



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV  
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

January 11, 2002

Paul D. Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations  
River Bend Station  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
P.O. Box 220  
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-458/01-08

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

On December 13, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 13, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures, representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the inspectors identified one issue that was determined to be appropriate to document as a finding of "No Color." The finding related to programmatic and performance weaknesses in past-operability and reportability determinations. Otherwise, the inspectors concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony T. Gody, Chief  
Operations Branch  
Division of Reactor Safety



Entergy Operations, Inc.

-3-

Docket: 50-458  
License: NPF-47

Enclosure:  
NRC Inspection Report  
50-458/01-08

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-4-

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**ENCLOSURE**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Dockets: 50-458  
Licenses: NPF-47  
Report No.: 50-458/01-08  
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.  
Facility: River Bend Station  
Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61  
St. Francisville, Louisiana  
Dates: December 13, 2001  
Inspectors: S. McCrory, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch  
T. Stetka, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch  
S. Schneider, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B  
Approved By: Anthony T. Gody, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-08

IR 05000458-01-08, on 11/26-12/13/200: Entergy Operations, Inc; River Bend Station. Baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems. One finding of No Color.

The inspection was conducted by two regional senior operations engineers, and one resident inspector. The significance of issues was indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

#### **Identification and Resolution of Problems**

- The licensee was effective at identifying problems and putting them into the corrective action program. However, the licensee's corrective action program procedures did not require an additional review of reportability when an operability determination was subsequently modified. In several instances documentation for past operability and reportability decisions was lacking. However, no instances were identified in which the licensee failed to make a required report. There were instances in which the licensee conducted reviews and evaluations as a part of their corrective actions that were related to events or conditions, but did not document these activities. The licensee implemented corrective actions, when specified, in a timely manner. The licensee performed effective audits and self-assessments. During interviews conducted during this inspection, the site staff expressed open willingness to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program (Section 40A2).

#### **Cornerstone: None**

- No Color. In several instances, licensee records lacked evidence that evaluations for past-operability assessments were performed when equipment or systems failed routine surveillance tests. Further, in some instances, the licensee determined reportability before relevant evaluations were completed. Finally, as a matter of routine, the licensee did not re-assess the reportability of an event or condition following a revision to an operability determination subsequent to the initial reportability determination. However, no instances were identified in which the licensee failed to make a required report (Section 40A.b(2)).

The NRC evaluated the issue using the significance and documentation determination process of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0610\*, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Thresholds for Documentation." The NRC determined that the described reportability determination weaknesses, if left uncorrected, could cause the same issues under the same conditions to become a more significant safety concern, due to the latent potential to fail to make a required report. The NRC determined that the issue did not apply to any specific cornerstone and was, therefore, not subject to the Significance Determination Process. The NRC also determined that the issue had the potential to impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, specifically, the ability of the NRC to monitor compliance with safety standards. Therefore, the NRC considered the

issue to have extenuating circumstances that warranted documentation as a finding of No Color.



## Report Details

### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

#### 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

##### a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification

###### (1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The inspectors reviewed several hundred summary reports of events, conditions, problems and deficiencies entered into the various licensee data bases and tracking systems including: condition reports, maintenance action items, engineering requests, emergency planning action tracking system, security deficiencies and training action items. The inspectors conducted detailed reviews of over 200 condition reports, maintenance action items, and engineering requests (listed in the attachment to this report) from a list of approximately 2000 documents, which had been issued between November 2000 and November 2001. The inspectors also reviewed licensee's audits and self-assessments of the corrective action activity at the programmatic and departmental levels. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing the audit and assessment results against self-revealing, external audits and NRC-identified issues.

The inspectors evaluated the items contained in the various licensee problem reporting processes to determine the licensee's threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program. Also, the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems were evaluated by reviewing pertinent control room logs, work requests, engineering modification packages, self-assessment results, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks.

