April 26, 2002

Mr. John T. Conway
Site Vice President
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-220/02-02, 50-410/02-02

Dear Mr. Conway:

On March 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 12, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment. With the issuance of the Order, we will evaluate NMPNS's compliance with these interim requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document management system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-220
50-410
License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-220/02-02, 50-410/02-02

Attachment 1 - Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: M. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation Group
R. L. Wenderlich, Senior Constellation Nuclear Officer
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M. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn
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Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-220, 50-410

License Nos: DPR-63, NPF-69

Report No: 50-220/02-02, 50-410/02-02

Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2

Location: P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Dates: February 17, 2002 - March 30, 2002

Inspectors: G. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Fuller, Resident Inspector
L. Cline, Resident Inspector
A. Lohmeier, Reactor Inspector
J. Noggle, Senior Health Physicist
C. Sisco, Operations Engineer

Approved by: Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Summary of Findings

IR 05000220-02-02, IR 05000410-02-02, on 2/17-4/6/2002; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2. Resident Inspector Report

This inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and three region-based inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. The violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS

Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (Unit 1) began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained there through the end of the inspection period.

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (Unit 2) began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On March 15, 2002, Unit 2 was shutdown for a refueling outage and remained there through the end of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector selected the Unit 2 alternate decay heat removal system to walkdown when the system was placed in service. The walkdown included a system lineup verification and a comparison of decay heat load with system capacity.

The inspector selected the Unit 2 division II emergency diesel generator (EDG) system to walkdown, when the division I EDG failed to operate properly following maintenance. The walkdown included a control room switch line-up verification, an EDG system walk down and the review of open work orders.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 main condenser off-gas system and stack effluent monitoring system. The inspector reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report description for each system, fourth quarter 2001 system health reports, and the maintenance rule classifications. Open work orders and deviation/event reports (DERs) were reviewed to assess the material condition of these systems. The inspector verified proper valve position, component alignment, and system material condition using system drawings and operating procedures. Additional documentation reviewed included:

- NMPC Letter to NRC dated September 28, 2001, Request to Change Equipment Used for Implementation of TMI Action Plan Items II.F.1(1) and II.F.1(2).

- Temporary Modification 00-021, Restore the post accident stack gas effluent monitoring capability of the radioactive gaseous monitoring system.
- N1-SD-023, System Description for Main Condenser Air Removal and Off-gas System.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of selected fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The condition of fire detection devices, the readiness of the sprinkler fire suppression systems and the fire doors were also inspected against industry standards. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. Additional emphasis was placed on outage activities conducted in Unit 2. The following plant areas were inspected:

- Unit 1 Reactor building, all fire areas.
- Unit 1 Turbine building, all fire areas.
- Unit 2 Turbine building including condenser bays and turbine deck inside shield wall.
- Unit 2 Reactor building including refuel floor.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 In-Service Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed and/or reviewed results of selected Unit 2 in-service inspection (ISI) program activities for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary risk-significant structures, systems, and components, including piping system boundaries, and reactor vessel internals. The inspector verified that the licensee met requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI - Nuclear Components.

The inspector selected several nondestructive examinations (NDE) of safety system components on which to base the licensee's ISI program performance. These included inspection samples of RCS weld repairs by different techniques, including volumetric

examination weld repairs using ultrasonic testing (UT), surface examination of weld surfaces using magnetic testing (MT), radiographic test (RT) examination of pipe, and internal vessel visual examination (IVVI) of core spray piping. The inspector reviewed the DER procedure (including the corrective action process) related to issues arising from the ISI program including the corrective action process.

