. Their ease in moving about and talking with such variety of delegates has drawn on apparent linguistic versatility. Ubiquitous corridor motion justifies friendly delegation officer's remark that Chinese activity and its apparent relaxed manner already exceed that which characterized Soviet Delegation ten years ago. Indeed PRC may quickly approach USUN coverage of both UN committees and corridors.

4. Mild and cautious posture in UN chambers broken on November 19 with sharp exchange in First Committee between Chinese (An Chih-yuan) and Saudi Arabia (Baroody) over Chinese nuclear test. On same day, Chinese made dramatic appearance in Third Committee where they came down hard on side of Pakistan against India.

5. Chinese, while moving with ease around corridors, appear generally to be avoiding contact with American officials, but Chiao exchanged greeting with Bush in corridor prior November 15 plenary welcoming session and Huang shook hands with Phillips November 18. US press corps has confirmed in detail to us impression conveyed by published stories that Chinese very accessible to them. Li Wen-chuan, whose English considerably better than Kao's, appears be acting as Kao's assistant and interpreter in press contacts.

6. UN Protocol Assistant Castrounis informs us that PRC delegation staffing pattern published by *NY Times* November 18 reflects Secretariat's current understanding of delegation pigeon holes. He had been obliged to put this list together, however, on basis of "bits and pieces" elicited on various occasions from Chinese. When Chinese expressed surprise to him at publication of list, Castrounis asked if it contained any

errors. Chinese indicated list contained only one or two small mistakes. Castrounis tells us, however, that he confident only in list's identification of top ten names and he has pressed PRC delegation to let him know ASAP, for example, which of personnel were to be members of permanent mission. PRC has declined to indicate when this question would be sorted out.

7. Castrounis also states that below Huang Hua, only Chen Chu has ambassadorial rank. Chen is specifically designated as deputy for Security Council.

8. Castrounis has confirmed to us that in past week, Kao Liang has not been involved in protocol matters. These now seem to be handled largely by Hsu Hsin-hsi (when English required); Lin Chia-sen (French) and a third staffer, surnamed Liu, who speaks English.

9. Another Secretariat source informs us that Chou Nan will be handling military liaison work with Secretariat. PRC designated him in response to Secretariat request. We previously reported that Chou was functioning as delegation secretary, stressing internal coordination, and we assume that for present he doing both concurrently.

Bush

447. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

The People's Republic of China Enters the UN: Prospects for Her Political Posture, Staff Competence, Voting Patterns, and Issues

The rapid turn around on Chinese representation in the UN raises new prospects for the world organization. This memorandum sketches out Peking's likely political posture for the present UN session, notes

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, NSC Secretariat, Richard Solomon Chrons, 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Concurred in by Wright. Attached is a one-page chart dividing UN members into "Independents," "U.S. Supporters," "Sino-U.S. Cross-Pressured," "PRC Supporters," "Sino-Soviet Cross-Pressured," "Soviet Supporters," "U.S.-Soviet Cross-Pressured," and "Small Arab States."

the competence of her delegation staff, explores the issues that are likely to involve China's relations with the U.S. and USSR, and suggests possible voting patterns that may emerge in the General Assembly given the PRC's presence.

China's Political Posture: Defender of "Oppressed Nations" Against the "Super-Powers"

The tone of PRC public statements regarding her sudden acceptance by the UNGA as the sole legitimate government of China has been a self-righteous sense that her "legitimate rights" have been restored. The vote against the US-sponsored IQ resolution and subsequent support for the Albanian resolution is pictured in mainland media as representing "the defeat of might by justice."

Peking's international propaganda for several years has attempted to portray the PRC as defender of small countries against the bullying of the two super-powers. This line has been given particular emphasis in Chinese statements on her entrance to the UN, apparently in an effort to build a base of support from "third world" countries—and to undercut backing for the U.S. and USSR. "China will never be a super-power bullying other countries," asserted an official PRC statement of October 29. Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei told guests at an official banquet on November 3 that China had long "supported all the oppressed nations and peoples," and that "the one or two super-powers are finding it more and more difficult to engage in truculent acts of manipulating the UN and international affairs." And in an interview with a Japanese newsman made public on November 9, Chou En-lai stressed, "We must particularly and without fail respect the opinions of the small and medium-sized nations." In contrast, PRC propaganda has attempted to characterize official U.S. handling of the GA vote, and the subsequent reaction to the expulsion of the Nationalists, as "dollar blackmail" and crude political abuse.

The rapid sequence of developments in the UN seems to have confronted Peking with new opportunities and problems earlier than anticipated. A report from the Norwegian Ambassador to Peking characterizes the PRC as "completely unprepared to enter the UN this year;" and Chou En-lai has publicly stated that he was "surprised" by the "overwhelming majority" vote for the Albanian resolution.

The most notable political issue raised by Peking in the wake of the General Assembly vote has been an attack on the U.S. and Japan for allegedly promoting "Taiwan independence." Thus while Peking has succeeded in undercutting international support for the Nationalists, the Party leadership now sees that it has landed on the other horn of its dilemma of preventing the island, further severed from institutional and political ties to the mainland via the UN, from moving closer toward de facto independence.

How will Peking use its new UN presence to deal with the Taiwan issue, and other matters of concern to its security and international support? While this question is dealt with in a subsequent section of this memorandum on an issue-by-issue basis, it is our view that at least initially Peking will tread cautiously in a public forum where the ground is untested. Chou En-lai said as much in his interview with the Japanese newsman, stressing that China must “not be indiscreet and haphazard” as she enters the UN.

It seems that Peking initially will prefer to deal with her most sensitive issues through other channels. Most obvious is the new link to the USG. Peking has invested its public prestige heavily behind the coming Presidential visit (as most evident in the publicity given to Mr. Kissinger’s second visit to Peking); and given indications of Chou En-lai’s awareness of opposition to the President’s China policy from the American “right,” it seems likely that the PRC UN delegation will not seek to confront the U.S. on the most contentious matters during this session of the General Assembly. More likely, the PRC will want to explore such issues as Taiwan and Korea at the confidential and authoritative level of the Presidency in order to gain a sense of its options.

PRC Staff Competence in the UN: Starting with the “First Team”

A CCP cadre in Hong Kong has described the PRC delegation to the UN as China’s “first team.” Analysis of the professional experience of the eleven-man delegation reveals a number of characteristics which support such an assertion. Above all, this delegation is a “Chou En-lai” team. The senior members of the delegation have had long personal association with Chou, and four of the group have served in official ambassadorial roles in Chou’s Foreign Ministry.

This is a well-seasoned delegation: the senior members of the group have had personal experience in dealing with Americans going back to the days of the Yen-an “Dixie Mission” of 1944–1945, and the Marshall Mission of 1946. The broad international negotiating experience of the group includes participation in the 1950 UN China debate, the Panmunjom negotiations, the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea, the 1955 Bandung Conference, the 1961–1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, the Sino-Soviet Border negotiations, and the most recent “Kissinger” Sino-American contacts in Peking. All these negotiating situations, it might be emphasized, were directed by Chou En-lai.

