January 22, 2002

Mr. M. Reddemann
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/01-15; 50-301/01-15

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On December 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 4, 2002, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection was a routine review of plant activities by the resident inspectors and regional inspectors.

No findings of significance were identified.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). From these audits, the NRC has concluded that your security program is adequate at this time.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/01-15;
50-301/01-15

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-266; 50-301
License Nos:	DPR-24; DPR-27
Report No:	50-266/01-15; 50-301/01-15
Licensee:	Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility:	Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:	6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241
Dates:	November 6 through December 29, 2001
Inspectors:	P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector R. Powell, Resident Inspector H. Peterson, Senior Operations Specialist B. Palagi, Operations Specialist B. Wetzel, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Approved by:	Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266-01-15, IR 05000301-01-15, on 11/06-12/29/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2. Routine Resident and Licensed Operator Requalification Report.

This report covers a 7-week routine resident inspection and a licensed operator requalification inspection. The inspections were conducted by resident and regional specialist inspectors. No findings or violations were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at **http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html**.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent until December 3, 2001, when power was reduced to approximately 98 percent for work associated with the plant process computer system (PPCS). Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power until December 18, when power was reduced to 30 percent to reduce the potential dose to workers for a containment entry to isolate a small leak on the sensing line for 1PT-420, reactor coolant system (RCS) wide range pressure detector. Unit 1 was returned to 98 percent power on December 19 and to 100 percent power on December 24 after the PPCS modification was accepted for Rated Thermal Power calculation purposes. Unit 1 remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent until November 14, 2001, when power was reduced to approximately 67 percent for turbine stop valve testing. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power later that day and remained at 100 percent until December 3 when power was reduced to approximately 98 percent for work associated with the PPCS. Unit 2 remained at 98 percent power until December 7, when power was reduced to 92 percent for condenser steam dump testing. Unit 2 was returned to 98 percent power on December 19 and to 100 percent power on December 24 after the PPCS modification was accepted for Rated Thermal Power calculation purposes. Unit 2 remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Unit 2 'A' Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Partial System Walk-down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial system walk-down of the Unit 2 ‘A’ Train EDG (G-02), while a planned service water (SW) system modification rendered the normal Unit 1 ‘A’ Train EDG (G-01), unavailable. The inspectors used licensee checklists (CLs) during the walk-downs and used selected portions of system electrical, fuel oil, lubricating oil, and starting air drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors walked down G-02 to verify the correct position of control switches, breakers, louvers, dampers, and valves associated with G-02, and ventilation, heating, fuel oil transfer, starting air, and engine control power alignments associated with G-02 support systems. The inspectors also performed walk-downs in the control room to verify appropriate switch positions and valve configurations. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 1 SW Complete System Walk-down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete walk-down of accessible portions of the Unit 1 SW system to verify system operability. The SW system was selected due to its high risk significance and because of several configuration changes made during recent system modifications. The inspectors used SW system CLs and system drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors walked down the system to verify the correct position of valves and breakers in the SW system using the system diagrams and CLs. The inspectors also observed instrumentation valve configurations and whether appropriate meter indications existed. As part of the walk-down, the inspectors checked control room switch positions to verify that they were in the correct position. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

- Fire Zone 780, G-03 Radiator Room
- Fire Zone 783, G-04 Radiator Room
- Fire Zone 784, G-04 Exhaust Fan Room
- Fire Zone 785, G-03 Exhaust Fan Room

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation. Area conditions/configurations were evaluated based on information provided in the licensee's "Fire Hazards Analysis Report," dated August 17, 2001.

The inspectors looked at fire hoses, sprinklers, and portable fire extinguishers to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. The inspectors also evaluated the physical location and condition of fire detection devices. Additionally, passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and mechanical and electrical penetration seals were inspected to verify

that they were located per Fire Protection Evaluation Report requirements and were in good physical condition. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review: Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation

a. Inspection Scope

On November 7, 2001, the resident inspectors observed licensed operator training involving a main turbine first stage pressure instrument failure, reactor coolant pump high vibrations, a large-break loss-of-coolant accident, a residual heat removal and safety injection pump auto start failure, and transfer to containment sump recirculation.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance for clarity and formality of communication; the ability to take timely action in the safe direction; the prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms; the correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and group dynamics. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of a reactor and senior reactor operator's actions during the scenario to verify that the training staff had observed important performance deficiencies and specified appropriate remedial actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Facility Operating History

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists reviewed the plant’s operating history from January 2000 through September 2001, to assess whether the Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) program had addressed operator performance deficiencies noted at the plant.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Licensee Requalification Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists performed a biennial inspection of the licensee's LORT program. The operations specialists reviewed the annual requalification operating and written examination material to evaluate general quality, construction, and difficulty level. The operating portion of the examination was inspected during October 29 - 31, 2001. The operating examination material consisted of dynamic simulator scenarios and job performance measures. The biennial written examination administered during January - February 2001 was inspected. The biennial written examination material included a total of 35 open-reference, multiple-choice questions. Approximately half of the 35 written examination questions were static-simulator, multiple-choice questions. The operations specialists reviewed the methodology for developing the examinations, including the LORT program two-year sample plan, probabilistic risk assessment insights, previously identified operator performance deficiencies, and plant modifications. The operations specialists assessed the level of examination material duplication during the current year annual examinations and with last year's annual examinations. The operations specialists also interviewed members of the licensee's management and training staff and discussed various aspects of the examination development.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Licensee Administration of Requalification Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists observed the administration of the requalification operating test to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the test and to assess the facility evaluators' ability to determine adequate performance using objective, measurable performance standards. The operations specialists evaluated the performance of one operating shift crew during three dynamic simulator scenarios and five job performance measures in parallel with the facility evaluators. The operations specialists observed the training staff personnel administering the operating test, including pre-examination briefings, observations of operator performance, individual and crew evaluations after dynamic scenarios, techniques for job performance measure cuing, and the final evaluation briefing for licensed operators. The operations specialists noted the performance of the simulator to support the examinations. The operations specialists also reviewed the licensee's overall examination security program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Licensee Training Feedback System