The inspector reviewed the licensee commitment to regularly re-examine the status of a planar indication due to a fabrication fault found during the first refueling outage (RFO) in the safe-end extension to safe-end A182 weld material in the high pressure core spray system nozzle 2RPV-KC32 (N-16). At that time, the licensee applied a mechanical stress improvement process (MSIP) to improve the residual stress distribution in the flaw region with a compressive stress field to eliminate flaw growth. Subsequent examinations of the flaw following RFO1 indicated no further growth of the flaw and the licensee opted to continue operation with the MSIP treated weld with a regular schedule of UT inspection until extension of the flaw was observed. The inspector reviewed analytic justification of the MSIP, and the results of licensee UT examinations of the weld through RFO 8, including UT examination summary sheets of General Electric, Westdyne, and Niagara Mohawk together with a compilation of the UT measurements of flaw size over this period in satisfaction of the commitment of the licensee to monitor the flaw size.

The inspector reviewed DER 2-2000-1224, finding of a planar indication during RFO6 on a reactor pressure vessel feed-water nozzle to safe-end weld 2RPV-KB20. The inspector reviewed the licensee acceptance of this weld in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1989 Edition, Table IWB-3514-2, and considering further evaluation under IWB-3600 to demonstrate its acceptability for continued service. The inspector reviewed the results of subsequent inspection of this weld indication during RFO 7, which revealed that the crack growth during the interim between RFO 6 and RFO 7 warranted repair using the overlay weld process in accordance with ASME Section XI, NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, Code Case N-504-1, and Generic Letter 88-01. The inspector reviewed results of the UT examination of the overlay weld repair 2RPV-KB20-OL, detailed in examination summary sheet NMP Unit 2 - RFO7 of the GE “Automated with Smart 2000“ UT System. The inspector reviewed results of overlay welding tests on two mockups to justify acceptability of small welding flaws found in the overlay weld with UT and MT.

The inspector reviewed the scope of the IVVI performed during the inspection week. This inspection, implemented remotely with video tape recording, included upper elbow pipe welds, and core spray header bracket and vessel attachment welds. The inspector specifically observed remote video tapes of the inspections of the upper elbow to downcomer weld P4b and the horizontal pipe to upper elbow weld P4a.

The inspector examined the radiographic film of Class 1 and Class 2 feed-water pipe gas tungsten and submerged arc welds (GTAW/SMAW) FW047, FW019, FW029, and FWO29 repaired, including the RT examination reports for each. In reviewing the radiographs, the inspector confirmed the characterization and location of each indication, and the reason for rejection on the basis of ASME Section XI acceptance standards.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification training activities to assess the licensee's training program effectiveness. The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on February 28. The inspectors reviewed performance in the areas of procedure use, self and peer-checking, completion of critical tasks, and training performance objectives. Following the simulator exercise, the inspectors observed the crew debrief and critique and reviewed simulator fidelity through a sampling process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper maintenance rule scoping, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and, (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's system scoping documents and system health reports.

The inspectors reviewed the following licensee Maintenance Rule records:

Unit 1 Containment spray system unavailability for 2001.
Unit 1 EDG 102/103 system unavailability for 2001.

The following DERs were reviewed:

- DER 2002-866, Control rod 30-07 full-in position indication (Unit 1).
- DER 2002-903, Plugged drain line on liquid poison tank (Unit 1).
- DER 2002-1511, 13 Reactor feedwater pump flow detector (FT-29-113A)(Unit 1)
  .

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

For selected maintenance work orders (WOs), the inspectors evaluated: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before the maintenance activities were conducted; (2) risk management control activities; (3) the necessary steps taken to plan and control resultant emergent work tasks; and, (4) the overall adequacy of identification and resolution of emergent work and the associated maintenance risk assessments. The following WOs were reviewed:

- WO 02-01806-02, Durability monitor steam leak repair (Unit 1).
- WO 01-07955-00, Restoration of MG 167 and shift to mechanical pressure regulator (Unit 1).
- WO02-02673, 2EGS*EG3, EDG field failed to flash (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems, to assess: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluation; (2) whether continued system operability evaluations were warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded systems adversely impacted the affected system or compensatory measures; (4) where compensatory measures were used, whether the measures were appropriate and properly controlled; and, (5) the degraded systems impact on TS limiting condition for operations. The following licensee documents were reviewed:

- DER 2002-921, Secondary containment nitrogen leakage (Unit 1).
- DER 2002-1416, Screw from camera used for IVVI was lost in the reactor vessel (Unit 2).
- DER 2002-1695, Sludge and debris in the suppression pool (Unit 2).
- DER 2002-1041, Service water pump P1C discharge valve, 2SWP*MOV74C incorrect key length (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness, consistent with the design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following tests and activities were reviewed:

- N1-ST-Q1A Core Spray 111 (Unit 1).
- 00-16180, EDG division I six year preventive maintenance (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following activities related to the Unit 2 refueling outage for conformance to the applicable procedure and witnessed selected activities associated with each evolution. Surveillance tests were reviewed to verify TS were satisfied. Inspections were focused on reactor decay heat removal, spent fuel pool decay heat removal, inventory control, power availability, reactivity control and secondary containment. The inspectors reviewed the outage plan and outage risk mitigation strategies and evaluations. Portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes were observed. The following outage activities were observed:

- Shutdown cooling system operation.
- Refueling operations.
- Outage related surveillance tests.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk significant structures, systems and components (SSCs) to assess whether the SSCs satisfied Technical Specifications (TS), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and licensee procedure requirements; and to determine if the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were witnessed:

- N1-PM-W7, Mechanical pressure regulator testing (Unit 1).
- N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray 111 (Unit 1).
- N1-ST-M1A, 11 Liquid Poison (Unit 1).
- N1-ST-C1, Alternate Boron Injection (Unit 1).
- N2-OSP-EGS-R004, Division I Loss of Offsite Power/ Loss of Coolant Accident Test (Unit 2).
- N2-OSP-M@001, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Division I (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed temporary modification No. 2000-016 for the radioactive gaseous monitoring system (RAGEMS). The purpose of the temporary modification was to modify RAGEMS by removing several automatic capabilities to allow limited manual operation for post-accident monitoring. The temporary modification changed the status of RAGEMS from inoperable to available. The inspector verified that the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was adequate, that the installation was consistent with the temporary modification documentation, and that the post-modification functional testing was acceptable.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the access control program (as required under Plant Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 20.1601) by examining the controls established for exposure significant areas, including postings, barricades, radiological briefings to workers, radiation protection technician job coverage, and locking controls of access to radiologically significant areas. In-plant areas and activities reviewed included: reactor vessel N6A nozzle insulation replacement, under vessel seal can flushing, suppression pool diving, control rod drive replacement demobilization, safety relief valve replacement, feedwater flow control valve modifications, drywell access to various locked high radiation areas, and refueling floor hot particle monitoring controls. In addition, the following deviation event reports, associated with radiation protection controls during the refueling outage, were reviewed: 2002-1335, 2002-1082, 2002-1089, 2002-1167, 2002-1197, 2002-1282, 2002-1364, 2002-1386, 2002-1387, 2002-1405, 2002-1438, 2002-1454, 2002-1507, 2002-1512.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed licensee ALARA performance in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b). This review included an evaluation of ALARA planning and controls for the 5 highest exposure outage tasks: drywell in-service inspection, drywell under vessel activities, refueling floor activities, safety relief valve replacements, and feedwater flow control valve modifications. These reviews included independent radiation surveys of the drywell that were used to verify licensee surveys; and independent temporary shielding evaluations of the drywell that were performed to verify the ALARA shielding plan and its effectiveness in reducing work area dose rates. In addition, radioactive piping source term measurements were reviewed with respect to industry values and with respect to temporary drywell shielding results.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Conway, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 12, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations:

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-cited Violation (NCV).

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
05000410/2002-002-01	The licensee did not properly provide audible alarming dosimetry for a control rod drive replacement high radiation area entry as required by TS 6.12.1. Headsets prevented workers from hearing alarming electronic dosimeters.

If you deny this NCV, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC.