###### (2) Issues and Findings

The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action system. Licensee audits and assessments were of good depth and identified issues similar to those that were self-revealing or raised during previous NRC inspections. The inspectors identified no findings in this area.

##### b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

###### (1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed approximately 200 condition reports, maintenance action items, and engineering requests, and supporting documentation, including an appropriate analysis of the cause of the problem, to assess the licensee's evaluation of the problems identified. The inspectors focused on the licensee's performance regarding operability,

reportability, the full extent of conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

(2) Issues and Findings

Based on a review of the licensee's records, the inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively prioritized and evaluated issues. With respect to issues associated with significant conditions adverse to quality, however, the inspectors found weaknesses associated with the reportability determination aspect of the River Bend Station corrective action program. Although these weaknesses were not linked to a specific cornerstone, the inspectors determined that if left uncorrected, the weaknesses had the potential to impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function.

The inspectors reviewed over 75 condition reports (CR) for adequacy of operability and reportability determinations in the various cornerstones. Almost one third of the CRs reviewed addressed discrepancies identified during the performance of Technical Specification Surveillance Testing. With minor variation, the majority of the CRs sampled which identified a discrepancy during Technical Specification Surveillance Testing simply stated,

“This condition involves equipment issues that are not reportable. This condition was found during scheduled surveillance testing. ‘Time of Discovery’ applies to past operability.”

The licensee had no other records to demonstrate the scope of assessment for past-operability and had to rely on individual recollection to provide any additional information. This level of performance was contrary to both NRC and licensee expectations.

NUREG-1022, “Event Reporting Guidelines,” provided NRC expectations regarding past-operability assessment for determining reportability. NUREG-1022 states, in part,

“For testing that is conducted within the required time (i.e., the surveillance interval plus any allowed extension), it should be assumed that the discrepancy occurred at the time of its discovery unless there is firm evidence, based on a review of relevant information such as the equipment history and the cause of failure, to indicate that the discrepancy existed previously.”

River Bend Station procedure NSA-4.6, Nuclear Safety Assurance Reportability Guidelines, was the licensee's guidance for performing reportability determinations. Paragraph 4 under the Management Expectations section stated,

“‘Boilerplate’ responses should be minimized. When documenting a reportability determination, the reporting requirements considered should be identified followed by the evaluation/discussion of that requirement. Enough information needs to be available for a reviewer to understand the issue considered/thought process that resulted in the given determination.”

The inspectors also identified that LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," did not require the reportability determination to be reviewed again if the operability determination was subsequently revised. Discussion with licensee personnel responsible for making reportability determinations revealed that they used the information in the operability determination statements to a great extent in determining reportability. A review of the CRs sampled identified several cases where the original operability determination was revised subsequent to the reportability determination with no re-review of the reportability potential. The inspectors also identified two instances involving fire barriers, in condition reports CR-RBS-2000-1944 and CR-RBS-2001-0898, wherein the reportability determination was made before the completion of any evaluation or safety significance determination of the reported condition. The licensee did not re-evaluate reportability after the evaluation and safety significance determination were completed. However, the inspectors did not identify any instance in which the licensee failed to make a required report. As a result of this inspection finding, the licensee initiated CR-RBS-2001-1607 to document the condition as a potential "trap" in the RBS reportability determination process. The CR was subsequently closed out to an Echelon corporate condition report, CR-ECH-2001-0132, since LI-102 was a corporate document and the potential "trap" applied to all Entergy sites who used LI-102.

The inspectors evaluated the issue using the significance and documentation determination process of NRC Manual Chapter 0610\*, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Thresholds for Documentation." The inspectors determined that the reportability determination weaknesses described above constituted a latent condition that, if left uncorrected, could cause the same issues under the same conditions to become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors further determined that the issue had the potential to impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, specifically, the ability of the NRC to monitor compliance with safety standards. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the issue constituted extenuating circumstances that warranted documentation as a finding of No Color.