A number of minor characteristics of the group include experience with press and propaganda work, and exposure to life in foreign countries including the U.S., USSR, Poland, Egypt, India, Germany, Canada, Ghana, Tanzania, and the Congo.

One member of the group has been identified as a member of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and

one is thought to be an intelligence operative with experience in dealing with "leftist" or revolutionary groups. It is rumored that the one female in the group, Wang Hai-yung, is a niece of Mao Tse-tung.

The fact that Huang Hua, the PRC's Permanent Representative to the UN, is transferring his base of operations from Ottawa to New York suggests that the PRC will actively use its UN presence to strengthen its influence in the world community. It also seems likely that the delegation will use its New York base to increase information gathering activities regarding the U.S., and as an informal diplomatic presence for contact with USG. In some measure, the PRC's UN presence removes any incentive for a reciprocal establishment of diplomatic relations (at whatever level) with the United States.

Peking Seeks to Build a Claque in the "Third World"

In a speech of November 8, CCP Politburo member Chang Ch'unch'iao asserted, "The trend of small and medium-sized countries to unite in opposition to the power politics of the super-powers is making headway with each passing day." Chou En-lai's active diplomacy among "third world" countries in preparation for the Chirep vote, reinforced by the increased level of PRC trade and economic aid programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America this year, indicates a determined effort to build a base of support among "non-aligned" countries which can be expressed, in part, through support for PRC policies in the UN.

Particular voting issues will obviously play a major role in defining country positions in the General Assembly. But it is likely that race and colonial questions will enable Peking to strengthen support from African and some Latin American states. Disarmament questions might give her the basis for gaining support against both the U.S. and USSR. Some economic and arms control and race issues may enable Peking to gain backing at U.S. expense.

UN Issues: Isolating the "Super-Powers"

Apparently earlier than expected the PRC will have to take positions on major international issues given its UN presence during the remaining session of this General Assembly. On the basis of those items now inscribed on the agenda for the 26th session, the following are our estimates of likely PRC positions:

Items 22, 38, 40, the Middle East Crisis, Palestinian Refugees, and Israeli Practices. This is a set of issues where the Chinese at no real expense to themselves, can assert themselves in a way which will place them on the right side of a problem with the Arab states and at the expense of the U.S. The PRC rebuff to the Israelis when they refused to accept their telegram of congratulations on the passage of the Albanian Resolution, and Chou En-lai's recent public criticism of Israel for

having started an “aggressive war,” indicate a willingness to “distinguish clearly between self and enemy” in the Middle East.

Items 23, 55, and 65, Colonial Independence, Portuguese and Southern Rhodesia Territories, and non-Self-Governing Territories. This is another set of issues where the Chinese, in this session of the GA, might very well take a “hard” position in order to gain support from “third world” countries without having to confront her major protagonists. Chou En-lai also signalled as much in this area when, in his interview with the Japanese journalist, he ridiculed Portuguese support for China’s admission to the UN by saying this would never deter her from attacking Portugal on the colonial question.

Other issues under this general rubric which might be used against the U.S. are related to our current negotiations over the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.

Items 27, 29, 32, and 97, Disarmament Issues, Nuclear Testing, and Use of the Seabed. Reporting has indicated that the Chinese are considering supporting the Soviet position on a World Disarmament Conference, but have not made up their mind on this question. While the Chinese might attempt to use disarmament discussions to “expose” the reluctance of the U.S. and USSR to agree to total and complete disarmament—a position Chou En-lai has espoused in the past—their own developing nuclear program puts them in the awkward position of wanting to test their own growing capabilities while damning the “super-powers.” They have long sought to justify their own weapons program as breaking the nuclear monopoly of the U.S. and USSR, but their position may now take new directions as the issues are defined by the world community.

In order to deal with contradictory pressures, the Chinese may seek to break the disarmament issue into more limited problem areas and take conflicting positions, such as seeking to justify their own testing program while supporting moves to make the seabed off limits to weapons placement. They can be expected to support regional disarmament or “weapons-free zone” proposals, such as Ceylon is considering for the Indian Ocean, and may attempt to inhibit their geographical rivals—the Indians and Japanese—from developing nuclear weapons in the context of a regional arms control program.

Items 37, 54, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination. Here is another issue area where at little cost to themselves the Chinese can take a strong moral position in order to win support in Africa. They might even feel justified in attacking the U.S. on the racism issue; but given our expectation that they will be cautious and protect the Presidential visit in the next few months, they are likely to leave this matter to the initiative of third parties.

Issues That Might Be Raised By the PRC:

In addition to the GA's present agenda, there are a number of contentious issues which, at some point, the Chinese may very well wish to raise in the UN. While we do not think they will do so this year for the political considerations already noted, it is at least useful to call these issues to attention:

—*Cambodia*. In their October 29 official statement, the Chinese gave unusual support to Prince Sihanouk for his efforts to have the PRC's "lawful rights" restored in the UN. This unusual degree of backing for an exile with limited opportunity to assist them in the UN prompted speculation that the Chinese might use the precedence of the GRC's expulsion to promote the expulsion of the Khmer Republic and have the Royal Government of National Union take over Cambodia's UN seat. There is, however, no evidence which would support this speculation, and it seems to us that at least in her first year of UN membership the PRC would be unlikely to promote such a contentious issue for an exile government. In future years, however, this situation might change, especially if the Lon Nol government falls.

—*Korea*. The blocking of inscription of the yearly Korean debate on this year's GA agenda has temporarily removed from consideration one of the most contentious issues in Sino-American relations. It is conceivable that the Chinese might seek to have the Korean question reinscribed this year, but considering the coming Presidential visit, and the weak international position of the North Koreans, we think this unlikely. In future years, however, as the Chinese gain a sense of their support in the UN and as international backing for Kim Il-song's government might grow, it seems expectable that the PRC will seek to have the UN Korean Command and UNCURK dissolved, and the resolution of 1950 branding them an aggressor for involving themselves in the Korean conflict, rescinded.

—*Territorial limit of 200 miles*. Peru and Ecuador are among the nations interested in having territorial waters extended out to 200 miles. The Chinese already have given public support to this position in their communiqué of November 2, issued when they established diplomatic relations with Peru, although the PRC itself claims a 12-mile territorial sea. Peking may well support the right of coastal states to determine their own territorial limits, a position which they could exploit at U.S. expense.

—*Taiwan*. In due time the PRC is very likely to raise issues relating to Taiwan—the island's legal status, and U.S. and Japanese treaties with the GRC—in the UN. Given the exceptional contentiousness of these matters, however, we do not anticipate moves in this direction before the Presidential visit, and until the Chinese

have tested sentiment in the international community. This, however, does not mean a moratorium on rhetoric.