ATTACHMENT 1

a. Key Points of Contact

Licensee

D. Barcomb, Unit 2 RP Manager
J. Conway, Site Vice President
R. Dean, Manager Unit 2 Engineering
L. Hopkins, Unit 1 Plant General Manager
S. Minihan, Unit 2 Operations Manager
B. Montgomery, General Manager Nuclear Engineering
M. Peckham, Unit 2 Plant General Manager
B. Randall, Manager Unit 1Engineering
C. Terry, General Manager, Quality Assurance
D. Topley, Unit 1 Operations Manager
D. Wolniak, Licensing Manager

b. List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed

Opened and Closed

50-410/2002-002-01	NCV	Headsets prevented workers from hearing alarming electronic dosimeters.

c. List of Documents Reviewed

2135-410-001-01	SMC O'Donnell, Inc., Analytical Verification of Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) for the N-16 10 inch Core Spray (CS) Nozzle
2-G9M12-02-02	MNP2 Re-circulation System 2RP-KC32(N-16), Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld Examination Summary Sheet and Automated Analysis Sheet with attachments
NCR 2-90-0064	Niagara Mohawk Non-Conformance Report Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, Disposition of UT indication > IWM-3514-2 with attachments including technical justification, root cause, future examination requirements evaluation ½/91
QA92-U2-174	Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point Unit Two, 2RPV-kc32 UT Examination, 4/7/92
EPRI Letter	UT Records Summary 4/9/92
R-025	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 10/28/90
R-033	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 12/10/90 with attachments
2-208-92-0001	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 4/2/92

JPC9214	GE Nuclear Energy, UT Examination of the Nine Mile Point Unit II Weld No. 2RPV-KC32, 4/9/92
93-001	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 10/6/93
R-010	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 5/4/95
RA-002	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet, Core Spray Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld KC 32, 6/4/98
NMP2 Summary	KC-32 Inspection Results - RFO1 through RFO8 (preliminary)
NMP2L 1395	High Pressure Core Spray Nozzle Safe-End Extension Weld
EPRI Summary	Review of 2RPV-KB20 (N4D) Weld Overlay Repair
DC N23-98-009	NMPC ASME Section XI Repair Plan
146	GE Nuclear Energy Examination Summary Sheet NMP2-RF07 SE - Safe End to Nozzle N 4DOverlay Repair - FW Nozzle 2RPV-KB20-OL with attachments
2M11677A	Niagra Mohawk Design Document Change Weld Overlay of Feedwater Nozzle to Safe End Weld -2RPV-KB20 RFO6
WO 01-00040-00	Constellation NMP Preliminary Report
Diagram	NMP2 Core Spray Piping System - General Layout
2-5.00-02-0011	Constellation RHS Class 2 Pipe SMAW/GTAW FW019 NDE Reports Unrepaired and Repaired
2-5.00-02-0020	Constellation RHS Class 1 Pipe SMAW/GTAW FW017 NDE Report
2-5.00-02-0016	Constellation RHS Class 2 Pipe SMAW/GTAW FW029-R1 NDE Report
ISI 66-42	ISI Weld and Pipe Support Identification Drawing
ISI 09-14	ISI Weld and Pipe Support Identification Drawing
12177-EP-71E-12	Residual Heat Removal Piping
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1989 Edition	
NIP-ECA-01Rev.24	Deviation/Event Report

d. List of Acronyms

ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ASME	American Society Mechanical Engineers
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DBT	Design Basis Threat
DER	Deficiency/Event Report
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
GTAW	Gas Tungsten Arc Weld
ISI	In-Service Inspection
IVVI	Internal Vessel Visual Inspection
MSIP	Mechanical Stress Improvement Process
MT	Magnetic Testing
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NDE	Nondestructive Examination
NMP2	Nine Mile Point Unit 2
NMPNS	Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station

NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
QA	Quality Assurance
RAGEMS	Radioactive Gaseous Monitoring System
RFO	Refuel Outage
RT	Radiographic Test
SMAW	Submerged Arc Weld
SSC	Structures, Systems and Components
TS	Technical Specifications
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unit 1	Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Unit 2	Nine Mile Point Unit 2
UT	Ultrasonic Testing
WO	Work Order