UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

January 12, 2001

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-390/00-05 AND 50-391/00-05

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On December 16, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Watts Bar 1 & 2 reactor facilities. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 21, 2000, with Mr. W. Lagergren and other members of your staff.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-390, 50-391
License No. NPF-90 and Construction
Permit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:	50-390, 50-391
License Nos:	NPF-90 and Construction Permit CPPR-92
Report No:	50-390/00-05, 50-391/00-05
Licensee:	Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility:	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:	1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City TN 37381
Dates:	September 17 through December 16, 2000
Inspectors:	J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector D. Rich, Resident Inspector W. Bearden, Reactor Inspector D. Jones, Senior Radiation Specialist D. Thompson, Physical Security Specialist
Approved by:	P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000390-00-05, IR 05000391-00-05, on 06/19 - 12/16/2000, Tennessee Valley Authority, Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional radiation specialist, a regional reactor inspector and a regional physical security specialist. No finding of significance were identified.

Licensee Identified Violations

- A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7.

Report Details

Unit 1 was in a refueling outage at the beginning of this report period. The unit was started up on October 6 and operated at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. Unit 2 remained in a suspended construction status.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

The purpose of the inspection was to verify that preparations for freezing weather conditions would limit the risk of freeze-related initiating events and adequately protect mitigating systems from the effects of freezing weather. The inspectors observed accomplishment of portions of Procedure 1-PI-OPS-1-FP, Freeze Protection, Revision 7, and reviewed the results of the remainder of the procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted equipment alignment partial walkdowns using the applicable system operating instructions (SOIs) to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The walkdowns included, as appropriate, consideration of plant procedures and reviews of documents to determine correct system lineups, and verification of critical components to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, SOI 78.01, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleaning System, Revision 24
- 1B-B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), SOI 82.02, Diesel Generator 1B-B, Revision 38
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and associated level control valves, SOI 3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 29

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of areas important to reactor safety, listed below, to evaluate, as appropriate, conditions related to (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation.

- 6.9 kV and 480 V shutdown boardrooms
- 480 V reactor MOV boardrooms
- Auxiliary control room
- EDGs and associated electrical boardrooms
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary instrument rooms
- Intake pumping structure
- Auxiliary building 713 elevation corridor, 737 elevation, and 692 elevation

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated inservice inspection (ISI) and repair and replacement activities during the Unit 1 Cycle 3 ongoing refueling outage to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI ISI program. Activities included review of radiographs of completed welding on steam generator blowdown system piping, review of examination reports for completed ultrasonic (UT) and magnetic particle (MT) examinations of risk significant components, observation of visual inspections of rigid supports and snubbers in the containment, and review of the licensee's program for eddy current testing of steam generator tubes. The inspectors evaluated compliance with ASME code requirements, reviewed non-destructive (NDE) methods, reviewed NDE examiner qualifications, and evaluated NDE inspection results. The inspectors also verified that identified indication problems were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as applicable. The inspection included review of the following documents:

- Watts Bar U1C3 Steam Generator Tubing Examination Scan Plan, Revision 0
- Watts Bar U1C2 Twelve Month Steam Generator Tubing Examination Report, dated June 4, 1999
- Watts Bar Unit 1 Steam Generator Eddy Current Examination Guidelines, Revision 2
- Procedure TI-100.012, ASME Section XI Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI) Program, Revision 0

- Procedure 1-TIR-0-10, ASME Section XI ISI NDE Program, Revision 6
- Procedure SPP-9.1, ASME Section XI, Revision 0

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On November 28, 2000, the inspectors observed operators in the plant simulator during licensed operator retraining and the post-training critiques. In addition, the inspectors reviewed training critique documentation from previous cycles and verified that remedial training for the weaknesses identified was incorporated into the following training cycles.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled portions of selected structures, systems or components (SSCs), listed below, as a result of performance-based problems, to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped SSCs. Reviews focused, as appropriate, on (1) maintenance rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classifications; and (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

- Failure of main control room chiller, Train A
- Failure of shutdown boardroom chiller, Train A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate for the selected SSCs listed below, (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved.

- Replace Train B auxiliary feedwater suction pressure switch
- 2A-A EDG preventive maintenance with #1 steam generator power operated relief valve inoperable
- 1A-A EDG preventive maintenance
- Partial review of 1B-B EDG generator replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, as described below, (1) personnel performance during selected non-routine events and/or transient operations; (2) licensee event reports focusing on those events involving personnel response to non-routine conditions; and (3) operator response after reactor trips which required more than routine expected operator responses, or which involved operator errors. As appropriate, the inspectors: (1) reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, or strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded; (2) determined if operator responses were in accordance with the response required by procedures and training; (3) evaluated the occurrence and subsequent personnel response using the significance determination process (SDP); and (4) confirmed that personnel performance deficiencies were captured in the licensee's corrective action program.

