September 10, 2001

Mr. J. Sorensen
Site Vice-President
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/01-15; 50-306/01-15

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

On August 16, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on August 16, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Roger D. Lanksbury

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306
License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-282/01-15; 50-306/01-15

See Attached Distribution

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/s/Roger D. Lanksbury

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cc w/encl: Plant Manager, Prairie Island
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Site Licensing Manager
Nuclear Asset Manager
J. Malcolm, Commissioner, Minnesota
Department of Health
State Liaison Officer, State of Wisconsin
Tribal Council, Prairie Island Indian Community
J. Silberg, Esquire
Shawn, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge
A. Neblett, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
S. Bloom, Administrator
Goodhue County Courthouse
Commissioner, Minnesota Department
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-282, 50-306
License Nos:	DPR-42, DPR-60
Report No:	50-282/01-15; 50-306/01-15
Licensee:	Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility:	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:	1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089
Dates:	July 1 through August 16, 2001
Inspectors:	S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector S. Thomas, Resident Inspector G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector
Approved by:	Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000282-01-15; IR 05000306-01-15, on 07/1-08/16/2001; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Inspector and Physical Security Inspector Report.

This report covers a 6-week routine resident inspection and a baseline physical security inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and a physical security specialist inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was operated at or near full power until August 1, 2001, when the Unit tripped from full power due to dropped control rods. The rods dropped after water from the plugged drain line of an overhead room cooler seeped into a rod control cabinet. Unit 1 was restarted on August 3, 2001, but tripped again later that same day from about 25 percent power as a result of a fire in an electrical breaker. Unit 1 remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period. Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except that power was reduced to about 43 percent on July 27 through 28, 2001, for condenser cleaning and turbine valve testing.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the accessible portions of equipment trains to verify that critical portions of the redundant system or train, or other significant protected equipment, was in the correct lineup during the time when one safety significant system or train was out-of-service. The inspectors also verified that there were no outstanding Work Orders (WOs) or Condition Reports (CRs) associated with the equipment that could affect their functions. The following walkdowns were conducted:

- the 22 residual heat removal (RHR) train during a time when the 21 RHR and the 22 charging trains were unavailable;
- the D2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) during a time when the D1 EDG was unavailable; and
- the ability to lineup component cooling water from 12 component cooling heat exchanger to 11 RHR heat exchanger during the time 11 component cooling heat exchanger was unavailable due to a through wall leak on the relief valve line located on the cooling water discharge for that heat exchanger.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The

inspectors selected the following fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), or their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient.

- Fire Area 46: Cooling Tower Equipment House;
- Undesignated Fire Area: Substation Control Building;
- Fire Areas 28a, c, and e: Unit 1 Transformers; and
- Fire Areas 28b, d, and f: Unit 2 Transformers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an operating crew on the simulator during requalification testing activities. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:

- clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the safe direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
- procedure use;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- group dynamics.

The inspectors also observed the performance of the examination evaluators and their critique of the crew's performance. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed simulator configuration compared to the actual control room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:

- whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
- whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
- safety significance classification;

- the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
- the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:

- circulating water systems;
- Breaker 12-4 (1M station auxiliary transformer supply to Bus 12); and
- cooling tower substation system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities. These activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety-related equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce risk where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:

- troubleshooting and repair of the D2 EDG voltage regulator during the time when only one source of off-site power was available to safeguards Bus 16;
- troubleshooting and repair of Rod Control Power Cabinet 2AC following water intrusion into the cabinet; and
- troubleshooting and repair of malfunctioning equipment associated with the August 1, 2001, Unit 1 trip, which included 6 rod bottom lights which did not illuminate immediately following the reactor trip and issues associated with rod position indication calibration.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

On two occasions, the inspectors evaluated operator response to reactor trips which required more than routine expected operator actions. This evaluation included actual observations of operator performance and a review of logs and data. The purpose of the inspections was to determine what actually occurred and how the operators responded, to determine whether operator response was in accordance with what was

required by plant emergency and operating procedures, and to evaluate the overall risk significance of the events with regards to plant safety. The two events that the inspectors evaluated were:

