September 5, 2001

Mr. John K. Wood
Vice President - Nuclear
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
P. O. Box 97, A200
Perry, OH 44081

SUBJECT: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-440/01-10

Dear Mr. Wood:

On August 22, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on August 23, 2001, with members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Christine A. Lipa

Christine A. Lipa, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-440
License No. NPF-58

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-440/01-10

See Attached Distribution

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Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-440
License No:	NPF-58
Report No:	50-440/01-10
Licensee:	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:	Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:	P.O. Box 97 A200 Perry, OH 44081
Dates:	July 1 through August 22, 2001
Inspectors:	Christine A. Lipa, Senior Resident Inspector Gerald J. McCoy, Acting Senior Resident Inspector Rene Vogt-Lowell, Resident Inspector Katherine Green-Bates, Reactor Engineer Robert Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
Approved by:	Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000440-01-10; on 07/01-08/22/2001; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Reactor Operations and Emergency Preparedness.

This report covers a 6-week routine inspection and an emergency preparedness inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and a regional specialist inspector. No findings of significance were identified by the inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://nrr10.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Licensee Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

At the beginning of the inspection period on July 1, 2001, the plant was operating at 100 percent power. Power remained at 100 percent until July 11, 2001 at 10:27 p.m. when an electrical transient originating with a blown fuse, resulted in an automatic, low water level, reactor scram. To allow for the necessary troubleshooting and repairs, the plant was taken to cold shutdown (Mode 4) on July 13, 2001. After the repairs were completed, while returning to power operation, and after having reached Mode 2 at 7:02 p.m. on July 16, 2001, a decision was made by plant management to return to cold shutdown at 11:20 p.m. the next day due to problems encountered with the motor feedwater pump's (MFP) minimum flow control valve. Troubleshooting activities during the shutdown disclosed that the MFP's diffuser was damaged and metallic diffuser pieces had been released into the piping system, damaging the minimum flow control valve internals and thus accounting for the valve's abnormal operation. In addition to repairing the MFP and its minimum flow control valve, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump's shaft seal was replaced during this shutdown. This MFP / HPCS seal outage ended with the plant entering Mode 2 at 2:09 p.m. on July 29, 2001, synchronizing to the grid at 00:48 am on July 31, 2001, and achieving 100 percent power on August 1, 2001. Power has remained at essentially 100 percent through the end of the inspection period with the exception of minor reductions for turbine valve testing and control rod "rod line" adjustments.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the risk significant control room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) and emergency recirculation systems (M25/26) for a partial walk-down. The inspectors walked down train A, during an M25 train B control room HVAC outage to verify mechanical and electrical equipment lineups, component labeling, component lubrication, component and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. In addition a selection of condition reports associated with these systems and associated chillers were reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Routine Plant Tours

a. Inspection Scope (71111.05Q)

The inspectors walked down selected risk significant areas looking for any fire protection issues related to: the control of transient combustibles, ignition sources, fire detection equipment manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation. Areas walked down include the accessible portions of: the refuel floor in containment, the heater building, the turbine complex, the control complex and the auxiliary building.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Fire Drill

a. Inspection Scope (71111.05A)

The inspectors observed a fire brigade drill in a plant area important to safety to evaluate the readiness of the licensee's personnel to prevent and fight fires. The inspectors observed an unannounced drill which included a simulated fire in the Unit 2 Division 1 cable spreading room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed equipment issues, surveillance test failures, and other performance problems for the systems or components listed below. The inspectors reviewed whether the components were properly scoped in accordance with the Maintenance Rule, whether failures were properly characterized, and whether the performance criteria were appropriate. In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports associated with implementation of the maintenance rule to determine if the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program. The problem identification and resolution (PIR) condition reports reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

- Residual heat removal (E12)
- Emergency service water (P45)
- Feedwater system (N27)

b. Findings

No significant findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

- The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment associated with a forced outage the week of July 15 through July 21, 2001. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment, which included emergent work on the motor-driven feedwater pump, and observed shutdown safety postings and briefings.

- The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment and compensatory actions taken when the reactor core isolation cooling system was taken out of service for steam admission valve repairs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

Following an automatic reactor scram on July 11, the inspectors responded to the site and observed post-scram evolutions. The inspectors observed operator actions in response to ONI-C71-1, "Reactor Scram" and use of the reactor core isolation cooling system for reactor water level control.