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed condition reports and self-assessments to verify that corrective actions, related to the issues, were identified and implemented in a timely manner commensurate with safety, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. A listing of specific documents reviewed during the inspection is included in the attachment to this report.

(2) Issues and Findings

Based on a review of the licensee's records, the inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively implemented corrective actions. The inspectors identified no findings related to the effectiveness of corrective actions.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed members of the licensee's staff, which represented a cross-section of functional organizations and supervisory and non-supervisory personnel, regarding their willingness to identify safety issues. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.

(2) Issues and Findings

Based on interviews, the inspectors identified no findings related to the safety conscious work environment. The inspectors concluded, based on information collected from interviews with the licensee personnel, that these employees were willing to identify issues and accepted the responsibility to pro-actively identify and enter safety issues into the corrective action program.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-458/01-001: Unplanned Reactor Scram During Turbine Control Valve Testing. The event occurrence was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-02. During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed Condition report CR-RBS-2001-0523, that the licensee issued to document the findings of its root cause determination and planned corrective actions.

This event occurred during a surveillance test of the main turbine control valves while the reactor was at 54% power. As Control Valve 1 was being closed for the test, Control Valves 2, 3 and 4, which initially began to open as designed, stopped opening and started ramping closed causing a high reactor pressure and a subsequent reactor scram. The licensee's Significant Event Review Team identified that a previous turbine modification, (completed in July 1999) which changed the turbine operation to a "partial arc admission" mode of operation, caused steam flow induced turbine rotor vibrations. This resulted in the generation of an erroneous increasing turbine speed signal, which caused the turbine control system to begin shutting the remaining three control valves. The inspectors noted that previous control valve testing (which was usually conducted quarterly) was conducted at a substantially higher or lower reactor power level, which did not result in a reactor scram.

The inspectors observed that the licensee's Significant Event Review Team identified two contributing factors to the event that were not fully documented. The first factor involved a failure to review historical operating experience events as a part of the modification process. The licensee concluded that had a previous Significant Event Report, (SER 91-04, Asymmetric Turbine Loading), been reviewed, the effect of the "partial arc admission" steam flow on the surveillance test may have been recognized. During its investigation the licensee discussed the generic aspects of this factor and sampled other plant modifications to assess the extent of the condition. However, the inspectors observed that

the licensee did not document these activities and their results. The second factor involved the isolation of the moisture separator re-heaters (MSRs). The inspectors observed that, in all testing performed since the turbine was modified, the only time the MSRs were isolated was during the April 21 test. Again, the licensee discussed the impact of the MSRs on the event and determined that they had no impact, but did not document this information. As the result of the inspectors' observations regarding these omissions in the documentation, the licensee issued an additional corrective action (#34) to the condition report CR-RBS-2001-0523 to document their review of the generic aspects of both factors.

The inspectors determined that the corrective actions for this event were appropriate and either completed or progressing in a timely manner. The inspectors also noted that control valve testing was not required by license conditions and that the licensee decided to suspend turbine control valve testing pending the results of further turbine inspections planned for the next refueling outage.

#### 4OA6 Meetings

##### Exit Meeting

The inspectors discussed these findings with Mr. Paul D. Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations and members of the licensee's staff in a telephonic meeting on December 13, 2001. The licensee's management acknowledged the findings presented.