- the August 1, 2001, Unit 1 reactor trip involving 6 rod bottom lights which did not illuminate post-trip, requiring boration of the core; and
- the August 3, 2001, Unit 1 reactor trip which required cooling down using natural circulation due to the loss of the normal power supplies to the reactor coolant pumps.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Impact of Mis-positioned Valve on Pressurizer Spray Piping

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the evaluations for a condition caused by a mis-positioned shut valve (2RC-18-5) which led to an abnormal difference in temperature between different portions of the pressurizer spray lines. This evaluation was performed to determine whether operability was justified considering the thermal stresses imposed on the piping due to the mis-positioned component, whether availability was affected, and whether an unrecognized increase in risk had occurred.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Bypassing the 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Undervoltage Autostart Function

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 screening for bypassing the 11 turbine-driven AFW pump undervoltage autostart function while Unit 1 was in Mode 3. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the Technical Specifications and other design basis documents in their evaluation, that the component remained operable, and that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred due to the installation of the bypass.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the design documents and observed portions of the post-installation testing of Design Change 00SI01, "Boric Acid Reduction," Revision 0. This modification was to be performed in two stages: 1A (performed on-line) and 1B (performed during each Unit's next refueling outage). The inspectors evaluated the implementation of Stage 1A of the design change which positioned shut valves to separate the boric acid storage tanks from the safety injection system, opened valves to lineup safety injection pump suctions to the refueling water storage tank, and modified applicable control board annunciator circuitry to reflect the new required positions of the valves that were repositioned in accordance with this design change. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant systems had not been degraded through the modification and that performance of the modification and subsequent testing did not place the plant in an unsafe condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability, with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. Testing subsequent to the following activities was observed:

- installation of backup air system for cooling water strainer backwash valves in accordance with Design Change 00CL02, and
- installation of a smaller orifice in the D2 EDG crankcase ejector line.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 1, 2001, Unit 1 tripped from full power due to several dropped control rods. The rods dropped after water from the plugged drain line of an overhead room cooler seeped into a rod control cabinet. The Unit was brought to a critical condition and the generator placed on-line on August 3. Later on August 3, Unit 1 tripped from about 25 percent power due to a fire in the cubicle for Breaker 12-4 (1M station auxiliary

transformer feed to Bus 12). Since the breaker fire directly caused the loss of 12 reactor coolant pump and indirectly caused the loss of 11 reactor coolant pump, control room operators were forced to cool down the primary plant using natural circulation. The inspectors conducted inspections of outage activities associated with both forced outages including:

- control of shutdown risk and emergent work;
- estimation of critical condition and approach to criticality; and
- establishment and control of the cooldown of the primary plant using a combination of natural circulation and bleeding steam via the steam generator power-operated relief valves and/or the steam dumps to the main condenser.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance test procedures (SPs) met Technical Specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Design Basis Documents, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying barrier integrity or mitigating systems capability. The following tests were evaluated:

- SP 2088, “Safety Injection Pumps Monthly Test”;
- SP 2102, “22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test”; and
- SP 1093, “D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test.”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed removal of Temporary Modification 95T047 in conjunction with the installation of Design Change 00CL02 (Backup Air System For Cooling Water Control Valves). The inspectors observed the maintenance activities and reviewed the work control documents to identify interim or unidentified risk configurations encountered during the transition from the temporary modification to the permanently installed design change.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization Program (Behavior Observation Only) (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice of implementing the licensee's behavior observation program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were also reviewed. Licensee fitness-for-duty semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, audits, and security logged events. The inspectors also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's protected area access control testing and maintenance procedures. The inspectors observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On two occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspectors observed in-processing search of personnel, packages, and vehicles to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program to control security keys, and measures in place to protect the integrity of data entered in the security computer system.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, audits, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspectors interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revision 41 to the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant Security Plan and Revision 17 to the Security Force Training and Qualification Plan to verify that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans. The revisions were submitted in accordance with the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) by licensee letters dated July 18, 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the Scrams with a Loss of Normal Heat Removal performance indicator in the initiating events cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports and their associated condition reports as well as NRC inspection reports for the period July 2000 through June 2001 to verify that the licensee had reported all occurrences for those four quarters.