On July 17, with the reactor holding at approximately 1 percent reactor power following startup on July 16, the inspectors observed portions of the reactor shutdown directed by plant management following indications of problems with the operation of the motor-driven feedwater pump minimum flow valve. The inspectors observed control rod movements, crew briefings, and management oversight of the evolution.

On July 31, during the process of returning the plant to full power operation, the inspectors observed operator reactivity manipulations associated with transferring the recirculation pumps from slow speed to fast speed. The inspectors noted operator usage of procedure SOI-B33, "Reactor Recirculation System."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

- Spurious Reactor Water Level Indications/Actuations. The inspectors reviewed the Operability Determination for CR 01-2706 and the associated Immediate Investigation. The inspectors attended a PORC committee meeting that was held on July 16, 2001 to review the conclusions of the CR 01-2706 Immediate Investigation. The inspectors also reviewed portions of the USAR as part of this inspection.

- R. R. A Pump Seal Leakage. The inspectors reviewed the Operability Determination for CR 01-2916 and related programmatic requirements contained in procedure PAP-1111, "Primary Coolant Leakage Reduction for Systems Outside Containment." Also reviewed by the inspectors were portions of the USAR associated with post-los of coolant accident leakage pathways from Engineered Safety Features outside Containment.

- Motor Feed Pump (MFP) Foreign Material. The inspectors reviewed the cause and immediate investigations conducted by the licensee for CRs 01-2181, 01-2779, and 01-2827. These condition reports documented unexpected material found in the N27 (Feedwater) system, later determined to originate from damage to the second stage diffuser vanes of the MFP and the internals of the MFP recirculation valve. The licensee's identification of missing parts, as well as efforts for their retrieval were reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of travel mechanisms, termination points for undiscovered fragments, and possible detriments of resident fragments and their impact on the operability of the Feedwater system and the impending reactor startup.

- Pipe Support Snubber 1E12H0255. The inspectors reviewed an Operability Determination for CR 01-3056 arising from the need for removal of portions of insulation on E12 (Residual Heat Removal) piping. Insulation removal was necessitated to perform maintenance on snubber 1E12H0255 to correct an earlier noted discrepancy, whereby the spherical bearing on the pipe end of the snubber was observed to be dislodged by 1/16". Included in the licensee's Operability Determination was a technical evaluation of the condition and a conclusion that the remaining bearing area for the dislodged spherical bearing was adequate for the design load.

- Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) "B" Heater Disconnect. The inspectors reviewed an Operability Determination for CR 01-3063 written to document observance of insulation overheating and charring on the "C" phase wire of the CRER "B" heater motor control center disconnect. The licensee's Operability Determination concluded that with the heater out of service, the "B" train of CRER would be unable to maintain Control Room relative humidity at less than 70% and was therefore inoperable. Work Order 01-13203 was initiated to effect the necessary repairs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the activities listed below for review. Completed work packages were reviewed and/or tests were observed to determine whether test requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed other documents, such as the USAR, Technical Specifications (TSs), and Maintenance Procedures to determine if the testing was sufficient to demonstrate that the systems and components were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

- WO# 01-12633 Main Steam Line “C” Radiation Monitor
- WO# 00-2855 Master Trip Unit - Suppression Pool Temperature - High
- WO# 01-12938 RCIC Steam Shutoff Valve (1E51F045)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the test data for the below listed surveillance tests to determine whether requirements were met, consistent with applicable sections of TSs, USAR, and Plant Procedures. The inspectors reviewed whether test control was properly coordinated with the control room and performed in the sequence specified in the surveillance instruction and if test equipment was properly calibrated and installed to support the surveillance tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports associated with surveillance testing to determine if the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program. The problem identification and resolution (PIR) condition reports reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