The PRC vs. the Nationalists in the UN Specialized Agencies

The question of continued Nationalist Chinese (ROC) representation in UN specialized agencies will be coming up over the period of the next year. General Assembly action has already had the automatic effect of replacing Taipei with Peking in the UN subsidiary organs—the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, along with its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and its UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

Two specialized agencies, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), have already expelled the ROC and seated Peking. Taipei has also been deprived of observer status in GATT. The ROC probably has little or no chance for continued representation in four of the specialized agencies,² given the fact that a majority of their members voted for the Albanian Resolution. Sentiment seems to be running strong among members to bring the PRC into all parts of the UN at an early date, seemingly out of an undifferentiated enthusiasm to see the PRC represented, but possibly also to avoid complicating bilateral negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations or the conduct of the bilateral relationship if already established. Peking has undoubtedly reinforced this immediate post-victory emotion by its strong statement of October 29 calling for Taipei’s expulsion from all UN agencies forthwith—although not making this in any way a precondition for PRC participation in the UN.

The ROC probably has a somewhat better, but not very hopeful, chance in three other specialized agencies—the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Telecommunications Union. In these organizations substantive technical problems and certain procedural considerations give the ROC some opportunity to hold onto a seat, particularly if the agencies were to delay considering the Chirep problem until after the current enthusiasm for immediate PRC entry abates.

The ROC has a better opportunity to stay on in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group (the IBRD), the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation. The Communist states—with the exception of Yugoslavia—have remained aloof from these “capitalist” agencies, and we have no

² The World Meteorological Organization, World Health Organization, Universal Postal Union, and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. [Footnote in the source text.]

indication at this time that Peking will wish to join them. Thus we do not expect the pressure for the GRC's expulsion to be as great in these organizations, although member countries may respond to Peking's indirect pressures for expulsion for their own political reasons. The weighted voting in these agencies, moreover, does give some advantage to the GRC, and the past practice of not always following the General Assembly's lead would make the Chirep vote of less influence here. In addition, the ROC has sizeable outstanding financial obligations in at least two of these agencies.

Despite its public posture of adamant opposition to the Nationalists, the PRC will very possibly be content to passively allow the existing tide of opinion to work its will in most of the specialized agencies in the coming months. The ROC, for its part, has told us privately that, while it will publicly say it intends to make a stiff fight to hang on in every case, it will do so only where it has a reasonable chance of retaining a seat. It believes this approach will conserve its diplomatic capital for a campaign to hold and strengthen those bilateral relationships that it deems of real importance to its international position.

448. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 8, 1972, 0118Z.

065. Subj: ECOSOC—PRC Maiden Speech.

1. Summary: In maiden intervention as ECOSOC member, PRC, during second organizational meeting of 52nd ECOSOC on AM Jan 6, attacked "one or two superpowers" who have in past "monopolized" UN affairs. Characterized PRC as champion of small countries. USSR replied, criticizing PRC del for attempting create schism and bring disharmony to ECOSOC. Also chided PRC for attempting assume role as protector of third world. End Summary.

2. During procedural discussion AM Jan 6 on ECOSOC organizational meeting's agenda, PRC (An Chih-yen) made maiden intervention as ECOSOC member, attacking "one or two superpowers." Reviewing world situation last year and 26th GA, he said, it easy to see

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Unclassified. Repeated to Taipei, Moscow, and Hong Kong.

spectacular change in international arena and in UN. Asians, Africans and Latins becoming more united and have intensified their struggle against foreign domination and interference and against power politics and hegemony of superpowers. It is becoming progressively difficult for the “two superpowers” to monopolize UN affairs. An hit out at Indians as semi-superpower² which subjecting another country to subversion and dismemberment and has been condemned by overwhelming number of members of SC and UN and has been discredited and isolated. PRC has supported struggle of smaller countries for equality in UN and opposes the “one or two superpowers” who plunder, bully and oppose smaller countries. PRC supports principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and is in favor of economic cooperation and promoting human progress. An concluded that despite limited role it can play in UN, PRC willing do its best in ECOSOC and is ready to exert best efforts together with other dels.

3. In right of reply, USSR (Makeyev) quoted portion of Gromyko address to 26th GA (portion quoted was para immediately following Brezhnev quote) and said in light of this, PRC’s statement can be regarded only as desire bring about schism and create disharmony in ECOSOC, especially among UN members. Only criterion which can be used to assess states’ contributions in class, he said, and in this regard it important to distinguish between socialists—who follow illuminated policies—and capitalists, who oppose. “Superpowers” concept not popular in UN and cannot be successful. He asked PRC not to adopt position as protector of Third World—“They don’t need protectors or patrons.”

Bush

²The phrase in this sentence that reads: “An hit out at Indians as semi-superpower” originally read: “An hit out at Soviets as a superpower . . .” It was corrected in telegram 146 from USUN, January 14, and corrected by hand on telegram 065. (Ibid.)

449. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 18, 1972, 2216Z.

186. Subj: PRC's Interest in Senior Secretariat Post.

1. During talk with me Jan 14, SYG, among other things, told me he had recently discussed PRC position in Secretariat with Huang Hua.

2. When Huang Hua recently called on Waldheim to discuss Chinese interest in a top Secretariat position, he asked SYG what suggestions he had concerning an appropriate position. SYG proposed the Djermakoye job (Under SYG for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories). Waldheim said that Huang Hua listened politely but then made clear this would be unacceptable. The PRC, Huang Hua said, was interested in a senior political position. First he mentioned the Under SYG for Political and Security Affairs (occupied by Kutakovy). When Waldheim pointed out the impossibility of dislodging the Soviet incumbent, Huang Hua suggested the position of Chef de Cabinet as an alternative.

3. Huang Hua felt that the Indians were too strongly entrenched in the Secretariat and that Narasimhan should be replaced.

4. Waldheim made no commitments but told him that he would take into account the Chinese desire for a top level political position.

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

450. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-111

New York, January 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC in 26th GA: The Last Three Weeks

REF

USUN 4797²

1. Summary. The PRC Delegation's official participation in the final three weeks of the 26th UNGA was limited to irregular attendance in the Plenary and several Committees. During this same period, however, the Chinese actively participated in Security Council meetings, particularly those on the Indo-Pak War, which spilled over into the GA. The Delegation has charted an active course for the new year, accepting seats on ECOSOC, the Committee of 24, and ACABQ. On the social side, PRC diplomats continue to move with ease through the cocktail circuit and, although social contacts with American officers are limited, administrative dealings have grown. End summary.

2. In the final three weeks of the UNGA (December 4 to December 22), the PRC Delegation only irregularly attended meetings of the Plenary, Special Political Committee, First, Third and Fifth Committees, and did not participate in the other three Committees. While the vitriolic nature of their Security Council (SC) statements on the Indo-Pakistan War made these the most memorable, the Chinese also spoke on eight other issues in various UN bodies:

a) Indo-Pak War: After the U.S. took the initiative to bring the Indo-Pak War to the SC, the PRC adopted a one hundred percent pro-Pakistan position. Except for their statements in Plenary prior to and after the GA vote, the PRC spoke on the war during this period only in the SC. The issue marked an escalation of the ideological clash with the Soviets in the UN. (See USUN 4861.)³ The Chinese tabled their first (and to date only) UN resolution during the SC debate. They tabled the resolution for tactical reasons and did not press for a vote on their resolution. (Statements on this issue were made in Plenary on Decem-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Secret. Drafted by Sally Werner; cleared by David L. Stottlemeyer, Robert W. Kitchen, Ernest C. Grigg, Harry E. T. Thayer, and Michael H. Newlin; and approved by Newlin. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USNATO, and the SALT delegation.

