

THE PRESIDENT'S READING COPY

TV REPORT -- June 3, 1970

One month ago, I announced a decision ordering American participation with South Vietnamese forces in a series of operations against Communist-occupied areas in Cambodia which have been used for five years as bases for attacks on our forces in Vietnam.

1. This past weekend, in the Western White House in California, I met with Secretary Laird, General Abrams and other senior advisors to receive a firsthand report on the results of this operation.

(1) Based on General Abrams' report, I can now state that this has been the most successful operation of this long and difficult war.

Before going into the details which form the basis for this conclusion, I believe it would be helpful to review briefly why I considered it necessary to make this decision; what our objectives were; and the prospects for achieving those objectives.

1. On April 20, I announced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within a year -- which will bring the total number withdrawn, since I have taken office, to 260,000 men.
2. I also reaffirmed our proposals for a negotiated peace.
3. At the time of this announcement, I warned that if the enemy tried to take advantage of our withdrawal program by increased attacks in Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam in a way that endangered the lives of our remaining men in Vietnam I would, in my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, take strong action to deal with that threat.
 - (1) Between April 20 and April 30, Communist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia.
 1. Their objective was unmistakable -- to link together bases they had maintained in neutral Cambodia for five years in flagrant violation of Cambodian neutrality.

2. The entire six-hundred-mile Cambodian-South Vietnam border would then have become one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces.

(2) This posed an unacceptable threat to our remaining forces in South Vietnam.

1. It would have meant higher casualties.

2. It would have jeopardized our program for troop withdrawals.

3. It would have meant a longer war.

4. And -- carried out in the face of an explicit warning from this government -- failure to deal with this enemy action would have eroded the credibility of the United States before the entire world.

After intensive consultations with my top advisors, I directed that American troops join the South Vietnamese in destroying these major enemy bases along the Cambodian frontier.

1. I said then: "Our purpose is not to occupy these areas. Once the enemy forces are driven out of the sanctuaries and once their supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw."

(1) That pledge is being kept.

2. I said further: "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam."

- (1) That purpose is being advanced.

As of today I can report that all our major military objectives have been achieved.

1. 43,000 South Vietnamese took part in these operations, along with 31,000 American troops.

- (1) Our combined forces have moved with greater speed and success than we had planned;

1. We have captured and destroyed far more in war material than we anticipated;

2. And American and allied casualties have been far lower than we expected.

- (2) In the month of May, in Cambodia alone, we captured a total amount of enemy arms, equipment, ammunition and food nearly equal to what we captured in all of Vietnam all last year.

fontaine

Here is some film of the war material that has been captured.

(Film starts after above sentence)

1. First, the ammunition.

(1) We have captured more than ten million rounds of ammunition -- equal to the enemy's expenditures for nine months.

(2) Here, also, you will see a few of the over fifteen thousand rifles and machine guns captured.

1. They will never be used against American boys in Vietnam.

(1) This reality was brought home directly to me a few days ago.

1. I was talking with a union leader from New York. His son died in Vietnam this past February. He told me that -- had we moved earlier into Cambodia -- we might have captured the enemy weapon that eventually killed his son.

Handwritten notes:
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2. Now, you will see some of the heavy mortars, rocket launchers and recoilless rifles that have shelled U. S. base camps and Vietnamese towns.

(1) We have seized over two thousand of these, along with ninety thousand rounds of ammunition -- what the enemy shoots in a year.

1. Had this war material made its way into South Vietnam and been used against American and allied troops, U. S. casualties would have been vastly increased.

3. We have also captured more than eleven million pounds of rice -- some of it is shown here -- this is more than enough rice to feed all the enemy's combat battalions in Vietnam for over three months.

(1) This rice will not be feeding enemy troops now, however -- but rather war refugees.

(End of Film)

With the rainy season now beginning, it will take the enemy months to rebuild his shattered installations and to replace the equipment we have captured or destroyed.

1. The success of these operations to date has guaranteed that the June 30 deadline I set for withdrawal of all American troops from Cambodia will be met.

General Abrams advises me that

- (1) Seventeen thousand of the 31,000 American troops who entered Cambodia have already returned to Vietnam.

- (2) The remainder will return *by* before the end of the month.

1. This includes all American ~~logistics support~~ *logistics* and military advisory personnel. *are*

- (3) The only remaining American activity in Cambodia after July 1 will be air missions to interdict the movement of enemy troops and material where I find this is necessary to protect the lives and security of our forces in South Vietnam.

~~South Vietnamese forces are planning to leave Cambodia on a similar timetable.~~

1. Our discussions with the South Vietnamese Government indicate that their primary objective remains the security of South Vietnam, and their activity in Cambodia in the future -- after their withdrawal from ^{the}~~these~~ sanctuaries -- will be determined by the actions of the enemy.