The inspectors verified the data for the physical protection cornerstone performance indicators pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, maintenance logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the period October 1, 2000, through March 30, 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 16 of 17 Flood Prevention Panels Considered Non-Functional

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee response and proposed corrective actions to the event described in Event Notification 38129 and CR 20015571, “Miscellaneous Flood Panel Deficiencies,” regarding non-functional flood prevention panels.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified at the time of this inspection. The inspectors will conduct additional reviews of this event when the Licensee Event Report (LER) is issued.

.2 Fire in Bus 12 Caused Unit 1 Reactor Trip

The inspectors reviewed the licensee response and initial corrective actions to the Unusual Event described in Event Notification 38185 and CR 20016501, "Fire in Bus 12 During 1R to 1M Transfer During Unit 1 Startup on 8/03/01."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors will conduct additional reviews of this event when the LER is issued.

.3 (Open) LER 2-01-03: Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators

This event was discussed in Special Inspection Report 50-306/01-13. The LER will remain open pending resolution of Unresolved Item 50-306/01-13-01 associated with that report.

.4 (Closed) LER 2-01-04: Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to High Differential Condenser Backpressure

This event was discussed in Special Inspection Report 50-306/01-13. No additional issues were identified.

4OA6 Meeting(s)

Exit Meeting

The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Sorensen and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 16, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

Preliminary Exit Meeting

Senior Official at Exit:	J. Sorensen, Site Vice President
Date:	July 19, 2001
Proprietary	No
Subject:	Safeguards Baseline Inspection
Change to Inspection Findings:	No

Public End of Cycle Assessment Results Meeting

On June 29, 2001, representatives of the NRC and the licensee met in a public meeting to discuss the results of the NRC's annual end of cycle assessment of plant performance through March 31, 2001. The assessment was discussed in the Annual Assessment Letter (Report 50-282/01-01; 50-306/01-01) dated May 31, 2001.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

T. Allen, General Superintendent Engineering, Nuclear Generation Services
T. Amundson, General Superintendent Engineering
D. Blaskley, Nuclear Security Consultant
T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment
L. Gard, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance
T. Grossell, Project Manager, (Wackenhut)
A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry
H. Nyberg, Shift Captain, (Wackenhut)
D. Parrish, Security Engineer
D. Popp, Nuclear Management Company Corporate Access Authorization Staff Member
Y. Shen, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project Manager
T. Silverberg, General Superintendent Plant Operations
M. Sleigh, Superintendent Security
J. Sorensen, Site Vice President
M. Werner, Plant Manager
P. Wildenborg, Site Health Physicist

NRC

R. Lanksbury, Chief, Projects Branch 5

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

2-01-03	LER	Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators (Section 4OA3.3)

Closed

2-01-04	LER	Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to High Differential Condenser Backpressure (Section 4OA3.4)

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
CRDM	Control Rod Drive Mechanism
CW	Circulating Water
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
FFD	Fitness-For-Duty
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IPEEE	Individual Plant Evaluation of External Events
IR	Inspection Report
LER	Licensee Event Report
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
SBO	Station Blackout
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SI	Safety Injection
SIP	Security Instruction Procedure
SP	Surveillance Test Procedure
SSC	Structure, System, or Component
WO	Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-5	D2 Diesel Generator Valve Status	Revision 15
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-6	D2 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room Cooling Local Panels	Revision 8
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-7	Diesel Generator D2 Main Control Room Switch and Indicating Light Status	Revision 12
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-8	D2 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Panel Switches	Revision 15
Operating Procedure 2C15	Residual Heat Removal System	Revision 22
Integrated Checklist C1.1.15-2	Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal	Revision 24
Operating Procedure 1C15	Residual Heat Removal System	Revision 22
Temporary Change Notice 2001-1430 to Operating Procedure 1C15	Provide Guidance to Transfer RHR Trains With 11 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolated	
Abnormal Operating Procedure 1C15 AOP1	RHR Flow Restoration	Revision 3
Temporary Change Notice 2001-1424 to Abnormal Operating Procedure 1C15 AOP1	Make Component Cooling Available to 11 RHR Heat Exchanger Out Of Service	
Operating Procedure 1C14	Component Cooling System - Unit 1	Revision 17
Temporary Change Notice 2001-1429 to Operating Procedure 1C14	Provide Guidance to Transfer Between Component Cooling Pumps With 11 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolated	