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists assessed the methods and effectiveness of the licensee's processes for revising and maintaining its LORT program up-to-date, including the use of feedback from plant events and industry experience information. The operations specialists interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, training management, and operations management) and reviewed the applicable licensee's procedures. In addition, the operations specialists reviewed the licensee's self-assessment reports, including the 2001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant Operations Training Self-Assessment Report, S-A-OPS-2001-01, the Cycle 01-02 Licensed Operator Requalification End of Cycle Report, and the training section of the Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Report, 2Q2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Licensee Remedial Training Program

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial training conducted since the previous annual requalification examinations and the training planned for the current examination cycle to verify that they addressed weaknesses in licensed operator or crew performance identified during training and plant operations. The operations specialists reviewed remedial training procedures and individual remedial training plans, and interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, and training management). In addition, the operations specialists reviewed the licensee's current examination cycle remediation packages for unsatisfactory operator performance on the written examination and operating test to ensure that remediation and subsequent re-evaluations were completed prior to returning individuals to licensed duties.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Conformance with Operator License Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists evaluated the facility and individual operator licensees' conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The operations specialists reviewed the facility licensee's program for maintaining active operator licenses. The operations specialists reviewed the procedural guidance and the process for tracking on-shift hours for licensed operators and which control room positions were granted credit for maintaining active operator licenses. The operations specialists also reviewed

eight licensed operators' medical records maintained by the facility for verifying the medical fitness of its licensed operators and to assess compliance with medical standards delineated in American National Standards Institute and American Nuclear Society ANSI/ANS-3.4 and with 10 CFR 55.21 and 10 CFR 55.25.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Written Examination and Operating Test Results

a. Inspection Scope

The operations specialists reviewed the overall pass/fail results of individual written tests, operating tests, and simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems and components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed station logs, maintenance work orders, condition reports (CRs), (a)(1) corrective action plans, selected surveillance test procedures, and a sample of CRs to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance criteria to verify that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance and to verify that licensee changes to performance criteria were reflected in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. Specific components and systems reviewed were:

- Engineering Safety Features System
- Diesel Generator Room Heating & Ventilation
- Nuclear Instrumentation

For a safeguards timing relay calibration procedure, the inspectors examined the cumulative effect of six time-delay relays which had drifted and required adjustment. The inspectors considered the potential cumulative effect to ensure that the engineering safety feature system remained capable of performing its design basis function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities, to verify that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments to verify that the licensee's planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of on-line risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed actions to address increased on-line risk during periods when equipment was out-of-service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when on-line risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components. When risk-significant equipment was taken out-of-service, the inspectors reviewed selected tagouts to verify that no unintentional equipment had been removed from service which would increase the assumed risk profile. The following specific activities were reviewed:

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 11, 2001. This included risk-significant work and testing involving the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and the Unit 1 'B' train component cooling water pump. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the activities added to the work week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the previously completed risk assessment.

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 18, 2001. This included work involving risk-significant surveillance testing of the Unit 2 safeguards bus undervoltage relays, steam generator safeguards logic testing, Unit 1 over-temperature-delta-temperature setpoint calibrations, and a Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil change and cold-start test. This testing occurred while the Unit 2 'A' EDG was out-of-service due to an electrical generator rotor failure. The inspectors also reviewed the additional activities added to the work week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the previously completed risk assessment. Finally, the inspectors reviewed selected procedures to verify that configuration changes as a result of cycling main steam valves and purifying the refueling water storage tanks did not render any safety-related functions unavailable.

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 25, 2001. This included risk-significant work and testing involving the Unit 1 condenser steam dump valves, Unit 2 reactor protection logic testing, and SW Pump P-32A.

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning December 23, 2001.

b Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)

.1 Unit 1 RCS Leak on RCS Wide Range Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee performance during the identification and isolation of a small RCS leak from a Unit 1 wide-range pressure transmitter sensing line leading to pressure transmitters 1PT-420, 1PT-420C, and 1PI-447. The inspectors reviewed licensee efforts at identifying the source of the leak through chemistry analyses, determining the physical location of the leak through containment entries, reducing reactor power while isolating the leak to minimize personnel radiation exposure, and subsequent sensing line repair activities. The inspectors also reviewed design basis information to determine if any control or interlock functions were lost as a result of isolating the pressure transmitters. Where interlock functions were affected, the inspectors verified that the licensee had taken appropriate compensatory actions to ensure adequate equipment protection remained. Inspectors also considered the location of the leak and the potential effect on adjacent equipment to ensure the effects of the leak were fully understood.

b Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) (URI 50-266/01-13-01): Operating crew response to high electrical generator differential temperatures during Unit 1 startup activities. The inspectors reviewed the operating crew response to an electrical generator hot gas differential temperature limit being exceeded during Unit 1 startup activities on September 17, 2001, to determine the appropriateness of crew actions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation of the manual turbine trip which included an evaluation of operating crew response to the event.