## ATTACHMENT

### KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

#### Licensee

K. Aitken, Senior Coordinator, Security  
J. Antoine, Configuration Management Group Supervisor  
C. Bailey, Senior Technical Instructor  
R. Bare, Corrective Action and Assessment  
R. Biggs, Coordinator, Safety and Regulatory Affairs  
S. Burd, Turbine System Engineer  
D. Burnett, Superintendent, Chemistry  
J. Carlson, Shift Manager  
J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager  
R. Cole, Manager, Systems Engineering  
N. Crane, Senior Operations Specialist  
A. Dalawari, Senior Civil Engineer  
M. Davis, Nuclear Specialist IV  
J. Dunkelberg, Civil Engineer  
D. Gilley, Maintenance Coordinator  
T. Glass, I&C Engineer  
R. Glueck, Senior System Engineer  
H. Goodman, Superintendent, Reactor Engineering  
H. Grimes, Senior Engineer, Quality Assurance  
T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance  
P. Hinnenkamp, Vice President, Operations  
K. Huffstatler, Senior Emergency Planner  
F. Hurst, Senior Emergency Planner  
R. Jackson, Code Engineer  
M. Kassar, Senior Civil Engineer  
R. Kerar, Fire Protection Engineer  
J. Leavines, Manager, Licensng  
D. Marble, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance  
J. McGhee, Manager, Operations  
J. Merchan, Senior Engineer, Programs ans Components Group  
P. Miktus, Supervisor, Design Engineering  
G. Miller, Senior System Engineer  
D. Mimms, General Manager, Operations  
D. Myers, Radiation Protection Specialist  
R. Northrup, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
C. Pratt, Design Engineer III  
M. Rathcke, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance  
D. Reynolds, Maintenance Specialist  
M. Robinette, System Engineer  
P. Sicard, Manager, Safety Analysis  
A. Spencer, Operations Coordinator  
C. Stout, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance  
N. Tison, Senior Emergency Planner

W. Trudell, Manager, Corrective Action and Assessment  
R. Tunstall, Senior Technical Instructor  
D. Williamson, Senior Licensing Specialist

NRC

P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, River Bend Station  
E. Connell, Senior Fire Protection Engineer, NRR  
P. Qualls, Senior Fire Protection Engineer, NRR  
D. Allison, Generic Issues, Environmental, Financial, and Rulemaking Branch, NRR  
J. Tappert, Chief, Generic Issues, Environmental, Financial, and Rulemaking Branch, NRR

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

50-458/01-001	LER	Unplanned Reactor Scram During Turbine Control Valve Testing. (Section 4OA3)
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

Procedures

RBNP-078, "Operability Determinations," Revision 6

P870-53, "Alarm Response," Revision 7

SOP-0010, "MSR & FW Heaters Extraction Steam and Drains," Revision 22

OSP-0102, "Turbine Valve Testing," Revision 6

LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Revision 1

MCP-1005, "Testing and Calibration of GE Type GGP-53C Relay," Revision 5A

RBNP-083, "Reactivity Management," Revision 2

EDG-AA-115, "Engineering Request - Response Development," Revision 0

ADM-0022, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 30

OSP-0003, "Logs and Records," Revision 12

SOP-0010, "Moisture Separator Reheater and Feedwater Heaters Extraction Steam and Drains,"  
Revision 22

AOP-0007, "Loss of Feedwater Heating," Revision 20

RPP-STD-01, "Radiation Protection Standards," Revisions 12 and 13

AOP-009, " Loss of Normal Service Water," Revision 12

RBNP-004, "Event Notification and Reporting," Revision 12

NSA 4.6, "Nuclear Safety Assurance Reportability Guidelines," Revision 1

Operations Policy 006, "Active Limiting Conditions of Operations," Revision 13

Condition Reports (CRs)