1R05 Fire Protection

IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Appendix B	Internal Fires Analysis	Revision 2
Plant Safety Procedure F5 Appendix A	Fire Strategies	Revision 8
F5 Appendix D	Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room	Revision 6

F5 Appendix F	Fire Hazard Analysis	Revision 14

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Lesson Plan P91605-001	Simulator Cycle Quiz #30	Revision 1

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

General

	2000 Equipment Performance Annual Report	April 20, 2001
	Maintenance Rule System Basis Document	Volume 1A
	Quarterly Equipment Performance Report - 1st Quarter 2001	May 4, 2001
	Quarterly Equipment Performance Report - 2nd Quarter 2001	August 7, 2001

Circulating Water

WO 0004191	12 Circulating Water [CW] Bay Reads High	
WO 0004556	Troubleshoot and Repair Seal Injection Line for 21 CW Pump	
WO 0007344	Inspect, Clean, and Rebuild 11 CW Pump Motor	
WO 0010754	Adjust Limit Switches on MV-32005 (1B Condenser CW Crossover Motor Valve) and Inspect Seat	
WO 0101113	11 Circulating Water Pump Has No Seal Flow Indication	
WO 0101114	12 Circulating Water Pump Has No Seal Flow Indication	
WO 0108065	Install Portable Air Conditioning For 11 Circulating Water Pump	
CR 20016501	Fire in Bus 12 During 1R to 1M Transfer During Unit 1 Start-Up On 8/3/01	
Operating Procedure 1C1.2	Unit 1 Startup Procedure	Revision 25
Operating Procedure 1C1.3	Unit 1 Shutdown Procedure	Revision 47

Breaker 12-4

CR 19990098	1M Transformer	

CR 19983535	Breaker 26-2 Fails to Close During Manual Operation
CR 19991364	Non-SBO [station blackout] 4.16 KV [Kilovolt] Bus Lock-Out (86) Relays are Becoming Slow to Operate Over Time and are in Need of Maintenance /Repair
CR 19992653	Revise Trending of Program For 5HK Circuit Breakers
CR 19993462	Part 21 - Trip Roller for HK Circuit Breakers
CR 20003067	Trend Plastic/Odd Smell in Bus 15 - Perceived Source is From the Back of Breaker 15-3 [1RY Source]
CR 20010614	Trip Switch 1/11-3 Was Found Open During a Planned Maintenance - Having the Switch Open Would Disable the Undervoltage Tip of 11 Feedwater Pump
CR 20012640	Closing Springs for Breaker 23-4 [21 Cooling Water Pump] Did Not Charge Resulting in 21 Cooling Water Pump Out-Of-Service
CR 20016631	Investigation of Secondary Voltages Present on Bus 12 After Operation of Bus 12 Lockout Form Bus Fault
Cooling Tower Substation	
LER 1-99-08	Engineered Safety Features Actuation Following Bus Lockout Caused by an Accidental Actuation of a Lock Out Relay
CR 20015064	Breaker CT11-1 Tripped During Grid Voltage Disturbance
CR 19992677	New Westinghouse Vacuum Controlled Breaker Has Bent Guide Bar
CR 19993133	Accidental Actuation of Bus CT11 Lock Out Relay Causes Loss of One Offsite Source to Safeguards Bus 16

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control

Work Request A16910	Investigate Water Leakage into Power Cabinet
WO 0109582	Repair D2 Exciter Motor Operated Auto Transformer
WO 0109581	Restore 1R Feed To Bus 15 and Bus 16

