UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

July 12, 2001

Otto L. Maynard, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

SUBJECT: NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-482/01-02

Dear Mr. Maynard:

On June 30, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with Mr. R. Muench and other members of your staff on July 2, 2001.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. The violation is being treated as a noncited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV, which has been entered into your corrective action plan, is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-482
License: NPF-42

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-482/01-02

cc w/enclosure:
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RIV:SRI:DRP/B	SPE/DRP/B	PE/DRP/B	DRS/PSB	DRS/PSB
FLBrush	RAKopriva	RVAzua	ABEarnest	MPShannon
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DRS/PSB	DRS/PSB	C:DRS/PSB	C:DRP/B	
PJElkmann	JBNicholas	GMGood	WDJohnson	
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No:	50-482
License No:	NPF-42
Report No:	50-482/01-02
Licensee:	Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:	Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:	1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas
Dates:	April 1, 2001, through June 30, 2001
Inspectors:	F. L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector R. A. Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer R. V. Azua, Project Engineer A. B. Earnest, Senior Physical Security Inspector M. P. Shannon, Senior Health Physicist P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. B. Nicholas, Ph.D., Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:	W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT:	Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/01-02

IR 50-482/01-02; on 4/01/2001 - 6/30/2001; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Wolf Creek Generating Station. Integrated Resident/Regional Report. Physical Protection

The report covers a 13-week period of resident inspection and announced inspections by Region IV inspectors. The inspection identified one Green finding which was a noncited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, or red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

- Green. Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551.

  The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function (Section 4A05).

B. Licensee Identified Findings

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power for the report period with the following exceptions. On May 11, 2001, the licensee reduced power to approximately 55 percent to allow repair of main feedwater Pump A and returned the plant to 100 percent power the same day. On May 29, 2001, the plant experienced a reduction in power to approximately 88 percent when a 120 Vac vital instrument bus inverter failed. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power the same day.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, **Emergency Preparedness**

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of various power block buildings and reviewed Administrative Instruction AI 14-006, “Severe Weather,” Revision 3, to verify that adverse weather would not affect mitigating systems. The inspectors also used the following:

- OFN SG-003, Natural Events, Revision 8
- Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 3, EAL-11, natural phenomena
- Updated Safety Analysis Report

The inspectors also discussed adverse weather preparations with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following partial walkdowns:

- Control Room Air Conditioning Train A
- Emergency Diesel Generator B
- Residual Heat Removal Train B

The inspectors performed the walkdowns to verify equipment alignment and identify discrepancies that could impact redundant system operability. The inspectors used the following procedures and information to perform the walkdowns:

- CKL EJ-120, "Residual Heat Removal Normal System Lineup," Revision 27
- CKL GK-131, "Control Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Electrical Checklist," Revision 18
- CKL KJ-121, "Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist," Revision 21
- M-12BN01, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Borated Refueling Water Storage System," Revision 10
- M-12EJ01, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System," Revision 27
- SYS GK-121, "Control Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Startup," Revision 19

The inspectors also discussed the walkdowns with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Quarterly Fire Area Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the below listed areas to determine that the licensee implemented a fire protection program in accordance with the Updated Safety Analysis Report fire hazards analysis. Elements of the fire protection program inspected included the control of combustibles, fire detection and suppression equipment and passive fire protection features, and adequate compensation for inoperable or degraded fire protection equipment, systems, or features.

- Circulating water screenhouse
- Control room, shift manager's office, control room foyer, control room back panels, and control room vestibule
- Control building 1974 foot essential service water pipe space
- Fuel building 2000 foot, fuel pool cooling heat exchanger Room B
- Radwaste building elevation 1976 foot

- Turbine building 2065 foot south end
- Turbine building general floor area 2000 foot south

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a fire drill that included licensee and local fire department participation to evaluate the readiness of licensee personnel to prevent and fight fires in accordance with Administrative Procedure AP 10-105, "Fire Protection Program Training," Revision 5. The licensee held the drill at the XNB01 transformer. This transformer was the normal power supply to vital Bus A.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