- SVI-D17-T8035, “ESW Rad Monitor Source Check for 1D17-K604 and 1D17-K605"
- SVI-E12-T2002, “R.R. B Pump and Valve Operability Test”
- SVI-E22-T1319, “Diesel Generator Start and Load, Division 3", Rev. 10
- SVI-C51-T0027F, “APRM F Channel Functional for 1C51-K605F”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector discussed with Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff the design, equipment, and periodic testing of the public ANS for the Perry reactor facility emergency planning zone to verify that the system was properly tested and maintained. The inspector also reviewed procedures and records for a six month period ending June 2001, related to ANS testing, annual preventive maintenance, and non-scheduled maintenance. The inspector reviewed the licensee's criteria for determining whether each model of siren installed in the emergency planning zone would perform as expected if fully activated. Records used to document and trend component failures for each model of installed siren were also reviewed to ensure that corrective actions were taken for test failures or system anomalies.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing (71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees ERO augmentation testing to verify that the licensee maintained and tested its ability to staff the ERO during an emergency in a timely manner. Specifically, the inspector reviewed semi-annual, off-hours staff augmentation drill procedures, related January through June 2001 drill records, primary and backup provisions for off-hours notification of the Perry reactor facility emergency responders, and the current ERO rosters for Perry. The inspector reviewed and discussed the facility EP staff's provisions for maintaining ERO call out lists.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed and discussed a sample of emergency preparedness corrective actions and condition reports related to the facility's emergency preparedness program in order to determine whether related corrective actions were acceptably completed as indicated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams and Power Changes Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the licensee's data for the performance indicator (PI) listed below. For the time periods indicated, the inspectors reviewed: (1) Operator Logs and Daily Plant Status Reports for information related to the indicator, and (2) Condition Reports related to system equipment issues. The inspectors also verified that the licensee's data met the guidance in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 0.

- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
- Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified that the licensee had accurately reported the following performance indicators: Alert Notification System (ANS), Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP), for the emergency preparedness cornerstone. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the licensee's PI records, data reported to the NRC, and condition reports for January through June 2001 to identify any occurrences that were not identified by the licensee. Records of relevant Control Room Simulator training sessions, periodic ANS tests, and excerpts of drill and exercise scenarios and evaluations were also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors responded to the site to observe operator actions and plant conditions following after an automatic scram from full power on the evening of July 11, 2001. The inspectors followed up on the event by interviewing operators and reviewing plant logs, chart recorders, sequence of event recorders, procedures, and other documents. The inspectors also walked down the control panels and discussed the timeline of the event with licensed operators.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-440/2001-001: Manual Scram due to Decreasing Main Condenser Vacuum and Invalid Division 2 and 3 ECCS Actuations. This LER describes an unplanned power reduction on April 28, 2001 which resulted in a loss of condenser vacuum and manual scram. This event is closed based on discussion in NRC Inspection Report 50-440/01-08 and the condition reports resulting from this event, which were reviewed in Inspection Report 50-440/01-10.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Annual Assessment Public Meeting

The NRC Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4 and the Senior Resident Inspector assigned to Perry met on July 11, 2001, with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) annual assessment of safety performance for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant during the period of April 2, 2000 - March 31, 2001. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's ROP assessment program, the results of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included FENOC site management and members of the plant staff. Members of the local news media as well as state and local officials were invited but did not attend.

The meeting was held in the Training Building at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant site and was open to the public. Information used for the discussion of the ROP is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML011980088. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

.2 Exit Meeting

The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Bob Schrauder, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 23, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

.3 Interim Exit Meetings Conducted

Senior Official at Exit:	B. Boles
Date:	August 16, 2001
Proprietary:	No
Subject:	Emergency Preparedness Program and Performance Indicators Inspection
Change to Inspection Findings:	None

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG 1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

If you deny this Non-Cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Perry facility.

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
NCV 50-440-01-10-01	Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.6 requires that the licensee verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channel overlap prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position. Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures/instructions shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, specifies hot standby to minimum load (nuclear startup) as an example of a general plant operating procedure. During the plant startup on July 29, 2001, operators failed to perform the TS required surveillance in that they failed to record the overlap data between the SRM and the IRM prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the core as required by procedure IOI-1, Cold Startup. The licensee entered this

occurrence into its corrective action program as Condition Report 01-2918.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

J. Wood, Vice President-Nuclear
B. Boles, Operations Manager
G. Dunn, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
D. Gudger, Supervisor, Compliance
T. Lentz, Manager, Design Engineering
K. Ostrowski, Director, Nuclear Services Department
D. Phillips, Manager, Plant Engineering
T. Rausch, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department
R. Schrauder, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department
R. Strohl, Superintendent, Plant Operations

Ohio Emergency Management Agency

E. Edwards, Radiation Analyst

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-440-01-10-01	NCV	Failure to perform a TS required surveillance.