Specifically, the inspectors considered procedural compliance and conservative decision making practices when reviewing the crew's decision to manually trip the turbine despite the procedural guidance of Operating Procedures (OPs) OP 1C, Step 3.8.7.c, and OP 2A, Step 2.8.6.c, which directed a manual trip of both the reactor and the turbine. The inspectors reviewed the associated emergent temporary procedure change notice, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation, the turbine trip incident investigation report, and conduct-of-operations guidance in determining the appropriateness of the crew's decision to deviate from safety-related, continuous-use, and reference-use procedure requirements.

The inspectors concluded that the crew's response was technically justifiable and was conducted in accordance with established procedures for emergent procedure changes. The inspectors were, however, concerned about the potential ramifications of setting a precedent of not tripping a reactor when directed to do so by procedure. The inspectors engaged licensee management on several occasions to discuss the concern. In this instance, the problems experienced on the secondary side were quickly diagnosed and determine to be isolated to the secondary side. For that reason, not tripping the reactor below the P-9 permissive (49 percent power) concurrent with a turbine trip was consistent with operator training and management expectation for procedure compliance. The inspectors conducted reviews to verify that the licensee reinforced expectations concerning conservative decision-making practices, reactor trip criteria, and the requirements for procedure changes during crew training cycle 01-06, conducted after the September 17 trip.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Instrument Channel Wide Range Detectors

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with CR 01-3407, “Environmental Quals of Components Questioned,” to understand the impact of radiation dose levels during normal and accident conditions on wide range nuclear instrument EQs. The inspectors reviewed selected drawings to determine the specific location of important wide range nuclear instrument components including the detectors, cable runs, connectors, seals (o-rings) and junction boxes. For each component and location, the inspectors considered the effects of gamma, beta, and neutron radiation for the integrated dose projections over 40 years of operation and post-accident expected exposures. The inspectors also interviewed an EQ engineer to understand vendor qualification tests and sources of EQ data that were not part of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis documentation. Finally, the inspectors performed detector junction box and connector exposure calculations to independently confirm the licensee's conclusions of operability.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Comparison of FSAR Total Integrated Dose for Equipment Inside Containment to the Cumulative Contribution of Normal and Post-Accident Radiation Qualification Requirements

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with CR 01-3408, "Total Integrated Dose Equipment In Containment May Not Be Accurate," to understand the ability of equipment inside containment to withstand the cumulative effects of normal (gamma and neutron) and post-accident (gamma, neutron, and beta) radiation exposures. Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 14.3.4-15 for total integrated dose for equipment inside containment only identified gamma radiation for post-accident conditions up to 1,000 hours and did not consider the effects of neutron or beta radiation during accident conditions or gamma and neutron radiation during normal conditions. The inspectors reviewed the additional dose to equipment as a result of beta and neutron exposures during accident conditions and the neutron and gamma exposure during normal conditions to verify that the gamma exposure data included in the FSAR remained bounding for all accident and normal operating conditions. The inspectors also reviewed selected licensee submittals to verify that compliance with all regulatory requirements concerning radiation qualification of equipment inside containment had been met and no violation of regulatory requirements had occurred.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Effects of Low Environmental Temperatures on Primary Containment Tendon Cable Fracture Toughness Characteristics

a. Inspection Scope

During a review of cold weather preparations, the inspectors considered the effects of cold ambient temperatures on the exposed tendon cans and adjacent ductile material in the facade area. The inspectors interviewed a containment structural engineer to understand the tensile load bearing components of concern in the tendon system and the containment stress response during a design basis event. The inspectors also referenced the design basis pressurization rates, peak pressures, and temperature profiles across the primary containment wall during a design basis accident to understand the integrated stress response of the primary containment structure. The inspectors researched local temperature extremes in Two Rivers, Wisconsin, to determine the lowest temperature to which tendon materials had been exposed. The inspectors reviewed American Society for Testing and Materials 421-90, "Standard for Uncoated Stress-Relieved Steel Wire for Prestressed Concrete," requirements for tendon cables and researched the available literature for fracture toughness data to determine if local temperature extremes could cause tendon material to transition from the ductile to the brittle response regime. The inspectors also considered the energy absorption capability of the primary containment structure during cold temperature extremes to other design basis considerations such as tornado and wind impact loadings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Safety Injection Pump Operability With Safeguards Bus Voltages in Excess of Continuous Operating Motor Rating

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability considerations associated with CR 01-3528, "Safety Related Bus Voltages High - 7 Day LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] Entered," to understand the impact of safeguards bus voltages in excess of 4400 volts alternating current (VAC) on safety injection pump (rated at 4000 VAC) operability. The inspectors reviewed Improved Technical Specification Bases Section B.3.8.1 which set a maximum continuous voltage rating for safety-related motors of 110 percent of nominal ratings. The inspectors reviewed recent safeguards bus voltage levels and referenced industry guidance for electric motor overheating effects with terminal voltages in excess of 110 percent of nominal ratings.