1. Seasonal

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the licensee's design requirements and the risk assumptions in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The area inspected was the plant cooling lake normal and emergency overflow.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Periodic

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the licensee's design requirements and the risk assumptions in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The turbine building basement was inspected. The inspectors reviewed the following information:

- Work Order 99-213383-000, Circulating water condenser pit level switches ALSH0021A, B, and C

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed control room operator simulator training to verify that the licensed operator requalification program ensures safe operation of the plant by adequately evaluating how well the operators and crews have mastered the training objectives. The inspectors used Simulator Training Guide LR5001003, "Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accident," Revision 4, to evaluate operator performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for:

- BG-06, Reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- BG-10, Chemical and volume control system excess letdown capability
- CI-01, Containment isolation for essential service water valves
- KJ-01, Standby diesel engine system
- QD, Emergency lighting DC system
- UU, Supervisory control system

The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped structures, systems, and components using inspection Attachment 71111.12. The inspectors reviewed various maintenance rule information.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensee's effectiveness in assessing risk for planned and emergent maintenance. The inspectors performed the review using inspection Attachment 71111.13. The inspectors also discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. The inspector's review included the following:

- Operational risk assessments for planned maintenance for the weeks of April 2, 23, 30, and May 14 and 21, 2001
- Actual, planned, and emergent work schedules for the same weeks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance Related To Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance in accordance with alarm response and off-normal procedures during an unplanned power reduction when vital ac power supply Inverter NN14 failed. The inspectors discussed the event with licensee personnel and reviewed the following procedures:

- ALR 00-28A, "NN04 Instrument Bus Undervoltage," Revision 6
- ALR 00-28B, "NN14 Inverter Undervoltage," Revision 6
- OFN NN-021, "Loss of Vital 120 Vac Instrument Bus," Revision 6
- SYS NN-200, "Transferring Buses Between Power Sources," Revision 4

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following to ensure that operability was properly justified for the below listed components or systems:

- M-018-00309, "Governor, Woodward EGB-50C Instruction Manual"
- STS IC-615A, "Slave Relay Test 615 Train A Safety Injection," Revision 16

The components or systems were:

- Emergency Diesel Generator A - automatic start circuit
- Emergency Diesel Generator A - mechanical governor

The inspectors also discussed the component or system operability status with licensee personnel and reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed the postmaintenance testing on the following equipment or systems in accordance with inspection Attachment 71111.19 to verify that procedures and test activities are adequate to verify system operability:

- Centrifugal Charging System B
- Control room air conditioning Unit A
- Control room air conditioning Unit B
- Emergency Diesel Generator A
- Emergency Diesel Generator A auxiliary lube-oil keep warm pump
- Residual heat removal Pump A and refueling water storage tank to residual heat removal Pump A suction valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed all or part of the following surveillance activities in accordance with inspection Attachment 71111.22 to verify that risk significant structures, systems, and components are capable of performing their intended safety functions and assessing their operational readiness:

- STN PE-037A "Essential Service Water Train A Heat Exchanger Flow and Differential Pressure Trending," Revision 2
- STS AL-102 "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test," Revision 26
- STS EN-100B "Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test," Revision 14
- STS IC-615B "Slave Relay Test K615 Train B Safety Injection," Revision 17
- STS KJ-015B "Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE02," Revision 14

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the startup transformer fire protection temporary modification to verify that the modification had not affected the safety functions of systems important to safety. The modification removed the automatic sprinkler system initiation and transformer breaker trips in the event of a fire. A fire detector failed and was inaccessible for maintenance during plant operation.

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification Order 01-004-KC and applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed an emergency drill to evaluate the conduct of the drill. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator control room, the technical support center, and the emergency offsite facility. The inspectors used the 2001 Semi-Annual Drill 01-SA-02 scenario and inspection Attachment 71114.06 to evaluate licensee performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Radiation Safety
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety [PS]

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed cognizant personnel and walked down the major components of the gaseous and liquid release systems to observe ongoing activities, equipment material condition, and system configuration, as compared to the description in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements to determine whether the licensee maintained adequate radioactive waste gaseous and liquid processing systems so that radiological

effluent releases were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure and to ensure that the radioactive waste effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied so that releases of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated.