- Dropped rod cluster control assembly during defueling activities
- Reactor coolant pump trip

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, listed below, to assess, as appropriate, (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) and the risk significance in accordance with the SDP.

- Engineered Safety Feature Equipment Room Cooler Tube Fouling, WBPER 00-008250-000

- Containment Isolation with One Train Solid State Protection System Out Of Service, WBPER 00-013046-000
- Seismic Qualification of Essential Raw Cooling Water Pipe Support, WBPER 00-014455-000
- Steam Generator #1 Power Operated Relief Valve, WBPER 00-015024-000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, selected risk-significant operator workarounds, listed below, for potential affects on the functionality of mitigating systems. The workarounds were reviewed to determine (1) if the functional capability of the system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event was affected; (2) the effect on the operator's ability to implement abnormal or emergency procedures; and (3) if operator workaround problems were captured in the licensee's corrective action program.

- Steam generator #1 power operated relief valve in manual
- Chemical volume control system boric acid integrator

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test (PMT) procedures and/or test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; (8) and equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function.

- 1B-B Centrifugal charging pump rotor replacement, Surveillance Instruction (SI) 1-SI-63-905, Boron Injection Check Valve Flow Test During Refueling Outages, Revision 1, One Time Change 1
- Essential raw cooling water flow balancing, TI 31.08, Flow Balancing Valves Setpoint Positions, Revision 27

- Valve repair to eliminate cold leg accumulator leakage, SI 1-SI-63-906, Safety Injection Check Valve Flow Test During Refueling Outages, Revision 11
- Main steam isolation valve 1-FCV-1-22, WO 99-015581-000
- Ice basket post servicing weights, SI 1-SI-61-2, 18 Month Ice Weighing, Revision 14
- 1B-B EDG quarterly inspection, SI 0-SI-82-11-B, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test 1B-B, Revision 10
- 1A-A EDG 18 month engine inspection, SI 0-SI-82-11-A, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test 1A-A, Revision 10
- 1B-B EDG generator replacement, WO 00-014550-03 and SI 0-SI-82-18-B, 184 Day Fast Start and Load Test DG 1B-B, Revision 1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed numerous activities associated with the Unit 1 Cycle 3 refueling outage. These activities are listed below.

Outage Configuration Management - Verified defense-in-depth and configuration changes due to emergent work were maintained in accordance with the outage risk control plan. Verified that control room operators were kept aware of plant configuration changes.

Electrical Power - Checked that status and configurations of electrical systems met TS requirements and the outage risk control plan and that switchyard activities were controlled commensurate with safety and the outage risk control plan assumptions.

Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System Monitoring - Observed DHR parameters to assess proper system function and that the steam generators, when relied upon, were a viable means of backup DHR.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Operation - Verified spent fuel pool cooling was not affected by work during and after core offload.

Inventory Control - Reviewed flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition for consistency with the outage risk plan. Reviewed activities with the potential to cause loss of inventory for adequacy of controls to prevent inventory loss.

Reactivity Control - Evaluated licensee control of reactivity for compliance with TS and evaluated activities or SSCs for potential to cause unexpected reactivity changes for inclusion and proper control under the outage risk plan.

Containment Closure - Reviewed control of containment penetrations for compliance with refueling operations TS and to ensure that containment closure could be achieved during selected configurations.

Reduced Inventory and Mid-Loop Conditions - Reviewed activities associated with reduced inventory and mid-loop operations with emphasis on the licensee's ability to monitor and control reactor coolant system (RCS) water level. Verified that licensee's commitments from Generic Letter 88-17 were in place and adequate.

Refueling Activities - Reviewed fuel handling operations (removal, inspection, and insertion) and other ongoing activities for conformance with TS and approved procedures. Confirmed that the location of fuel assemblies was tracked from core offload through core reload.

Monitoring of Heatup and Startup Activities - Reviewed on a sampling basis that TS and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations. The inspectors walked down containment prior to reactor startup to verify that debris had not been left which could affect performance of the containment sumps.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs, listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met TS, the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), and licensee procedure requirements, and to determine if the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

- SI 1-SI-61-3, 18 Month Ice Condenser Flow Passage Inspection, Revision 6
- SI 0-SI-82-3, 18 Month Loss of Offsite Power With Safety Injection Test - DG 1A-A, Revision 15
- SI 1-SI-63-907, RHR Hot Leg and Cold Leg Injection Check Valve Testing During Refueling Outages, Revision 8
- SI 1-SI-3-22, 18 Month Channel Calibration Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Suction Header Pressure Switch, Revision 7
- SI 1-SI-201-B, Response Time Test - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Suction Header Transfer - Train B, Revision 7
- SI 0-SI-67-903-B, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump G - B Performance Test, Revision 9

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency drill on November 17, 2000, to evaluate drill conduct and the adequacy of the licensee critique.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments used for the protection of occupational radiation workers and the adequacy of the program for providing workers with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The licensee's programs for radiation monitoring and SCBA were evaluated against the TS, implementing procedural requirements, and 10 CFR 20.

