UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 6, 2000

Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
Sr. Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/00-04, 50-281/00-04 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 72-002/00-05

Dear Mr. Christian:

On September 16, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, and the Surry Independent Fuel Storage Installation. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection which were discussed on September 21, 2000, with Mr. T. Sowers and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. As identified in the report, no findings of significance were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281, 72-002
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37, SNM-2501

Enclosure: Inspection Report

cc w/encl.:
W. Rentz, Acting Manager
Nuclear Licensing and
Operations Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Blount
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

D. A. Heacock
Site Vice President
North Anna Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P. O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209

Donald P. Irwin, Esq.
Hunton and Williams
Electronic Mail Distribution

Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Distribution w/encl.:
G. Edison, NRR
PUBLIC

OFFICE	RII	RII	RII	RII	RII	RII	RII
SIGNATURE	lg	lm	kp	gm	jc	rg	lh
NAME	LGarner	RMusser	KPoertner	GMcCoy	JColey	RGibbs	LHayes
DATE	10/06/2000	10/04/2000	10/04/2000	10/04/2000	10/04/2000	10/04/2000	10/05/2000
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\sur0004.wpd

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281, 72-002
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37, SNM-2501

Report Nos.: 50-280/00-04, 50-281/00-04, 72-002/00-05

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facilities: Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Surry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

Location: 5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883

Dates: June 18 - September 16, 2000

Inspectors: R. Musser, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
G. McCoy, Resident Inspector
J. Coley, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R02)
R. Gibbs, Senior Resident Inspector, Sequoyah (Sections 1R05 and 1R15)
L. Hayes, Physical Security Specialist (Section 4OA1.1)

Approved by: R. Haag, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000280-00-04, IR 05000281-00-04, IR 07200002-00-05, on 6/18-09/18/2000; Virginia Electric and Power Co., Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 and ISFSI.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a reactor inspector and a physical security specialist. No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at power the entire reporting period. Unit 2 began its end of cycle power coast down on September 11, 2000. A Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled to commence on October 1, 2000.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R02 Evaluation of Changes, Tests or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the "Documents Reviewed" section at the end of this report. The inspectors reviewed ten completed safety evaluations performed by the licensee since January 1999. This review was performed to verify that plant modifications, procedure changes, tests, or experiments associated with risk significant structures, systems, and components had been properly evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Additionally, screening forms associated with 17 plant modifications completed by the licensee since January 1999 were reviewed to verify that 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations had not been required. Completed plant modifications and procedure changes implemented by the licensee were evaluated to verify that changes were made in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

The inspectors reviewed a nuclear oversight audit (Independent Review of Activities: 99-04) dated February 22,1999, and an audit performed by the Management Safety Review Committee of safety evaluations dated February 28, 2000. Eight plant issue reports, including four which were identified by these audits, and the licensee's proposed resolution were also reviewed by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

For the systems identified below, the inspectors reviewed plant documents referenced below to determine correct system lineup, and observed equipment to verify that the system was correctly aligned:

- Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System (2-OP-FW-001A, "Auxiliary Feedwater Alignment," Revision 2-P1);

- Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Fuel Oil System (0-OP-EG-001A, “EDG 3 System Alignment,” Revision 3; 1-OP-EG-001A “EDG 1 System Alignment,” Revision 3-P3; and 2-OP-EG-001A, “EDG 2 System Alignment,” Revision 8); and

- Unit 1 1A-1 120VAC Inverter (1-MOP-EP-001, “Removal From Service and Return to Service of UPS 1A-1 Components,” Revision 5).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown on the accessible portions of the Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection System. The walkdown emphasized material condition and correct system alignment of system valves, breakers and handswitches. In performing this review, the inspectors utilized plant procedure 2-OP-SI-001A, “Safety Injection System Alignment,” Revision 8-P1 and drawing 11548-FM-089A, Sheets 1-3. A review of outstanding work orders was performed to determine if any deficiencies existed which could affect the ability of the system to perform its function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the following areas to assess the adequacy of the fire protection program implementation. During this review the inspectors utilized Surry Power Station Appendix R Report, Revision 17. The inspectors checked for the control of transient combustibles and the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression systems for:

- Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pump House Rooms (North and South);

- Unit 2 Safeguards Building and Main Steam Valve House;

- Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Room;

- 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B Battery Rooms;

- Fire Pump House;

- Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room;

- Unit 1 Cable Vault;
- Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Room; and
- Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On July 28, 2000, the inspectors observed senior reactor operators' and reactor operators' performance on the plant simulator while implementing lesson RQ-00.4-ST-1, "Loss of all AC Power (ECA-0.0)." The inspectors verified that the training program included risk-significant operator actions, implementation of the emergency plan, previous lessons learned and plant operating experience issues. The inspectors assessed individual and crew performance and licensee training evaluator's critiques.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