² Dated December 6, 1971. (Ibid., UN 22-2 GA)

³ Dated December 8, 1971. (Ibid., DEF 18-3)

ber 7; statements were made in the SC on December 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 21.)

b) Admission of the United Arab Emirates to the UN: While the PRC approved the admission of this new state, they noted differences on the question of admission among the Arab States (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had opposed admission). They said they hoped the Arab States would resolve problems among themselves in the interest of Arab solidarity and the struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. (Statements made in the Committee on Admission of New Members and in the SC on December 7 and 8.)

c) Southern Rhodesia: The Chinese accused the UK of conniving with Ian Smith. The UK, they said, wished to end sanctions against the Salisbury regime in order to legalize racist rule. Thus, with the support of the UK and the US, Southern Rhodesia would become another South Africa. The PRC proclaimed its support for the struggle of the Zimbabwe people against colonialism. (Statement made in the SC on December 8.)

d) Middle East: The Israeli Zionists, with US support, launched the "war of aggression", the Chinese said, and the UN, without distinguishing between right and wrong, had merely passed resolutions encouraging aggression in the name of "maintaining peace." The PRC called on all countries to strongly condemn Zionist aggression, US imperialism and reactionary forces in Jordan for the repression of Palestinian people. Israeli Zionists must withdraw from occupied territories, while the legitimate rights of Palestinian and other Arab peoples must be decided by themselves. (Statement made in Plenary on December 8. The PRC abstained on the ME Resolution, which was adopted 79-7-36 (US).)

e) Disarmament (Resolution on Suspension of Nuclear Testing): The PRC delegate briefly stated China's opposition to the resolution: such a resolution was insignificant unless linked to complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and therefore these resolutions would not prevent the use of such weapons. He said China would vote against all drafts. (Statement made in First Committee on December 9. All three test ban resolutions passed. PRC and Albania cast the only negative votes.)

f) Cyprus: Explaining that the PRC felt the Cyprus Question was a left-over from imperialist rule, the Chinese said it should be settled by countries concerned on the basis of equality. (Statement made in SC on December 13. China was present but did not participate in the vote. Resolution adopted 14-0-0.)

g) World Disarmament Conference: With a brief recapitulation of Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua's bloc-busting speech of November 24, Permanent Representative Huang Hua stated his country's

prerequisites for a WDC which were a pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of all forces from nuclear bases outside their territories. Given this understanding of China's position, the PRC would vote in favor. (Statement made in GA on December 16. Resolution adopted unanimously.)

h) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) Elections: At the PRC's only appearance in the Fifth Committee, Counsellor Hsing Sung-yi expressed appreciation for his election to ACABQ. (Statement made on December 16. Hsing received 60 votes.) On the last day of the GA during an organizational meeting, Hsing, on invitation of the Chairman, attended the ACABQ closed meeting with his interpreter but did not participate in the discussion. He did make a brief non-substantive comment in Chinese.

i) Credentials Committee Report: China made a brief statement that it believed the delegations of the Khmer Republic and South Africa were unqualified to represent the peoples of their countries in the UN. (Statement made in GA on December 20.)

3. The PRC, initially slow to get involved in full discussions of the Secretary-General succession, did participate in five power consultations that began in the first week of December. The Chinese indicated a strong preference for an LA candidate, insisting that Herrera and Valdez, both of Chile, be included on the list. They did so despite clear indications that these candidates would receive a U.S. veto. In the five power talks, the Chinese argued that while geography should not be the overriding criterion in the selection of a Secretary-General, it should play a role. Having made this point in supporting the Latin Americans, they announced they could support Jakobson. The Chinese allegedly told the Finns and the Norwegians that they would veto Waldheim until the bitter end but did not carry through on this reported promise. Reasons for their final acquiescence in the selection of Waldheim are not known, but it is probable that they included all or a combination of the following: a continued veto would have isolated the PRC as the lone vote preventing selection of a successor; a disinclination to end the UNGA without naming a successor; and possibly an assumption that of the candidates that others would not veto, Waldheim would discharge the duties of Secretary-General in a manner most acceptable to them. The Chinese also reportedly told the Norwegians that it was necessary to have a new Secretary-General who could put the UN's house in order.

4. In the final phase of the UNGA the Chinese committed themselves to participation in a wide range of activities: the Committee of 24 (colonial issues); ECOSOC; the Special Committee on the Financial Situation of the UN; and the Host Country Committee. According to a Japanese Officer, the Chinese made their choices from a recommended

list prepared by the Secretariat. PRC delegates have also attended meetings of the Committee of 77 and its Asian sub-group, although not yet members of either. They have indicated interest in participating in the Law of the Sea Conference, the Seabed Committee and in the UN (Stockholm) Environment Conference (the Canadians have passed to the PRC all background documents on the latter conference).

5. According to some delegates, the PRC attendance and activity in the Committee of 77 may have been a factor in the 77's pressing successfully to increase Part VI of the regular UN budget (which provides funds for the regular program of technical assistance) from 6.9 to 8.7 million. Chinese support for the prevailing LDC attitude was a factor in overcoming the opposition of some of the larger developed countries, including the US, UK and USSR, which for various reasons would have preferred that such increases take the form of voluntary contributions. Some delegates also believe that China's support for the doubling of the membership of ECOSOC from 27 to 54 apparently influenced some of those LDC's which had previously opposed enlargement to change their votes. While clearly the activities of the fiscal, economic and social sides of the UN are of interest to the Chinese, limited knowledge of the workings of these UN organs may force them to move slowly. Their claims on jobs in the Secretariat dealing with these subjects will give a better idea of their intentions.

6. The Chinese continued their energetic and effective corridor activity during the month in connection with both GA and SC issues as well as in their assiduous pursuit of strengthened relations generally. Notably, during the India-Pakistan debate in the Security Council, the Japanese, to their obvious pleasure, found the Chinese delegates wholly accessible and engaged them often in informal discussions regarding the substance of resolutions as well as in more casual exchanges. The Belgians also found the Chinese to be approachable, dealing with them informally in the Council as they naturally would with other delegations. (The USSR and U.S. delegations were virtually alone in keeping their distance from the Chinese during the SC debate.)

7. With the annual increase in the pace of social events as the GA drew to a close, the Chinese correspondingly increased their attendance on the cocktail circuit. Several Chinese delegates met and spoke to American officers at these functions, which ranged from the celebration of Burundi's independence to a Thai National Day. The number of Chinese present at any given function appeared to be directly related to the warmth of the relationship between the PRC and the host government (e.g., wall-to-wall Chinese were present at the celebration of Tanzania's Independence Day). The Chinese seemed to pay particular attention to representatives of African and Latin American countries. At several functions the ubiquitous Kao Liang, PRC First Secretary, was observed singling out delegates to introduce them to Vice

Foreign Minister Ch'iao or Permanent Representative Huang. Although many delegates expressed apprehension over the ramifications for the UN of the Sino-Soviet clashes, the PRC version of personal diplomacy appears effective and to have assisted in establishing the warm relationships necessary for informal lobbying.