The inspectors reviewed calibration procedures and records for the most recent calibrations of eight types of radiation monitoring instruments. Those instruments included a whole body counter, a personnel contamination monitor (PCM), a tool monitor, a RSO-5 ionization chamber, a hand-held frisker, an electronic dosimeter (ED), a containment high-range radiation monitor, and a continuous air monitor (CAM). The inspectors verified that the calibrations for those selected instruments were current. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the alarm setpoints for the PCM and the tool monitor. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the instrument response for a whole body counter, a RSO-5 ionization chamber, a hand-held frisker, and an ED through the use of selected calibration sources or the licensee's instrument calibration equipment. The inspectors verified that the calibrations were current for several randomly selected portable survey instruments which were then currently available for use.

The inspectors toured the plant and verified the SCBA was available at selected locations and that equipment was available for refilling SCBA air bottles. The licensee's lesson plan for respiratory protection training was reviewed by the inspectors and determined to include provisions for training personnel in the use of SCBA, including air bottle change out. The training records for three randomly selected individuals who were then currently on duty in the control room were reviewed. The inspectors determined that the selected individuals had been trained and qualified in the use of SCBA in accordance with the lesson plan.

The effectiveness of characterization and resolution of selected radiation monitoring related issues identified during April through October, 2000, was evaluated by the inspectors.

The following are licensee procedures reviewed to evaluate the licensee's program for maintaining radiation monitoring instrumentation:

- RCI-112 WBC Operation and Calibration
- RCI-121 Calibration and Operation of Eberline Contamination Monitors
- RCI-134 Calibration and Operation of Eberline Gamma Tool Monitor
- LSCP-0049 Calibration Procedure for Bicron Model RSO-5, RSO-50, and RSO-500 Survey Meters
- LSCP-0044 Calibration Procedure for the Bicron Surveyor 50
- LSCP-0078 Calibration Procedure for Merlin Gerin (MG) DMC-90, 100, and 2000 Units
- 1-S-90-2 18 Month Channel Calibration (Source Cal) of Train B Containment High Range Post Accident Radiation Monitor
- IMI-90.028 18 Month Channel Calibration (Source Cal) of the General Atomics Air Particulate Radiation Monitoring Loops
- HPT063.002 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Training

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures, Fitness For Duty (FFD) reports, and licensee audits and interviewed five representatives of licensee management and five escort personnel concerning their understanding of the behavior observation portion of the personnel screening and FFD program. In interviewing these personnel, the inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of their training and abilities to recognize aberrant

behavioral traits. The following are documents and procedures reviewed to evaluate the licensee program for maintaining access authorization:

- Fitness for Duty Semi-Annual Report, January through October, 2000
- TVAN SSP-1.2, Fitness for Duty, Revision 4
- Fitness-for-Duty/Continual Behavior Observation General Employee Training
- Fitness-for-Duty/Continual Behavior Observation Supervisory Training

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed access control activities on October 30 and November 1-2, 2000, and equipment testing conducted on November 2, 2000. In observing the access control activities, the inspectors assessed whether officers could detect contraband prior to it being introduced into the protected area. The inspectors also assessed whether the officers were conducting access control equipment testing in accordance with regulatory requirements through observation, review of procedures, and log entries. Preventative and post maintenance procedures were reviewed and observed as performed. The following are documents reviewed to the evaluate the licensee program for maintaining access control:

- Safeguard Event Logs, 2000
- Watts Bar Self Assessment, WBN-SA-01-001, dated October 4, 2000, Access Control - Personnel-Vehicles and Packages
- Security Incident Reports, 2000
- Watts Bar Quality Assurance Audit, WBN-SA-SEC-00-01, Conducted November 1 - December 31, 1999

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. Other Activities

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verifications

Licensee records were reviewed to determine whether the submitted PI statistics were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Revision 0, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

.1 Initiating Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operating logs, problem evaluation reports, and monthly operating reports for the period of April 1 through December 1, 2000, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Transients Per 7000 Critical Hours PI.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed licensee event reports for the period of April 1 through December 1, 2000, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Safety System Functional Failures PI.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed operating logs and an engineering database for RCS leakage for the period of April 1 through December 1, 2000, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the RCS Leak Rate PI.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Physical Protection Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee programs for gathering and submitting data and verified the accuracy and completeness of the Fitness-for-Duty, Personnel Screening, and Protected Area Security Equipment PIs. The review included TVA's tracking and trending reports and security event reports for the PI data submitted from the first quarter 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Public and Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstones

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness and the RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence PIs. To verify the PI data, the inspectors reviewed listings of the issues related to the chemistry and the radiation protection programs which were entered into the licensee's corrective action program during the period April through September, 2000. The inspectors verified that there were no issues in those listings which should have been reported as occupational or public radiation safety occurrences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-390/2000-002-00: Entry into LCO 3.0.3 Due to Both Trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Being Inoperable

During system testing on May 25, 2000, the licensee discovered that control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) train A was unable to meet control room pressurization requirements. On May 26, 2000, the licensee identified that an access door on the common pressurization ducting for the CREVS opened due to vibration and pressure changes in the ducting. This condition rendered both trains of CREVS inoperable because each train by itself was unable to maintain the control room at greater than the TS required 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure. However, the breach was small enough that an individual train could still maintain a slightly positive pressure in the control room. The lowest pressure recorded during testing with a single CREVS train running was 0.08 inches water gauge. Control room pressure would have been maintained greater than 0.125 inches water gauge with both CREVS trains operating. The licensee reviewed records from the last surveillance test conducted on January 6, 2000, through May 25, 2000, and found no activities which impacted the ability of the CREVS to perform the safety function of pressurizing the MCR. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.

The licensee determined that the cause of the event was determined to be vibration and pressure changes in the duct and failure to complete corrective actions from a 1997 PER on the emergency gas treatment system. The corrective actions for the May 2000 occurrence included a walkdown of all pressurized rectangular ducting in the auxiliary building, diesel building, and control building to identify duct access doors which could inadvertently open, secure access doors identified by the walkdown, add screws through any duct access doors which opened outward, and address the failure to complete the corrective actions for the 1997 PER.

The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the significance determination process because, even though the control room pressurization function was degraded, it was capable of performing its safety function. This licensee identified finding involved a violation of TS 3.7.10. The enforcement aspects of this finding is discussed in Section 4OA7.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-390/2000-003-00: Discovery of a Missed Response Time Test for Reactor Trip Breakers.

The work order controlling the breaker replacement required the appropriate work center be notified that the time response test was required but did not require any documentation of completion of the test. The breaker was tested at the earliest opportunity and performed within specifications. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The event is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as WBPER 00-011177-000.

.3 (Closed) LER 50-390/2000-004-00: Inadvertent Actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

The actuation was caused by the bumping of a relay during maintenance activities and is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as WBPER 00-011538-000. The LER was reviewed and no findings of significance were identified. This event did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.

.4 (Closed) LER 50-390/2000-005-00: Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine Trip Due to a Condenser Vacuum Transient

The MFP trip occurred at 13% reactor power and resulted in an automatic start of all three auxiliary feedwater pumps. The event is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as WBPER 00-013705-000. The LER was reviewed and no findings of significance were identified. This event did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.

4OA4 Other

4OA5 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr W. Lagergren and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection on December 21, 2000. On January 5 and 12, 2001, the inspectors re-exited with Mr L. Bryant and Mr. P. Pace respectively, concerning Section 1R13. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violation. The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV).

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
NCV 50-390/00-05-01.	TS 3.7.10, Condition F, requires that, with both trains of CREVS inoperable in Mode 1 for reasons other than actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, the licensee is to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not recognize that both trains of CREVS were inoperable on May 25 and did not enter TS LCO 3.0.3 until May 26. Therefore the licensee was in a condition prohibited by TS until the problem was corrected on May 26. Because of the very low safety significance of the issue and because the licensee has included this item in their corrective action programs WBPER 00-007416-000, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and will be identified as NCV 50-390/00005-01, Both trains of CREVS inoperable.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. Beecken, Maintenance and Modifications Manager
D. Boone, Radiological Control Manager
L. Bryant, Plant Manager
S. Casteel, Radiological and Chemistry Control Manager
J. Cox, Training Manager
L. Hartley, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
M. King, Acting Chemistry Manager
D. Kulisek, Operations Manager
W. Lagergren, Site Vice President
D. Nelson, Business and Work Performance Manager
P. Pace, Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager
J. Roden, Operations Superintendent
J. West, Site Quality Manager

NRC

J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Rich, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

50-390/00-05-01	NCV	Both Trains of CREVS Inoperable (Section 4OA7)

Closed

50-390/2000-002-00	LER	Entry into LCO 3.0.3 Due to Both Trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Being Inoperable (Section 40A3.1)
50-390/2000-003-00	LER	Discovery of a Missed Response Time Test for Reactor Trip Breakers (Section 40A3.2)
50-390/2000-004-00	LER	Inadvertent Actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Section 40A3.3)
50-390/2000-005-00	LER	Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine Trip Due to a Condenser Vacuum Transient (Section 40A3.4)