For the equipment issues described in the plant issues (PIs) listed below, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) using VPAP 0815, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 10, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix, Revision 11. Attributes of the maintenance rule that the inspectors focused on included characterization of failures, the appropriateness of the associated a(1) or a(2) classification, and the appropriateness of either the associated a(2) performance criteria or the associated a(1) goals and corrective actions:

- S-2000-1355, EDG 1 Overspeed Setpoint Outside Acceptance Criteria;
- S-2000-1533, EDG 1 Overspeed Lever Failure;
- S-2000-1003, ESW Pump 1A Starter Motor Failure;
- S-2000-1494, Leaking Connection Downstream of Service Water Pump 10A;
- S-2000-1131, Unit 1 Boric Acid Transfer Pump Seal Leak; and
- S-2000-1702, Unit 1 Boric Acid Transfer Pump Failure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of the risk impact of removing from service the components associated with the work orders (WOs) listed below. The inspectors verified that the licensee adequately planned and controlled activities to avoid initiating events, and that the licensee ensured the functional capability of accident mitigation systems:

- WO 432733-02, Repair of 2-SW-P-10A, 'A' Charging Pump Service Water Pump Discharge Piping;
- WO 432938-02, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Failure on 1-EE-EG-01, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator;
- WO 434547-01, Repair of Air Leak on 2-CC-TV-240A, Component Cooling Water Flow Isolation Valve;
- WO 432168-01, Removal of 1-EP-UPS-1A, '1A' Uninterruptable Power Supply from Service for Maintenance;
- WO 419323-01, Manual Operation of 2-RC-PCV-2455B, Pressurizer Spray Valve due to Intermittent Failure of Controller; and
- WO 374073-03, Replacement of Breaker 2-EP-BKR-25J2, Alternate Power Supply for 2-CH-P-1C, Unit 2 C Charging Pump.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability evaluations were described in the engineering transmittals (ETs), PIs, and WOs listed below:

- PI-S-1999-1239, 1-CH-P-1A Vibration in the Alert Range;
- PI-S-2000-1669, Emergency Diesel Generator Number 2 Fuel Oil Filter Fouling;

- PI-S-2000-1687, Low Internal Pressure in Multiple Unit 2 Containment Electrical Penetrations;
- WO 43003-02, Evaluation of Overspeed Trip Mechanism on 2-EE-EG-01, Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator;
- ET-S-2000-0157, Restart of Cable Vault Fans; and
- ET-S-2000-0162, Elimination of Administrative Controls for Turbine Building Supply and Exhaust Fans.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work-arounds to determine whether the work-arounds affected either the functional capability of the related system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event. During these reviews, the inspectors specifically considered whether the work-around affected the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures. The following is the list of operator work-arounds reviewed:

- 1999-ODA-011, Unit 2 Individual Rod Position Indication Temperature Sensitivity;
- 1999-ODA-012, Emergency Response Facility Computer System/ Radiation Monitor Interface; and
- 1999-ODA-013, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance test procedures and activities associated with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine that the procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional capability following maintenance:

- Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (1-OPT-EG-005, "Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Tests," Revision 5);

- Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2-OPT-EG-009, “Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Major Maintenance Operability Test,” Revision 2-P1);

- Repair and Setting of Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Overspeed Trip Mechanism (1-OPT-EG-009 “Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Major Maintenance Operability Test,” Revision 4);

- Unit 2 Control Room Air Handling Unit Belt Replacement (0-ECM-1404-04, “Load Check,” Revision 0, GMP-008; “Drive Belt Inspection and Adjustment,” Revision 5);

- Unit 2 C Charging Pump (2-OPT-CH-003, “Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-1C,” Revision 26); and

- Motor Operator Valve Testing of 2-CH-MOV-2270B (WO 43-2639; 0-ECM-1509-01, “VOTES MOV Testing,” Revision 13).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:

- 2-IPT-FT-RP-SI-001A, “Train A Safeguards Actuation Logic Functional Test,” Revision 7-P1;

- 0-OPT-EG-001, “Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test,” Revision 13-P1;

- 2-OPT-CH-002, “Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-1B,” Revision 23;

- 0-OPT-FP-005, “Motor Driven Fire Protection Water Pump 1-FP-005,” Revision 6;

- 1-OPT-RC-10.0, “Reactor Coolant Leakage - Computer Calculated,” Revision 7-P1; and

- 2-PT-2.33A, “Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Protection Test “H” Train,” Revision 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification S1-00-021, "Plug Pressure Tap on Pressure Gauge 1-MS-PI-1504 due to Steam Leakage," to determine whether system operability/availability was affected, that configuration control was maintained, and that the associated safety evaluation (SE 00-071) adequately justified implementation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency response training drill conducted on August 15 to assess the licensee's performance in emergency classification, notification, and protective-action-recommendation development.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Review