ECH-2001-0132	RBS-2001-1607	RBS-2000-1944	RBS-2001-0253	RBS-2001-0523
OPX-2000-0037	RBS-1996-1479	RBS-2000-1991	RBS-2001-0258	RBS-2001-0530
OPX-2001-0005	RBS-1998-1333	RBS-2000-1992	RBS-2001-0277	RBS-2001-0544
OPX-2001-0007	RBS-1999-0263	RBS-2000-1993	RBS-2001-0299	RBS-2001-0551
OPX-2001-0008	RBS-1999-1068	RBS-2000-2006	RBS-2001-0313	RBS-2001-0557
OPX-2001-0012	RBS-1999-1696	RBS-2000-2050	RBS-2001-0317	RBS-2001-0559
OPX-2001-0014	RBS-2000-0531	RBS-2000-2213	RBS-2001-0318	RBS-2001-0561
OPX-2001-0019	RBS-2000-0095	RBS-2001-0034	RBS-2001-0339	RBS-2001-0562
OPX-2001-0035	RBS-2000-0274	RBS-2001-1260	RBS-2001-0350	RBS-2001-0567
OPX-2001-0039	RBS-2000-0597	RBS-2001-0437	RBS-2001-0361	RBS-2001-0603
OPX-2001-0043	RBS-2000-0629	RBS-2001-0858	RBS-2001-0374	RBS-2001-0656
OPX-2001-0050	RBS-2000-0782	RBS-2001-1103	RBS-2001-0378	RBS-2001-0658
OPX-2001-0051	RBS-2000-0969	RBS-2001-0293	RBS-2001-0381	RBS-2001-0664
OPX-2001-0054	RBS-2000-1198	RBS-2001-0674	RBS-2001-0389	RBS-2001-0695
OPX-2001-0063	RBS-2000-1209	RBS-2001-0001	RBS-2001-0391	RBS-2001-0699
OPX-2001-0070	RBS-2000-1232	RBS-2001-0054	RBS-2001-0392	RBS-2001-0700
OPX-2001-0071	RBS-2000-1377	RBS-2001-0071	RBS-2001-0398	RBS-2001-0701
OPX-2001-0072	RBS-2000-1459	RBS-2001-0073	RBS-2001-0403	RBS-2001-0708
OPX-2001-0075	RBS-2000-1486	RBS-2001-0101	RBS-2001-0412	RBS-2001-0709
OPX-2001-0079	RBS-2000-1490	RBS-2001-0103	RBS-2001-0413	RBS-2001-0710
OPX-2001-0112	RBS-2000-1597	RBS-2001-0109	RBS-2001-0419	RBS-2001-0711
OPX-2001-0115	RBS-2000-1628	RBS-2001-0126	RBS-2001-0423	RBS-2001-0714
OPX-2001-0117	RBS-2000-1645	RBS-2001-0134	RBS-2001-0463	RBS-2001-0726
OPX-2001-0125	RBS-2000-1680	RBS-2001-0164	RBS-2001-0479	RBS-2001-0727
OPX-2001-0144	RBS-2000-1712	RBS-2001-0192	RBS-2001-0492	RBS-2001-0730
OPX-2001-0158	RBS-2000-1723	RBS-2001-0200	RBS-2001-0494	RBS-2001-0750
RBS-2001-1625	RBS-2000-1848	RBS-2001-0202	RBS-2001-0515	RBS-2001-0773
RBS-2001-1632	RBS-2000-1936	RBS-2001-0243	RBS-2001-0516	RBS-2001-0775



RBS-2001-0776	RBS-2001-0931	RBS-2001-1086	RBS-2001-1215	RBS-2001-1345
RBS-2001-0779	RBS-2001-0936	RBS-2001-1087	RBS-2001-1216	RBS-2001-1358
RBS-2001-0810	RBS-2001-0961	RBS-2001-1130	RBS-2001-1249	RBS-2001-1368
RBS-2001-0814	RBS-2001-0977	RBS-2001-1134	RBS-2001-1254	RBS-2001-1369
RBS-2001-0832	RBS-2001-0978	RBS-2001-1141	RBS-2001-1269	RBS-2001-1520
RBS-2001-0837	RBS-2001-0982	RBS-2001-1143	RBS-2001-1285	RBS-2001-1632
RBS-2001-0854	RBS-2001-0984	RBS-2001-1169	RBS-2001-1285	RLO-2001-0102
RBS-2001-0860	RBS-2001-0986	RBS-2001-1174	RBS-2001-1298	RLO-2001-0111
RBS-2001-0872	RBS-2001-0995	RBS-2001-1182	RBS-2001-1309	RLO-2001-0126
RBS-2001-0898	RBS-2001-1006	RBS-2001-1199	RBS-2001-1336	RLO-2001-0136
RBS-2001-0902	RBS-2001-1008	RBS-2001-1201	RBS-2001-1337	RLO-2001-0152
RBS-2001-0929	RBS-2001-1086	RBS-2001-1214		