WO 0109580	Isolate 1R Differential From Bus 11 and 12	
WO 0109576	Investigate and Correct 1RY-S Potential Circuits	
CR 20016504	D2 Failed SP 1305 When Kilovolt-Amps Could Not Be Manually Raised Greater Than 750 Kilovolts-Amps	
CR 20016500	Equipment Out Of Service Risk Modeling Tool Was Not Used For Risk Insights Either During the 8/3/01 Bus 12 Event or When D2 Was Declared Inoperable on 8/4/01	
CR 20016438	Water on Power Cabinet in the Unit 1 Rod Drive Room. Water on the Power Cabinet Facilitated Unit 1 Trip	
CR 20016426	Condensate From Room Unit Cooler in Unit 1 Rod Drive Room Dripping on Rod Control Cabinet	
CR 20016468	Several Rod Bottom Lights Did Not Light After Unit 1 Trip	
CR 20016502	Closure of 1RYBT Caused Arcing in Breaker 12-3 - Investigate Cause and Possible Connections Between 1RY-S and Bus 12	

1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events

CR 20016429	Unit 1 Reactor Tripped at 0730 on 8/1/01 - First-out Indicator Was Negative Rate	
CR 20016468	Submit LER 1-01-04, Unit 1 Reactor Trip Caused By Water (from Overhead Unit Cooler) in Rod Control Power Cabinets	
Emergency Subguideline 1ES-0.3A	Natural Circulation Cooldown With CRDM [Control Rod Drive Mechanism] Fans	Revision 11
Emergency Guideline 1E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	Revision 19
Emergency Subguideline 1ES-0.1	Reactor Trip Recovery	Revision 17

1R15 Operability Evaluations

CR 20014779	Found 2RC-18-5 Closed After Checklist Was Signed That It Was Open

Automated Engineering Services Corporation Letter	Preliminary Evaluation of Condition Report 20014779	June 2, 2001
Automated Engineering Services Corporation Letter	Evaluation of Condition Report 20014779, Dated 6/02/01 - EMRCMS AES Calculation No. PI-P-079, Revision 0	June 7, 2001
NMC Standard 10 CFR 50.59 Screening No. 1086	Bypass 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Undervoltage Autostart	
WO 0109557	Install Bypass for 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Undervoltage Autostart	

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

Design Change 00SI01	Boric Acid Reduction	Revision 0
WO 0106926	Implement Boric Acid Reduction Mod - Part 1A (Unit 1)	
WO 0106927	Implement Boric Acid Reduction Mod - Part 1A (Unit 2)	
WO 0106928	Rewire MV-32079 and SI [safety injection] Status Lights	
WO 0106929	Rewire MV-32080 and SI Status Lights	
WO 0106930	Rewire MV-32182 and SI Status Lights	
WO 0106931	Rewire MV-32183 and SI Status Lights	
WO 0106932	Rewire Status Light 44102-E3	
WO 0106932	Rewire Status Light 44512-E3	
Prairie Island Technical Specifications for Unit 1 and Unit 2	Revisions 161 and 162	
Prairie Island License Amendment Request dated April 17, 2000	Removal of Boric Acid Storage Tanks Form Safety Injection System	

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

WO 108185	SP 1151A Train A Cooling Water Quarterly Test	Modified to test 11 and 21 cooling water backwash control valves

WO 108186	SP 1151B Train B Cooling Water Quarterly Test	Modified to test 12 and 22 cooling water backwash control valves
CR 20012119	Instrument Air Regulators To Cooling Water Backwash Control Valves Is Set Lower Than Minimum Required Air Pressure For Control Valves	
SP 1305	D2 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test	Revision 23
WO 0109510	Install New Crankcase Ejector Orifice in D2	

1R20 Refueling and Outage

Emergency Subguideline 1ES-0.3A	Natural Circulation Cooldown With CRDM Fans	Revision 11
Operating Procedure 1C1.3	Unit 1 Shutdown	Revision 47
Operating Procedure 1C15	Residual Heat Removal System	Revision 22
Operating Procedure 1C1.2	Unit 1 Startup Procedure	Revision 25

1R22 Surveillance Testing

SP 2088	Safety Injection Pumps Monthly Test	Revision 40
SP 2102	22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test	Revision 66
SP 1093	D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test	Revision 70

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

WO 0106941	Test New Safety Relief Valves Per D44.1
WO 0106908	Calibrate Gauges And Preset New Instrument Air Regulators
WO 0104898	Calibrate Gauges For Backup Air System Cooling Water Strainers
WO 0101037	Install Wall Brackets For Compressed Air Bottles
WO 0104061	Install New Backup Air System For 11 and 21 Cooling Water Backwash Control Valves