Following the licensee's change of Improved Technical Specification bases to allow maximum system voltage operating limits of 115 percent nominal voltage (4600 VAC), the inspectors reviewed the associated safety evaluation screening that concluded that the change would not have more than a marginal effect on the reliability of the safety-related motors. The inspectors challenged this assumption and interviewed selected engineering personnel to better understand the design basis functional impact of elevated 4160- and 480-VAC safeguard bus voltages on safety-related motor continuous ratings. The inspectors also considered the effects of increased safeguards bus voltages on current transformers, protective relaying devices, motor starting torques, solenoid-operated devices, and power transformer magnetic core saturations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (71111.16)

.1 OWA Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed OWAs to identify any potential effect on the function of mitigating systems, or the ability of operators to respond to an event and implement abnormal and emergency OPs. The inspectors interviewed selected operations and engineering licensee personnel and evaluated the following OWAs:

- OWA 2-01R-001 CW, "Waterbox Level Alarms"
- OWA 2-00R-002 SG, "2MS-312, Blowdown Filter Bypass Throttled Open"
- OWA 2-99R-003 WL, "Unit 2 Facade Sump Requires Frequent Pumping Due to Ground Water Intrusion"

- OWA 0-01C-001 PI, “Unit 2 Main Condenser Vacuum Gages in Control Room Unreliable Requiring Frequent Venting”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Cumulative Effect of OWAs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of OWAs to determine the total impact of these workarounds on plant operations. Specifically, the inspectors considered the interactions between OWAs associated with oversized condenser steam dump valves, water intrusion into the Unit 2 facade sump indicating submersion of selected electrical cables, manual operator action required to reseat crossover steam dump valves, safeguards battery room high speed ventilation fan operation which caused moisture intrusion in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, and the inability to use two Unit 2 letdown system orifices at higher RCS pressures. The inspectors also reviewed the interaction between four of the thirteen OWAs which, in part, pertained to maintaining the condenser as the normal, preferred heat sink for reactor operations. The inspectors also reviewed OWA meeting minutes from June, July, August, September, and October 2001, to determine if the licensee had been conducting periodic reviews of OWAs and considering the total impact of workarounds on plant operations. The inspectors reviewed probabilistic risk assessment personnel involvement in the periodic workaround reviews to determine if the licensee was attempting to gain possible risk insights concerning the cumulative effect of OWAs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (71111.19)

.1 G-01 SW Supply

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Individual Work Plan 00-102-01, “Service Water Upgrades to Emergency Diesel Generator G01 Units 1 and 2,” to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors reviewed, following system modifications, portions of the SW system associated with EDG G-01 to verify that the systems were leak tight and capable of performing their design functions. The inspectors also examined selected pipe supports and hangars to verify seismic adequacy of the modified SW piping.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 'D' SW Pump Removal, Installation, and Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Work Order (WO) 9933943 and Routine Maintenance Procedures (RMPs) 9216-1, 9216-2, and 9216-3 following replacement of the 'D' SW pump and motor to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors observed portions of the motor and pump replacement activities and reviewed completed maintenance records to verify that foreign material exclusion controls were properly applied; inservice leak tests were properly performed; pump and motor vibrations following reassembly were at acceptable levels; motor power supply lugs and cables were properly reattached and assembled; the new motor had acceptable electrical performance characteristics; and shaft runout and bearing clearances following reassembly were within acceptable limits. The inspectors selected this activity due to the risk-significance of the SW system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unit 2 Containment Spray Pump 2P-14B

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Inservice Test Procedure (IT)-06, “Containment Spray Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2,” Revision 50, following an oil change of 2P-14B to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed design basis requirements and completed documentation for Procedure TS-9, “Control Room Heating and Ventilation System Monthly Checks,” Revision 22, to verify operability of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 'D' SW Pump Surveillance Testing Following Motor and Pump Replacement

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance test and reviewed the completed documentation for IT-07D, “P-32D Service Water Pump (Quarterly),” Revision 10, to verify operability of 'D' SW pump following motor and pump replacement activities. The inspectors also reviewed design basis requirements for the SW system to verify that the surveillance test accurately tested the design function of the pump.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance test and reviewed the completed documentation for IT-08A, “Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1,” Revision 24, to verify operability of Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspectors also reviewed design basis requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system to verify that the surveillance test accurately tested the design function of the pump.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