- 1999 and 2000 radiological effluent release reports
- Anomalous results, if any, reported in the radiological effluent release reports
- Effluent radiological occurrence performance indicator incidents (none reported)
- Changes to the offsite dose calculation manual (Revision 3, dated 12/18/1999) and a modification to the radioactive waste system design and operation (Temporary Modification TMO 98-018-HB, diversified technology's zero filtration system)
- Sample collection and analysis of the unit vent for continuous release reporting
- Sample collection and analysis of the secondary liquid waste monitor tank for batch liquid release reporting
- Selected radioactive effluent release permits and associated projected and cumulative doses to members of the public (radioactive batch and continuous waste liquid - 2000024, 2000026, 2000037, 2000047, 2000055, 2000058, 2000062, 2000065, 2000071, 2000080, 2000092, 2000106, 2000109, 2001010, 2001012, and 2001016) (radioactive batch and continuous waste gas - 2000003, 2000009, 2000016, 2000024, 2000038, 2000052, 2000055, 2000062, 2000068, 2000093, 2000094, 2000102, 2000121, 2000144, 2000149, 2001009, 2001035, 2001055, 2001057, and 2001082)
- Compensatory sampling and radiological analyses conducted when effluent radiation monitors were declared out of service
- Monthly, quarterly, and annual radioactive liquid and gaseous waste dose calculation results
- Engineered safety feature air cleaning system surveillance test results for the control room emergency ventilation system and the auxiliary/fuel building emergency exhaust system
- Records of channel calibrations, checks, and operational tests performed since the last inspection (December 1999) for each point of discharge effluent radiation monitor and flow measurement device
- Effluent radiation monitor alarm setpoint values
- Calibration and quality control records of counting room instrumentation associated with effluent monitoring and release activities

- Radioactive waste effluent program sections of quality evaluation audits (K-518 and K-539), plant evaluation program reports (OB 99-1145, OB 00-1169, OB 01-1010, and OB 01-1053), and vendor audit (NUPIC Joint Audit 1684)

- Selected performance improvement requests related to the radioactive waste effluent treatment and monitoring program (PIR 2000-0162, -0354, -0779, -0791, -0813, -1102, -1239, -1302, -1387, -1732, -1893, -2035, -2578, and PIR 2001-0101)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and Radioactive Material Control Program (71122.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed members of the licensee's staff responsible for implementing the radiological environmental, meteorological monitoring, and radioactive material control programs. The inspector observed the following activities and equipment to verify that the above programs were implemented consistent with the licensee's Technical Specifications and/or offsite dose calculation manual.

- Preparation of airborne particulate and charcoal sample holders for sample collection

- Meteorological instrument data displays at the meteorological tower, emergency operations facility, and control room

- Three environmental air sampling stations (2,18, and 37), one vegetation sampling station (G-1), two surface water sampling stations (DC and MUSH), and two thermoluminescent dosimetry stations (2 and 37)

No material was released from the radiologically controlled area; therefore, this aspect of the inspection procedure was not performed.

The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements to determine whether the licensee had an adequate program to verify the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and to ensure that the licensee's surveys and controls were adequate to prevent the inadvertent release of licensed materials into the public domain:

- Implementing procedures for the radiological environmental monitoring program

- Number and location descriptions of the environmental sampling stations as specified in the offsite dose calculation manual

- Environmental sample analytical results

- Calibration and maintenance records for environmental air sampling equipment and radiation measurement instrumentation
- Changes to the radiological environmental monitoring program
- 1999 and 2000 annual radiological environmental operating reports
- The environmental laboratory's performance in the interlaboratory comparison program
- Implementing procedures for the meteorological monitoring program
- Meteorological instrument operability, reliability, and annual meteorological data recovery
- Procedures, methods, and instruments used to survey, control, and release materials from the radiologically controlled area
- Calibration procedures and records for instruments used to perform radiological surveys prior to material release
- Detection sensitivities of radiation survey instruments used for the release of potentially contaminated materials from the radiologically controlled area
- Criteria used for the unrestricted release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area
- Environmental sections of quality evaluation audits (K-510, K-518, and K-539) and vendor audits (TLD processing March 27, 2000 and NUPIC Joint Audit 16864)
- A summary of meteorological, environmental, and release of licensed radioactive material related corrective action reports written since July 1, 1999 (11 of these reports were reviewed in detail: PIR 1999-2431, -2474, -2701, -3726, -3785, 2000-0666, -1011, -1609, -1788, -2548, and PIR 2001-0247)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)