WO 0104062	Install New Backup Air System For 12 and 22 Cooling Water Backwash Control Valves	
WO 0100977	Separate Backup Compressed Air Lines To Backwash Control Valves	
Design Change 00CL02	Backup Air System For Cooling Water Control Valve	Revision 0
SP 1151A	Train A Cooling Water System Quarterly Test	Revision 0
SP 1151B	Train B Cooling Water System Quarterly Test	Revision 0

3PP Physical Protection

Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 5.1.0	Site Security	Revision 6
Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 3.18.0	Fitness-For-Duty Program	Revision 4
Corporate Control Directive N1ACD 2.12	Fitness-For-Duty Program	Revision 2
	FFD [Fitness-for-Duty] Program Performance Data	June 30, and December 31, 2000
	FFD Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening, and Security Equipment Performance Indicator Data	Fourth Quarter, 2000 and First Quarter, 2001
	Quality Services Internal Audit Report No. AG 2000-S-3	October 31, 2000
Security Administrative Procedure SAP 2.8	Quarterly Security Report	Revision 2
	Security Event Logs	October 2000 - June 2001
Security Instruction Proceure SIP 1.1	Badge Control	Revision 0
SIP 1.5	Escort Responsibilities	Revision 0
SIP 3.3	Portal Control Operations	Revision 1
SIP 4.1	Testing and Inspection of Systems and Equipment	Revision 2
SIP 4.2	Calibration and Surveillance Procedure	Revision 0
SIP 5.1	Reporting of Security Events	Revision 3
	Security Key Inventory Report	June 9, 2001

Personnel Security Procedure AAP-15	Continuous Behavior Observation	Revision 5
	Security Self-Assessment Schedule for 2001	
Self-Assessment Audit No. PI 02-01	Admittance and Exit of Personnel	February 8, 2001
Self-Assessment Audit No. PI 03-01	Vehicle Search	February 15, 2001
Self-Assessment Audit No. PI 12-01	Portal Control Room	April 19, 2001
SP 1620	Quarterly Metal Detector Calibration	Revision 10
SP 1621	Explosive Vapor Detector Annual Test	Revision 12
SP 1653	Quarterly X-Ray Machine Test	Revision 6
	Summary Report of Work Orders and Preventive Maintenance for Personnel Search Equipment	January 2001-June 1, 2001

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

LER 2-01-04	Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip due to High Differential Condenser Backpressure	Revision 0
CR 20014153	At 24 Megawatts During Performance of 2C1.3 Unit 2 Turbine was Manually Tripped due to High Condenser Differential Pressure of 2.5 Inches with Vacuum Decreasing	
CR 20014847	Turbine Tripped During the Performance of WO 0107437 on Low Condenser Vacuum	

4OA3 Event Followup

CR 20015571	Miscellaneous Flood Panel Deficiencies	
Preventive Maintenance Procedure 3586-10	Periodic Structures Inspection	Revision 1
SP 1293	Flood Preparation Flood Control Panel Inspection/Installation	Revision 8
Pioneer Service and Engineering Company Drawing NF-38276	Powerhouse Steel Flood Protection Panels	Revision E
Abnormal Procedure AB-4	Flood	Revision 17
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001	Appendix C - Other External Events	Revision 0

Prairie Island Updated Safety Analysis Report	Appendix F - Probable Maximum Flood Study	Revision 4
CR 20016554	Submit LER 1-01-05, Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due to Fire in 4 Kilovolt Bus 12, Which Supplies 12 Reactor Coolant Pump and 12 Feedwater Pump	
Plant Safety Procedure F5 Appendix A	Fire Strategies	Revision 9
Plant Safety Procedure F5 Appendix D	Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room	Revision 6
Emergency Guideline 1E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	Revision 19
Emergency Subguideline 1ES-0.1	Reactor Trip Recovery	Revision 17
Emergency Subguideline 1ES-0.3A	Natural Circulation Cooldown With CRDM Fans	Revision 11
LER 2-01-04	Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to High Differential Condenser Backpressure	Revision 0
LER 2-01-03	Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators	Revision 0