.1 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) Temporary Filtration Skid Installation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modifications 01-041 and 01-042, "Installation of Filtration Skid for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A/B)," to verify that the modifications were properly installed, had no effect on the operability of adjacent safety-related equipment, and adequately reduced elevated FOST particulate levels. The inspectors performed walk-downs of the modification while filtering of each FOST was occurring to verify that appropriate compensatory actions for open vital area security and fire protection barriers had been implemented. During filtration, the inspectors examined the temporary modification flow paths, suction and discharge piping, and filtration equipment to verify that the design basis amount of fuel oil remained available for each EDG to meet its intended safety function. The inspectors verified that the filtration skid took a suction from the bottom of each FOST to ensure that all fuel oil was being effectively filtered and to eliminate the possibility of high and low particulate fuel oil stratification. The inspectors also examined foreign material exclusion controls during the filtration process to verify that no unwanted materials entered the safety-related EDG fuel oil supply system. Finally, the inspectors examined the filtration skid for fuel oil leaks to verify that appropriate precautions had been taken to prevent leaks from affecting adjacent equipment or the environment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Temporary Cooling for the Cable Spreading Room (CSR)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Safety Evaluation 2001-0049, "Upgrade of the Control Room Ventilation Boundary," to understand the effects of the upgrade on control room in-leakage rates and habitability. The first phase of the control room envelope upgrade included temporary cooling for the CSR which consisted of a skid mounted chiller in the Unit 1 turbine building, piping manifolds and electrical power feeds to six CSR air handling units, and CSR pipe penetrations. The inspectors performed a walk-down of the temporary CSR cooling installation to verify that the temporary equipment did not impact the operation of adjacent safety-related breakers, relays, and transformers. In addition, the inspectors examined the temporary equipment for seismic adequacy and the maintenance of fire barrier integrity. During the temporary modification, the CSR temporary chilled water line and electrical power penetrations were also reviewed for high-energy-line-break barrier adequacy since these penetrations passed from the turbine building into the CSR. The inspectors also checked to verify that insulation had been applied to chilled water lines as necessary to prevent dripping condensation from affecting nearby components in both the turbine building and CSR. At selected times while the CSR temporary cooling system was installed and operating, the inspectors performed walk-downs to verify that work-in-progress did not cover or degrade the

detection capability of smoke and heat detectors in the control room ventilation equipment room or the CSR. The inspectors also reviewed the temporary modification fire protection conformance CL to verify that as-built configurations in the turbine building and CSR were in compliance with fire protection requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the CSR temporary cooling system operating instructions to verify that they provided adequate operator direction during normal start-up, steady state, and shutdown conditions. The inspectors also reviewed the area to verify that in the event of a CSR temporary cooling system failure, emergency CSR cooling equipment was staged and available as required by Abnormal Operating Procedure 10A, "Safe Shutdown - Local Control," Attachment E, Revision 32. Following removal of CSR temporary cooling system, the inspectors walked down portions of the control room ventilation boundary to ensure that normal ventilation alignments, fire penetration barriers, and high energy line break barriers had been properly restored.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

.1 Emergency Alternating Current System Power Availability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported third quarter 2001 data for the Emergency Alternating Current System Power Availability PIs for Units 1 and 2 using the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 1.

The inspectors reviewed station log entries and system engineer data sheets for periods of system unavailability to verify that planned and unplanned unavailability hours were characterized correctly in determining PI results. The inspectors also made independent calculations to verify PI data. The inspectors reviewed recent equipment failures and the recording of fault exposure hours to verify system unavailability was being properly reflected in the PI. Where questions arose concerning an electrical rotor failure associated with the G04 EDG, the inspectors engaged the licensee staff who submitted a frequently-asked-question to NRC headquarters to clarify the intent of reporting emergency alternating current system power fault exposure hours. Finally, the inspectors reviewed selected surveillance test procedures affecting the EDGs to verify that the surveillance tests did not render the generators unavailable for performing their safety-related function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 50-266/2001-003-00; 50-301/2001-003-00; 50-266/2001-003-01 and 50-301/2001-003-01: Containment response for MSLB [Main Steamline Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). This event report and supplement discussed a potential non-conservatism in the Point Beach primary containment analyses for a MSLB inside containment with an assumed failure of a main feedwater regulating valve to close. The inspectors previously reviewed the licensee's interim operability determinations and event response notifications as documented in Inspection Report 50-266/01-10; 50-301/01-10, Sections 1R15 and 4OA3.1.

Based on a review of the issue, the LER, and the supplement, the inspectors determined that no violation of regulatory requirements had occurred and that compensatory measures instituted by the licensee were sufficient to prevent primary containment design pressure from being exceeded in the event of a MSLB inside containment with failure of the main feedwater regulating valve to close. This issue has been included in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 01-2026.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting

The resident inspectors presented the routine inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and other members of licensee management on January 4, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

Interim Exit Meetings

Senior Official at Exit Meeting:	Mark Reddemann, Site Vice-President
Date:	November 2, 2001 Overall annual examination results via telephone
Proprietary:	No
Subject:	Results of an Inspection of the Licensee's Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Change to Inspection Program:	No

Senior Official at Exit Meeting:	Chuck Sizemore, Training Supervisor
Date:	November 20, 2001 Overall annual examination results via telephone
Proprietary:	No
Subject:	Results of an Inspection of the Licensee's Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Change to Inspection Program:	No

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

J. Anderson, Production Planning Group Manager
L. Armstrong, Design Engineering Manager
C. Arnone, Outage Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
F. Flentje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist
D. Gehrke, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
N. Hoefert, Engineering Programs Manager
R. Hopkins, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
C. Krause, Regulatory Compliance
R. Mende, Director of Engineering
D. Schoon, Operations Manager
R. Pulec, Site Assessment Manager
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
D. Shannon, Radiation Protection Supervisor
C. Sizemore, Training Supervisor
P. Smith, Operations Training Supervisor
J. Strharsky, Assistant Operations Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Turner, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
P. Walker, Training Manager
T. Webb, Licensing Manager