8. Although the PRC did not accept a USUN invitation to a reception for the Third Committee, as the UNGA neared completion the Chinese did demonstrate that they were prepared to deal directly with USUN rather than the Secretariat on host country and administrative matters. In addition, the PRC Mission has begun to mail, apparently regularly, English-language statements and selected newspaper editorials from the mainland press to USUN. The envelopes carry mimeographed address stickers and presumably this material is also sent to all UN Missions.

9. In the final three weeks, Chinese delegates were not active in tabling new resolutions or drafting suggestions. They did however, work closely with other missions, asking other delegations to communicate PRC positions on various issues. Pakistan transmitted PRC views on the texts of resolutions on the Indo-Pak War which came before the SC. The PRC passed on its intention to participate in the Seabed Committee meeting via Ceylon, although this interest was also volunteered to a USUN Mission officer when the latter assured a PRC delegate that the U.S. hoped the Chinese would not misconstrue a subsequent U.S. vote to mean opposition to the addition of the PRC to the Seabed Committee (see USUN 5105).⁴ The Chinese negotiated with other delegations the final compromise language of the WDC resolution (see USUN 5144).⁵

10. In all, the Chinese demonstrated considerable flexibility during the final phase of the 26th UNGA in the sense that they were willing either to vote in favor of or abstain on not-totally-acceptable resolutions, making an explanation of vote to record their reservations. Despite the heated atmosphere caused by the polemics during the WDC and the Indo-Pak debates, they quietly participated in the effort to find a generally acceptable WDC resolution. Their votes may reflect the effect of UN give-and-take and/or the results of soundings with the Third World. The Chinese continued to present themselves as insufficiently prepared to participate in this UNGA and there is no reason to doubt that this lack of preparation and familiarity with UN processes did limit their role. Also, if they had been better prepared they probably would have tried to get stronger language in resolutions

⁴ Dated December 17, 1971. (Ibid., POL 33–3)

⁵ Dated December 18, 1971. (Ibid., DEF 18–3)

rather than simply voting yes and explaining that they would have preferred stronger language.

11. During the new year the Chinese will be able to focus on questions that were overshadowed by issues before the 26th UNGA: the role they will play in the fiscal problems of the UN; the substantive Secretariat posts they want and for which they will be lining up qualified PRC nationals and adding to the number of qualified Chinese-language interpreters and translators. Now that the drama, pressure and public spotlight of the 26th UNGA has passed, the Chinese will have more time to attend to these and other questions.

Bush

451. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-792

New York, May 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC in the UN: Settling In

REF

USUN A-111, January 18, 1972²

Summary and Conclusions

This airgram reviews PRC activity at the UN since the end of the 26th UNGA. During this period the Chinese attended all Security Council meetings but have not fully participated in all of the various committees set up by the GA to which they have access. They have been slow to commit themselves on a number of UN issues such as peacekeeping and Law of the Sea and have adopted the tactic of “not participating” in a vote (as opposed to abstaining) when faced with a decision that pits their own “principles” against bi-lateral or Third World considerations. The one exception is on the demand for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Secret. Drafted May 19 by Sally Werner; cleared by Harry E. T. Thayer, A. Reynolds Smith, Robert B. Rosenstock, James C. Irwin, Richard E. Combs, David L. Stottlmyer, and Albert F. Bender; and approved by Michael H. Newlin. Repeated to London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, USNATO, and Hong Kong.

² Document 450.

complete cessation of UN ties with the ROC, a policy the PRC pursues apparently even at the risk of damaging its image with the Third World. We expect the Chinese to continue cautiously to expand their activities in the UN and to continue to use the tactic of “not participating”. Committee participation, restricted in part because of limited and inexperienced personnel, should widen now that the Chinese have permanent quarters, are able to assess their needs, and to house and support additional personnel. We have seen little active Chinese lobbying for a substantive item, although in two instances they made unsuccessful attempts to block Indian candidacy for seats on UN committees. The Chinese will of course continue to study and prepare for a maximum input into the UN, but we doubt that they will be able to mount a major campaign before 1973 because they need more UN experience in the art of lobbying, more established and wider bi-lateral channels, more experienced personnel in their Mission and better developed relations with the Secretariat. This inability to capitalize fully on UN membership in the present and immediate future, does not preclude the possibility that friends of the PRC will either on their own initiative and/or at Chinese behest work and achieve PRC objectives.

In assessing the performance of the Chinese over the past few months we believe that they have viewed and will continue to view US positions on substantive matters before the UN with skepticism and suspicion. While we expect social relationships between individual officers of the US and PRC Missions will improve and expand, we do not expect working/personal relationships soon to reach the point of easy informality now characterizing the contacts we have with certain key members of the Soviet Mission.³

PRC Participation in UN Committees

The frenetic activity and constant pressure for decisions was lifted from the Chinese with the end of the 26th UNGA on December 22. Since that time the PRC has continued selectively to limit its UN activity in New York. From January to April, twenty-nine General Assembly-created committees met in New York. The Chinese are members of only some of these but had they desired they could have attended as observers or otherwise indicated interest in virtually all of the committees. They chose, however, not to attend even all of those meetings of committees of which they are members. In January, for example, six committees of which the Chinese are members met; they

³ Telegram 38831 to USUN (and repeated to all posts), March 7, transmitted guidelines for use in both working and social contacts with PRC delegations at the United Nations or international conferences. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 22–2 CHICOM)

chose to attend two (ECOSOC and the Committee of 24). In February they attended only the Seabeds meeting. Restricted participation apparently was dictated, at least in part, by limited personnel. The Chinese have attended all meetings of the Security Council and its subcommittees—Sanctions Committee and the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia—and in March an observer attended all the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the UN (Stockholm) Conference on the Human Environment. In April a military contingent arrived from Peking to represent the PRC on the Military Staff Committee, which meets bi-weekly. Hsing Sung-yi, in an expert's capacity, attended the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in May. The PRC has continued to absent itself from the Committee on Relations with the Host Country and the Special Committee on the Financial Situation in the UN, although it is a member of both.

In public and private statements the Chinese continue to profess lack of UN experience and unfamiliarity with many UN issues. They are in fact still behaving as newcomers and show the awkwardness of dealing with an institution that has its own customs and idiom. Even an experienced diplomat like Huang Hua seemed uncertain of himself during the SC consultations on Lebanon and in one meeting indicated an unfamiliarity with procedure. The Chinese have stated that Peking has not decided on a number of questions concerning PRC participation and positions. Following UN day-to-day activity in detail obviously was not a priority in Peking before October 25, 1971. The Chinese continue to consult with various friendly missions, e.g., Romania, Yugoslavia and African and Latin American representatives. We understand from the Indians that the PRC's staunch ally, Albania, has its nose out of joint because they are not being consulted. (However, the Albanians recently were taking the initiative on the PRC's behalf to assure newsmen informally that Peking would not relax its support for Hanoi.)