.1 Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)/Personnel Reliability Program, Personnel Screening Program and Protected Area Performance Index Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's programs for gathering and submitting data for the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)/Personnel Reliability Program, Personnel Screening Program and Protected Area Performance Index performance indicators. The review included licensee tracking and trending reports and security event reports for the Performance Indicator data submitted from the first quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2000. The following licensee documents and procedures were reviewed:

- NRC PI Data Provider/Peer Reviewer Guideline for the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)/Personnel Reliability Performance Indicator;
- Guideline for the Reporting of NRC Performance Indicator for Personnel Screening; and
- Security Incident reports, January 2000 to present.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2000. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly operating reports and licensee event reports.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Performance Indicator

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Reactor Coolant System Leakage performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2000. Documents reviewed included applicable daily operator logs and leak rate calculations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Reactor Coolant System Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Reactor Coolant System Activity performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2000. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly operating reports and Chemistry Department Logs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

Transnuclear (TN)-32 Spent Fuel Cask Low Pressure Alarm

The inspectors reviewed licensee actions associated with a low pressure alarm on a TN-32 cask located at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. A special inspection was conducted to review aspects of the licensee's operations, engineering, and maintenance of the TN-32 dry cask storage system. The results of this inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 72-002/00-06.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors discussed the inspection results with Mr. T. Sowers, the manager of Station Safety and Licensing and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 21, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

M. Adams, Superintendent, Engineering
R. Allen, Superintendent, Maintenance
R. Blount, Manager, Operations & Maintenance
M. Crist, Superintendent, Operations
E. Grecheck, Site Vice President
D. Llewellyn, Superintendent, Training
T. Sowers, Manager, Station Safety & Licensing
B. Stanley, Supervisor, Licensing
J. Swientoniewski, Director, Nuclear Oversight
W. Thornton, Superintendent, Radiological Protection

NRC

R. Haag, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection discussed in Section 1R02:

50.59 Evaluation Reports

99-023, AFW Cross Tie ISI Test
99-092, DC 99-078, LHSI Pump Recirculation Line
99-094, FS-99-041, CH & RH System
00-011, DC 99-090, RWST Cross Tie Valve Openings on Header to Line Signal
00-020, FT NAF 2000-013, Revision 0, “Evaluation of Potentially Unfiltered SI and Charging System Leakage From the AB July 7, 2000 During LOCA”
00-022 FS-99-050, Civil, Structural, Seismic Topics
00-031 TM SI-00-008, 1-CS-27 Strong Back
00-050 DCP 99-109, MCR Envelope Fan Trip MOD
00-051 DCP 93-040, RWST Vent Cap MOD
00-064 Reduction in Low Power Physics Testing

50.59 Screening Forms Reviewed for the Following Design Change Packages (DCPs)

DCP 97-033, CH Blender Count Controller Replacements, Units 1&2
DCP 99-043, BS Low Level Pit Lighting Upgrades, Units 1&2
DCP 99-102, SW Replacement of 2-SW-308 Valve, Unit 2
DCP 00-004, FP Diesel Engine Overspeed Alarms, Units 1&2
DCP 00-007, FP Diesel Engine Overspeed Trip Switch Adjustment, Units 1&2

DCP 99-012, HS Heating Steam Conductivity Instrumentation Upgrades, Unit 2
DCP 99-032, 1A Routing of Air Supply for Unloaders, Units 1&2
DCP 96-005, HS Level Indication Modification (1-HS-LT-101), Units 1&2
DCP 97-028, VS CRDM Ducting Elbow Connections, Unit 2
DCP 98-080, Repair of 1-MS-1CV-3518, Unit 1
DCP 98-084, Corrosion Product Monitor Sampling Installation, Units 1&2
DCP 99-005, Instrument Air to 1/2-RH-HCV-1758, 1/2-RH–FCV-1605, Units 1&2
DCP 99-018, Component Cooling Piping, Units 1&2
DCP 99-034, EDP Replacement of Panels 1-EPD-DB-DC-1-1/1-EPD-DB-DC-1, Unit 1
DCP 99–071, FAC Piping Replacement, Unit 1
DCP 99-075, Main Turbine Valve Limit Switch Replacement, Unit 1
DCP 99-108, Instrument Air Flow Station Modification, Units 1&2

Plant Issue Reports

S-99-0560, SE 98-0002 Completed in a Manner Inconsistent with Procedural Requirements
S-99-1729, 50.59 Evaluation Not Performed as Required
S-99-1326, EOP Action Not Addressed by a Safety Evaluation
S-99-0659, Administrative Errors in Safety Evaluations and Activity Screening Checklists
S-99-0559, Safety Evaluation Changes Not Properly Reviewed
S-99-2717, No Safety Evaluation Performed to Demonstrate Compliance with IE Bulletin 80-10
S-2000-0333, Safety Evaluation Improperly Prepared
S-2000-0536, Safety Evaluations Prepared by Non-Qualified Individual

Procedure

Virginia Power Administrative Procedure No. VPAP-3001, “Safety Evaluations,” Revision 6

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.