3PP1 Access Authorization (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed the following inspection activities:

- Reviewed the safeguards event logs for the third and fourth quarters of 2000 and first and second quarters 2001 to identify problems in the access authorization program.

- Reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments of the following programs/areas to determine the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems: behavior observation, access authorization, fitness-for-duty, supervisor and escort training, and requalification training.

- Interviewed five supervisors/managers and five individuals who had escorted visitors into the protected and/or vital areas to determine their knowledge and understanding of their responsibilities in the behavior observation program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed the following inspection activities:

- Reviewed the safeguards event logs for the third and fourth quarters of 2000 and first and second quarters 2001 to identify problems with access control equipment.

- Interviewed security personnel concerning the proper operation of the explosive and metal detectors, X-ray devices, and key card readers.

- Observed licensee testing of access control equipment and the ability of security personnel to control personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area. The inspector conducted tests of the metal detection equipment to determine its ability to detect the test weapon.

- Verified that a program was in place for controlling and accounting for hard keys to vital areas.

- Reviewed condition reports, licensee event reports, safeguards event logs, audits, selected security event reports, and self-assessments for the licensee's access control program in order to assess the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems with the access control program.

- Interviewed key security department and plant support personnel to determine their knowledge and use of the corrective action reports and resolution of problems regarding repair of security equipment.

b. Findings

A noncited violation with very low safety significance (Green) was identified for failure to adequately detect a test weapon. On June 13, 2001, through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate.

The safety significance of this finding was identified to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.

Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a (1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 22, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosive, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Ara, Vital area, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a (1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective action to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as PIR 2001-1551 (50-452/0102-01).

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Resident Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the following performance indicators for the year 2000 and the first quarter of 2001 using inspection Procedure 71151 to determine the accuracy and completeness of the performance indicators:

- Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours
- Safety system unavailability, heat removal system, and auxiliary feedwater
- Safety system unavailability and residual heat removal system

The inspectors discussed the system status with various licensee personnel. The inspectors also reviewed licensee information and the Technical Specifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Physical Protection Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the program for collection and submittal of performance indicator data. Specifically, a random sampling of security event logs and corrective action reports for the third and fourth quarters of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001 were reviewed for the following program performance areas:

- Protected area security equipment
- Personnel screening program performance
- Fitness-for-duty/personnel reliability program performance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/1995-008-00: Improper granting of unescorted access.

During a self-assessment, the licensee discovered a historical error pertaining to access authorization. The licensee granted unescorted access to an individual that had criminal convictions that would have prevented the individual from being granted unescorted access if the information had been reviewed. The issue was determined to be a minor violation of the licensee's access authorization procedures. Although this issue should be corrected, it constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The issue was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2060.

4OA5 Other

The inspectors reviewed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Evaluation and Assessment Report, dated May 16, 2001. The report was based on the site visit performed in April 2001.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Mr. R. Muench, Vice President, Technical Services, and other members of licensee management on July 2, 2001.

The inspector presented the physical protection inspection results to Mr. B. T. McKinney, Vice President, Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 15, 2001. No proprietary information was identified.

The inspectors presented the public radiation safety inspection results to Mr. E. A. Ray, Acting Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 22, 2001. No proprietary information was identified.

The resident inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee identified that proprietary material was provided to the resident inspectors. The inspectors returned the material to the licensee prior to the end of the inspection.