[Omitted here are sections entitled "Issues," "Cutting ROC Ties With the UN," "Chinese Mission: Administration and Personnel," "PRC and the Secretariat," "Social/Official Contacts Between PRC and USUN Officers," and "Personal Diplomacy."]

Bush

452. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 26, 1972, 0430Z.

2617. Bush–Huang Meeting July 25. Ref: USUN 2551.²

1. Summary. Two-hour informal exchange of views on 27th GA between PRC PermRep Huang and Ambassadors Bush and Bennett covered India/Pakistan, Bangladesh, Middle East, UN financing (inc. 25 percent), peacekeeping, Charter review, SC expansion and other items. Huang reserved PRC position or recalled previous statements on bulk of principal issues and on subsidiary aspects but, of above topics, demonstrated particular curiosity about US attitudes toward Middle East, WDC, and Charter review. Said he had no instructions on PRC position regarding UN membership for Bangladesh and pointedly mentioned unresolved issue of Pakistani POW's. End summary.

2. Ambassador Bush met with PRC Ambassador Huang at Waldorf July 25 for two-hour informal exchange of views on 27th GA. Huang accompanied by Second Secretaries Chao Wei and Kuo Chia-ting. Ambassador Bennett and MisOff Thayer also participated.

3. Bush opened meeting by welcoming the opportunity to meet with Huang informally in fashion he has found useful for exchanging views with other major participants in UN. Bush said he had no intention of attempting to touch on all items on 27th GA agenda but would mention several that he felt might be of interest to Chinese and would welcome Huang commenting on these as he saw fit and perhaps introduce some items of interest to him.

4. US and Chinese Dels. Bush began by describing how US composes its delegation, noting the inclusion of Congressional as well as public members. In brief exchange on this topic, Huang said he had received no word yet on who would be coming from Peking to head delegation which so far composed only of himself, Ambassadors Chen Chu and Wang Jun-sheng.

5. India/Pakistan/Bangladesh. Bush said that we view Simla conference as a constructive first step by Bhutto. We hope that further progress would be made in bilateral forum and do not anticipate India/Pakistan as important issue on 27th GA. However, he continued, we expect that Bangladesh will apply for membership and we will

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Confidential; Noform. Telegram 2619 from USUN, July 26, asked that telegram 2617 be marked Noform. (Ibid.)

² Not printed.

support such an application this fall. Huang said that the Simla meeting seems to be a beginning but Simla "is a far distance from solution" of the problems. Regarding matters to be resolved, he mentioned in particular the issues of Kashmir and prisoners of war, including the question of trials in East Pakistan". Huang concluded by stating that while the Simla conference represented progress, there is still much to do to carry out last year's resolutions on India/Pakistan, including that by the GA. In response to a direct question, Huang said that he had received no instructions on the question of Bangladesh membership.

6. Middle East. Bush said that we anticipate that Arab states probably will want a full Middle East debate this year, as last. We do not yet know what form resolution or the debate will take and thus do not have any fixed position. However, he did not anticipate the US taking a leading role in seeking debate and our posture will principally be to wait and see. Picking up Bush's brief reference to formulation by Jarring of his report to the GA, Huang raised possibility that Jarring's forthcoming visit to New York would lead to contact with both parties to the dispute, to which Bennett replied that we understood that one reason he is returning is to survey ground to see what might be done. Huang said that it is his impression that Egypt had asked through SYG for reactivation of Jarring Mission. Bush reviewed history of 4-power talks since early last year. Regarding question of reactivating 4/5-power talks, Huang said that PRC has general position that it does "not regard Resolution 242 to be fair. That is why we have reservations regarding the previous 4-power talks". Huang said he does not have instructions yet regarding the future. He added that the PRC attitude toward Jarring was of course identical with that toward Resolution 242.

7. Recent ME developments. Huang asked Bush if USG sees any new proposals about to come forward as result of new developments in Middle East (removal of Soviet personnel). Bush said we still analyzing recent events carefully but have come to no fixed conclusions. Bush asked Huang how Chinese assessed significance of these developments. Huang recalled Chou En-lai's 20th anniversary message to Egypt, noting that this message expressed support for Egypt's action. He said that Chinese would have to wait and see as to whether or not there are new initiatives as a result. He asked for US views on this. Bush reiterated that we had come to no conclusions yet and suggested that perhaps he and Huang might pursue this at later stage. Bush mentioned to Huang in passing that USG views recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Yemen as a contribution to reduction of tensions in Middle East; even though not of major significance, it was also an expression of fact that tensions not as great today as they were previously.

8. UN financial questions. Bush provided overview of US concern over UN financing, mentioning our desire to control excesses of

bureaucracy, to support efforts to minimize budgetary increases and to reduce UN inefficiency in general. He also briefly reviewed history of US contributions to UN, including changes in our previous assessments, current share of total contributions to UN and Lodge Commission recommendations. Bush told Huang that he would have difficult assignment at 27th GA of implementing policy that no nation should pay more than 25 percent. Bush described Congressional attitude toward this question and noted that we are seeking Congressional agreement to permit us to negotiate appropriate reduction with UN membership. He explained that new UN members and economic growth of others could help us meet target. Bush acknowledged that this would not receive enthusiastic response from UN, but stressed that this is important issue for USG and we obliged to discuss frankly with others. He pointed out that Lodge Commission also recommended increase in voluntary contributions and noted that US had been particularly responsive to needs in this area.

9. (Finances—continued). Stating that he would be pleased to discuss this further with Huang, Bush asked if Huang had any particular thoughts to convey on question of assessments or contributions. Huang said that he did not follow all financial questions in detail but pointed out that Chinese Delegation had already made known PRC reservations about certain UN financial questions. After mentioning Ambassador Algaard's efforts, Huang said that one question that had been raised was that regarding the "several million dollars left over from the Chiang Kai-shek clique". Huang went on to say to Bush: "As you know, we were deprived of our UN seat since 1949, so we cannot assume the responsibility for payment. The Middle East and Congo operations were the result of resolutions passed before the resolution of rights of PRC in UN. As you know, we have differences of views about this in the UN. We have stated our views regarding this. This is our position regarding contributions to the UN. As to future contributions, we have not settled this question". Bush and Bennett pointed out that the matter of contributions would come up next spring and that assessments were now fixed through 1973. Bush recalled Ambassador Algaard's proposal on the handling of certain contentious funds. We believe, Bush said, that Algaard was on the right track but we understand that the Soviet Union was not sympathetic. Bush added that we understand that SYG was to raise this question in Moscow. After brief reference to working capital fund and other problems, Bush asked if PRC had submitted economic data to provide basis for assessment. Huang said that PRC had been requested to provide data for general purposes "but not in connection with PRC contributions". At later point in conversation and responding to Huang's question as to what Bush saw as most important issues coming before 27th GA, Bush told Huang that

he thought broad range of financial questions must be considered by whole membership and these would be among most significant issues.