Maintenance Action Item (MAI)

MAI 336589	MAI 336211	MAI 312253
MAI 341311	MAI 341051	MAI 350593
MAI 341314	MAI 345236	MAI 351559
MAI 341313	MAI 347438	MAI 345172
MAI 341312		

Engineering Request (ER)

ER-RB-2001-0400, Postulated Fuel Assembly Drop Accident Analysis for High Density Spent Fuel Racks, 7/19/2001.

ER-RB-2001-0114, Change yoke material for heater dump valves from cast iron to steel yokes, 7/16/01.

ER-RB-2001-0198, Revise ERIS point associated with EHC system in main control panel, 4/23/01.

Audits and Assessments

April Oversight Report, 4/01

May Oversight Report, 5/01

June Oversight Report, 6/01

July Oversight Report, 7/01

Security Self Assessment, RLO-2001-0047, 5/25/01

Dominion Oversight Benchmarking Report, 6/01

QA-3-2001-RBS-1-Multi-site, "ENSW QA Multi-site Audit of the Corrective Action Program," 7/3/01

QA-6-2001-RBS-1, "RBS QA Audit of Effluent and Environmental Monitoring," 9/25/01

QA-7-2001-RBS-1, "RBS QA Audit of the Emergency Planning Program," 5/15/01

QA-14-2001-RBS-1, "RBS QA Audit of the Radiation Protection Program," 4/10/01

River Bend EP (Self) Assessment, 11/00

Self-Assessment Topic: Radioactive Material Control, 12/18/00

Self-Assessment Report: ALARA Planning and Controls, 3/01

RPG-M-01-013, Effluent Dose Calculations Self Assessment, 2/23/01

RBS Self-Assessment - CA&A - Evaluation of NRC Corrective Action Inspections at Other EOI Sites and RBS, dated 11/20/00

RBS Self-Assessment - CR Disposition Corrective Actions, dated 11/29/00

RBS Self-Assessment - Maintenance Department Standards and Expectations, dated 3/29/01

RBS Self-Assessment - CA&A Process Review, dated 6/21/01

RBS Learning Organization Assessment, dated 6/27/01

ENSW Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of the Corrective Action Program, dated 7/03/01

River Bend Corporate Operations Training Assessment dated June 18, 2001

QA-12-2001-RBS-1, RBS Quality Assurance Audit of Operations dated July 5, 2001

Self-Assessment Topic: Protective Tagging dated December 8, 2000

Self-Assessment Topic: The Operator Aid Program dated March 15, 2001

Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection Readiness Self-Assessment dated June 18, 2001

OP-2001-01-RBS, River Bend Station Human Performance Self-Assessment dated December 11 - 14, 2000

#### Miscellaneous Documents

System Engineering Handbook, Revision 1, 1/11/01, Guideline 6.9, Plant/System Walkdown Guidelines.

Procedure Action Request (PAR) ARP-870-53R06CN-A dated 3/28/01.

Operations Standards and Expectations, Revision 12

Monthly Report-October 2001, Sec-2001-0050 (Security), 11/05/01

Emergency Planning Action Tracking System summary data from 5/1 to 11/28/01

EP-M-01-07, "Exercise Evaluation Report, ERO Team A," 3/6/01

Engineering Calculation G13.18.12.2, "Evaluate the wall that separates Fire Areas AB-7 and AB-18, 12/5/00