When this operation was announced, critics charged that it would increase American casualties -- widen the war -- lengthen our involvement -- postpone troop withdrawals.

1. But the operation was taken for precisely the opposite reasons -- and it has had precisely the opposite effect.

Let us examine the long-range impact of this operation.

1. First, we have eliminated an immediate danger to the security of the remaining Americans in Vietnam, thereby reducing future casualties.
 - (1) Seizing those weapons and ammunition will save American lives.
 - (2) Because of this operation, American soldiers who might not otherwise be ever coming home -- will be coming home.

2. Secondly, we have won precious time for the South Vietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry the burden of their national defense so that our American forces can be withdrawn.

(1) From General Abrams' reports and from our advisors in the field, one of the most dramatic and heartening developments of the operation has been the splendid performance of the South Vietnamese army in the field.

1. Sixty per cent of all the troops involved in the Cambodian operations were South Vietnamese.

(1) The effectiveness, the skill and the valor with which they fought far exceeded expectations.

(2) Confidence and morale in ARVN has been greatly bolstered.

(2) This operation has clearly demonstrated that our Vietnamization program is succeeding.

3. Third, we have insured the continuance and success of our withdrawal program.

(1) On April 20, I announced an additional 150,000 American troops would be home by next Spring.

1. As a result of the success of the Cambodian operations, Secretary Laird has resumed the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.

- (1) Fifty thousand of the one-hundred-fifty-thousand I announced on April 20 will now be out by October 15th.

As long as the war goes on, we can expect setbacks and reversals.

1. But, following the success of this effort, we can say with confidence that we will keep our timetable for troop withdrawals.

Secretary Rogers and I have been particularly encouraged by the resolve of eleven Asian countries at the Djakarta Conference to seek a solution to the problem of Cambodia.

1. Cambodia offers an opportunity for the eleven nations, as well as other countries of the area, to cooperate in supporting the Cambodian Government's efforts to maintain Cambodian neutrality, independence and territorial integrity.

- (1) We shall do what we can to make it possible for these Asian initiatives to succeed.

To the North Vietnamese tonight, I say again -- the door to a negotiated peace remains wide open.

1. Every offer we have made at the conference table, publicly or privately, I herewith reaffirm.
2. We are ready to negotiate, whenever they are ready to negotiate.

(1) However, if their answer to our troop withdrawal program, and to our offer to negotiate, is to increase their attacks

demonstrated, in a way that jeopardizes the safety of our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall *as my action 5 weeks ago* take strong and effective measures ~~again as I did five weeks ago~~ to deal with that situation.

When I first announced the decision on Cambodia, it was subjected to an unprecedented barrage of criticism.

1. I want to express my deep appreciation tonight to the millions of Americans who supported me then and who have supported me since in our efforts to win a just peace.

(1) But I also understand the deep divisions in this country over the war.

1. I realize many Americans ^{are} ~~were~~ deeply troubled.

(1) They want peace.

(2) They want to bring the boys home.

2. Let us understand once and for all that no group has a monopoly on these concerns.

(1) Every American shares those desires;

I share them.

Our differences are over the best means to achieve a just peace.

1. As President, I have a responsibility to listen to those who disagree with my policies.

(1) But I also have a solemn obligation to make the hard decisions which I find are necessary to protect the lives of the four hundred thousand young Americans remaining in Vietnam.

When I spoke to you a month ago, a clear threat was emerging in Cambodia to the security of our men in Vietnam.

1. If an American President had failed to meet this threat to 400,000 American men in Vietnam, would those nations and peoples who rely on America's power and treaty commitments for their security -- in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East or other parts of Aisa -- retain any confidence in the United States?

- (1) That is why I deeply believe that a just peace in Vietnam is essential, if there is to be a lasting peace in other parts of the world.

With this announcement tonight, we have kept the pledge I made when I ordered the operation, that we would withdraw from Cambodia on a scheduled timetable -- just as this Administration has kept every pledge it has made to the American people regarding the war in Vietnam and the return of American troops.

Let us look at the record.

1. In June of 1969 I pledged a withdrawal of 25,000 troops.
 - (1) They came home.

2. In September of the same year, I said I would bring home an additional 35,000 American men.

(1) They came home.

3. In December I said an additional 50,000 Americans were coming out of Vietnam.

(1) They, too, have come home.

There is one basic commitment yet to be fulfilled.

1. I have pledged to end this war.

(1) I shall keep that promise.

1. But I am determined to end the war in a way that will promote peace rather than conflict throughout the world.

2. I am determined to end it in a way that will bring an era of reconciliation to our people -- and not a period of furious recrimination.

In seeking peace, let us remember that at this time only this Administration can end this war and bring peace.

1. We have a program for peace -- and the greater the support the Administration receives in its efforts, the greater the opportunity to win that just peace we all
- (2) Peace is the goal toward which we are working.
- (3) Peace is the goal this government will pursue until the day that we reach it.

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