NRC

B. A. Wetzel, Point Beach Project Manager, NRR

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-266/2001-003-00 50-301/2001-003-00 50-266/2001-003-01 50-301/2001-003-01	LER	Containment response for MSLB [Main Steam Line Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per square inch gauge (Section 4A03.1)

Closed

50-266/01-13-01	URI	Operating crew response to high electrical generator differential temperatures during Unit 1 startup activities (Section 1R14.2)

50-266/2001-003-00 50-301/2001-003-00 50-266/2001-003-01 50-301/2001-003-01	LER	Containment response for MSLB [Main Steam Line Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per square inch gauge (Section 4A03.1)

Discussed

None.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CL	Checklist
CR	Condition Report
CSR	Cable Spreading Room
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EQ	Environmental Qualification
FOST	Fuel Oil Storage Tank
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
IT	Inservice Test Procedure
LER	Licensee Event Report
LORT `	Licensed Operator Requalification Training
MSLB	Main Steam Line Break
Mwth	Megawatts Thermal
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OP	Operating Procedure
OWA	Operator Workaround
PI	Performance Indicator
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
PPCS	Plant Process Computer System
psig	Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RMP	Routine Maintenance Procedure
SCR	Safety Evaluation Screening
SW	Service Water
URI	Unresolved Item
VAC	Volts Alternating Current
WCAP	Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power
WO	Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Checklist (CL) 10B	Service Water Safeguards Lineup	Revision 50
CL 10D	Fuel Oil System	Revision 17
CL 11A G-02	G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist	Revision 24
CL 10C	Service Water Turbine Building Valve Lineup Unit 1	Revision 19
CL 10J	Safeguards Service Water System Checklist Unit 1	Revision 18

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 780, G-03 Radiator Room	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 783, G-04 Radiator Room	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 784, G-04 Exhaust Fan Room	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 785, G-03 Exhaust Fan Room	August 17, 2001

1R11 Licensed Operator Qualifications

Simulator Guide SES-034	Large-Break LOCA [Loss-of-Coolant Accident] and Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation	Revision 2
TI 9.0	Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Examination Security Requirements	Revision 1
OM 3.1	Operations Shift Staffing Requirements	Revision 11
OM 3.7	AOP and EOP Procedure Sets Use and Adherence	Revision 10
OM 3.10	Operations Personnel Assignments and Scheduling	Revision 13
OM 3.31	Removal and Restoration of Control Room Alarms	Revision 3
OM 3.34	Reactivity Management Procedure	Revision 1

OM 3.35	Improving Operator Performance	Revision 0
NP 1.10.1	Record Keeping for NRC Licensed Operators	Revision 3
NP 2.1.1	Conduct of Operations	Revision 0
NP 6.1.1	Training	Revision 7
TRPR 33.0	Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program	Revision 14
OTS 01	Training Advisory Committees	Revision 2
OTS 02	Written Evaluations/ Remediation/ Watchstander Log	Revision 4
OTS 04	Technical Qualifications for Instructors	Revision 0
OTS 06	Performance Review Committee	Revision 1
OTS 07	Operations Instructor In-Plant Time	Revision 0
List	Plant vs. Simulator Differences (Listing)	List as of November 1, 2001
List	Simulator Discrepancy Report (Listing)	List as of November 1, 2001
Training Plan	2001/2002 LOR [Licensed Operator Requalification] Long Range Training Plan	May 16, 2001
Report	Cycle 01-2 LOR End of Cycle Report	October 29, 2001
S-A-OPS-2001-01	PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] Operations Training Self-Assessment January 22-26, 2001	February 28, 2001
2Q2001	Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Report 2Q2001 Section 2.4, Plant Support Training and Qualification	Second Quarter (April-June, 2001)
WMR# 2000-0086	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Instructor Performance	April 27, 2000
WMR# 2000-0152	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Review of NRC Information Notices	August 2, 2000
WMR# 2000-0163	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: TS 84, Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly	August 10, 2000

WMR# 2000-0177	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Hazmat Drill 2000	August 22, 2000
WMR# 2000-0202	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Operations Continuing Training Cold Weather Protection Lesson	September 18, 2000
WMR# 2000-0248	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Operations TAC Meeting	November 14, 2000
WMR# 2000-0270	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Instructor Performance	December 7, 2000
WMR# 2001-0028	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Operations Requal Training Presentation for NMC Conduct of Operations Procedure	February 20, 2001
WMR# 2001–0106	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Initial Auxiliary Operator Training	May 7, 2001
WMR# 2001-0149	Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report Activity Observed: Review of Actions Taken to Address SOER 88-03-03, “Review Initial and Continuing Training from SOER 85-4 (SOER 85-4, “Loss or Degradation of Residual Heat Removal Capability in PWRs”)	September 26, 2001
EP 5.0	Organizational Control of Emergencies	Revision 44
EPIP 1.1	Course of Action	Revision 37
EPIP 1.2	Emergency Classification	Revision 34
EP Appendix A	Emergency Response Organization Personnel Function and Responsibility	Revision 20
SER	Safety Evaluation Report Topic: Minimum Staffing Levels for Emergency Situations	April 29, 1983
Letter	Wisconsin Electric to NRC Response Letter Dated March 6, 1984 Topic: Emergency Plan Clarifications, Attachment A, Item 4, Communicator and Rad/Chem Technician On-Shift Staffing	March 6, 1984
SES-029	Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Scenario SES-029	Revision 2