ATTACHMENT

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

K. Harris, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
M. Hicks, Manager, Operations
D. Jacobs, Plant Manager
O. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. McKinney, Vice President, Operations
R. Muench, Vice President, Technical Services

NRC

G. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

50-482/0102-01	NCV	Inadequate Metal Detectors (Section 3PP2)

Closed

50-482/95-008-00	LER	Improper granting of unescorted access (Section 4OA3)
50-482/0102-01	NCV	Inadequate Metal Detectors (Section 3PP2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Fire Protection

- FPP C-1, “Control building 1974 Foot Essential Service Water Pipe Space,” Revision 6
- FPP C-27, “Control Building 2047 Foot Control Room Area,” Revision 4
- FPP F-2, “Fuel Building 2000 Foot, B Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger Room B,” Revision 5
- FPP RW-2, “Radwaste Building Elevation 1976 Foot,” Revision 4
- FPP S-1, “Circulating Water Screenhouse,” Revision 3
- FPP T-2, “Turbine Building General Floor Area 2000 Foot South,” Revision 4
- FPP T-12, “Turbine Building General Floor Area 2065 Foot South,” Revision 5

Maintenance Rule Documents

- Functional failure evaluations for BG-06, reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- Functional failure evaluations for CI-01, containment isolation for essential service water valves
- Functional failure evaluations for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Functional failure evaluations for QD-02, emergency lighting DC system
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for BG-06, reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for BG-10, chemical and volume control system excess letdown capability
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for CI-01, containment isolation for essential service water valves
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for QD-02, emergency lighting DC system
- Maintenance rule bases information, BG-06, reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- Maintenance rule bases information, BG-10, chemical and volume control system excess letdown capability
- Maintenance rule bases information, CI-01, containment isolation for essential service water valves
- Maintenance rule bases information, KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance rule bases information, QD-02, emergency lighting DC system
- Maintenance rule bases information, UU-01, supervisory control system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for BG-06, reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for BG-10, chemical and volume control system excess letdown capability

- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for CI-01, containment isolation for essential service water valves
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for QD-02, emergency lighting DC system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for UU-01, supervisory control system
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for BG-06, reactor coolant system charging and letdown function
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for BG-10, chemical and volume control system excess letdown capability
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for CI-01, containment isolation for essential service water valves
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for QD-02, emergency lighting DC system

Operability Evaluations

- Control room shift manager's log
- Generic Letter 96-01, testing of safety-related logic circuits
- M-12KJ02, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "A" Intake, Exhaust, Fuel Oil, and Starting Air System," Revision 11
- E-13KJ01A, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator KJ01A Engine Control (Start/Stop Circuit)," Revision 10

Performance Indicator Verification

- Licensee worksheets
- Maintenance rule expert panel position papers, Revision 3
- Performance Improvement Request 2001-0727, -0609, -0313, -0214
- Selected NRC inspection reports
- Selected control room operator logs

Postmaintenance Testing

- STS BG-100B, “Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Pump Test,” Revision 25
- STS BG-202B, “Train B Chemical & Volume Control System Inservice Valve Test,” Revision 0
- STS BN-207B, “Borated Refueling Water Storage System Inservice Valve Test,” Revision 2
- STS GK-001A, “Control Room Emergency Vent System Train B Operability Test,” Revision 23
- STS GK-002A, “Control Room Air Conditioning Unit Operability Test,” Revision 0
- STS GK-001B, “Control Room Emergency Vent System Train B Operability Test,” Revision 25
- STS GK-002B, “Control Room Air Conditioning Unit Operability Test,” Revision 0
- Sys GK-121, “Control Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Startup,” Revision 19
- SYS KJ-123, “Post Maintenance Run of Emergency DieselGenerator A,” Revision 15
- Work Order 99-213826-002,003, BNHV8812A, Refueling water storage tank to residual heat removal Pump A suction valve
- Work Orders 00-220233-001, -002, -003, PKJ03A, Auxiliary lube-oil (keep warm) pump for KKJ01A
- Work Order 00-222618-001, Emergency Diesel A postmaintenance testing
- Work Order 01-2225534-000, Residual heat removal Pump A discharge flow
- Work Order 01-224675-003,004, Control room air conditioning Unit B