Closed

50-440/2001-001-00	LER	Manual Scram due to Decreasing Main Condenser Vacuum and Invalid Division 2 and 3 ECCS Actuations
50-440-01-10-01	NCV	Failure to perform a TS required surveillance.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ANS	Alert and Notification System
APRM	Average Power Range Monitor
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
CRER	Control Room Emergency Recirculation
DEP	Drill and Exercise Performance
ECCS	Emergency Closed Cooling System
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EP	Emergency Preparedness
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
ESW	Emergency Service Water
FENOC	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
FME	Foreign Material Exclusion
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
HPCS	High Pressure Core Spray
IOI	Integrated Operating Instruction
IRM	Intermediate Range Monitor
LER	Licensee Event Report
MFP	Motor Feed Pump
MOV	Motor Operated Valve
MTU	Master Trip Unit
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI	Performance Indicator
PIR	Problem Identification and Resolution
PMT	Post Maintenance Test
PORC	Plant Operations Review Committee
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
R.R.	Residual Heat Removal
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SRM	Source Range Monitor
SVI	Surveillance Instruction
TS	Technical Specifications
URI	Unresolved Item
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignment

CR 01-0139	M25/26 Compensatory Actions Remain Open with No Work Planned	January 13, 2001
CR 01-0221	M25 B PMT Test Data Evaluation	January 19, 2001
CR 01-0247	M25 Inlet 'A' Train Modification	January 22, 2001
CR 01-2733	M25/26 Auto Initiated in Emergency Recirc Following Scram	July 12, 2001
CR 01-1567	Control Room Boundary Leakage Testing	March 30, 2001
CR 01-0723	Control Room HVAC Hydromotor Failed	February 20, 2001
CR 01-2609	Control Complex Chilled Water Pump A	July 1, 2001
VLI-M25/26	Perry Operations Manual Valve Lineup Instruction for Control Room HVAC & Recirculation System, Rev 6	October 14, 1993
SOI-M25/26	Perry Operations Manual System Operating Instruction for Control Room HVAC & Recirculation System	April 24, 1992
SDM M25/26	Control Room HVAC & Recirculation System	December 9, 1997

1R05 Fire Protection

FDU-1075-081601	Fire Drill Planning Guide	August 16, 2001

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

CR 01-0014	Improper Thread Engagement	January 2, 2001
CR 01-0246	R.R. support (snubber)	January 23, 2001
CR 01-0265	R.R. Snubber & Piping Problems	January 25, 2001
CR 01-0799	Several Fasteners have Obvious Inadequate Thread Engagement	February 24, 2001
CR 01-1249	Walkdown of R.R. "B" Room	March 2, 2001

CR 01-1292	While Performing MOV Testing Evaluate Thrust Values for 1G33F0001	March 17, 2001
CR 01-1381	SVI Issues from Refuel	March 13, 2001
CR 01-1414	ESW System Safety & Other Various Relief Valves (ASME CL 2 & 3)	March 12, 2001
CR 01-1492	During Performance of SVI Valve Exceeded Allowable Limit	March 14, 2001
CR 01-1588	Maintenance Rule Eval Required on Temperature Module	March 21, 2001
CR 01-1812	Safety Related/Seismically supported Rigid Conduit	April 6, 2001
CR 01-1821	Work Order 01-7665 Div 3 ESW	April 11, 2001
CR 01-1879	Valve Removed from P47F574C Fails As-Found Set Pressure Testing	April 18, 2001
CR 01-2625	Demands on System May Not Be Accurate Therefore Unreliability Would Increase	July 11, 2001
CR 01-2649	Maintenance Rule Monitoring Evaluation is Required for Failure	July 14, 2001
CR 01-2779	Repeated Motor Feed Pump Recirc Valve & Air Operated Valve Problems Should Have Prompted Inspections & Testing	July 17, 2001
CR 01-2994	Relief Valve Removed from OP47F574B Fails As-Found Pressure Testing	August 2, 2001
SVI-E12-T2023	R.R. B&C Waterleg Check Valve Operabilty Test, Rev 2	April 4, 2001
	Maintenance Rule Failure & Condition Monitoring Report No. 01-1381	April 5, 2001
	Maintenance Rule Failure & Condition Monitoring Report No. 01-2649	July 26, 2001
WO 01-007665	Div 3 ESW P-45 Repair Card SVI P45-70375	April 2001