SES-034	Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Scenario SES-034	Revision 2
SES-039	Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Scenario SES-039	Revision 4
P000.043 AOT	Licensed Operator Requalification Job Performance Measure: Perform Manual Hand Pump Operation of the Containment Sump B Isolation Valves	Revision 1
P000.049a COT	Licensed Operator Requalification Job Performance Measure: Respond to a Dropped Rod	Revision 0
P045.005 COT	Licensed Operator Requalification Job Performance Measure: Synchronize Turbine Generator with Output Grid at Minimum Load	Revision 2
P0062.009b AOT	Licensed Operator Requalification Job Performance Measure: Operate a 4.16kV Breaker Locally	Revision 0
P000.033b COT	Licensed Operator Requalification Job Performance Measure: Respond to Degraded RHR System	Revision 0
Records	Sample of Four Licensed Operators' Medical Records	Various
Records	Annual LORT Exam Remediation Packages: Four Written Examination Failures	January - February 2001
Written Exams	LOR Biennial Written Examinations Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator	Cycle 1 of 2001
Training Records	Cycle 01-6 Examination Evaluation Forms Crew F	November 1, 2001

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

WO 9913385	2ICP-05.058, Safeguards Timing Relay Calibration	October 18, 2000
	Performance Criteria for Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System	December 3, 2001
	ESF Unavailability Time, Unit 1 and 2, Trains A & B, Unavailability Records	December 17, 2001

	List of WOs for ESF Initiated or Completed between 1/1/2000 and 12/31/2000	December 6, 2001
	List of WOs for ESF Initiated or Completed between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2001	December 3, 2001
CR 00-3270	ORT 3A Acceptance Criteria for Test Lamp Indication Requested	October 23, 2000
CR 01-3097	TS Equipment Failure, Unit 1 Containment Pressure Indicator	October 9, 2001
WO 9602189	Containment Pressure Inverter	
	Maintenance Rule (a)(1) System Action Plan Checklist and Approval - VNDG	May 11, 2001
NPM 2001-0251	2000Annual Report for the Maintenance rule	March 26, 2001

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	November 11, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	November 11, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	November 18, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	November 18, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	November 25, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	November 25, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	December 23, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	December 23, 2001
Periodic Check (PC) 25	Recirculation and Purification of RWST [Refueling Water Storage Tank] Unit 1	Revision 18
PC-25	Recirculation and Purification of RWST Unit 2	Revision 21
Inservice Test (IT) 85	Main Steam Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2	Revision 20

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

FSAR Section 9.2	Residual Heat Removal	June 2001
Point Beach Drawing PB 01MRCK00000611	Reactor Coolant System Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1	Revision E

1R15 Operability Evaluations

CR 01-3407	Environmental Quals [Qualifications] of Components Questioned	November 2, 2001
Operability Determination (OD) CR 01-3407	Unit 1&2 N-00040 NI [Nuclear Instrument] Fission Channel Wide Range Detector Environmental Qualification	November 6, 2001
Drawing 900131	Customer Assembly, NFMS Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1&2	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-133	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #7 Elevation 21'-0", Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-2133	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #11 Elevation 21'-0", Point Beach N.P. Unit 2	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-132	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #7 Elevation 8'-0", Point Beach Nuclear Plant	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-2132	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #11 Elevation 8'-0", Point Beach Nuclear Plant	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-134	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #7 Elevation 46'-0", Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	Revision E
Bechtel Drawing E-2133	Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area #11 Elevation 46'-0"	Revision E
CR 01-3408	Total Integrated Dose Equipment In Containment May Not Be Accurate	November 2, 2001
CR 01-3408	EQSS [Environmental Qualification Summary Sheets] Reference FSAR 14.3.4-15, TID [Total Integrated Dose] Does Not Include Neutron, Beta and Normal Operation Radiation	November 7, 2001
Wisconsin Electric Letter	Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment Response to IE Bulletin No. 79-01 Point Beach Nuclear Plant	June 13, 1979

FSAR Section 5.1	Containment System Structure	June 2001
FSAR Section 14.3.4-1	Containment Integrity Evaluation	June 2001
American Society for Testing and Materials Designation A 421-90	Standard Specification for Uncoated Stress-Relieved Steel Wire for Prestressed Concrete	
Drawing CH-1072	Grease Volume Unit 1 Schematic Work Sheet	Contract #247680
Internet Site	Midwestern Regional Climate Center Climate Summaries for the Midwest, Wisconsin, Two Rivers (Site 478672), Climate Summary (Test),http://mcc.sws.uiuc.edu/Summary/Html/478672.html	
CR 01-3528	Safety Related Bus Voltages High - 7 Day LCO Entered	November 21, 2001
	Document Review and Approval for TS Bases B.3.8.1, AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Operating	November 21, 2001
0-TS-EP-001	Weekly Power Availability Verification	Revision 0
Wisconsin Electric Calculation N-94-081	AC Distribution System Maximum Voltage Study	Revision 0
American National Standard C50.41-1982, Section 14	Variation from Rated Voltage and Rated Frequency	
EPRI NP-1558	A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology	
US Department of Energy Motor Challenge Program	Optimizing Your Motor-Driven System	
Safety Evaluation Screening (SCR) 2001-0480	Revision to Technical Specification Bases B.3.8.1	November 21, 2001