10. Peacekeeping. Bush said we hope for progress in working out guidelines for peacekeeping operations but noted that we had long-standing differences of views with Soviets over role of SYG and the Security Council. US and USSR not totally deadlocked over this question but, nevertheless, we foresaw no early breakthrough. Bush solicited Huang's comment on the Committee of 33 and on UN peacekeeping role. Huang indicated some surprise that there had not been more result from the Peacekeeping Committee's work and stated flatly that PRC was not planning to get involved in that committee. Bush confirmed, in response to Huang's query, that Peacekeeping Committee's report would be made to 27th GA.

11. Law of the Sea. Bush mentioned briefly our belief that LOS was highly important effort and that we were optimistic that current preparatory committee meeting in Geneva would make significant progress. He asked Huang's views. Huang replied simply that PRC had "made clear our basic position on LOS in conference in New York". (Huang revealed no interest in this subject.)

12. Role of ICJ. Bush described our interest in greater role for ICJ, mentioning possibility of establishment of committee to study ICJ. He asked if Chinese planned to offer candidate for ICJ and if PRC had any views on activation of the court. Huang replied merely that PRC "has not considered putting forward a candidate", and he would not offer any views, despite mild prodding on Court's role.

13. Participation in UNGA committees. Noting that ICJ question would be considered by Sixth Committee, Bennett asked Huang if PRC, which had not participated in Sixth Comite last year, would be doing so this year. Later in conversation, Bennett also asked about Fourth and Fifth Committees. Huang gave precisely same reply to both questions. "Maybe we will take part in Sixth Comite/Fourth and Fifth Comite at this GA".

14. International Law Commission. Bush briefly raised question of ILC and protection of diplomats, noting that we believe convention would be valuable contribution and that we plan to support it. Huang replied only that PRC "had not taken part in ILC."

15. ECOSOC reform. Bush and Bennett described briefly our interest in ECOSOC reform and solicited Huang's comments. Huang recalled that the Chinese had supported the expansion of ECOSOC, but said his delegation in New York had "no specific views" on various questions regarding institutional reform.

16. World Disarmament Conference. Huang introduced WDC question, noting that PRC's basic views made clear at 26th GA and asking USG attitude. Bush mentioned US-Soviet communique statement

that WDC could play role at appropriate time, adding that we do not think however, that that time had come and we would oppose a premature effort to convene WDC. Huang pressed for clarification on timing and on attitude of US allies. Bush and Bennett noted that we would wish to examine prospect closely to see what could be accomplished and made point that we believe progress on disarmament matters best made by taking small steps one at a time. They said that European allies generally share our view. Huang asked if Bush anticipated Soviets would make particular new proposals on WDC, to which Bush said we had no specific estimate. Huang then went on to say that WDC this year may be “an essential problem” for 27th GA. Problem was left over from 26th GA when PRC position was clearly stated. PRC “favors disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. In carrying out our limited tests, PRC has committed itself not to be first to use nuclear weapons. So, if any real progress is to be made then serious attention has to be paid to nuclear disarmament. Thus, to insure success of WDC, prerequisite must be met and only then can WDC be correctly oriented, so it would not be a club for endless debates. In this connection (Huang concluded) we do not agree with the Soviet approach.”

17. Charter Review. Huang noted that several replies had been sent to SYG on Charter review, but not many; however, many other states had “expressed oral views”. He asked US attitude. Bush told Huang that we questioned advisability of engaging in broad review of Charter since such an exercise would be fraught with difficulties, including unproductive and divisive debate. Bush added that US was not obstructionist regarding possible changes, but we believed case by case method was best approach to Charter revision. We told Huang that we would be responding to SYG having these considerations in mind. Huang said he would appreciate Bush’s clarification of significance for Charter reviewing exercise of (a) proposal to revise term “enemy state”; (b) expansion of SC; (c) a permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent membership; and (d) veto power. In subsequent exchanges, we made clear we did not expect to abandon veto, that we understood some others were interested in questions involving first three points but would await clarification from them. Huang, declining to give any view himself on four points (including veto) said only that PRC would have to study others’ views before taking any position, stressing that PRC “must study whole question of Charter review”.

18. Department repeat as desired.

Bush

453. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 9, 1972, 1700Z.

2774. Subj: Contributions of PRC to UN Regular Budget.

1. MisOfs informed confidentially by UN Deputy Controller (Ziehl) that PRC has agreed to pay all but about \$400,000 of its 1972 assessment of \$7.1 million. Ziehl originally anticipated PRC payment only in neighborhood of \$5.2 million but as a result of extended negotiations Ziehl conducted with PRC Mission has obtained higher figure.

2. Amounts withheld by PRC wld cover its share of items included in UN regular budget which it objects to in principle on political grounds, i.e., UNCURK, UN bonds, Korean cemetery and about \$900 for administrative costs of 3 field offices of UNHCR.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential.

454. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 9, 1972, 2340Z.

3773. Subj: Statement of PRC Rep in UN Fifth Committee.

Summary: PRC Rep made first statement in UN 5th Comite (administrative and budgetary questions) since PRC became member UN. End summary.

1. PRC (Hsing Sung-yi) made first statement in 5th Comite since PRC became member UN. Stated PRC has paid all contributions due regular budget and working capital fund since admission PRC. Notwithstanding PRC developing country, it plans raise contribution level to 7 per cent assessed UN budget within next 5 years in view economic development.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Unclassified. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, and Geneva.

2. PRC cannot be held responsible in any way for arrearages in contributions of “Chiang clique.” Amount due from “Chiang clique” shld not have been reflected in budget as arrearage of PRC. Expects correction to be made by end of year.

3. Financial difficulties of UN are due its sending military forces which interfered in internal affairs of nations during time PRC denied its lawful rights. PRC ready join other member states in exploration ways of overcoming deficit.

4. Noted UN budget includes such expenses as bond issue, Korean cemetery, UNCURK, and UNHCR programs Macao. Illegal expenditures for Korean programs shld have ceased long ago and shld be stopped forthwith. Assistance to so-called Tibetan refugees constitutes meddling in Chinese internal affairs. Hong Kong and Macao are Chinese territory and Chinese there are not refugees. Demanded immediate cessation all UNHCR activities in Macao, India, and Kathmandu and deletion expenditures from budget.

5. Stated UN has 5 official languages and all except Chinese are working languages. Called for placing consideration of approval Chinese as working language on 1973 GA agenda, use of Chinese as working language wld improve efficiency of organization. Called also for greater UNSec efficiency.

Bush

455. Report Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 1973.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO SECURE DUAL REPRESENTATION
FOR CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
(NOVEMBER 1970–OCTOBER 1971)

SUMMARY

On August 2, 1971, Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced that the United States would support a dual representation solution to the Chinese representation problem at the upcoming 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary's announcement marked a departure from a policy which had endured for more than twenty years. For the first time since the Chinese representation question had become an annual fixture in the General Assembly, American officials dropped their opposition to the seating of the People's Republic of China and concentrated upon preserving a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China. In part, the revision of American policy was prompted by the climate of opinion which had developed in the General Assembly in favor of seating the People's Republic of China. In a larger sense, the adoption by the United States of a dual representation policy was part of the Nixon administration's continuing effort to adjust to the reality of mainland China without severing American ties with the Government on Taiwan. On July 15, President Nixon dramatically underscored his desire to achieve a détente with the People's Republic of China by announcing his intention to visit Peking. In making his announcement, the President offered the assurance that the United States did not intend to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China at the expense of old friends. Secretary Rogers' subsequent announcement of a policy favoring membership in the United Nations for both Chinese Governments was in the spirit of the President's assurance.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Top Secret; Nodis. This is Research Project No. 1034, prepared in the Historical Studies Division of the Historian's Office. As noted in the Foreword to the 172-page report (not printed): "This study was undertaken in response to a request from the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The research and writing were done by Louis J. Smith under the immediate direction of Homer L. Calkin, Chief of the Special Studies Branch, Historical Studies Division." The study focuses on Department of State efforts and relied on materials now in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, but does not take into account documentation from the White House or National Security Council.