RBS QA Surveillance Report-QS-2001-RBS-0011 dated May 29, 2001

RBS QA Surveillance Report-QS-2001-RBS-026 dated July 17, 2001

RBS Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, QS-2001-RBS-042

RBS Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, QS-2001-RBS-043

RBS Quarterly Trend and Analysis Report - First Quarter 2001

RBS Quarterly Trend and Analysis Report - Second Quarter 2001

Entergy Root Cause Analysis Desk Guide, Revision 5

Entergy Corrective Action Process Desk Guide, Revision 2

Entergy Problem Trending Guide, Revision 2

RBS Engineering Expectations Guidance Document

RBS System Engineering Handbook, Revision 1

RBS System Engineering Qualification Card, Revision 4

RBS General Employee Training, Revised 12/19/00

EOI Orientation Workbook, Corrective Action Program, Revision 00

RBS, Unit 1, Facility Operating License No. NPF-47

RBS Maintenance Rule Function(s) Listing

RBS Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria

NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, NEI Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants

Information Request 1  
River Bend PIR Inspection (IP 71152) 01-08

The inspection will cover the period of December 19, 2000 to November 26, 2001. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in either electronic (preferred) or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of CDs (preferred), e-mail attachment(s), or 3 ½ floppy disks. The agency's text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro; however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, Access, and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files. Where possible, it is preferred that the files be searchable text or data files vice image files.

Please provide the following information to Stephen McCrory in the Region IV Arlington office by October 15, 2001. If you have questions or comments, please contact Mr. McCrory at (817) 860-8265 or e-mail at [slm@nrc.gov](mailto:slm@nrc.gov).

1. Summary list of all currently open/active items for:
  - a. condition reports of significant conditions adverse to quality
  - b. engineering review requests
  - c. maintenance requests
2. Summary list of all items completed/resolved/closed since December 19, 2000 for:
  - a. condition reports of significant conditions adverse to quality
  - b. engineering review requests
  - c. maintenance requests
3. Summary list of all condition reports generated during the specified period and sorted by:
  - a. chronology
  - b. initiating organization
  - c. responsible organization
4. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities since December 19, 2000.
5. All self-assessments and Non-NRC third party assessments of corrective action activity and functional area performance since December 19, 2000.
6. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated since December 19, 2000 and broken down by functional organization.
7. Current revision of the following procedures:  
  
ADM-022, "Conduct of Operations"  
ADM-0023, "Conduct of Maintenance"

CPN LI-102, "Corrective Action Process"  
EDG-PR-001, "Maintenance Rule Program"  
EDG-PE-002 "Guideline for Performing 10 CFR Part 21 Applicability Reviews"  
ENG-3-033, "Modification Design Control Plan"  
ENG-3-037, "Engineering Request Process"  
LI-102, "Corrective Action Process"  
OE-100, "Operating Experience Program"  
PEP-0219, "Reliability Monitoring Program"  
RBNP-002, "Root Cause Determination Guidance"  
RBNP-010, "Configuration Management"  
RBNP-030, "Initiation and Processing of Condition Reports"  
RBNP-062, "River Bend Industry Events and Analysis Program"  
RBNP-069, "Significant Event Evaluation"  
RBNP-078, "Operability Determinations"

8. Any additional governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:

Condition Reporting  
Corrective Action Program  
Root Cause Evaluation/Determination  
Operator Work-Arounds  
Work Requests  
Engineering Requests  
Temporary Modifications  
Procedure Change Requests  
Deficiency Reporting and Resolution  
Training Needs Request/Evaluation

9. For each of the items (applicable to River Bend) listed below please provide the following:

- Full text of the condition report (please indicate any findings that did not result in a condition report or corrective actions)
  - Any "Roll-up" or "Aggregating" Conditions Reports related to the generic communication or condition report.
  - Root Cause analysis report (if applicable)
  - Risk significance assessments
  - Probable Cause evaluation (if applicable)
  - Approved corrective actions
  - Basis for extending originally approved due dates
  - Evidence of corrective action completion (work packages, design change documentation, temporary modifications, training lesson plans/material, training attendance records, procedure revisions, etc.)
- a. Part 21 Reports 2001-01 through last issued (2001-24 or later)
- b. NRC Information Notices 2001-01 through last issued (2001-13 or later)

- c. All LERs issued since December 19, 2000 excluding LER 00-016-00
- d. All NRC identified NCVs and Violations issued since December 19, 2000.