1R16 Operator Workarounds

	Operator Workaround Meeting Minutes	June - October, 2001
	Operator Workaround Summary List	November 13, 2001

NP 2.1.4	Operator Workarounds	Revision 0
Plant Modification 01-089	Subsoil Sump Drain Line Reroute	July 12, 2001
CR 01-1790	Unit Low Condenser Vacuum Trend	May 17, 2001
CR 01-1822	Water Box Cleaning	May 21, 2001
CR 01-1818	Lessons Learned While Removing Unit Water Boxes From Service	May 20, 2001
OI 38	Circulating Water System Operation	Revision 27
AOP-5A	Loss of Condenser Vacuum	Revision 10
Alarm Response Book (ARB) 2C03 2F 1-8	Condenser Vacuum Low	Revision 4

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

IWP 00-102-01,	Service Water Upgrades to Emergency Diesel Generator G01 Units 1 and 2	Revision 0
OI 70	Service Water System Operation	Revision 36
TS 81	Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly	Revision 61
WO 9933943	P-32D SW [Service Water] Pump Discharge Expansion Joint	
Removal, Replacement, and Modification Form 01-0005	XJ-02975C, P-032D Service Water Pump Discharge Expansion Joint	December 19, 2001
Routine Maintenance Procedure (RMP) 9216-1	Service Water Pump Motor Removal and Installation	Revision 3
RMP 9216-2	Service Water Pump Motor Removal and Installation, and Maintenance	Revision 3
RMP 9216-3	Service Water Pump Vibration Testing and Balancing for Post-Maintenance Testing Motor Removal and Installation	Revision 5
IT-06	Containment Spray Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2	Revision 50

1R22 Surveillance Testing

Technical Specification Test TS-9	Control Room Heating and Ventilation System Monthly Checks	Revision 22
Design Basis Document DBD-31	Control Room HVAC and Habitability	Revision 0
IT-7D	P-32D Service Water Pump (Quarterly)	Revision 10
FSAR Section 9.6.2	Service Water System	Revision June 2001
IT-08A	Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1	Revision 24

1R23 Temporary Modifications

Temporary Modification (TM) 01-041	DG [Diesel Generator] Fuel Oil Tank T-175A Filter Skid Installation	November 18, 2001
TM 01-042	DG Fuel Oil Tank T-175B Filter Skid Installation	November 18, 2001
SCR 2001-0967	Change Stability Testing Requirements for Diesel Fuel Oil in TRM [Technical Requirements Manual] From Absolute to Trending Only	November 19, 2001
SCR 2001-0965	Installation of Filtration Skid for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A/B)	November 18, 2001
OI 92C	Filtration of T-175A/B Using Temporary Filter Unit	Revision 0
TM 97-049*D	Upgrade Control Room Envelope Boundary Isolation	March 21, 2001
WO Plan for MR 97-049*D01	Cable Spreading Room Temporary Cooling	September 11, 2001
Safety Evaluation 2001-0049	Upgrade Control Room Envelope Boundary	August 17, 2001
Fire Protection Conformance Checklist for MR 97-049*D01	Cable Spreading Room Ventilation and Control Room Ventilation Systems	August 15, 2001
Abnormal operating Procedure 10A	Safe Shutdown - Local Control, Attachment E	Revision 32

Operating Instruction (OI) 90, Attachment M	Control, Computer, and Cable Spreading Room Ventilation Systems, CSR Temporary Chiller and CSR Temporary AHUs [Air Handling Units]	Revision 15

4AO1 Performance Indicator Verification

NEI 99-02	Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline	Revision 1
WO 9945275	Voltage Regulator Does Not Respond to Manual Control	August 5, 2001
TS-84	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly	Revision 10
RMP 9043-41	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Inspection	Revision 0
RMP 9043-41	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Inspection	Revision 4
RMP 9043-41	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Inspection	Revision 3
Electro-Motive Diesel Vendor Manual	645 E4 Engine Maintenance, Sections 5.8, “Windings,” and 5.10, “Insulation Resistance”	Control #00367G
1RMP 9071-1	A-05 4160/480 Degraded and Loss of Voltage Monthly Surveillance	Revision 14
2RMP 9071-2	A-06 4160/480 Degraded and Loss of Voltage Monthly Surveillance	Revision 12
2RMP 9330-1	2X-13/A-05 Relay Testing and Calibration	Revision 7
1RMP 9330-2	2X-14/A-06 Relay Testing and Calibration	Revision 7
OI 35A	Standby Emergency Power Alignment	Revision 7
IT 72	Service Water Valves (Quarterly)	Revision 17
IT 100	Seat Leakage Test of Diesel Air Compressor Discharge Check Valves (Quarterly)	Revision 10

4A03 Event Follow-up

WCAP 15153	Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach, Units 1 and 2 Steamline Break and Containment Integrity Analysis	December 1998
CR 99-0153	Some Accident Reanalyses of Containment Integrity Using Thermal Upgrade parameters Do Not Meet FSAR Limits	January 15, 1999

CR 00-1304	Failure to Consider Single Failure to Close FWRV [Feedwater Regulating Valve] to Faulted SG [Steam Generator] - Containment Pressure	April 24, 2000
CR 01-2026	Containment Design Pressure Issue	June 6, 2001
FSAR Section 14.2.5	Rupture of a Steam Pipe	June 2000