The change in policy which the Secretary announced on August 2 had been under active consideration in Washington for more than eight months. On November 19, 1970, the National Security Council had requested interdepartmental studies treating China policy in general and the Chinese representation question in particular. The studies had to take into account Premier Chou En-lai's vigorous campaign to break the diplomatic isolation which the People's Republic of China had known during the period of the "Cultural Revolution", a campaign which bore important fruit on November 20, 1970 when a majority of the members of the General Assembly voted for the first time to seat the representatives of the Peking Government in the United Nations (the Republic of China retained its place because of the General Assembly's determination that any change in the representation of China constituted an "Important Question" and required a two-thirds majority to effect). Also, American officials were inclined to encourage the People's Republic of China to play a larger, more normal diplomatic role. Specialists throughout the United States Government agreed that it would be very difficult and unwise to continue to exclude Peking's representatives from the United Nations. At the same time, those participating in the policy review agreed that the United States should continue to support the international position of the Republic of China. A dual representation approach to the problem of China's seat in the United Nations offered an obvious answer. Dual representation was an idea which had enjoyed some support in the General Assembly in years past as an equitable solution which would contribute to a more universal organization. The arguments for and against a change to a dual representation policy were laid out for President Nixon by his advisers at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 25, 1971.²

Similar policy reviews were taking place in other capitals. American officials were most interested in the conclusions being reached in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which had been the closest associates of the United States in the previous strategy of defining Chinese representation as an "Important Question". They were also concerned about Belgium, which was the country most prominently identified with the concept of dual representation, and about Great Britain, which was hinting that it intended to throw its considerable weight behind the "Albanian" resolution to give the Chinese seat to Peking. Conversations on Chinese representation with these countries could not be postponed until the policy review had been completed in Washington. As early as December, 1970, cautious and non-committal discussions had begun. By the middle of March, there was general agreement

² See Document 342.

among the specialists in Washington, Wellington, Canberra, and Tokyo that a dual representation approach offered the best hope of preserving a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China. The Belgian Government indicated that it was anxious to play a part in promoting a dual representation resolution. Only the British, among the allies initially sounded, expressed no sympathy for what they saw as a "two-China" solution.

Before a dual representation policy could be adopted, the Republic of China had to lend at least tacit approval to the idea. Less than two weeks after the vote on the Albanian resolution at the 25th General Assembly, Secretary Rogers began the task of persuading the Taipei Government that a new approach to Chinese representation was necessary. At first, the line taken by officials in Taipei was that, with a redoubled effort, the usual Important Question strategy could be made to prevail again. Gradually, however, indications grew that the Government of the Republic of China recognized the situation and would make a realistic effort to preserve its place in the United Nations. In April, Robert D. Murphy, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, traveled to Taipei as the personal representative of President Nixon to discuss Chinese representation with President Chiang Kai-shek. Ambassador Murphy told Chiang that the United States intended to continue to honor its treaty commitments and to provide military assistance to the Republic of China. Thus reassured, Chiang implied that he could accept a dual representation resolution which did not affect the Republic of China's seat on the Security Council. Murphy assured Chiang that the United States would oppose any effort to deprive the Republic of China of its Security Council seat. Chiang's conversation with Murphy set a standard for the remarkable flexibility which the Republic of China demonstrated throughout the dual representation effort. American officials recognized, however, that the flexibility of the Republic of China was never more than tactical, being based on the calculation that Peking might reject any dual representation resolution and would certainly refuse an offer which did not include the Security Council seat.

The Republic of China's cooperation was essential to the process of developing a dual representation policy. American officials recognized that the commitment to defend the Republic of China's seat in the Security Council might not be possible to sustain, but they were willing to make an effort. A full-scale canvass of opinion among the members of the General Assembly was required to determine the type of dual representation formula which would command the support necessary to succeed. Until July, however, the White House restrained the State Department from discussing the Chinese representation question with more than a handful of close allies. The President's announcement on July 15 of his intention to visit Peking made it evident

that the decision on Chinese representation had to be timed to coordinate with a larger reordering of U.S. policy on China. The President's announcement freed the Department to move forward with the dual representation initiative.

The lobbying effort in support of the dual representation approach began immediately after the Secretary's announcement of policy on August 2. Department specialists were aware that time was short by then. Nonetheless, they had to struggle with the difficult co-sponsorship problem before they could formulate a definite dual representation resolution and lobby in support of an established position. The key to unraveling the co-sponsorship problem lay in the matter of China's Security Council seat. Many of the countries important to the dual representation effort indicated that they would not co-sponsor unless the dual representation resolution contained a recommendation that the People's Republic of China be given the seat in the Security Council. Although the Republic of China remained opposed, United States officials finally decided that they would have to support a "complex" dual representation resolution. On September 10, telegrams announcing the American decision went to potential co-sponsors, and the co-sponsorship problem fell into place. The most encouraging development occurred on the day on which the dual representation resolution was submitted to the United Nations Secretariat, along with a revised Important Question resolution. On that day, September 22, the Government of Japan put aside the serious domestic problems occasioned by the controversy over Chinese representation and agreed to join the list of co-sponsors.

Once the resolutions were formulated, and the co-sponsors established, the State Department could turn its full attention to the business of building support for the dual representation initiative. An intense, world-wide campaign was mounted in conjunction with the other principal co-sponsors, and it was maintained until the votes were taken on October 25. The effort was mounted in the face of daunting odds and narrowly failed.

The sponsors of the Albanian resolution were able to build upon a base which had been established over the years and upon momentum carrying over from the majority support they had enjoyed at the 25th General Assembly. They profited from Peking's continuing campaign to improve its bilateral relations and from the reiterated insistence that the People's Republic of China would never enter the United Nations under the terms of a dual representation resolution. The adamant stance taken by the People's Republic of China did much to offset the appeal which dual representation had for those countries concerned with equity and a universal world organization. A number of conservative countries, on the other hand, had no interest in pursuing

the ideal of universality at the expense of welcoming representatives from Peking into the United Nations. Those supporting dual representation had little time to alter preconceptions and establish the credibility of an untested proposition. Throughout the lobbying campaign, United States officials had to work against the widespread suspicion that President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking had been paved by a secret understanding with regard to Chinese representation. In the circumstances, the remarkable thing about the effort to preserve a place for the Republic of China in the 26th General Assembly was not that it failed, but that it failed so narrowly.

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