Information Request 2  
River Bend PIR Inspection (IP 71152) 01-08

Please provide the information requested below to the PIR inspection team member indicated as soon as possible after the team's arrival on 11/26/01. All information may be provided in the medium most convenient (electronic or hard copy). If you believe that the NRC has previously comprehensively reviewed any of the following items with regard to problem identification and resolution, please identify them to the inspection team, who will assess the need for further review.

Please arrange the requested interviews to begin no earlier than 8 AM on 11/27/01 and to be completed by 3 PM 11/29/01. The interviews should be scheduled for about 45 minutes with at least ½ hour between interviews.

**S. McCrory**

Full copies of the following CRs:

2000-0095	2000-1992	2001-0317	2001-0412	2001-0860
2000-0274	2000-1993	2001-0339	2001-0551	2001-0986
2000-1232	2000-2006	2001-0350	2001-0562	2001-1174
2000-1597	2001-0243	2001-0361	2001-0727	2001-1199
2000-1991	2001-0253	2001-0381	2001-0773	

Interview:

Individual(s) to address the "unsatisfactory" assessments in the RBS Quality Assurance Audit of Effluent and Environmental Monitoring, dated 9/25/01

Individuals with PIR oversight responsibility for:

Radiation Protection  
Security  
Emergency Planning

**M. Schneider**

Full copies of the following CRs:

2000-1628	2000-2174	2001-0318	2001-0530	2001-0726
2000-1680	2000-2175	2001-0398	2001-0674	2001-0730
2000-1712	2001-0201	2001-0475	2001-0695	2001-0750
2000-2173	2001-0232	2001-0518	2001-0714	2001-0756

2001-0761	2001-0814	2001-0854	2001-0862	2001-0936
2001-0761	2001-0815	2001-0857	2001-0892	2001-1146
2001-0775				

Copies of with full event/condition descriptions, operability determinations, and reportability determinations for the following CRs (or full copies if thats easier):

2000-2213	2001-0374	2001-0567	2001-0872	2001-1201
2001-0034	2001-0378	2001-0580	2001-0898	2001-1214
2001-0071	2001-0389	2001-0603	2001-0902	2001-1215
2001-0073	2001-0390	2001-0627	2001-0929	2001-1216
2001-0101	2001-0391	2001-0639	2001-0961	2001-1249
2001-0103	2001-0392	2001-0656	2001-0995	2001-1254
2001-0109	2001-0403	2001-0658	2001-1006	2001-1285
2001-0126	2001-0413	2001-0664	2001-1086	2001-1298
2001-0134	2001-0423	2001-0708	2001-1087	2001-1335
2001-0164	2001-0437	2001-0740	2001-1103	2001-1336
2001-0200	2001-0492	2001-0776	2001-1130	2001-1337
2001-0202	2001-0494	2001-0779	2001-1134	2001-1340
2001-0277	2001-0544	2001-0807	2001-1141	2001-1345
2001-0293	2001-0557	2001-0810	2001-1143	2001-1358
2001-0299	2001-0559	2001-0858	2001-1169	2001-1368
2001-0313	2001-0561			

Copies of the following self-assessments:

Maintenance and System Engineering Self-Assessments since 10/00.

Interviews:

- Maintenance Manager - Tom Hildebrandt
- Maintenance Supervisors - Craig Stout (I&C), Danny Marble (Electrical), Mike Rathcke (Mechanical)
- Systems Engineering Manager - Amir Shahkarami (or his designate)
- System Engineering Supervisors - Paul Miktus (Civil), Ronnie Cole (E/I&C)
- Corrective Actions Program Manager - Bill Trudell