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

ONI-C71-1	Reactor Scram	May 21, 2001
SOI-B33	Reactor Recirculation System	March 19, 2001

1R15 Operability Evaluations

CR 01-2181	FME, Metal Chunk that is not Part of the Valve was Removed from 1N27F0170
CR 01-2706	Inadvertent Division 3 Initiation Signal
CR 01-2779	1N27F0170 Failed to Stroke Properly
CR 01-2827	Damaged 2nd Stage Diffuser Vanes - N27 Motor Feed Pump
CR 01-2916	R.R. A Pump Seal Leakage
CR 01-3056	Request for Assistance - Insulation Removal 1E12 Piping
CR 01-3063	EF1C09-H, CR Emergency Recirculation B Heater Disconnect Insulation Found Charred
CR 01-3076	TS 3.3.6.1 Required Actions not Completed within Required Time

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

WO# 01-12633	Main Steam Line "C" Radiation Monitor
WO# 00-2855	MTU: Suppression Pool Temperature - High
WO# 01-12938	RCIC Steam Shutoff Valve (1E51F045)

1R22 Surveillance Testing

SVI-E22-T1319	Diesel Generator Start and Load, Division 3	December 14, 2000
SVI-D17-T8035	ESW Rad Monitor Source Check for 1D17-K604 and 1D17-K605	December 17, 1993
SVI-E12-T2002	R.R. B Pump and Valve Operability Test	February 2, 2001
SVI-C51-T0027F	APRM F Channel Functional for 1C51-K605F	February 1, 1995

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing

Prompt Alert Siren System Activation History	
Prompt Alert Siren System Maintenance Report	Jan. - June, 2001
Perry Plant Siren Test Checklist	Jan. - June, 2001

	NRC Performance Indicator Desktop Guideline: Alert & Notification System Reliability	Jan. - June, 2001
CR 01-1864	Prompt Alert Siren System Audible Test Failures	April 16, 2001

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing

	Dialogics Quarterly Tests - March 31 & June 29, 2001	
	Communicator Perry Nuclear Call Response Report	June 29, 2001
CR 01-2676	EP Pagers Did Not Activate for Weekly Pager Test	July 9, 2001
CR 01-2707	Forced Outage Pagers Were Not Correct	July 12, 2001

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

CR 01-0434	Required Reading List, TMP-2303, Includes Deleted Instructions	February 6, 2001
CR 01-0904	Reportability Guidance In EPI-B4	February 26, 2001
CR 01-2539	Loss Of NRC ENS	June 25, 2001
CR 01-2547	Loss of NRC ENS Phone Line	June 25, 2001
CR 01-2722	Offsite Phone Line Interruption	July 12, 2001

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

	Emergency Response Telephone Directory	
	2001 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Organization Training Drills May 1, 8, 15	
	Common Performance Indicators For Perry Nuclear Power Plant and Records	Jan. - June, 2001
	NRC Performance Indicator Desktop Guideline: Drill and Exercise Performance Records	Jan - June, 2001
	NRC Performance Indicator Desktop Guideline: Emergency Response Organization Participation Records	Jan. - June, 2001

	NRC Performance Indicator Desktop Guideline: Alert and Notification System Reliability Records	Jan. - June, 2001
CR 01-0426	EP Performance Indicator For Drill and Exercise Participation	February 5, 2001
CR 01-2363	Reduction In Qualified ERO Positions	June 4, 2001
CR 01-2392	Initial Notification Form Completed Incorrectly	June 6, 2001
CR 00-3851	Simulator Event Misclassified	December 8, 2001
CR 01-2860	CADAP Program Faulty Logic In Auto Mode	July 24, 2001
CR 01-2882	Errors Made While Completing EP Initial Notification Form	February 5, 2001
CR 01-3012	Forced Outages Caused Drills to Be Rescheduled Resulting in Some ERO Members Out of Qual	August 7, 2001
CR 00-3018	Untimely Initial Notification to State & Local Agencies	August 8, 2000

4OA3 Event Response

ONI-C71-1	Reactor Scram
	Annunciator Response Procedures
CR 01-2706	Invalid ECCS Actuations
PEI-B13	Reactor Water Level Control